A. Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic

2/4/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 704
G.R. No. 179987. September 3, 2013.*
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally

A. Malabanan), petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Civil Law; Property; Public Dominion; Private Ownership;

Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either
of public dominion or of private ownership.—Land, which is an
immovable property, may be classified as either of public
dominion or of private ownership. Land is considered of public
dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs
to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or
although of such character but no longer intended for public use
or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the
State. Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of
the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Same; Same; Same; Regalian Doctrine; Pursuant to the
Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced
into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the
Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State.—Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura
Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the
West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. This
means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. All lands not appearing to be clearly under private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands
remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless
the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to
private persons.
Same; Same; Same; Agricultural Lands; The 1987
Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935
Constitution into agricul-
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* EN BANC.
562
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines
tural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks;

Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only
agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other
natural resources may not be.—Whether or not land of the public
domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under
the 1935 Constitution, lands of the public domain were classified
into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. Section 10,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public
domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest,
and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide
other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the
classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest
or timber, and mineral, but added national parks. Agricultural
lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to
which they may be devoted. The identification of lands according
to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a
positive act of the Executive Department. Based on the foregoing,
the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may
be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be
alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Same; Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Agricultural
Lands; Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the
Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain,
or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the
limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.—Alienable
and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit:
(a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of
private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without
limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands
as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the
lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as
forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of
alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as
agricultural. A positive act of the Government is necessary to
enable such reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to

classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the
Executive Department, not in the courts. If, however, public land
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VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 563
will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral

or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth,
thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public
dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the
form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law to that effect. Thus, until the Executive Department exercises
its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or
the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to
be used for public service or for the development of national
wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 11 of the Public Land Act
(CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can
be disposed of.—Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141)
provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to
wit: Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes
can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise: (1)
For homestead settlement; (2) By sale; (3) By lease; and (4) By
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles; (a) By judicial
legalization; or (b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Absent proof that the land is
already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the
Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that
the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act.—Taking into consideration that the
Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify
lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
presupposes that the land subject of the application for
registration must have been already classified as agricultural
land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine
applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable
and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land

Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the
classifica-
564
tion required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is

classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Alienable public land held by a
possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed
statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse
or completion of the period.—An examination of Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no
requirement that the land subject of the registration should have
been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As
such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only
from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
This means that the character of the property subject of the
application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not
the ownership or title over it. Alienable public land held by a
possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-
interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the
mere lapse or completion of the period. In fact, by virtue of this
doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public
domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private
ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the
requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.
It is for this reason that the property subject of the application of
Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of
the requisite period of possession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rules Relative to the Disposition of
Public Land or Lands of the Public Domain.—We now observe the
following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of
the public domain, namely: (1) As a general rule and pursuant to
the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under
private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated or disposed; (2) The following are
excepted from the general rule, to wit: (a) Agricultural lands of
the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through

any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the
Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under Section 48(b) of
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VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 565
the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the

application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable
as of the time of the application, provided the applicant’s
possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12,
1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the
applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant arises, and the applicant becomes the owner of
the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal
fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public
domain and has become private property. (b) Lands of the public
domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended
for public use or for the development of national wealth are
removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered
converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership
that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of
acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary,
proof that the land has been already converted to private
ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is
a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113,
Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription.
BRION, J., Separate Opinion:
Civil Law; Property; Public Land Act; View that Section 7 of
the Public Land Act delegates to the President the authority to
administer and dispose of alienable public lands.—Section 7 of
the PLA delegates to the President the authority to administer
and dispose of alienable public lands. Section 8 sets out the
public lands open to disposition or concession, and the
requirement that they should be officially delimited and classified
and, when practicable, surveyed. Section 11, a very significant
provision, states that — Section 11. Public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not
otherwise: (1) For homestead settlement (2) By sale (3) By lease
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title: (a) By
judicial legalization (b) By administrative legalization (free
patent).
Same; Same; Public Lands; View that the Constitution

classifies public lands into agricultural, mineral, timber lands
and national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands can be
alienated.—The Constitution classifies public lands into
agricultural, mineral, timber
566
lands and national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands can be

alienated. Without the requisite classification, there can be no
basis to determine which lands of the public domain are alienable
and which are not. Hence, classification is a constitutionally-
required step whose importance should be given full legal
recognition and effect. Otherwise stated, without
classification into disposable agricultural land, the land
continues to form part of the mass of the public domain
that, not being agricultural, must be mineral, timber land or
national parks that are completely inalienable and, as such,
cannot be possessed with legal effects. To recognize possession
prior to any classification is to do violence to the Regalian
Doctrine; the ownership and control that the Regalian Doctrine
embodies will be less than full if the possession — that should be
with the State as owner, but is also elsewhere without any solid
legal basis — can anyway be recognized.
Same; Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; View that no
imperfect title can be confirmed over lands not yet classified as
disposable or alienable because, in the absence of such
classification, the land remains unclassified public land that fully
belongs to the State.—No imperfect title can be confirmed over
lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable because, in the
absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified
public land that fully belongs to the State. This is fully
supported by Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the PLA. If the land is
either mineral, timber or national parks that cannot be alienated,
it defies legal logic to recognize that possession of these
unclassified lands can produce legal effects.
Same; Same; Forest Lands; Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No.
705); View that P.D. No. 705 confirms that all lands of the public
domain that remain unclassified are considered as forest land. As
forest land, these lands of the public domain cannot be alienated
until they have been reclassified as agricultural lands.—
Parenthetically, PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code states
that “Those [lands of public domain] still to be classified
under the present system shall continue to remain as part

of the public forest.” It further declares that public forest covers
“the mass of lands of the public domain which has not been
the subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest purposes and
which are not.” Thus, PD No. 705 confirms that all lands of the
public domain
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VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 567
that remain unclassified are considered as forest land. As forest

land, these lands of the public domain cannot be alienated until
they have been reclassified as agricultural lands. For purposes of
the present case, these terms confirm the position that
re/classification is essential at the time possession is acquired
under Section 48(b) of the PLA.
Same; Same; Regalian Doctrine; View that the Regalian
Doctrine was incorporated in all the Constitutions of the
Philippines (1935, 1973 and 1987) and the statutes governing
private individuals’ land acquisition and registration.—The
Regalian Doctrine was incorporated in all the Constitutions of the
Philippines (1935, 1973 and 1987) and the statutes governing
private individuals’ land acquisition and registration. In his
Separate Opinion in Cruz v. Sec. of Environment and Natural
Resources, 347 SCRA 128 (2000), former Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno made a brief yet informative historical discussion on how
the Regalian Doctrine was incorporated in our legal system,
especially in all our past and present organic laws. His historical
disquisition was quoted in La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association,
Inc. v. Sec. Ramos, 421 SCRA 148 (2004), and the consolidated
cases of The Secretary of the DENR et al. v. Yap and Sacay et al.
v. The Secretary of the DENR, 568 SCRA 164 (2008), which were
also quoted in Justice Lucas P. Bersamin’s Separate Opinion in
his very brief discussion on how the doctrine was carried over
from our Spanish and American colonization up until our present
legal system.
Same; Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Possession;
View that prior to the declaration of alienability, a land of the
public domain cannot be appropriated; hence, any claimed
possession cannot have legal effects.—Possession is essentially a
civil law term that can best be understood in terms of the Civil
Code in the absence of any specific definition in the PLA, other
than in terms of time of possession. Article 530 of the Civil Code
provides that “[o]nly things and rights which are susceptible of

being appropriated may be the object of possession.” Prior to the
declaration of alienability, a land of the public domain cannot be
appropriated; hence, any claimed possession cannot have legal
effects. In fact, whether an application for registration is filed
before or after the declaration of alienability becomes immaterial
if, in one as in the other, no effective possession can be recognized
prior to and within the proper period for the declaration of
alienability.
568
Separation of Powers; Statutes; View that if the Supreme

Court believes that a law already has absurd effects because of the
passage of time, its role under the principle of separation of powers
is not to give the law an interpretation that is not there in order to
avoid the perceived absurdity.—If the Court believes that a law
already has absurd effects because of the passage of time, its role
under the principle of separation of powers is not to give the law
an interpretation that is not there in order to avoid the perceived
absurdity. If the Court does, it thereby intrudes into the realm of
policy — a role delegated by the Constitution to the Legislature. If
only for this reason, the Court should avoid expanding — through
the present ponencia and its cited cases — the plain meaning of
Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by PD No. 1073.
Same; Supreme Court; View that the Supreme Court should
be very careful in delineating the line between the constitutionally-
allowed interpretation and the prohibited judicial legislation,
given the powers that the 1987 Constitution has entrusted to this
Court.—In the Philippines, a civil law country where the
Constitution is very clear on the separation of powers and the
assignment of constitutional duties, I believe that this Court
should be very careful in delineating the line between the
constitutionally-allowed interpretation and the prohibited
judicial legislation, given the powers that the 1987 Constitution
has entrusted to this Court. As a Court, we are given more powers
than the U.S. Supreme Court; under Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, we are supposed to act, as a matter of duty,
on any grave abuse of discretion that occurs anywhere in
government. While broad, this power should nevertheless be
exercised with due respect for the separation of powers doctrine
that underlies our Constitution.
Civil Law; Land Registration; View that the act of registration

merely confirms that title already exists in favor of the applicant.
—The act of registration merely confirms that title already exists
in favor of the applicant. To require classification of the property
only on application for registration point would imply that during
the process of acquisition of title (specifically, during the period of
possession prior to the application for registration), the property
might not have been alienable for being unclassified land (or a
forest land under PD No. 705) of the public domain. This claim
totally contra-
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VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 569
venes the constitutional rule that only agricultural lands of the

public domain may be alienated.
LEONEN, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Civil Law; Property; Regalian Doctrine; View that our present
Constitution does not contain the term, “regalian doctrine.”—I do
not agree that all lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State or that lands
remain part of the public domain if the State does not reclassify or
alienate it to a private person. These presumptions are
expressions of the Regalian Doctrine. Our present Constitution
does not contain the term, “regalian doctrine.” What we have is
Article XII, Section 2, which provides: Section 2. All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated x x x.
Same; Same; View that there could be land, considered as
property, where ownership has vested as a result of either
possession or prescription, but still, as yet, undocumented.—
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides: Section 1. No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of
the laws. This section protects all types of property. It does not
limit its provisions to property that is already covered by a form of
paper title. Verily, there could be land, considered as property,
where ownership has vested as a result of either possession or
prescription, but still, as yet, undocumented. The original
majority’s opinion in this case presents some examples.
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
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RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for
reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision
promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the
ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application
of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground
that they had not established by sufficient evidence their
right to the registration in accordance with either Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is
a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite,
more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D,
with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20,
1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for
land registration covering the property in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that
the property formed part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and
occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby
entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented
during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the
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1 Rollo, pp. 16-17.
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VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 571

Department of Environment and Natural Resources

(DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot

No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr.
Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite
containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and
described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification
Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered

judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land
registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this

application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise
known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in
Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area
of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four
(71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO
MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and
with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the

judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
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2 Id., at pp. 37-38.
3 Id., at p. 87.
572

prove that the property belonged to the alienable and

disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required
by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision
reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v.
Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should
be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification
stated that the property had been declared alienable and
disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession
prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of
computing Malabanan’s period of possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the
appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of
February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for
review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains
the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved
is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as
alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning
of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public
Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property
Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in
Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land
subject of the application for registration as alienable and
disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land
registration proceedings therein were in fact
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4 G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183.
5 G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 442.
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VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 573

found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of

the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that the
property had been ipso jure converted into private property
by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable
land of the public domain for more than 30 years.
According to them, what was essential was that the
property had been “converted” into private property
through prescription at the time of the application without
regard to whether the property sought to be registered was
previously classified as agricultural land of the public
domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on
certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by
sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the
property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in
interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners
submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable
or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into
patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in
Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the
reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable
opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code;
that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his
predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the
land with the right to validly transmit
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6 G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477.
7 G.R. No. 135527, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 716.
8 G.R. No. 134308, December 14, 2000, 348 SCRA 128.
9 Supra note 6.
574

title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-

year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in
relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan

filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998,
he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16
years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was
declared alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order
to obtain a clarification with reference to the application of
the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that
the decision has enlarged, by implication, the
interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view
that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the
land subject of the application had been declared alienable
and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be
imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in
relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of
the Philippines.
Classifications of land according
to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be
classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.11 Land is
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10 Article 415(1), Civil Code.
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VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 575

considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for

public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for
public use, and is intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging
to the State that is not of such character, or although of
such character but no longer intended for public use or for
public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the
State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial
property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is
of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a

legal concept first introduced into the country from the
West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the
Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to
the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.16 All lands not appearing
to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is
shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private
persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
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11 Article 419, Civil Code.
14 Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No.
135385, December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 128, 165.
15 Section 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
16 Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-71285, November 5,
1987, 155 SCRA 412, 419.
17 Republic v. Lao, G.R. No. 150413, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 291, 298.
576

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable

and disposable primarily rests on the classification of
public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified
into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19
Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified
lands of the public domain into seven, specifically,
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land,
with the reservation that the law might provide other
classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the
classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural,
forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20
Agricultural lands may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted.21 The
identification of
_______________
18 1935 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
19 Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phil. 461, 468 (1947).
20 Section 3 of Article XII, 1987 Constitution states:
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of
the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses
which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not
hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period
not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the
Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not
more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and
development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the
Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain
which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions
therefore.
21 Id.
577
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 577

lands according to their legal classification is done

exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive
Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit
on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only
agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated;
all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or
those classified as lands of private ownership under Article
425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of
the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must
only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as
forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not
susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are
reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the
Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25
and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under
existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in
the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as
neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national

park, or when public land is no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth,
thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of
public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be
made in
_______________
22 See Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed., pp. 1188-1189.
23 Article 425. Property of private ownership, besides the
patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities,
consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or
collectively. (345a)
24 Director of Forestry v. Villareal, G.R. No. 32266, February 27, 1989,
170 SCRA 598, 608-609.
25 Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, No. L-27873,
November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69, 75.
26 Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, No. L-58867, June 22, 1984,
129 SCRA 689, 692.
578

the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a

Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify
or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President
declares that the State no longer intends the land to be
used for public service or for the development of national
wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides
the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to
wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can

be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper

interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession
by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, viz.:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the

Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
_______________
27 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127060, November 19, 2002, 392
SCRA 190, 201.
579
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 579

claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but

whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of
the applications for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold
emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the
words “lands of the public domain” or “alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain” to clearly signify
that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or
timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or
private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public
Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The
use of the descriptive phrase “alienable and disposable”
further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the
agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in
mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the

applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order
for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
_______________
28 Section 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registra-
580

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest,

has been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the
application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June
12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land
of the public domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive
Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of
the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in
relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application
for registration must have been already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain in order for the
provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is
already classified as agricultural land of the public domain,
the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the
presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as
laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However,
emphasis is placed on the requirement that the
classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as
agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or
reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
agricultural land
_______________
tion of title to land, whether personally or through their duly

authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
581
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 581

should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or

earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such
classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It
observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be
minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation
or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the
full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the
reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation
was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of
which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers.
Except that said date qualified the period of possession and
occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be
associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945.
Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and
literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no
requirement that the land subject of the registration should
have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete
title is derived only from possession and occupation since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of
the property subject of the application as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain
determines its eligibility for land registration, not the
ownership or title over it. Alienable public land held by a
possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-
interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted to private property
by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by
virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire
_______________
29 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-73002,

December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 509, 518. See also the dissenting opinion of
Justice Teehankee in Manila Electric Company v. Judge Castro-
Bartolome, No. L-49623, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 799, 813.
582

lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were

already converted to private ownership, by operation of
law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for
this reason that the property subject of the application of
Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the
entire duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should
have been classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land at the time of the application for
registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption
that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable
also serves to determine the point at which prescription
may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete
title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the
applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where
all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government are complied with through actual physical,
open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law
not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government,
because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be
issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the
courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the
Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to
unregistered lands
_______________
30 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-73002,
December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 509, 521.
31 Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, 428 (1925);
Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90380, September 13, 1990, 189
SCRA 550, 560; Cruz v. Navarro, No. L-27644, November 29, 1973, 54
SCRA 109, 115.
583
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 583

in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their

occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years
prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should
always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a
fairly recent legislative development bears out, when
Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in
order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures
in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified
applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area
limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no
longer intended for public use or for the development of
national wealth by declaration of Congress or the
President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or
private land of the State, the applicable provision
concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in
conjunction with Section 14(2) of the
_______________
32 x x x WHEREAS, it has always been the policy of the State to hasten
the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to unregistered lands
including alienable and disposable lands of the public domain in favor of
qualified Filipino citizens who have acquired inchoate, imperfect and
incomplete titles thereto by reason of their open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious occupation and cultivation thereof under bonafide claim of
acquisition of ownership for a number of years prescribed by law; x x x
(Presidential Decree 1073).
33 An Act Authorizing the Issuance of Free Patents to Residential Lands
(Approved on March 9, 2010).
34 Republic Act No. 10023 reduces the period of eligibility for titling
from 30 years to 10 years of untitled public alienable and disposable lands
which have been zoned as residential; and enables the applicant to apply
with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources having jurisdiction
over the parcel subject of the application, provided the land subject of the
application should not exceed 200 square meters if it is in a highly
urbanized city, 500 meters in other cities, 750 meters in first-class and
second-class municipalities, and 1,000 meters in third-class
municipalities.
584

Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can

now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative
to the disposition of public land or lands of the public
domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian
Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly
under private ownership are also presumed to belong
to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or
disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to
wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are
rendered alienable and disposable through any
of the exclusive modes enumerated under
Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the
agricultural land subject of the application
needs only to be classified as alienable and
disposable as of the time of the application,
provided the applicant’s possession and
occupation of the land dated back to June 12,
1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive
presumption that the applicant has performed
all the conditions essential to a govern-
_______________
35 Section 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
585
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 585

ment grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes

the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect
or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has
already ceased to be part of the public domain
and has become private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently
classified or declared as no longer intended for
public use or for the development of national
wealth are removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered converted into
patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership
that may be alienated or disposed through any
of the modes of acquiring ownership under the
Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary,
proof that the land has been already converted
to private ownership prior to the requisite
acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine
qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113,
Civil Code) that property of the State not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object
of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land
since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite
character and period of possession — possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier — the land cannot
be considered ipso jure converted to private property even
upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable. Prescription never began to run against the
State, such that the land has remained ineligible for reg-
_______________
36 Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-75042, November
29, 1988, 168 SCRA 165, 174.
37 Dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee in Manila Electric Company
v. Castro-Bartolome, supra, note 29.
586

istration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration

Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for
land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the
President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no
longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent’s Partial
Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Abad,

Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe,
JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., No part due to relationship to a party.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., I submitted my vote joining
the Separate Opinion of Justice Brion.
Brion, J., In the result: See Separate Opinion.
Leonen, J., See separate concurring and dissenting
opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
BRION, J.:
Prefatory Statement
This Separate Opinion maintains my view that, on the
merits, the petition should be denied, as the petitioners,
Heirs of Mario Malabanan, failed to establish that they and
their predecessors-in-interest have a right to the property
applied for through either ordinary or extraordinary
prescription. I share this view with the majority; hence,
the Court
587
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 587

is unanimous in the result in resolving the issue

presented to us for our resolution.
As lawyers and Court watchers know, “unanimity in the
result” carries a technical meaning and implication in the
lawyers’ world; the term denotes that differing views exist
within the Court to support the conclusion they commonly
reached. The differences may be in the modality of reaching
the unanimous result, or there may just be differences in
views on matters discussed within the majority opinion. A
little of both exists in arriving at the Court’s present result,

although the latter type of disagreement predominates.
This Separate Opinion is submitted to state for the
record my own (and of those agreeing with me) view on the
question of how Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act and
Section 14(1) and (2) ofthe PRD should operate, particularly
in relation with one another, with the Constitution and with
the Civil Code provisions on property and prescription.
A critical point I make relates to what I call the
majority’s “absurdity argument” that played a major part
in our actual deliberations. The argument, to me, points to
insufficiencies in our laws that the Court wishes to rectify
in its perennial quest “to do justice.” I firmly believe though
that any insufficiency there may be — particularly one that
relates to the continuing wisdom of the law — is for the
Legislature, not for this Court, to correct in light of our
separate and mutually exclusive roles under the
Constitution. The Court may be all-powerful within its own
sphere, but the rule of law, specifically, the supremacy of
the Constitution, dictates that we recognize our own
limitations and that we desist when a problem already
relates to the wisdom of the law before us. All we can do is
point out the insufficiency, if any, for possible legislative or
executive action. It is largely in this sense that I believe
our differing views on the grant and disposition of lands of
the public domain should be written and given the widest
circulation.
588

I wrap up this Prefatory Statement with a cautionary

note on how the discussions in this Resolution should be
read and appreciated. Many of the divergent views
expressed, both the majority’s and mine, are not completely
necessary for the resolution of the direct issues submitted
to us; thus, they are, under the given facts of the case and
the presented and resolved issues, mostly obiter dicta. On
my part, I nevertheless present them for the reason I have
given above, and as helpful aid for the law practitioners
and the law students venturing into the complex topic of
public land grants, acquisitions, and ownership.
Preliminary Considerations
As a preliminary matter, I submit that:
1. the hierarchy of applicable laws must be given
full application in considering lands of the public
domain. Foremost in the hierarchy is the Philippine

Constitution (particularly its Article XII), followed by the
applicable special laws — Commonwealth Act No. 141 or
the Public Land Act (PLA) and Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree (PRD). The
Civil Code and other general laws apply suppletorily and to
the extent called for by the primary laws; and
2. the ponencia’s ruling that the classification of
public lands as alienable and disposable does not need
to date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier is incorrect
because:
a. under the Constitution’s Regalian Doctrine,1
classification is a required step whose full import
should be given full effect and recognition. The legal
recognition of possession prior to classification runs
counter to, and effectively weakens, the Regalian
Doctrine;
_______________
1 CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 2.
589
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 589

b. the terms of the PLA only find full application

from the time a land of the public domain is
classified as agricultural and declared
alienable and disposable. Thus, the possession
required under Section 48(b) of this law cannot be
recognized prior to the required classification and
declaration;
c. under the Civil Code, “[o]nly things and rights which
are susceptible of being appropriated may be the
object of possession.”2 Prior to the classification of
a public land as alienable and disposable, a
land of the public domain cannot be
appropriated, hence, any claimed possession prior to
classification cannot have legal effects;
d. there are other modes of acquiring alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under the PLA.
This legal reality renders the ponencia’s absurdity
argument misplaced; and
e. the alleged absurdity of the law addresses the
wisdom of the law and is a matter for the
Legislature, not for this Court, to address.
In these lights, I submit that all previous contrary

rulings (particularly, Republic of the Phils. v. Court of
Appeals [Naguit]3) should — in the proper case — be
abandoned and rejected for being based on legally-flawed
premises and as aberrations in land registration
jurisprudence.
I. THE LAWS AFFECTING PUBLIC LANDS
I likewise submit the following short overview as an aide

memoire in understanding our basic public land laws.
_______________
2 CIVIL CODE, Article 530.
3 489 Phil. 405; 448 SCRA 442 (2005).
590

A. The Overall Scheme at a Glance

1. The Philippine Constitution
The Philippine Constitution is the fountainhead of the
laws and rules relating to lands of the public domain in the
Philippines. It starts with the postulate that all lands of
the public domain — classified into agricultural,
forests or timber, mineral lands and national parks
— are owned by the State.4 This principle states the
Regalian Doctrine, and classifies land according to its
nature and alienability.
By way of exception to the Regalian Doctrine, the
Constitution also expressly states that “[w]ith the
exception of agricultural lands [which may be further
classified by law according to the uses to which they may
be devoted],5 all other natural resources shall not be
alienated.”6 Alienable lands of the public domain shall
be limited to agricultural lands.7
2. The Public Land Act
How and to what extent agricultural lands of the
public domain may be alienated and may pass into private
or non-State hands are determined under the PLA, which
governs the classification, grant, and disposition of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
and, other than the Constitution, is the country’s
primary substantive law on the matter.
As a rule, alienation and disposition of lands of the
public domain are exercises in determining:
_______________
4 CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Sections 2 and 3.
591
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 591

a. whether a public land is or has been classified

as agricultural (in order to take the land out of the
mass of lands of the public domain that, by the terms
of the Constitution, is inalienable);
b. once classified as agricultural, whether it has
been declared by the State to be alienable and
disposable. To reiterate, even agricultural lands,
prior to their declaration as alienable, are part of the
inalienable lands of the public domain; and
c. whether the terms of classification, alienation
or disposition have been complied with. In a
confirmation of imperfect title, there must be
possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier, in an open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious manner, by the
applicant himself or by his predecessor-in-interest, of
public agricultural land that since that time has been
declared alienable and disposable, as clearly provided
under PD No. 1073.
The Civil Code provides that “[o]nly things and rights
which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the
object of possession.”8 Prior to the classification of a
public land as alienable and disposable, a land of the
public domain cannot be appropriated, hence, any
claimed possession cannot have legal effects;
d. upon compliance with the required period and
character of possession of alienable public
agricultural land, the possessor acquires
ownership, thus converting the land to one of private
ownership and entitling the applicant-possessor to
confirmation of title under Section 48(b) of the PLA
and registration under Section 14(1) of the PRD.
3. Classification under the Civil Code
_______________
592

Separately from the classification according to the

nature of land under the Constitution, another system of
classification of property is provided under the Civil Code.
The Civil Code classifies property (as a general term,
compared to land which is only a species of property,
labeled under the Civil Code as immovable property9) in
relation with the person to whom it belongs.10
Property under the Civil Code may belong to the public
dominion (or property pertaining to the State for public
use, for public service or for the development of the national
wealth)11 or it may be of private ownership (which
classification includes patrimonial property or property
held in private ownership by the State).12 Significantly,
the Civil Code expressly provides that “[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State.”13
What is otherwise a simple classification from the point
of view of the person owning it, assumes a measure of
complexity when the property is land of the public
domain, as the Constitution, in unequivocal terms,
requires classification and declarations on the means and
manner of granting, alienating, disposing, and
acquiring lands of the public domain that all originally
belong to the State under the Regalian Doctrine.
In a reconciled consideration of the Constitution and
the Civil Code classifications, made necessary because
they have their respective independent focuses and
purposes, certain realities will have to be recognized or
deduced:
_______________
11 CIVIL CODE, Article 420; Arturo Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume II – Property
(1992 ed.), p. 30.
12 CIVIL CODE, Articles 421 and 422.
593
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 593

First. As a first principle, in case of any conflict,

the terms of the Constitution prevail. No ifs and buts
can be admitted with respect to this recognition, as
the Constitution is supreme over any other law or
legal instrument in the land.
Second. A necessary corollary to the first
principle is that all substantive considerations of
land ownership, alienation, or disposition must
always take into account the constitutional
requirements.
Third. The classification and the requirements
under the Constitution and under the Civil Code may
overlap without any resulting violation of the
Constitution.
A piece of land may fall under both classifications (i.e.,
under the constitutional classification based on the legal
nature of the land and alienability, and under the civil law
classification based on the ownership of the land). This can
best be appreciated in the discussion below, under the topic
“The PLA, the Civil Code and Prescription.”14
4. Prescription under the Civil Code
Prescription is essentially a civil law term and is a
mode of acquiring ownership provided under the Civil
Code,15 but is not mentioned as one of the modes of
acquiring ownership of alienable public lands of the public
domain under the PLA.16
A point of distinction that should be noted is that the
PLA, under its Section 48(b), provides for a system that
allows possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier to
ripen into ownership. The PLA, however, does not refer to
this mode as acquisitive prescription but as basis for
confirmation of title, and requires a specified period of
possession of alienable agricultural land, not the periods for
ordinary or extraordi-
_______________
14 See: discussion below at p. 17 hereof.
15 See CIVIL CODE, Articles 712 and 1106.
16 PLA, Section 11.
594

nary prescription required under the Civil Code. Ownership

that vests under Section 48(b) of the PLA can be
registered under Section 14(1) of the PRD.

The PRD, under its Section 14(2), recognizes that
registration of title can take place as soon as
ownership over private land has vested due to
prescription — “[t]hose who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.” Thus, prescription was introduced into the
PRD land registration scheme but not into the special law
governing the grant and alienation of lands of the public
domain, i.e., the PLA.
An important provision that should not be missed in
considering prescription is Article 1108 of the Civil Code,
which states that prescription does not run against the
State and its subdivisions. Article 1113 of the Civil
Code is a companion provision stating that “[a]ll things
which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.”
The above-cited rules express civil law concepts, but
their results are effectively replicated in the scheme
governing lands of the public domain since these lands, by
constitutional fiat, cannot be alienated and are thus
outside the commerce of man, except under the rigid terms
of the Constitution and the PLA. For example, confirmation
of imperfect title — the possession-based rule under the
PLA — can only take place with respect to agricultural
lands already declared alienable and possessed for the
required period (since June 12, 1945 or earlier).
5. The PRD
The PRD was issued in 1978 to update the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496) and relates solely to the
registration of property. The law does not provide the
means for
595
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 595

acquiring title to land; it refers solely to the means or

procedure of registering and rendering indefeasible title
already acquired.
The PRD mainly governs the registration of lands and
places them under the Torrens System. It does not, by
itself, create title nor vest one. It simply confirms a
title already created and already vested, rendering it
forever indeafeasible.17
In a side by side comparison, the PLA is the

substantive law that classifies and provides for the
disposition of alienable lands of the public domain. On the
other hand, the PRD refers to the manner of bringing
registerable title to lands, among them, alienable
public lands, within the coverage of the Torrens
system; in terms of substantive content, the PLA must
prevail.18 On this consideration, only land of the
public domain that has passed into private
ownership under the terms of the PLA can be
registered under the PRD.
II. THE CASE AND THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
_______________
17 Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, Property Registration Decree and Related Laws
(2006 ed.), pp. 14-15.
18 Substantive law is that which creates, defines and regulates rights,
or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of
action, that part of the law which courts are established to administer, as
opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion (Primicias v.
Ocampo, etc., et al., 93 Phil. 446). It is the nature and the purpose of the
law which determine whether it is substantive or procedural, and not its
place in the statute, or its inclusion in a code (Florenz D. Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, Volume I [Ninth Revised Edition], p. 19).
Note that Section 51 of the PLA refers to the Land Registration Act (the
predecessor law of the PRD) on how the Torrens title may be obtained
when an alienable land of public domain is acquired through the
substantive right recognized under Section 48 of the PLA.
596

The Case.
Before the Court are the motions separately filed by the
petitioners and by the respondent Republic of the
Philippines, both of them seeking reconsideration of the
Court’s Decision dated April 29, 2009 which denied the
petitioners’ petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
The Underlying Facts
The present case traces its roots to the land registration
case instituted by the petitioners’ predecessor, Mario
Malabanan (Malabanan). On February 20, 1998,
Malabanan filed an application for the registration of a

71,324-square meter land, located in Barangay Tibig,
Silang, Cavite, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cavite — Tagaytay City, Branch 18.19 Malabanan alleged
that he purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco. The
property was originally part of a 22-hectare land owned by
Lino Velazco (Velazco), who was succeeded by his four sons,
among them, Eduardo Velazco.20
Apart from his purchase of the property, Malabanan
anchored his registration petition on his and his
predecessors-in-interest’s open, notorious, continuous,
adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more
than 30 years. Malabanan claimed that the land is an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
presenting as proof the Certification dated June 11, 2001 of
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
The Certification stated that the land was “verified to be
within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established
_______________
19 See Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, April
29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172, 181.
20 Ibid.
597
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 597

under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO

4-1656 on March 15, 1982.”21
The Issue Before the Court.
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners
submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable
or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into
patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings
in Spouses de Ocampo v. Arlos,22 Menguito v. Republic,23
and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,24 they argue that
the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable
opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code;
that Malabanan had purchased the property from Velazco,
believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-
in-interest had been the real owners of the land, with the
right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that
consequently, the 10-year period prescribed by Article 1134
of the Civil Code, in relation with Section 14(2) of the PRD,

applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed his
application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had
already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years,
reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared
inalienable and disposable by the State.
The respondent seeks the partial reconsideration in
order to seek clarification with reference to the application
of the rulings in Naguit and Republic of the Phils. v.
Herbieto.25 It reiterates its view that an applicant is
entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable
since June 12, 1945.
_______________
21 Id., at p. 182; emphases and underscores ours.
22 397 Phil. 799; 343 SCRA 716 (2000).
23 401 Phil. 274; 348 SCRA 128 (2000).
24 G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477.
25 498 Phil. 227; 459 SCRA 183 (2005).
598

As presented in the petition and the subsequent motion

for reconsideration, the direct issue before the Court is
whether there had been acquisition of title, based on
ordinary or extraordinary prescription, over a land
of the public domain declared alienable as of March
15, 1982. The issue was not about confirmation of an
imperfect title where possession started on or before June
12, 1945 since possession had not been proven to have
dated back to or before that date.
The Antecedents and the Ruling under Review
On December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment
favoring Malabanan, approving his application for
registration of the land “under the operation of Act 141, Act
496 and/or PD 1529.”26
The respondent, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTC decision with
the Court of Appeals (CA). The OSG contended that
Malabanan failed to prove: (1) that the property belonged
to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
and (2) that he had not been in possession of the property
in the manner and for the length of time required by law
for confirmation of imperfect title. During the pendency of

the appeal before the CA, Malabanan died and was
substituted by the petitioners.
In its decision dated February 23, 2007, the CA reversed
the RTC decision and dismissed Malabanan’s application
for registration. Applying the Court’s ruling in Herbieto,
the CA held that “under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the
classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of
_______________
26 Id., at p. 5.
599
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 599

possession.”27 Since the land was classified as alienable

and disposable only on March 15, 1982, any possession
prior to this date cannot be considered.
The petitioners assailed the CA decision before this
Court through a petition for review on certiorari. On April
29, 2009, the Court denied the petition. The Court’s
majority (through Justice Dante Tinga) summarized its
ruling as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the PRD, Section 48(b)

of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such
lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since
12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands
should have been alienable and disposable during
the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled
to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as
it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the
timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property

Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public do-
_______________
27 See Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, supra note 19, at p. 183.
600

main lands become only patrimonial property not only with

a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There
must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under
Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government.
The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure
registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial
property may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property
through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith
and with just title. Uner extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years,
regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.28
Based on this ruling, the majority denied the petition,

but established the above rules which embody principles
contrary to Section 48(b) of the PLA and which are
not fully in accord with the concept of prescription
under Section 14(2) of the PRD, in relation with the
Civil Code provisions on property and prescription.
_______________
28 Id., at pp. 210-211; italics supplied, emphases ours, citation omitted.
601
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 601

In its ruling on the present motions for reconsideration,

the ponencia essentially affirms the above ruling,
rendering this Separate Opinion and its conclusions
necessary.
III. DISCUSSION OF THE PRESENTED
ISSUES
A. Section 48(b) of the PLA: Confirmation of
Imperfect Title
Section 48(b) of the PLA is the core provision on the
confirmation of imperfect title and must be read with
its related provision in order to fully be appreciated.
Section 7 of the PLA delegates to the President the
authority to administer and dispose of alienable public
lands. Section 8 sets out the public lands open to
disposition or concession, and the requirement that they
should be officially delimited and classified and, when
practicable, surveyed. Section 11, a very significant
provision, states that —
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes

can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement
(2) By sale
(3) By lease
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title:
(a) By judicial legalization
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
[emphases ours]
Finally, Section 48 of the PLA, on confirmation of

imperfect title, embodies a grant of title to the qualified
occupant or possessor of an alienable public land, under the
following terms:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the

Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
602

claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but

whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the

issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from
Spain to the x x x United States have applied for the
purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the
public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in
force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in
connection therewith, but have[,] with or without default
upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title
therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have
occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the
filing of their applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, except as against the Government, since
July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a
bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be
entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof.
[emphasis ours]
Subsection (a) has now been deleted, while subsection (b)

has been amended by PD No. 1073 as follows:
603
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 603

Section 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section

48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only
to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant
himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a [bona

fide] claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Based on these provisions and a narrow reading of the

“since June 12, 1945” timeline, the ponencia now rules that
the declaration that the land is agricultural and alienable
can be made at the time of application for registration and
need not be from June 12, 1945 or earlier.29 This conclusion
follows the ruling in Naguit (likewise penned by Justice
Tinga) that additionally argued that reckoning the
declarations from June 12, 1945 leads to absurdity.
For the reasons outlined below, I cannot agree with
these positions and with the Naguit ruling on which it is
based:
First. The constitutional and statutory reasons.
The Constitution classifies public lands into agricultural,
mineral, timber lands and national parks. Of these, only
agricultural lands can be alienated.30 Without the requisite
classification, there can be no basis to determine which
lands of the public domain are alienable and which are not.
Hence, classification is a constitutionally-required
step whose importance should be given full legal
recognition and effect.
Otherwise stated, without classification into
disposable agricultural land, the land continues to form
part of the mass of the public domain that, not being
agricultural, must be mineral, timber land or national
parks that are completely inalienable and, as such, cannot
be possessed with legal effects. To recognize possession
prior to any classifica-
_______________
29 Ponencia, pp. 11-12.
604

tion is to do violence to the Regalian Doctrine; the

ownership and control that the Regalian Doctrine
embodies will be less than full if the possession — that
should be with the State as owner, but is also elsewhere
without any solid legal basis — can anyway be recognized.
Note in this regard that the terms of the PLA do
not find full application until a classification into
alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain is made. In this situation, possession

cannot be claimed under Section 48(b) of the PLA.
Likewise, no imperfect title can be confirmed over lands
not yet classified as disposable or alienable because, in the
absence of such classification, the land remains
unclassified public land that fully belongs to the
State. This is fully supported by Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10
of the PLA.31 If the
_______________
31 Section 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify
the lands of the public domain into —
(a) Alienable or disposable;
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one
class to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
Section 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of
alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time
declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
Section 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when
practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or
quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any
manner become private property, nor those on which a private right
authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be
claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to
be so. However, the President may, for rea-
605
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 605

land is either mineral, timber or national parks that cannot

be alienated, it defies legal logic to recognize that
possession of these unclassified lands can produce legal
effects.
Parenthetically, PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry
Code states that “Those [lands of public domain] still
to be classified under the present system shall
continue to remain as part of the public forest.”32 It
further declares that public forest covers “the mass of
lands of the public domain which has not been the
subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest

purposes and which are not.”33
_______________
sons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to
disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been
surveyed, or may, for the same reason, suspend their concession or
disposition until they are again declared open to concession or disposition
by proclamation duly published or by Act of the National Assembly.
Section 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition,
the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be
classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are
destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural
(b) Residential commercial industrial or for similar productive
purposes
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes
(d) Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce, shall from time to time make the classifications provided
for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer
lands from one class to another.
Section 10. The words “alienation,” “disposition,” or “concession” as
used in this Act, shall mean any of the methods authorized by this Act for
the acquisition, lease, use, or benefit of the lands of the public domain
other than timber or mineral lands.
32 PD No. 705, Section 13.
33 PD No. 705, Section 3(a).
606

Thus, PD No. 705 confirms that all lands of the public

domain that remain unclassified are considered as forest
land.34 As forest land, these lands of the public domain
cannot be alienated until they have been reclassified as
agricultural lands. For purposes of the present case, these
terms confirm the position that re/classification is essential
at the time possession is acquired under Section 48(b) of
the PLA.
From these perspectives, the legal linkage between (1)
the classification of public land as alienable and disposable
and (2) effective possession that can ripen into a claim
under Section 48(b) of the PLA can readily be appreciated.
The Leonen Opinion
Incidentally, Justice Marvic F. Leonen opines in his

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion that the Regalian
Doctrine was not incorporated in our Constitution and that
“there could be land, considered as property, where
ownership has vested as a result of either possession or
prescription but still, as yet undocumented.”35
I will respond to this observation that, although relating
to the nature of the land applied for (land of the public
domain) and to the Regalian Doctrine, still raises aspects of
these matters that are not exactly material to the direct
issues presented in the present case. I respond to correct
for the record and at the earliest opportunity what I
consider to be an erroneous view.
The Regalian Doctrine was incorporated in all the
Constitutions of the Philippines (1935, 1973 and 1987) and
the statutes governing private individuals’ land acquisition
and regis-
_______________
34 Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
v. Yap, G.R. Nos. 167707 and 173775, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 164,
200.
35 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Marvic Mario Victor
F. Leonen, p. 2.
607
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 607

tration. In his Separate Opinion in Cruz v. Sec. of

Environment and Natural Resources,36 former Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno made a brief yet informative
historical discussion on how the Regalian Doctrine was
incorporated in our legal system, especially in all our past
and present organic laws. His historical disquisition was
quoted in La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Sec.
Ramos37 and the consolidated cases of The Secretary of the
DENR et al. v. Yap and Sacay et al. v. The Secretary of the
DENR,38 which were also quoted in Justice Lucas P.
Bersamin’s Separate Opinion in his very brief discussion on
how the doctrine was carried over from our Spanish and
American colonization up until our present legal system.
Insofar as our organic laws are concerned, La Bugal-
B’laan confirms that:
one of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935

Constitutional Convention [was the nationalization and
conservation of the natural resources of the country.]

There was an overwhelming sentiment in the
Convention in favor of the principle of state
ownership of natural resources and the adoption of
the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural
resources was seen as a necessary starting point to
secure recognition of the state’s power to control their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization.
The delegates [to] the Constitutional Convention very
well knew that the concept of State ownership of land
and natural resources was introduced by the
Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it
was continued and applied by the Americans. To
remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provi-
_______________
36 400 Phil. 904; 347 SCRA 128 (2000).
37 465 Phil. 860; 421 SCRA 148 (2004).
38 Supra note 34.
607
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 607

sion in the Constitution affirming the Regalian

doctrine.
xxxx
On January 17, 1973, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos proclaimed the ratification of a new Constitution.
Article XIV on the National Economy and Patrimony
contained provisions similar to the 1935 Constitution with
regard to Filipino participation in the nation’s natural
resources. Section, 8, Article XIV thereof[.]
xxxx
The 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine.
The first sentence of Section 2, Article XII states: “All lands
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State.”39
In these lights, I believe that, at this point in our legal

history, there can be no question that the Regalian
Doctrine remains in the pure form interpreted by this
Court; it has resiliently endured throughout our colonial
history, was continually confirmed in all our organic laws,
and is presently embodied in Section 2, Article XII of our
present Constitution. Short of a constitutional amendment

duly ratified by the people, the views and conclusions of
this Court on the Regalian Doctrine should not and cannot
be changed.
Second. The Civil Code reason. Possession is
essentially a civil law term that can best be understood in
terms of the Civil Code in the absence of any specific
definition in the PLA, other than in terms of time of
possession.40
Article 530 of the Civil Code provides that “[o]nly things
and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may
be the object of possession.” Prior to the declaration of
alienabil-
_______________
39 Supra note 37, at pp. 903-919; pp. 191-206; citations omitted.
609
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 609

ity, a land of the public domain cannot be appropriated;

hence, any claimed possession cannot have legal effects. In
fact, whether an application for registration is filed before
or after the declaration of alienability becomes immaterial
if, in one as in the other, no effective possession can be
recognized prior to and within the proper period for the
declaration of alienability.
To express this position in the form of a direct question:
How can possession before the declaration of
alienability be effective when the land then belonged
to the State against whom prescription does not run?
Third. Statutory construction and the cut-off date
— June 12, 1945. The ponencia concludes — based on its
statutory construction reasoning and reading of Section
48(b) of the PLA — that the June 12, 1945 cut-off is only
required for purposes of possession and that it suffices if
the land has been classified as alienable agricultural land
at the time of application for registration.41
This cut-off date was painstakingly set by law and its
full import appears from PD No. 1073 that amended
Section 48(b) of the PLA. While the resulting Section 48(b)
of the PLA did not expressly state what PD No. 1073
introduced in terms of exact wording, PD No. 1073 itself, as
formulated, shows the intent to count the alienability from

June 12, 1945. To quote the exact terms of PD No. 1073:
Section 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section

48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only
to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant
himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a [bona
fide] claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945. [emphases and underscores ours]
_______________
41 Ponencia, p. 11.
610

In reading this provision, it has been claimed that June

12, 1945 refers only to the required possession and not to
the declaration of alienability of the land applied for. The
terms of PD No. 1073, however, are plain and clear even
from the grammatical perspective alone. The term “since
June 12, 1945” is unmistakably separated by a comma from
the conditions of both alienability and possession, thus,
plainly showing that it refers to both alienability and
possession. This construction — showing the direct,
continuous and seamless linking of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain to June 12, 1945
under the wording of the Decree — is clear and should be
respected, particularly if read with the substantive
provisions on ownership of lands of the public domain and
the limitations that the law imposes on possession.
Fourth. Other modes of acquisition of lands under
the PLA. The cited Naguit’s absurdity argument that the
ponencia effectively adopted is more apparent than real,
since the use of June 12, 1945 as cut-off date for the
declaration of alienability will not render the grant of
alienable public lands out of reach.
The acquisition of ownership and title may still be
obtained by other modes under the PLA. Among other
laws, Republic Act (RA) No. 6940 allowed the use of free
patents.42 It was
_______________
42 Section 1. Paragraph 1, Section 44, Chapter VII of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not
the owner of more than twelve (12) hectares and who, for at least
thirty (30) years prior to the effectivity of this amendatory
Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest a tract or
tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition,
who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has
not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the
provisions of this Chapter, to
611
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 611

approved on March 28, 1990; hence, counting 30 years

backwards, possession since April 1960 or thereabouts
qualified a possessor to apply for a free patent.43
Additionally, the other administrative modes provided
under Section 11 of the PLA are still open, particularly,
homestead settlement, sales and lease.
Incidentally, the ponencia mentions RA No. 10023,
entitled “An Act Authorizing the Issuance of Free Patents
to Residential Lands,” in its discussions.44 This statute,
however, has no relevance to the present case because its
terms apply to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain (necessarily agricultural lands under the
Constitution) that have been reclassified as residential
under Section 9(b) of the PLA.45
_______________
have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land
not to exceed twelve (12) hectares.”
43 Under RA No. 9176, applications for free patents may be made up to
December 31, 2020.
44 Ponencia, p. 10.
45 Section 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition,
the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be
classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are
destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural
(b) Residential commercial industrial or for similar
productive purposes
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes
(d) Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.
[emphasis ours]
Note that the classification and concession of residential lands are
governed by Title III of the PLA; Title II refers to agricultural lands.
The ponente mentioned RA No. 10023 in support of his opinion on the
government’s policy of adjudicating and quieting titles to unregistered
lands (p. 13). He claims that the grant of public lands should be liberalized
to support this policy (citing the Whereas clause of PD No. 1073, which
states: “it has always been the policy of
612

Fifth. Addressing the wisdom — or the absurdity —

of the law. This Court acts beyond the limits of the
constitutionally-mandated separation of powers in giving
Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by PD No. 1073, an
interpretation beyond its plain wording. Even this Court
cannot read into the law an intent that is not there
even if the purpose is to avoid an absurd situation.
If the Court believes that a law already has absurd
effects because of the passage of time, its role under the
principle of separation of powers is not to give the law an
interpretation that is not there in order to avoid the
perceived absurdity. If the Court does, it thereby intrudes
into the realm of policy — a role delegated by the
Constitution to the Legislature. If only for this reason, the
Court should avoid expanding — through the present
ponencia and its cited cases — the plain meaning of Section
48(b) of the PLA, as amended by PD No. 1073.
In the United States where the governing constitutional
rule is likewise the separation of powers between the
Legislative and the Judiciary, Justice Antonin Scalia (in
the book Reading Law co-authored with Bryan A. Garner)
made the pithy observation that:
_______________
the State to hasten settlement, adjudication and quieting of title of
titles to unregistered lands); thus, his interpretation that classification of
the land as agricultural may be made only at the time of registration and
not when possession commenced.
To be entitled to a grant under RA No. 10023, the law states:
“…the applicant thereof has, either by himself or through his
predecessor-ininterest, actually resided on and continuously
possessed and occupied, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, the [residential] land applied for at least ten (10) years
and has complied with the requirements prescribed in Section 1
hereof…”
Notably, this requirements are not new as they are similar (except for
the period) to those required under Section 48(b) of the PLA on judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
613
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 613

To the extent that people give this view any credence, the
notion that judges may (even should) improvise on
constitutional and statutory text enfeebles the democratic
polity. As Justice John Marshall Harlan warned in the
1960s, an invitation to judicial lawmaking results inevitably
in “a lessening, on the one hand, of judicial independence
and, on the other, of legislative responsibility, thus
polluting the bloodstream of our system of government.”
Why these alarming outcomes? First, when judges fashion
law rather than fairly derive it from governing texts, they
subject themselves to intensified political pressures – in the
appointment process, in their retention, and in the
arguments made to them. Second, every time a court
constitutionalizes a new sliver of law – as by finding a “new
constitutional right” to do this, that, or the other – that
sliver becomes thenceforth untouchable by the political
branches. In the American system, a legislature has no
power to abridge a right that has been authoritatively held
to be part of the Constitution – even if that newfound right
does not appear in the text. Over the past 50 years
especially, we have seen the judiciary incrementally take
control of larger and larger swaths of territory that ought to
be settled legislatively.
It used to be said that judges do not “make” law – they
simply apply it. In the 20th century, the legal realists
convinced everyone that judges do indeed make law. To the
extent that this was true, it was knowledge that the wise
already possessed and the foolish could not be trusted with.
It was true, that is, that judges did not really “find” the
common law but invented it over time. Yet this notion has
been stretched into a belief that judges “make” law through
judicial interpretation of democratically enacted statutes.
Consider the following statement by John P. Dawson,
intended to apply to statutory law:
It seems to us inescapable that judges should have
a part in creating law – creating it as they apply it. In
deciding the multifarious disputes that are brought

before them, we believe that judges in any legal
system in-
614

variably adapt legal doctrines to new situations and

thus give them new content.
Now it is true that in a system such as ours, in which
judicial decisions have a stare decisis effect, a court’s
application of a statute to a “new situation” can be said to
establish the law applicable to that situation – that is, to
pronounce definitively whether and how the statute applies
to that situation. But establishing this retail application of
the statute is probably not what Dawson meant by “creating
law,” “adapt[ing] legal doctrines,” and “giv[ing] them new
content.” Yet beyond that retail application, good judges
dealing with statutes do not make law. They do not “give
new content” to the statute, but merely apply the content
that has been there all along, awaiting application to
myriad factual scenarios. To say that they “make law”
without this necessary qualification is to invite the taffy-
like stretching of words – or the ignoring of words
altogether. 46
In the Philippines, a civil law country where the

Constitution is very clear on the separation of powers and
the assignment of constitutional duties, I believe that this
Court should be very careful in delineating the line
between the constitutionally-allowed interpretation and
the prohibited judicial legislation, given the powers that
the 1987 Constitution has entrusted to this Court. As a
Court, we are given more powers than the U.S. Supreme
Court; under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, we are supposed to act, as a matter of duty,
on any grave abuse of discretion that occurs anywhere in
government. While broad, this power should nevertheless
be exercised with due respect for the separation of powers
doctrine that underlies our Constitution.
B. Registration under Section 14(1) and (2) of the
PRD
Complementing the substance that the PLA provides are
the provisions of the PRD that set out the registration of
the
_______________
46 Id., at pp. 4-6; citations omitted.
615
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 615

title that has accrued under the PLA. Section 14 of the

PRD provides:
SEC. 14. Who May Apply.—The following persons may

file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands
or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion
under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any
other manner provided for by law. [emphasis and italics
ours]
As mentioned earlier, the PLA is the substantive law on

the grant and disposition of alienable lands of the public
domain. The PRD, on the other hand, sets out the manner
of bringing registrable lands, among them alienable public
lands, within the coverage of the Torrens system. In this
situation, in terms of substantive content, the PLA should
prevail.
1. Section 14(1) of the PRD is practically a
reiteration of Section 48(b) of the PLA, with the difference
that they govern two different aspects of confirmation of
imperfect title relating to alienable lands of the public
domain. The PLA has its own substantive focus, while
Section 14(1) of the PRD, bearing on the same matter,
defines what title may be registered. For this reason, the
discussions of Section 48(b) apply
616

with equal force, mutatis mutandis, to Section 14(1) of the

PRD.
2. Section 14(2) of the PRD is another matter. By
its express terms, the prescription that it speaks of
applies only to private lands. Thus, on plain reading,
Section 14(2) should not apply to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain that Section 14(1) covers. This is
the significant difference between Sections 14(1) and 14(2).
The former — Section 14(1) — is relevant when the
ownership of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain vests in the occupant or possessor under the terms
of Section 48(b) of the PLA, even without the registration of
a confirmed title since the land ipso jure becomes a private
land. Section 14(2), on the other hand, applies to situations
when ownership of private lands vests on the basis of
prescription.
The prescription that Section 14(2) of the PRD speaks of
finds no application to alienable lands of the public domain
—specifically, to Section 48(b) of the PLA since this
provision, as revised by PD No. 1073 in January 1977,
simply requires possession and occupation since June
12, 1945 or earlier, regardless of the period the
property was occupied (although when PD No. 1073 was
enacted in 1977, the property would have been possessed
for at least 32 years by the claimant if his possession
commenced exactly on June 12, 1945, or longer if
possession took place earlier).
Parenthetically, my original April 29, 2009 Opinion
stated that the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 appeared to be
devoid of legal significance as far as the PLA was
concerned. This statement notwithstanding, it should be
appreciated that prior to PD No. 1073, Section 48(b) of
the PLA required a 30-year period of possession. This
30-year period was a requirement imposed under RA No.
1942 in June 1957, under the following provision:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors

in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
617
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 617

and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural

lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure[.]
When PD No. 1073 was enacted in 1977, it was

recognized that a claimant who had possessed the property
for at least 30 years (in compliance with RA No. 1942)
might not be entitled to confirmation of title under PD No.
1073 because his possession commenced only after June 12,
1945. This possibility constituted a violation of his vested
rights that should be avoided. To resolve this dilemma, the
Court, in Abejaron v. Nabasa,47 opined that where an
application has satisfied the requirements of Section 48(b)
of the PLA, as amended by RA No. 1942 (prior to the
effectivity of PD No. 1073), the applicant is entitled to
perfect his or her title even if possession and occupation do
not date back to June 12, 1945.
What this leads up to is that possession of land “for the
required statutory period” becomes significant only when
the claim of title is based on the amendment introduced by
RA No. 1942. The 30-year period introduced by RA No.
1942 “did not refer or call into application the Civil
Code provisions on prescription.”48 In fact, in The
Director of Lands v. IAC49 and the opinion of Justice
Claudio Teehankee in Manila Electric Co. v. Judge Castro-
Bartolome, etc., et al.,50 cited by the ponencia,51 both
pertained to the RA No. 1942 amendment; it was in this
sense that both rulings stated that mere lapse or
completion of the required period converts alienable land to
private property.
_______________
47 411 Phil. 552, 569-570; 359 SCRA 47, 61-62 (2001).
48 Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, supra note 19, at
p. 201.
49 230 Phil. 590; 146 SCRA 509 (1986).
50 200 Phil. 284; 114 SCRA 799 (1982).
51 Ponencia, p. 12.
618

In sum, if the claimant is asserting his vested right

under the RA No. 1942 amendment, then it would be
correct to declare that the lapse of the required statutory
period converts alienable land to private property ipso jure.
Otherwise, if the claimant is asserting a right under the
PD No. 1073 amendment, then he needs to prove
possession of alienable public land as of June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Although a claimant may have possessed the
property for 30 years or more, if his possession commenced
after January 24, 1947 (the adjusted date based on
Abejaron), the property would not be converted into private
property by the mere lapse of time.
3. As a last point, the ponencia effectively claims52 that
the classification of property as agricultural land is only
necessary at the time of application for registration of title.
This is completely erroneous. The act of registration
merely confirms that title already exists in favor of the
applicant. To require classification of the property only on
application for registration point would imply that during
the process of acquisition of title (specifically, during the
period of possession prior to the application for
registration), the property might not have been alienable
for being unclassified land (or a forest land under PD No.
705) of the public domain. This claim totally contravenes
the constitutional rule that only agricultural lands of the
public domain may be alienated.
To translate all these arguments to the facts of the
present case, the land applied for was not classified as
alienable on or before June 12, 1945 and was indisputably
only classified as alienable only on March 15, 1982. Under
these facts, the ponencia still asserts that following the
Naguit ruling, possession of the non-classified land during
the material period would still comply with Section 48(b) of
the PLA, provided that there is already a classification at
the time of application for registration.
_______________
52 Id., at p. 10.
619
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 619

This claim involves essential contradiction in terms

as only a land that can already be registered under Section
48(b) of the PLA can be registered under Section 14(1) of
the PRD. Additionally, the ponencia, in effect, confirmed

that possession prior to declaration of alienability can ripen
into private ownership of a land that, under the
Constitution, the PLA, and even the Civil Code, is not
legally allowed.
The ponencia’s position all the more becomes legally
preposterous if PD No. 705 is considered. To recall, this
Decree states that all lands of the public domain that
remain unclassified are considered forest lands that cannot
be alienated until they have been reclassified as
agricultural lands and declared alienable.53 Applying this
law to the facts of the present case, the land applied for,
prior to March 15, 1982, must have still been forest land
that, under the Constitution, cannot be alienated.
The deeper hole that the ponencia digs for itself in
recognizing possession prior to declaration of alienability
becomes apparent when it now cites Naguit as its
authority. Unnoticed perhaps by the ponencia, Naguit
itself explicitly noted PD No. 705 and expressly and
unabashedly pronounced that “[a] different rule obtains for
forest lands, such as those which form part of a reservation
for provincial park purposes the possession of which cannot
ripen into ownership. It is elementary in the law governing
natural resources that forestland cannot be owned by
private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,
forest land is not registrable and possession thereof,
no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private
property, unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable.”54
How the ponencia would square this Naguit statement
with the realities of PD No. 705 and its present ruling
would
_______________
53 Id., at p. 6.
54 Supra note 3, at pp. 415-416; p. 450; citations omitted, italics and
emphasis ours.
620

be an interesting exercise to watch. It would, to say the

least, be in a very confused position as it previously
confirmed in Naguit the very same basic precept of law
that it now debunks in its present ruling, citing the same

Naguit ruling.
C. The PLA, the Civil Code and Prescription
In reading all the provisions of Book II of the Civil Code
on the classification of property based on the person to
whom it belongs, it should not be overlooked that these
provisions refer to properties in general, i.e., to both
movable and immovable properties.55 Thus, the Civil
Code provisions on property do not refer to land alone,
much less do they refer solely to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. For this latter specie of
property, the PLA is the special governing law and, under
the Civil Code itself, the Civil Code provisions shall apply
only in case of deficiency.56
Whether, as in the present case, land of the public
domain can be granted and registered on the basis of
extraordinary prescription (i.e., possession by the applicant
and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of at least 30
years), the obvious answer is that the application can
only effectively be allowed upon compliance with the PLA’s
terms. Classification as agricultural land must first take
place to remove the land from its status as a land of the
public domain and a declaration of alienability must
likewise be made to render the land available or
susceptible to alienation; the required possession, of course,
has to follow and only upon completion does the land pass
to “private” hands.
Whether land classified as “agricultural” and declared
“alienable and disposable” can already be considered “patri-
_______________
55 CIVIL CODE, Article 419, in relation to Article 414.
56 CIVIL CODE, Article 18, which states that “In matters which are
governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall
be supplied by the provisions of this Code.”
621
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 621

monial” property does not yield to an easy answer as these

concepts involve different classification systems as
discussed above. To be sure, the classification and
declaration of a public land as alienable public agricultural
land do not transfer the land into private hands nor divest
it of the character of being State property that can only be
acquired pursuant to the terms of the PLA. Separate from

this requirement, a property — although already declared
alienable and disposable — may conceivably still be held by
the State or by any of its political subdivisions or agencies
for public use or public service under the terms of the
Civil Code. In this latter case, the property cannot be
considered patrimonial that is subject to acquisitive
prescription.
Based on these considerations, the two concepts of
“disposable land of the public domain” and “patrimonial
property” cannot directly be equated with one another. The
requirements for their acquisition, however, must both be
satisfied before they can pass to private hands.
An inevitable related question is the manner of
enforcing Article 422 of the Civil Code that “[p]roperty of
the public dominion, when no longer intended for public use
or public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State,” in light of the implication that
patrimonial property may be acquired through prescription
under Article 1113 of the Civil Code (“Property of the State
or any of its subdivision not patrimonial in character shall
not be the object of prescription”). This position,
incidentally, is what the original decision in this case
claims.
A first simple answer is that the Civil Code provisions
must yield when considered in relation with the PLA and
its requirements. In other words, when the property
involved is a land of the public domain, the consideration
that it is not for public use or for public service, or its
patrimonial character, initially becomes immaterial; any
grant or alienation must first comply with the mandates of
the Constitution on lands of
622

the public domain and with the requirements of the PLA as

a priority requirement.
Thus, if the question is whether such land, considered
patrimonial solely under the terms of Article 422 of the
Civil Code, can be acquired through prescription, the prior
questions of whether the land is already alienable under
the terms of the Constitution and the PLA and whether
these terms have been complied with must first be
answered. If the response is negative, then any
characterization under Article 422 of the Civil Code is
immaterial; only upon compliance with the terms of the

Constitution and the PLA can Article 422 of the Civil Code
be given full force. If the land is already alienable, Article
422 of the Civil Code, when invoked, can only be complied
with on the showing that the property is no longer intended
for public use or public service.
For all these reasons, alienable and disposable
agricultural land cannot be registered under Section 14(2)
of the PRD solely because it is already alienable and
disposable. The alienability must be coupled with the
required declaration under Article 422 of the Civil Code if
the land is claimed to be patrimonial and possession under
Section 14(2) of the PRD is invoked as basis for
registration.
As an incidental matter, note that this PRD provision is
no longer necessary for the applicant who has complied
with the required possession under Section 48(b) of the
PLA (i.e., that there had been possession since June 12,
1945); he or she does not need to invoke Section 14(2) of the
PRD as registration is available under Section 14(1) of the
PRD. On the other hand, if the required period for
possession under Section 48(b) of the PLA (or Section 14[1]
of the PRD) did not take place, then the applicant’s
recourse would still be under the PLA through its other
available modes (because a land of the public domain is
involved), but not under its Section 48(b).
Section 14(2) of the PRD will apply only after the land is
deemed to be “private” or has passed through one of the
modes of grant and acquisition under the PLA, and after
the
623
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 623

requisite time of possession has passed, counted from the

time the land is deemed or recognized to be private. In
short, Section 14(2) of the PLA only becomes available to a
possessor of land already held or deemed to be in private
ownership and only after such possessor complies with the
requisite terms of ordinary or extraordinary prescription.
In considering compliance with the required possession,
possession prior to the declaration of alienability cannot of
course be recognized or given legal effect, as already
extensively discussed above.
To go back and directly answer now the issue that the
petitioners directly pose in this case, no extraordinary
prescription can be recognized in their favor as their

effective possession could have started only after March 15,
1982. Based on the reasons and conclusions in the above
discussion, they have not complied with the legal
requirements, either from the point of view of the PLA or
the Civil Code. Hence, the denial of their petition must
hold.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur with the denial of the Motions for
Reconsideration.
I concur with the original Decision penned by Justice
Dante Tinga promulgated on April 29, 2009. I also concur
with the Resolution of Justice Lucas Bersamin with respect
to the Motions for Reconsideration, but disagree with the
statements made implying the alleged overarching legal
principle called the “regalian doctrine.”
Mario Malabanan filed an application for registration of
a parcel of land designated as Lot 9864-A in Silang, Cavite
based on a claim that he purchased the land from Eduardo
Velazco. He also claimed that Eduardo Velazco and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continu-
624

ous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more

than thirty1 (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court
of Cavite Tagaytay City, Branch 18.2 Malabanan’s witness,
Aristedes Velazco, testified that Lot 9864-A was originally
part of a 22-hectare property owned by his great-
grandfather.3 His uncle, Eduardo Velazco, who was
Malabanan’s predecessor-in-interest, inherited the lot.4
Malabanan also presented a document issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of
the Department of Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR) on
June 11, 2001. The document certified that the subject land
had already been classified as alienable and disposable
since March 15, 1982.5
The Solicitor General, through Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr., affirmed the truth of
Aristedes Velazco’s testimony.6 Malabanan’s application

was not challenged.7
_______________
1 Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, April 29,
2009, 587 SCRA 172, 180-181; See also note 5 of original Decision (We
noted the appellate court’s observation: “More importantly, Malabanan
failed to prove his ownership over Lot 9864-A. In his application for land
registration, Malabanan alleged that he purchased the subject lot from
Virgilio Velazco. x x x As aptly observed by the Republic, no copy of the
deed of sale covering Lot 9864-A, executed either by Virgilio or Eduardo
Velazco, in favor of Malabanan was marked and offered in evidence. x x x
[The deed of sale marked as Exhibit “I”] was a photocopy of the deed of
sale executed by Virgilio Velazco in favor of Leila Benitez and Benjamin
Reyes. x x x Thus, Malabanan has not proved that Virgilio or Eduardo
Velazco was his predecessor-in-interest.”).
2 Id., at p. 181.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id., at p. 182.
6 Id.
7 Id.
625
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 625

The RTC granted Malabanan’s application on December

2, 2002.
The Republic appealed the Decision to the Court of
Appeals. It argued that Malabanan failed to prove that the
subject land had already been classified as alienable and
disposable. The Republic insisted that Malabanan did not
meet the required manner and length of possession for
confirmation of imperfect title under the law.8
The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the RTC.
The CA held that under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree,
possession before the classification of land as alienable and
disposable should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession.9 Therefore, possession before March
15, 1982 should not be considered in the computation of the
period of possession. This is also in accordance with the
ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.10
Malabanan’s heirs (petitioners) appealed the Decision of
the CA.11 Relying on Republic v. Naguit,12 petitioners
argued that the period of possession required for perfecting

titles may be reckoned prior to the declaration that the
land was alienable and disposable.13 Open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of an alienable land of
public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts it
into private property.14 Previous classification is
immaterial so long as the
_______________
8 Id., at p. 183.
9 Id.
10 Id., at p. 184; Republic v. Herbieto, G.R. No. 156177, May 26, 2005,
459 SCRA 183.
11 Id., at p. 184. (Malabanan died before the CA released its Decision.)
12 Republic v. Naguit, G.R. No. 144507, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA
442.
13 Supra note 1, at p. 184.
14 Id., at p. 186.
626

property had already been converted to private property at

the time of the application.15
We dismissed the Petition because there was no clear
evidence to establish petitioners’ or their predecessors-in-
interest’s possession since June 12, 1945.16 Moreover, while
there was evidence that the land had already been declared
alienable and disposable since 1982, there was no evidence
that the subject land had been declared as no longer
intended for public use or service.17
Both petitioners and respondent ask for the
reconsideration of Our Decision on April 29, 2009.
I agree that Malabanan was not able to prove that he or
his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject land
since June 12, 1945. We already noted in the original
Decision that Malabanan offered no deed of sale covering
the subject lot, executed by any of the alleged predecessors-
in-interest in his favor.18 He only marked a photocopy of a
deed of sale executed by Virgilio Velazco in favor of Leila
Benitez and Benjamin Reyes.19
On that note alone, no title can be issued in favor of
Malabanan or petitioners.
However, I do not agree that all lands not appearing to

be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State20 or that lands remain part of the public
domain if the State does not reclassify or alienate it to a
private person.21 These presumptions are expressions of
the Regalian Doctrine.
_______________
15 Id.
16 Id., at p. 211.
17 Id.
18 Supra note 1.
19 Id.
20 Decision, p. 5.
21 Id.
627
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 627

Our present Constitution does not contain the term,

“regalian doctrine.” What we have is Article XII, Section 2,
which provides:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters,

minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated x x x.
There is no suggestion in this section that the

presumption in absolutely all cases is that all lands are
public. Clearly, the provision mentions only that “all lands
of the public domain” are “owned by the state.”
This is not the only provision that should be considered
in determining whether the presumption would be that the
land is part of the “public domain” or “not of the public
domain.”
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or

property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied equal protection of the laws.
This section protects all types of property. It does not

limit its provisions to property that is already covered by a
form of paper title. Verily, there could be land, considered

as property, where ownership has vested as a result of
either possession or prescription, but still, as yet,
undocumented. The original majority’s opinion in this case
presents some examples.
In my view, We have properly stated the interpretation
of Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the
Public Land Act as amended22 in relation to Section 14(1)
and 14(2)
_______________

22 Prior to Commonwealth Act No. 141, Act 926 (1903) provided for a
chapter on “Unperfected Title and Spanish Grants and Conces-
628

of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property

Registration Decree. Our ratio decidendi, therefore, should
only be limited to the facts as presented in this case. We
also properly implied that the titling procedures under
Property Registration Decree do not vest or create title.
The Property Registration Decree simply recognizes and
documents ownership and provides for the consequences of
issuing paper titles.
We have also recognized that “time immemorial
possession of land in the concept of ownership either
through themselves or through their predecessors in
interest” suffices to create a presumption that such lands
“have been held in the same way from before the Spanish
conquest, and never to have been public land.”23 This is an
interpretation in Cariño v. Insular Government24 of the
earlier version of Article III, Section 1 in the McKinley’s
Instructions.25 The case clarified that the
_______________
sions.” Act No. 2874 then amended and compiled the laws relative to
lands of the public domain. This Act was later amended by Acts No. 3164,
3219, 3346, and 3517. Commonwealth Act No. 141 or what is now the
Public Land Act was promulgated on November 7, 1936. Section 48 (b)
was later on amended by Republic Act No. 1942 (1957) and then later by
Pres. Dec. 1073 (1977). The effects of the later two amendments were
sufficiently discussed in the original majority opinion.
23 Cariño v. Insular Government, 202 U.S. 449, 460 (1909).
24 Id. (Cariño was an inhabitant of Benguet Province in the

Philippines. He applied for the registration of his land, which he and his
ancestors held as owners, without having been issued any document of
title by the Spanish Crown. The Court of First Instance dismissed the
application on grounds of law. The decision was affirmed by the U.S.
Supreme Court. The case was brought back to the U.S. Supreme Court by
writ of error.)
25 President’s Policy in the Philippines: His Instructions to the
Members of the Second Commission (April 7, 1900). (“Upon every division
and branch of the government of the Philippines, therefore, must be
imposed these inviolable rules: That no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation x x x.”)
629
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 629

Spanish sovereign’s concept of the “regalian doctrine” did

not extend to the American colonial period and to the
various Organic Acts extended to the Philippines.
Thus, in Cariño:
It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the

universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the
Crown… It is true also that, in legal theory, sovereignty is
absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United
States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it
does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the
Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such
power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a
question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new
sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the
subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall
recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide.
Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain,
it does not follow that, in view of the United States, [plaintiff
who held the land as owner] had lost all rights and was a
mere trespasser when the present government seized the
land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a
denial of native titles throughout an important part of
Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the
Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power
to enforce.
No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent
with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal
administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives,
not to exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic

Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 12, 32 Stat. 691, all the
property and rights acquired there by the United States are
to be administered “for the benefit of the inhabitants
thereof.”26 (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
26 Supra note 23, at pp. 457-459.
630

And with respect to time immemorial possession, Cariño

mentions:
The [Organic Act of July 1, 1902] made a bill of rights,

embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the
Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides
that
‘no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of
the laws.’
§ 5. In the light of the declaration that we have quoted
from § 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was
ready to declare in the next breath that x x x it meant by
“property” only that which had become such by ceremonies
of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never
had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what
they, by native custom and by long association--one of the
profoundest factors in human thought --regarded as their
own.
x x x
It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when,
as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been
held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it
will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public
land.27
Cariño is often misinterpreted to cover only lands for

those considered today as part of indigenous cultural
communities. However, nothing in its provisions limits it to
that kind of application. We could also easily see that the
progression of various provisions on completion of
imperfect titles in earlier laws were efforts to assist in the
recognition of these rights. In my view, these statutory

attempts should never be inter-
_______________
27 Supra note 23, at pp. 459-460.
631
VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 631

preted as efforts to limit what has already been

substantially recognized through constitutional
interpretation.
There are also other provisions in our Constitution
which protect the unique rights of indigenous peoples.28
This is in addition to our pronouncements interpreting
“property” in the due process clause through Cariño.
It is time that we put our invocations of the “regalian
doctrine” in its proper perspective. This will later on, in the
proper case, translate into practical consequences that do
justice to our people and our history.
Thus, I vote to deny the Motions for Reconsideration.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and respondent’s

Partial Motion for Reconsideration denied.
Notes.—Notwithstanding the passage of the Property

Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1)
therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both
laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-
interest who “have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.” (Heirs
of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic, 587 SCRA 172 [2009])
Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of
the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which
seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather
than establishing the right itself for the first time. (Id.)
——o0o——
_______________
28 CONSTITUTION, Art. XII, Sec. 5; Art. II, Sec. 22; Art. XIII, Sec. 6.
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2/4/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 704

G.R. No. 179987. September 3, 2013.*

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally

Civil Law; Property; Public Dominion; Private Ownership;

562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines

tural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks;

enable such reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to

VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 563

Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines

will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral

and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land

564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines

tion required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is

the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through

VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 565

Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines

the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the

Same; Same; Public Lands; View that the Constitution

566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines

lands and national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands can be

under the present system shall continue to remain as part

VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 567

Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines

that remain unclassified are considered as forest land. As forest

provides that “[o]nly things and rights which are susceptible of

568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines

Separation of Powers; Statutes; View that if the Supreme

Civil Law; Land Registration; View that the act of registration

VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 569

Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines

venes the constitutional rule that only agricultural lands of the

MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the

570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 571

Department of Environment and Natural Resources

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the

572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

prove that the property belonged to the alienable and

VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 573

found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of

574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-

Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan

VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 575

considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a

576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable

VOL. 704, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 577

lands according to their legal classification is done

neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national

578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a