A New Populism Index
A New Populism Index
A New Populism Index
Institutional Repository
CONTEXT
AUTHORS
1
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES
Essex, where he completed his PhD. He has worked at the Universities of Essex and
1999) and The Lacanian Left (Edinburgh University Press/ SUNY Press, 2007), co-
POPULISMUS: www.populismus.gr
for Modules 3 and 4 and a founding member of the Hellenic National Election
Studies. He specializes in web surveys and is the designer of the Voting Advice
journals, books and conference proceedings. For more details please visit
http://www.polres.gr/en/andreadis/
articles and reviews have appeared in a variety of journals, such as the Journal of
2
Political Ideologies, Constellations, European Political Science and Political Studies
Collective Movements Today. The Biopolitics of the Multitude versus the Hegemony
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work partly draws on research supported by the European Social Fund (European
Union) and National Funds (Greece) - Action ‘ARISTEIA II’ within the framework of
the Operational Programme ‘Education and Lifelong Learning’ under grant no. 3217.
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ABSTRACT
particular, the index is applied in a candidate survey carried out in Greece in 2015.
Findings indicate that this index allows for a clear differentiation between populist
and non-populist parties. Based on candidate attitudes, SYRIZA and ANEL belong to
the first group whereas New Democracy, PASOK and River to the second. The
examination of additional survey items reveals a clear ideological division within the
KEYWORDS
4
Introduction
In this paper we present the findings of research designed to test if and how populist
the work published in the available populism literature with insights from a
(a) are constructed around the nodal point ‘the people’, and (b) reflect a
against the elite. Our first research question is the following: Can we use this
between populist and non-populist parties? A second one follows: Can we use these
populism?
indicate their level of agreement with a series of statements on a five point Likert
scale and we have used their responses to create an index of populist attitudes for each
order to create a populism index for each political party. In order to test our research
separating Greek political parties into populist and non-populist or anti-populist. Then
we compare our survey-based populism indexes with this standpoint. If the index
associated with a populist party is significantly stronger than the index pertaining to a
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non-populist party, then our battery could be seen as a promising way of measuring
populism. The findings presented in this paper are based on the Greek part of the
the dataset does not offer the opportunity for a comparative analysis between
countries, but it can serve as a useful pilot study to check the quality of the statements
regarding the supply side of populist attitudes in the Greek context, since candidates
they represent. Measuring candidates’ populist attitudes has not been attempted in the
2010; Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn et al 2014; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011) and citizens’
Doing so could provide valuable insights into what may be not just an additional
aspect, but the missing link connecting the two aforementioned dimensions,
The first version of our survey items used to measure populist attitudes have been
developed by Kirk Hawkins and Scott Riding (2010). Following their argument that
populism is not an ideology, but a worldview that ‘identifies Good with a unified will
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of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite’ they have tried to develop questions
that incorporate both the core ideas of populism and the language in which they are
expressed. Their first battery of populist attitude items was included in the 2008
indicate their level of agreement with a statement. The overall focus of this attempt
was to measure populist attitudes as the expression of a struggle between the ‘pure’
In the same paper Hawkins and Riding use a subsample of 1,000 respondents
survey conducted by Yougov/Polimetrix and the 2008 Utah Colleges Exit Poll
(UCEP) and a sample of 950 respondents that was collected during the November
2008 general elections. The same datasets and a similar analysis were used later in a
(2013) have tested a battery of items to measure populist attitudes and to investigate
whether these attitudes can be linked with party preferences on a representative data
set of 586 Dutch respondents. This battery consists of three types of questions with a
target to measure (a) populist attitudes, (b) pluralist attitudes, and (c) elitist attitudes.
Based on the findings of this paper a group of scholars has proposed six populist
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The way we have chosen to formulate our questions attempts to facilitate further an
the aforementioned work by Mudde, Hawkins, etc. – and a discursive approach based
on ‘minimal criteria’ and inspired by the Essex School (Towshend 2003). It is true
that the theoretical and methodological corpus of the Essex School has not been thus
far adequately combined with quantitative measures of analysis. Thus, combining the
Essex School conceptual toolkit with quantitative methods, and especially ones that
Obviously, our aim is not some kind of fusion of discourse theory with attitudes
between the two traditions and methods. To be sure, methodological distance remains
between discursive and survey approaches. There is, for example, a mounting critical
Schwarz and Bohner 2001; Potter and Wetherell 1987; Potter 1998; Ajzen 2005).
Thus, from a discursive point of view the ‘attitudes’ captured and represented here are
specific behaviours, discursive patterns and public views (see also, in this respect,
Potter & Wetherell 1987: 43-55). They are rather interpreted as discursive units like
many others, and thus not as privileged entry points into the real (and/or supposedly
articulations of populist and nonpopulist parties, which can be assessed side by side,
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for example, with the official discourse of these parties to be found in party
documents and electoral manifestos. In this context, and despite the internal
approaches to populism, the exercise attempted here might tell us something useful
about the very nature of populism itself and the best way to research it.
Now, the theorists that developed the Essex School approach (see Laclau 1977,
1980, 2005a, 2005b; Panizza 2005; Stavrakakis 2004; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis
defining populism, one that has recently attracted the attention of mainstream theorists
(Hawkins 2010: 10). This model is based on two minimal discursive criteria. In
a) stage a polarized representation of society as divided between two main blocs: i.e.
the establishment, the power block versus the underdog (in opposition to consensual
b) involve claims to represent one of the poles implicated in this uneven dualist
distribution, the one associated with the excluded/subordinated part, namely ‘the
field and ‘the people’ as a discursive nodal point. Otherwise no useful differential
classification can emerge to the extent that far too many political discourses could be
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associated with only one of the two without, of course, being populist. Hence, on the
one hand, these criteria can produce operational mappings of the political frontiers
well as accounting for their occasional sedimentation through the emergence and
2014: 58); on the other, they also register the vast plurality of different and often
Having registered the communication between the new mainstream and the
Mudde (2007) (Aslanidis 2015). It is crucial to stress here that even scholars that
claim to understand populism along the lines of Mudde’s perspective, often avoid
interesting example here is Stijn van Kessel, who departs from Mudde’s remarks in
order to offer a definition that stresses the discursive elements of populism (van
Kessel 2015: 13), understanding it more as a ‘set of ideas’ (Kessel 2015: 11). In fact,
van Kessel highlights right from the first page of his latest book that he aims to
‘identify parties that stand out from the others in terms of their consistent expression
of a populist discourse’ (Kessel 2015: 1). To sum up, dropping the ideological clause
means that we clearly acknowledge the lack of coherence and continuity in terms of
values, policies, programmes, etc. between populist parties and movements. It means
that we opt to shift the emphasis from content to form; that we choose to focus
primarily on their shared logic, on the particular way in which the various discursive
elements are organised and articulated in a given discourse. Such a choice is clearly
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reflected in the way our survey items are formulated. This, however, does not mean
that we are throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Despite the shortcomings of the
undisputable merit in the relevant theoretical corpus and empirical research as well
some shared premises with discourse analysis. In this sense, our stance is not one of
rejection, but rather of creative incorporation (see also Stavrakakis & Katsambekis
2014: 122).
Katsambekis 2014), has to do with the varying contents of populist discourses and the
different significations of the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’, or ‘the people’ and its ‘other(s)’.
For example, when studying the recent Greek experience one immediately realizes
that the content of SYRIZA’s discourse, regarding who the ‘people’ are, could not be
furthest from the populist right and extreme-right rhetoric of other parties, which are
often described as populist as well. What becomes thus visible is two very different
conceptualizations of the ‘people’ circulating in the Greek public sphere: the first, put
predominantly nationalist, rather passive, even racially and ethnically pure, anti-
democratic and authoritarian (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014: 135). For example,
the Independent Greeks (ANEL), a populist and nationalist right-wing party (currently
one finds Golden Dawn, which also portrays ‘the people’ as a ‘national people’;
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actually a racially pure and ethnic people, very close to a Greek version of Aryanism.
At the same time, the enemy of the people is most often identified with persecuted
minorities (immigrants, refugees, etc.). In this sense, and although Golden Dawn is
predominantly ‘populist’: any references to the ‘people’ within its discourse remains
peripheral, ultimately reduced to a nativist and racist conception of the nation, which
functions as the nodal point of its discursive articulation. Indeed, not only is ‘people’
reduced to ‘nation’ or ‘race’ in Golden Dawn rhetoric; at the same time (popular)
representation is replaced by some sort of direct embodiment along the lines of the
Führerprinzip.
regions. For example, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) elaborate
their distinction in geographical terms, with Latin America being recognized as the
right-wing exclusionary populism (also see Gidron and Bonikowski 2014: 5). Even
until a few years ago, it may be that today such schemas of exclusive geographical
conditions (i.e. the role of economic and debt crises, political culture, etc.) and the
similarities between Latin American and European countries that were not visible a
few years ago. For example, we knew that left-wing populism existed in Europe all
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along (March 2011: 122). In the crisis context, however, certain left-wing populist
(Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, etc.). It may, thus, make sense to bracket the
geographical criterion, sticking to the socio-political and discursive one instead, and
right-wing populism(s), that is to say negotiating the very boundary between the two,
represented by the divide ‘inclusion versus exclusion’ (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013),
but also marking the complex relationship between people and nation or demos and
differentiations and their influence on political behaviour. For example, it has been
recently argued that what actually shapes the behaviour of right-wing or left-wing
and not ‘populism’ per se. In an extensive comparative study of the parliamentary
behaviour of the Dutch Socialist Party (SP) and the Party for Freedom (PVV), which
Otjes and Tom Louwerse have shown that their parliamentary choices were dictated
by their left-wing or right-wing ideology and not by their alleged ‘populism’ (Otjes
and Louwerse 2013: 16). Thus, the PVV voted in a much more similar way to the
mainstream centre-right VVD, while SP’s behaviour was closer to the Labour Party
(PvdA) and the Green Left. The most significant issue where these differences played
out regarded – not surprisingly – policies on immigration (Otjes and Louwerse 2013:
15-16). Katsambekis (2014, 2015) has observed a similar pattern within the Greek
political system, concerning especially SYRIZA and ANEL. Hence, while the two
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parties formed two coalition governments between January and September 2015, they
clashed when SYRIZA proposed a law in June 2015 that would grant full citizenship
children. The bill was eventually voted down by ANEL, but passed with the support
of parties of the liberal centre and the centre-left (RIVER [Potami], PASOK). The
same happened with the new legal framework concerning same-sex civil unions
Now, the above research hypotheses and orientations have been mostly based
quantitative means, we purport to further consolidate certain theses on two levels: (a)
regarding the distinctive character of populist and non-populist parties, and (b)
regarding the sharp (?) difference between populist parties of the Left and the Right.
assuming that ‘the people’ would occupy a less significant position in non-populist
ones; second, a strong antagonistic conception of society that represents the ‘people’
and the ‘elites’ as two rival camps in the first group; and third, a more inclusivist and
pluralist conception of ‘the people’ on the left of the political spectrum, against a
rather exclusivist and homogenizing one on the right (examining attitudes towards
immigration and specific social groups, like homosexuals, etc., would be crucial here).
Last but not least, affinities between parties regarding inclusivity/exclusivity and thus
the ideologico-political spectrum (Left-Right) and not with regard to their populist or
non-populist profile (e.g. ANEL should be closer to ND, and SYRIZA should be
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Data
The Greek Candidate Study is part of the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS)
which is a joint multi-national project with the goal of collecting data on candidates
CCS is conducted after the elections in order to collect data at the same period that
data on voters are collected as part of national election studies. This means that in
order to understand the findings presented in the following sections of this paper, we
should take into account that the candidates give their answer when they already
know the electoral outcome and whether their political parties are in government or
not.
It should be noted that, in theory, the target population of the CCS comprises
all the candidates who have participated in the parliamentary election. In practice,
when the members of each national research team organize the national candidate
survey, they have to take into account the specific characteristics of their country.
There are three significant factors that affect their decisions in this respect: (a) the
funds available for a given survey (b) the relative size and importance of each
political party within the national party system and (c) the availability of contact
details of the candidates. The first two factors (funds and parties) interact with each
other: if the funds are adequate, the survey can target the candidates of all parties. On
the other hand, if funds are limited, only the candidates of the larger, more significant
parties can be included in the designed sample. The third factor sometimes depends
on the first factor; however, there are occasions in which the contact details of the
candidates remain inaccessible even when funding is not an issue. In order to clarify
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this argument, let’s imagine a situation in which we want to obtain a list of the email
addresses of the candidates of a particular party. What happens if this party declines
to provide this list? If the candidates of this party have their own personal websites or
corresponding websites and harvesting the email addresses. In this case the whole
process would require some extra time and resources, but it would be possible to
create the required list of email addresses. On the other hand, if the candidates of the
party do not have personal websites or blogs, it may be impossible to collect the email
addresses, or any other contact details, no matter what the level of available funds is.1
In Greece CCS is usually run as a mixed-mode survey and the first mode is always a
web-survey (Andreadis 2010) with invitations and reminders sent to the email address
of the candidates. The data of these studies are available from the website of the
Hellenic National Election Studies (http://www.elnes.gr) and have been used in many
The selection of the target population of the Greek CCS has been determined
availability of contact details. Due to the limited resources of the Greek CCS research
team, the target population cannot include all the candidates of the 22 parties and
party coalitions that participated in the Greek parliamentary elections of January 2015.
The target population has thus been limited to the candidates of the larger parties. In
addition, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and Golden Dawn (GD) have always
and consistently refused to provide a list of email addresses for their candidates. To
make things worse, the candidates of these parties are usually selected directly by the
party leadership. Most of them do not run personal campaigns, they do not have
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personal websites and it is arguably impossible to find their personal contact details.2
At the same time, obtaining a limited number of questionnaires from these parties
makes impossible any reliable statistical processing.3 As a result, the Greek Candidate
At any rate, the lack of KKE and GD candidates is not anticipated to create
substantial problems for our analysis. Firstly, because we never purported to argue
that our populism index can examine and classify all 22 parties that participated in the
elections. This would be extremely costly and probably useless, mainly because, for
most of the smaller Greek parties, it is not known by other methods (such as discourse
analysis) and has not been publicly debated whether they should be considered
populist or not. Instead, what is really and crucially at stake is whether it is possible to
identify and classify as populist (or not) the five parties that are included in the
dataset; it is here that one can compare an overall consensus on their populist or non-
(Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014) – with the mapping resulting from the
(innovative) use of our index in a candidate survey. Secondly, because as far as the
populism/anti-populism axis is concerned, both KKE and Golden Dawn are marginal
(fulfilling the first criterion of a discursive approach to populism), the role of the
ethnically and racially pure conception of the ‘nation’ (Golden Dawn). A thorough
literature review indeed reveals that KKE is hardly ever discussed as a populist force
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misplaced both from a discursive and an ideational perspective (Stavrakakis and
For the Greek part of the study we have used 6 items that were included in the
perspective. The only item that had to be changed because it was not suitable for
citizen than by a specialized politician’. A statement with this meaning is not expected
by a mainstream politician, but there are many examples of populist leaders who have
expressed similar ideas, arguing that they should not be seen as politicians (Panizza
2005: 21). Instead, they claim to be ordinary citizens and when they get in dialogue
with the people they follow Berlusconi who used to adopt the phrase: “I am one of
you” (Tarchi 2002: 133). This approach seems to work for Donald Trump as well,
who gets endorsements for not being a ‘professional’ politician, but one of the people.
We have also avoided to include any item that refers to politics as a struggle
between ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Whenever a similar item was used in a survey it either has
not loaded heavily in the factors (both US studies in Hawkins et al 2012) or it has
loaded higher on the elitism dimension (Akkerman et al 2013). Trying to justify the
failure of this item to load on the populism factor, Akkerman et al have argued that
the item may have been interpreted more strictly along religious lines and that it may
be more suitable for the ‘Latin American context, where populist leaders use a more
religiously inspired discourse’ (ibid., 12). Thus, the items we have used clearly
involve a polarized viewpoint of a society that is divided between two main blocs, but
the moral dimension, i.e. the opposition of ‘good’ against ‘evil’ (which may be as
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well used by the supporters of the anti-populism camp in order to accuse populist
people’ and the ‘elite’, where the former is perceived as ‘good’, ‘pure’ and/or
‘homogeneous’ and the latter is regarded as ‘corrupt’ and ‘evil’ (Mudde 2007; see
also Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012) need to be engaged with caution, bracketing the
around very different nodal points. De la Torre is right to point out that such
narratives of redemption epitomize ‘the saga of the people, the proletariat, the
indigenous, or the nation’ (De la Torre 2015: 10). Interestingly enough, today the
‘markets’ are also routinely invested with such imagery of purity to the extent that
for many influential critical political theorists the turn to moralistic discourse, ‘the
populist consensual politics positioned beyond left and right; here moral
(Mouffe 2002: 1, 14). If this is indeed the case then this criterion may be more useful
in determining the degree, the depth and salience, of a given populist (or other)
identification. At any rate, we are not arguing that moralistic arguments are not
present in populist discourses. They may as well be present, as they are in most types
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of political discourse, animating different types of antagonistic divides. What we are
populism, and thus cannot form part of its minimal definition. Moreover, there have
been studies that illustrate that a populist discourse might operate without overly
2016).
All in all, in our analysis, one item (the one concerning the moral dimension)
is excluded and two new ones are added, marking in this way a first shift/variation
The battery of the eight items was thus formulated as follows and they were
included as 5-point Likert items using the following coding 1: Strongly disagree, 2:
POP1. The politicians in parliament need to follow the will of the people.
POP2. The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy
decisions.
POP3. The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the
POP5. Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.
POP6. What people call ‘compromise’ in politics is really just selling out on one’s
principles.
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POP7. Popular demands are today ignored in favour of what benefits the
establishment.
POP8. Political forces representing the people should adopt a more confrontational
Τhe two new items (POP7 and POP8) were added in a bid to capture the
nature and the depth of the perceived antagonistic divide between people and
establishment/elite (previously only covered by POP3 to the extent that in most other
particular, a high score in POP7 would reflect a sharp contrast between the perceived
interests of ‘the people’ and the interests of the ‘establishment’, while a lower score
would mean that a representation of society in such antagonistic terms is not prevalent.
With POP8 we aim at further investigating and clarifying the linkage between
ones. A high score in this case would thus reflect a more confrontational political
rationale, close to what Laclau has described as the ‘logic of equivalence’, while a
low score would reflect what we can describe as a more ‘institutional’ political
rationale, close to what Laclau has described as the ‘logic of difference’ (Laclau
Findings
The Greek CCS 2015 was conducted from mid-February to end of July 2015 as a web
survey. The population of interest is the group of all candidates running with the five
(depending on how the cases of unknown eligibility are used in the formula). Since
the targeted population includes the same number of candidates from each of the five
parties, in a representative sample each party should be represented by circa 20%. The
demonstrating that the distribution per party in the sample is similar to the distribution
According to Andreadis (2016): (a) the distribution of the candidates in the sample is
very similar to the corresponding distribution in the population with regard to their
electoral districts, (b) the elected MPs are slightly under-represented in the sample,
but the gap is not very large (8.1% of the sample and 12.5% of the population)4 and
(c) there is a high level of correspondence between sample and population as far as
In Table 2 we present the descriptive statistics for the eight populist attitudes
items that were included in the Greek CCS 2015. The table shows the number of
responses (N) for each variable, its mean value, standard deviation and median. The
because the variables are ordinal. The mean value for two of the items (POP4 and
POP6) is less than 3 (i.e. the middle category of the scale). In fact, the median of POP
6 is 2, indicating that half of the candidates disagree with the idea that compromising
is equal to selling out. The highest mean value is observed for item POP8: ‘Political
22
forces representing the people should adopt a more confrontational attitude in order to
In the Appendix we test the reliability and unidimensionality of the scale. The
reliability is tested with both Cronbach’s alpha and ordinal alpha (Gadermann, Guhn
and Zumbo, 2012). The unidimensionality is tested with factor analysis and Mokken
scale analysis (van Schuur, 2003; Germann and Mendez, 2015) using the R package
mokken (Van der Ark, 2012). All the tests we have used indicate that excluding POP5
gives a better scale. Thus, we have dropped this item and our populism index is
constructed as the mean value of the remaining seven populist attitude items.5 As
with our discursive framework – score below 3.5 while the candidates of both
consistent with our discursive framework – score over 3.5. As their 95% confidence
intervals indicate, ANEL candidates score higher than SYRIZA candidates on the
populism index. PASOK, ND and RIVER candidates do not differ significantly on the
same index and they form a common group. But this group (the candidates of PASOK,
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Greece is not only one of the few countries with both significant left-wing and right-
left-wing and a right-wing populist party. This allows for very interesting
are differences between the (assumed) left-wing populism of SYRIZA candidates and
the (assumed) right-wing populism of ANEL candidates we have run a t-test for each
between the candidates of SYRIZA and ANEL is less than 0.05 for six out of the
seven items included in the scale. The item with the largest difference between
SYRIZA and ANEL candidates is the item: ‘What people call compromise in politics
is really just selling out on one’s principles’. In this respect, SYRIZA candidates’
score is 2.84 and ANEL candidates’ score is 3.59. The p value of the t-test is less than
0.001. This finding is consistent with Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2013) who find
have observed that the voters of the left-wing SP are more willing to listen to the
opinions of others and they argue that this finding is consistent with the idea that
‘compromise’ stem from different political cultures that have developed in different
history within party politics and other forms of representative institutions (like trade
unions) within a larger and more coherently organized structure (around 80% of
SYRIZA’s cadres come from Synaspismos, which was founded in 1992, while a lot of
them also originate from the Greek Communist Party / KKE). On the other hand,
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ANEL constitute a considerably leader-centric party that was practically built around
the persona of their leader, Panos Kammenos, a former ND MP, from 2012 onwards.
Its cadres have not thus developed the type of militancy and institutional culture that
populism on the supply side in Greece we have used items reflecting socio-cultural
issues from the Greek Voting Advice Application HelpMeVote 2015 (Andreadis
the questionnaire of the Greek Candidate Study 2015 and provide significant data on
the different attitudes along the GAL (Green, Alternative, Libertarian) vs TAN
2002). In the index produced along these lines larger values appear for the candidates
who promote the ideas of security and national identity, the exclusion of immigrants
and other groups such as homosexuals. Candidates with lower scores are those who
Table 4 shows that there is a chasm separating SYRIZA and ANEL with regard to
their attitudes toward issues such as crime and immigration. The scores of SYRIZA
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additional support to the hypothesis that right-wing populism is exclusionary and
wing and right-wing populist parties we can refer to Table 5 that presents the
distribution of answers per party on immigration. Indeed this table shows a significant
majority of ANEL candidates (58.3%) support that immigrants who come to Greece
should be required to adopt Greek customs. On the other hand, the majority of
SYRIZA candidates (68.5%) disagree with this idea. It is interesting that the two
populist parties occupy the extreme positions and they are clearly separated by the
mainstream parties, which are located in the middle. What is also very clear in this
table is that candidate attitudes regarding this issue are strictly determined by their
since they are distributed along a perfect sequence from the (radical) right to the
(radical) left.
Conclusion
demonstrated that this index can be used to discriminate between populist and non-
populist parties in contemporary Greece. More specifically, our findings show that the
candidates of the parties that have been generally categorized as populist and also
26
qualify as such using discourse analysis (in dialogue with the ‘new mainstream’ in
populism studies), namely SYRIZA and ANEL, score significantly higher than the
populist.
Our second task was to investigate if we can use these and additional survey
items to discriminate between left-wing and right-wing populism. Using the candidate
data we have found that the candidates of the left-wing populist party SYRIZA are
more willing to listen to other opinions and to compromise than the candidates of the
right-wing populist party ANEL. Using additional survey items we have concluded
populism is more inclusive and pluralist. Indeed inclusionary and pluralist attitudes
are stronger on the left of the political spectrum than on the right, and thus affinities
and not with regard to a populist or non-populist profile (e.g. ANEL appear closer to
the mainstream right or centre-right ND, and SYRIZA closer to the centre or centre-
left, PASOK and RIVER). The findings in Table 5 regarding attitudes towards
be much more important in shaping attitudes and/or behaviour, than populism per se.
To sum up, what this pilot study shows is that there is indeed open ground for
mainstream orientations. What is more, our findings have revealed differences among
27
populist parties that were not evident through qualitative discourse analysis, namely
the willingness of SYRIZA’s candidates to accept compromise more easily than the
ones of ANEL. On this level, we should go back to our qualitative data and inquire
under this new light for evidence of such signals in public discourse materials. This
also means that surveys do not merely test hypotheses already formulated within a
theoretical/qualitative context. They also generate feedback that can lead to further
research strategy. At the same time, the utilization of discourse theory in this study
has been rather cautious, limited to the re-formulation of the battery (by theoretically
supporting the exclusion of a certain item and by contributing two new items). Such
could explore the possibility of developing more substantive links on this front
It should have become clear up to this point that the candidate survey
parties within the Greek political system. This means that on the supply-side one
indeed finds evidence that supports the different categorization of certain parties
within the political system along the lines of our theoretical framework. Now, it
and attitudes that are expressed from their voter constituency, leading to the creation
of sustainable bonds between the two sides? Now, one might argue here that this is a
constructed at the level of discourse, as political actors actively shape the (collective)
28
identities of the social subjects to which they appeal and vice-versa. However, the
(populist) message/call from above, which simultaneously creates its subjects, and
Phillips 2002: 15, 40-1, 43). Such a distinction may be utilized as a qualification of
hence the wider validity of the index we have developed will require its future
with such a research that will shed additional light to the hypotheses and findings
presented here. It also remains to be seen whether our method is suitable to research
other countries in the European context and beyond; it seems, however, plausible to
expect that similar results will be generated in countries facing similar challenges in
crisis-ridden Europe and exhibiting a similar political culture. After all, certain items
of the questionnaire we have utilised have already been used in other contexts (as has
Regarding further future research, our attempt here is indicative of the merits
Additional methods that could be adopted here, in order to arrive at an even wider
would, in the first instance, encompass congruence between candidates and voters in
29
the Greek context and beyond. Our discursive methodology provides the concrete
basis for a strategy that could simultaneously utilize different research approaches and
can serve both as the source for the formulation of questions/hypotheses on each level
and as a reflexive tool for the analysis of the respective research outcomes.
Notes
1. For some readers it may be surprising that certain parties refuse to participate in an
academic research project, but this depends on the country under study. According to
Trechsel and Mair (2011) the pan-European Voting Advice Application euprofiler has
asked European political parties to code themselves. The overall response rate was
37.6% but its variability per country was enormous. For countries with long tradition
of co-operation between parties and VAA designers (e.g. Belgium, Finland, the
Netherlands) the response rate was larger than 75%, but in Greece only 3 out of 7
2. The interested reader can easily verify that most of the elected MPs of KKE cannot
be contacted directly via email. A simple visit to the website of the Greek Parliament:
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr shows that almost all KKE MPs either do not have
an email account or they have a common email account that belongs to the party:
kke@parliament.gr
3. The Greek Candidate Study 2015 includes only one completed questionnaire from
4. At this point it should also be noted that we have replicated the analysis of the
following sections in the sub-group of the sample that is created after the removal of
the elected MPs, and we have received similar results. When we examine only the
30
non-elected MPs, all parties appear slightly more populist, but the difference of the
populism index is less than 0.5% for all other parties and less than 1.5% for SYRIZA,
the party with the larger number of MPs. We note that if elected MPs are removed,
the group of SYRIZA candidates will be the smaller in the sample, because this party
has the smaller number of non-elected candidates (e.g. SYRIZA: out of 412
candidates, 144 have been elected, ND: out of 412 candidates, 72 have been elected,
etc). In order to have almost the same number of candidates per party we opted to
5. As an additional test, we have built a second populism index as the mean of all
eight items. Replicating the analysis with this index we get very similar results.
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37
Appendix
We need to test the internal consistency of the items mainly for two reasons. The first
reason is that there are two new items that have not been tested before. The second
reason is that the remaining six items have only been tested on voters so far. This is
the first time these items are used on candidates, thus we need to check if the
reliability of the scale remains intact when the scale is applied on candidates.
Cronbach’s alpha for the eight items included in the Greek Candidate Study gets the
value of 0.80, suggesting that the eight items have relatively high internal consistency.
The item with the lower correlation (0.304) with the whole set of items is the item
POP5 ‘Elected officials talk too much and take too little action’. If POP5 is removed,
Cronbach’s alpha for the remaining seven items becomes 0.81. Since we have
measurements involving ordinal data, we also calculate ordinal alpha. Ordinal alpha
for the eight items is 0.83 and if POP5 is removed, it becomes 0.84.
In order to test if the items form a unidimensional scale we can use factor
analysis. If all items load on a single factor, then the scale is unidimensional. The first
column of Table A.1 gives the output of a factor analysis using all the populist
attitudes items. The loading of POP5 on the first factor (i.e. the correlation between
POP5 and the latent variable of populist attitudes) is low (0.29). The second column
gives the output of a factor analysis after excluding POP5. All factor loadings in the
second column are rather high. In addition, the indexes of model fit presented at the
bottom of the first two columns indicate that the second model is much better, as it
becomes obvious by the smaller BIC in the second column. In addition, we observe
that two of the three presented fit indexes of the first model are far from the thresholds
38
used for accepted models, while the fit indexes of the second model are either within
or very close to the range of suggested values of a good fit. For the root mean square
error of approximation (RMSEA), the suggested cut-off value is between 0.06 and
0.07. For the non-normed fit index (NNFI) the suggested cut-off is 0.95. Finally, for
the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), a value of .08 or less is
Confirmatory Factor Analysis on the seven populist attitudes items and after
consulting the modification indices we have been able to improve the fit indices: For
instance, after specifying an error correlation between items POP7 and POP8,
RMSEA decreases to 0.036. This finding reinforces our argument that the model with
39
For ordinal items with different distribution it is better to use Mokken scale
analysis instead of factor analysis. Thus, in order to verify the results provided by
factor analysis, we have included in the last two columns of Table A.1 the output of
Mokken scale analysis. In the third column we present the item scalability coefficients
Hi. As a rule of thumb, in order to accept a set of items as a Mokken scale, the
scalability coefficient for each item should be larger than 0.30 and POP5 fails this
criterion. In the last column of the table we present the output of Mokken scale
analysis on the remaining seven items. Now, all coefficients pass the 0.3 threshold.
The scalability (homogeneity) coefficient H for the entire scale is improved from
0.381 (in the model with all eight items) to 0.422 (after excluding POP5).
40
Table 1. Number of candidates per party in the sample
Party Frequency Percent
SYRIZA 112 21.5
ND 102 19.6
RIVER 108 20.8
PASOK 96 18.5
ANEL 102 19.6
Total 520 100.0
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the populist attitudes items
Standard
N Mean Deviation Median
POP1 497 3.85 0.95 4
POP2 494 3.25 1.17 3
POP3 471 3.49 1.07 4
POP4 501 2.89 1.04 3
POP5 490 3.74 0.92 4
POP6 492 2.68 1.15 2
POP7 492 3.37 1.17 4
POP8 492 3.95 0.92 4
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Table 3. SYRIZA/ANEL differences per item
SYRIZA ANEL
Item N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. t p
POP1 107 4.18 0.63 98 4.40 0.65 -2.46 0.015
POP2 106 3.95 0.83 98 3.91 1.04 0.34 0.736
POP3 106 4.08 0.82 90 3.90 0.91 1.41 0.159
POP4 109 3.08 0.86 98 3.38 1.09 -2.14 0.033
POP6 102 2.84 1.00 98 3.59 1.07 -5.10 <0.001
POP7 102 3.70 1.12 98 4.17 0.94 -3.26 0.001
POP8 108 4.24 0.73 97 4.48 0.61 -2.56 0.011
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Table 4. Comparison of Populism and TAN indexes per political party
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Table 5. ‘Immigrants who come to Greece should be required to adopt Greek
customs’; responses by political party
Party Disagree Neither Agree
… nor
SYRIZA 68.5% 21.3% 10.2%
ND 32.6% 30.5% 36.8%
RIVER 47.6% 29.5% 22.9%
PASOK 47.8% 22.2% 30.0%
ANEL 21.9% 19.8% 58.3%
Total 44.3% 24.7% 31.0%
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Figure 1. Populism Index by political party
46