RWP20 002 Norris

Measuring Populism Worldwide
Faculty Research Working Paper Series
Pippa Norris
Harvard Kennedy School
February 2020
RWP20-002
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Measuring Populism Worldwide: Norris 1/8/20 8:50 PM
Measuring Populism Worldwide
Pippa Norris
McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
Pippa_Norris@Harvard.edu
www.pippanorris.com
@PippaN15
www.GlobalPartySurvey.org
Data: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/GlobalPartySurvey.
Synopsis: Populism studies have rapidly burgeoned but nevertheless

systematic cross-national evidence about this phenomenon has lagged far
behind. How can populism be measured in ways which are consistent, valid,
and reliable? To address this issue, Part I outlines the minimalist concept of
populism used in the study. Part II summarizes the pros and cons of previous
attempts at gauging and classifying party ideological values and issue
positions in general, as well as recent studies seeking to classify populists as
a distinct party family. Part III describes the research design employed to
construct the Global Party Survey, replicating the methods of previous expert
surveys but expanding coverage worldwide and including innovative
measures of populist rhetoric. The new dataset, drawing upon estimates from
1,861 experts, covers 1,043 political parties in 163 countries around the globe
(see www.GlobalPartySurvey.org). Part IV presents key results and a series
of robustness tests confirming that the new estimates of ideological values
and populist parties are consistently correlated with previous measures. The
conclusion in Part V summarizes the results and considers the potential uses
of the dataset for understanding populism as a global phenomenon.
Keywords: populist parties, measuring populism, expert survey methods,
comparative politics
1
The rise of populism has generated a rapidly expanding literature across

diverse social science disciplines. But can parties as varied as the Sweden
Democrats, Jobbik, the French National Rally, and the Italian Five Star
Movement all be classified consistently as part of the same ‘populist radical
right’ family? Are there shared values among ‘populist’ leaders as diverse as
Donald Trump, Geert Wilders, Jair Bolsonaro, Rodrigo Duterte, Narendra
Modi, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orbán, Miloš Zeman,
Hugo Chavez, Bernie Sanders, Boris Johnson, and Nigel Farage?
Unfortunately, systematic, valid, and rigorous cross-national measurement of
the populist phenomenon has lagged far behind scholarly research.
The Global Party Survey project aims to identify multidimensional patterns
of party competition in global perspective, broadening and updating
estimates from previous expert surveys used for this purpose. The study also
includes innovative measures gauging how far political parties around the
world use populist rhetoric.
Part I discusses the concept of populism employed in the study, understood
as a rhetoric claiming that the only legitimate authority flows directly from
‘the people’, and by contrast ‘the establishment’ is corrupt, out of touch and
self-serving, betraying the public trust, and thwarting the popular will. Part
II describes the pros and cons of techniques used previously to measure the
general ideological values and issue positions of political parties, as well as
recent studies seeking to classify populist parties as a distinct family. Part III
builds upon the methods of expert surveys to construct the Global Party
Survey, designed to estimate of key ideological values, issue positions, and
the degree of populist rhetoric used by contemporary political parties
worldwide. The dataset draws upon 1,861 experts. It covers 1,043 political
parties in 163 countries around the globe (see www.GlobalPartySurvey.org).
Part IV briefly describes key results by data visualizations illustrating
multidimensional patterns of party competition on Left-Right economic
values and Conservative-Liberal social values, as well as in the use of populist
rhetoric. A series of robustness tests provide health checks to compare the
GPS estimates with several previous studies of European parties (including
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), the Parliamentary Governance
project, and the Comparative Manifesto Project), as well as the list of populist
parties developed by Team Populus, and the values and attitudes of party
voters from the pooled World Values Survey/European Values Survey 1-7.
The conclusion in Part V summarizes the key features of the GPS dataset
and its capacity to expand the research agenda by understanding populism as
a global phenomenon.
I: The concept of populism
It is essential to establish clear definitions of populism prior to developing
valid operational measures. A common approach in the research literature,
followed by the project, regards populism as a rhetorical form or style of
political discourse, implying a language and form of speech designed to
persuade its audience (Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Aalberg et al 2017;
Bonikowski and Gidron 2016; Hawkins 2009; Hawkins et al 2019).
Building upon this perspective, populism is conceptualized in this study as a
rhetoric about legitimate authority and where power should rightfully lie. At
minimum, what qualifies rhetoric as specifically ‘populist’ are twin claims,
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namely that: (i) the only legitimate authority flows directly from the ‘people’,
and by contrast (ii) the enemy of the people are the ‘establishment’ who are
corrupt, out of touch, and self-serving, false, betraying the public trust, and
thwarting the popular will. The notions of ‘people’ and ‘establishment’ are
fuzzy in this language rather than precise, and malleable to each context and
audience rather than well-defined.
In the political sphere, the rhetoric claims that legitimacy lies with the
‘people’, a powerful claim echoing core democratic values. In practice,
however, the language may often be weaponized as a façade by strongman
leaders with authoritarian values who claim a direct mandate to act on behalf
of ‘the people’ while they actively seek to dismantle checks and balances on
executive power. This includes attacking the legitimacy of elected
representatives and political opponents, as well as the courts, judges, and rule
of law, state officials and mainstream media, along with the broader range of
policy technocrats, professional think-tanks, academic opinion-formers, and
scientific consultants.
As argued in our previous work (Norris and Inglehart 2019):
“In this regard, populism is treated not a distinct type of leadership, or
even a family of political parties, as is often assumed, but rather as a
discourse about governance that can be adopted by actors across the
entire ideological spectrum. We reject the notion that populism, in
itself, makes other ideological claims about substantive or
programmatic claims about what should be done; instead it is a rhetoric
about the rightful location of governance authority in any society.
In Western democracies, the most common antithesis of populism is
‘Pluralism’, emphasizing the importance of tolerating multiculturalism
and social diversity in society, governance through liberal democratic
institutions, the role of checks and balances on executive powers, and
respect for minority rights to counterbalance the majoritarian voice of
the people. In non-democratic countries, however, populism may also
be contested by those advocating ‘elitism’ – claiming that power should
rest in the hands of a single leader, a leadership elite, or a predominant
party.” (Norris and Inglehart 2019).
Ideologies such as socialism, communism or liberalism present a set of
coherent values and principles, suggesting a plan of action to achieve these
goals, with policies on a wide range of issues like the economy, immigration,
the environment, and international affairs. By contrast, populism does not
provide a vision about the good society or present a coherent set of ideas.
The chameleonic rhetoric of populism is adaptable to parties and leaders of
many political persuasions. It is colored by ‘second order’ principles,
including varied values and issue positions.
The European literature has conventionally categorized populists as part of
the so-called ‘radical right’ or ‘extreme right’, implying unidimensional
patterns of party competition (Ignazi 2003; Betz 1994; Betz and Immerfall
1998; Hainsworth 1992, 2000; Mudde 2007, 2016; Wodak et al. 2013). But,
in fact, a broader perspective suggests that these labels, and indeed even the
conventional Left-Right framework, are often inadequate to capture the
varied types of populists found around the world. Many populist leaders have
traditionally been regarded as economically leftwing in Central and Eastern
3
Europe (Pirro 2015) as well as in Latin America (Torre and Arnson 2013).
In the United States, as well, President Trump advocates a mélange of policies
including America-First nationalism, anti-immigrant nativism, and social
conservatism on cultural issues like gay rights, climate change, gun control,
and reproductive rights, mixed with protectionist economic policies like
tariffs and farm subsidies which fly in the face of traditional GOP orthodoxy.
The populist tropes can also be heard in the language of social democrats like
Senator Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, railing against the billionaire
class and policies benefitting the ‘few not the many’ while advocating
progressive taxation and healthcare for all.
One reason for the difficulties of understanding this phenomenon is that, like
an architectural façade for a movie studio lot, the rhetorical style (and thus
the ideas being expressed in the speech) may be genuine or faux. The
language is chameleonic and adaptable. Slogans are intended to signal shared
meanings recognized by its audience as largely symbolic rather than literal
(‘Build the Wall’, ‘Lock her Up’, ‘Drain the Swamp’, ‘Get Brexit Done’).
Critics regard such slogans as transparent lies. By expressing shared feelings
of anger, however, supporters may believe that the words reflect a deeper
truth (Wodak 2015). The exaggerative hyperbole anticipates the hopes and
fears of the audience, building repetitive call-and-response choruses
interacting with the speaker, as predictable as familiar church rituals. Indeed,
the rhetoric may say more about the audience than the speaker. President
Trump, for example, uses two distinct styles of oratory, one flat and
humdrum, read from the teleprompter for official occasions, the other
impromptu, rambling, repetitive, and deeply emotive, tapping into the
impotent rage, victimhood resentment, and frustration of his base (Kelly
2019; Rowland 2019; Lamont, Park and Ayala-Hurtado 2017). What version
is real? Whether language conveys the genuine intentions of any speaker
cannot be determined by analysis of the meaning of the words alone, but only
by whether their actions are either consistent with the language – or
contradictory. In the words of President Obama: “Now suddenly President
Trump acts like he’s a populist helping working people? Come on, man. You wanna know
what somebody’s gonna do? Look at what they have been doing their whole lives.”
[Figure 1 about here]
This understanding leads to the framework illustrated in Figure 1. The use of
populist rhetoric is conceptualized as a ‘first order’ set of normative values
about the rightful distribution of legitimate authority and power in decision-
making processes. In liberal democracies, the most common contrast to
populism is the rhetoric of ‘liberal pluralism’, emphasizing the values of
multiculturalism and tolerance of social diversity, the importance of liberal
democratic institutions in providing checks and balances limiting the abuse
of executive powers, and respect for minority rights to counterbalance the
majoritarian voice of ‘the people’. The substantive meaning of the rhetoric
about governance becomes colored by the second order principles, including
social and economic values and programmatic policy positions, reflecting
core socioeconomic and cultural cleavages in the mass electorate.
II: Measuring party values and rhetoric
Until relatively recently, an extensive literature on populism in Latin America
has most commonly drawn upon intensive case-studies of particular leaders
4
seen to exemplify this phenomenon – such as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela,

Carlos Menem in Argentina, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, and Alberto Fujimori
in Peru. In Europe, scholars have focused upon comparing specific political
parties seen as ‘populist’, such as the French National Rally, the Freedom
Party of Austria, the Alternative for Germany, the Lega and the Five Star
Movement in Italy, and the Danish People’s Party, Norway Progress Party,
and Sweden Democrats party in Scandinavia, Fidesz and Jobbik in Hungary,
and so on.
In general, the single in-depth case-study and small-N comparative method
is invaluable for generating a rich contextual literature, for insights into elite
strategies and historical processes, and for grounded theory-building
(Gerring 2004). Over-reliance on these methods carries several risks,
however, restricting the development of general concepts and theories
applicable across diverse political parties, social conditions and institutional
contexts, limiting systematic testing of propositions through cross-national
empirical evidence, and hindering the Large-N comparative method in the
sub-field of populism studies.
How can the concept of populist rhetoric be measured in a valid and reliable
way? And, in general, what methods allow analysts to operationalize,
categorize, and compare contemporary patterns of party competition around
the world? Several alternative techniques have traditionally been used in
studies to explore general cross-national and longitudinal patterns of party
ideologies and issue positions, each with different strengths and weaknesses
(Mair 2001; Laver 2001). This includes gathering data from:
(i) Identifying ‘party families’ according to shared names;
(ii) Classifying parties based on transnational organizational
affiliations;
(iii) Rhetorical analysis of the discourse used in leadership speeches
and political communications;
(iv) Hand and digitalized content analysis coding the texts of
programmatic party platforms, exemplified by the Comparative
Manifesto Project;
(v) Expert surveys used to identify party issue positions and
ideological values, like the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES).
Other methods, not reviewed here for reasons of space, include analysis of
roll-call votes by legislators (Poole and Rosenthal 2001), surveys of political
elites (such as elected representatives, parliamentary candidates, activists and
party members) (Katz and Wessels 1999; van Haute and Gauja 2015), and
mass surveys gathering voters’ estimate of party issue positions and their own
policy preferences and populist attitudes (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove
2014).
What are the pros and cons of the main approaches for identifying patterns
of party competition -- and which are potentially most useful for populism
studies?
(i) Party names

Other older typologies often defined party families based on shared
nomenclatures, such as ‘Social Democrats’, ‘Christian Democrats’, ‘Liberals’,
5
and ‘Greens’ (Ware 1996; Mair and Mudde 1998). The titles that parties adopt
goes to the heart of their brand name in the political marketplace and their
historical origins. It seems a straightforward approach to classify party
families by their self-adopted names.
In practice, however, party labels can disguise deep ideological divisions, such
as those between neo-classical laissez-faire liberals, favoring free markets and
a minimal role for governments, versus social liberals, advocating cradle-to-
grave welfare states, progressive taxation, and generous public services.
Moreover, identical party labels have been adopted by parties with
contrasting platforms and ideologies. The same party name can also mask
major ideological shifts over time, exemplified by the contrasts between the
Republican party under George H. Bush and Donald Trump, or the British
Labour party under the leadership of Tony Blair and Jeremy Corbyn. Parties
and leaders widely regarded as populists do not adopt the populist label and
many, wanting to burnish their outsider credentials, also adopt sui generis
names to avoid being associated with established parties, exemplified by the
Italian Five Star Movement, Poland’s Law and Justice Party, the Greek
Golden Dawn, and the Spanish Podemos.
(ii) Transnational party affiliations
Scholars of party politics often seek to classify distinct party families through
common transnational organizational networks, such as membership in the
European People’s Party, or institutional affiliations with transnational
federations, exemplified by the Liberal International and the Global Greens.
This approach is most useful for classifying older party families, such as
members affiliated with the Socialist International. This method is relatively
straightforward to apply using publicly accessible information. It also reflects
the way that political parties seek to build international alliances, cooperate
across borders, and share resources with sister organizations (Gomez-Reino
2017).
But these networks have proved far from stable, with populist parties shifting
alliances; for example, the Italian Northern League belonged to the Rainbow
Coalition in the European Parliament before moving in 1994 to join the
Euro-liberals. Political parties can also be members simultaneously of
different associations at transnational, national, and regional levels. For
example, several parties in the European Parliament which are commonly
regarded as populist are currently associated with the Europe of Nations and
Freedom (ENF) group. This includes the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO), the
Flemish Vlaams Belang (FB), the French National Rally (FN), the Alternative
for Germany (AfD), the Italian Lega Nord, and the Dutch Party for Freedom
(PVV). But the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFD) provides
another rival group in the European Parliament, linking UKIP (prior to
Brexit), the Alternative for Germany, the Five Star Movement, the Lithuanian
Order and Justice party, and the Sweden Democrats. The EFD is
Eurosceptic, using populist rhetoric claiming to reflect ‘the people’s voice’ by
fighting ‘big government, big banks, and big business’ which are ‘strangling
national identities.’
Not all European parties commonly seen as populist belong to these two
groupings, however, for example the Danish People’s Party and the Finns
Party are members of the center-right European Conservatives and
6
Reformists. European populist parties have recently strengthened their

transnational networks, but these ties are not yet consolidated (Gomez-Reino
2017). Therefore, it is far from easy to identify the common ideological
principles and shared values of populist political parties based on shifting
allegiances to formal transnational affiliations.
(iii) Rhetorical and discourse analysis
An approach common in communication studies focuses upon
deconstructing the speeches, social media messages, and press releases of
parties and leaders. Techniques include discourse analysis and both human
and computerized content analysis of text and visual images. This perspective
reflects the concept of populism used in this study, where it is viewed as a
style of communication characterized by a language claiming ‘power to the
people’ and a critique of the establishment, rather than a set of ideological
beliefs about substantive public policies on issues like the economy (Jagers
and Walgrave 2007; Aalberg et al 2017). For example, this approach was used
by Bonikowski and Gidron (2016) when they examined over 2000 American
presidential speeches from 1952-1996. Populist language was found to be
used by both Democrats and Republicans – but especially by challengers and
outsiders. Similarly, Lamont et al (2017) scrutinized Trump’s campaign
speeches, while Kreis (2017) deconstructing his Twitter feed as an informal,
direct and provoking communication style.
The most extensive use of this approach for cross-national comparison,
developed by Hawkins (2009), and expanded by the Global Populism Project
(Hawkins et al 2019), has analyzed selected leadership speeches by over 200
presidents and prime ministers to understand its key features and measure
populism. Discourse analysis of written texts and visual symbols can provide
potentially useful insights, especially to compare successive leaders within a
particular country. But the techniques face many challenges when seeking to
use the method for cross-national comparisons, raising issues of equivalence
when covering speeches in multiple languages. Moreover, so far the
classifications developed by the Global Populism Project have not yet been
subjected to robustness tests against independent evidence.
(iv) Programmatic policy platforms and issue positions
One of the most common practices in the comparative literature has sought
to distinguish the issue location of political parties, and the similarities across
party families, based on content analysis of policy manifestos. Data has been
extracted from hand and automatic textual coding of party platforms,
exemplified by the long-standing Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge
2000; Budge et al 2001; Klingemann et al 2006; Benoit and Laver 2007;
Krouwel and Elrinkhof 2014).
The Comparative Manifesto Project provides the most extensive resources,
widely used in the research literature, covering party manifestos published in
more than fifty countries since 1945. These documents have been analyzed
to identify issue salience (the amount of coverage or prominence) as well as
issue positions (the direction of statements for or against issues) published in
party election programs and related proxy documents. Directional theories
of party competition assume that parties vary primarily in how much
prominence or salience party manifestos devote to certain issues, such as
unemployment, healthcare, or inflation (Laver and Budge 1992).
7
Most attempts at party classification based on this data have used the familiar
‘Left-Right’ dimension, including redistributive economic issues reflecting
the class cleavage, such as party positions for or against taxation, welfare
spending, privatization or nationalization, and so on. These were key to
patterns of party competition in many European countries during the post-
war era with Keynesian economic policies, pro-welfare state, and public
ownership, on the center-left, and free-market policies favoring a smaller role
for the state, deregulation, and low taxes on the center-right. The CMP data
demonstrates that the Left-Right issue cleavage has gradually faded in
importance, however, as party programs during recent decades have often
given greater prominence to Liberal and Conservative social issues, like
LGBTQ rights, immigration, reproductive rights, and environmental
protection, reflecting contemporary culture wars (Norris and Inglehart 2019).
The CPM project has become the standard reference source for analyzing
trends in the issue agenda and party competition in European democracies,
where parliamentary parties publish official manifesto documents which
guide their policy programs if they are elected to power. Outside of this
context, however, platforms may not function as important guides to party
policy, for example, in presidential contests with personalistic competition,
where parties compete with clientelist appeals, or where parties and party
systems are unstable and poorly institutionalized. Even more importantly,
the CMP coding system was not designed to capture the core components of
populism as a style of discourse -- and it is difficult to see how the data could
be adapted retrospectively for this purpose
(v) Expert surveys
Expert surveys have been increasingly adopted within the global scientific
and policy communities to construct multiple international and domestic
indicators of complex phenomena, exemplified by the World Bank Institute
Good Governance indices, the Varieties of Democracy project,
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, and the Electoral
Integrity Project (Cooley and Snyder 2015).
The technique has been used for a long series of comparative studies seeking
to classify the ideological values and issue positions of political parties based
on expert estimates, including datasets produced by Castles and Mair (1984),
Laver and Hunt (1992), Huber and Inglehart (1995), Ray (1999),
Wiesehomier (2019), and the series of Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES)
conducted every four years since 1999 (Hooghe et al 2010; Bakker et al. 2012,
2015).
The series of Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) has traditionally focused on
measuring party competition in Europe towards the classic Left-Right
ideological cleavage in post-war politics, monitored by party positions on
policy issues such as management of the economy, social welfare, and
European integration, as well as the Liberal-Conservative cleavage revolving
around cultural and social values, such as positions towards issues of
immigration, environmental protection, reproductive rights, and
homosexuality. CHES was not designed to measure populism, however,
although selected anti-elite and anti-corruption variables from the 2014
questionnaire have been adapted for this purpose (Inglehart and Norris 2016;
Polk 2017; Simmons et al 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2019).
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Two other recent attempts have sought to fill this lacuna by identifying cross-
national lists of populist parties. Team Populism worked with journalists at
The Guardian, consulting an informal network of 30 scholars to generate a list
of 127 political parties classified as populist/ non-populist in thirty Europe
states (Rooduijn et al 2019). In another study, for the Tony Blair Institute,
Kyle and Gultchin (2018) developed a database of 53 populist leaders in 33
countries by identifying the use of the term through searches in the academic
journal literature. These classifications have not been subject to robustness
tests, however, and the use of simple binary categories (populist/non-
populist) makes them vulnerable to major classification errors.
III: THE GPS RESEARCH DESIGN
To address these issues, the Global Party Survey, 2019 (GPS) has been
designed as an international expert survey to compare key ideological values,
issue positions, and populist rhetoric used by political parties around the
world. The questionnaire includes 21 core survey items designed to estimate
key ideological values, issue positions, and populist rhetoric. The dataset
provides estimates for 1,052 parties in 163 countries, drawing on responses
gathered from 1,861 party and election experts. There are several potential
advances from the new evidence, namely the Global Party Survey:
• Expands comparisons of political parties well beyond Western
democracies;
• Uses fine-grained scaled measures which can be disaggregated into
categories;
• Incorporates standardized party codes for merging with related
cross-national macro, mezzo and micro-level datasets; and,
• The methods maintain continuity with previous studies, facilitating
robustness tests.
Questionnaire design
The questionnaire for the Global Party Survey was administered through the
Qualtrics platform. It includes 21 core items measured using ten-point
continuous scales (illustrated in Figure 1). These were designed to identify
each party’s current position and salience ideological values on Left-Right
economic values and Liberal-Conservative Social Values; their position on
several policy issues such as spending and taxation, immigration, nationalism,
women’s rights, ethnic minority rights, liberal democracy, and environmental
protection; as well as several items monitoring their position and saliency
concerning the use of populist rhetoric. The full GPS Questionnaire and
Codebook can be downloaded from the project website, along with some
data visualizations illustrating the results.
As well as the core items, the GPS survey also asked questions about the
expert’s nationality and citizenship, gender, age, party preferences, and their
self-reported L-R ideology, as well as their familiarity with each of the parties,
and the degree of difficulty they experienced in completing the survey. Many
more items were considered but eventually dropped as the final design sought
to establish a judicious trade-off which balanced the length of the
questionnaire with the likely fall in the response rate from using a longer
9
survey. The questionnaire was professionally translated and made available in

six major world languages (English, French, German, Spanish, Russian, and
Mandarin).
Operationalizing the concept of populist rhetoric
As discussed earlier, populism is defined as a rhetoric making claims about
first order principles concerning the source of legitimate authority governing
any polity, emphasizing ‘power to the people’ and presenting a critique of
‘the establishment’, rather than presenting a set of coherent ideological beliefs
about substantive public policies on issues like the economy, immigration, or
nationalism. This section of the questionnaire specifies to respondents that
the study “seeks to understand the type of rhetoric commonly used by each
party, such as in their leadership speeches, rallies, press releases, party
platforms and campaign communications.” It then asks experts to place each
party on a series of scale.
The core measure operationalizing the minimalist conceptualization of
populist rhetoric, treated as antithetical to pluralist rhetoric, asks respondents
to identify each party’s position on the 10-point scale using following
question cue:
“Parties can also be classified by their current use of POPULIST OR
PLURALIST rhetoric.
POPULIST language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political
institutions and emphasizes that the will of the people should prevail.
By contrast, PLURALIST rhetoric rejects these ideas, believing that elected
leaders should govern, constrained by minority rights, bargaining and compromise,
as well as checks and balances on executive power.
Where would you place each party on the following scale?
0 Strongly favors pluralist rhetoric…10 Strongly favors populist rhetoric”
Given continuing conceptual debate in the research literature, however,
rather than relying upon a single measure, the questionnaire includes
alternative indicators which can be used to gauge populism, with items
adapted from other surveys. This includes where respondents place each
party in their country of expertise on the following 10-point scales:
• The salience or importance of populist rhetoric for the party,
• Whether ordinary people or leaders should decide important issues,
• Whether politicians should lead or follow the will of the people,
• Whether most politicians are honest and trustworthy or dishonest
and corrupt,
• Whether parties strongly respect or undermine liberal democratic
principles, norms and practices; and
• Whether parties strongly favor or oppose checks and balances on
executive power.
Details about the survey questions are specified in the GPS Codebook. This
process allows users to select the variables closest to their preferred
conceptual framework of populism. By combining survey measures, the
dataset helps to identify the parties most likely to use populist language, along
with their underlying ideological values and issue positions.
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Measurement and Party Typologies

There remains debate about the pros and cons of using categorical or
continuous measures. The survey employs 0 to 10-point scales throughout
the questionnaire. This facilitates more fine-grained estimates than binary
categories, such as the degree to which parties favor spending or tax cuts,
nationalism or multiculturalism, and liberal or conservative social values.
Often, party positions are far from black and white, and scales allow experts
to take account of subtle variations among parties and shifts over time.
Identifying party positions on continuous scales also avoids sharp-edged
boundary issues and potential risks of misclassifications, as well as facilitating
more granular analysis.
At the same time, categories may also be useful for analysis, for example to
select parties as either outliers or typical cases on any dimension or issue.
Scaled ideological measures are converted into categories by taking parties
scoring most highly on each item. The core ideological measures in the survey
-- estimating the position of parties on the Left or Right towards economic
values, and as Liberal or Conservative on social values – are therefore
measured using continuous 10-point scales, but also then sub-divided into
binary (0/1) categories, as well as 1-4 ordinal categories.
The survey departs from previous studies by treating the use of populist
rhetoric as an appeal which can be adapted and used by parties and leaders
across the political spectrum. This differs from treating ‘populists’ as a
distinct type of party family or leadership, a standard practice in the case-
study literature.
Nevertheless, for users preferring categories and typologies, the Populist
rhetoric scale is also categorized to identify the parties most strongly favoring
populist or pluralist rhetoric. Robustness tests, presented in the next section,
suggest that the category of ‘strongly populist parties’ based on this survey
correlates closely with Team Populus list of ‘populist’ parties in Europe.
The dataset offers users several alternative party typologies constructed by
combining categorizing variables. The Party Values typology combines the
types of economic and social values. These values are often closely correlated in
many West European parties, but elsewhere these can often be observed to
diverge. The Populism typology is generated by categorizing the populist rhetoric
scale into four ordinal groups. This assumes that the degree of populist and
pluralist rhetoric can vary among parties and leaders, rather than being a fixed
and distinct type of party family. Lastly, the Populist Values typology combines
the type of pluralist or populist rhetoric used by each party with their liberal
or conservative social values.
Party Coverage
The survey sought to gather information about the position of parliamentary
political parties represented in the lower (or single) House of
Parliament/Congress in each country under comparison, thereby excluding
parties which only contested presidential, supranational, and regional/local
elections.
It is challenging to identify a comprehensive, reliable and up-to-date list of
political parties worldwide, however, as there is no single published resource.
In addition, lists can quickly become out-of-date as the names (and
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acronyms) of loosely institutionalized ‘flash’ parties and unstable party

coalitions can shift rapidly over time. Leadership parties, formed as loose
campaigning factions around the time of an election, but with minimal
organizational structure or mass membership, are common in many
developing countries. Determining a reliable list of the largest ‘party blocs’ is
challenging in states with formal legal bans on party organizations and many
independent candidates, such as Kuwait.
The project compiled a list of parliamentary parties (and their share of seat
and vote) for each country running for election to the lower house of the
legislature using the IFES Election Guide. The list of full party names (in
English) for up to ten of the largest parties (with the highest number of
legislators) was automatically merged as a field into the Qualtrics
questionnaire and tailored for each country. Normally the party list reflected
the legislative election closest to the starting date of the survey (Nov 2019),
but in some cases the list was compiled from an earlier election (with the year
of the election specified in the dataset).
In one or two cases, like Italy, the names of the main party coalitions on the
Center-Left and Center-Right were used. This practice will be replaced in any
future surveys by listing the names of the individual parties, not least because
of the volatility of coalitions over successive contests. In total, the survey
covers 1,043 parties worldwide (listed in the GPS Codebook’s Appendix).
To facilitate merging and multilevel analysis, the dataset includes party
metadata, such as each party’s share of votes and seats in recent national
elections. Standard party identification codes allow users to match the GPS
data easily with several other party-level datasets, such as Party Facts (Doring
and Regel 2019), CHES, the Political Party Database (Scarrow, Webb and
Pogunte 2017), and ParlGov. Similarly integrated codes in the dataset also
allow users to link GPS estimates of party values with party voters in cross-
national surveys of the mass electorate, including the European Social Survey
and World Values Survey.
Country Coverage
The project sought to cover independent nation-states worldwide, excluding
micro-states (with populations less than 100,000, and those without de jure
popular elections for the lower house of the national parliament and/or
severe party bans. Several other cases were dropped from the final dataset
due to non-response. The countries in the study are listed in Table 3.
The dataset includes country-level metadata, using the latest year available
(usually 2018), including measures of levels of liberal and electoral
democracy, the Regimes of the World typology, the type of electoral system,
and several institutional party characteristics from the Varieties of
Democracy project (Version 9.0), measure of democracy from Polity IV and
Freedom House, as well as national-level measures from the World Bank
Development Indicators of economic development (per capita GDP), area,
and population size. Regional codes are included along with the Electoral
Integrity Project index of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. It also includes
the standard country codes from the Correlates of War (COW) project, to
facilitate merging other national-level data.
12
Experts
Participation in the survey was by personal invitation only. Experts were
defined as scholars of parties and elections selected for each country drawing
upon the global database established since 2012 by the Electoral Integrity
Project, checked and verified according to several criteria. Experts were
defined as political scientists (or other social scientist in a related discipline)
who had demonstrated knowledge of the electoral process and parties in a
particular country, such as through publications, membership of a relevant
research group, or university employment. This pool was supplemented in a
few smaller countries, like island states in the Caribbean, by several additional
scholarly party experts suggested by respondents using the ‘snowball’
technique.
Expert surveys have greatly expanded in use during the last decade (Cooley
and Snyder 2015). Like other approaches, however, there are many sources
of potential bias in the estimates they produce (Budge 2000; Mair 2001;
Martinez i Coma and Van Ham 2015). This includes potential errors of
judgments arising from assessments of complex multidimensional
phenomenon, varied contexts for party competition under different regimes,
and the depth of scholars’ expertise on the topic.
Ever since Almond and Verba’s Civic Culture (1963), one classic challenge
facing cross-national surveys arises from the appropriate benchmarks which
people may employ in making their assessments, for example, whether
current a party position is judged relative to their past location, or compared
with rival parties within a country, or else compared with parties in other
societies. As discussed later, the external validity of the data can be examined
most effectively by comparing the GPS estimates with similar independent
studies of the same parties.
To test for internal validity, the GPS expert-level dataset allows users to
analyze whether estimates of party positions were systematically influenced
by the background and personal characteristics of participants, such as their
nationality, Left-Right ideological leanings, gender, or age (Curini 2009).
Regression analysis models using the individual-level expert dataset suggest
that none of these factors were significant predictors of estimates for the
position of parties on the Pluralism-Populist scale.
Two-thirds of respondents were born in their country of expertise, while
three quarters are currently a citizen of that country. One quarter of the
experts in the survey were female, reflecting gender disparities in the
discipline. Respondents were asked to identify party positions in one country
reflecting their primary area of published expertise, irrespective of their
nationality or institutional location. The survey included both resident
(domestic) and international experts (e.g. a scholar teaching at an American
university who specializes in Egyptian or Liberian politics).
There are questions about the reliability of academic experts, in particular
whether their estimates may be skewed by more liberal personal values. To
test this, the position of experts on the self-reported 10-point Left-Right
ideological scale can be compared. The mean was 4.75, just below the mid-
point illustrated in Figure 3, suggesting a fairly balanced distribution.
[Figures 3 and 4 about here]
13
Overall, when asked about the difficulty or ease of completing the survey on
a ten-point scale, as illustrated in Figure 4, most reported positively that it
was fairly easy (Mean 7.82). There was usually greater familiarity with larger
parties, however, suggesting caution is advisable when analyzing estimates for
the smaller parties.
Response Rate
Personalized survey invitations were distributed by email to experts, and
responses collected online, through the Qualtrics platform. Fieldwork was
conducted for one month, with an initial personal invitation to individual
experts followed by two reminders, from 19 November to 20 December
2019.
Responses were received from 1,891 experts in total, representing an overall
response rate of 23%. On average, each country included replies from around
a dozen experts, but the numbers varied a great deal.
Like V-Dem, the GPS study aimed to include replies from a minimum of five
experts per Country-Party. Sometimes we received fewer replies, however,
especially in smaller developing societies in Africa and the Middle East; in
states governed by autocratic regimes restricting freedom of expression; and
in countries where fewer political scientists specialize in the study of parties
and elections, and in ‘all of the above’. For example, on average around 19
experts responded to assess parties in liberal democracies. By contrast,
around five expert estimates were gathered in many closed autocracies.
There are obviously tensions between the desire for the broadest global
coverage and the need for considerable caution about the reliability of the
estimates for societies with few responses, generating large confidence
intervals. Users can take several steps with these particular cases.
Firstly, the number of experts per country is included as a variable in the
dataset (Experts). Users may choose to adopt any minimum threshold. For
example, the V-Dem project advises users to drop country cases in their
dataset with three or fewer expert estimates. The variable (Min_experts) can
be selected in GPS to filter out cases below 4.9 experts, removing 193 party
estimates. Users may also choose to filter or weight the estimates based on
several indicators. This includes a ten-point scaled measure of expert
familiarity with each political party in each country, which was included as the
first item in the questionnaire, along with a 0-10 point scaled measure of the
difficulty which experts reported at the end of the questionnaire after
completing the survey. Finally, analysts may choose to aggregate across
country cases, for example to compare world regions or party families.
IV: KEY RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS
The dataset contains many variables which can be explored in detail for
macro-level cross-national comparisons of how multidimensional patterns of
party competition vary across different world regions, types of regime,
cultural areas, or levels of development. Figures 5 and 6 provide a brief
illustration of some of the results comparing the key ideological scales
measuring Left-Right economic values and Liberal-Conservative social
values. The size of each party is show by the size of the symbol, and only
parties with more than 10% of the seats in the national parliament are shown
in the graphs, excluding smaller parties. The degree to which political parties
14
use populist rhetoric, using the main Pluralist-Populist scale already

discussed, is illustrated by the symbol color. Parties using the most pluralist
rhetoric are indicated in shades of green and the most use of populist rhetoric
in shades of red. The type of regime in each country is classified using the
Varieties of Democracy coding of Regimes of the World.
[Figure 5 and 6 about here]
Figure 5 illustrates estimates of multidimensional party competition in liberal
democracies. The scatterplot shows populist parties are concentrated in the
top right quadrant, favoring free market economics with a minimal role for
the state and yet traditional social values towards issues of nationalism,
nativism and immigration, confirming patterns observed previously using
CHES data (Norris and Inglehart 2019). The classic profile includes those
such as the Spanish Vox party, the Swiss People’ Party, the Alternative for
Germany, Israel’s Likud, -- and the US Republican party.
But despite often being labelled ‘radical right’, in fact populist parties are also
distributed in the other quadrants, Hence the Danish People’s Party and the
Czech Freedom and Direct Democracy party are both estimated to be located
on the center-Left in their stance towards the economy and welfare state, but
still highly nativist, favoring highly restrictive immigration policies. There are
also a few populist parties scattered in the other quadrants, such as President
Macron who campaigned for La République En Marche! as an anti-
establishment outsider, while advocating moderate centrist economic policies
and a pro-EU stance. Equally complex to classify, Geert Wilder’s Dutch Party
for Freedom expresses moderately leftwing views on healthcare, social
services, and care of the elderly, as well as progressive social values on issues
such as gender equality, gay rights and religious freedoms, while still being
resolutely anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim (Duina and Carson 2020).
If we compare party competition worldwide, the scatter across all the
quadrants becomes more pronounced. Figure 7 shows the distribution of all
political parties while Figure 8 presents the locates estimated for the strongly
populist parties. Thus, the top right quadrant in both figures includes many
populist parties which fit the conventional profile by being rightwing towards
the economy and traditional towards social values, exemplified by Modi’s BJP
in India, the Popular Force in Peru, and the New Frontier Party in the
Republic of Korea. But parties using populist rhetoric fall across the
economic spectrum, for example, Poland’s Law and Justice party (in common
with many Eastern European populist parties) is socialist towards the
economy and welfare state but highly traditional in its social values, for
example towards Christianity, homosexuality and immigrants, alongside
Bulgaria’s United Patriots and Hungary’s Fidesz. By contrast, fewer populist
parties are seen by experts as free market economically and socially liberal,
but there are some, such as the Norwegian Progress party.
[Figures 7 and 8 about here]
The conventional association of populism with ‘radical right’ parties is
therefore commonly observed in Western Europe, although there are
important exceptions even within this region, and there are varied varieties
of populism around the world. We can focus on comparing the strongly
Populist parties identified in the global survey, defined as those scoring over
7.5 on the 10-point Pluralism-Populism scale discussed earlier. As illustrated
15
in Figure 9, almost half of the strongly populist parties (104/288 or 46%)

were estimated to fall into the economically rightwing and socially
conservative quadrant, fitting the standard ‘radical right’ conceptual
framework. But almost as many populist parties around the world (95/288
or 42%) were estimated to be socially conservative towards issues such as
gender and minority rights but located on the left towards the economy, for
example favoring generous public spending on welfare state benefits and
health care, and redistributive taxation. Of the rest, only a small minority of
populist parties (20/288 or just 9%) were located in the progressive quadrant,
like Spain’s Podemos, Greece’s Syriza, and the Bernie Sanders campaign,
expressing economically socialist and socially liberal values. And finally, even
fewer populist parties (9/288 or just 4%) were in the classic libertarian
quadrant favoring a minimal role for the state, being economically free-
market and socially liberal in their values.
Clearly a substantial research agenda is needed to confirm the estimates
through detailed regional and country studies, especially patterns of party
competition in developing societies and electoral democracies, as well as
unpacking the potential explanations behind the observed patterns of party
competition. Potential explanations include the role of the formal
institutional arrangements, such as the use of proportional and majoritarian
electoral systems and party laws. Cultural and political legacies may also be
expected to prove important, like the deep imprint of communism in Eastern
and Central Europe. Other factors include contemporary levels of
democratization and economic development, and the predominant societal
cleavages underlying each party system. What the preliminary map of party
competition suggests is that the use of populist rhetoric is not confined to
parties which hold a common set of ideological values, as often assumed in
the European literature.
Robustness tests
Does the GPS data provide reliable and valid measures of party ideological
values, issue positions and populist rhetoric? Comparison with other datasets
provides health checks of the reliability and robustness of the estimates in
this survey. For example, the CHES estimates have been compared with data
from party manifestos, surveys of MPs, and other expert studies (Keman
2007; Bakker et al. 2012; Hooghe et al., 2010; Marks et al., 2007; Netjes and
Binnema, 2007; Steenbergen and Marks, 2007; Whitefield et al., 2007).
At the same time, however, studies can be expected to vary in their estimates
for various reasons, not least the use different question wordings, party lists,
and methods. Parties are also far from static in their positions and ideological
values, whether responding to leadership turnover, the shifting saliency of
issues on the policy agenda, changes in their electoral fortunes, or new
patterns of party competition. Where studies conducted within a few years
of each other can be compared, however, this helps to assess the external
validity and robustness of several key GPS estimates.
CHES-2017
Accordingly, the estimates in the GPS survey can be compared with the most
recently available Chapel Hill Expert Survey. The CHES-2017 dataset
16
contains seven identical (or functionally equivalent) items designed to

measure ideological values and issue positions which are comparable to the
GPS measures.
[Table 2 and Figure 10 about here]
The comparison of estimates in both studies generates remarkably strong and
significant correlations in the 84 European parties contained in both studies
(See Table 2 and Figure 10). Despite differences in the timing, selection of
experts, and fieldwork methods, both studies produce remarkably similar
estimates of party positions.
ParlGov
Comparisons can also be drawn for 192 parties in this study with estimates
in the Parliaments and Government (ParlGov) database (Döring and Manow
2019). The position of political parties was estimated in ParlGov by
combining data from previous expert surveys conducted by Castles/Mair
1983, Huber/Inglehart 1995, Benoit/Laver 2006, and CHES 2010. The GPS
estimates of the Left-Right economic position of parties was strongly
correlated with the ParlGov left-right estimates (R=0.739***). Similarly,
ParlGov’s 10-point value scale for the position of parties on the
‘libertarian/authoritarian’ dimension was strongly related to the GPS’s
estimate on this dimension (R=0.828 ***). Given the differences in time
periods and measures used, this is a remarkably strong correlation.
Comparative Manifesto Project
The GPS measure of Left-Right economic values can also be compared with
the Comparative Manifestoes Project measures of Left-Right ideological
party positions, based on textual analysis of the salience of issues in party
platforms. The CMP data was averaged for parliamentary election held from
2014-19. The results showed a moderately strong correlation between GPS
and these CMP estimates (R=.569**, N. 157), still statistically significant, but
a weaker fit than with the CHES and PG expert surveys.
Popu-List
The position of populist parties has been subject to considerable debate in
recent years, not least the European tradition of classifying these using legacy
concepts as part of the ‘extreme right’, ‘far right’, or ‘radical right’ party
family. The Popu-List project (Rooduijn et al 2019) provides a test of the
face-validity of the GPS estimates. The study consulted a network of thirty
scholars of populism to classify the position of 127 European parties with at
least 2% of the vote in a national parliamentary election since 1998. Parties
were categorized using simple (0/1) binary codes into the four dimensions,
namely as populist, far right, far left, and Eurosceptic (Rooduijn et al 2019).
Where comparisons could be drawn, Figure 11 shows the Popu-list
classification of populist parties (highlighted in red) is strongly correlated
with the GPS scaled estimates of populism, using the core Pluralism-
Populism scale.
Moreover, to examine this further, the Popu-List classification of populist
parties in Europe can be compared against several of the measures in the
GPS survey. As shown in Table 3, the scaled measure of Pluralism-Populism
17
proved to be the estimate most strongly correlated with parties classified as

populist by the Popu-List project. Several other items in the GPS survey
were also strongly correlated with the Popu-List classification, however, as
shown in Table 3, such as whether party rhetoric emphasized the ‘will of the
people’ and the party position towards political corruption, as well as issues
such as opposition to ethnic minority rights and immigration. By contrast,
economic values were not significantly to the Popu-List classification of
populist parties.
[Table 3 about here]
The World Values Survey/European Values Survey, 1981-2020.
Finally, comparisons can also be drawn between the GPS estimates on major
ideological values and the position of voters for each party, using the World
Value Survey/European Values Survey (World Values Survey). This dataset
was pooled over all seven waves, to maximize the number of respondents
who reported voting for smaller parties, although this generates less up-to-
date estimates than using only the most recent wave. The GPS dataset also
includes measures of the location of party voters on functionally equivalent
Left-Right and Liberal-Conservative scales, derived from the World Values
Survey/European Values Survey Waves 1-7. Users can compare the GPS
expert estimates of party positions with the location of their own party voters,
and the position of the median voter in each country, as well as measures
calculating the distance of parties on these scales from their own voters and
the median voter in each country.
The Left-Right scale in the WVS/EVS has asked respondents to identify their
ideological position based on the following question: “In political matters, people
talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right.’ How would you place your views on this scale, generally
speaking.” Coded Left (1) to Right (10).
The Liberal-Conservative social values scale was constructed from adding
responses to three items then converting to a 10-point scale: “Please tell me for
each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified,
or something in between, using this card….Abortion, Homosexuality, Divorce.” This
was coded from ‘Always justifiable’ (1) to ‘Never justifiable’ (10) for each
item. This is similar but obviously not identical to the CHES/GPS measure
of Liberal-Conservative social values (known as the Gal/tan scale).
Strong and significant correlation (R.477*** N. 401 parties) are observed link
the GPS expert estimates of party locations on the Left-Right scale
(horizontal axis below) with where party voters placed themselves on the
same scale in the WVS/EVS (vertical axis below). Moreover, the correlation
strengthened (R=.632***) when comparing the subset of 157 parties within
the liberal democracies, with more stable and institutionalized party systems
(see Figure 12). Similar patterns can be observed when comparing voter’s
social values with the position of parties on the liberal-conservative social
values scale (R=.483*** N. 416 parties).
Overall therefore, where comparisons could be drawn with a wide range of
independent evidence, the robustness tests serve as health checks lending
confidence to the external validity of the GPS estimates. The inclusion of
several independent estimates in the GPS dataset allows analysts to make
18
their own further comparisons, for example by global region or party type.
At the same time, however, as discussed earlier, there remains a health
warning about the size of the margin of error of the GPS estimates in parties
and countries with few respondents. Replication of the survey in future years
would help to provide further cross-checks on the robustness of the
estimates.
V: CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
A wealth of popular commentary has sought to understand the rise of
populist parties and the consequences of this development. Unfortunately to
date cross-national measures of populist parties capable of throwing light on
these issues has been limited in a number of ways.
Firstly, comparative studies have devoted most attention to examining parties
and leaders in established democracies, especially in Western Europe, where
populist actors have conventionally been categorized as part of the ‘radical
right’, or the ‘extreme right’, implying a unidimensional form of party
competition. The use of the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ to categorize parties is
deeply ingrained but it may serve to disguise important contrasts. As
demonstrated in this study, deeply conservative cultural values are indeed
expressed on issues like immigration, gay rights, and gender equality by many
populist parties, like the Polish Justice and Development party, Spain’s Vox,
and the Swiss People’s Party. Yet a global perspective suggests that populist
leaders like Chavez and Sanders, and parties like Fidesz, the Slovak National
Party, and Jobbik, endorse leftwing economic policies. And other populist
parties, like Syriza and Unidos Podemos, endorse progressive or liberal social
values (Duina and Carson 2019). In this regard, scholars need to identify
varieties of populists distributed across a multidimensional issue space, such
as distinguishing Progressives, the Nativist Left, Laissez faire Libertarians, as
well as the Authoritarian Right, rather than assuming that all can be neatly
categized by their ‘extreme’ rightwing position along a single Left-Right
dimension (Norris 2019).
The new dataset still needs much further refinement in future iterations,
particularly by improving the accuracy of the list of political parties in several
countries, especially where there is rapid change in unstable party systems. It
is also important to gather more expert assessments in the most challenging
cases where few responses were received, including in smaller developing
societies and in countries with autocratic regimes. The basic approach could
also be replicated to gather new data to compare political leaders, as well as
political parties. Subsequent surveys can be used as further checks on the
reliability of the estimates.
Nevertheless, despite these qualifications, the new dataset has many potential
advantages for users. In particular:
• To improve measurement, the GPS questionnaire incorporates six
alternative indicators of populist rhetoric, measured by standardized
0-10 point continuous scales. The more granular measure provides
greater precision that simple binary classifications.
• By gauging the use of populist rhetoric by parties, as well as their
adherence to key ideological values, and a range of issue positions,
analysts can develop systematic typologies identifying varieties of
populism.
19
• By expanding the geographic scope, the Global Party Survey allows

cross-national comparisons of party competition well beyond the
traditional focus on established democracies in Europe. This is
important, not least because programmatic parties, mass-branch
party organizations, and party systems reflecting the predominant
social cleavages in established European democracies and
postindustrial societies may well be atypical of many other parts of
the developing world.
• By retaining sufficient continuity on key indices with several
previous party datasets, the new GPS survey facilitates replication
for the estimates of Left-Right economic values and Conservative-
Liberal social values, as well as with lists categorizing populist parties.
The series of robustness tests lends confidence about the external
validity of the new estimates of party positions.
• Lastly, by including party codes derived from many other related
studies, facilitating merger across projects, the new study also
expands the capacity for multilevel analysis in related subfields. The
dataset. The GPS evidence can be compared, for example, with the
national or macro-level context of constitutional arrangements, like
electoral systems, party systems, and levels of democracy; with the
meso-level characteristics of political parties, like their resources,
organizational structure, membership, and size; as well as with the
attitudes and values of voters monitored in cross-national surveys of
the electorate, at micro-level.
For all these reasons, the new dataset generates many opportunities to expand
the research agenda and improve measurement in party politics, electoral
analysis, and populism studies.
20
Table 1: Country coverage

# Definition and source
Total number of independent 194 Membership of the United Nations
nation-states (plus Taiwan)
Excluded categories
Micro-states (pop less than 16 Andorra, Dominica, Kiribati,
100,000) Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands,
Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau,
San Marino, Seychelles, St. Lucia, St
Vincent & Grenadines, St. Kitts and
Nevis, Tonga, and Tuvalu.
Without de jure direct 7 Brunei Darussalam, China, Oman,
(popular) elections for the Qatar, UAE, Democratic People’s
lower house of the national Republic of Korea, and Saudi
legislature and/or severe legal Arabia
bans on parties
Lack of response 8 Cape Verde, CAR, Honduras,
Liberia, Niger, Senegal, South
Sudan, Sri Lanka
Covered in the 2019 GPS 163 84% of all nation-states
dataset
Source: www.GlobalPartySurvey.org
21
Table 2: Comparing GPS and CHES estimates

R Sig
V4 Values: The party is left (0) or right (10) on economic 0.848 0.000
issues
V5 Saliency: The importance of economic issues 0.822 0.000
V6 Values: The party is liberal (0) or conservative (10) 0.939 0.000
in their social values
V7: Saliency: The importance of social values 0.788 0.000
V10 Issues: Party favors liberal (0) or restrictive (10) 0.936 0.000
immigration policies
V15 Issues: Party favors (0) or opposes (10) ethnic 0.885 0.000
minority rights
V19 Rhetoric: The people should decide important 0.598 0.000
issues (0) or leaders should decide (10)
Sources: www.GlobalPartySurvey.org CHES-2017
22
Table 3: Correlations of GPS and the Popu-List classification of

populist parties.
R Sig
V8 Party favors pluralist or populist rhetoric 0.542 ***
V13 Party favors multilateralism or nationalism 0.509 ***
V18 Party rhetoric strongly emphasizes that 0.496 ***
politicians should follow the will of the people
V16 Party respects or undermines liberal 0.436 ***
democratic principles
V20 Party rhetoric emphasizes that most politicians 0.457 ***
are dishonest and corrupt
V15 Party opposes ethnic minority rights 0.425 ***
V19 Party rhetoric emphasizes that the people 0.380 ***
should decide important issues
V21 Party rhetoric opposes checks and balances on 0.369 ***
executive power
V10 Party favors liberal or restrictive immigration 0.366 ***
policies
V14 Party opposes women's rights 0.333 ***
V12 Party opposes environmental protection 0.330 ***
V17 Party favors distribution of public goods 0.296 ***
mainly to their own supporters (clientelism)
V3 Party presents detailed plans or more general 0.258 ***
slogans and vague promises
V6 Party is conservative in their social values 0.256 ***
V11 Party favors increased public spending or 0.052 N/s
reduced taxation
V4 Party is leftwing or rightwing in their economic 0.004 N/s
values
Source: https://popu-list.org/ www.GlobalPartySurvey.org
23
Figure 1: The conceptual framework of multidimensional party

competition
MAJOR CLEAVAGES IN PARTY COMPETITION
Legitimate authority and decision-making processes:
Who should decide policy issues.
The role & powers of leaders, elected representative and authorities, and
the people.
Left-right economic values Conservative-liberal social

values
What should be done and the
role of state v. markets in What should be done and the role
managing the economy, welfare, of the state in managing social
and redistribution. order, foreign relations, and moral
issues
Socio-economic cleavages: Cultural cleavages:

Linked to socioeconomic class, Linked to generation, education,
income, wealth, poverty, local race/ethnicity, religiosity, urban-
community and human rural, nation/region/localities
development
24
Figure 2: Illustrating the question format for the scaled measures
25
Figure 3: The distribution of left-right ideological values by experts
26
Figure 4: Assessments of the difficulties of completion by experts
27
Figure 5: Party competition in liberal democracies
KEY: Left-Right values on the horizontal axis are measured by: “Parties can be classified by their current stance on ECONOMIC ISSUES such as privatization, taxes, regulation, government
spending, and the welfare state. Those on the economic LEFT want government to play an active role in the economy. Those on the economic RIGHT favor a reduced role for government. Where would you place
each party on the following 0-10 scale?” Social values on the vertical axis are measured by: “Parties can also be classified by their current social values. Those with LIBERAL values favor expanded
personal freedoms, for example, on abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation. Those with CONSERVATIVE values reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition and stability, believing
that government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?” Populism, coloring the categorized bubbles, is measured
by: “Parties can also be classified by their current use of POPULIST OR PLURALIST rhetoric. POPULIST language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political institutions and emphasizes that
the will of the people should prevail. By contrast, PLURALIST rhetoric rejects these ideas, believing that elected leaders should govern, constrained by minority rights, bargaining and compromise, as well as checks
and balances on executive power. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?” Red=high, green=low. The bubble size reflects the % seat for each party in recent elections.
28
Figure 6: Party competition worldwide
KEY: Left-Right values on the horizontal axis are measured by: “Parties can be classified by their current stance on ECONOMIC ISSUES such as privatization, taxes, regulation, government spending,
and the welfare state. Those on the economic LEFT want government to play an active role in the economy. Those on the economic RIGHT favor a reduced role for government. Where would you place each party
on the following 0-10 scale?” Social values on the vertical axis are measured by: “Parties can also be classified by their current social values. Those with LIBERAL values favor expanded personal freedoms,
for example, on abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation. Those with CONSERVATIVE values reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition and stability, believing that government should
be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?” Populism, coloring the categorized bubbles, is measured by: “Parties can also be
classified by their current use of POPULIST OR PLURALIST rhetoric. POPULIST language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political institutions and emphasizes that the will of the people
should prevail. By contrast, PLURALIST rhetoric rejects these ideas, believing that elected leaders should govern, constrained by minority rights, bargaining and compromise, as well as checks and balances on
executive power. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?” Red=high, green=low. The bubble size reflects the % seat for each party in recent elections.
29
Figure 7: Varieties of strongly populist parties
KEY: Left-Right values on the horizontal axis are measured by: “Parties can be classified by their current stance on ECONOMIC ISSUES such as privatization, taxes, regulation, government spending,
and the welfare state. Those on the economic LEFT want government to play an active role in the economy. Those on the economic RIGHT favor a reduced role for government. Where would you place each party
on the following 0-10 scale?” Social values on the vertical axis are measured by: “Parties can also be classified by their current social values. Those with LIBERAL values favor expanded personal freedoms,
for example, on abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation. Those with CONSERVATIVE values reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition and stability, believing that government should
be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?” Populism, coloring the categorized bubbles, is measured by: “Parties can also be
classified by their current use of POPULIST OR PLURALIST rhetoric. POPULIST language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political institutions and emphasizes that the will of the people should
prevail. By contrast, PLURALIST rhetoric rejects these ideas, believing that elected leaders should govern, constrained by minority rights, bargaining and compromise, as well as checks and balances on executive
power. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?” Only strongly [populist parties (scoring 7.5 or above.) The bubble size reflects the % seat for each party in recent elections.
30
Figure 8: The distribution of the varieties of populist parties
Leftwing economic values Rightwing economic values
E.g. Swiss People’s Party, Likud, India’s

E.g. Hungary’s Fidesz, Polish Law and
BJP, Greek Golden Dawn, US
Conservative social values Justice Party, Danish People’s Party
Republicans
42% (95)
46% (104)
E.g. Spain’s Podemos, Greece’s E.g. Bangladesh Jatiya Party, Norway

Liberal social values SYRIZA, Italy’s Five Star Movement Progress Party
9% (20) 5% (9)
31
Figure 9: Comparing the GPS and CHES expert estimates of Liberal-Conservative social values
Notes: Q: “Parties can also be classified by their current social values. Those with LIBERAL values favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, on abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and
democratic participation. Those with CONSERVATIVE values reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition and stability, believing that government should be a firm moral authority on social and
cultural issues. Where would you place each party on the following scale?”
Sources: www.GlobalPartySurvey.org CHES-2017
32
Figure 10: Comparing the GPS expert estimates of populism with the Popu-List classification
Notes: “We seek to understand the type of rhetoric commonly used by each party, such as in their leadership speeches, rallies, press releases, party platforms, and campaign
communications. Vertical Axis: Parties can be classified by their current use of POPULIST OR PLURALIST rhetoric. POPULIST language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political
institutions and emphasizes that the will of the people should prevail. By contrast, PLURALIST rhetoric rejects these ideas, believing that elected leaders should govern, constrained by minority
rights, bargaining and compromise, as well as checks and balances on executive power. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scales? And how important is populist rhetoric for
each of these parties?” Parties in RED are identified as populist by the Popu-List project.
Source: https://popu-list.org/ www.GlobalPartySurvey.org
33
Figure 11. Comparing the GPS expert estimates of Left-Right party positions with the mean Left-Right position of each party’s voters in Liberal
Democracies
Note:
KEY:OECD countries
Left-Right valuesonly. Vertical
of parties axis=WVS_LR_PARTYVOTER.
on the horizontal axis are measured in theHorizontal Axis=V4_scale.
GPS by: “Parties can be classified Colors by Type_Values
by their current Crimson ISSUES
stance on ECONOMIC =Left-Liberal/ Umber=Left-
such as privatization, taxes,
Conservative/ Azure=Right-Liberal/ Royal Blue=Right-Conservative.
regulation, government spending, and the welfare state. Those on the economic LEFT want government to play an active role in the economy. Those on the economic RIGHT favor a reduced role for
government.www.GlobalPartySurvey.org
Sources: Where would you place each partyand
on the following 0-10
WVS/EVS scale?” LR position of each party’s voters on the vertical axis are measured in the WVS/EVS 1-7 by:“ “In political
1-7.
matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right.’ How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking.” Coded Left (1) to Right (10). Populism, coloring the categorized
bubbles, is measured by: “Parties can also be classified by their current use of POPULIST OR PLURALIST rhetoric. POPULIST language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political
institutions and emphasizes that the will of the people should prevail. By contrast, PLURALIST rhetoric rejects these ideas, believing that elected leaders should govern, constrained by minority rights, bargaining
and compromise, as well as checks and balances on executive power. Where would you place each party on the following 0-10 scale?” Red=high, green=low. The bubble size reflects the % seat for each
party in recent elections. Liberal democracies only. www.GlobalPartySurvey.org and www.WorldValuesSurvey.org
34
Acknowledgments
The survey was directed by Pippa Norris at Harvard and administered by Laura Welty
at the University of Sydney. It was funded by the Australian Research Council
Laureate award as part of the Electoral Integrity Project. The research design was
developed in conjunction with colleagues at the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES),
Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Ryan Bakker, the team conducting a similar survey
in Europe and Latin America. The study also benefited from several other scholars
of parties and elections who were consulted about the early draft survey design and
who generously offered invaluable suggestions, including Mark Franklin, David
Farrell, Ioannis Andreadis, Tim Bale, and Susan Scarrow. Comments and corrections
remain welcome for subsequent releases of the dataset. Finally, the research could
not have been completed without the time and effort which all the experts invested
in completing the survey – which is greatly appreciated.
The Global Party Survey dataset (Version 1, Spring 2020) is available in Excel, SPSS,
Stata and .csv formats at the level of experts and parties, along with the Codebook
and Questionnaire. Details are available from the project website
www.GlobalPartySurvey.org and the data files can be downloaded from:
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/GlobalPartySurvey
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Measuring Populism Worldwide

Faculty Research Working Paper Series

Visit the HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series at:

Measuring Populism Worldwide

Synopsis: Populism studies have rapidly burgeoned but nevertheless

The rise of populism has generated a rapidly expanding literature across

seen to exemplify this phenomenon – such as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela,

(i) Party names

Reformists. European populist parties have recently strengthened their

survey. The questionnaire was professionally translated and made available in

Measurement and Party Typologies

acronyms) of loosely institutionalized ‘flash’ parties and unstable party

use populist rhetoric, using the main Pluralist-Populist scale already

in Figure 9, almost half of the strongly populist parties (104/288 or 46%)

contains seven identical (or functionally equivalent) items designed to

proved to be the estimate most strongly correlated with parties classified as

• By expanding the geographic scope, the Global Party Survey allows

Table 1: Country coverage

Table 2: Comparing GPS and CHES estimates

Sources: www.GlobalPartySurvey.org CHES-2017

Table 3: Correlations of GPS and the Popu-List classification of

Source: https://popu-list.org/ www.GlobalPartySurvey.org

Figure 1: The conceptual framework of multidimensional party

Left-right economic values Conservative-liberal social

Socio-economic cleavages: Cultural cleavages:

Figure 2: Illustrating the question format for the scaled measures

Figure 3: The distribution of left-right ideological values by experts

Figure 4: Assessments of the difficulties of completion by experts

Figure 5: Party competition in liberal democracies

Figure 6: Party competition worldwide

Figure 7: Varieties of strongly populist parties

Figure 8: The distribution of the varieties of populist parties

Leftwing economic values Rightwing economic values

E.g. Swiss People’s Party, Likud, India’s

E.g. Spain’s Podemos, Greece’s E.g. Bangladesh Jatiya Party, Norway

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