G.R. No.

192558 February 15, 2012

BITOY JAVIER
(DANILO P. JAVIER), Petitioner,
- versus -
FLY ACE CORPORATION/
FLORDELYN CASTILLO,Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the March 18, 2010 Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) and its June 7, 2010 Resolution,[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 109975, which reversed the May 28, 2009
Decision[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in the case entitled Bitoy Javier v. Fly Ace/Flordelyn
Castillo,[4] holding that petitioner Bitoy Javier (Javier) was illegally dismissed from employment and ordering Fly Ace
Corporation (Fly Ace) to pay backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

Antecedent Facts

On May 23, 2008, Javier filed a complaint before the NLRC for underpayment of salaries and other labor

standard benefits. He alleged that he was an employee of Fly Ace since September 2007, performing various tasks at the

respondents warehouse such as cleaning and arranging the canned items before their delivery to certain locations, except in

instances when he would be ordered to accompany the companys delivery vehicles, as pahinante; that he reported for work

from Monday to Saturday from 7:00 oclock in the morning to 5:00 oclock in the afternoon; that during his employment, he

was not issued an identification card and payslips by the company; that on May 6, 2008, he reported for work but he was

no longer allowed to enter the company premises by the security guard upon the instruction of Ruben Ong (Mr. Ong), his

superior;[5] that after several minutes of begging to the guard to allow him to enter, he saw Ong whom he approached and

asked why he was being barred from entering the premises; that Ong replied by saying, Tanungin mo anak mo; [6] that he

then went home and discussed the matter with his family; that he discovered that Ong had been courting his daughter

Annalyn after the two met at a fiesta celebration in Malabon City; that Annalyn tried to talk to Ong and convince him to

spare her father from trouble but he refused to accede; that thereafter, Javier was terminated from his employment without

notice; and that he was neither given the opportunity to refute the cause/s of his dismissal from work.

To support his allegations, Javier presented an affidavit of one Bengie Valenzuela who alleged that Javier was a

stevedore or pahinante of Fly Ace from September 2007 to January 2008. The said affidavit was subscribed before the

Labor Arbiter (LA).[7]

For its part, Fly Ace averred that it was engaged in the business of importation and sales of groceries. Sometime

in December 2007, Javier was contracted by its employee, Mr. Ong, as extra helper on a pakyaw basis at an agreed rate of

₱300.00 per trip, which was later increased to ₱325.00 in January 2008. Mr. Ong contracted Javier roughly 5 to 6 times
1
only in a month whenever the vehicle of its contracted hauler, Milmar Hauling Services, was not available. On April 30,

2008, Fly Ace no longer needed the services of Javier. Denying that he was their employee, Fly Ace insisted that there was

no illegal dismissal.[8] Fly Ace submitted a copy of its agreement with Milmar Hauling Services and copies of

acknowledgment receipts evidencing payment to Javier for his contracted services bearing the words, daily

manpower (pakyaw/piece rate pay) and the latters signatures/initials.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On November 28, 2008, the LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit on the ground that Javier failed to
present proof that he was a regular employee of Fly Ace. He wrote:

Complainant has no employee ID showing his employment with the Respondent nor
any document showing that he received the benefits accorded to regular employees of the
Respondents. His contention that Respondent failed to give him said ID and payslips implies
that indeed he was not a regular employee of Fly Ace considering that complainant was a
helper and that Respondent company has contracted a regular trucking for the delivery of its
products.

Respondent Fly Ace is not engaged in trucking business but in the importation and
sales of groceries. Since there is a regular hauler to deliver its products, we give credence to
Respondents claim that complainant was contracted on pakiao basis.

As to the claim for underpayment of salaries, the payroll presented by the Respondents
showing salaries of workers on pakiao basis has evidentiary weight because although the
signature of the complainant appearing thereon are not uniform, they appeared to be his true
signature.

xxxx

Hence, as complainant received the rightful salary as shown by the above described
payrolls, Respondents are not liable for salary differentials. [9]

Ruling of the NLRC

On appeal with the NLRC, Javier was favored. It ruled that the LA skirted the argument of Javier and
immediately concluded that he was not a regular employee simply because he failed to present proof. It was of the view
that a pakyaw-basis arrangement did not preclude the existence of employer-employee relationship. Payment by result x x
x is a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the relation. It is a mere method of computing
compensation, not a basis for determining the existence or absence of an employer-employee relationship.[10] The NLRC
further averred that it did not follow that a worker was a job contractor and not an employee, just because the work he was
doing was not directly related to the employers trade or business or the work may be considered as extra helper as in this
case; and that the relationship of an employer and an employee was determined by law and the same would prevail
whatever the parties may call it. In this case, the NLRC held that substantial evidence was sufficient basis for judgment on
the existence of the employer-employee relationship. Javier was a regular employee of Fly Ace because there was
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee (as a pahinante) in relation to the usual
business or trade of the employer (importation, sales and delivery of groceries). He may not be considered as an

2
independent contractor because he could not exercise any judgment in the delivery of company products. He was only
engaged as a helper.

Finding Javier to be a regular employee, the NLRC ruled that he was entitled to a security of tenure. For failing to
present proof of a valid cause for his termination, Fly Ace was found to be liable for illegal dismissal of Javier who was
likewise entitled to backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The NLRC thus ordered:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, complainants appeal is partially GRANTED. The

assailed Decision of the labor arbiter is VACATED and a new one is hereby entered holding
respondent FLY ACE CORPORATION guilty of illegal dismissal and non-payment of
13th month pay. Consequently, it is hereby ordered to pay complainant DANILO Bitoy JAVIER
the following:

1. Backwages -₱45,770.83

2. Separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement - 8,450.00

3. Unpaid 13th month pay (proportionate) - 5,633.33

TOTAL -₱59,854.16

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On March 18, 2010, the CA annulled the NLRC findings that Javier was indeed a former employee of Fly Ace
and reinstated the dismissal of Javiers complaint as ordered by the LA. The CA exercised its authority to make its own
factual determination anent the issue of the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties. According
to the CA:

xxx

In an illegal dismissal case the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its
dismissal was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an
employer-employee relationship must first be established. x x x it is incumbent upon private
respondent to prove the employee-employer relationship by substantial evidence.

xxx

It is incumbent upon private respondent to prove, by substantial evidence, that he is an

employee of petitioners, but he failed to discharge his burden. The non-issuance of a company-
issued identification card to private respondent supports petitioners contention that private
respondent was not its employee.[12]

The CA likewise added that Javiers failure to present salary vouchers, payslips, or other pieces of evidence to bolster his
contention, pointed to the inescapable conclusion that he was not an employee of Fly Ace. Further, it found that Javiers
work was not necessary and desirable to the business or trade of the company, as it was only when there were scheduled

3
deliveries, which a regular hauling service could not deliver, that Fly Ace would contract the services of Javier as an extra
helper. Lastly, the CA declared that the facts alleged by Javier did not pass the control test.

He contracted work outside the company premises; he was not required to observe definite hours of work; he was not
required to report daily; and he was free to accept other work elsewhere as there was no exclusivity of his contracted
service to the company, the same being co-terminous with the trip only.[13] Since no substantial evidence was presented to
establish an employer-employee relationship, the case for illegal dismissal could not prosper.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but to no avail.

Hence, this appeal anchored on the following grounds:

I.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS NOT A REGULAR EMPLOYEE OF FLY ACE.
II.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO HIS MONETARY CLAIMS.[14]

The petitioner contends that other than its bare allegations and self-serving affidavits of the other employees, Fly
Ace has nothing to substantiate its claim that Javier was engaged on a pakyaw basis. Assuming that Javier was indeed
hired on a pakyaw basis, it does not preclude his regular employment with the company. Even the acknowledgment
receipts bearing his signature and the confirming receipt of his salaries will not show the true nature of his employment as
they do not reflect the necessary details of the commissioned task. Besides, Javiers tasks as pahinante are related,
necessary and desirable to the line of business by Fly Ace which is engaged in the importation and sale of grocery items.
On days when there were no scheduled deliveries, he worked in petitioners warehouse, arranging and cleaning the stored
cans for delivery to clients.[15] More importantly, Javier was subject to the control and supervision of the company, as he
was made to report to the office from Monday to Saturday, from 7:00 oclock in the morning until 5:00 oclock in the
afternoon. The list of deliverable goods, together with the corresponding clients and their respective purchases and
addresses, would necessarily have been prepared by Fly Ace. Clearly, he was subjected to compliance with company rules
and regulations as regards working hours, delivery schedule and output, and his other duties in the warehouse. [16]

The petitioner chiefly relied on Chavez v. NLRC,[17] where the Court ruled that payment to a worker on a per trip
basis is not significant because this is merely a method of computing compensation and not a basis for determining the
existence of employer-employee relationship. Javier likewise invokes the rule that, in controversies between a laborer and
his master, x x x doubts reasonably arising from the evidence should be resolved in the formers favour. The policy is
reflected is no less than the Constitution, Labor Code and Civil Code. [18]

Claiming to be an employee of Fly Ace, petitioner asserts that he was illegally dismissed by the latters failure to
observe substantive and procedural due process. Since his dismissal was not based on any of the causes recognized by law,
and was implemented without notice, Javier is entitled to separation pay and backwages.

In its Comment,[19] Fly Ace insists that there was no substantial evidence to prove employer-employee
relationship. Having a service contract with Milmar Hauling Services for the purpose of transporting and delivering
company products to customers, Fly Ace contracted Javier as an extra helper or pahinante on a mere per trip basis. Javier,
who was actually a loiterer in the area, only accompanied and assisted the company driver when Milmar could not deliver

4
or when the exigency of extra deliveries arises for roughly five to six times a month. Before making a delivery, Fly Ace
would turn over to the driver and Javier the delivery vehicle with its loaded company products. With the vehicle and
products in their custody, the driver and Javier would leave the company premises using their own means, method, best
judgment and discretion on how to deliver, time to deliver, where and [when] to start, and manner of delivering the
products.[20]
Fly Ace dismisses Javiers claims of employment as baseless assertions. Aside from his bare allegations, he
presented nothing to substantiate his status as an employee. It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove his
affirmative allegation. If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence, relying on the
strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of his opponent. [21] Invoking the case of Lopez v. Bodega
City,[22] Fly Ace insists that in an illegal dismissal case, the burden of proof is upon the complainant who claims to be an
employee. It is essential that an employer-employee relationship be proved by substantial evidence. Thus, it cites:

In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its
dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can
prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first be established.
Fly Ace points out that Javier merely offers factual assertions that he was an employee of Fly Ace, which are
unfortunately not supported by proof, documentary or otherwise.[23] Javier simply assumed that he was an employee of Fly
Ace, absent any competent or relevant evidence to support it. He performed his contracted work outside the premises of the
respondent; he was not even required to report to work at regular hours; he was not made to register his time in and time
out every time he was contracted to work; he was not subjected to any disciplinary sanction imposed to other employees for
company violations; he was not issued a company I.D.; he was not accorded the same benefits given to other employees; he
was not registered with the Social Security System (SSS) as petitioners employee; and, he was free to leave, accept and
engage in other means of livelihood as there is no exclusivity of his contracted services with the petitioner, his services
being co-terminus with the trip only. All these lead to the conclusion that petitioner is not an employee of the
respondents.[24]
Moreover, Fly Ace claims that it had no right to control the result, means, manner and methods by which Javier
would perform his work or by which the same is to be accomplished.[25] In other words, Javier and the company driver were
given a free hand as to how they would perform their contracted services and neither were they subjected to definite hours
or condition of work.

Fly Ace likewise claims that Javiers function as a pahinante was not directly related or necessary to its principal
business of importation and sales of groceries. Even without Javier, the business could operate its usual course as it did not
involve the business of inland transportation. Lastly, the acknowledgment receipts bearing Javiers signature and
words pakiao rate, referring to his earned salaries on a per trip basis, have evidentiary weight that the LA correctly
considered in arriving at the conclusion that Javier was not an employee of the company.
The Court affirms the assailed CA decision.
It must be noted that the issue of Javiers alleged illegal dismissal is anchored on the existence of an employer-
employee relationship between him and Fly Ace. This is essentially a question of fact. Generally, the Court does not
review errors that raise factual questions. However, when there is conflict among the factual findings of the antecedent
deciding bodies like the LA, the NLRC and the CA, it is proper, in the exercise of Our equity jurisdiction, to review and
re-evaluate the factual issues and to look into the records of the case and re-examine the questioned findings.[26] In dealing
with factual issues in labor cases, substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion is sufficient.[27]

5
 As the records bear out, the LA and the CA found Javiers claim of employment with Fly Ace as wanting and
deficient. The Court is constrained to agree.Although Section 10, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC[28] allows a relaxation of the rules of procedure and evidence in labor cases, this rule of liberality does not mean a
complete dispensation of proof. Labor officials are enjoined to use reasonable means to ascertain the facts speedily and
objectively with little regard to technicalities or formalities but nowhere in the rules are they provided a license to
completely discount evidence, or the lack of it. The quantum of proof required, however, must still be satisfied. Hence,
when confronted with conflicting versions on factual matters, it is for them in the exercise of discretion to determine which
party deserves credence on the basis of evidence received, subject only to the requirement that their decision must be
supported by substantial evidence.[29]Accordingly, the petitioner needs to show by substantial evidence that he was indeed
an employee of the company against which he claims illegal dismissal.
Expectedly, opposing parties would stand poles apart and proffer allegations as different as chalk and cheese. It is,
therefore, incumbent upon the Court to determine whether the party on whom the burden to prove lies was able to hurdle
the same. No particular form of evidence is required to prove the existence of such employer-employee relationship. Any
competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted. Hence, while no particular form of evidence is
required, a finding that such relationship exists must still rest on some substantial evidence. Moreover, the substantiality of
the evidence depends on its quantitative as well as its qualitative aspects.[30] Although substantial evidence is not a function
of quantity but rather of quality, the x x x circumstances of the instant case demand that something more should have been
proffered. Had there been other proofs of employment, such as x x x inclusion in petitioners payroll, or a clear exercise of
control, the Court would have affirmed the finding of employer-employee relationship.[31]
In sum, the rule of thumb remains: the onus probandi falls on petitioner to establish or substantiate such claim by
the requisite quantum of evidence.[32] Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or
her right thereto x x x.[33] Sadly, Javier failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief.
In this case, the LA and the CA both concluded that Javier failed to establish his employment with Fly Ace. By
way of evidence on this point, all that Javier presented were his self-serving statements purportedly showing his activities
as an employee of Fly Ace. Clearly, Javier failed to pass the substantiality requirement to support his claim. Hence, the
Court sees no reason to depart from the findings of the CA.
While Javier remains firm in his position that as an employed stevedore of Fly Ace, he was made to work in the
company premises during weekdays arranging and cleaning grocery items for delivery to clients, no other proof was
submitted to fortify his claim. The lone affidavit executed by one Bengie Valenzuela was unsuccessful in strengthening
Javiers cause. In said document, all Valenzuela attested to was that he would frequently see Javier at the workplace where
the latter was also hired as stevedore.[34] Certainly, in gauging the evidence presented by Javier, the Court cannot ignore
the inescapable conclusion that his mere presence at the workplace falls short in proving employment therein. The
supporting affidavit could have, to an extent, bolstered Javiers claim of being tasked to clean grocery items when there
were no scheduled delivery trips, but no information was offered in this subject simply because the witness had no
personal knowledge of Javiers employment status in the company. Verily, the Court cannot accept Javiers statements,
hook, line and sinker.
The Court is of the considerable view that on Javier lies the burden to pass the well-settled tests to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship,viz: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of
wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees conduct. Of these elements, the most
important criterion is whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to the
result of the work but also as to the means and methods by which the result is to be accomplished. [35]
In this case, Javier was not able to persuade the Court that the above elements exist in his case. He could not
submit competent proof that Fly Ace engaged his services as a regular employee; that Fly Ace paid his wages as an
6
employee, or that Fly Ace could dictate what his conduct should be while at work. In other words, Javiers allegations did
not establish that his relationship with Fly Ace had the attributes of an employer-employee relationship on the basis of the
above-mentioned four-fold test. Worse, Javier was not able to refute Fly Aces assertion that it had an agreement with a
hauling company to undertake the delivery of its goods. It was also baffling to realize that Javier did not dispute Fly Aces
denial of his services exclusivity to the company. In short, all that Javier laid down were bare allegations without
corroborative proof.
Fly Ace does not dispute having contracted Javier and paid him on a per trip rate as a stevedore, albeit on
a pakyaw basis. The Court cannot fail to note that Fly Ace presented documentary proof that Javier was indeed paid on
a pakyaw basis per the acknowledgment receipts admitted as competent evidence by the LA.Unfortunately for Javier, his
mere denial of the signatures affixed therein cannot automatically sway us to ignore the documents because forgery cannot
be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery.[36]
Considering the above findings, the Court does not see the necessity to resolve the second issue presented.
One final note. The Courts decision does not contradict the settled rule that payment by the piece is just a method
of compensation and does not define the essence of the relation. [37] Payment on a piece-rate basis does not negate regular
employment. The term wage is broadly defined in Article 97 of the Labor Code as remuneration or earnings, capable of
being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece or commission basis. Payment by
the piece is just a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the relations. Nor does the fact that the
petitioner is not covered by the SSS affect the employer-employee relationship. However, in determining whether the
relationship is that of employer and employee or one of an independent contractor, each case must be determined on its
own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be considered. [38] Unfortunately for Javier, the attendant facts and
circumstances of the instant case do not provide the Court with sufficient reason to uphold his claimed status as employee
of Fly Ace.
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it
should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its
rights which are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for the less
privileged in life, the Court has inclined, more often than not, toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with
the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving,
to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine. [39]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 18, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its June 7,

2010 Resolution, in CA-G.R. SP No. 109975, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.