Sabili v. Commission On Elections

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 193261. April 24, 2012.]
MEYNARDO SABILI , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

FLORENCIO LIBREA , respondents.
DECISION
SERENO , J : p
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to annul the Resolutions in SPA No. 09-047 (DC) dated 26 January 2010
and 17 August 2010 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which denied due
course to and canceled the Certi cate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Meynardo Sabili
(petitioner) for the position of Mayor of Lipa City for the May 2010 elections. At the heart
of the controversy is whether petitioner Sabili had complied with the one-year residency
requirement for local elective officials.
When petitioner led his COC 1 for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he
stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8)
months. Prior to the 2010 elections, he had been twice elected (in 1995 and in 1998) as
Provincial Board Member representing the 4th District of Batangas. During the 2007
elections, petitioner ran for the position of Representative of the 4th District of Batangas,
but lost. The 4th District of Batangas includes Lipa City. 2 However, it is undisputed that
when petitioner led his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then
staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.
Private respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) led a "Petition to Deny
Due Course and to Cancel Certi cate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for
Possessing Some Grounds for Disquali cation" 3 against him before the COMELEC,
docketed as SPA No. 09-047 (DC). Citing Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the
Omnibus Election Code, 4 private respondent alleged that petitioner made material
misrepresentations of fact in the latter's COC and likewise failed to comply with the one-
year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. 5 Allegedly,
petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of
Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local
elections. aCcSDT
In support of his allegation, private respondent presented the following:

1. Petitioner's COC for the 2010 elections filed on 1 December 2009 6
2. 2009 Tax Declarations for a house and lot (TCT Nos. 173355, 173356
and buildings thereon) in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City registered under
the name of Bernadette Palomares, petitioner's common-law wife 7
3. Lipa City Assessor Certi cation of Property Holdings of properties
under the name of Bernadette Palomares 8
4. Affidavit executed by private respondent Florencio Librea 9
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
5. Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Eladio de Torres 10
6. Voter Certi cation on petitioner issued by COMELEC Election O cer
Juan D. Aguila, Jr. 11
7. 1997 Voter Registration Record of petitioner 12
8. National Statistics O ce (NSO) Advisory on Marriages regarding
petitioner 13
9. Lipa City Assessor Certi cate of No Improvement on Block 2, Lot 3,
Brgy. Lood, Lipa City registered in the name of petitioner 14
10. NSO Certificate of No Marriage of Bernadette Palomares 15
11. Lipa City Assessor Certi cate of No Improvement on Block 2, Lot 5,
Brgy. Lood, Lipa City registered in the name of petitioner 16
12. Lipa City Permits and Licensing O ce Certi cation that petitioner
has no business therein 17
13. Apparent printout of a Facebook webpage of petitioner's daughter,
Mey Bernadette Sabili 18
14. Department of Education (DepEd) Lipa City Division Certi cation
that the names Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili and
Francis Meynard Sabili (petitioner's son) do not appear on its list of
graduates 19
15. Certi cation from the O ce of the Election O cer of Lipa City that
Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard
Sabili do not appear in its list of voters 20
16. Affidavit executed by Violeta Fernandez 21
17. Affidavit executed by Rodrigo Macasaet 22
18. Affidavit Executed by Pablo Lorzano 23
19. Petitioner's 2007 COC for Member of House of Representative 24
For ease of later discussion, private respondent's evidence shall be grouped as
follows: (1) Certi cates regarding ownership of real property; (2) petitioner's Voter
Registration and Certi cation (common exhibits of the parties); (3) petitioner's COCs in
previous elections; (3) Certi cations regarding petitioner's family members; and (4)
Affidavits of Lipa City residents.
On the other hand, petitioner presented the following evidence to establish the fact
of his residence in Lipa City:
1. Affidavit executed by Bernadette Palomares 25
2. Birth Certificate of Francis Meynard Sabili 26
3. Affidavit of Leonila Suarez (Suarez) 27
4. Certification of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain,
Dominador Honrade 28
5. Affidavit executed by Rosalinda Macasaet 29
6. Certi cate of Appreciation issued to petitioner by the parish of Sto.
Nino of Pinagtong-ulan 30
7. Designation of petitioner in the Advisory Body (AB) of Pinagtong-ulan,
San Jose/Lipa City Chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. 31
8. COMELEC Voter Certi cation on petitioner issued by Election O cer
Juan Aguila, Jr. 32
9. COMELEC Application for Transfer/Transfer with Reactivation dated 6
June 2009 signed by Election Officer Juan Aguila, Jr. 33
10. Petitioner's Income Tax Return for 2007 34
11. Official Receipt for petitioner's income tax payment for 2007 35
12. Petitioner's Income Tax Return for 2008 36
13. Official Receipt for petitioner's income tax payment for 2008 37 EITcaD
14. Birth Certificate of Mey Bernadette Sabili 38

15. Affidavit executed by Jacinto Cornejo, Sr. 39
16. Joint Affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents, including
past and incumbent Pinagtong-ulan officials. 40
For ease of later discussion, petitioner's evidence shall be grouped as follows: (1)
his Income Tax Returns and corresponding O cial Receipts for the years 2007 and 2008;
(2) Certification from the barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan; (3) A davit of his common-
law wife, Bernadette Palomares; and (4) A davits from a previous property owner,
neighbors, Certi cate of Appreciation from the barangay parish and Memorandum from
the local chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.
The COMELEC Ruling
In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010, 41 the COMELEC Second Division granted
the Petition of private respondent, declared petitioner as disquali ed from seeking the
mayoralty post in Lipa City, and canceled his Certi cate of Candidacy for his not being a
resident of Lipa City and for his failure to meet the statutory one-year residency
requirement under the law.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the
COMELEC, during the pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections were held.
The next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering the
highest number of votes cast for the said position. He accordingly led a Manifestation
42 with the COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact.
In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010, 43 the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion
for Reconsideration of petitioner. Although he was able to receive his copy of the
Resolution, no prior notice setting the date of promulgation of the said Resolution was
received by him. Meanwhile, Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 (Rules on
Disquali cation Cases Filed in Connection with the May 10, 2012 Automated National and
Local Elections) requires the parties to be noti ed in advance of the date of the
promulgation of the Resolution.
SEC. 6. Promulgation. — The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution
of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date previously xed, notice
of which shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally,
or by registered mail, telegram, fax, or thru the fastest means of communication.
Hence, petitioner led with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with
Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct
of a Special Ra e of this Case) under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the annulment of the 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 Resolutions of the
COMELEC. Petitioner attached to his Petition a Certi cate of Canvass of Votes and
proclamation of Winning Candidates for Lipa City Mayor and Vice-Mayor issued by the
City/Municipal Board of Canvassers, 44 as well as a copy of his Oath of O ce. 45 He also
attached to his Petition another Certi cation of Residency 46 issued by Pinagtong-ulan
Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade and sworn to before a notary public.
On 7 September 2010, this Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order 47 requiring the
parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions. Thereafter, the parties filed their responsive pleadings. IScaAE
Issues
The following are the issues for resolution:
1. Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
failed to promulgate its Resolution dated 17 August 2010 in
accordance with its own Rules of Procedure; and
2. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year
residency requirement for local elective officials.
The Court's Ruling
1. On whether the COMELEC
acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it failed to promulgate its
Resolution dated 17 August 2010
in accordance with its own
Rules of Procedure
Petitioner argues that the assailed 17 August 2010 COMELEC Resolution, which
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, is null and void. The Resolution was
allegedly not promulgated in accordance with the COMELEC's own Rules of Procedure
and, hence, violated petitioner's right to due process of law.
The rules governing the Petition for Cancellation of COC in this case is COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696 (Rules on Disquali cation of Cases Filed in Connection with the May
10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections), which was promulgated on 11
November 2009. Sections 6 and 7 thereof provide as follows:
SEC. 6. Promulgation. — The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution
of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date previously xed, notice
of which shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally,
or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the fastest means of communication.
SEC. 7. Motion for Reconsideration. — A motion to reconsider a
Decision, Resolution, Order or Ruling of a Division shall be led within three (3)
days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the
execution for implementation of the Decision, Resolution, Order or Ruling.
Within twenty-four (24) hours from the ling thereof, the Clerk of the
Commission shall notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two
(2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.
The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the Motion for

Reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within three (3)
days from the certification thereof.
However, the COMELEC Order dated 4 May 2010 48 suspended Section 6 of

COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 by ordering that "all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of
the Commission for immediate promulgation" in view of "the proximity of the Automated
National and Local Elections and lack of material time." The Order states: TCHcAE
ORDER
Considering the proximity of the Automated National and Local Elections
and lack of material time, the Commission hereby suspends Sec. 6 of Resolution
No. 8696 promulgated on November 11, 2009, which reads:
Sec. 6. Promulgation. — The promulgation of a Decision or

Resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date
previously xed, notice of which shall be served upon the parties or their
attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the fastest
means of communication."
Let all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for

immediate promulgation.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner claims that he did not receive notice of the said suspension of Section 6
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Thus, his right to due process was still violated. On the
other hand, the COMELEC claims that it has the power to suspend its own rules of
procedure and invokes Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution, which gives it the power
"to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of
its offices."
We agree with the COMELEC on this issue.
In Lindo v. Commission on Elections , 49 petitioner claimed that there was no valid
promulgation of a Decision in an election protest case when a copy thereof was merely
furnished the parties, instead of rst notifying the parties of a set date for the
promulgation thereof, in accordance with Section 20 of Rule 35 of the COMELEC's own
Rules of Procedure, as follows:
Sec. 20. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. — The decision of the
court shall be promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice must be given
the parties. It shall become nal ve (5) days after promulgation. No motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.
Rejecting petitioner's argument, we held therein that the additional rule requiring
notice to the parties prior to promulgation of a decision is not part of the process of
promulgation. Since lack of such notice does not prejudice the rights of the parties,
noncompliance with this rule is a procedural lapse that does not vitiate the validity of the
decision. Thus: aCSTDc
This contention is untenable. Promulgation is the process by which a

decision is published, o cially announced, made known to the public or delivered
to the clerk of court for ling, coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel
(Neria v. Commissioner of Immigration , L-24800, May 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 812). It
is the delivery of a court decision to the clerk of court for ling and publication
(Araneta v. Dinglasan , 84 Phil. 433). It is the ling of the signed decision with the
clerk of court (Sumbing v. Davide , G.R. Nos. 86850-51, July 20, 1989, En Banc
Minute Resolution). The additional requirement imposed by the COMELEC rules
of notice in advance of promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation.
Hence, We do not agree with petitioner's contention that there was no
promulgation of the trial court's decision. The trial court did not deny that it had
o cially made the decision public. From the recital of facts of both parties,
copies of the decision were sent to petitioner's counsel of record and petitioner's
(sic) himself. Another copy was sent to private respondent.
What was wanting and what the petitioner apparently objected to was not
the promulgation of the decision but the failure of the trial court to serve notice in
advance of the promulgation of its decision as required by the COMELEC rules.
The failure to serve such notice in advance of the promulgation may be
considered a procedural lapse on the part of the trial court which did not prejudice
the rights of the parties and did not vitiate the validity of the decision of the trial
court nor (sic) of the promulgation of said decision. CaTcSA
Moreover, quoting Pimping v. COMELEC, 50 citing Macabingkil v. Yatco, 51 we further

held in the same case that failure to receive advance notice of the promulgation of a
decision is not sufficient to set aside the COMELEC's judgment, as long as the parties have
been afforded an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, viz.:
The fact that petitioners were not served notice in advance of the
promulgation of the decision in the election protest cases, in Our view, does not
constitute reversible error or a reason su cient enough to compel and warrant
the setting aside of the judgment rendered by the Comelec. Petitioners anchor
their argument on an alleged denial to them (sic) due process to the deviation by
the Comelec from its own made rules. However, the essence of due process is
that, the parties in the case were afforded an opportunity to be heard.
In the present case, we read from the COMELEC Order that the exigencies attendant
to the holding of the country's rst automated national elections had necessitated that the
COMELEC suspend the rule on notice prior to promulgation, and that it instead direct the
delivery of all resolutions to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation.
Notably, we see no prejudice to the parties caused thereby. The COMELEC's Order did not
affect the right of the parties to due process. They were still furnished a copy of the
COMELEC Decision and were able to reckon the period for perfecting an appeal. In fact,
petitioner was able to timely lodge a Petition with this Court.
Clearly, the COMELEC validly exercised its constitutionally granted power to make
its own rules of procedure when it issued the 4 May 2010 Order suspending Section 6 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Consequently, the second assailed Resolution of the
COMELEC cannot be set aside on the ground of COMELEC's failure to issue to petitioner a
notice setting the date of the promulgation thereof. DSAICa
2. On whether the COMELEC

committed grave abuse of discretion
in holding that Sabili failed to
prove compliance with the one-year
residency requirement for local
elective officials
As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC's appreciation
and evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been established, including
when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly
unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is
compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELEC's
error. 52
In Mitra v. Commission on Elections , (G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010), we explained
that the COMELEC's use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is
sufficient to taint its action with grave abuse of discretion —
As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" de es exact de nition; generally,
it refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of
wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is su cient to taint a
decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.
Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the
condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that ndings of fact of
the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall be nal and non-
reviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree of evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept to support a conclusion.
In light of our limited authority to review ndings of fact, we do not

ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation
of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an
error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the
appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to
the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the
constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present,
resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to
one of jurisdiction.
Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the COMELEC's use of wrong or
irrelevant considerations in deciding the issue of whether petitioner made a material
misrepresentation of his residency quali cation in his COC as to order its cancellation.
Among others, petitioner pointed to the COMELEC's inordinate emphasis on the issue of
property ownership of petitioner's declared residence in Lipa City, its inconsistent stance
regarding Palomares's relationship to the Pinagtong-ulan property, and its failure to
consider in the rst instance the certi cation of residence issued by the barangay captain
of Pinagtong-ulan. Petitioner bewails that the COMELEC required "more" evidence to show
the change in his residence, notwithstanding the various pieces of evidence he presented
and the fact that under the law, the quantum of evidence required in these cases is merely
substantial evidence and not clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner further ascribes
grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's brushing aside of the fact that he has been
ling his ITR in Lipa City (where he indicates that he is a resident of Pinagtong-ulan) on the
mere expedient that the law allows the ling of the ITR not only in the place of legal
residence but, alternately, in his place of business. Petitioner notes that private
respondent's own evidence shows that petitioner has no business in Lipa City, leaving only
his residence therein as basis for filing his ITR therein.
Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
in ruling that petitioner had not su ciently shown that he had resided in Lipa City for at
least one year prior to the May 2010 elections, we examine the evidence adduced by the
parties and the COMELEC's appreciation thereof. IATHaS
In the present case, the parties are in agreement that the domicile of origin of Sabili
was Brgy. Sico, San Juan, Batangas. He claims that he abandoned his domicile of origin
and established his domicile of choice in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, thereby making
him quali ed to run for Lipa City mayor. On the other hand, respondent COMELEC held that
no such change in domicile or residence took place and, hence, the entry in his Certi cate
of Candidacy showing that he was a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City constituted
a misrepresentation that disqualified him from running for Lipa City mayor.
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be
coupled with conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's xed and permanent
place of abode. 53 As in all administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary in
election cases is substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 54
The ruling on private
respondent's evidence
We begin with an evaluation of the COMELEC's appreciation of private respondent's
evidence.
a) Petitioner's Voter Certification,
Registration and COCs in
previous elections
Petitioner's Voter Certi cation is a common exhibit of the parties. It states, among
others, that petitioner is a resident of Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, Batangas; that he had been
a resident of Lipa City for two (2) years and three (3) months; and that he was so
registered on 31 October 2009. The information therein was "certi ed correct" by
COMELEC Election Officer Juan B. Aguila, Jr.
Private respondent presented this document as proof that petitioner
misrepresented that he is a resident of Lipa City. On the other hand, the latter presented
this document as proof of his residency.
The COMELEC correctly ruled that the Voter Certi cation issued by the COMELEC
Election O cer, Atty. Juan B. Aguila, Jr., was not conclusive proof that petitioner had been
a resident of Lipa City since April 2007. It noted that Aguila is not the competent public
o cer to certify the veracity of this claim, particularly because petitioner's COMELEC
registration was approved only in October 2009. aEHAIS
The Voter Registration Record of petitioner accomplished on 21 June 1997 showing

that he was a resident of Sico, San Juan, Batangas, as well as his various COCs dated 21
June 1997 and March 2007 indicating the same thing, were no longer discussed by the
COMELEC — and rightly so. These pieces of evidence showing that he was a resident of
Sico, San Juan, Batangas on the said dates are irrelevant as, prior to April 2007, petitioner
was admittedly a resident of Sico, San Juan Batangas. Rather, the relevant time period for
consideration is that from April 2007 onwards, after petitioner's alleged change of
domicile.
b) Certificates regarding
ownership of real property
The various certi cates and tax declarations adduced by private respondent
showed that the Lipa property was solely registered in the name of petitioner's common-
law wife, Bernadette Palomares. In discussing the import of this document, the COMELEC
reasoned that, being a "seasoned politician," he should have registered the Lipa property
(which he claimed to have purchased with his personal funds) in his own name. Such
action "would have offered positive proof of intent to change actual residence" from San
Juan, Batangas to Lipa City, considering that he had previously declared his ancestral
home in San Juan, Batangas as his domicile. Since Palomares and petitioner are common-
law spouses not capacitated to marry each other, the property relation between them is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, 55 where only the parties' actual contributions
are recognized. Hence, petitioner cannot prove ownership of a property and residence in
Lipa City through the registered ownership of the common-law wife of the property in Lipa
City.
On the other hand, petitioner bewails the inordinate emphasis that the COMELEC
bestowed upon the question of whether the Lipa property could be considered as his
residence, for the reason that it was not registered in his name. He stresses that the issue
should be residence, not property ownership.
It is true that property ownership is not among the quali cations required of
candidates for local election. 56 Rather, it is a candidate's residence in a locality through
actual residence in whatever capacity. Indeed, we sustained the COMELEC when it
considered as evidence tending to establish a candidate's domicile of choice the mere
lease (rather than ownership) of an apartment by a candidate in the same province where
he ran for the position of governor. 57 In the more recent case of Mitra v. Commission on
Elections, 58 we reversed the COMELEC ruling that a candidate's sparsely furnished, leased
room on the mezzanine of a feedmill could not be considered as his residence for the
purpose of complying with the residency requirement of Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. 59 ECTHIA
The Dissent claims that the registration of the property in Palomares's name does
not prove petitioner's residence as it merely showed "donative intent" without the
necessary formalities or payment of taxes.
However, whatever the nature of the transaction might be, this point is immaterial
for the purpose of ascertaining petitioner's residence. We have long held that it is not
required that a candidate should have his own house in order to establish his residence or
domicile in a place. It is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or
that of a friend or relative. 60 What is of central concern then is that petitioner identi ed
and established a place in Lipa City where he intended to live in and return to for an
indefinite period of time.
Hence, while the COMELEC correctly ruled that, of itself, Palomares' ownership of
the Lipa property does not prove that she or — and in view of their common-law relations,
petitioner — resides in Lipa City, nevertheless, the existence of a house and lot apparently
owned by petitioner's common-law wife, with whom he has been living for over two
decades, makes plausible petitioner's allegation of bodily presence and intent to reside in
the area.
c) Certifications regarding the
family members of petitioner
Private respondent presented a Certi cation from the DepEd, Lipa City Division,
indicating that the names Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili (petitioner's
daughter) and Francis Meynard Sabili (petitioner's son) do not appear on the list of
graduates of Lipa City. Private respondent also presented a Certification from the Office of
the Election O cer of Lipa City that the names of these family members of petitioner do
not appear in its list of voters.
As the issue at hand is petitioner's residence, and not the educational or voting
record of his family, the COMELEC properly did not consider these pieces of evidence in
arriving at its Resolution.
The Dissent nevertheless asserts that because his children do not attend
educational institutions in Lipa and are not registered voters therein, and because
petitioner does not maintain a business therein nor has property in his name, petitioner is
unable to show the existence of real and substantial reason for his stay in Lipa City.
As to the Dissent's rst assertion, it must be stressed that the children, like the wife,
do not dictate the family domicile. Even in the context of marriage, the family domicile is
jointly decided by both husband and wife. 61 In addition, we note that the transfer to Lipa
City occurred in 2007, when petitioner's children were already well into college and could
very well have chosen to study elsewhere than in Lipa City.
Also, it is petitioner's domicile which is at issue, and not that of his children. But even
assuming that it was petitioner himself (rather than his children) who attended educational
institutions or who registered as a voter in a place other than Lipa City, we have held that
"absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a
voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence."
62 In fact, Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that transfer of residence to
any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and
public service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the
army, navy or air force, the constabulary or national police force; or con nement or
detention in government institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of
residence. SDEHCc
As to the Dissent's second assertion, petitioner apparently does not maintain a

business in Lipa City. However, apart from the Pinagtong-ulan property which both Suarez
(the previous property owner) and Palomares swear was purchased with petitioner's own
funds, the records also indicate that there are two other lots in Lipa City, particularly in
Barangay Lodlod, Lipa City 63 which are registered jointly in the name of petitioner and
Palomares. In fact, it was private respondent who presented the Lipa City Assessor's
Certi cate to this effect. Even assuming that this Court were to disregard the two Lodlod
lots, it is well-established that property ownership (and similarly, business interest) in the
locality where one intends to run for local elective post is not requirement of the
Constitution. 64
More importantly, we have gone so far as to rule that there is nothing "wrong in an
individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able
to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election
law purposes for the period required by law." 65
d) Affidavits of Lipa City residents
Private respondent also presented the a davits of Violeta Fernandez 66 and
Rodrigo Macasaet, 67 who were also residents of Pinagtong-ulan. Both stated that
petitioner did not reside in Pinagtong-ulan, as they had "rarely seen" him in the area.
Meanwhile, Pablo Lorzano, 68 in his A davit, attested that although the Lipa property was
sometimes used for gatherings, he did "not recall having seen" petitioner in their barangay.
On the other hand, private respondent 69 and Eladio de Torres, 70 both residents of Brgy.
Calamias, reasoned that petitioner was not a resident of Lipa City because he has no work
or family there. ACTEHI
The COMELEC did not discuss these A davits in its assailed Resolution. It was
correct in doing so, particularly considering that these A davits were duly controverted by
those presented by petitioner.
Moreover, even assuming the truth of the allegation in the A davits that petitioner
was "rarely seen" in the area, this does not preclude the possibility of his residence therein.
In Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal , 71 we held that the averments
of certain barangay health workers — that they failed to see a particular candidate
whenever they made rounds of the locality of which he was supposed to be a resident — is
of no moment. It is possible that the candidate was out of the house to attend to his own
business at the time. The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24)
hours a day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement.
The ruling on petitioner's evidence
We now evaluate how the COMELEC appreciated petitioner's evidence:
a) Petitioner's Income Tax
Returns for 2007 and 2008
The Income Tax Returns of petitioner presented below showed that petitioner had
been paying his Income Tax (2007 and 2008) to the Revenue District O ce of Lipa City. In
waving aside his Income Tax Returns, the COMELEC held that these were not indications of
residence since Section 51 (B) of the National Internal Revenue Code does not only state
that it shall be led in a person's legal residence, but that it may alternatively be led in a
person's principal place of business.
In particular, Section 51 (B) of the National Internal Revenue Code 72 provides that
the Income Tax Return shall be led either in the place where a person resides or where his
principal place of business is located. However, private respondent's own evidence — a
Certi cation from the City Permits and Licensing O ce of Lipa City — showed that there
was no business registered in the City under petitioner's name.

Thus, COMELEC failed to appreciate that precisely because an individual income tax
return may only be led either in the legal residence OR the principal place of business, as
prescribed under the law, the fact that Sabili was ling his Income Tax Returns in Lipa City
notwithstanding that he had no business therein showed that he had actively elected to
establish his residence in that city.
The Dissent claims that since the jurisdiction of RDO Lipa City includes both San
Juan and Lipa City, petitioner's ling of his ITR therein can also support an intent to remain
in San Juan, Batangas — petitioner's domicile of origin.
However, a simple perusal of the Income Tax Returns and Revenue O cial Receipts
for 2007 and 2008 shows that petitioner invariably declares his residence to be
Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, rather than San Juan, Batangas. 73 Hence, while petitioner may be
submitting his income tax return in the same RDO, the declaration therein is unmistakable.
Petitioner considers Lipa City to be his domicile. cTCADI
b) Certification from the Barangay

Captain of Pinagtong-ulan
The COMELEC did not consider in the rst instance the Certi cation issued by
Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade 74 (Honrade) that petitioner had
been residing in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan since 2007. When this oversight was raised as an
issue in petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC brushed it aside on the
ground that the said Certi cation was not sworn to before a notary public and, hence,
"cannot be relied on." Subsequently, petitioner presented another, substantially identical,
Certi cation from the said Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, save for the fact that it had
now been sworn to before a notary public.
We disagree with the COMELEC's treatment of the Barangay Captain's Certi cation
and find the same tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Even without being sworn to before a notary public, Honrade's Certi cation would
not only be admissible in evidence, but would also be entitled to due consideration.
Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 44. Entries in o cial records. — Entries in o cial records made
in the performance of his duty by a public o cer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.
I n Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-

purpose Cooperative, Inc., 75 we explained that the following three (3) requisites must
concur for entries in official records to be admissible in evidence: cSICHD
(a) The entry was made by a public o cer, or by another person

specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) It was made by the public o cer in the performance of his duties, or
by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law; and
(c) The public o cer or other person had su cient knowledge of the
facts stated by him, which facts must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information.
As to the rst requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government
Code to "keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay." 76 Regarding the
second requisite, we have explicitly recognized in Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 77 that
"it is the business of a punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own
barangay." Anent the third requisite, the Barangay Captain's exercise of powers and duties
78 concomitant to his position requires him to be privy to these records kept by the
Barangay Secretary.
Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the COMELEC for its failure to consider
Honrade's Certification on the sole ground that it was initially not notarized.
Meanwhile, the Dissent opines that the sworn a davit of the barangay chair of
Pinagtong-ulan that petitioner is a resident of Lipa City does not help petitioner's case
because it was not shown that the term "resident" as used therein carries the same
meaning as domicile, that is, not merely bodily presence but also, animus manendi or intent
to return. This Court has ruled otherwise.
In Mitra v. Commission on Elections , 79 the declaration of Aborlan's punong
barangay that petitioner resides in his barangay was taken to have the same meaning as
domicile, inasmuch as the said declaration was made in the face of the Court's recognition
that Mitra "might not have stayed in Aborlan nor in Palawan for most of 2008 and 2009
because his office and activities as a Representative were in Manila."
Assuming that the barangay captain's certi cation only pertains to petitioner's
bodily presence in Pinagtong-ulan, still, the COMELEC cannot deny the strength of this
evidence in establishing petitioner's bodily presence in Pinagtong-ulan since 2007.
c) Affidavit of petitioner's
common law wife
To substantiate his claim of change of domicile, petitioner also presented the
a davit of Palomares, wherein the latter swore that she and petitioner began residing in
Lipa City in 2007, and that the funds used to purchase the Lipa property were petitioner's
personal funds. The COMELEC ruled that the A davit was self-serving for having been
executed by petitioner's common-law wife. Also, despite the presentation by petitioner of
other A davits stating that he and Palomares had lived in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan since
2007, the latter's A davit was rejected by the COMELEC for having no independent
collaboration.
Petitioner faults the COMELEC's stand, which it claims to be inconsistent. He argues
that since the property regime between him and Palomares is governed by Article 148 of
the Family Code (based on the parties' actual contribution) as the COMELEC stressed, then
Palomares's A davit expressly stating that petitioner's money alone had been used to
purchase the Lipa property (notwithstanding that it was registered in her name) was not
self-serving, but was in fact, a declaration against interest.
Petitioner's argument that Palomares's a davit was a "declaration against interest"
is, strictly speaking, inaccurate and irrelevant. A declaration against interest, under the
Rules of Civil Procedure, refers to a "declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify against the interest of a declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the
time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true." 80 A
declaration against interest is an exception to the hearsay rule. 81 As such, it pertains only
to the admissibility of, not the weight accorded to, testimonial evidence. 82 SEDICa
Nevertheless, we see the logic in petitioner's claim that the COMELEC had
committed grave abuse of discretion in being inconsistent in its stand regarding
Palomares, particularly regarding her assertion that the Lipa property had been purchased
solely with petitioner's money. If the COMELEC accepts the registration of the Lipa
property in her name to be accurate, her a davit disavowing ownership thereof in favor of
petitioner was far from self-serving as it ran counter to her (and her children's) property
interest.
The Dissent states that it was not unreasonable for the COMELEC to believe that
Palomares may have committed misrepresentations in her a davit considering that she
had perjured herself as an informant on the birth certi cates of her children with respect to
the supposed date and place of her marriage to petitioner. However, this was not the
reason propounded by the COMELEC when it rejected Palomares' affidavit.
Moreover, it is notable that Palomares' assertion in her a davit that she and
petitioner have been living in the Pinagtong-ulan property since April 2007 is corroborated
by other evidence, including the a davits of Pinagtong-ulan barangay o cials and
neighbors.
d) Affidavits from a previous
property owner , neighbors,
certificate from parish and
designation from socio-civic
organization
The A davit issued by Leonila Suarez 83 (erstwhile owner of the Lipa house and lot)
states that in April 2007, after she received the down payment for the Lipa property and
signed an agreement that petitioner would settle her bank obligations in connection with
the said transaction, he and Palomares actually started residing at Pinagtong-ulan. The
COMELEC brushed this A davit aside as one that "merely narrates the circumstances
surrounding the sale of the property and mentions in passing that Sabili and Palomares
lived in Pinagtong-ulan since April 2007 up to the present." 84
We disagree with the COMELEC's appreciation of the Suarez A davit. Since she
was its owner, transactions for the purchase of the Lipa property was within her personal
knowledge. Ordinarily, this includes the arrangement regarding who shall pay for the
property and when, if ever, it shall be occupied by the buyers. We thus consider that her
statements impact positively on petitioner's claim of residence. CADacT
The Dissent on the other hand argues that the claim that petitioner started living in
the Lipa house and lot in April 2007 is made dubious by the fact that (1) there might not be
enough time to effect an actual and physical change in residence a month before the May
2007 elections when petitioner ran for representative of the 4th District of Batangas; and
(2) the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized, and the subsequent transfer of ownership in
the tax declaration was made, only in August 2008.
Before further discussing this, it is pertinent to point out that these were not the
reasons adduced by the COMELEC in the assailed Resolutions. Assuming that the above
reasons were the unuttered considerations of the COMELEC in coming up with its
conclusions, such reasoning still exhibits grave abuse of discretion.
As to the Dissent's rst argument, it must be remembered that a transfer of
domicile/residence need not be completed in one single instance. Thus, in Mitra v.
Commission on Elections, 85 where the evidence showed that in 2008, petitioner Mitra had
leased a small room at Maligaya Feedmills located in Aborlan and, in 2009 purchased in
the same locality a lot where he began constructing his house, we recognized that
petitioner "transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008 and concluded
his transfer in early 2009" and thus, he transferred his residence from Puerto Princesa City
to Aborlan within the period required by law. We cannot treat the transfer to the Pinagtong-
ulan house any less than we did Mitra's transfer to the Maligaya Feedmills room.
Moreover, the Joint A davit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents, including
former and incumbent barangay o cials, attests that petitioner had begun living in the
Pinagtong-ulan house and lot before the May 2007 elections such that it was where his
coordinators for the May 2007 elections went to meet him. 86 Jacinto Cornejo Sr., the
contractor who renovated the Pinagtong-ulan house when it was bought by petitioner, also
swore that petitioner and his family began living therein even while it was being renovated.
87 Another A davit petitioner adduced was that of Rosalinda Macasaet, a resident of
Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, 88 who stated that she also sold a lot she owned in favor of
petitioner and Palomares. The latter bought her lot since it was adjacent to the Lipa house
and lot they had earlier acquired. Macasaet also swore that the couple had actually resided
in the house located in Pinagtong-ulan since April 2007, and that she knew this because
her own house was very near the couple's own. Macasaet's A davit is a positive assertion
of petitioner's actual physical presence in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City. cHEATI
While private respondent had adduced a davits of two Pinagtong-ulan residents

(that of Violeta Fernandez 89 and Rodrigo Macasaet) 90 attesting that petitioner could not
be a resident of Pinagtong-ulan as he was "rarely seen" in the area, these a davits were
controverted by the Joint a davit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents who plainly
accused the two of lying. Meanwhile, the a davits of private respondent 91 and Eladio de
Torres 92 stating that petitioner is not a resident of Lipa City because he has no work or
family there is hardly worthy of credence since both are residents of Barangay Calamias,
which is, and private respondent does not contest this, about 15 kilometers from
Pinagtong-ulan.
As to the Dissent's second argument, the fact that the notarization of the deed of
absolute sale of the property was made months after April 2007 does not negate
petitioner's claim that he started residing therein in April 2007. It is clear from the A davit
of the property's seller, Leonila Suarez, that it was not yet fully paid in April 2007, so it was
understandable that a deed of absolute sale was not executed at the time. Thus:
That initially, the contract to sell was entered into by and between Mr. &
Mrs. Meynardo Asa Sabili and Bernadette Palomares and myself, but eventually
the spouses changed their mind, and after the couple settled all my loan
obligations to the bank, they requested me to put the name of Ms. Bernadette P.
Palomares instead of Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo Asa Sabili and Bernadette Palomares
in the absolute deed of sale;
EDCTIa
That it was Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili who came to my former residence at
Barangay Pinagtong-ulan sometime in the month of April 2007. At that time, Mr.
Meynardo Asa Sabili was still running for Representative (Congressman) in the
4th District of Batangas;
That after payment of the down payment and signing of an agreement

that Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili will be the one to settle my bank obligations, Mr. &
Mrs. Meynardo A. Sabili and Bernadette Palomares had an actual transfer of their
residence at Barangay Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City;
That they started living and residing in Pinagtong-ulan in the month of
April, 2007 up to this point in time; . . . 93
As to the rest of the documents presented by petitioner, the COMELEC held that the
Memorandum issued by the Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. San Jose/Lipa City Chapter
merely declares the designation of petitioner in the organization, without any showing that
residence in the locality was a requirement for that designation. Meanwhile, the Certi cate
of Appreciation was nothing more than an acknowledgment of petitioner's material and
financial support, and not an indication of residence.
We agree that considered separately, the Guardians Brotherhood Memorandum and
the Pinagtong-ulan Parish Certi cate of Appreciation do not establish petitioner's
residence in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City. Nevertheless, coupled with the fact that petitioner
had twice been elected as Provincial Board Member representing the Fourth District of
Batangas, which encompasses Lipa City, petitioner's involvement in the religious life of the
community, as attested to by the certi cate of appreciation issued to him by the
Pinagtong-ulan parish for his "material and nancial support" as President of the Barangay
Fiesta Committee in 2009, as well as his assumption of a leadership role in the socio-civic
sphere of the locality as a member of the advisory body of the Pinagtong-ulan, San
Jose/Lipa City Chapter of the Guardians Brotherhood, Inc., manifests a signi cant level of
knowledge of and sensitivity to the needs of the said community. Such, after all, is the
rationale for the residency requirement in our elections laws, to wit: caAICE
The Constitution and the law requires residence as a quali cation for
seeking and holding elective public o ce, in order to give candidates the
opportunity to be familiar with the needs, di culties, aspirations, potentials for
growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it
enables the electorate to evaluate the o ce seekers' quali cations and tness for
the job they aspire for . . . . 94
Considering all of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that while separately, each
evidence presented by petitioner might fail to convincingly show the fact of his residence
at Pinagtong-ulan since 2007, collectively, these pieces of evidence tend to su ciently
establish the said fact.
Petitioner's actual physical presence in Lipa City is established not only by the
presence of a place (Pinagtong-ulan house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the
a davits of various persons in Pinagtong-ulan, and the Certi cation of its barangay
captain. Petitioner's substantial and real interest in establishing his domicile of choice in
Lipa City is also su ciently shown not only by the acquisition of additional property in the
area and the transfer of his voter registration, but also his participation in the community's
socio-civic and religious life, as well as his declaration in his ITR that he is a resident
thereof.
We therefore rule that petitioner has been able to adduce substantial evidence to
demonstrate compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective
officials under the law.
In view of this Court's finding that petitioner has not misrepresented his residence at
Pinagtong-ulan and the duration thereof, there is no need to further discuss whether there
was material and deliberate misrepresentation of the residency qualification in his COC.
As a nal note, we do not lose sight of the fact that Lipa City voters manifested their
own judgment regarding the quali cations of petitioner when they voted for him,
notwithstanding that the issue of his residency quali cation had been raised prior to the
elections. Petitioner has garnered the highest number of votes (55,268 votes as opposed
to the 48,825 votes in favor of his opponent, Oscar Gozos) 95 legally cast for the position
of Mayor of Lipa City and has consequently been proclaimed duly elected municipal Mayor
of Lipa City during the last May 2010 elections. 96
In this regard, we reiterate our ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections 97 that "
(t)o successfully challenge a winning candidate's quali cations, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal
principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of
the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions
and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote."
Similarly, in Japzon v. Commission on Elections , 98 we concluded that "when the
evidence of the alleged lack of residence quali cation of a candidate for an elective
position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would
not be thwarted by upholding the victor's right to the o ce, the will of the electorate
should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than
frustrate, the will of the voters."
In sum, we grant the Petition not only because petitioner su ciently established his
compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective o cials under the
law. We also recognize that "(a)bove and beyond all, the determination of the true will of
the electorate should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must
prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy we continue to hold sacred." 99 TaCIDS
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED . The assailed

COMELEC Resolutions dated 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 in Florencio Librea v.
Meynardo A. Sabili [SPA No. 09-047 (DC)] are ANNULLED . Private respondent's Petition
to cancel the Certi cate of Candidacy of Meynardo A. Sabili is DENIED . The Status Quo
Ante Order issued by this Court on 7 September 2010 is MADE PERMANENT .
SO ORDERED .
Carpio, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,
concur.
Corona, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro and Abad, JJ., join the dissent of Hon. Justice
Velasco.
Velasco, Jr., J., please see Dissenting Opinion.
Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
VELASCO, JR. , J., dissenting :
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari 1 assailing and seeking to set aside the
Resolutions 2 dated January 26, 2010 and August 17, 2010 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 09-047 (DC), which denied due course to, and canceled,
the Certi cate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Meynardo Sabili (Sabili) for the position of
Mayor of Lipa City in the May 2010 elections on the ground of his misrepresentation that
he is a resident of Barangay (Brgy.) Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City. ISDHcT
During the 1995 and 1998 elections, petitioner Sabili was elected as a member of
the Provincial Board representing the 4th District of Batangas. During the 2007 elections,
he ran for the o ce of Congressman of the 4th District of Batangas but lost. During these
times, he admitted that he was a resident of Brgy. Sico, San Juan, Batangas. On December
1, 2009, however, petitioner Meynardo Sabili led a COC for Mayor of Lipa City, Batangas
for the May 2010 elections. In his COC, he wrote that he had been a resident of Brgy.
Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City for two (2) years and eight (8) months.
On December 5, 2009, private respondent Florencio Librea (Librea) led a veri ed
Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certi cate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a
Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disquali cations with respondent COMELEC,
which was docketed as SPA No. 09-047 (DC). In his petition, private respondent Librea
maintained that petitioner made several material misrepresentations in his COC where he
indicated that he was a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan for the last two years when in fact
he was, and is, a resident of Brgy. Sico, San Juan, Batangas, and so failed to meet the one-
year residence requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. 3
In resolving the controversy, the COMELEC held in its January 26, 2010 Resolution
that the evidence presented by petitioner, as respondent in SPA No. 09-047 (DC), failed to
establish an abandonment of his domicile of origin and the adoption of Lipa City as his
domicile of choice or residence for election law purposes. Hence, petitioner was
disquali ed to run in the May 2010 elections for the mayoralty position in that city. The
COMELEC stated:
In the case before us, it is not denied that Respondent's domicile of origin
is in San Juan, Batangas. What Respondent repeatedly asserts is that since 2007,
he transferred his domicile to Lipa City after allegedly acquiring the Bgy.
Pinagtong Ulan property and claiming that he continuously lived there. ScCIaA
In the rst place, domicile or origin is not easily lost. If one wishes to
successfully effect a change of domicile, he must demonstrate by
evidence an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona
d e intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one, and de nite acts which correspond with the
purpose . These elements must concur, and absent clear and positive proof of the
concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile of origin continues . . . .
xxx xxx xxx

The above pieces of documentary evidence, all taken together
however, fail to convince us that Respondent Sabili successfully
effected a change of domicile . In all, the evidence adduced by
Respondent Sabili plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required
to convince this Commission that an abandonment of domicile or origin
in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred . The claim of an incidental
change of residence, lacking evidence determinative of abandonment of domicile
of origin, without more, would not be su cient to break the principle, long
followed in cases involving questions of domicile that there was clear intent to
abandon and repudiate his domicile in San Juan, Batangas. To effect
abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing Petitioner's
former domicile with intent to supplant the former domicile with one of
his own choosing . Since he is a new voter of Lipa City, the records clearly
indicating that o cially, his registration came into effect only on October 31,
2009; the said voter's document hardly furnishes su cient proof of
abandonment of domicile of origin and a change of domicile of choice. Indeed,
while we have ruled in the past that voting gives rise to a strong presumption of
residence, it is not conclusive evidence thereof. Sabili, in fact, has never even
voted in Lipa City . . . .
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must

be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such
bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it
one's fixed and permanent place of abode.
In this case, Sabili's claim of a common law relationship with

Bernadette Palomares does not establish his actual physical presence
in Bgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City . In fact, the documents pertaining to
Palomares' actual place of residence are con icting, since she is listed as a
resident of Parañaque City . The Deed of Sale and registration of the house in
Bgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, merely proves Palomares' ownership or that she
own property in the city. And it is not impossible that, as indicated in documents
presented herein, she is a resident of Parañaque City owning property in Lipa City.
4
On January 28, 2010, petitioner led a Motion for Reconsideration of the

COMELEC's January 26, 2010 Resolution, and a Supplemental Motion the following day.
On February 2, 2010, the case was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. In the
meantime, the May 10, 2010 elections were conducted and petitioner emerged as the
winning candidate for Mayor of Lipa City. 5 He eventually took his oath and assumed
office. 6 DSacAE
In a Manifestation dated June 15, 2010, petitioner informed the COMELEC En Banc
of these developments and again prayed for the setting aside of the January 26, 2010
Resolution.
In its August 17, 2010 Resolution, however, the COMELEC En Banc denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Discussing each point petitioner raised in that
motion, the COMELEC En Banc held:
We nd that the Second Division fully appreciated the evidence presented
by both parties and correctly found Sabili disquali ed for failing to comply with
the one (1) year residency requirement. TacADE
Anent Sabili's rst ground in his motion for reconsideration, We nd it

important to state that Sabili admitted in Paragraph 14 of his Answer that his
domicile of origin is in Brgy. Sico, San Juan, Batangas. This admission on the
part of Sabili was construed in conjunction with related jurisprudence that
domicile of origin is not easily lost. In order "[t]o successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate an actual change of domicile; 2) a bona de
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and 3) acts which correspond with the purpose." Undoubtedly, Librea must
prove his allegations in support of his petition for disquali cation, but since
Sabili did not deny that his domicile of origin is different from the place
where he intends to run, he now has to prove that he has abandoned his
domicile of origin in favor of Lipa City. Unfortunately, he failed to prove
the same to the satisfaction of the Second Division .
Sabili's second and third grounds refer to the Second Division's supposed
failure to appreciate the evidence adduced in this case. We do not nd basis for
these arguments. The evidence presented, together with the arguments of the
parties, were inextricably interrelated and were thoroughly discussed and resolved
by the Second Division in the assailed 15-page Resolution. The Second
Division was correct in giving little or no weight to the following pieces
of evidence presented by Sabili: a) Affidavit of Bernadette P. Palomares
which is self-serving for being executed by the common-law wife, and
has no independent corroboration that they are residing in Lipa City
since 2007 or that the property was purchased with Sabili's personal
funds; b) A davit of Lenila G. Suarez, the previous owners of the
property in Lipa City supposedly occupied by Sabili and his family,
which merely narrates the circumstances surrounding the sale of the
property and mentions in passing that Sabili and Palomares lived in
Pinagtong-ulan since April 2007 up to the present; c) Certi cation
issued by Hon. Dominador B. Honrade, Barangay Captain of Brgy.
Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, which is unsworn and thus cannot be relied
on; d) Certi cate of Appreciation issued by the Parish of Santo Niño,
Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City which is nothing more than an
acknowledgment of Sabili's material and nancial support and not an
indication of residence; e) Designation as member of the Advisory Body
of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc., San Jose/Lipa City Chapter effective 02
January 2009 which merely declares the designation of Sabili without
any showing that residence in the locality is a requirement for such
designation; f) Voter Certi cation issued by Atty. Juan B. Aguila, Jr.
Election O cer of COMELEC Lipa City and the Application for Transfer
of Registration Record Due to Change of Residence led with the
COMELEC on 06 June 2009 which are not conclusive proof of change of
domicile; g) Income Tax Returns of respondent for the years 2007 and
2008 and the corresponding O cial Receipts which are not indications
of residence since Sec. 51(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code
does not only state that it shall be led in a person's legal residence
but that it may also be led in a person's princip[al] place of business,
and in most cases the return is led where the individual earns his
income. The only other evidence for Sabili on record are the a davits
he submitted which, standing alone, cannot be considered, no matter
how many, as su cient proof of one's change of domicile. There has
to be more.
With regard to Sabili's fourth ground, We nd that the Second Division
made no pronouncement adding a property requirement as a quali cation of an
elective official.
As to the fth ground, We will sustain the position of the Second Division
when it ruled:
In this case, Sabili's claim of a common law relationship with Bernadette

Palomares does not establish his actual physical presence in Bgy. Pinagtong-
ulan, Lipa City . . . as indicated in documents presented herein, she is a resident of
Parañaque City owning property in Lipa City.
Sabili's sixth and seventh grounds deserve little merit. Nothing in the
Assailed Resolution reveals that Sabili's relationship with Palomares or the
property regime governing such relationship had direct bearing on the Second
Division's determination of Sabili's quali cation. Sabili's relationship was merely
discussed in relation to the allegations that Sabili bought a house using his
personal funds but decided to register the property only in the name of Palomares
which is quite peculiar.
Finally, on the eight ground, We hereby declare that Sabili's residence is a

matter that will affect his quali cation to run for public o ce in Lipa City. In view
of the evidence presented in this case, his declaration in his certi cate of
candidacy that he is a resident of Lipa City, when in fact he had not yet
abandoned his domicile of origin in San Juan, Batangas, may convince the voters
that he has all the quali cations to run for the position of mayor, which tends to
mislead the public from a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible, is
precisely what is being referred to in the case of Ugdoracion. 7ScCIaA
Aggrieved, petitioner led with this Court a Petition for Certiorari with Extremely
Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order under Rule 64 in relation to Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nulli cation of the COMELEC's Resolutions for
supposedly having been issued without or in excess of respondent COMELEC's
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Among the documents attached to his petition is a new Certi cation of Residency issued
by the Pinagtong-ulan barangay chairman Dominador Honrade that had been sworn before
a notary public. 8
On September 7, 2010, this Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order requiring the
parties to observe the status quo before the issuance of the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions.
As pointed out by Justice Sereno in her opinion, the following are the issues for Our
Resolution: cDECIA
(1) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to
promulgate its Resolution dated 17 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules of
Procedure; and
(2) Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that
Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective
officials.
Failure to serve advance notice of the
promulgation of the resolution does
not affect the validity of the resolution
On the rst issue, petitioner posits that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it failed to serve advance notice of the promulgation of the August 17,
2010 Resolution under Sec. 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 (Rules on Disquali cation of
Cases Filed in Connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections).
9 Hence, so petitioner claims, his right to due process was violated. Respondents, on the
other hand, argue that Sec. 9 of COMELEC Resolution 8696 had been suspended by
COMELEC Order dated May 4, 2010 in view of the exigencies attendant to the holding of
the country's first automated national elections.
Justice Sereno is of the opinion that petitioner erred in his claim of having been
deprived of due process, adding that the August 17, 2010 Resolution was validly
promulgated. On this issue, I fully agree with my esteemed colleague.
The suspension of Sec. 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and the consequential
lack of advance notice regarding the date of promulgation of the COMELEC En Banc's
August 17, 2010 Resolution is in accordance with the COMELEC's constitutionally granted
power to make its own rules of procedure. The suspension action, without more, did not
violate the petitioner's right to due process or vitiate the validity of the COMELEC's
resolution. After all, as pointed out by Justice Sereno, the advance notice of the date of
promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation. More than that, the COMELEC En
Banc's Resolution was su ciently made known to petitioner who was able to timely le
the present petition to assail and question the same Resolution. Clearly, the suspension of
Sec. 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and the non-service of an advance notice to
petitioner are of no consequence to the validity of the Resolution and the ndings of the
COMELEC, or to the opportunity granted to petitioner to assail the Resolution.
A certiorari writ is not available
to correct errors in the appreciation
of evidence by the lower tribunal
On the second issue, however, I respectfully disagree with Justice Sereno who
maintains that the COMELEC committed errors in the appreciation and evaluation of
evidence so that "the Court is compelled by it[s] bounden constitutional duty to intervene
and correct the COMELEC's errors." 10
Lest it be forgotten, the present recourse was led under the aegis of Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Time and again, this Court has emphasized that a
Rule 65 petition for certiorari is a limited remedy to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not
of judgment. 11 Its only function is to keep a lower tribunal within its jurisdiction 12 and not
to authorize the court exercising certiorari powers to review, reconsider, re-evaluate, and
re-calibrate the evidence previously presented before and considered by the lower tribunal.
In First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals , 13 We reiterated this
elementary precept: aDSHCc
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is

not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem
— beyond the ambit of appeal. I n certiorari proceedings, judicial review
does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties
and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry
as to the correctness of the evaluation of the evidence. Any error
committed in the evaluation of the evidence is merely an error of
judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari . An error of judgment is one
which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors of
the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its
conclusions anchored on the said ndings and its conclusions of law.
It is not for this Court to re-examine con icting evidence, re-evaluate
the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the ndings of fact of the
court a quo .
This rule holds greater force in an application for certiorari against the COMELEC as
it is the institution created by the Constitution precisely to handle election matters and so
presumed to be most competent in matters falling within its domain. 14 Hence, the factual
ndings of the COMELEC En Banc are binding on this Court 15 absent any showing of a
grave abuse of its discretion.
Expectedly, petitioner Sabili attributes grave abuse of discretion to respondent
COMELEC to justify a review and re-evaluation of the evidence presented by the parties.
However, not every claim of an existence of a grave abuse of discretion deserves
consideration; otherwise, every erroneous judgment will be void, appellate courts will be
overburdened and the administration of justice will not survive. 16 Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough.
"Grave abuse of discretion" exists only when there is a "capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."
17 An unfavorable evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence presented by a party will not
be inquired into unless it is shown that the evaluation was done in an "arbitrary manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility." 18 This, the petitioner has failed to
prove in his petition for certiorari.
In fact, petitioner has not disputed or even mottled the presumption that the
COMELEC has "regularly performed" 19 its duties "in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction."
20 Thus, this Court must not, as it cannot, stray beyond the con nes of a certiorari review
and go so far as to re-examine and re-assess the evidence of the parties and weigh anew
its probative value. 21
Nonetheless, Justice Sereno subscribes to the view that the COMELEC's
appreciation and evaluation of evidence are so "grossly unreasonable as to turn into errors
of jurisdiction." 22 I beg to disagree. Even if We consider the present case as an exception
to the rule on the limitations of a certiorari review, the evidence presented by petitioner
does not persuade an actual change of his domicile. SaAcHE
Petitioner failed to establish compliance with

all the requisites for a change of domicile
Petitioner admits that before April 2007 he was a resident of, and his domicile of
origin was, San Juan, Batangas. This Court has previously ruled that "domicile" and
"residence" are synonymous in election law. A domicile is "the place where a party actually
or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found, at
any given time, eventually intends to return and remain." 23 Thus, the question of domicile
is mainly one of intention 24 and circumstances. 25
In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind: (1) a man
must have residence or domicile somewhere; (2) a residence once established remains
until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can only have one residence or domicile at a
time. 26 Clearly, therefore, there is a presumption in favor of a continuance of an
existing domicile . 27 When the evidence presented by the contending parties are in
equipoise that it is impossible for the court to determine with certainty the real intent of
the person whose domicile is in question, the presumption requires the Court to
decide against a change of domicile and the retention of a domicile in question.
28 Hence, the burden of proving a change of domicile lies on the person who

claims that a change has occurred. 29 In this case, the burden lies on the petitioner.
For the petitioner to overcome the presumption of the continuity of his domicile of
origin, he must show by clear and convincing evidence of (1) an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; (2) a bona de intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one; and (3) de nite acts which correspond with the purpose. 30
Thus, to establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must
be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. Bodily presence in the new
locality is not the only requirement; there must be a declared and probable
intent to make it one's xed and permanent place of abode . 31 Indeed, the most
important requirements for the establishment of a new domicile is (1) an actual and
physical presence in the new locality; and (2) a clear and declared intent to abandon the
old domicile (animus non revertendi) and remain in the new place of residence (animus
manendi).
Intending to establish that petitioner failed to meet the foregoing requisites,
respondent Librea presented the following documentary exhibits:
1. Petitioner Sabili's COC filed on December 1, 2009; 32 IcTaAH
2. Tax Declaration issued in 2009 covering the property in Brgy.

Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City and in the name of Bernadette Palomares
(Palomares); 33
3. Certi cation of Property Holdings issued on November 24, 2009
covering the properties in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City in the name of
Palomares; 34
4. Palomares' Tax Declaration issued on December 14, 2009 over the lot
bought from spouses Manolito and Leonila Suarez and covered by
TCT No. T-173356; 35
5. Palomares' Tax Declaration issued on December 14, 2009 over the lot
bought from spouses Rodolfo and Rosalinda Macasaet and covered
by TCT No. T-173355; 36
6. Palomares' Tax Declaration issued on December 14, 2009 over the
building on the lot covered by TCT No. T-173356 bought from the
spouses Suarez and covered by TCT No. T-173355; 37
building on the lot covered by TCT No. T-173355 bought from the
spouses Suarez and covered by TCT No. T-173355; 38 HTAIcD

building on the lot no. 5553 bought from the spouses Suarez; 39
9. Certi cation of No Improvement dated December 14, 2009 over
Block 2, Lot 3, Brgy. Lodlod, Lipa City (TCT No. 164454) in the name
of Sabili and Palomares; 40
10. Certi cation of No Improvement dated December 14, 2009 over
Block 2, Lot 5 Brgy. Lodlod, Lipa City (TCT No. T-164455) in the name
of Sabili and Palomares; 41

11. Affidavit of petitioner Florencio Librea dated December 4, 2009; 42
12. Sinumpaang Salysay Eladio de Torres dated December 4, 2009; 43
13. A davit executed by Violeta Fernandez dated December 28, 2009;
44
14. A davit executed by Rodrigo Macasaet dated December 28, 2009;

45
15. Affidavit executed by Pablo Lorzano; 46

16. Voter Certi cation on petitioner Sabili issued by COMELEC Election
Officer Juan D. Aguila, Jr.; 47
17. Voter's Registration Record No. 07361248 of petitioner Sabili
approved on June 21, 1997; 48
18. 1997 Voter Registration Record of petitioner;
19. Sabili's 2007 COC for Member of House of Representative; 49
20. Certi cation of No Marriage for Bernadette Palomares issued by the
National Statistics Office (NSO) on December 22, 2009;
21. National Statistics O ce (NSO) Advisory on Marriages stating that
as of November 28, 2009, Sabili is married to Daisy Cervas; 50
22. NSO Certi cation issued on December 22, 2009 stating that
Palomares does not appear in the National Indices of Marriages; 51
23. Lipa City Permits and Licensing O ce Certi cation that Sabili has no
business therein dated December 11, 2009; 52
24. Printout of a Facebook webpage of petitioner's daughter, Mey
Bernadette Sabili stating that her hometown is "Porto no, Las Piñas,
Philippines"; 53
25. Department of Education (DepEd) Lipa City Division Certi cation
that the names Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili and
Francis Meynard Sabili (petitioner's son) do not appear on its list of
graduates; 54
26. Certification from the Office of the Election Officer of Lipa City dated
December 28, 2009 that Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette
Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili do not appear in its list of voters. 55
CIDaTc
On the other hand, to support his position that he has abandoned his domicile of
origin and adopted Lipa City, Batangas as his domicile of choice, making him quali ed to
be elected as the City's Mayor, petitioner Sabili presented the following documentary
evidence:
1. Affidavit of Bernadatte Palomares; 56
2. Birth Certificate of Francis Meynard Sabili; 57
3. Birth Certificate of Mey Bernadette Sabili; 58
4. Affidavit of Leonila G. Suarez; 59
5. Certi cation of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay
Chairman Dominador Honrade dated October 30, 2009; 60
6. Notarized Certi cation of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan
Barangay Chairman Dominador Honrade dated August 25, 2010; 61
7. Affidavit executed by Jacinto Honrade Cornejo, Sr.; 62
8. Affidavit executed by Rosalinda Macasaet; 63 aSIHcT
9. Certi cate of Appreciation issued by the parish of Sto. Niño of

Pinagtong-ulan; 64
10. Designation of petitioner in the Advisory Body (AB) of Pinagtong-
ulan, San Jose/Lipa City Chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.; 65
11. COMELEC Voter Certification on petitioner issued by Election Officer
Juan Aguila, Jr.; 6 6
12. COMELEC Application for Transfer/Transfer with Reactivation dated
June 6, 2009; 67
13. Petitioner's Income Tax Return for 2007; 68
14. Official Receipt for petitioner's income tax payment for 2007; 69
15. Petitioner's Income Tax Return for 2008; 70
16. Official Receipt for petitioner's income tax payment for 2008; 71
17. Pinagsama-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated January 16, 2010;
72
18. Sinumpaang Salaysay dated January 16, 2010 executed by

Dominador Macuha; 73
19. Certi cate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning
Candidates for Lipa City Mayor and Vice-Mayor; 74
20. Sabili's Panunumpa sa Katungkulan dated July 30, 2010. 75
Petitioner claims that the foregoing documents are su cient to constitute
substantial evidence of his change of domicile pursuant to this Court's pronouncements in
Mitra v. COMELEC . 76 A closer inquiry, however, will reveal a whale of difference between
the present case and Mitra. Consider: While there were circumstances in Mitra that led the
majority of this Court to conclude that petitioner Mitra made "incremental transfer moves"
to change his domicile (by, among others, leasing a dwelling, purchasing a lot for his
permanent home, building a house thereon, and maintaining substantial investments in the
new locality in the form of an experimental pineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse, and a
cock farm), the petitioner in this case, Sabili, failed to adduce any evidence that would
substantially prove a change of his domicile from San Juan, Batangas to Lipa City whether
by incremental acts or an immediate deed. There lies the difference. TIAEac
As shown by the Certi cation of No Improvement issued by the Lipa City assessor,
petitioner made no efforts to build a house on the lots located in Brgy. Lodlod that are
actually registered in his own name. 77 Neither has he maintained any business in the
locality despite his avowed profession as a businessman. 78 As implied by Mitra, having
substantial investments and constructing improvements on properties bought in the new
locality are indicative of animus manendi. Hence, the non-existence of such evidence in the
present case supports respondents' claim of continuance of his domicile of origin in San
Juan, Batangas.
Indeed, petitioner heavily anchors his claimed residency in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City
since April 2007 primarily on his allegation that he purchased a house and lot thereat in the
same month, registered the property in the name of his "common-law spouse," Bernadette
Palomares (Palomares), and actually resided therein since April 2007 together with
Palomares and their children.
To say the least, this claim is not only questionable but appalling. Petitioner's
temerity in asserting that he had been living with Palomares for 20 years, while he was
legally married to another , and so should be considered to have followed his
paramour's residence simply goes against the norms of decency, if not the law against
concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, We cannot now recognize his residency in Lipa City on the pretext that his
"common-law spouse" lives therein. Commodum ex injuria sua non habere debet. No
person ought to derive any advantage of his own wrong . 79
Even in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC , 80 this Court did not consider Mrs. Marcos
to have followed the residence of former President Marcos, her legal spouse. Why should
this Court now consider Sabili to have adopted a domicile of choice in Lipa just because
his "common-law spouse" has a house registered in her name located in the same city? To
consider a man to follow the residence of the woman who he cannot marry is dangerous
precedent.
If this Court is disposed to establish a rule that a man can follow the residence of a
woman, that woman must be the man's lawful wife, not his concubine. This is corollary to
the provisions of the Family Code explicitly imposing on the husband the obligation to
establish his domicile with his wife and live with her:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall x the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter
should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the
exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not
compatible with the solidarity of the family.
Further, even assuming that it was petitioner who negotiated the purchase and paid
for the property in Pinagtong-ulan (no deed of sale was presented), his act of having it
registered in the name of his "common-law" spouse only indicates a donative intent
without the necessary formalities or the payment of taxes, not the intent to abandon his
domicile of origin and maintain a new domicile of choice.
In fact, Sabili's resounding omission to provide the COMELEC and this Court the
deeds of sale over the properties in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City executed by the spouses
Manolito and Leonila Suarez and the spouses Rodolfo and Rosalinda Macasaet in favor of
Palomares, as well as the certi cates of title, puts doubt on Sabili's allegation that there
was a transfer of ownership over the properties to Palomares in April 2007 that would
have allowed her and/or the petitioner to claim the right to reside in the properties. This
doubt is aggravated by the fact that the tax declarations over the properties show that the
deeds of sale were drawn up and notarized only in August 2008. 81 cCDAHE
Indeed, the claim of an actual and physical transfer on the same month of the
negotiation, April 2007, strains credulity considering that it is admitted by Sabili that he ran
for a position in the lower house of Congress in the May 2007 elections (for which he led
a COC indicating his domicile as San Juan, Batangas). Was there enough time to effect an
actual and physical change a month before the elections? If there was time to relocate,
why were the deeds of sale drawn up and notarized only in August 2008 82 and the tax
declarations transferred in the name of Palomares only in the same month if they had
already relocated in April 2007?
All these inconsistencies easily show that when Sabili stated in his COC that he had
lived in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan since April 2007, he had deliberately committed a material
misrepresentation obviously to deceive the voting public.
It is also curious to note that even Sabili's common-law spouse, named as the owner
of the property in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, is registered as a resident of 215 Elizalde Street,
BF Homes, Parañaque City in the tax declarations covering the Pinagtong-ulan property. 83
Clearly, the COMELEC could not be held "grossly unreasonable" for holding that while
Palomares might be a Lipa City property owner, she was a resident of
Parañaque City . O cial documents issued by the O ce of the City Assessor of Lipa City
clearly establish such fact. This o cial records cannot be defeated by a self-serving
a davit drawn up by petitioner's common-law wife that she resides in Lipa City in order to
support petitioner's claim that he too is a resident of the city.
Parenthetically, Palomares' A davit cannot be considered as a declaration against
her interest under the rules on evidence because the primary requisite of Sec. 38, Rule 130
84 is that the declarant is dead or unable to testify, and it is not alleged that Palomares has
died or is now unable to testify.TICAcD
Instead, Palomares' A davit should be taken with the metaphorical grain of salt.
The numerous falsities committed by Palomares in various o cial and governmental
documents negate any faith on her word and betray her propensity to lie to favor her
"family" so that it is not grossly unreasonable to hold that Palomares have committed a
misrepresentation in her a davit in order to support Sabili. This is readily apparent in the
very documents presented by Sabili as his own evidence. For instance, Palomares had
previously perjured herself as the informant in the birth certi cates of her children sired by
petitioner. 85 Palomares asserted in the birth certi cate of her son that she married
petitioner on December 2, 1980 in Bulacan, Bulacan. On the other hand, she claimed that
she and petitioner were married on March 2, 1983 in Manila in the birth certi cate of her
daughter when the fact certi ed by the NSO is that she and petitioner had never been
married. 86 These misrepresentations are undeniably important as they determine the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the children. Hence, the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus clearly applies and the COMELEC had reason not to nd Palomares' statements
worthy of credit.
So are Sabili's statements. It should not escape this Court that Sabili has adopted
the untruthful statements of Palomares in the birth certi cates of their children as his own
evidence in the proceedings before the COMELEC and this Court. He has, therefore, clearly
sanctioned the falsities boldly stated thereon. Worse, the same predilection for the untruth
can be observed in Sabili's Voter's Certi cation that he presented as his own evidence.
While it is not denied that he is married to Daisy Cervas Sabili, he did not dispute the entry
made on his status as "single." In fact, in his Income Tax Returns (ITRs) for 2007 and 2008
he claimed that his spouse's name was "Sabili Bernadette Palomares," when the NSO
certi ed that as of November 2009, Sabili was still legally married to Daisy Cervas. Clearly,
petitioner shows a pattern of false machinations intended to assume a coveted electoral
position. Unfortunately for him, deceit cannot take the place of compliance with the
statutory qualifications for office.
It is also notable that petitioners' children by Palomares have not attended any of
the educational institutions in Lipa City, 87 nor have Palomares or the children been
registered as voters of Lipa City 88 despite the fact that Sabili filed a COC for the Mayoralty
position. Instead, Sabili's own daughter made an extra-judicial declaration that she
considers "Portofino, Las Piñas" as her hometown, not Batangas.
In the case of Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 89 this Court
considered the existence of "real and substantial reason" to indicate animus manendi in the
purported new domicile of choice:
In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for
petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa as his domicile of choice and abandon
his domicile of origin and/or any other previous domicile. To begin
with, petitioner and his wife have owned and operated businesses in
Sta. Rosa since 2003. Their children have attended schools in Sta. Rosa
at least since 2005 . Although ownership of property should never be
considered a requirement for any candidacy, petitioner had su ciently con rmed
his intention to permanently reside in Sta. Rosa by purchasing residential
properties in that city even prior to the May 2007 election, as evidenced by
certi cates of title issued in the name of petitioner and his wife. One of
these properties is a residence in Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa which petitioner acquired even
before 2006 but which petitioner had been leasing out. He claims that he rented
out this property because prior to 2006 he had not decided to permanently reside
in Sta. Rosa. This could explain why in early 2006 petitioner had to rent a
townhouse in Villa de Toledo — his Bel-Air residence was occupied by a tenant.
The relatively short period of the lease was also adequately explained by
petitioner — they rented a townhouse while they were in the process of building
their own house in Sta. Rosa. True enough, petitioner and his spouse
subsequently purchased a lot also in Villa de Toledo in April 2007,
about a month before election day, where they have constructed a home
for their family's use as a residence . In all, petitioner had adequately shown
that his transfer of residence to Sta. Rosa was bona de and was not merely for
complying with the residency requirement under election laws. 90 IHaECA
Unlike in Fernandez where We sustained petitioner's change of domicile and

quali cation for his o ce, Sabili has no "real and substantial reason" to establish his
domicile in Lipa City and abandon his domicile of origin in San Juan, Batangas. With no
children or wife actually residing in Lipa City, or business interests therein, it is not "grossly
unreasonable" for the COMELEC to conclude that petitioner had no "declared and
probative intent" to adopt Lipa City as his domicile of choice in the absence of a real and
substantial reason to do so.
Contrary to Justice Sereno's Opinion, Sabili's act of ling his ITR in Revenue District
O ce No. (RDO) 59 in Lipa City for the years 2007 and 2008 does not indicate a change of
domicile from San Juan to Lipa City, Batangas. RDO 59's jurisdiction includes both San
Juan and Lipa City 91 so that the intent to remain cannot immediately be ascribed to Lipa
City. On the contrary, his ling of the ITR in RDO 59 can also be used to support his intent
to remain in San Juan, Batangas — his domicile of origin. In fact, petitioner left the space
for his residence in his 2007 ITR blank without indicating where he was actually residing.
To reiterate, any doubt on residency or domicile shall be resolved in favor of the domicile
of origin.
In the clear absence of the most important element in the establishment of a
domicile —animus manendi — it is of no use to discuss the consequence of testimonies as
to his bodily presence in the locality. As stated, all the requisites for a valid change of
domicile or residence is necessary for election law purposes. In the absence of even just
one element, the presumption is in favor of the maintenance and continuity of the domicile
of origin. Hence, in this case, petitioner is presumed to still be a resident of San Juan,
Batangas and disqualified from taking the mayoralty position in Lipa City, Batangas.
The notarized certi cation of the Baranggay Chairman of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa
City does not bar Us from holding this position contrary to Justice Sereno's opinion. My
esteemed colleague bases her appreciation of the notarized certi cation on Section 44,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 44. Entries in o cial records. — Entries in o cial records
made in the performance of his duty by a public o cer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.
ATcEDS
As is readily apparent, Section 44, Rule 130 pertains to "entries in o cial records."
Needless to state, no such "entries" or "records" were referred to in the certi cation, much
less presented before the COMELEC or this Court. Instead, the certi cation plainly states
in a pro-forma way: "This is to certify that Meynardo A. Sabili, 53 years old is a resident of
Zone 5 of Barangay Pinagtong-ulan Lipa City since April 2007." Neither does the
certi cation mention any record kept by the Baranggay Secretary, or even cite any of its
entries. Clearly, Section 44, Rule 130 cannot clothe the certi cation executed by the
Baranggay Chairman of Pinagtong-ulan with nality and conclusiveness. Instead, as it is
not the duty of the Baranggay Chairman, but the duty of the Baranggay Secretary, "to keep
an updated record of all inhabitants of the baranggay, " 92 the certi cation must be
dismissed as nothing but containing hearsay statements.
In fact, even if we consider arguendo the Baranggay Chairman's certi cation stating
that Sabili is a resident of his baranggay, there is no indication that the term "resident" used
therein carries the same meaning as the "resident" used in the provision requiring
residence as a quali cation for candidacy, which is equivalent to domicile that requires not
just physical presence but, again, animus manendi. At most, the certi cation may only
attest to the bodily presence of petitioner in his baranggay, but not the element of Sabili's
intent to remain therein which, as indicated by circumstances, is patently absent.
The certification is also negated given the conflicting testimonies of residents of the
Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan where petitioner claims to be residing. 93 Again, the rule is in the
presence of con icting evidence on the issue of domicile, the Court is behooved to uphold
the presumption of the continuity of the domicile of origin . 94
Both the Certi cate of Appreciation issued by the Parish of Santo Niño and Sabili's
Designation as a Member of the Advisory Body of Guardians Brotherhood Incorporated
cannot be considered to establish Sabili's domicile in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan since, as noted
by the COMELEC, the rst merely mentions material and nancial support to the esta
celebration. And there is nothing in the second document making residency in Brgy.
Pinagtong-ulan as a requisite for the designation in the Advisory Board.
Furthermore, it notable that Sabili applied for transfer of his registration record only
on June 9, 2009 and the same was approved in October 31, 2009 as proven by Sabili's
voter certi cation. Technically, therefore, Sabili is a registered voter of Lipa City only in
October 2009, seven months prior to the May 2010 elections. caIDSH
Indeed, it is not only that "each evidence presented by petitioner… fail(s) to

convincingly show that fact of his residence at Pinagtong-ulan since 2007," 9 5 even
collectively considered, these pieces of evidence tend to sufficiently establish such failure.
As Sabili's acts belie his intent to change his domicile and be a resident of Lipa City,
he had deliberately and falsely misrepresented in his COC that he is resident of Lipa City,
knowing fully well that he is not, in order to qualify as a candidate for the o ce of the
Mayor. Sabili's statement in the COC cannot be dismissed as a simple mistake that does
not warrant its cancellation since residence being primarily a matter of intent, any
falsehood with regards thereto, as in this case, reveals an intentional and deliberate
misrepresentation that cannot be sanctioned by this Court. Hence, the misrepresentation
committed by Sabili regarding his residence is a clear ground for the cancellation of his
COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and his disquali cation from
the office he is presently occupying.
Sabili's subsequent election is of no consequence considering that an invalid COC
cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, much less valid votes. More importantly, while the
electorate's will is indeed primary, the electorate likewise deserves a person who is
unwilling to resort to a Machiavellian circumvention of the laws and blatant falsehood just
to suit his own purposes. He is not only disquali ed from a public o ce but more
importantly does not deserve the public's trust.
I, therefore, submit that the COMELEC's Resolutions be upheld and the instant
petition for certiorari be denied.
Footnotes
1.Rollo, p. 79.
2.The 4th district of Batangas is composed of the municipalities of Ibaan, Padre Garcia,
Rosario, San Jose, San Juan and Taysan, and the City of Lipa.
http://www.batangas.gov.ph/index.php?p=15 (last accessed on 30 January 2012).
3.Rollo, pp. 70-76.
4.Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy . — A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false .
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing,
not later than fifteen days before the election.
xxx xxx xxx

Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office
stated therein and that he is eligible for said office ; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city of district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political
party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation ; that he
will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge . (Emphasis
supplied.)
5.Section 39. Qualifications. —
a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect. (Underscoring supplied.)
6.Id. at 137.
7.Id. at 138, 152-155.
8.Id. at 139.
9.Id. at 140-141.
10.Id. at 142-143.
11.Id. at 144.
12.Id. at 145-146.
13.Id. at 147.
14.Id. at 148.
15.Id. at 149.
16.Id. at 150.
17.Id. at 156.
18.Id. at 157-158.
19.Id. at 159.
20.Id. at 160.
21.Id. at 161.
22.Id. at 162.
23.Id. at 163.

24.Id. at 164.
25.Id. at 102.
26.Id. at 103.
27.Id. at 104.
28.Id. at 105.
29.Id. at 106.
30.Id. at 107.
31.Id. at 108.
32.Id. at 109.
33.Id. at 110.
34.Id. at 111.
35.Id. at 112.
36.Id. at 113.
37.Id. at 114.
38.Id. at 187.
39.Id. at 190.
40.Id. at 211-212.
41.Id. at 48-62.
42.Id. at 296-299.
43.Id. at 63-69.
44.Id. at 294.
45.Id. at 295.
46.Id. at 300.
47.Id. at 314-315.
48.Id. at 739.
49.271 Phil. 844 (1991).
50.224 Phil. 326, 359 (1985).
51.128 Phil. 165 (1967).
52.Mitra v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191938, 19 October 2010, 633 SCRA 580.
53.Domino v. Commission on Elections, 369 Phil. 798 (1999).
54.Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 347 Phil. 510 (1997).
55.Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property
or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
bad faith.
56.Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 187478, 21 December
2009, 608 SCRA 733.
57.Perez v. Commission on Elections, 375 Phil. 1106 (1999). The other pieces of evidence
considered by the COMELEC in the Perez case were the candidate's marriage certificate,
the birth certificate of his daughter, and various letters bearing the address, all showing
that he was a resident of the province for at least one (1) year before the elections.
58.G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010, 622 SCRA 744.

59.As further proof of his change in residence, Mitra had adduced affidavits from the seller of
the lot he purchased, the owner of Maligaya Feedmill, the barangay captain and
sangguniang barangay members of Isaub, Aborlan, as well as an Aborlan councilor. He
also presented photographs of the residential portion of Maligaya Feedmill where he
resides, and of his experimental pineapple plantation and cock farm. He further
submitted the community tax certificate he himself secured, and a House of
Representatives Identification Card, both indicating that he resides in Aborlan.
60.De los Reyes v. Solidum, 61 Phil. 893 (1935).
61.Family Code, Article 69.
62.Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954).

63.Rollo, pp. 148 and 150, Office of the City Assessor of Lipa Certification dated 14 December
2009.
64.Maquerra v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 (1965).
65.Japzon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009, citing Aquino v.
Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 467 (1995).
66.Supra note 21.
67.Supra note 22.
68.Supra note 23.
69.Rollo, pp. 82-83.

70.Id. at 84-85.
71.G.R. No. 187478, 21 December 2009, 608 SCRA 733.
72.SEC. 51. Individual Return. —

(A) Requirements. —
xxx xxx xxx
(B) Where to File. — Except in cases where the Commissioner otherwise permits, the
return shall be filed with an authorized agent bank, Revenue District Officer, Collection
Agent or duly authorized Treasurer of the city or municipality in which such person has
his legal residence or principal place of business in the Philippines, or if there be no legal
residence or place of business in the Philippines, with the Office of the Commissioner. . .
.
73.Rollo, pp. 112-114.
74.Rollo, p. 105.
75.425 Phil. 511 (2002).
76.SEC. 394. Barangay Secretary: Appointment, Qualifications, Powers and Duties. — (a) The
barangay secretary shall be appointed by the punong barangay with the concurrence of
the majority of all the sangguniang barangay members. The appointment of the
barangay secretary shall not be subject to attestation by the Civil Service Commission.
(b) The barangay secretary shall be of legal age, a qualified voter and an actual resident
of the barangay concerned.
(c) No person shall be appointed barangay secretary if he is a sangguniang barangay
member, a government employee, or a relative of the punong barangay within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
(d) The barangay secretary shall:

(1) Keep custody of all records of the sangguniang barangay and the barangay
assembly meetings;
(2) Prepare and keep the minutes of all meetings of the sangguniang barangay and the
barangay assembly;
(3) Prepare a list of members of the barangay assembly, and have the same posted in
conspicuous places within the barangay ;
(4) Assist in the preparation of all necessary forms for the conduct of barangay
elections, initiatives, referenda or plebiscites, in coordination with the Comelec;
(5) Assist the municipal civil registrar in the registration of births, deaths, and marriages;
(6) Keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay containing the following
items of information: name, address, place and date of birth, sex, civil status, citizenship,
occupation, and such other items of information as may be prescribed by law or
ordinances;
(7) Submit a report on the actual number of barangay residents as often as may be
required by the sangguniang barangay ; and
(8) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be
prescribed by law or ordinance.
77.Supra note 56.

78.SEC. 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, and Functions. — (a) The punong barangay , as
the chief executive of the barangay government, shall exercise such powers and perform
such duties and functions, as provided by this Code and other laws.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the barangay and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code,
the punong barangay shall:
(1) Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable within the barangay ;
(2) Negotiate, enter into, and sign contracts for and in behalf of the barangay , upon
authorization of the sangguniang barangay ;
(3) Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or
municipal mayor and the sanggunian members in the performance of their duties and
functions;
(4) Call and preside over the sessions of the sangguniang barangay and the barangay
assembly, and vote only to break a tie;
(5) Upon approval by a majority of all the members of the sangguniang barangay ,
appoint or replace the barangay treasurer, the barangay secretary, and other appointive
barangay officials;
(6) Organize and lead an emergency group whenever the same may be necessary for the
maintenance of peace and order or on occasions of emergency or calamity within the
barangay;
(7) In coordination with the barangay development council, prepare the annual executive
and supplemental budgets of the barangay ;
(8) Approve vouchers relating to the disbursement of barangay funds;

(9) Enforce laws and regulations relating to pollution control and protection of the
environment;
(10) Administer the operation of the Katarungang Pambarangay in accordance with the
provisions of this Code;
(11) Exercise general supervision over the activities of the sangguniang kabataan;
(12) Ensure the delivery of basic services as mandated under Section 17 of this Code;
(13) Conduct an annual palarong barangay which shall feature traditional sports and
disciplines included in national and international games, in coordination with the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports;
(14) Promote the general welfare of the barangay ; and
(15) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be
prescribed by law or ordinance.
79.G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010.
80.RULES OF COURT, Rule 130C (6), Sec. 38.
81.Unchuan v. Lozada, G.R. No. 172671, 16 April 2009, 585 SCRA 421.
82.People v. Catalino, 131 Phil. 194 (1968).

83.Rollo, p. 104.
84.Id. at 66.
85.G.R. No. 191938, 19 October 2010.
86.Rollo, pp. 211-212, Pinagsama-Samang Salaysay executed by 21 Barangay Pingtong-ulan

residents, namely Esmeraldo P. Macasaet (former barangay captain of Pinagtong-Ulan),
Eduardo R. Lorzano (former barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan), Patricia L. Alvarez
(incumbent councilor of Pinagtong-ulan), Pedro Y. Montalba (former councilor of
Pinagtong-ulan), Loida M. Macasaet, Mario P. Lingao, Sancho M. Garcia, Jr., Atilano H.
Macasaet, Baby Jean A. Mercado, Ligaya C. Mercado, Rosalinda M. Macasaet, Olga M.
Reyes, Jennifer D. Garcia, Sancho C. Garcia, Sr., Marissa G. Mercado, Wilma C. Mercado,
Aireen M. Macasaet, Eden R. Suarez, Noemi R. Ubalde, Arthur A. del Rosario, and
Norberto M. Layog.
87.Rollo, p. 190.
88.Id. at 106.
89.Rollo, p. 161.
90.Rollo, p. 162.
91.Rollo, pp. 82-83.

92.Rollo, pp. 84-85.
93.Rollo, p. 188.
94.Torayno v. Commission on Elections, 392 Phil. 343 (2000).

95.http://www.comelec.gov.ph/results/2010_natl_local/res_reg1014000.html (last accessed
on 3 April 2012).
96.Rollo, p. 294.
97.G.R. No. 137329, 9 August 2000, 337 SCRA 574.
98.G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009, 576 SCRA 331.

99.Sinaca v. Mula, 373 Phil. 896 (1999).
VELASCO, JR., J., dissenting:
1.Under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

2.Both penned by Judge Jose Emmanuel M. Castillo.
3.Sec. 39. Qualifications. —
(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect. (Underscoring supplied.)
4.Rollo, pp. 59-61. Emphasis supplied.
5.Annex "P" to the Petition.

6.Rollo, p. 293, Annex "Q" to the Petition.
7.Emphasis supplied.
8.Rollo, p. 300, Annex "S" to the Petition.

9.SEC. 6. Promulgation. — The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or
a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in
advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram,
fax or thru the fastest means of communication.
10.Ponencia, p. 12.
11.Lydia R. Pagaduan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 172278, March 29, 2007, 519 SCRA
512.
12.Angara v. Fedman Development Corporation, 483 Phil. 495 (2004); quoted in PCGG v.
Silangan Investors and Managers, Inc., G.R. Nos. 167055-56 & 170673, March 25, 2010,
616 SCRA 382.
13.G.R. No. 171989, July 4, 2007, 526 SCRA 564, 578 (emphasis supplied); quoted in Soriano v.
Marcelo, G.R. No. 160772, July 13, 2009, 592 SCRA 394.
14.Matalam v. Commission on Elections, 338 Phil. 447, 470 (1997).
15.Japzon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331;
citing Dagloc v. Commision on Elections, 463 Phil. 263, 288 (2003); Mastura v.
Commission on Elections, 349 Phil. 423, 429 (1998).
16.San Fernando Rural Bank, Inc. v. Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation, G.R. No.
168088, April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA 564.
17.Id.; citing Lee v. People, G.R. No. 159288, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 662, 678-679.
18.Rimbunan Hijau Group of Companies v. Oriental Wood Processing Corporation, G.R. No.
152228, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 650, 661.
19.RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 2 (m).
20.Id., id., Sec. 2 (n).
21.Macawaig v. Balindong, G.R. No. 159210, September 20, 2006, 502 SCRA 454; citing Garcia
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 147427, February 7, 2005, 450 SCRA
535, 547.
22.Ponencia, p. 12.
23.Japzon v. COMELEC, supra note 15; emphasis supplied.
24.Limbona v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 186006, October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA 240.
25.Pundaodaya v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179313, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA
178, 184-185; citing Domino v. Commission on Elections, 369 Phil. 798, 818 (1999).
26.Id.
27.In the Matter of the Petition for Disqualification of Tess Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. Nos.
163619-20, November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 290, 303; Chesire, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 218-219.
28.Private International Law by Chesire, pp. 218-219.

29.Bevilaqua v. Bernstein, 642 F. Supp. 1072, 1073 (S.D.N.Y.1986); cited in Israel v. Carpenter,
Not Reported in F.Supp., 1995 WL 640534 (S.D.N.Y.); Rich Products Corp. v. Diamond, 51
Misc.2d 675, 273 N.Y.S.2d 687, N.Y.Sup. 1966, October 11, 1966.
30.Id.
31.Domino v. Commission on Elections, supra note 25, at 820 (1999); emphasis supplied.
32.Rollo, p. 431.
33.Id.
34.Id. at 433.
35.Id. at 444.
36.Id. at 445.
37.Id. at 446.
38.Id. at 447.
39.Id. at 448.
40.Id. at 442.
41.Id. at 443.
42.Id. at 434.
43.Id. at 436.
44.Id. at 454.
45.Id. at 455.
46.Id. at 456.
47.Id. at 438.
48.Id. at 440.
49.Id. at 457.
50.Id. at 441.
51.Id. at 439.
52.Id. at 449.
53.Id. at 450.
54.Id. at 452.
55.Id. at 453.
56.Annex "1" to petitioner's Answer; id. at 102, 394.

57.Annex "2" to Sabili's Answer; id. at 103, 395.
58.Annex "3" to Sabili's Answer; id. at 394.
61.Annex "S" to Sabili's Petition for Certiorari; id. at 300.
62.Annex "6" to Sabili's Answer; id. at 399.


69.Annex "12-A" to Sabili's Answer; id. at 112, 407.

71.Annex "13-A" to Sabili's Answer; id. at 114, 408.
72.Rollo, p. 212.
73.Id. at 213.
74.Annex "P" to Petition for Certiorari.
75.Annex "Q" to Petition for Certiorari.
76.G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010.

77.Rollo, pp. 442-443.
78.Id. at 449.
79.Rimbunan Hijau Group of Companies and Niugini Lumber Merchants Pty., Ltd. v. Oriental
Wood Processing Corporation, G.R. No. 152228, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 650;
European Resources and Technologies, Inc. v. Ingenieuburo Birkhahn + Nolte,
Ingeniurgesellschaft mbh, G.R. No. 159586, July 26, 2004, 435 SCRA 246;
Communication Materials Design, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102223, August 22,
1996, 260 SCRA 673.
80.G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300.
81.Rollo, pp. 444-448; Private respondent's Annex "B".

82.Id.
83.Id.
84.Section 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact is asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that
a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in
interest and against third persons.
85.Rollo, pp. 58-59.

86.Id. at 439; Respondent's Annex "F."
87.Id. at 452.
88.Id. at 453.
89.G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 733.

90.Emphasis supplied.
91.<http://www.bir.gov.ph/directory/rdoinner.htm#66> visited March 15, 2012.
92.Section 394 (d) (6), Local Government Code.

93.Respondent Librea presented his Affidavit as well as the Affidavits of Eladio de Torres,
Violeta Fernandez, Rodrigo Macasaet and Pablo Lorzano. Sabili on the other hand,
presented the Affidavits of Leonila Suarez, Jacinto Cornejo Sr. and Rosalinda Macasaet.
Notably, the witnesses of Sabili all benefited from a business transaction with
Palomares, Sabili's common-law wife. Suarez and Macasaet sold properties to
Palomares while Cornejo was hired by her to renovate a house. Hence, it is not far-
fetched to conclude that they would be biased in favour of Sabili. Furthermore, the
Pinagsama-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated January 16, 2010 and the
Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Dominador Macuha attributed familial relations to
the witnesses of Librea and the wife of Sabili's opponent for the mayoralty position.
94.Bevilaqua, supra note 29.

95.Ponencia, pp. 23-24.

Sabili v. Commission On Elections

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Sabili v. Commission On Elections

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Sabili v. Commission On Elections

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 193261. April 24, 2012.]

MEYNARDO SABILI , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

In support of his allegation, private respondent presented the following:

14. Birth Certificate of Mey Bernadette Sabili 38

The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the Motion for

However, the COMELEC Order dated 4 May 2010 48 suspended Section 6 of

Sec. 6. Promulgation. — The promulgation of a Decision or

Let all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for

This contention is untenable. Promulgation is the process by which a

Moreover, quoting Pimping v. COMELEC, 50 citing Macabingkil v. Yatco, 51 we further

2. On whether the COMELEC

In light of our limited authority to review ndings of fact, we do not

The Voter Registration Record of petitioner accomplished on 21 June 1997 showing

As to the Dissent's second assertion, petitioner apparently does not maintain a

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

b) Certification from the Barangay

I n Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-

(a) The entry was made by a public o cer, or by another person

While private respondent had adduced a davits of two Pinagtong-ulan residents

That after payment of the down payment and signing of an agreement

WHEREFORE , premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED . The assailed

xxx xxx xxx

To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must

In this case, Sabili's claim of a common law relationship with

On January 28, 2010, petitioner led a Motion for Reconsideration of the

Anent Sabili's rst ground in his motion for reconsideration, We nd it

In this case, Sabili's claim of a common law relationship with Bernadette

Finally, on the eight ground, We hereby declare that Sabili's residence is a

It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is

Petitioner failed to establish compliance with

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

2. Tax Declaration issued in 2009 covering the property in Brgy.

8. Palomares' Tax Declaration issued on December 14, 2009 over the

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

14. A davit executed by Rodrigo Macasaet dated December 28, 2009;

15. Affidavit executed by Pablo Lorzano; 46

9. Certi cate of Appreciation issued by the parish of Sto. Niño of

18. Sinumpaang Salaysay dated January 16, 2010 executed by

Unlike in Fernandez where We sustained petitioner's change of domicile and

Indeed, it is not only that "each evidence presented by petitioner… fail(s) to

xxx xxx xxx

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

58.G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010, 622 SCRA 744.

62.Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954).

69.Rollo, pp. 82-83.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

(d) The barangay secretary shall:

77.Supra note 56.

(8) Approve vouchers relating to the disbursement of barangay funds;

82.People v. Catalino, 131 Phil. 194 (1968).

86.Rollo, pp. 211-212, Pinagsama-Samang Salaysay executed by 21 Barangay Pingtong-ulan

91.Rollo, pp. 82-83.

94.Torayno v. Commission on Elections, 392 Phil. 343 (2000).

98.G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009, 576 SCRA 331.

1.Under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

5.Annex "P" to the Petition.

8.Rollo, p. 300, Annex "S" to the Petition.