Balao vs.

Ermita, 833 SCRA 532, August 01, 2017

Case Title: ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, JONILYN
BALAO-STRUGAR, and BEVERLY LONGID, petitioners, vs. EDUARDO ERMITA,
GILBERTO TEODORO, RONALDO PUNO, NORBERTO GONZALES, Gen. ALEXANDER
YANO, Gen. JESUS VERZOSA, Brig. Gen. REYNALDO MAPAGU, Lt. P/Dir. EDGARDO
DOROMAL, Maj. Gen. ISAGANI CACHUELA, Commanding Officer of the AFP-ISU based in
Baguio City, PSS EUGENE MARTIN, and several JOHN DOES, respondents., SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA, SECRETARY GILBERTO TEODORO, SECRETARY RONALDO
PUNO, SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, P/DGEN.
JESUS VERZOSA, BRIG. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU, MAJ. GEN. ISAGANI
CACHUELA, and POL. SR. SUPT. EUGENE MARTIN, petitioners, vs. ARTHUR BALAO,
WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR, and BEVERLY
LONGID, respondents.
G.R. No. 186050
Case Nature: PETITION for issuance of writ of amparo.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Archiving of Cases ;

Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Archiving of Cases; Archiving of cases is a procedural
measure designed to temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no immediate action is
expected, but where no grounds exist for their outright dismissal.-
—As mentioned in the Court’s June 21, 2016 Resolution, “archiving of cases is a procedural
measure designed to temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no immediate action is
expected, but where no grounds exist for their outright dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive
case is kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation obtains in which action thereon can be
taken. To be sure, the Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases, provided, that it is impelled
by a valid cause, such as when the witnesses fail to appear due to threats on their lives or to
similar analogous causes that would prevent the court from effectively hearing and conducting
the amparo proceedings x x x.” Section 20 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, entitled “The Rule on the
Writ of Amparo,” reads: Section 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases.—The court shall not
dismiss the petition, but shall archive it, if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid
cause such as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives. A
periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo court that shall, motu proprio
or upon motion by any party, order their revival when ready for further proceedings. The
petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon failure to prosecute the case after the lapse of
two (2) years from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the case. The clerks of court
shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a consolidated list of archived cases under
this Rule not later than the first week of January of every year.
Hi-Lon Manufacturing, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit, 833 SCRA 540,
August 01, 2017
Case Title: HI-LON MANUFACTURING, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
respondent.
G.R. No. 210669
Case Nature: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Special Civil Actions ; Remedial Law ; Grave Abuse of
Discretion ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in
other words, the exercise of the power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice,
or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.-
—Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, the exercise of the power in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law. No grave abuse of discretion can be imputed against the
COA when it affirmed the Notice of Disallowance issued by the LAO-N in line with its
constitutional authority and jurisdiction over cases involving “disallowance of expenditures or
uses of government funds and properties found to be illegal, irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable.” Having determined that HI-LON does, not own the disputed
RROW, the COA correctly ruled that HI-LON is not entitled to payment of just compensation and
must accordingly refund the partial payment made by the DPWH in the amount of
P10,461,338.00. To stress, even if HI-LON is the registered owner of the subject property under
TCT No. T-383819 with an area of 89,070 sq. m., the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29 October
1987 clearly shows that only the 59,380 sq. m. portion of the subject property, and not 29,690 sq.
m. portion used as RROW, was sold and conveyed by the government (through APT) to HI-
LON’s immediate predecessor-in-interest (TGPI).
10. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Considering that findings of
administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and
order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of discretion, it is
only when the Court of Appeals (COA) acted with such abuse of discretion that the Supreme
Court (SC) entertains a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.-
—It is the policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially
one that was constitutionally created like herein respondent COA, not only on the basis of the
doctrine of separation of powers, but also of their presumed expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. Considering that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only
respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of discretion, it is only when the COA acted with such
abuse of discretion that the Court entertains a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
Tan vs. Valeriano, 833 SCRA 649, August 02, 2017
Case Title: JOSE G. TAN and ORENCIO C. LUZURIAGA, petitioners, vs. ROMEO H.
VALERIANO, respondent.
G.R. No. 185559
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Malicious Prosecution ;
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; The
Supreme Court’s (SC’s) scope of review in a Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law;
Exceptions.-
—At the onset, we must remember that our scope of review in a Rule 45 petition is limited to
questions of law. This limitation exists because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts that
undertakes the reexamination and reassessment of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial. The appreciation and resolution of factual issues are the functions of the
lower courts, whose resulting findings are then received with respect and are binding on the
Supreme Court subject to certain exceptions. These exceptional circumstances when we have
entertained questions of fact are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
Fahrenbach vs. Pangilinan, 834 SCRA 597, August 07, 2017
Case Title: SPOUSES JANET URI FAHRENBACH and DIRK FAHRENBACH, petitioners,
vs. JOSEFINA R. PANGILINAN, respondent.
G.R. No. 224549
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Special Civil Actions ; Forcible Entry ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Under Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the judgment in cases
for forcible entry shall include the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises.-
—With regard to the rent due respondent, the CA correctly held that since petitioners disturbed
respondent’s possession of the subject lot, rent is due respondent from the time petitioners
intruded upon her possession. Under Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the judgment in
cases for forcible entry shall include the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. However, in Badillo v. Tayag, 400
SCRA 494 (2003), the Court clarified that reasonable amount of rent in suits for forcible entry
must be determined not by mere judicial notice, but by supporting evidence. Here, since the RTC
indeed failed to cite any document showing the assessment of the subject lot, any increase in the
realty taxes, and the prevailing rental rate in the area, the CA correctly remanded this aspect to
the RTC for proper determination.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Supreme Court; As a rule, the Supreme Court
(SC) is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark in the evaluation of evidence adduced
during trial.-
—It must be emphasized that as a rule, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
embark in the evaluation of evidence adduced during trial. This rule, however, allows
exceptions, such as instances when the findings of fact of the trial court are conflicting or
contradictory with those of the CA, as in this case where the conflicting findings of facts of the
MCTC on one hand, and the RTC and the CA on the other, warrant a second look for the proper
dispensation of justice.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Forcible Entry; Unlawful Detainer; It is well-settled that the
only question that the courts must resolve in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases is who
between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in dispute.-
—It is well-settled that the only question that the courts must resolve in forcible entry or
unlawful detainer cases is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the property in dispute. The main issue is possession de facto, independently of any
claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may set forth in his pleading. The
principal issue must be possession de facto, or actual possession, and ownership is merely
ancillary to such issue. In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that it was in prior physical
possession of the premises until it was deprived thereof by the defendant.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence states that the law does not require a person to
have his feet on every square meter of the ground before it can be said that he is in possession
thereof.-
—In this case, respondent had sufficiently proven her prior possession de facto of the subject lot.
Records disclose that respondent occasionally visited the subject lot since she acquired the same
from Abid in September 1995. She even paid the lot’s realty taxes, as well as requested for a
survey authority thereon. In fact, she submitted old photographs showing herself on the subject
lot, the identity of which petitioners did not contend. Notably, jurisprudence states that the law
does not require a person to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before it can be
said that he is in possession thereof. In Bunyi v. Factor, 591 SCRA 350 (2009), the Court held
that “visiting the property on weekends and holidays is evidence of actual or physical
possession. The fact of her residence somewhere else, by itself, does not result in loss of
possession of the subject property.” In contrast, petitioners themselves claim that they began
occupying the subject lot only in August 2005, after Alvarez executed the corresponding Deed of
Sale in their favor. Hence, in light of the foregoing, there is no doubt that respondent had prior
de facto possession.
Abagatnan vs. Clarito, 834 SCRA 534, August 07, 2017
Case Title: JOSE AUDIE ABAGATNAN, JOSEPHINE A. PARCE, JIMMY ABAGATNAN,
JOHN ABAGATNAN, JENALYN A. DE LEON, JOEY ABAGATNAN, JOJIE ABAGATNAN
and JOY ABAGATNAN, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES JONATHAN CLARITO and ELSA
CLARITO, respondents.
G.R. No. 211966
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Pre-trial ;

Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Pre-trial; The issues to be tried between parties in a case is
limited to those defined in the pretrial order as well as those which may be implied from those
written in the order or inferred from those listed by necessary implication.-
—It is important to stress that the issues to be tried between parties in a case is limited to those
defined in the pretrial order as well as those which may be implied from those written in the
order or inferred from those listed by necessary implication. In this case, a cursory reading of
the issues listed in the Pretrial Order easily shows that the parties never agreed, whether
expressly or impliedly, to include the lack of prior barangay conciliation proceedings in the list
of issues to be resolved before the MTCC. In effect, the noninclusion of this issue in the Pre-trial
Order barred its consideration during the trial. This is but consistent with the rule that parties
are bound by the delimitation of issues that they agreed upon during the pretrial proceedings.
2. Local Government Code; Barangay Conciliation; The Local Government Code (LGC)
further provides that “the lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the
parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes,”
subject to certain exceptions. One such exception is in cases where the dispute involves parties
who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, unless said barangay units
adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement
by an appropriate lupon.-
—The LGC further provides that “the lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring
together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of
all disputes,” subject to certain exceptions enumerated in the law. One such exception is in cases
where the dispute involves parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, unless said barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to
submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon. Thus, parties who do
not actually reside in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays are not required to
submit their dispute to the lupon as a precondition to the filing of a complaint in court. In
Pascual v. Pascual, 475 SCRA 268 (2005), the Court ruled that the express statutory
requirement of actual residency in the LGC pertains specifically to the real parties-in-interest in
the case. It further explained that said requirement cannot be construed to apply to the attorney-
in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as doing so would abrogate the meaning of a “real party-in-
interest” as defined in Section 2, in relation to Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The same
ruling was reiterated in Banting v. Spouses Maglapuz, 499 SCRA 505 (2006), where the Court
held that “the requirement under Section 412 of the [LGC] that a case be referred for
conciliation before the Lupon as a precondition to its filing in court applies only to those cases
where the real parties-in-interest actually reside in the same city or municipality.” In the present
case, the Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged that not all the real parties-in-
interest in the case actually reside in Roxas City: Jimmy resided in Poblacion, Siniloan, Laguna,
while Jenalyn resided in Brgy. de La Paz, Pasig City. As such, the lupon has no jurisdiction over
their dispute, and prior referral of the case for barangay conciliation is not a precondition to its
filing in court.
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Velasco, 834 SCRA
409, August 07, 2017
Case Title: GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs.
ALBERT M. VELASCO, respondent.
G.R. No. 196564
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; View that it is an
established rule that failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a procedural matter that may
be dispensed with in the name of substantial justice, I see no basis for the application of this
doctrine, contrary to the ponencia’s view that there is.-
—The dissent did not make any finding of fact, but only analyzed the failure to apply the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Indeed, it is an established rule that failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is a procedural matter that may be dispensed with in the name of
substantial justice, I see no basis for the application of this doctrine, contrary to the ponencia’s
view that there is.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Forum shopping is the act of a party
against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and
possibly favorable) opinion in another forum other than by appeal or special civil action of
certiorari, or the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause on the supposition that one or the other court might look with favor upon the party.-
—According to jurisprudence, forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in
another forum other than by appeal or special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two
(2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or
the other court might look with favor upon the party. Where the elements of litis pendentia are
not present or where a final judgment in one case will not amount to res judicata in the other,
there is no forum shopping.
3. Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Exceptions to the Doctrine of
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.-
—Petitioner claims that Velasco violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
by filing a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals instead of assailing
his dismissal with the CSC. The Court of Appeals ruled that the assailed GSIS issuances were
patently illegal and, hence, the case falls within at least one of several exceptions to the doctrine
on exhaustion of administrative remedies. The exceptions, according to Province of Zamboanga
del Norte v. Court of Appeals, 342 SCRA 549 (2000), are: (1) when there is a violation of due
process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative
action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel
on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6)
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President,
bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a
claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule
does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice
the complainant; (12) when no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of
qualified political agency applies; and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot.
4. Same; Same; Same; Bad Faith; It is precisely in cases when the bad faith and irregularity
are so blatant that immediate recourse to the courts is necessary in order to nullify a capricious
and whimsical exercise of authority.-
—This Court cannot accept the proposition that a mere allegation of good faith by the issuers of
the assailed official acts automatically takes the disputed action out of its being patently illegal
and thereby necessitates the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Bad faith and irregularities can be evident from the assailed acts themselves, in which case the
courts should not simply turn a blind eye on the ground that it is the administrative agencies
which must take the first look. It is precisely in cases when the bad faith and irregularity are so
blatant that immediate recourse to the courts is necessary in order to nullify a capricious and
whimsical exercise of authority.
5. Same; Same; Questions of Law; Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct
proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts. Consequently, when the facts-
— namely the acts from which bad faith can be inferred — already appears on record and are
uncontroverted, the legal consequence of such acts becomes a question of law which falls under
the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies as well.—The dissent asserts
that bad faith is never presumed; it is a conclusion to be drawn from the facts. However, intent,
being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from
the facts. Consequently, when the facts — namely the acts from which bad faith can be inferred
— already appears on record and are uncontroverted, the legal consequence of such acts
becomes a question of law which falls under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies as well. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns
the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of facts being admitted.
6. Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The right to unionize or to form
organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental
and private sectors and that the Bill of Rights itself demands that such right shall not be
abridged.-
—Prior to the resolution by the PSL-MC of the question of Velasco’s eligibility to join the union
and serve as union president, the GSIS had no basis to act against Velasco on that ground other
than the opinion of its own chief legal counsel. For this reason, the GSIS was bound to respect in
good faith Velasco’s election as union president of the KMG until the PSL-MC could issue its
opinion on the grievance raised by Velasco. As the Court of Appeals correctly emphasized,
“[t]he right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to
employees in both the governmental and private sectors” and that the Bill of Rights itself
demands that such right shall not be abridged.
7. Same; Evidence; Presumption of Regularity; The Supreme Court (SC) will not be induced
into setting a precedent that a government employer can hide behind the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty in spite of evidence of illegal, discriminatory and
oppressive acts against labor extant in the records.-
—In the private sector, the Court has held that the reassignment of an employee is illegal if it is
used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker or when the real
reason is to penalize an employee for his union activities and when there is no genuine business
urgency that necessitated the transfer. Neither does the Court condone a reassignment done by a
private employer on the pretext of eventually removing an employee with whom the employer felt
“uncomfortable” because it doubted the employee’s loyalty. This Court will not be induced into
setting a precedent that a government employer can hide behind the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty in spite of evidence of illegal, discriminatory and oppressive acts
against labor extant in the records.
8. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; View that after
receiving notice that he was dropped from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) roll
of employees, respondent should have initially filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) as required by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.-
—Considering that his cause of action is constructive dismissal, respondent should have initially
filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Section 71 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (the Uniform Rules) specifically provides that appeal is
the proper remedy in cases involving personnel actions, such as reassignment and dropping an
employee from the rolls for being AWOL. Section 4 of the Uniform Rules also allows the CSC to
review decisions and actions of the offices and agencies falling under its jurisdiction. Hence,
after receiving notice that he was dropped from the GSIS roll of employees, respondent should
have initially filed an appeal with the CSC as required by the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. In contravention of the doctrine, respondent proceeded immediately
and directly to the CA by way of certiorari under Rule 65. This doctrine holds that when the law
provides for a remedy against a certain administrative action, the litigant can seek relief from
the courts only after exhaustion of the remedy; otherwise, when there is a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, a complaint is dismissible for lack of cause of action.
12. Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumption of Regularity; View that under Section 3(m),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is disputably presumed that an official duty has been
regularly performed, absent any contradiction or other evidence to the contrary;
petitioner’s acts of reassigning respondent, filing the formal charges against him, and dropping
him from the roll of employees were all done in the performance of official duties.-
—Petitioner’s acts are clothed with presumptive regularity. Under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, it is disputably presumed that an official duty has been regularly performed,
absent any contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We have held that “[t]he presumption
of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty.” In the case at bench, petitioner’s acts of reassigning respondent, filing the
formal charges against him, and dropping him from the roll of employees were all done in the
performance of official duties.
13. Same; Same; Same; View that considering that these acts were done in the performance of
official duties, the presumption of regularity attaches to them, thereby defeating the claim of
patent illegality.-
—Considering that these acts were done in the performance of official duties, the presumption of
regularity attaches to them, thereby defeating the claim of patent illegality. Of course, the
presumption of regularity, much like that of the presumption of good faith, is merely prima facie
and can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. One must present proof before the CSC
prior to seeking relief from the courts.
16. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; View that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should not be ignored. It is a cornerstone of
our judicial system founded on sound public policy and practical considerations.-
—The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should not be ignored. It is a
cornerstone of our judicial system founded on sound public policy and practical considerations.
The theory is that administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions that
properly belong to their particular expertise. This doctrine gives superiors an opportunity to
review and rectify errors committed by their subordinates. Likewise, it relieves the courts of a
considerable number of cases, thereby decongesting their already heavily loaded dockets. Here,
the doctrine assumes greater significance inasmuch as the CA’s ruling effectively violated
petitioner’s right to due process. The CA’s finding of bad faith on the part of petitioner and the
consequent nullification of the assailed acts denied petitioner’s right to a hearing, which includes
the right to present its case and submit evidence in support thereof. In other words, the CA
condemned petitioner without a full-blown hearing. It cannot be overemphasized that the
violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue that cannot be
disregarded.
17. Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; View that respondent had the remedy of appeal to
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) from his dismissal. Certiorari was therefore not available to
him. Undoubtedly, his bare allegation that an appeal to the CSC was not adequate did not justify
an immediate resort to certiorari.-
—A special civil action for certiorari requires, among other things, that there be no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As previously discussed,
respondent had the remedy of appeal to the CSC from his dismissal. Certiorari was therefore not
available to him. Undoubtedly, his bare allegation that an appeal to the CSC was not adequate
did not justify an immediate resort to certiorari. A writ of certiorari may be issued only if there is
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In this case, not only was
an appeal available to respondent as a remedy from the dropping of his name from the GSIS roll
of employees, he also failed to sufficiently establish grave abuse of discretion on the part of
petitioner that would justify his immediate resort to certiorari in lieu of an appeal. As previously
discussed, the assailed acts of petitioner are clothed with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions. The presumption stands in this case until the same is overcome
by presentation of clear and convincing evidence at the CSC level.
Ocampo vs. Enriquez, 835 SCRA 484, August 08, 2017
Case Title: SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TRINIDAD H. REPUNO, BIENVENIDO
LUMBERA, BONIFACIO P. ILAGAN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, MARIA CAROLINA
P. ARAULLO, M.D., SAMAHAN NG EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT
ARESTO (SELDA), represented by DIONITO CABILLAS, CARMENCITA M.
FLORENTINO, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, FELIX C. DALISAY, and DANILO M. DELA
FUENTE,** petitioners, vs. REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ (in his capacity as
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Reservist and Retiree Affairs, Armed Forces of the Philippines),
The Grave Services Unit (Philippine Army), and GENERAL RICARDO R. VISAYA (in his
capacity as the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines), DEFENSE SECRETARY
DELFIN LORENZANA, and HEIRS OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, represented by his
surviving spouse IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 225973, G.R. No. 225984, G.R. No. 226097, G.R. No. 226116, G.R. No. 226117, G.R. No. 226120,
G.R. No. 226294, G.R. No. 228186, G.R. No. 228245
Case Nature: MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court;
URGENT MOTION OR PETITION for exhumation of Marcos’ remains at the LNMB; and
PETITIONS to cite respondents in contempt.
Syllabi Class: Marcos Burial ;
4. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus Standi; Generally, a party will be allowed to
litigate only when he or she can demonstrate that (1) he or she has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2)
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by the remedy being sought.-
—Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he or she can
demonstrate that (1) he or she has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because
of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought.
Petitioners have not clearly shown the direct injury they suffered or would suffer on account of
the assailed memorandum and directive allowing Marcos’ burial at the LNMB.
5. Same; Same; Same; While the Supreme Court (SC) has adopted a liberal attitude and
recognized the legal standing of concerned citizens who have invoked a public right allegedly
breached by a governmental act, there must be showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early.-
—While the Court has adopted a liberal attitude and recognized the legal standing of concerned
citizens who have invoked a public right allegedly breached by a governmental act, there must be
showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early.
Since the term has no exact definition, the Court has provided the following instructive guides to
determine whether a matter is of transcendental importance: (1) the character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and
(3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being
raised. As held in the assailed Decision and further elucidated below, petitioners are unable to
satisfy all three determinants.
6. Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Motion for Reconsideration; The purpose behind
the settled rule that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a
petition for certiorari is to grant the court or administrative body which issued the assailed
decision, resolution or order the opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to
it by the reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.-
—The purpose behind the settled rule that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non for the filing of a petition for certiorari is to grant the court or administrative body which
issued the assailed decision, resolution or order the opportunity to correct any actual or perceived
error attributed to it by the reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. Even
if the challenged issuance of public respondents were rendered upon the verbal order of President
Duterte, it cannot be denied that the concerned AFP officials still have the power to enforce
compliance with the requirements of AFP Regulations G 161-375, as amended. The logical and
reasonable remedy to question the burial procedures and the allocation of plots should be with
public respondents who issued the directives. If the court or administrative body is given an
opportunity to correct itself on an MR, there is no reason then not to extend such basic courtesy
to public respondents since they are subordinates who merely follow the orders of their
Commander-in-Chief. Like the President who is tasked to faithfully execute the laws of the land,
they are also enjoined to obey the laws and are entitled to the disputable presumption of
regularity in the performance of their official duties. Having been charged to exercise overall
supervision in the implementation of AFP Regulations G 161-375, public respondents could
correct the interment directive issued should there be any meritorious ground therefor. The fact
that the administrative regulation does not provide a remedy to question an interment directive
does not automatically entitle petitioners to directly implore this Court considering that it does
not prevent them to appeal or ask for reconsideration based on their claim of right to due process
or an opportunity to be heard on an issue over which they insist to have a standing to intervene.
7. Same; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Newspaper Articles; Newspaper articles amount
to “hearsay evidence, twice removed” and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any
probative value at all whether objected to or not, unless offered for a purpose other than proving
the truth of the matter asserted.-
—The Court cannot anchor its judgment on news accounts of President Duterte’s statements
with regard to the issue of Marcos’ burial at the LNMB. Newspaper articles amount to “hearsay
evidence, twice removed” and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative
value at all whether objected to or not, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth
of the matter asserted. As it is, the news article is admissible only as evidence that such
publication exists with the tenor of the news therein stated. The same rules apply to news article
published via the broadcast media or the internet communication. While it may be asserted that
President Duterte’s position on the issue is consistent, We must base Our decision on a formal
concrete act, preferably a written order denying the MR or appeal, so as to avoid being entangled
in possibly moot and academic discourses should he make a volte-face on the issue. Needless to
state, he should be given an opportunity to correct himself, as it is disputably presumed that he
would maintain his solemn oath to faithfully and conscientiously fulfill his duties as President of
the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man,
and consecrate himself to the service of the Nation.
10. Remedial Law; Judgments; Even if the case is one of first impression, the New Civil Code
provides that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. What is missing in the rules may be found in the general
principles of logic, justice and equity.-
—In a case where the constitutionality of an executive order was challenged, the Court stressed
that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted,
subject only to review by the highest tribunal. Besides, even if the case is one of first impression,
the New Civil Code provides that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of
the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. What is missing in the rules may be found in
the general principles of logic, justice and equity. A judge may apply a rule he sees fit to resolve
the issue, as long as the rule chosen is in harmony with general interest, order, morals and public
policy.
12. Remedial Law; Execution of Judgments; While the Supreme Court (SC) concedes that
execution takes place only when decisions become final and executory, there are cases that may
be executed pending appeal or are immediately executory pursuant to the provisions of the Rules
and the statutes as well as by court order.-
—While the Court concedes that execution takes place only when decisions become final and
executory, there are cases that may be executed pending appeal or are immediately executory
pursuant to the provisions of the Rules and the statutes as well as by court order. Yet, the fact
that a decision is immediately executory does not prevent a party from questioning the decision
before a court of law.
13. Same; Injunction; Under Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules, judgments in actions for
injunction are immediately executory; it shall be enforceable after their rendition and shall not
be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the court.-
—Based on the title, allegations, and relief being sought, this consolidated case is one for
prohibition; hence, essentially in the nature of petitions for injunction. Under Section 4, Rule 39
of the Rules, judgments in actions for injunction are immediately executory; it shall be
enforceable after their rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. With the dismissal of the petitions and the lifting of the SQAO,
nothing stood to hinder respondents from acting on and proceeding with Marcos’ burial at the
LNMB prior to the expiration of the period to file a MR and before its resolution. Considering
that there is no fault or punishable acts to speak of, respondents cannot be held guilty of indirect
contempt under Section 3(c) and (d), Rule 71 of the Rules. On the same ground, neither is there
any legal justification to order the exhumation of the mortal remains of Marcos and subject the
same to forensic examination to ascertain its authenticity.
33. Remedial Law; Prohibition; Execution Pending Appeal; View that execution pending
appeal is discretionary and may issue only upon good reasons in cases covered by Rule 39,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, immediate execution is permitted only in
very specific cases as provided by law, the rules, or jurisprudence. A petition for prohibition
clearly does not fall within any of the above mentioned exceptions.-
—Indeed, while there are certain judgments that may be executed immediately or even pending
appeal, these remain specific exceptions to the general rule that a pending motion for
reconsideration results in a stay of execution of the judgment. In Engineering Construction, Inc.
v. National Power Corp., 163 SCRA 9 (1988), this Court stated: The point that the Court wishes
to emphasize is this: Courts look with disfavor upon any attempt to execute a judgment which
has not acquired a final character. Section 2, Rule 39, authorizing the premature execution of
judgments, being an exception to the general rule, must be restrictively construed. It would not
be a sound rule to allow indiscriminately the execution of a money judgment, even if there is a
sufficient bond. “The reasons allowing execution must constitute superior circumstances
demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a
reversal of the judgment.” (Emphasis supplied) I must emphasize that execution pending appeal
is discretionary and may issue only upon good reasons in cases covered by Rule 39, Section 2 of
the Rules of Court. On the other hand, immediate execution is permitted only in very specific
cases as provided by law, the rules, or jurisprudence. A petition for prohibition clearly does not
fall within any of the above mentioned exceptions. Contrary to the position taken by the ponente,
the fact that the remedy of prohibition is in the nature of an injunction does not mean that
immediate execution is automatically warranted. Following Rule 52, Section 4, the Court must
first order the immediate execution of a decision for good reasons, in order to warrant an
exception to the general rule on the stay of execution.
34. Marcos Burial; Execution of Judgments; View that the lack of urgency notwithstanding,
respondents facilitated the burial of Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) prior to the
expiration of the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration.
Their act was clearly in violation of the Rules of Court, because it amounted to the premature
execution of a judgment that had not yet attained finality.-
—Here, no order for the immediate execution of the Decision dated 8 November 2016 was
made. Accordingly, the general principle applies — the execution of the ruling must be
considered deferred until its finality. This was how it should have been in this case, since there
were no “good reasons” to justify the immediate execution of the ruling. Based on the records,
there was neither allegation nor proof of any urgent need to proceed with the burial. The lack of
urgency notwithstanding, respondents facilitated the burial of Marcos at the Libingan prior to the
expiration of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Their act
was clearly in violation of the Rules of Court, because it amounted to the premature execution of
a judgment that had not yet attained finality.
Confederation of Coconut Farmers Organizations of the Philippines, Inc.
(CCFOP) vs. Aquino III, 835 SCRA 311, August 08, 2017
Case Title: CONFEDERATION OF COCONUT FARMERS ORGANIZATIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (CCFOP), petitioner, vs. HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT BENIGNO
SIMEON C. AQUINO III, ACTING COMMISSIONER RICHARD ROGER AMURAO of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), CHAIRMAN CESAR L.
VILLANUEVA of the Governance Commission for GOCCS (GCG) and SECRETARY LEILA
M. DE LIMA of the Department of Justice, respondents.
G.R. No. 217965
Case Nature: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.
Syllabi Class: Coconut Levy Funds ;
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus Standi; Considering that the coconut levies were
imposed primarily for the benefit of petitioner’s members, it behooves the Supreme Court (SC)
to accord standing to petitioner to ensure that the subject grievance is given its due.-
—The Court upholds petitioner’s assertion that it has legal standing to institute the present case.
In PKSMMN, the Court recognized petitioner organization as among those representing coconut
farmers on whom the burden of the coco levies attached. Considering that that the coconut levies
were imposed primarily for the benefit of petitioner’s members, it behooves the Court to accord
standing to petitioner to ensure that the subject grievance is given its due.
5. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Execution of Judgments; A party-litigant may choose to
have a judgment enforced and if for some reason he cannot do so, he may decide to avail of the
coercive measure of execution in order for the judgment to be realized.-
—Execution has been defined as a remedy afforded by law for the enforcement of a judgment,
its object being to obtain satisfaction of the judgment on which the writ is issued. Being a
remedy, it is thus optional on the winning litigant and may avail it in case the judgment cannot
be enforced. In other words, a party-litigant may choose to have a judgment enforced and if for
some reason he cannot do so, he may decide to avail of the coercive measure of execution in
order for the judgment to be realized. A writ of execution was never meant to be a prerequisite
before a judgment may be enforced.
Rama vs. Moises, 835 SCRA 222, August 08, 2017
Case Title: HON. MICHAEL L. RAMA, in his capacity as Mayor of Cebu City,
METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT (MCWD), represented by its General Manager,
ARMANDO PAREDES, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF MCWD, represented by its Chair,
ELIGIO A. PACANA, JOEL MARI S. YU, in his capacity as Member of the MCWD Board;
THE HONORABLE TOMAS R. OSMEÑA, in his capacity as Congressional Representative of
the South District, Cebu City, petitioners, vs. HON. GILBERT P. MOISES, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu City; and HON. GWENDOLYN F.
GARCIA, in her capacity as Governor of the Province of Cebu, respondents.
G.R. No. 197146
Case Nature: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
Syllabi Class: Water Districts ;

2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The policy on the hierarchy
of courts is not to be regarded as an iron-clad rule.-
—The policy on the hierarchy of courts is not to be regarded as an ironclad rule. In The Diocese
of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1 (2015) and Querubin v. Commission on
Elections, 776 SCRA 715 (2015), the Court has enumerated the various specific instances when
direct resort to the Court may be allowed, to wit: (a) when there are genuine issues of
constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time; (b) when the issues involved
are of transcendental importance; (c) cases of first impression; (d) when the constitutional issues
raised are best decided by this Court; (e) when the time element presented in this case cannot be
ignored; (f) when the petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (g) when there is no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (h) when public welfare and
the advancement of public policy so dictates, or when demanded by the broader interest of
justice; (i) when the orders complained of are patent nullities; and (j) when appeal is considered
as clearly an inappropriate remedy.
3. Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has full discretionary power to take cognizance
of and assume jurisdiction over the special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus filed
directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or when warranted by the nature of the
issues that are clearly and specifically raised in the petition.+
4. Statutes; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; When the issues involve the constitutionality
of a statute or law, or when the issues involved are those of transcendental importance,
procedural technicalities should yield in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules
of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but rather to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice.-
—While this Court has often insisted on the strict application of the principle of hierarchy of
courts in numerous cases, the application has not been absolute. When the issues involve the
constitutionality of a statute or law, or when the issues involved are those of transcendental
importance, procedural technicalities should yield in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but rather to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. And while it is true that laws are presumed to
be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted.
Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then
“will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily,” to recall Justice Laurel’s trenchant
warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned.
5. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; View that petitioners
utterly failed to establish that the constitutional issues raised in the Petition at bar are of
transcendental importance calling for urgent resolution, which would warrant the relaxation of
the doctrine of locus standi and the principle of hierarchy of courts.-
—In my view, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the constitutional issues raised in the
Petition at bar are of transcendental importance calling for urgent resolution, which would
warrant the relaxation of the doctrine of locus standi and the principle of hierarchy of courts.
Indeed, the constitutional issues presently before the Court relate to local water districts (LWDs)
in charge of local water supply and waste water disposal; but as pointed out by now retired
Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, whom I joined in his Dissenting Opinion to the Decision
dated December 6, 2016, none of the parties alleged that the operations of MCWD had been or
would be paralyzed simply because the appointing power of the members of the MCWD Board
of Directors shifted from one government official to the other. In addition, Section 18 of PD No.
198 specifically limits the power of the Board of Directors of an LWD, such as MCWD, to
policy-making, hence, any question as to the appointment of its Board members will not have a
direct and immediate effect upon the day-to-day operations of MCWD.
North Greenhills Association, Inc. vs. Morales, 837 SCRA 28, August 09,
2017
Case Title: NORTH GREENHILLS ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. ATTY. NARCISO
MORALES, respondent.
G.R. No. 222821
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Compulsory Counterclaims ; Counterclaims ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Counterclaims; Criteria in Determining Whether the Counterclaim is
Compulsory or Permissive.-
—The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive are as
follows: (a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the
same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent the compulsory
rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as
defendant’s counterclaim? (d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the
counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory. Otherwise, the same is permissive.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; The nature of an action, as well as which court
or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined from the allegations contained in the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.-
—Basic is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as
which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined from the allegations contained in the
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction remains
vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. Relative thereto is the rule that lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or
enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on
appeal.
3. Homeowners’ Association; Membership in a homeowners’ association is voluntary and
cannot be unilaterally forced by a provision in the association’s articles of incorporation or
bylaws, which the alleged member did not agree to be bound to.+
4. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Findings of Fact; A finding of fact is generally conclusive
upon the Supreme Court (SC), because it is not its function to analyze and weigh the evidence
all over again; Exceptions.-
—The CA in disposing the case, ruled that the restroom posed sanitary issues to Atty. Morales
and is, therefore, a nuisance per accidens. Such is a finding of fact, which is generally conclusive
upon the Court, because it is not its function to analyze and weigh the evidence all over again.
There are, however, well-recognized exceptions. These are (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
7. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Compulsory Counterclaims; A compulsory counterclaim
is any claim for money or any relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing
party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff’s complaint.-
—A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a defending party may
have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected
with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff’s complaint. It
is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and
will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any
other counterclaim is permissive. The Court has held that the compelling test of compulsoriness
characterizes a counterclaim as compulsory if there should exist a logical relationship between
the main claim and the counterclaim. The Court further ruled that there exists such a relationship
when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial
duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court; when the multiple claims involve the
same factual and legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy
between the parties.
FGU Insurance Corporation vs. Roxas, 836 SCRA 16, August 09, 2017
Case Title: FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES FLORO ROXAS
and EUFEMIA ROXAS, respondents., SPOUSES FLORO ROXAS and EUFEMIA ROXAS,
petitioners, vs. ROSENDO P. DOMINGUEZ, JR., PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, and FGU
INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 189526, G.R. No. 189656
Case Nature: PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Judgments ; Res Judicata ;

Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; The principle of res judicata bars
the relitigation in a subsequent case of the same facts and issues actually and directly resolved in
a former case between the same parties.-
—The question of Philtrust Bank’s liability for unauthorized release of the funds has already
been settled in Civil Case No. 4809. Philtrust Bank has been adjudged liable by the Regional
Trial Comi of Bataan to the Spouses Roxas for damages of P100,000.00 for breach of the
provisions of the Contract of Building Construction in a decision that has already attained
finality. The principle of res judicata bars the relitigation in a subsequent case of the same facts
and issues actually and directly resolved in a former case between the same parties. Hence, this
Court shall no longer pass upon the issue of the liability of Philtrust Bank with regard to the
unauthorized release of the remaining construction funds.
Adtel, Inc. vs. Valdez, 836 SCRA 57, August 09, 2017
Case Title: ADTEL, INC. and/or REYNALDO T. CASAS, petitioners, vs. MARIJOY A.
VALDEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 189942
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Special Civil Actions ; Certiorari ; Motion for Extension of
Time ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; In the absence of a more compelling reason cited in the motion
for extension of time other than the “undersigned counsel’s heavy volume of work,” the Court of
Appeals (CA) did not commit a reversible error in dismissing the petition for certiorari.-
—In Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 715 SCRA 153 (2014), this Court held
that the heavy workload of counsel is hardly a compelling or meritorious reason for availing a
motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari. Similarly, in Mid-Islands Power
Generation v. Court of Appeals, 667 SCRA 342 (2012), this Court ruled that the heavy workload
and the resignation of the lawyer handling the case are insufficient reasons to justify the
relaxation of the procedural rules under Rule 65. In both Thenamaris and Mid-Islands Power,
this Court denied the motions for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari and held that
the heavy workload of counsel was not a compelling reason contemplated by the Rules of Court.
As previously stated in Labao v. Flores, 634 SCRA 723 (2010), there should be an effort on the
part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his
or her failure to comply with Rule 65. Accordingly, in the absence of a more compelling reason
cited in the motion for extension of time other than the “undersigned counsel’s heavy volume of
work,” the CA did not commit a reversible error in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC states that in cases
where a motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the filing of a petition for certiorari
questioning the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration must be made not later than
sixty (60) days from the notice of the denial of the motion.-
—A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC states that in cases where a motion for reconsideration was timely filed,
the filing of a petition for certiorari questioning the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration must be made not later than sixty (60) days from the notice of the denial of the
motion. In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 594 SCRA 139 (2009), this Court held
that following A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days
from the notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. In Laguna
Metts Corporation, this Court stated the rationale for the strict observance of the 60-day period
to file a petition for certiorari, to wit: The 60-day period is deemed reasonable and sufficient
time for a party to mull over and to prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of discretion by a
lower court. The period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate
the constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
3. Same; Same; Same; Motion for Extension of Time; The rule is that in filing petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65, a motion for extension is a prohibited pleading. However in
exceptional or meritorious cases, the Supreme Court (SC) may grant an extension anchored on
special or compelling reasons.-
—In Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, 613 SCRA 528 (2010), this
Court held that the strict observance of the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari is not
absolute. This Court ruled that absent any express prohibition under Rule 65, a motion for
extension is still permitted, subject to the Court’s sound discretion. Similarly, in Labao v. Flores,
634 SCRA 723 (2010), this Court recognized that the extension of the 60-day period may be
granted by the Court in the presence of special or compelling circumstances provided that there
should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or
meritorious explanation for his or her failure to comply with the rules. Likewise, in Mid-Islands
Power Generation v. Court of Appeals, 667 SCRA 342 (2012), this Court held that a motion for
extension was allowed in petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 subject to the Court’s sound
discretion and only under exceptional or meritorious cases. The exception to the 60-day rule to
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was also applied by this Court in a more recent case
in Republic of the Philippines v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc., 678 SCRA 738 (2012), to wit:
“[u]nder exceptional circumstances, however, and subject to the sound discretion of the Court,
[the] said period may be extended pursuant to [the] Domdom, Labao and Mid-Islands Power
cases.” Therefore, the rule is that in filing petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, a motion for
extension is a prohibited pleading. However in exceptional or meritorious cases, the Court may
grant an extension anchored on special or compelling reasons.
Heirs of Jose Peñaflor vs. Heirs of Artemio and Lydia dela Cruz, 836
SCRA 292, August 09, 2017
Case Title: HEIRS OF JOSE PEÑAFLOR, namely: JOSE PEÑAFLOR, JR. and VIRGINIA P.
AGATEP, represented by JESSICA P. AGATEP, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF ARTEMIO and
LYDIA DELA CRUZ, namely: MARILOU, JULIET, ROMEO, RYAN, and ARIEL, all
surnamed DELA CRUZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 197797
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Special Civil Actions ; Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; View that a third party claiming ownership of the subject property need
not prove the validity of the claim in the proceedings for the issuance of a writ of possession.-
—At the outset, it cannot be emphasized enough that a third party claiming ownership of the
subject property need not prove the validity of the claim in the proceedings for the issuance of a
writ of possession. What needs to be shown is simply possession of an adverse character as
against the claim of the debtor/mortgagor in the foreclosure case. In other words, what needs to
be shown is a bona fide claim, not proof of ownership per se. The veracity or truth of that claim
must be threshed out in a separate proceeding, as discussed above.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage; It is well-
settled that the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property becomes the absolute
owner of the property if no redemption is made within one (1) year from the registration of the
certificate of sale by those entitled to redeem.-
—It is well-settled that the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property becomes
the absolute owner of the property if no redemption is made within one [(1)] year from the
registration of the certificate of sale by those entitled to redeem. As absolute owner, he is entitled
to all the rights of ownership over a property recognized in Article 428 of the New Civil Code,
not least of which is possession, or jus possidendi[.]
3. Same; Same; Same; Possession being an essential right of the owner with which he is able to
exercise the other attendant rights of ownership, after consolidation of title, the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale may demand possession as a matter of right.-
—“Possession being an essential right of the owner with which he is able to exercise the other
attendant rights of ownership, after consolidation of title[,] the purchaser in a foreclosure sale
may demand possession as a matter of right. This is why Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended
by Act No. 4118, imposes upon the RTC a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession to the
new owner upon a mere ex parte motion. Section 7 reads: In any sale made under the provisions
of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where
the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption
period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve
months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the
mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made
under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if
the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the
Mortgage Law or under Section 194 of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property
encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance
with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition,
collect the fees specified in paragraph 11 of Section 114 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No.
2866, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue,
addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said
order immediately.
4. Same; Same; Same; Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court-
— which is applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages as per Section 6 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 3135 — provides that upon the expiration of the redemption period, the possession of
the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner, unless a third party is actually
holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor.—Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court — which is applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages as per Section 6 of Act No.
3135 — provides that upon the expiration of the redemption period, the possession of the
property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner, unless a third party is actually
holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. “In China Banking Corporation v.
Spouses Lozada, 557 SCRA 177 (2008), it was held that for the court’s ministerial duty to issue a
writ of possession to cease, it is not enough that the property be held by a third party, but rather
the said possessor must have a claim thereto adverse to the debtor/mortgagor: Where a parcel
levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is
for the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said adverse possession. Similarly, in
an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, when the foreclosed property is in the possession of
a third party holding the same adversely to the defaulting debtor/mortgagor, the issuance by the
RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser of the said real property ceases to be
ministerial and may no longer be done ex parte. For the exception to apply, however, the
property need not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party adversely to
the debtor/mortgagor. Specifically, the Court held that to be considered in adverse possession,
the third-party possessor must have done so in his own right and not merely as a successor or
transferee of the debtor or mortgagor: The exception provided under Section 33 of Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by
adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner,
agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not
merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of
the property.
5. Same; Same; Same; Where a third party has raised in an opposition to the writ of possession
or in a motion to quash the same his actual possession thereof upon a claim of ownership or a
right adverse to that of the debtor or mortgagor the procedure is for the trial court to order a
hearing to determine the nature of the adverse possession, conformably with the time-honored
principle of due process.-
—Where a third party has raised in an opposition to the writ of possession or in a motion to
quash the same his actual possession thereof upon a claim of ownership or a right adverse to
that of the debtor or mortgagor — as in this case — the procedure is for the trial court to order a
hearing to determine the nature of the adverse possession, conformably with the time-honored
principle of due process. Notably, when this opposition is made, the proceeding for the issuance
of a writ of possession loses its nature of being an ex parte, and instead, turns adversarial, so as
to give: On the one hand, the third-party claimant the opportunity to present evidence of his title
showing his independent right over the subject property adverse to the judgment
obligor/mortgagor; and on the other hand, the mortgagee the opportunity to rebut said evidence
in order to sustain the issuance of the writ and gain possession of the subject property pursuant
to his consolidated title.
6. Same; Ex-Parte Proceedings; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence describes that “[a]n ex
parte proceeding merely means that it is taken or granted at the instance and for the benefit of
one (1) party, and without notice to or contestation by any party adversely affected.”-
—Jurisprudence describes that “[a]n ex parte proceeding merely means that it is taken or
granted at the instance and for the benefit of one party, and without notice to or contestation by
any party adversely affected.” Clearly, this is not the case when an opposition is made by a
third-party claimant against the issuance of a writ of possession, from which the court is
compelled to now order a hearing to determine the nature of the former’s adverse possession.
7. Same; Writ of Possession; The purpose of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
under Republic Act (RA) No. 3135, as amended by RA No. 4118, is to expeditiously accord the
mortgagee who has already shown a prima facie right of ownership over the subject property
(based on his consolidated title over the same) his incidental right to possess the foreclosed
property; It is only upon a credible showing by a third-party claimant of his independent right
over the foreclosed property that the law’s prima facie deference to the mortgagee’s
consolidated title should not prevail. Verily, a mere claim of ownership would not suffice.-
—It should be clarified that the purpose of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
under Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, is to expeditiously accord the mortgagee who
has already shown a prima facie right of ownership over the subject property (based on his
consolidated title over the same) his incidental right to possess the foreclosed property. To
reiterate, “[p]ossession being an essential right of the owner with which he is able to exercise
the other attendant rights of ownership, after consolidation of title[,] the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale may demand possession as a matter of right.” Thus, it is only upon a credible
showing by a third-party claimant of his independent right over the foreclosed property that the
law’s prima facie deference to the mortgagee’s consolidated title should not prevail. Verily, a
mere claim of ownership would not suffice. As jurisprudence prescribes, the demonstration by
the third-party claimant should be made within the context of an adversarial hearing, where the
basic principles of Evidence and Civil Procedure ought to be followed, such as: (1) it is the
claimant who has the burden of proving his claim; (2) the claim must be established through a
preponderance of evidence; and (3) evidence not presented or formally offered cannot be
admitted against the opposing party. In this case, none of these principles were followed for the
CA considered evidence that were not only submitted in a totally different case against an
entirely different party, but are also innately inadequate to — at least — prima facie show the
source of the third-party claimant’s independent title, all to the detriment of the mortgagee who
had already consolidated his title to the contested property. The reversal of its ruling is therefore
in order.
8. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage; View that the
well-settled rule is that in the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Republic
Act (RA) No. 3135, the issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial upon the court after the
foreclosure sale and during the redemption period.-
—The well-settled rule is that in the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Act
No. 3135, the issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial upon the court after the foreclosure
sale and during the redemption period. In the latter period, the court may issue an order for a
writ of possession upon the mere filing of an ex parte motion and the approval of the
corresponding bond. A writ of possession also issues as a matter of course without need of a
bond or of a separate and independent action after the lapse of the period of redemption and the
consolidation of ownership in the purchaser’s name. There are, however, several exceptions to
this ministerial duty established by law and jurisprudence. One of the exceptions is that which
was first enunciated in Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 358 (1988), in line
with Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court: when a third party in possession of the property
claims a right adverse to that of the debtor-mortgagor in a foreclosure case. The threshold issue
in this case revolves around this particular exception.
9. Same; Same; Same; Writ of Possession; View that a hearing is conducted only to determine
whether or not possession by a third-party claimant is really adverse for purposes of issuing a
writ of possession. If the possession is adverse within the definition of the law, the court shall
defer or quash the issuance of a writ of possession; otherwise, it shall proceed to issue the
writ.-
—A hearing is conducted only to determine whether or not possession by a third-party claimant
is really adverse for purposes of issuing a writ of possession. If the possession is adverse within
the definition of the law, the court shall defer or quash the issuance of a writ of possession;
otherwise, it shall proceed to issue the writ. This rule is explained in Rivero de Ortega v.
Natividad, 71 Phil. 340 (1941), which reads in relevant part as follows: But where a party in
possession was not a party to the foreclosure, and did not acquire his possession from a person
who was bound by the decree, but who is a mere stranger and who entered into possession
before the suit was begun, the court has no power to deprive him of possession by enforcing the
decree. Thus, it was held that only parties to the suit, persons who came in under them pendente
lite, and trespassers or intruders without title, can be evicted by a writ of possession. The reason
for this limitation is that the writ does not issue in case of doubt, nor will a question of legal title
be tried or decided in proceedings looking to the exercise of the power of the court to put a
purchaser in possession. x x x The petitioner, it is held, should be required to establish his title in
a proceeding directed to that end.
10. Same; Same; Same; View that in determining whether or not possession is indeed adverse,
the court must look into the nature of the possession by the third-party claimant and determine if
the latter’s claim is indeed adverse, as defined above, and is bona fide and in good faith.-
—In determining whether or not possession is indeed adverse, the court must look into the nature
of the possession by the third-party claimant and determine if the latter’s claim is indeed
adverse, as defined above, and is bona fide and in good faith. To provide a better understanding
of when possession is adverse, jurisprudence on who is not an adverse claimant is informative.
In Planas v. Madrigal rather, the adverse claimant must be a mere stranger who entered into
possession before the foreclosure suit began.
11. Same; Same; Same; View that the third-party claimant need not prove ownership in the
proceedings. All that needs to be shown with a preponderance of evidence is that the third-party
claimant is in possession of the property and is asserting a right adverse to that of the
debtor/mortgagor with respect to the possession.-
—It is apparent that the third-party claimant need not prove ownership in the proceedings. All
that needs to be shown with a preponderance of evidence is that the third-party claimant is in
possession of the property and is asserting a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor with
respect to the possession as discussed above. Once such evidence is shown, the court must defer
the issuance of a writ of possession and let the parties file the proper judicial action. The matter
of whether or not the third-party claimant is indeed the lawful owner or better possessor of the
property is a matter that must be threshed out in a separate proceeding. It bears to emphasize
that the mandated separate proceeding is founded on the underpinnings of the exception in
substantive law, particularly Art. 433 of the Civil Code. Under this provision, as explained in
Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 374 SCRA 22 (2002), one who claims to be the
owner of a property possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its
physical recovery. Art. 433 requires nothing less than an ejectment or reivindicatory action to be
brought even by the true owner. After all, the actual possessors of a property enjoy in their favor
the legal presumption of a just title, which must be overcome by the party claiming otherwise. An
ex parte petition for the issuance of a possessory writ under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not,
strictly speaking, a “judicial process” as contemplated above. Even if the petition may be
considered a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in
a foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit filed in court. In an ordinary lawsuit, one party
“sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.”
12. Same; Same; Same; View that Development Bank of the Philippines v. Prime Neighborhood
Association, 587 SCRA 582 (2009), has ruled that a third party’s possession of the property is
legally presumed to be pursuant to a just title. It must be borne in mind that the foregoing legal
presumption may be overcome by the purchaser only in a judicial proceeding for recovery of the
property.-
—As has been said, all that third-party claimants in foreclosure proceedings need to show is that
they are in possession, and that their possession is adverse to the claim of the judgment obligor.
In other words, they simply have to show that they have a valid claim of ownership together with
their possession, not that they in fact have ownership. Here, the second SC judgment itself
shows, at the very least, that Artemio has indisputably been in possession of the subject property
since 1968. The ponencia points out that the second SC judgment was limited to the issue of
possession against his sister, Carmelita. Nevertheless, possession of the property by Artemio
gives him a presumptive title over it, considering that the debtor/mortgagor (Nicolasa) did not
have any title in her name and was not in possession of the property at the time she mortgaged it.
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Prime Neighborhood Association, 587 SCRA 582
(2009), has ruled that a third party’s possession of the property is legally presumed to be
pursuant to a just title. It must be borne in mind that the foregoing legal presumption may be
overcome by the purchaser only in a judicial proceeding for recovery of the property.
Joson vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 836 SCRA 252, August 09, 2017
Case Title: EDWARD THOMAS F. JOSON, petitioner, vs. THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, AURELIO M. UMALI, GIOVANNI AGTAY, ALEJANDRO R. ABESAMIS,
EDILBERTO M. PANCHO, and JAIME P. PALLANAN, respondents.
Docket Number: G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435

Case Nature: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Syllabi Class: Ombudsman ; Probable Cause ; Policy of Non-interference ;

2. Remedial Law; Motion for Reconsideration; Office of the Ombudsman’s Rules of

Procedure; Under the Office of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure, an aggrieved party may
file a motion for reconsideration (a) within five (5) days from receipt of notice of the assailed
decision in a criminal case or (b) within ten (10) days from receipt of notice of the Office of the
Ombudsman’s decision in an administrative case.-
—Under the Office of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure, an aggrieved party may file a
motion for reconsideration (a) within five (5) days from receipt of notice of the assailed decision
in a criminal case or (b) within 10 days from receipt of notice of the Office of the Ombudsman’s
decision in an administrative case. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was filed beyond the
required period. Petitioner received a copy of the December 4, 2009 Joint Resolution on
February 8, 2011. He could have filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision in the
criminal case within five (5) days from receipt or until February 13, 2011, or that in the
administrative case within 10 days from receipt or until February 18, 2011. However, he filed his
Motion for Reconsideration only on February 23, 2011, which was 10 days late with respect to
the criminal case and five (5) days late with respect to the administrative case. The Office of the
Ombudsman was correct in holding that it lost jurisdiction over the case as a result of the late
filing of the motion and that its December 4, 2009 Joint Resolution had become final.
Baring vs. Elena Loan and Credit Company, Inc., 837 SCRA 133, August
14, 2017
Case Title: NORMA I. BARING, petitioner, vs. ELENA LOAN AND CREDIT COMPANY,
INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 224225
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Writ of Possession ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; A pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure does not stay
the issuance of a writ of possession.-
—Petitioner’s assertion that respondent has not been granted any authority to operate as a
lending company, as well as the allegations of unconscionable and exorbitant interest rates
imposed on her loans, cannot be raised as a legal basis to prevent the issuance of the writ of
possession. We have held that given the ministerial nature of the RTC’s duty to issue the writ of
possession after the purchaser has consolidated its ownership, any question regarding the
regularity and validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be raised as justification for
opposing the issuance of the writ. A pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure
does not stay the issuance of a writ of possession.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Writ of Possession; Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended
by Act 4118, governs the issuance of a writ of possession in cases of extrajudicial foreclosure
sales of real estate mortgage.-
—Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act 4118, governs the issuance of a writ of
possession in cases of extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgage, to wit: Sec. 7. In
any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First
Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him
possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the
use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that
the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of
this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion x x x and
the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the
sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order
immediately.
3. Same; Same; Same; A writ of possession may be issued in favor of a purchaser in a
foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage either (1) within the one (1)-year redemption period,
upon the filing of a bond; or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a
bond.-
—A writ of possession may be issued in favor of a purchaser in a foreclosure sale of a real estate
mortgage either (1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond; or (2) after
the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond. Within the one-year redemption
period, a purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession by filing a petition in
the form of an ex parte motion under oath for that purpose. Upon the filing of such motion with
the RTC having jurisdiction over the subject property and the approval of the corresponding
bond, the law, also in express terms, directs the court to issue the order for a writ of possession.
On the other hand, after the lapse of the redemption period, a writ of possession may be issued in
favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale as the mortgagor is now considered to have lost
interest over the foreclosed property. Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession
after the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when
no redemption is made. In this regard, the bond is no longer needed. The purchaser can demand
possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to
him of a new TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the
mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the absolute
right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper
application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely
a ministerial function.
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo, 837 SCRA 160, August 15, 2017
Case Title: SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANK E.
LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 226679
Case Nature: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Plea Bargaining ; Plea to a Lesser Offense ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; View that preventing the accused from pleading to the lesser
offense of possession is a cruel, degrading, and unusual punishment for those who genuinely
accept the consequences of their actions and seek to be rehabilitated.-
—Plea bargaining does not necessarily mean that the accused will automatically be sentenced to
the lesser offense. The plea is subject to the acceptance of the prosecution and is only allowed by
discretion of the court. What is essential is that the choice exists. Preventing the accused from
pleading to the lesser offense of possession is a cruel, degrading, and unusual punishment for
those who genuinely accept the consequences of their actions and seek to be rehabilitated. It will
not advance the policy of the law to punish offenders with penalties not commensurate with the
offense and to hinder their reintegration into society.
2. Courts; Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; It is within the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) power to make
exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, it may permit the full and exhaustive
ventilation of the parties’ arguments and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a
petition or its alleged procedural flaws.-
—On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct. Nonetheless, without
much further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court’s power to make exceptions
to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation
of the parties’ arguments and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or
its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional
issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first
impression, with far-reaching implications.
3. Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a
backseat when issues of substantial and transcendental importance are present.-
—Matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial
and transcendental importance are present. We have acknowledged that the Philippines’
problem on illegal drugs has reached “epidemic,” “monstrous,” and “harrowing” proportions,
and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives,
shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens. At the
same time, We have equally noted that “as urgent as the campaign against the drug problem
must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the
accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the
law enforcers, may be unjustly accused and convicted.” Fully aware of the gravity of the drug
menace that has beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its
sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the
continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users.
4. Courts; Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is now the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) exclusive domain and no longer shared with
the Executive and Legislative departments.-
—The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive
domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. In Echegaray v.
Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96 (1999), then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S.
Puna traced the history of the Court’s rulemaking power and highlighted its evolution and
development.
6. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Plea Bargaining; Speedy Trial Act of 1998; Section 2
of Republic Act (RA) No. 8493 (“Speedy Trial Act of 1998”) required that plea bargaining and
other matters that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered during pretrial
conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Regional Trial Court (RTC),
and the Sandiganbayan.-
—When R.A. No. 8493 (“Speedy Trial Act of 1998”) was enacted, Section 2, Rule 118 of the
Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and other
matters that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered during pretrial
conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.
7. Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The Supreme Court’s (SC’s) sole prerogative to issue,
amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the
former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter.-
—The Supreme Court’s sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to
the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the
latter. “Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law
which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions.”
8. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Promulgation of Judgments; Failure to Appear at the
Promulgation; The Supreme Court (SC) said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 746 SCRA
452 (2015), that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides that an accused who failed to
appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available
against the judgment, does not take away substantive rights but merely provides the manner
through which an existing right may be implemented.-
—We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 746 SCRA 452 (2015), that Section 6, Rule
120 of the Rules, which provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the judgment, does not take
away substantive rights but merely provides the manner through which an existing right may be
implemented. Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of
the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to
appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of
conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment. It is
not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the
substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to
“provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases.” This
provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases — delay
arising from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled
promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
9. Same; Same; Plea Bargaining; In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a
process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of
the case subject to court approval.”-
—In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the accused and
the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the
agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential
losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of
the system — speed, economy, and finality — can benefit the accused, the offended party, the
prosecution, and the court. Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea
bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to
implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction of them.
10. Same; Same; Same; Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is
not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,
which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily
included in the offense charged.-
—The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant’s appraisal of the
prosecution’s case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a
guilty plea be offered and accepted. In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a
lesser crime, a guilty plea is a “serious and sobering occasion” inasmuch as it constitutes a
waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be
heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted
by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. Yet a
defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him
rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.
Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but
depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent
to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged.
The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions;
his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what
the evidence on hand can sustain.
11. Same; Same; Same; Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a
lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of
bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.-
—The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the
accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.
The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the
accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a
lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of
bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.
12. Same; Same; Same; Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pretrial, or
even up to the point when the prosecution already rested its case.-
—Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pretrial, or even up to the point when
the prosecution already rested its case. As regards plea bargaining during the pretrial stage, the
trial court’s exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof. “Grave abuse of
discretion” is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it
arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
13. Same; Same; Same; If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a
bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.-
—If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after
the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not
have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the
prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty
could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor
has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to
assiduously study the prosecution’s evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the
accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be
served. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s
evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge’s acceptance of
the defendant’s change of plea is improper and irregular.
14. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Plea Bargaining; Rulemaking Power of the Supreme
Court; View that the prohibition found in Section 23 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 is
unconstitutional not only because it contravenes the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court
(SC), it also constitutes “cruel,to a lesser offense, he or she waives all the fundamental rights
degrading, [and] inhuman” punishment for the accused.-
—In my view, the prohibition found in Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional
not only because it contravenes the rulemaking power of this Court, it also constitutes “cruel,
degrading, [and] inhuman” punishment for the accused. It is the declared policy of the law “to
provide effective mechanisms or measures to reintegrate into society individuals who have fallen
victims to drug abuse or dangerous drug dependence through sustainable programs of treatment
and rehabilitation.” The aim is to rehabilitate, not punish, those drug offenders.
15. Same; Same; Same; Plea to a Lesser Offense; View that when an accused pleads to a lesser
offense, he or she waives all the fundamental rights guaranteed to an accused.-
—When an accused pleads to a lesser offense, he or she waives all the fundamental rights
guaranteed to an accused. It is essentially a choice that only the accused can make, as a way to
acknowledge his or her guilt and as atonement for that guilt. The reality is that most “drug
pushers” that come before the courts are found with less that 0.1 gram of illegal drugs. While
some of these accused will be charged with both selling and possession, most of them will have
to suffer the penalty of selling, that is, life imprisonment. They will be sentenced to life
imprisonment for evidence amounting to “only about 2.5% of the weight of a five-centavo coin
(1.9 grams) or a one-centavo coin (2.0 grams).”
Frondozo vs. Manila Electric Company, 837 SCRA 378, August 22, 2017
Case Title: CRISPIN S. FRONDOZO,** DANILO M. PEREZ, JOSE A. ZAFRA, ARTURO B.
VITO, CESAR S. CRUZ, NAZARIO C. DELA CRUZ, and LUISITO R. DILOY, petitioners,
vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondent.
G.R. No. 178379
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Special Civil Actions ; Certiorari ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; In Agoy v. Araneta Center, Inc., 668 SCRA 883 (2012), the Supreme
Court (SC) explained that “[w]hen the Court does not find any reversible error in the decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) and denies the petition, there is no need for the Court to fully explain
its denial, since it already means that it agrees with and adopts the findings and conclusions of
the CA. The decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct.”-
—In Agoy v. Araneta Center, Inc., 668 SCRA 883 (2012), this Court explained that “[w]hen the
Court does not find any reversible error in the decision of the CA and denies the petition, there is
no need for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it already means that it agrees with and
adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA. The decision sought to be reviewed and set aside
is correct.” Hence, the Court’s Third Division adopted the findings and conclusions reached by
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 72480 which dismissed petitioners from the service.
The finality of the denial of the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161159 and 161311 should be given
greater weight than the denial of the petition in G.R. No. 164998 on technicality. It can also be
interpreted that, in effect, the finality of the denial of the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161159 and
161311 also removed the jurisdiction of the Court’s First Division and bound it to the final
resolution in G.R. Nos. 161159 and 161311. The Court’s First Division denied MERALCO’s
petition for failure to prosecute only on 15 June 2005, long after the denial of the petitions in
G.R. Nos. 161159 and 161311 became final and executory on 15 July 2004 and 2 September
2004, respectively.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; A judicial review of the decisions of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) may be filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) via
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court but the petition shall not stay the
execution of the assailed decision unless a restraining order is issued by the CA.-
—A judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC may be filed before the Court of Appeals via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court but the petition shall not stay the
execution of the assailed decision unless a restraining order is issued by the Court of Appeals.
Magat, Sr. vs. Tantrade Corporation, 837 SCRA 458, August 23, 2017
Case Title: MARIO MAGAT, SR., MARIO S. MAGAT, JR., MARIO S. MAGAT III, MA.
MARGARITA M. ESTAVILLA, MA. MARJORIE S. MAGAT, all substitute parties and heirs
of the deceased party, JULIANA S. MAGAT, petitioners, vs. TANTRADE CORPORATION
and PABLO S. BORJA, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 205483
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ; Petition for Review ; Motion for
Extension ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To legitimately seek an initial extension, petitioners had to
file a proper motion and to ensure that docket and lawful fees were paid and deposit for costs
was made before the expiration of the reglementary period.-
—To legitimately seek an initial extension, petitioners had to file a proper motion and to ensure
that docket and lawful fees were paid and deposit for costs was made before the expiration of the
reglementary period. Save for the Court of Appeals’ assertion of procrastination, there is no
intimation that petitioners failed in any of these requirements. No other technical defect has been
attributed to petitioners’ First Motion for Extension. They also timely paid the docket and other
fees, and deposited for costs. They did these alongside the filing of their First Motion for
Extension before the lapse of 15 days following their receipt of a copy of the Regional Trial
Court April 18, 2011 Order on May 9, 2011.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review; Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure governs appeals taken to the Court of Appeals (CA) from decisions of Regional
Trial Courts (RTCs) rendered in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction.-
—Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs appeals taken to the Court of Appeals
from decisions of Regional Trial Courts rendered in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction.
Its Section 1 specifies the period for filing petitions for review: Section 1. How appeal taken;
time for filing.—A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court
of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other
lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court
and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s
motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion
and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs
before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional
period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension
shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15)
days.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule 42 enables not just one (1) but two (2) extensions of fifteen
(15) days each.-
—Rule 42 takes a particularly liberal stance with regard to the period for filing petitions. It
explicitly enables extensions, while other modes of appeal do not. In contrast with Rule 42, Rule
40, or the rules on appeals to the Regional Trial Courts from the Municipal Trial Courts, and
Rule 41, or the rules on appeals to the Court of Appeals of decisions of the Regional Trial Courts
rendered in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, make no similar reference to any extension
to file such appeals. They even proscribe motions for extension to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration. Rule 42 enables not just one (1) but two (2) extensions of 15 days each. An
initial extension may be given, provided that it is sought through a proper motion, docket and
lawful fees are paid, and a deposit for costs is made before the expiration of the reglementary
period. After this initial extension, Rule 42 permits a second extension of another 15 days. This
second extension shall, however, only be “for the most compelling reason.” The grants of both
first and second extensions are addressed to the sound discretion of the Court of Appeals. Mere
compliance with the requirements of timely filing a proper motion, tendering payment and
making a deposit, and averring compelling reasons does not guarantee the Court of Appeals’
solicitude. The general rule remains to be the filing of a verified petition “within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for
new trial or reconsideration.” Extensions are proper only under exceptional circumstances.
4. Same; Same; Same; The need to comply with reglementary periods to file appeals is an
adjunct of the basic principle that the right to appeal is merely vested by statute.-
—The need to comply with reglementary periods to file appeals is an adjunct of the basic
principle that the right to appeal is merely vested by statute. Thus, anyone who appeals must
diligently comply with the governing rules. The nonadmission of belatedly filed appeals amounts
to decision on the merits: There are certain procedural rules that must remain inviolable, like
those setting the periods for perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for review, for it is
doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of
that right must comply with the statute or rules . . . [T]he perfection of an appeal in the manner
and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and the
failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a
losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also
has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case. These periods are
carefully guarded and lawyers are well-advised to keep track of their applications. After all, a
denial of a petition for being time-barred is a decision on the merits.
5. Same; Same; Same; Petition for Review; Motion for Extension; Rule 42 allows fifteen (15)
days to file petitions for review. Within the same period, appellants are expressly permitted by
the penultimate sentence of Rule 42, Section 1 to file motions for extension.-
—Rule 42 allows 15 days to file petitions for review. Within the same period, appellants are
expressly permitted by the penultimate sentence of Rule 42, Section 1 to file motions for
extension. It is true that in seeking an extension, rather than immediately filing a petition,
appellants wager on the Court of Appeals’ favorable action. Still, it remains that they have 15
days to seek an extension. They should not be faulted for maximizing the period that Rule 42
allows. In doing so, they are not “procrastinating” but are merely exercising a legitimate option.
If the Court of Appeals takes issue with the filing of motions for extension a day before the end of
the proper period, it should advocate a revision of Rule 42 instead of faulting parties which act
within the bounds of this rule.
Juan vs. Juan, 837 SCRA 613, August 23, 2017
Case Title: FERNANDO U. JUAN, petitioner, vs. ROBERTO U. JUAN (substituted by his son
JEFFREY C. JUAN) and LAUNDROMATIC CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 221732
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Evidence ; Judicial Notice ; Words and Phrases ;

Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Judicial Notice; Words and Phrases; Judicial notice is the
cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof because these
facts are already known to them.-
—In connection therewith, the RTC’s basis or source, an article appearing in a website, in ruling
that the song entitled “Lavandera Ko” is protected by a copyright, cannot be considered a
subject of judicial notice that does not need further authentication or verification. Judicial notice
is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof because
these facts are already known to them. Put differently, it is the assumption by a court of a fact
without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on convenience
and expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not ordinarily
capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.
2. Liberal Interpretation; Liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where
there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same
does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and it at least connotes a reasonable attempt at
compliance with the rules.-
—Rules of procedure must be used to achieve speedy and efficient administration of justice and
not derail it. Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely
resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. It is, [thus] settled that liberal construction of
the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or
error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and it
at least connotes a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules.
Ley Construction and Development Corporation vs. Sedano, 837 SCRA
632, August 23, 2017
Case Title: LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, represented by
its President, JANET C. LEY, petitioner, vs. MARVIN MEDEL SEDANO, doing business
under the name and style “LOLA TABA LOLO PATO PALENGKE AT PALUTO SA
SEASIDE,” respondent. MARVIN MEDEL SEDANO, doing business under the name and style
“LOLA TABA LOLO PATO PALENGKE AT PALUTO SA SEASIDE,” respondent (third-
party plaintiff), vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondent
(third-party defendant).
G.R. No. 222711
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City, Br. 75.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Venue ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Venue; Since the lease contract already provided that all actions or cases
involving the breach thereof should be filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City,
and that petitioner’s complaint purporting the said breach fell within the RTC’s exclusive
original jurisdiction, the latter should have then followed the contractual stipulation and filed its
complaint before the RTC of Pasay City.-
—In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner’s action was one for collection of sum of money in
an amount that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. Since the lease contract already
provided that all actions or cases involving the breach thereof should be filed with the RTC of
Pasay City, and that petitioner’s complaint purporting the said breach fell within the RTC’s
exclusive original jurisdiction, the latter should have then followed the contractual stipulation
and filed its complaint before the RTC of Pasay City. However, it is undeniable that petitioner
filed its complaint with the Valenzuela-RTC; hence, the same is clearly dismissible on the ground
of improper venue, without prejudice, however, to its refiling in the proper court.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Venue; The venue for personal actions shall-
— as a general rule — lie with the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the
defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, parties may, through a written
instrument, restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue.—The venue for
personal actions shall — as a general rule — lie with the court which has jurisdiction where the
plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, parties may,
through a written instrument, restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue. In
Briones v. Court of Appeals, 746 SCRA 240 (2015), the Court explained: Written stipulations as
to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon,
or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but
also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment
of the intention of the parties respecting the matter. As regards restrictive stipulations on venue,
jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words, such as “exclusively,” “waiving for this purpose any other
venue,” “shall only” preceding the designation of venue, “to the exclusion of the other courts,”
or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
3. Same; Same; Same; In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Tecson, 428 SCRA 378 (2004),
the Supreme Court (SC) held that an exclusive venue stipulation is valid and binding,
provided, that: (a) the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in intent; (b) it
is expressed in writing by the parties thereto; and (c) it is entered into before the filing of the
suit.-
—In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Tecson, 428 SCRA 378 (2004), the Court held that an
exclusive venue stipulation is valid and binding, provided, that: (a) the stipulation on the chosen
venue is exclusive in nature or in intent; (b) it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto; and
(c) it is entered into before the filing of the suit. After a thorough study of the case, the Court is
convinced that all these elements are present and that the questioned stipulation in the lease
contract, i.e., Section 21 thereof, is a valid venue stipulation that limits the venue of the cases to
the courts of Pasay City. It states: 21. Should any of the party (sic) renege or violate any terms
and conditions of this lease contract, it shall be liable for damages. All actions or case[s] filed in
connection with this lease shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive of
all others. x x x The above provision clearly shows the parties’ intention to limit the place where
actions or cases arising from a violation of the terms and conditions of the contract of lease may
be instituted. This is evident from the use of the phrase “exclusive of all others” and the
specification of the locality of Pasay City as the place where such cases may be filed.
4. Same; Same; Jurisdiction; It is fundamental that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not
subject to stipulation of the parties.-
—The fact that this stipulation generalizes that all actions or cases of the aforementioned kind
shall be filed with the RTC of Pasay City, to the exclusion of all other courts, does not mean that
the same is a stipulation which attempts to curtail the jurisdiction of all other courts. It is
fundamental that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not subject to stipulation of the parties.
Hence, following the rule that the law is deemed written into every contract, the said stipulation
should not be construed as a stipulation on jurisdiction but rather, one which merely limits
venue. Moreover, “[t]he parties are charged with knowledge of the existing law at the time they
enter into the contract and at the time it is to become operative.” Thus, without any clear
showing in the contract that the parties intended otherwise, the questioned stipulation should be
considered as a stipulation on venue (and not on jurisdiction), consistent with the basic
principles of procedural law.
Wenceslao vs. Makati Development Corporation, 838 SCRA 436, August
30, 2017
Case Title: WILLIAM R. WENCESLAO, VIVENCIO B. RODRIGO, JR., NOEL N.
DAMIASAN, VIRGILIO B. CRISTOBAL, JEMYLITO M. APIAG, JOVENAL P. ATAG,
ARNULFO S. DASCO, CARLITO E. INFANTE, ALFREDO T. VISAYA, JAMES M. REAL,
RENATO A. GUINGUE, ZACARIAS G. TALABOC, JR., GEORGE N. TAGUIAM, RANDY
D. ABRENCILLO, MELECIO B. QUINIMON, CESAR B. JARANILLA, RIZALDE R.
BARILE, HERICO A. BUENAVENTE, JERSON A. TATOY, MICHAEL L. CASIANO,
FELIX M. DINIAY, PEDRO DELA CRUZ, JR., JHOSEL BOY G. ABAYON, AUGUSTO L.
OCENAR, MARIO M. FUNELAS, and AVELINO T. QUIÑONES, petitioners, vs. MAKATI
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, DANTE ABANDO and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 230696
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Dismissal of Actions ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; The failure to state the material dates in a petition for certiorari is sufficient
ground to dismiss it under Section 3, Rule 46, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.-
—Even with copies of portions of the case records attached, the petitioners still failed to address
the lacking statement of the material dates despite clear notice of such violation together with
the other grounds for the dismissal of the petition set forth in the first assailed CA’s resolution.
Indeed, the failure to state the material dates in a petition for certiorari is sufficient ground to
dismiss it under Section 3, Rule 46, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Section 3 of Rule
46 provides three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under
Rule 65: the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received; the date
when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration was filed; and the date when notice of the
denial thereof was received. In this case, the petition filed with the CA failed to state the first and
second dates. Thus, the CA rightfully dismissed the petition.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; It is settled that a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and it will lie only if there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.-
—If the petition is to be treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, then it should
appropriately be dismissed because there is a plain, adequate, and speedy remedy available
under the circumstances. It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an
original or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, what the petitioners seek to be annulled are
the resolutions of the CA dismissing their petition for certiorari and the motion for
reconsideration from such dismissal being, without a doubt, a final order for the complete
disposition of such petition. Consequently, the petitioner’s right and available legal recourse to
assail such resolutions is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 instead of a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65.
3. Same; Dismissal of Actions; The Court of Appeals (CA) was justified in initially dismissing
the petition based on the petitioners’ failure to attach to the petition the certified true copies of
the assailed decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), as
well as other portions of the records of the case.-
—We rule that the CA was justified in initially dismissing the petition based on the petitioners’
failure to attach to the petition the certified true copies of the assailed decision and resolution of
the NLRC, as well as other portions of the records of the case. As noted by the CA, only
photocopies, not the certified true copies, of the NLRC’s decision and resolution complained of
were attached; neither were the pleadings and other papers filed before the labor arbiter and the
NLRC appended. Absent such required documents, the CA correctly opined that it would have no
basis to determine whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in finding the petitioners as
project employees and that their termination was not illegal. On the necessity of attaching
legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution or ruling
subject of the petition, we explained in Pinakamasarap Corporation v. NLRC, 503 SCRA 128
(2006), that: There is a sound reason behind this policy and it is to ensure that the copy of the
judgment or order sought to be reviewed is a faithful reproduction of the original so that the
reviewing court would have a definitive basis in its determination of whether the court, body or
tribunal which rendered the assailed judgment or order committed grave abuse of discretion.
4. Same; Same; Should the court find that the copies of the essential pleadings or portions of the
case records are lacking, it may dismiss the petition. But if such copies of the pleadings and case
records are later submitted, the court may, in the exercise of sound discretion, reinstate the case
and decide the same on the merits.-
—The petitioners are correct that not all pleadings or papers need to be appended. As in Air
Philippines Corporation v. Zamora, 498 SCRA 59 (2006), only such portions of the case records
as may be relevant in resolving the issues before the court are necessary to accompany the
petition. The court before whom the petition is filed has, at first instance, the opportunity to
determine which of these portions of the case records are material to the resolution of the issue,
that is, whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. Should the court find
that the copies of the essential pleadings or portions of the case records are lacking, it may
dismiss the petition. But if such copies of the pleadings and case records are later submitted, the
court may, in the exercise of sound discretion, reinstate the case and decide the same on the
merits.
Edison (Bataan) Cogeneration Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 838 SCRA 287, August 30, 2017
Case Title: EDISON (BATAAN) COGENERATION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent., REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs. EDISON (BATAAN) COGENERATION CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 201665, G.R. No. 201668
Case Nature: PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Tax Appeals En Banc.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ;

Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is a settled rule that issues not raised below
cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal because a party is not allowed to change his
theory on appeal; to do so would be unfair to the other party and offensive to rules of fair play,
justice and due process.-
—Neither do we find any reason for the retroactive application of RR No. 12-01, which provides
that the withholding of final tax commences “at the time an income payment is paid or payable,
or the income payment is accrued or recorded as an expense or asset, whichever is applicable in
the payor’s book, whichever comes first.” To begin with, this issue was never raised before the
CTA. Thus, we cannot rule on this matter now. It is a settled rule that issues not raised below
cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal because a party is not allowed to change his
theory on appeal; to do so would be unfair to the other party and offensive to rules of fair play,
justice and due process.
2. Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; It is a basic rule in evidence that the person who
alleges payment has the burden of proving that payment has indeed been made.-
—Considering that EBCC filed the Petition for Review before the CTA to question the deficiency
tax assessment issued by the CIR, it was incumbent upon EBCC to prove that the deficiency tax
assessment had no legal or factual basis or that it had already paid or remitted the deficiency tax
assessment as it is the taxpayer that has the burden of proof to impugn the validity and
correctness of the disputed deficiency tax assessment. In addition, it is a basic rule in evidence
that the person who alleges payment has the burden of proving that payment has indeed been
made. More so, in cases filed before the CTA, which are litigated de novo, party-litigants must
prove every minute aspect of their case.
Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Sabado, 838 SCRA 425, August 30, 2017
Case Title: PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES RAMON AND
ANNABELLE SABADO, respondents.
G.R. No. 224204
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Indispensable Parties ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; An indispensable party is one who has an interest in the subject matter of
the controversy which is inseparable from the interest of the other parties, and that a final
adjudication cannot be made without affecting such interest.-
—The Court cannot subscribe to the CA’s conclusion that since HTPMI retained ownership over
the subject property pursuant to the Deed of Assignment, it is an indispensable party to the case.
As adverted to earlier, an indispensable party is one who has an interest in the subject matter of
the controversy which is inseparable from the interest of the other parties, and that a final
adjudication cannot be made without affecting such interest. Here, the only issue in the instant
unlawful detainer suit is who between the litigating parties has the better right to possess de
facto the subject property. Thus, HTPMI’s interest in the subject property, as one holding legal
title thereto, is completely separable from petitioner’s rights under the Contract to Sell, which
include the cancellation or rescission of such contract and resultantly, the recovery of actual
possession of the subject property by virtue of this case. Hence, the courts can certainly proceed
to determine who between petitioner and respondents have a better right to the possession of the
subject property and complete relief can be had even without HTPMI’s participation.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Indispensable Parties; Words and Phrases; Case law
defines an indispensable party as one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the
litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had.-
—Case law defines an indispensable party as “one whose interest will be affected by the court’s
action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The
party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably
intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an
absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties
before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.” “Thus, the absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.”
Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Huang, 838 SCRA 221, August 30, 2017
Case Title: MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and ROLANDO J. DEL ROSARIO,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES RICHARD Y. HUANG & CARMEN G. HUANG and STEPHEN G.
HUANG, respondents.
G.R. No. 197654
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; A writ of execution that exceeds the tenor of the judgment is patently void and
should be struck down.-
—Another effect of a final and executory judgment is that winning litigants are entitled to the
satisfaction of the judgment through a writ of execution. A writ of execution must substantially
conform to the judgment sought to be enforced. A writ of execution that exceeds the tenor of the
judgment is patently void and should be struck down. Upon a finding of its invalidity, the case
may be remanded to the lower court for the issuance of the proper writ.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Immutability of Final Judgments; It is a
fundamental principle that a judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and
unalterable.-
—A final and executory judgment produces certain effects. Winning litigants are entitled to the
satisfaction of the judgment through a writ of execution. On the other hand, courts are barred
from modifying the rights and obligations of the parties, which had been adjudicated upon. They
have the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment. It is a fundamental
principle that a judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and unalterable. The
primary consequence of this principle is that the judgment may no longer be modified or
amended by any court in any manner even if the purpose of the modification or amendment is to
correct perceived errors of law or fact. This principle known as the doctrine of immutability of
judgment is a matter of sound public policy, which rests upon the practical consideration that
every litigation must come to an end.
3. Same; Same; Same; Dispositive Portions; Clerical or Typographical Errors; Clerical errors
or ambiguities in the dispositive portion of a judgment may result from inadvertence. These
errors can be rectified without violating the doctrine of immutability of judgment provided that
the modification does not affect the substance of the controversy.-
—Clerical errors or ambiguities in the dispositive portion of a judgment may result from
inadvertence. These errors can be rectified without violating the doctrine of immutability of
judgment provided that the modification does not affect the substance of the controversy.
Clerical errors are best exemplified by typographical errors or arithmetic miscalculations. They
also include instances when words are interchanged.
4. Same; Same; Same; Nunc Pro Tunc Orders; A judgment nunc pro tunc is made to enter into
the record an act previously done by the court, which had been omitted either through
inadvertence or mistake.-
—“Nunc pro tunc” is a Latin phrase that means “now for then.” A judgment nunc pro tunc is
made to enter into the record an act previously done by the court, which had been omitted either
through inadvertence or mistake. It neither operates to correct judicial errors nor to “supply
omitted action by the court.” Its sole purpose is to make a present record of a “judicial action
which has been actually taken.” The concept of nunc pro tunc judgments was sufficiently
explained in Lichauco v. Tan Pho, 51 Phil. 862 (1923), thus: [A judgment nunc pro tunc] may be
used to make the record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought
to have spoken. If the court has not rendered a judgment that it might or should have rendered,
or if it has rendered an imperfect or improper judgment, it has no power to remedy these errors
or omissions by ordering the entry nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment. Hence, a court in
entering a judgment nunc pro tunc has no power to construe what the judgment means, but only
to enter of record such judgment as had been formerly rendered, but which had not been entered
of record as rendered. In all cases the exercise of the power to enter judgments nunc pro tunc
presupposes the actual rendition of a judgment, and a mere right to a judgment will not furnish
the basis for such an entry.
5. Same; Same; Same; Same; The exercise of issuing nunc pro tunc orders or judgments is
narrowly confined to cases where there is a need to correct mistakes or omissions arising from
inadvertence so that the record reflects judicial action, which had previously been taken.-
—The exercise of issuing nunc pro tunc orders or judgments is narrowly confined to cases where
there is a need to correct mistakes or omissions arising from inadvertence so that the record
reflects judicial action, which had previously been taken. Furthermore, nunc pro tunc judgments
or orders can only be rendered if none of the parties will be prejudiced. Parties seeking the
issuance of nunc pro tunc judgments or orders must allege and prove that the court took a
particular action and that the action was omitted through inadvertence. On the other hand,
courts must ensure that the matters sought to be entered are supported by facts or data. This may
be accomplished by referring to the records of the case.
6. Same; Same; Same; Immutability of Final Judgments; The doctrine of immutability of
judgment is premised upon the existence of a final and executory judgment. It is, therefore,
inapplicable where the judgment never attains finality, as in the case of void judgments.-
—The doctrine of immutability of judgment is premised upon the existence of a final and
executory judgment. It is, therefore, inapplicable where the judgment never attains finality, as in
the case of void judgments. Void judgments produce “no legal [or] binding effect.” Hence, they
are deemed nonexistent. They may result from the “lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter”
or a lack of jurisdiction over the person of either of the parties. They may also arise if they were
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
7. Same; Same; Same; Same; Void Judgments; A void judgment never acquires the status of a
final and executory judgment.-
—A void judgment never acquires the status of a final and executory judgment. Parties may,
therefore, challenge them without running afoul of the doctrine of immutability of judgment. A
direct attack may be brought either through a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court or through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. A
void judgment may also be challenged collaterally “by assailing its validity in another action
where it is invoked.”
F.F. Cruz & Company, Inc. vs. Philippine Iron Construction and Marine
Works, Inc., 838 SCRA 174, August 30, 2017
Case Title: F.F. CRUZ & COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE IRON
CONSTRUCTION AND MARINE WORKS, INC., and/or ANCHOR METALS CORP.,
respondents., PHILIPPINE IRON CONSTRUCTION AND MARINE WORKS, INC., and/or
ANCHOR METALS CORP., petitioners, vs. F.F. CRUZ & COMPANY, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 188144, G.R. No. 188301
Case Nature: PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Negligence ; Contributory Negligence ;
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; It is aphoristic
that a reexamination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because x x x the Supreme Court (SC) is not a
trier of facts; it reviews only questions of law.-
—A petition for review under Rule 45 is, thus, limited only to questions of law. Factual questions
are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. This Court will not review facts, as it is not
our function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings
below. We are confined to the review of errors of law that may have been committed in the
judgment under review. “It is aphoristic that a reexamination of factual findings cannot be done
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because x x x this
Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only questions of law.” Over time, we have entertained
petitions for review raising factual questions in certain narrow and limited instances. One such
exception is when the factual findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court. The
presence of such circumstance alone, however, does not automatically warrant departure from
the general rule.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; A conflict between the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
(CA) and the trial court only provides prima facie basis for a recourse to the Supreme Court
(SC).-
—A conflict between the factual findings of the CA and the trial court only provides prima facie
basis for a recourse to the Supreme Court. But before we even give due course to a petition
under Rule 45 which raises factual issues — much less undertake a complete reexamination of
the records — it is incumbent upon the petitioner to clearly show that manifestly correct findings
have been unwarrantedly rejected or reversed by the CA. “[O]nly a showing, on the face of the
record, of gross or extraordinary misperception or manifest bias in the [CA]’s reading of the
evidence will justify this Court’s intervention by way of assuming a function usually within the
former’s exclusive province.” Both F.F. Cruz and AMC failed to show that their respective
petitions meet this standard.
4. Same; Same; The rule is that the Board of Marine Inquiry’s (BMI’s) findings are binding and
conclusive on the courts when it is supported by substantial evidence.-
—Simply put, the rule is that the BMI’s findings are binding and conclusive on the courts when it
is supported by substantial evidence. This is consistent with the elementary principle in
administrative law that findings of fact by administrative tribunals are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence.
Encarnacion Construction & Industrial Corporation vs. Phoenix Ready
Mix Concrete Development & Construction, Inc., 838 SCRA 500,
September 04, 2017
Case Title: ENCARNACION CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. PHOENIX READY MIX CONCRETE DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION,
INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 225402
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ; Petition for Review on Certiorari ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Factual questions are
not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari as it is not the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) function
to once again analyze and calibrate evidence that has already been considered in the lower
courts.-
—The other issues raised by ECIC on this matter are essentially factual in nature, and thus, not
proper for a petition for review on certiorari. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which governs this
kind of petition, requires that only questions of law should be raised. Factual questions are not
the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari as it is not the Court’s function to once again
analyze and calibrate evidence that has already been considered in the lower courts. While there
are recognized exceptions to this rule that warrant review of factual findings, ECIC, as the party
seeking review, however, failed to demonstrate that a factual review is justified under the
circumstances prevailing in this case.
3. Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; Case law states that the natural presumption is that
one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and consequences.-
—In this case, there is no proof that ECIC was disadvantaged or utterly inexperienced in dealing
with Phoenix. There were likewise no allegations and proof that its representative (and
owner/proprietor) Ramon Encarnacion (Encarnacion) was uneducated, or under duress or force
when he signed the Agreement on its behalf. In fact, Encarnacion is presumably an astute
businessman who signed the Agreement with full knowledge of its import. Case law states that
the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of
its contents and consequences. This presumption has not been debunked.
Express Padala (Italia) S.P.A., now BDO Remittance (Italia) S.P.A. vs.
Ocampo, 839 SCRA 47, September 06, 2017
Case Title: EXPRESS PADALA (ITALIA) S.P.A., now BDO REMIT-TANCE (ITALIA)
S.P.A., petitioner, vs. HELEN M. OCAMPO, respondent.
G.R. No. 202505
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolu-tion of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Service of Summons ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; As a rule, if a defendant has not been val-idly summoned, the court
acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered against him is void.-
—The service of sum-mons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of a defendant’s consti-
tutional right to due process. As a rule, if a defendant has not been validly summoned, the court
acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered against him is void. Since the
RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ocampo, the judgment ren-dered by the
court could not be considered binding upon her.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Service of Summons; Substi-tuted Service of Summons;
Substituted service is effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or by leaving the copies at
defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.-
—The general rule in this juris-diction is that summons must be served personally on the
defendant. Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 6. Service in person on
defendant.—Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to
the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. For
justifi-able reasons, however, other modes of serving summons may be resorted to. When the
defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time after efforts to locate him have
failed, the rules allow summons to be served by substituted service. Substituted service is effected
by leaving copies of the summons at the defen-dant’s residence with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
3. Same; Same; Same; Service of Summons by Publication; As an exception to the preferred
mode of service, service of summons by publication may only be resorted to when the
whereabouts of the defendant are not only unknown, but cannot be ascertained by dili-gent
inquiry.-
—When the defendant’s whereabouts are unknown, the rules allow service of summons by
publication. As an exception to the preferred mode of service, service of summons by publication
may only be resorted to when the whereabouts of the defendant are not only unknown, but
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. The diligence requirement means that there must be
prior resort to personal service under Section 7 and substituted service under Sec-tion 8, and
proof that these modes were ineffective before summons by publication may be allowed. This
mode also requires the plaintiff to file a written motion for leave of court to effect service of
summons by publication, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf,
setting forth the grounds for the application.
4. Same; Same; Same; Substituted Service of Summons; Substi-tuted service presupposes that
the place where the summons is being served is the defendant’s current residence or
office/regular place of business.-
—We agree with the CA that substituted service is im-proper under the facts of this case.
Substituted service presupposes that the place where the summons is being served is the
defendant’s current residence or office/regular place of business. Thus, where the defendant
neither resides nor holds office in the address stated in the summons, substituted service cannot
be resorted to. As we explained in Keister v. Navarro, 77 SCRA 209 (1977): Under the Rules,
substituted service may be effect[ed] (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s
dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof. The terms “dwelling house” or “residence” are generally
held to refer to the time of service, hence it is not sufficient “to leave the copy at defendant’s
former dwelling house, residence, or place of abode, as the case may be, after his removal
therefrom.” They refer to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time
when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time.
Similarly, the terms “office” or “regular place of business” refer to the office or place of
business of defendant at the time of service. Note that the rule designates the persons to whom
copies of the process may be left. The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists
between the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that
such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him notice thereof.
5. Same; Same; Same; Modes of service of summons must be strictly followed in order that the
court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.-
—BDO Remittance’s reliance on Palma v. Galvez, 615 SCRA 86 (2010), is misplaced for the
simple reason that the case involved service of summons to a person who is temporarily out of
the country. In this case, however, Ocampo’s sojourn in Italy cannot be classified as temporary
considering that she already re-sides there, albeit her precise address was not known. Modes of
service of summons must be strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant. The pur-pose of this is to afford the defendant an opportunity to
be heard on the claim against him. BDO Remittance is not totally without re-course, as the rules
allow summons by publication and extraterrito-rial service. Unlike substituted service, however,
these are extraor-dinary modes which require leave of court.
Macalanda, Jr. vs. Acosta, 839 SCRA 1, September 06, 2017
Case Title: PRIMITIVO MACALANDA, JR., petitioner, vs. ATTY. ROQUE A. ACOSTA,
respondent.
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolu-tion of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ; Factual Findings ;

Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Factual Findings; Well-settled is the rule that
factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are
afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings
were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive and
binding upon the Supreme Court (SC).-
—In the present case, both the DARAB and the CA found that Petitioner failed to establish the
existence of a tenancy relationship. Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of administrative
bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and
in the absence of substantial showing that such findings were made from an erroneous
estimation of the evi-dence presented, they are conclusive and binding upon this Court. The
DARAB, by reason of its mandate and functions have acquired expertise in specific matters
within their jurisdiction, and their findings deserve full respect. Without justifiable reason, their
factual findings ought not to be altered, modified or reversed, especially, such as in this case, the
CA affirmed such findings of facts.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; The question of
whether there is a tenancy relationship between the Petitioner and Respondent is basically a
question of fact, and the findings of the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as to the fact that Petitioner is not a bona fide tenant of
Respondent is entitled to respect and nondisturbance.-
—A Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law and the factual findings of the lower courts or
quasi-judicial agencies are conclusive on this Court. The question of whether there is a tenancy
relationship between the Petitioner and Respondent is basically a question of fact, and the
findings of the CA and the DA-RAB as to the fact that Petitioner is not a bona fide tenant of Re-
spondent is entitled to respect and nondisturbance.
Ignacio vs. Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City, 839 SCRA 304,
September 11, 2017
Case Title: TERESA R. IGNACIO, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, ROBERTO R.
IGNACIO, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, VICTOR
B. EN-DRIGA, OFFICE OF THE CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY, THE REGISTRAR
OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, ATTY. FELIXBERTO F. ABAD, and ALEJANDRO
RAMON and RACQUEL DIMALANTA, respondents.
G.R. No. 221620
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Dismissal of Actions ; Litis Pendencia ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; Litis Pendentia; Litis pendentia, as a ground for the
dismissal of a civil action, pertains to a situation wherein another action is pending between the
same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action be-comes unnecessary and
vexatious.-
—As compared to the doctrine of res judicata, which had been explained above, litis pendentia,
as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, pertains to a situation wherein another action is
pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action
becomes unneces-sary and vexatious. Its requisites are: (a) identity of parties or at least such
parties that represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; (c) identity of the two preceding particu-
lars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, re-gardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Case law holds that jurisdiction is conferred
by law and determined from the nature of action pleaded as appearing from the material
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.-
—Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. In
order for the court or an adjudicative body to have author-ity to dispose of the case on the
merits, it must acquire, among oth-ers, jurisdiction over the subject matter. Case law holds that
ju-risdiction is conferred by law and determined from the na-ture of action pleaded as appearing
from the material aver-ments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Once the
nature of the action is determined, it remains the same even on appeal until a decision rendered
thereon becomes final and executory.
3. Same; Same; Courts; Court of Tax Appeals; Jurisdiction; Local Tax Cases; Cases decided
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which involve issues relating to the power of the local
government to impose real property taxes are considered as local tax cases, which fall under the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).-
—Based on the above cited provision of law, it is apparent that the CTA’s appellate jurisdiction
over decisions, orders, or resolutions of the RTCs becomes operative only when the RTC has
ruled on a local tax case. Thus, before the case can be raised on appeal to the CTA, the action
before the RTC must be in the nature of a tax case, or one which primarily involves a tax issue.
In National Power Corporation v. Municipal Government of Navotas, 741 SCRA 505 (2014):
Indeed, the CTA, sitting as Division, has jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, rulings
and resolutions of the RTC over local tax cases, which includes real property taxes. This is
evident from a perusal of the Local Government Code (LGC) which includes the matter of Real
Property Taxation under one of its main chapters. Indubitably, the power to impose real
property tax is in line with the power vested in the local governments to create their own revenue
sources, within the limitations set forth by law. As such, the collection of real prop-erty taxes is
conferred with the local treasurer rather than the Bu-reau of Internal Revenue. Thus, cases
decided by the RTC which involve issues relating to the power of the local government to im-
pose real property taxes are considered as local tax cases, which fall under the appellate
jurisdiction of the CTA. To note, these issues may, inter alia, involve the legality or validity of
the real property tax assessment; protests of assessments; disputed assessments, surcharges, or
penalties; legality or validity of a tax ordinance; claims for tax refund/credit; claims for tax
exemption; actions to collect the tax due; and even prescription of assessments.
4. Same; Same; Res Judicata; For res judicata to absolutely bar a subsequent action, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the for-mer judgment or order must be final; (b) the
judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between the first and
second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.-
—Res judicata literally means a mat-ter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that an existing final judgment or
decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. For res judicata to absolutely bar
a subse-quent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment or order
must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by
a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between
the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
5. Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Words and Phrases; Forum shopping is the act of a litigant
who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already
resolved by some other court, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in
one court, then in another.-
—Forum shopping is the act of a liti-gant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circum-stances, and all raising substantially the
same issues, either pending in or already resolved by some other court, to increase the chances
of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. To determine whether a
party violated the rule against forum shopping, it is crucial to ask whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another.
Concejero vs. Court of Appeals, 839 SCRA 323, September 11, 2017
Case Title: DENNIS M. CONCEJERO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF AP-PEALS and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.
G.R. No. 223262
Case Nature: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Special Civil Actions ; Certiorari ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Petitioner had sixty (60) days to file a peti-tion for certiorari under
Rule 65. Since petitioner received the Na-tional Labor Relations Commission’s (NLRC’s)
Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration on September 23, 2014, he had until
November 22, 2014 (the 60th day) within which to file his petition. However, November 22,
2014 fell on a Saturday; hence, petitioner had until the next working day or until November 24,
2014 (Monday) to file the petition under Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.-
—Petitioner had 60 days to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Since petitioner received
the NLRC’s Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration on September 23, 2014, he had
until November 22, 2014 (the 60th day) within which to file his petition. However, November 22,
2014 fell on a Saturday; hence, petitioner had until the next working day or until November 24,
2014 (Monday) to file the petition under Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court: Section 1. How
to Compute Time.—In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by
order of the court, or by any applica-ble statute, the day of the act or event from which the
designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of per-formance included.
If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday
in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; The decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) is appealable to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.-
—The decision of the NLRC is appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides: SEC. 4. When and where peti-
tion filed.—The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether
such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the
denial of said motion. The petition shall be filed in the Su-preme Court or, if it relates to the acts
or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. No extension of time to file
the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15)
days.
Reyes, Jr. vs. Chung, 839 SCRA 615, September 13, 2017
Case Title: SPOUSES ROSALINO R. REYES, JR. and SYLVIA S. REYES, petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES HERBERT BUN HONG G. CHUNG and WIENNA T. CHUNG, respondents.
G.R. No. 228112
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Foreclosure of Mortgage ; Writ of Possession ; Ex Parte
Hearings ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Writ of Possession; Ex-Parte Hearings; Unlike the original mortgagee-
purchaser, the respondents’ right to apply for the issuance of a writ of possession is
circumscribed and cannot be made ex parte; the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of a
subsequent purchaser must be made only “after hearing and after determining that the subject
property is still in the possession of the mortgagor.”-
—In the case under consideration, the original right to file a Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Possession belonged to EIBI, being the mort-gagee-purchaser at the extrajudicial foreclosure
sale. But, instead of seeking the issuance of a writ of possession, it sold the subject prop-erty to
LNC, which, in turn, sold the same to the respondents. As such, by the sale, the respondents
became the new owners of the subject property and were vested with all the rights and interests
of their predecessors EIBI and LNC, including the right to the posses-sion of the property.
Undoubtedly, the respondents can apply for the issuance of a writ of possession even though they
were not the pur-chasers at the foreclosure proceedings. However, unlike the original
mortgagee-purchaser, the respondents’ right to apply for the issu-ance of a writ of possession is
circumscribed and cannot be made ex parte; the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of a
subsequent purchaser must be made only “after hearing and after determining that the subject
property is still in the possession of the mortgagor.”
2. Remedial Law; Forum Shopping; Forum shopping exists when a party avails himself of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other
courts.-
—It has been jurispruden-tially established that forum shopping exists when a party avails
himself of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultane-ously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transac-tions and the same essential facts and circumstances,
and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by
some other courts. The test to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping is whether the ele-ments of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another. Simply put, when litis pendentia or res judicata
does not exist, neither can forum shop-ping exist.
3. Same; Same; Litis Pendentia; Requisites of.-
—The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing
the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in
one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. On the
other hand, the elements of res judi-cata, also known as bar by prior judgment, are: (a) the
former judg-ment must be final; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between
the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
4. Same; Writ of Possession; A writ of possession is a writ of execu-tion employed to enforce a
judgment to recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give its
possession to the person entitled under the judgment.-
—A writ of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover the
possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give its possession to the person
entitled under the judgment. It may be issued under the following instances: (1) in land
registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act 496; (2) in a judicial foreclosure, provided the
debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the
foreclosure suit, had intervened; (3) in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage un-
der Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended; and (4) in execu-tion sales (last paragraph of
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court).
5. Same; Foreclosure of Mortgage; Possession; Writ of Possession; Possession being an
essential right of the owner with which he is able to exercise the other attendant rights of
ownership, after consolidation of title, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may demand
possession as a matter of right.-
—In an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, the purchaser becomes the absolute owner
thereof if no redemption is made within one year from the registration of the certificate of sale by
those entitled to redeem. Being the absolute owner, he is entitled to all the rights of ownership
over a property recognized in Article 428 of the New Civil Code, not the least of which is posses-
sion, or jus possidendi. Possession being an essential right of the owner with which he is able to
exercise the other attendant rights of ownership, after consolidation of title, the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale may demand possession as a matter of right. Thus, Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended, imposes upon the RTC a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession to the new owner
upon a mere ex parte motion.
Team Image Entertainment, Inc. vs. Solar Team Entertainment, Inc.,
839 SCRA 501, September 13, 2017
Case Title: TEAM IMAGE ENTERTAINMENT, INC., and FELIX S. CO, petitioners, vs.
SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC., respondent. SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT,
INC., petitioner, vs. TEAM IMAGE ENTERTAINMENT, INC., and FELIX S. CO, respondents.
G.R. No. 191652, G.R. No. 191658
Case Nature: PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and reso-lution of the Court
of Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Judgments ; Compromise Agreements ;

Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Compromise Agree¬ments; Upon approval, a
judgment upon a compromise is im-mediately executory, not even subject to appeal.-
—As held by the Court of Appeals, it was grave abuse of discretion for Judge Duma-yas to keep
the P2,000,000.00 in custodia legis. Upon approval, a judgment upon a compromise is
immediately executory, not even subject to appeal. Ordering the deposit of the P2,000,000.00
with the Office of the Clerk of Court effectively stayed the execution of an immediately executory
judgment. It is highly irregular. Nowhere in the law or the Rules of Court is such deposit
allowed.
Philippine National Bank vs. Gregorio, 840 SCRA 37, September 18,
2017
Case Title: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. TERESITA FE A. GREGORIO,
respondent.
G.R. No. 194944
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Evidence ; Retractions ;

Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Retractions; Just because one has executed an affidavit of
retraction does not imply that what has been previously said is false or that the latter is true.-
—We concur with the NLRC’s appreciation of the affidavits of retraction. We have often
repeated that “[j]ust because one has executed an affidavit of retraction does not imply that
what has been previously said is false or that the latter is true.” The reliability of an affidavit of
retraction is determined in the same manner that the reliability of any other documentary
evidence is ascertained. In particular, it is necessary to examine the circumstances surrounding
it. In the case of Villar’s affidavit of retraction, we note that this has never been identified and
authenticated. Thus, its weight as evidence is highly suspect. As to Rebollo’s alleged affidavit of
retraction, a reading of its contents, as correctly pointed out by the NLRC, reveals that Rebollo
in fact affirmed Gregorio’s participation in the lending activities within PNB Sucat when she
said in this affidavit that Gregorio introduced her to a certain Realina Ty who became her
borrower.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; The Supreme Court (SC) held in St. Martin
Funeral Home v. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494 (1998), that the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals (CA) through a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.-
—We held in St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494 (1998), that the decision of the
NLRC may be reviewed by the CA through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. While we stated in this case that the courts, particularly the CA, possess
jurisdiction to review the rulings of the NLRC, our existing laws and rules limit a resort to the
courts through a petition for certiorari. In ruling that a special civil action for certiorari is the
proper remedy to assail NLRC decisions, we specified in St. Martin the parameters of the
judiciary’s review powers over the rulings of the NLRC. In particular, the CA may review NLRC
decisions only when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the same as an appeal. In
an appeal, the appellate court reviews errors of judgment. On the other hand, a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 is not an appeal but a special civil action, where the reviewing court
has jurisdiction only over errors of jurisdiction. We have consistently emphasized that a special
civil action for certiorari and an appeal are “mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive.” A petition filed under Rule 65 cannot serve as a substitute for an appeal.
3. Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; An appeal through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is limited to questions of law.-
—The focus of a special civil action under Rule 65 also affects the scope of our review when we
are presented with a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the ruling of the CA in cases involving alleged grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC.
An appeal through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is limited to questions of
law. Thus, when a petition under Rule 45 is brought before us challenging the decision of the CA
in a petition under Rule 65 challenging an NLRC Decision, the question of law we must resolve
is this — whether the CA correctly ruled on the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the NLRC.
4. Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; When the Court of Appeals (CA) reviews a National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) decision, it is necessarily limited to the question of whether the
NLRC acted arbitrarily, whimsically, or capriciously, in the sense that grave abuse of discretion
is understood under the law, the rules, and jurisprudence.-
—An appeal is a statutory right. This means that there is no remedy of appeal unless there is a
law expressly granting it. In the case of the decisions of the NLRC, there is no law stating that
the aggrieved party may appeal the decision before the court. Our ruling in St. Martin Funeral
Home v. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494 (1998), however, explained that while there is no appeal from an
NLRC decision, this does not mean that NLRC decisions are absolutely beyond the powers of
review of the court. In fact, NLRC decisions may be reviewed by the CA through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. Pertinent here is the use of the word “review” and not “appeal.” Also
relevant is the use of the remedy of a petition under Rule 65, which is a special civil action for
certiorari on the basis of grave abuse of discretion. The implication of this is that an NLRC
decision is final and not subject to appeal or review by the courts. There is an exception to this,
which is a review by the CA only in cases where there is grave abuse of discretion. When the CA
reviews an NLRC decision, it is necessarily limited to the question of whether the NLRC acted
arbitrarily, whimsically, or capriciously, in the sense that grave abuse of discretion is
understood under the law, the rules, and jurisprudence. It does not entail looking into the
correctness of the judgment of the NLRC on the merits.
Planters Development Bank vs. Ramos, 840 SCRA 453, September 20,
2017
Case Title: PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VICTORIANO
and MELANIE RAMOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 228617
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Venue ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; The stipulation on the venue was couched in a language showing the
intention of the parties to restrict the filing of any suit or action to the designated place only. It is
crystal clear that the intention was not just to make the said place an additional forum or venue
but the only jurisdiction where any suit or action pertaining to the mortgage contracts may be
filed.-
—In the present case, Spouses Ramos had validly waived their right to choose the venue for any
suit or action arising from the mortgages or promissory notes when they agreed to limit the same
to Makati City only and nowhere else. True enough, the stipulation on the venue was couched in
a language showing the intention of the parties to restrict the filing of any suit or action to the
designated place only. It is crystal clear that the intention was not just to make the said place an
additional forum or venue but the only jurisdiction where any suit or action pertaining to the
mortgage contracts may be filed. There being no showing that such waiver was invalid or that
the stipulation on venue was against public policy, the agreement of the parties should be
upheld. It is therefore a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC to deny the motion to
dismiss filed by PDB on the ground of improper venue, especially when the said issue had been
raised at the most opportune time, that is, within the time for but before the filing of an answer.
The CA should have given this matter a more serious consideration and not simply brushed it
aside.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Venue; Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in
the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that
the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by
law.-
—The general rules on venue admit of exceptions in Section 4 thereof, i.e., where a specific rule
or law provides otherwise, or when the parties agreed in writing before the filing of the action on
the exclusive venue thereof. Stipulations on venue, however, may either be permissive or
restrictive. “Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be
filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not
only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement,
what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.”
3. Same; Same; Same; In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should
be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place.-
—In view of the predilection to view a stipulation on venue as merely permissive, the parties
must therefore employ words in the contract that would clearly evince a contrary intention. In
Spouses Lantin v. Judge Lantion, 499 SCRA 718 (2006), the Court emphasized that “the mere
stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in
other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence
of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on
an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.”
4. Same; Same; Same; Not being contrary to law or public policy, the stipulation on venue,
which Planters Development Bank (PDB) and Spouses Ramos freely and willingly agreed upon,
has the force of law between them, and thus, should be complied with in good faith.-
—In view of the foregoing, the RTC should have granted the Urgent Motion to Dismiss filed by
PDB on the ground that the venue was improperly laid. The complaint being one for annulment
of real estate mortgages and promissory notes is in the nature of a personal action, the venue of
which may be fixed by the parties to the contract. In this case, it was agreed that any suit or
action that may arise from the mortgage contracts or the promissory notes must be filed and
tried in Makati only. Not being contrary to law or public policy, the stipulation on venue, which
PDB and Spouses Ramos freely and willingly agreed upon, has the force of law between them,
and thus, should be complied with in good faith.
Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Limited vs.
Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 840 SCRA 203, September 20, 2017
Case Title: STEAMSHIP MUTUAL UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION (BERMUDA)
LIMITED, petitioner, vs. SULPICIO LINES, INC., respondent., SULPICIO LINES, INC.,
petitioner, vs. STEAMSHIP MUTUAL UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION (BERMUDA)
LIMITED, respondent.
G.R. No. 196072, G.R. No. 208603
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals; and SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Indirect Contempt.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Special Civil Actions ; Contempt ;

Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Contempt; The court’s contempt power should be
exercised with restraint and for a preservative, and not a vindictive, purpose. “Only in cases of
clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised.”-
—The court’s contempt power should be exercised with restraint and for a preservative, and not
a vindictive, purpose. “Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the
power be exercised.” In Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management Association
of the Philippines, 656 SCRA 331 (2011), this Court held that: There is no question that in
contempt the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of the
alleged contemnor should be considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not
clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith,
is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held
to be determinative of its character. A person should not be condemned for contempt where he
contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose,
however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. To constitute contempt, the act must
be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; A Rule 45
petition is the proper remedy to reverse a decision or resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
even if the error assigned is grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law.-
—A Rule 45 petition is the proper remedy to reverse a decision or resolution of the Court of
Appeals even if the error assigned is grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law.
“The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because
one of the requirements for the latter remedy is that there should be no appeal.” Allegations in
the petition of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals do not ipso facto
render the intended remedy that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In Microsoft
Corporation v. Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, 389 SCRA 615 (2002), this Court
discussed the distinction between a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review must be
verified and must contain a sworn certification against forum shopping.-
—Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review must be verified and must contain a
sworn certification against forum shopping. “A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the
affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his [or her]
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.” On the other hand, a certification against
forum shopping is a petitioner’s, statement “under oath that he [or she] has not . . . commenced
any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or
different divisions, or any other tribunal or agency[.]” In this certification, the petitioner must
state the status of any other action or proceeding, if there is any, and undertakes to report to the
courts and other tribunal within five (5) days from learning of any similar action or proceeding.
Failure to comply with the foregoing mandates constitutes a sufficient ground for the denial of
the petition.
Luntao vs. BAP Credit Guaranty Corporation, 840 SCRA 294, September
20, 2017
Case Title: VICENTE L. LUNTAO and NANETTE L. LUNTAO, petitioners, vs. BAP
CREDIT GUARANTY CORPORATION and EFREN M. PINEDA, respondents.
G.R. No. 204412
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ; Petition for Review on Certiorari ;

Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; In a Rule 45
petition, the Supreme Court (SC) may only entertain cases involving questions of law.-
—Clearly, in a Rule 45 petition, this Court may only entertain cases involving questions of law.
In Century Iron Works, Inc., et al. v. Bañas, 699 SCRA 157 (2013): A question of law arises
when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one
of law, the question must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the
law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of
the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is
one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same;
rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
Torres vs. Aruego, 840 SCRA 270, September 20, 2017
Case Title: ROBERTO A. TORRES, IMMACULADA TORRES-ALANON, AGUSTIN
TORRES, and JUSTO TORRES, JR., petitioners, vs. ANTONIA F. ARUEGO, respondent.
G.R. No. 201271
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Judgments ; Dispositive Portions ;

Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Judgments; Dispositive Portions; Jurisprudence holds that it is the
dispositive portion of the decision that controls for purposes of execution.-
—Jurisprudence holds that it is the dispositive portion of the decision that controls for purposes
of execution. If petitioners believed that the dispositive portion of the June 15, 1992 Decision is
questionable, they should have filed a motion for reconsideration or appeal before the said
Decision became final and executory. But as pointed out earlier, while petitioners filed a Motion
for Partial Reconsideration, they did not raise therein the supposed error of the court in
declaring the properties enumerated in the dispositive portion of the Decision as comprising the
estate of Aruego. They also failed to appeal the Decision and thereby lost the chance to question
the Decision and seek a modification or amendment thereof. The inevitable result of their failure
to timely question the Decision is for them to be bound by the pronouncements therein. To
reiterate, once a decision has attained finality, “not even this Court could have changed the trial
court’s disposition absent any showing that the case fell under one of the recognized
exceptions.” As amply discussed above, this case does not fall under any of die recognized
exceptions.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Immutability of Final Judgments; Nothing is
more settled in the law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered
it or by the highest court of the land.-
—We affirm the assailed Resolutions of the CA. Nothing is more settled in the law than that a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be
modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
The only recognized exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-
called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust
and inequitable.
3. Same; Same; Jurisdiction; It is settled that the active participation of a party before a court is
tantamount to recognition of that court’s jurisdiction and willingness to abide by the court’s
resolution of the case.-
—We have perused the records and found that respondent offered in evidence the certificates of
title to the properties allegedly comprising the estate of Aruego. There is nothing in the records
to show that petitioners opposed the said offer of evidence. They also lost the chance to dispute
the evidence presented by respondent when they failed to raise the issue in their Motion for
Partial Reconsideration of the June 15, 1992 Decision and more so when they failed to appeal
therefrom. The records also disclose that petitioners actively participated in the trial of the case.
They presented and formally offered their own evidence but nothing was presented to rebut
respondent’s evidence on the properties comprising the estate of Aruego. In short, petitioners
had ample opportunity to present their countervailing evidence during trial and it is now much
too late in the day to present the evidence that they should have presented way back then. It is
settled that the active participation of a party before a court is tantamount to recognition of that
court’s jurisdiction and willingness to abide by the court’s resolution of the case.
4. Attorney-Client Relationship; Nothing is more settled than the rule that the negligence and
mistakes of counsel are binding on the client.-
—Petitioners pass the blame to their counsels of record in the court below for their lost appeal.
This is unacceptable. Nothing is more settled than the rule that the negligence and mistakes of
counsel are binding on the client. We explained in Bejarasco, Jr. v. People, 641 SCRA 328
(2011), that “[t]he rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once retained, holds the implied
authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and management of
the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by counsel within the scope of the
authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of the client himself.”
5. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; In Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 438 SCRA 201 (2004), the
Supreme Court (SC) said: it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations that determine
the nature of the action.-
—It has been consistently held that it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations
therein that are controlling. In Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 438 SCRA 201 (2004), the Court
said: “it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations that determine the nature of the
action. The court should grant the relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no
such relief is prayed for.”
Heirs of Gilberto Roldan vs. Heirs of Silvela Roldan, 841 SCRA 62,
September 27, 2017
Case Title: HEIRS OF GILBERTO ROLDAN, namely: ADELINA ROLDAN, ROLANDO
ROLDAN, GILBERTO ROLDAN, JR., MARIO ROLDAN, DANNY ROLDAN, LEONARDO
ROLDAN, ELSA ROLDAN, ERLINDA ROLDAN-CARAOS, THELMA ROLDAN-
MASINSIN, GILDA ROLDAN-DAWAL and RHODORA ROLDAN-ICAMINA, petitioners,
vs. HEIRS OF SILVELA ROLDAN, namely: ANTONIO R. DE GUZMAN, AUGUSTO R. DE
GUZMAN, ALICIA R. VALDORIA-PINEDA, and SALLY R. VALDORIA, and HEIRS OF
LEOPOLDO MAGTULIS, namely: CYNTHIA YORAC-MAGTULIS, LEA JOYCE
MAGTULIS-MALABORBOR, DHANCY MAGTULIS, FRANCES DIANE MAGTULIS, and
JULIERTO MAGTULIS-PLACER, respondents.
G.R. No. 202578
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ;

Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Raising a new ground for the first time on appeal
contravenes due process, as that act deprives the adverse party of the opportunity to contest the
assertion of the claimant.-
—Petitioners have alleged prescription and laches only before this Court. Raising a new ground
for the first time on appeal contravenes due process, as that act deprives the adverse party of the
opportunity to contest the assertion of the claimant. Since respondents were not able to refute the
issue of prescription and laches, this Court denies the newly raised contention of petitioners.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Findings of Fact; The factual determination of
courts, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), is final and conclusive on the
Supreme Court (SC) except if unsupported by the evidence on record.-
—The factual determination of courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, is final and
conclusive on this Court except if unsupported by the evidence on record. In this case, the
exception does not apply, as petitioners merely alleged that Silvela “sold, transferred and
conveyed her share in the land in question to Gilberto Roldan for a valuable consideration”
without particularizing the details or referring to any proof of the transaction. Therefore, we
sustain the conclusion that she remains co-owner of Lot No. 4696.
3. Same; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Baptismal Certificates; A baptismal certificate is
“no proof of the declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or
of prior and distinct facts which require separate and concrete evidence.”-
—Jurisprudence has already assessed the probative value of baptismal certificates. In Fernandez
v. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 130 (1994), which referred to our earlier rulings in Berciles v.
Government Service Insurance System, 128 SCRA 53 (1984) and Macadangdang v. Court of
Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), the Court explained that because the putative parent has no hand
in the preparation of a baptismal certificate, that document has scant evidentiary value. The
canonical certificate is simply a proof of the act to which the priest may certify, i.e., the
administration of the sacrament. In other words, a baptismal certificate is “no proof of the
declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and
distinct facts which require separate and concrete evidence.”
Lefebre vs. A Brown Company, Inc., 841 SCRA 217, September 27, 2017
Case Title: GINA LEFEBRE, joined by her husband, DONALD LEFEBRE, petitioners, vs. A
BROWN COMPANY, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 224973
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ;

Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The failure to perfect an appeal as required by the
rules has the effect of defeating the right to appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court
from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.-
—Jurisprudence dictates that the “perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
laid down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The failure to perfect an appeal
as required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right to appeal of a party and precluding
the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.” Notably, “[t]he right to appeal is
not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who
seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the
right to appeal is lost.” While there are indeed exceptions to this rule, the reasons above
discussed clearly militate against the liberal application of the rules. Thus, there being no appeal
taken by respondent from the adverse judgment of the HLURB-BOC, its Decision has become
final and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by the CA. Finality of a judgment or an
order becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is
perfected, as in this case. Apropos thereto, the well-settled rule is that “[c]ertiorari cannot be
allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy.
[Verily,] [c]ertiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.”
2. Judgments; Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Rules; Section 60(b), Rule 17 of the
2011 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board provides that
the decision or resolution of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board-Board of
Commissioners (HLURB-BOC) shall become final and executory within fifteen (15) days after
receipt thereof unless an appeal has been filed.-
—Section 60(b), Rule 17 of the 2011 Revised Rules of Procedure of the HLURB (HLURB Rules)
provides that the decision or resolution of the HLURB-BOC shall become final and executory
within 15 days after receipt thereof unless an appeal has been filed: Rule 17 FINALITY OF
JUDGMENT Section 60. Finality of Judgment.—Decisions or orders of the Arbiter and the
Board of Commissioners shall be deemed final and executory in accordance with the following:
x x x x (b) Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Board of Commissioners shall become final
and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt thereof by the parties and no appeal has been
filed within the said period.
3. Same; Appeals; Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765, Series of 2004 prescribes
that the decisions of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board-Board of Commissioners
(HLURB-BOC) may be appealed to the Office of the President.-
—Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765, Series of 2004 prescribes that the
decisions of the HLURB-BOC may be appealed to the Office of the President: Section 2.
Appeal.—Any party may, upon notice to the Board and the other party, appeal a decision
rendered by the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President within fifteen (15) days
from receipt thereof, in accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18 Series of 1987. In this
case, it is undisputed that respondent did not interpose an appeal before the Office of the
President as it proceeded to file a petition for certiorari before the CA; hence, respondent
clearly violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. In Teotico v. Baer, 490
SCRA 279 (2006), the Court upheld the dismissal of therein petitioner’s appeal on the ground of
failure to exhaust the same administrative remedy before the HLURB.
4. Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Equity Jurisdiction; Where strong considerations of
substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the strict application of the rules of procedure
may be relaxed, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.-
—The doctrine states that “where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the
petition, the strict application of the rules of procedure may be relaxed, in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction.” As a general rule therefore, “[t]he rules of procedure must be faithfully
followed, except only when, for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of
an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply within the prescribed procedure.”
However, case law states that “[c]oncomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of
procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain
his failure to abide by the rules.”
People vs. Sandiganbayan, 840 SCRA 639, September 27, 2017
Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and JUAN1
ROBERTO L. ABLING, respondents.
G.R. No. 198119
Case Nature: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Special Civil Actions ; Certiorari ;

Syllabi:
1. Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; For as long as the court acted within its jurisdiction,
an error of judgment that it may commit in the exercise thereof is not correctable through the
special civil action of certiorari.-
—Even if the court a quo committed an error in its review of the evidence or application of the
law, these are merely errors of judgment. We reiterate that the extraordinary writ of certiorari
may only correct errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. For as long as the court acted within its jurisdiction,
an error of judgment that it may commit in the exercise thereof is not correctable through the
special civil action of certiorari. The review of the records and evaluation of the evidence anew
will result in a circumvention of the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgment; Double Jeopardy; The general rule is that a
judgment of acquittal rendered after trial on the merits shall be immediately final and
unappealable because further prosecution will place the accused in double jeopardy.-
—At the outset, this Court recognizes that a judgment of acquittal rendered by the
Sandiganbayan may be assailed via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
on narrow grounds established in jurisprudence. The general rule is that a judgment of acquittal
rendered after trial on the merits shall be immediately final and unappealable because further
prosecution will place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the defense of double jeopardy
will not lie in a Rule 65 petition. Unlike in an appeal, this remedy does not involve a review of
facts and law on the merits, an examination of evidence and a determination of its probative
value, or an inquiry on the correctness of the evaluation of the evidence. Judicial review in
certiorari proceedings shall be confined to the question of whether the judgment for acquittal is
per se void on jurisdictional grounds. The court will look into the decision’s validity — if it was
rendered by a court without jurisdiction or if the court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction — not on its legal correctness. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual
refusal to perform a duty imposed by law, or to act in contemplation of law or where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. More
specifically, to prove that an acquittal is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner
must show that the prosecution’s right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted
was a sham.
People vs. EEE, 841 SCRA 277, September 27, 2017
Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EEE, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 227185
Case Nature: APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Appeals ;

Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; As a rule, factual findings of the trial court
and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect.-
—Both the RTC and the CA found that these excuses failed to prove the physical impossibility of
his being at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission. As a rule, factual
findings of the trial court and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the
highest respect. As well, factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and
carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any
showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
3. Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; The trial judge is in the best position to assess whether
the witness was telling the truth as he had the direct and singular opportunity to observe the
facial expression, gesture and tone of voice of the complaining witnesses while testifying.-
—In this case, We do not find any reason to depart from the findings of the courts below that the
prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. As
borne by the records, the fourth and fifth elements of minority and relationship were sufficiently
proven by AAA’s birth certificate and EEEs own admission during the trial. As for the first three
elements, the Court agrees that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses deserve full faith and
credence. The trial court did not hesitate to throw out the testimonies of EEE’s relatives in view
of the more credible witnesses for the prosecution. Certainly, the trial judge is in the best position
to assess whether the witness was telling the truth as he had the direct and singular opportunity to
observe the facial expression, gesture and tone of voice of the complaining witnesses while
testifying.
4. Same; Same; Testimonial Evidence; Rape; The Supreme Court (SC) has held that in
resolving rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the credibility of the victim’s
testimony.-
—The CA rightly opined that AAA withstood the cross-examination and was un-equivocal on
how the rape was committed by her stepfather. Time and again, the Court has held that in
resolving rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the credibility of the victim’s
testimony. A finding that the accused is guilty of rape may be based solely on the victim’s
testimony if such testimony meets the test of credibility. This is because rape is a crime that is
almost always committed in isolation, usually leaving only the victim to testify on the
commission of the crime. Moreover, no woman, much less a child of such tender age, would
willingly submit herself to the rigors, the humiliation and the stigma attendant upon the
prosecution of rape, if she were not motivated by an earnest desire to put the culprit behind bars.