ThaiBritish PDF
ThaiBritish PDF
ThaiBritish PDF
on
Serious Incident
between
&
at
Delhi
on
07.10.2017.
This document has been prepared based upon the evidences collected during
the investigation, opinion obtained from the experts and laboratory
examination of various components. Consequently, the use of this report for
any purpose other than for the prevention of future incidents could lead to
erroneous interpretations.
i
Glossary
ii
INDEX
SYNOPSIS 02
1 FACTUAL INFORMATION 04
1.9 COMMUNICATIONS 09
1.14 FIRE 11
iii
1.19 USEFUL AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES 13
2 ANALYSIS 14
3 CONCLUSION 18
3.1 FINDINGS 18
4 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS 21
iv
Final Report on Serious Incident between M/s British Airways Ltd.
B787-9 & M/s Thai Airways Ltd. B777-300 at Delhi on 07.10.2017.
1. Aircraft
Nationality : British/Thailand
3. Pilot – in –Command : ATPL Holder for both British Airways and Thai airways
4. First Officer : CPL Holder for both British Airways and Thai Airways
7. Last point of Departure : London for British Airways and New Delhi for Thai Airways
8. Point of intended landing : New Delhi for British Airways and Bangkok for Thai Airways
9. Type of operation : Scheduled Operation for British Airways & Thai Airways
10. Crew on Board : 03+11 (British Airways) and 04+20 (Thai airways)
11. Passengers on Board : 216 (British Airways) and 234 (Thai Airways)
12. Phase of operation : Missed Approach for British Airways & Departure for Thai Airways
Page 1 of 20
SYNOPSIS
On 07.10.2017, British Airways flight BAW143, aircraft B787-9, from London to New
Delhi was given interception by Approach Radar Controller [APST] and the flight BAW143
established on ILS Rwy 29. The aircraft was changed over to Tower South Controller at frequency
125.85 MHz at approximately 10 NM from touchdown. As per ATC, since interception, BAW143
continued to maintain speed of 2001 kts whereas BAW143 was observed to be reducing speed2
from 205 Kts at 20 Nm from touch down, 194 kts at 12 Nm from touch down, 185 kts at 10 Nm
from touch down,183 Kts 7.5 Nm from touch down and 176 kts at 5 Nm from touch down. The
inter arrival spacing between BAW143 and the preceding arrival, Airbus 321 aircraft flight
AIC014 was observed to 6.5 NM3 with the speed of preceding aircraft (AIC014) as 140 kts and
succeeding aircraft (BAW 143) as 200 kts (with a speed differential of 60 kts)
Figure 1: Showing inter-arrival spacing of BAW143 with speed of 200kts as 6.5 NM with
speed differential of 60 Kts
1
ATC Radar replay and Tabular chart provided by ATC, Delhi
2
FDM data of G-ZBKF (BAW 143)
3
Approach – Arrival Radar Snap Shot at time 18:22:06 UTC
Page 2 of 20
The inter arrival spacing between arriving flight BAW143 and departing Thai flight
THA316 was 6NM, when THA316 was lining up. This inter arrival spacing was actually further
reduced and was approximately 5.27 NM, taking into consideration the high speed of BAW143,
the displaced threshold of RWY29 by 1460 M and CE2 intersection departure [110 M from
beginning of Rwy 29] by THA316.
The Aerodrome Controller without taking into consideration the speed of arriving BAW
143, the reduced inter arrival spacing and displaced threshold of RWY29 lined up and cleared the
departing THA316 for CE2 intersection takeoff. The departing THA316 also took some time on
the runway before commencing takeoff roll.
In the meantime, the arriving BAW143, which was approaching threshold of RWY29,
initiated missed approach at less than 01 NM from touchdown [ approximately from the beginning
of Rwy 29].
This simultaneous going around of the BAW143 and the departure of THA316 from Rwy
29 resulted in the breach of standard separation. The lateral and vertical separation was reduced to
less than 01 NM and 200 feet respectively. The departing THA316 was restricted in climb to 2600
feet and changed over to approach arrival (APAC) controller at 126.35 MHz. The going around
aircraft, BAW143 was asked to expedite climb to 3600 feet and in coordination with approach
arrival radar controller, given a left heading of 180. BAW143 was changed over to approach arrival
radar (APAC) at 126.35MHz.
Thereafter the flights were uneventful with no injuries to persons on board either aircraft.
Page 3 of 20
1. FACTUAL INFORMATION
1.1 History of the flight
On 07.10.2017, British Airways flight BAW143 from London to New Delhi came in
contact with approach [APST] radar controller at frequency 124.2 MHz at 18:10:24 UTC and
was vectored for ILS approach Rwy 29. The flight BAW143 was changed over to Aerodrome
Controller-South at 10 NM from touchdown. The APST radar Controller didn’t ask the British
Airways flight BAW143 to reduce speed4 to the published approach speed to maintain inter
arrival spacing of 7 NM. The Captain of BAW143 recalls that the approach was subject to
radar vectors and speed control from ATC, but due to the time elapsed since the event, cannot
recall the exact speeds requested or flown5.
The Tower South Controller gave line up to Thai Airways flight THA316 for CE2
intersection6 departure at time 18:21:57 when the arriving BAW143 was approximately at 7
NM from touchdown with speed of 2007 kts/1838 Kts.
Tower South Controller cleared THA316 for CE2 intersection takeoff at time 18:23:02
when the arriving BAW143 at 4 NM from touchdown with speed of 160 kts.Crew of THA316
stated that after receiving clearance to line up on runway 29, Pilots carried out standard
operation procedure (SOP) as normal. After received take off clearance from ATC and
checklist had been completed, pilot took off as normal without delay.9 The departing THA316
appears to take some time on the runway before starting takeoff roll. At time 18:24:28,
BAW143 reported going around10.
The minimum lateral and vertical separation reduced to less than 01 NM and 200 feet
respectively. The tower Controller passed traffic information11 to BAW143 about departing
THA316. The Tower Controller restricted the climb of THA31612 to 2600 feet and asked
4
ATC Tape transcript of APST Radar frequency 124.2MHz
5
Statement of Crew of BAW143
6
ATC tape transcript of Tower frequency 125.85 MHz
7
Radar Snap Shots and tabular data of ATC, Delhi
8
FDM data of G-ZBKF (BAW 143)
9
Statement of Crew of THA316.
10
ATC tape transcript of Tower frequency 125.85 MHz
11
ATC tape transcript of Tower frequency 125.85 MHz
12
ibid
Page 4 of 20
BAW14313 to expeditiously climb to 3600 feet and gave left heading 180 in coordination with
Approach Radar Controller at 126.35 MHz. Thereafter the flights were uneventful.
Figure 2: Tower Controller giving lineup to THA316 when BAW143 at 7NM from touchdown
13
ibid
Page 5 of 20
Figure 3: Simultaneous Go Around of BAW143 and departure of THA 316 from Rwy29
Figure 4: BAW143 going around and THA 316 departing Rwy29 simultaneously.
Page 6 of 20
1.2 Injuries to persons
Both the flights i.e. BAW143 and THA316 were operated by scheduled airlines and all the
flight crew were appropriately licensed. The crew of both the airlines fulfilled all the requirements
of concerned State for operating the flight.
Both the Air Traffic Controllers i.e. the Aerodrome Controller and the Approach Radar
Controller (APST) were authorized to handle R/T in the procedural and Radar environment
respectively. Both the Aerodrome Controller and Approach Radar Controller had undergone the
proficiency checks in the respective ATC units and were found proficient14 to perform ATC duties.
M/s British Airways Ltd. B787-9 and M/s Thai Airways Ltd. B777-300
14
Proficiency Check reports as obtained from GM ATC,AAI,IGI Airport.
Page 7 of 20
primarily of composite materials. Boeing 787 was designed to be 20% more fuel-efficient than
the Boeing 767. Boeing 787 Dreamliner’s distinguishing features include mostly electrical flight
systems, raked wingtips and noise-reducing chevrons on its engine nacelles. It shares a
common type rating with the larger Boeing 777 to allow qualified pilots to operate both models.
The Boeing 787-9 Dreamliner which features light-weight construction. Boeing 787-9
flight systems has a key change from traditional airliners in the form of electrical architecture. The
architecture is bleed less and replaces bleed air and hydraulic power sources with electrically
powered compressors and pumps, while completely eliminating pneumatics and hydraulics from
some subsystems.
Boeing 787-9 is the first major commercial airplane to have a composite fuselage,
composite wings, and use composites in most other airframe components.
Boeing 787-9 is powered by two engines; these engines use all-electrical bleed
less systems, eliminating the superheated air conduits normally used for aircraft power, de-icing,
and other functions. The aircraft’s left engine’s serial Number is 10573 and was fitted on
03/11/2017. The right engine’s serial Number is 10376 and never changed since new.
The aircraft B787-9 is certified in Normal (Passenger) category, for day and night operation
under VFR & IFR. The maximum operating altitude is 43100 feet and the maximum Laden weight
(MTOW) is 173000 Kgs. The Aircraft length is 62.8 meters. The distance between main wheels is
9.8 meters. The distance between engines is 19 meters.
Boeing 787-9 aircraft G-ZBKF (MSN 38622) had been manufactured in year 2016. The
aircraft’s Certificate of registration No. is G-ZBKF/R1. The Certificate of Airworthiness Number
068040/001 under "Large Aero plane category" was issued by UK, Civil Aviation Authority At
the time of incident the Certificate of Airworthiness was current.
Page 8 of 20
Boeing 777 is a family of long-range wide-body twin-engine jet airliners developed and
manufactured by Boeing Commercial Airplanes. It is the world's largest twinjet and has a typical
seating capacity of 314 to 396 passengers, with a range of 5,240 to 8,555 nautical miles (9,704 to
15,844 km). Commonly referred to as the "Triple Seven", its distinguishing features include the
largest-diameter turbofan engines of any aircraft, long raked wings, six wheels on each
main landing gear, fully circular fuselage cross-section and a blade-shaped tail cone. As Boeing's
first fly-by-wire airliner, it has computer-mediated controls.
The Boeing 777-300 of M/s Thai Airways, HSTKC (MSN 29211) had been manufactured
in year 1999. At the time of incident, the Certificate of Airworthiness and Certificate of
Registration was current.
All aids to navigation along with Tower South frequency 125.85 MHz, Approach (APST)
frequency 124.2 MHz and approach arrival (APAC) frequency 126.35 MHz were reported
working normal.
1.9 Communications
During the period of occurrence both the aircraft, B787-9 and B777-300 were in contact
with ATC on approach (APST), Tower –South and Approach arrival frequency at 124.2 MHz,
125.85 MHz and 126.35 MHz respectively. There was always two -way communications between
concerned ATC units and both the aircraft.
Page 9 of 20
1.10 Aerodrome information
Indira Gandhi International Airport (IATA: DEL, ICAO: VIDP) is a Joint venture airport
being managed by Delhi International Airport Limited (DIAL) and Airports Authority of
India. The air traffic services at IGI airport are provided by AAI which includes Aerodrome
Control service (ADC/SMC), Approach Control service (APP), Area Control Service (ACC),
Terminal Approach Radar (TAR) and Route Surveillance Radar Service (RSR). IGI airport houses
three near converging runways in the westerly direction namely Rwy 27, Rwy28 and Rwy29. On
the other hand, it has three diverging runways in the easterly direction i.e. Runway 09, Rwy10 and
Rwy 11. At the time of serious incident, the mode of operation at IGI airport was westerly, with
all the three runways being used as:
The declared distances concerning Rwy-in-use at the time of serious incident are
15
Manual of Air Traffic Services –Part 2 table 6.4 pg 6-5
16
Manual of Air Traffic Services –Part 2 table 6.7 pg 6-6
Page 10 of 20
1.11 Flight recorders
The ATC tape recording of frequency 128.85 MHz (Tower – South), 124.2 (Approach
Final controller) (APST), Direct Speech Circuit, SMGCS recordings and FDM data of G-ZBKF
(BAW 143) were available for analysis.
There was no reported adverse medical condition of the cockpit crew of both M/s British
Airways and M/s Thai Airways.
1.14 Fire
Both the aircraft were operated by the Scheduled International airlines viz. British Airways
and Thai Airways.
Both the procedural and Radar Controllers were under the administrative control of
Airports Authority of India which is responsible for Air Traffic Services at IGI airport including
Route Radar Surveillance, Terminal Approach Radar, Area control Service, Approach Control
Service and Aerodrome Control Service.
Page 11 of 20
1.18 Additional information
1.18.1 The standard provisions vide Para 1.5 and 1.6 of ARRIVAL, DEPARTURE PROCEDURE
AND RUNWAY CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT MEASURES at Section 5.2 (III) (1) of
VIDP AD 2.22 of AIP India at page AD 2 VIDP-34 and 35 are applicable.
Para 1.5 inter alia states that “Pilot shall complete all mandatory pre-departure
checks before entering the active runway for departure so that the aircraft is in a position
to take off immediately upon receipt of take-off clearance.”
Para 1.6 inter alia states that “When the aircraft is issued with a line-up and take-
off clearance at the taxi holding position it shall be in a position to line up and affect an
immediate take- off in one continuous movement.”
1.18.2 The provisions of Para 1.8 of ARRIVAL, DEPARTURE PROCEDURE AND RUNWAY
CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT MEASURES at Section 5.2 (III) (1) of VIDP AD 2.22 of
AIP India at page AD 2 VIDP-35 are applicable.
Para 18 inter-alia states that “If the Controller observes a delay in respect of the
departing aircraft commencing its take off run after issuance of take- off clearance, the
take- off clearance will be cancelled and the aircraft be advised to vacate the runway
immediately at the nearest taxiway to make way for the subsequent arrival or departure.
Necessary entries in this regard shall be recorded in the Log Book.”
1.18.3 The provisions of Para 29.1.3.6.2 and Para 29.1.8.3 of MATS-part 2 Page 29-3 and Page
29-7 are relevant. Para 29.1.3.6.2 inter-alia states that “Approach Arrival controller shall
be responsible for providing desired landing interval between arrivals.”
1.18.4 Para 29.1.8 of MATS-Part2 IGI Airport “Nominal spacing between arrivals” vide table 29-
6 states that for Rwy 29, the nominal spacing between arrivals when there is a departure in
between arrivals, is 7NM. This nominal spacing comes with many riders. One relevant to
this case is vide Para 29.1.8.3.
Page 12 of 20
Para 29.1.8.3 inter-alia states that “the spacing between two arrivals may be increased
when the speed differential between the preceding and succeeding arrivals is high.”
1.18.5 The required separation standard applicable is Para 7.10.1.1 of MATS-part1 Page 7-15.
Para 7.10.1.1 inter-alia states that “a landing aircraft will not normally be
permitted to cross the runway threshold on its final approach until the preceding
departing aircraft has crossed the end of the runway-in-use, or has started a turn, or
until all preceding landing aircraft are clear of the runway - in-use.” (Figure 4A)
Page 13 of 20
2. ANALYSIS
The analysis of ATC tape recording of frequency 128.85 MHz (Tower – South), 124.2
MHz (Approach Arrival-SA), Direct Speech Circuit and SMGCS recordings, Log books of Tower
and Approach Arrival and Proficiency Check report of AAI and FDM data of G-ZBKF (BAW
143) reveal that:
1. On 07.10.2017, British Airways flight BAW143, B787, from London to New Delhi came
in contact with approach final [APST] radar controller at frequency 124.2 MHz and was
vectored for ILS approach Rwy 29. The aircraft was changed over to Aerodrome
Controller-South at 10 NM from touchdown. At this point of time, BAW143 was number
two in the arrival sequence maintaining speed of 18517 kts. The number one aircraft Airbus
321 flight AIC014 was 3 miles from touchdown with speed of 140 kts. The inter arrival
spacing, with a speed differential of 45 kts between the same type of aircrafts (Heavy/wide
body), was less than 8 NM. This inter arrival spacing was continuously reducing and was
6.5 NM when the preceding aircraft was 0.5 NM from touchdown and the succeeding
BAW143 was 7NM from touchdown, flying with the speed of 183 kts.
2. Approach Radar Controller18 [APST] didn’t apply the speed control restrictions.
3. The crew of BAW143 was observed to be reducing speed 19 from 205 Kts at 20 Nm from
touch down, 194 kts at 12 Nm from touch down, 185 kts at 10 Nm from touch down ,183
Kts 7.5 Nm from touch down and 176 kts at 5 Nm from touch down but this speed was 20
to 25 kts higher as compared to the speed as laid down in SOP20.
4. Tower South Controller gave line up to THA316 for CE2 intersection departure without
confirming for immediate departure at time 18:21:57 when the arriving BAW143 was
approximately at 7 NM from touchdown with speed of 18321 Kts.
5. Tower South Controller cleared THA316 for CE2 intersection takeoff at time 18:23:02
when the arriving BAW143 at 4 NM from touchdown with speed of 160 kts.
17
FDM data of G-ZBKF (BAW 143)
18
Para 29.1.3.6.2 and Para 29.1.8.3 of MATS-part2 pg. 29-3 and pg. 29-7
19
FDM data of G-ZBKF (BAW 143)
20
Table 8-3: Speed Control under Radar Environment for Arriving Aircraft, MATS-Part1 pg. 8-26.
21
FDM data of G-ZBKF (BAW 143)
Page 14 of 20
Figure 5: THA316 Lining up RWY29 via TWY CE2 & AIC014 on Runway 29 at 18:22:59
Figure 6: THA316 Lined up RWY29 via TWY CE2 & AIC014 Vacated Runway 29 Via
TWY Z6 (time 18:23:24). Takeoff Clearance given at time 18:23:02-18:23:09
Page 15 of 20
Figure 7: THA316 rolling RWY29 position abeam Twy Z2 at time 18:24:02
6. The departing THA316 was observed to be taking some time on the runway before starting
takeoff roll. Though the Crew of THA316 have stated “After received clearance to line up
on runway 29, pilots carried out the standard operation procedure (SOP) as normal. After
received takeoff clearance from ATC and Checklist had been completed, pilot took off as
normal without delay”, yet the crew of THA316 appears to not followed the standard
provisions vide Para 1.5 and 1.6 of ARRIVAL, DEPARTURE PROCEDURE AND
RUNWAY CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT MEASURES at Section 5.2 (III) (1) of VIDP
AD 2.22 of AIP India at Page AD 2 VIDP-34 and 35.
7. The Tower Controller did not take into consideration the developing dynamic situation and
didn’t cancel takeoff clearance Thai Airways.. The Tower Controller did not follow the
provisions of Para 1.8 of ARRIVAL, DEPARTURE PROCEDURE AND RUNWAY
Page 16 of 20
CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT MEASURES at Section 5.2 (III) (1) of VIDP AD 2.22 of
AIP India at Page AD 2 VIDP-35.
8. The Approach Radar Controller did not follow the provisions of Para 29.1.3.6.2 and Para
29.1.8.3 of MATS-part 2 Page 29-3 and Page 29-7.
9. The speed differential between the preceding and succeeding arrival was high and it was
continuously above 30 kts and sometimes more than 50 kts.
10. The required standard separation as enunciated by Para 7.10.1.1 of MATS-part1 page
7-15 and depicted vide Figure 4 A: Separation between departing and arriving aircraft
was not followed by Tower Controller and crew of BAW 143. In the instant case, the
arriving BAW143 had crossed the threshold of RWY29 when the departing THA316
was still rolling on RWY29 abeam Twy Z4. (Figure 8).
Figure 8: BAW143 at the beginning of RWY29 (Abeam CE1) (0.7 NM from touchdown)
speed 160kts and THA316 rolling (abeam Twy Z4) speed 140 kts at time 18:24:21
Page 17 of 20
11. At time 18:24:28, BAW143 reported going around. At this time, BAW143 had crossed
threshold of RWY29 (abeam Twy CE2) and the departing/rolling THA316 was still on
Rwy29 (abeam Twy Z4)
12. The minimum lateral and vertical separation reduced to less than 1 NM and 200 feet
respectively.
13. The Tower Controller passed the traffic information to BAW143 about departing THA316.
14. The Tower Controller restricted the climb of flight THA316 to 2600 feet and asked the
flight BAW143 to expeditiously climb to 3600 feet and gave left heading 180 in
coordination with Approach Radar Controller. Thereafter the flights were uneventful.
15. The Coordination between Tower South Controller and the Approach Radar Controller was
affected in non-standard Language.
3. CONCLUSION
3.1 Findings
1. Both the scheduled flights were under the command of an appropriately licensed ATPL
holder and FO being CPL holders.
3. Traffic density with Approach Arrival Radar and Aerodrome Control South was moderate.
Page 18 of 20
5. The crew of BAW143 was observed to be reducing speed22 from 205 Kts at 20 Nm from
touch down, 194 kts at 12 Nm from touch down, 185 kts at 10 Nm from touch down ,183
Kts 7.5 Nm from touch down and 176 kts at 5 Nm from touch down but this speed was at all
the times 20 to 25 kts higher than the speed laid down in SOP.
6. No efforts were made by the approach radar controller23 (APST) to reduce speed of the
arriving aircraft.
7. The approach arrival radar Controller [APST] failed to provide “desired landing interval
between arrivals.” The nominal interval is 7NM and the spacing can be increased in cases
like this where the speed differential was over 30 NM [from the interception of Localizer by
BAW143 till around 5 NM from touchdown.]
8. The inter arrival spacing between arriving flight BAW143 and departing Thai flight THA316
was 6NM, when THA316 was lining up. This inter arrival spacing was actually further
reduced and was approximately 5.27 NM, taking into consideration the high speed of
BAW143, the displaced threshold of RWY29 by 1460 M and CE2 intersection departure
[110 M from beginning of Rwy 29] by THA316.
9. Tower South controller failed to take into consideration the high speed of the arriving aircraft
BAW143 and the continuously reducing inter arrival spacing which reduced to 5.27 NM,
before giving intersection line up to the departing THA316.
10. Tower South controller also failed to reassess the dynamic situation and didn’t cancel the
take-off clearance given to the departing THA316 flight.
11. Departing THA316 flight appears to have taken some time before rolling which is not in
accordance to the laid down SOPs of the Airport.
12. The Coordination between Tower South Controller and the Approach Radar Controller was
also affected in non-standard Language.
22
FDM data of G-ZBKF (BAW 143)
23
Para 29.1.3.6.2 and Para 29.1.8.3 of MATS-part2 pg. 29-3 and pg. 29-7
Page 19 of 20
VHF Tape Transcript
DATE : 07-10-2017
FREQUENCY : 124.2 MHz
CALL SIGN : BAW143, THA316
UNIT : Approach Arrival (SA) / Radar
The above transcript is specific to VHF communication between Approach Arrival (SA)
and BAW143 only on 124.2 MHz from time 1810 to 1822 UTC.
Tushar Anand,
Manager (ATM)
The tabular presentation of ground speeds of AlCOl-4 and BAW143 and approximate spacing between
these two arrivals.
Phone: 562-797-1172
Fax: 206-766-5520
e-mail: AirportCompatibility@boeing.com