VT Emm
VT Emm
VT Emm
GOVT OF INDIA
O/O DIRECTOR AIR SAFETY
WESTERN REGION
NEW INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL COMPLEX
SAHAR ROAD
VILLE PARLE (EAST)
MUMBAI-400099
INDEX
Section Subject Page No.
General Information 1
Synopsis 2
1.0 Information 2
1.1 History of Flight 2
1.2 Injuries to Persons 4
1.3 Damage to Aircraft. 4
1.4 Other Damage 5
1.5 Personnel Information 6
1.5.1 Pilot in Command/ Trainee Pilot 6
1.6 Aircraft Information 7
1.7 Meteorological Information 8
1.8 Aids to Navigation 8
1.9 Communications 9
1.10 Aerodrome Information 9
1.11 Flight Recorders 9
1.12 Wreckage & Impact Information 9
1.13 Medical and Pathological Information 11
1.14 Fire 11
1.15 Survival Aspects 11
1.16 Tests and Research 11
1.17 Organizational and Management Information 13
1.18 Additional Information 13
1.19 Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques 16
2.0 Analysis 16
2.1 Serviceability of Aircraft & Maintenance Aspects 16
2.2 Pilot handling of the Aircraft 17
2.3 Weather 18
2.4 Training Aspects 18
3.0 Conclusion 19
3.1 Findings 19
3.2 Probable Cause 20
3.3 Contributory Factors 19 20
4.0 Safety Recommendations 20
Abbreviations 21
In accordance with Annex 13 to the ICAO Convention on International
Civil Aviation and Aircraft (Investigation of Accidents and Incidents) Rules,
2017 of India, the sole objective of this investigation is the prevention of
aircraft incidents & accidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to
apportion blame or liability.
FINAL INVESTIGATION REPORT ON INCIDENT TO M/S GUJARAT
FLYING CLUB, CESSNA FA 152 AIRCRAFT, VT-EMM, ON 19.03.2020
AT VADODARA
GENERAL INFORMATION:
1|Page
SYNOPSIS:
The aircraft was in a Tail high position and trainee pilot was stuck in
her seat. No distress call was made by the trainee pilot. Fuel was spilled from
the aircraft and there was no fire. Fire station was advised on WALKIE-
TALKIE to proceed towards the crash site, information regarding Passengers
on-board and grid location was passed to fire station. Crash siren and crash
bell were pressed simultaneously. Trainee pilot was reported safe by Fire
personnel. Commercial Flight IGO2026 was advised to hold overhead
Vadodara due to runway blockage. Rescue team came and trainee pilot was
carried by ambulance to the Airport’s MI Room and clinically examination
conducted. No injury was reported.
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1.2 INJURIES TO PERSONS:
1. Due impact the nose landing gear fork found broken, subsequent the
nose landing gear wheel detached from Nose landing gear fork & Nose
wheel assembly also damaged. (Fig 01)
Fig 01 Photograph shows Nose landing gear fork & Nose landing
gear assembly damaged
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2. Due Propeller hit to the runway surfaces, both propeller blades were
bent
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1.5 PERSONNEL INFORMATION
1.5.1 PILOT IN COMMAND (TRAINEE PILOT):
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On 19.03.2020, the trainee had carried out 05 circuit and landings at
Vadodara airport on RWY22 along with CFI before the incident flight and
trainee pilot was debriefed.
As per progress report, Student was briefed for the standard circuit pattern
and procedures, approach, and landing, checks as per checklist, given
practise for the same. Student found to perform consistent in circuit,
approach and landing corrections, lookout scan of flight parameters was all
satisfactory.
Final approach and landing were found to be safe and satisfactory. Found fit
to fly solo and released for First Solo.
The flight time and flight duty times were within the limits. No
incident/accident involvement of Student pilot was observed from the
previous records.
From the Flight Trainee’s progress report, the irregular flying with lots of
break period is observed which might have affected her learning &
performance. The trainee has joined the flying club in year 2016 and her first
training flight was on 17.10.2016. Trainee Pilot has flying experience of 21:55
Hrs with longer interval between flying, however from 30.01.2020 onwards,
trainee was regular at the flying club, and trainee flew training sorties on
circuit & landing exercise with other instructors at the flying club and
completed only 28:50 Hrs since joining.
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Aero Mobile station A-151/WRLO-19 valid up to 31.12.2022
licence and validity
Any Major/Scheduled 100 Hrs/12 months inspection carried out on
inspection prior to the 26.02.2020 at 23435:50 A/F hours & 50 hrs
incident inspection carried out on 08.03.2020 at 23475:50
A/F hours which also includes the inspection of
NLG for condition and security of attachment
Meteorological report was available with the crew for briefing before flight. The
Aircraft VT-EMM took off at 1120 Hrs & after completion of circuit Aircraft
landed at Vadodara Airport at approx. 1130 Hrs IST. The METAR obtained
from Vadodara airport on the date of incident from 11:00 IST (19.03.2020)
Hrs to 11:30 IST (19.03.2020) Hrs are quoted as below:
Report time
in IST 11:00 11:30 12:00
Winds Calm Wind from 180° Calm
at 04 knots
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1.9 COMMUNICATION:
Aircraft is equipped with Very High Frequency sets and a High Frequency set
for communication. There was always two-way communication established
between the ATC and aircraft. However, post incident Trainee pilot could not
make a distress call on VHF.
The aircraft was found disabled outside the RH Runway Edge of RWY 22 on
basic strip at distance approx. 05 meters from the Runway Edge and
approx. 582 Meters from RWY 22 threshold. & Nose Landing gear wheel
was detached due impact on Nose landing gear during landing on
touchdown. (Shown in Fig 03)
Nose Landing gear wheel was found from a distance 12.4 meters from the
LH Runway Edge and approx. 464 Meters from RWY 22 threshold. (Shown
in Fig 04). Fuel leak from the aircraft was observed. There was no fire on
the aircraft after Aircraft veered off from RWY 22 to the RH Runway Edge.
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Following External Damages observed to Aircraft VT-EMM during visual
inspection of the aircraft:
Fig 03. Aircraft VT-EMM in tail high position on right side runway edges
of RWY22
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Fig 04. Runway diagram depicts the flight profile VT-EMM after
touchdown to final rest position
1.14 FIRE: There was no fire. However, there was a fuel spillage after
incident.
The failed / damaged parts of the nose wheel assembly were examined in
Aircraft Engineering Directorate, DGCA Hqrs. Upon examination, The
Inner Diameter of bearing inner race and Outer Diameter of tube axle at
the corresponding bearing locations have been dimensionally examined
and it is found that the parts under excessive clearance /play (undersized)
in their assembly from the prescribed limits observed. Hence, tube axle
(As Shown in Fig.05) is worn out and undersized at the bearing diameter
locations. There was an indication of undersized tube axle, circumferential
rubbing marking and pitting were noticed on the tube axle.
The worn-out tube axle outer diameter at the bearing locations would have
eased the bearing units to rotate over the tube axle. This could have also
caused the entire wheel assembly along with bearing unit (which is
restrained by ring retainer within the wheel assembly) to move on lateral
direction. The lateral movement of the wheel would have probably caused
offsetting of wheel loading on the tube axle, movement of bearing units
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close to ferrule’s inner surfaces & causing subsequent rubbing, also
causing slipping of one ferrule unit by approximately 90 degree and
enlargement of bolt holed on the ferrule perhaps due to load offset.
Over a period, the stated events would have loosened the fastening of NLG
tube axle unit with NLG Fork and perhaps caused the disintegration of wheel
unit from NLG due overload and exposing the fork to come in direct contact
with landing surface. The chip off/ flaking away of rolling elements within
the rollers also suggestive of overload due to offset wheel loading. Other
failures like, steering tube, steering tube linkage failure, shimmy damper
lug failure and wheel rim damage are consequential failures.
TUBE AXLE
The Engine of the involved Aircraft was also sent for strip investigation at
the approved vendor’s Facility. There is no major damage to the internal
parts of the Engine observed. The external damages observed on parts and
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accessories were due to the impact of the engine at the time of incident.
The carbon deposits noticed on piston dome is a normal as observed on
engine received. As per the Strip investigation report, the engine was
running and delivering power at the time of incident.
Probable Cause of the incident was Student pilot improper flare during
landing made the aircraft bounce and her improper bounce recovery
technique to recover from the bounced landing resulted into the incident.
The loose tube axle inside the bearing led to the breaking of the nose gear
on impact.
During the investigation of the failed nose wheel at DGCA HQ, indication of
poor maintenance in the nose wheel area was observed. The tube axle was
found to be undersized beyond manufacturer specified limits. The loose
tube axle inside the bearing led to the breaking of the nose gear on impact.
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1.18.2ATC tape recording was available and used for the facts and
analysis. Events based on ATC tape transcript are as follows:
05:44:12 From the ATC tape transcript, VT-EMM (CFI) has requested one
more circuit landing for the trainee pilot as Solo. ATC replied only one circuit
is possible due arrival.
05:44:12, VT-EMM requested for taxi instruction from stand 5
05:46:23 VT-EMM was cleared to taxi to holding point of RWY22
05:47:22 VT-EMM was cleared to follow Left hand circuit after departure.
05:47:58, VT-EMM was requested to confirm to expedite the departure due
arrival of Indigo2022, VT-EMM replied affirmative
05:48:10 VT-EMM was cleared to line up on RWY22 and report ready for
departure and to expedite
05:50:06 VT-EMM was requested present position for line up
05:50:30,VT-EMM again requested for present position for line up
05:50:36, VT-EMM replied negative and inform will call you when ready for
departure
05:52:06, VT-EMM reported ready for departure At 05:52:09, Tower
reported whether and winds were copied by VT-EMM and cleared for take-
off In mean time, IAF aircraft was also ready for departure and was at
holding point F cleared for departure after the circuit landing flight of
aircraft VT-EMM, and arrival of Indigo flight 2026 on RWY 22.
05:54:08 VT-EMM was requested to report on final, VT-EMM was airborne
at 05:54:08 VT-EMM was requested to report on final,
05:55:04 VT-EMM reported on left downwind RWY 22
05:57:46 VT-EMM reported on final
05:57:50 Tower reported wind calm RWY22 clear to land
05:57:56 VT-EMM reported clear to land and winds copied
05:58:53 IGO2026 was requested to report on 30 miles
06:00:00 tower reported IGO 2026 to hold overhead due RWY delay not
determined as the Cessna skid off RWY22
06:01:00 IAF aircraft was requested to proceed back due Cessna 152 skid off
06:04:48 IGO 2026 was requested to stop descent at FL55
06:04:50 IGO 2026 was advised that delay not determined as of now.
06:06:24 IAF aircraft went back to dispersal with the Marshaller
Further the Aircraft VT-EMM was removed from the basic strip after clearance from
Office of Director Air Safety (WR), Mumbai and the IGO 2026 was landed.
(All timings are mentioned in ATC tape transcript are in UTC):
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1.18.3 FIRST SOLO RELEASE PROCEDURE & REQUIREMENTS:
As per TPM of M/s GFC Chap 5 para 15 “before the first solo flight”,
Quote “FIRST SOLO for this exercise the instructor should make it clear to
the student that he is to make only one circuit and landing unless he needs
to overshoot. The student should also be told that if on landing he makes a
large bounce or for some reason the landing does not seems to be turning
out well, he should not be ashamed of going around again. After a bounced
landing, the balked landing procedures, where go-around should be
executed” Unquote.
2.0 ANALYSIS:
Prior to the incident the trainee pilot underwent 05 circuits & landing
exercise. Based on the satisfactory performance of trainee, CFI requested
ATC if they could get one more circuit for trainee pilot to go solo. The ATC
informed only one circuit is possible, and CFI informed that the trainee
would carry out only one circuit and landing. This was the first solo flight
for the trainee pilot.
Aircraft took off at around 11:23 Hrs IST and carried out Left hand circuit
on RWY22. The flight was uneventful till the final approach. It was
observed that the take-off, climb after take-off, circuit pattern and final
approach carried out by trainee as solo occupant was normal. The
approach was stabilised, and the winds were calm. As per statement of
trainee, the airspeed was approx. 65 kts while landing & the flap
configurations was 20 degrees.
The Aircraft was flared out at high, while controlling the landing Trainee
pushed the control column a bit more forward than needed. Subsequently
the nose wheel touched down first, bounced and then the main landing
gears touched, and trainee pulled the control column and the aircraft
bounced three times after that the aircraft veered to the right edge of the
RWY22 and stopped as applied brakes. Later Trainee pilot could not
transmit/ make a distress call on R/T and tried to open seat belt, but the
aircraft was in a tail high position and trainee pilot was stuck in seat.
Later the rescue team came and opened seat belt and rescued her.
The trainee pilot was inside the cockpit till the rescue team reached to
incident site which could have been dangerous as there was a fuel spillage
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which could have resulted into post impact fire. The pilot handling is
considered as a factor to the incident.
Post incident, the trainee pilot did not put the mixture ignition switch and
master switch to OFF position. The Maintenance manager of M/s Gujarat
flying club when he reached to incident spot, he opened the door and put
the master switch to OFF position for preventing the fire hazard.
Hence, it can be concluded that the pilot handing of the aircraft is the
main factor to the incident
2.3 WEATHER:
The trainee Pilot has joined the flying club in year 2016. Her first training
flight was on 17.10.2016 and till 19.09.2019 She has flying experience of
21:55 Hrs with longer interval between flying, however from 30.01.2020
onwards, trainee was regular at the flying club, and trainee flew training
sorties on circuit & landing exercise with other instructors at the flying
club and most of the time the approach & landing were assisted by Flying
instructor and debriefed as needs to be consistent and proactive, however
the overall performance of the trainee was found to be satisfactory.
From the Flight Trainee’s progress report, the irregular flying with lots of
break intervals are observed which might affected her learning &
performance.
On 19.03.2020, before her release for first solo check sortie, 05 standard
circuit & landing exercise were carried out. Out of five, first circuit was
carried out CFI with trainee assisted on flight controls as a demonstration
expected for the correct circuit pattern and approach and landing
expected by the trainee in the check. Onwards four circuits were flown by
the trainee herself and her performance during the check was found to be
consistent for correct approaches and safe landing with corrective actions
as required. Hence overall assessment for the trainee to carry out ONE
SOLO Circuit after this check found to be steady, consistent & safe
enough. After consent from trainee & upon ATCO’s clearance, the trainee
was released for her first solo flight, i.e. one circuit to land. However, as
per submission of Trainee pilot, three circuit & landing were assisted by
CFI and last two Circuit & landing exercise were carried out by the trainee
pilot.
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As per Statement of Trainee Pilot, on 19.03.2020, prior to releasing her solo
and during dual check, CFI had briefed the trainee pilot on the balloon &
bounce recovery technique except the go around procedures. However, From
the Flight Trainee’s progress report, the trainee was not briefed for Go-
Around Procedure, Recovery from Bounce and Balloon & PIO/Runway
change procedure for prior her first solo exercise.
From the statement of trainee, Chief flight instructor & Flight trainee’s
progress report, it can be concluded that the inadequate trainings for Go-
Around Procedure, Recovery from Bounce, Balloon & PIO/Runway change
procedure for prior to solo release flight is a contributory factor to the
incident.
3.0 CONCLUSION:
3.1 FINDINGS:
3.1.1 The Aircraft had valid C of A and ARC before the incident flight
and there was no snag reported to the aircraft before and during
the flight.
3.1.2 Post incident the Trainee pilot had undergone the BA test for
alcohol and the result was negative.
3.1.3 The incident flight was trainee pilot’s first solo flight.
3.1.4 From the Flying trainee’s progress record, the longer intervals of
non-flying are observed from period from 17.10.2016 to
19.03.2020 and completed only 28:50 hrs since joining.
3.1.5 From the Flight Trainee’s progress report & Trainee Pilot’s
statement, the trainee was found to be not briefed/ trained for Go-
Around Procedure, Recovery from Bounce, Balloon & PIO/Runway
change procedure for prior to her first solo exercise.
3.1.6 Improper flare techniques by trainee pilot during landing resulted
the aircraft to touch the runway on Nose wheel and bounce.
Subsequent improper bounce recovery techniques causes multiple
bounce and damage to the nose landing gear and engine propeller.
3.1.7 Post incident, the trainee pilot did not put the mixture ignition
switch and master switch to OFF position. Trainee pilot could not
transmit/ make a distress call on R/T.
3.1.8 The trainee pilot could not come out from the Aircraft till the rescue
team reached to incident site.
3.1.9 The loose tube axle inside the bearing led to the detaching of the
nose gear wheel on impact.
3.1.10 There is no any specific maintenance task/inspection to measure
the dimensions of axle tube and of the bearing of the nose wheel
for Cessna 152 type Aircraft.
3.1.11 Probably Weather was not a contributory factor.
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3.2 PROBABLE CAUSES:
Digitally signed by
DILIP BABUBHAI
CHAVDA
Date: 28.06.2021 Dilip Chavda
Place: Mumbai Air Safety Officer &
Investigator-in-charge, VT-EMM
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Abbreviations
# Number
AAI Airports Authority of India
AED Aircraft Engineering Directorate
A/F Airframe
ARC Airworthiness review certificate
AMM Aircraft maintenance manual
API Assistant Pilot instructor
ATC Air traffic control
ATCO Air Traffic controller
BA Breath Analyzer
C/L Checklist
C of A Certificate of Airworthiness
CPL Commercial pilot licence
CFI Chief Flight Instructor
CAR Civil aviation requirements
DGCA Directorate General of Civil Aviation
Dy CFI Deputy Chief Flight Instructor
FRTOL Flight Radio telephone operator’s licence
FTO Flying Training Organization
FTPR Flight trainee’ Progress report
GFC The Gujarat Flying Club
FI Flight Instructor
ft. Feet
HQ or Hqrs Head Quarter
Hrs Hours
ILS Instrument landing system
ICAO International Civil Aviation organization
Kg Kilogram
LDA Landing distance available
LH Left Hand
LHS Left hand side
MEL Minimum equipment list
METAR Meteorological terminal aviation routine weather report OR
Meteorological aerodrome report
M/s Messers
MSL Mean Seal Level
NA or N/A Not Applicable
NLG Nose Landing Gear
NG Next Generation
PAPI Precision approach path indicator
PIO Pilot induced Oscillation
QNH Query Nautical Height
P/N Part Number
RH Right hand
RHS Right hand side
RC Route check
RTR Radio telephony restricted (Aeronautical)
R/T Radio telephony
RVR Runway visual range
RWY or R/W Runway
SPL Student pilot licence
SAPL Simple Approach lighting
Sl No. Serial Number
THR Threshold
TBO Time between overhaul
TPM Training and Procedures Manual
TSN Time since new
TSN Time Since Overhaul
TODA Take-off distance available
TORA Take-off run available
UTC Universal time coordinated
VABO Vadodara Airport (ICAO)
VHF Very high frequency
VOR VHF Omni range
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