THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 197582 June 29, 2015

JULIE S. SUMBILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, petitioner Julie S. Sumbilla seeks the liberal
application of procedural rules to correct the penalty imposed in the
Decision1dated January 14, 2009 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Makati City, Branch 67, in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 which had
already attained finality in view of petitioner's failure to timely file an appeal.

The antecedent facts are not disputed.

Petitioner obtained a cash loan from respondent Matrix Finance

Corporation. As partial payment for her loan, petitioner issued Philippine
Business Bank Check Nos. 0032863 to 0032868. The six checks have a uniform
face value of ₱6,667.00 each.

Upon maturity, the six checks were presented by respondent to the drawee
bank for payment. However, all the checks were dishonored on the ground that
they were drawn against a closed account.

Petitioner's refusal to heed the demand letter of respondent for the

payment of the face value of the dishonored checks culminated in her indictment
for six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22). The cases were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174, and were raffled off to Branch
67, MeTC of Makati.

In a Decision dated January 14, 2009, the MeTC found petitioner

criminally and civilly liable for the issuance of the six rubber checks. For each
count of violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face value of ₱6,667.00, the
MeTC meted petitioner a penalty of fine amounting to ₱80,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment. Her civil liability for the six consolidated cases was
computed in the total amount of ₱40,002.00. The fallo of the decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment finding accused

Julie S. Sumbilla GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of six counts
of violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. For each count, she is
 sentenced to pay n. fine of ₱80,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of non-payment. She is likewise ORDERED
to indemnify private complainant Matrix Finance Corporation the
total amount of ₱40,002.00 plus 12% annual legal interest from
September 21, 2002 until full
payment.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.2 (Emphasis and underscoring added.)

Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner opted to file a Motion for

Reconsideration3 before the MeTC. The Motion was denied in the Order4 dated
April 17, 2009 being a pleading barred under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. The MeTC further noted that the prohibited motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioner will not suspend the running of the period
to perfect an appeal.

Subsequently, the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner was also denied for
having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.

With the denial5 of her Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying
her appeal, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari6 under Rule 65 of the Rules
which was docketed as SCA No. 09-1125 and raffled off to Branch 61, Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

Ruling that the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying
the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner, the RTC dismissed7 the petition for
certiorari. The Motion for Reconsideration8 filed by petitioner met the same fate
of dismissal.9

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for
review10 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA, however, ruled that an
ordinary appeal under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is the correct
remedy under the circumstances because the RTC rendered the decision in the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction.11

On July 27, 2011, after she received a copy of the June 28, 2011
Resolution12 of the CA denying her Motion for Reconsideration,13 petitioner filed
a motion for extension of time to file the instant petition.14

On August 11, 2011, petitioner filed her Petition for Review on

Certiorari15 within the period of extension granted in our Resolution16 dated
September 7, 2011. She ascribed to the CA a sole error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI ON TECHNICALITY AND NOT EXERCISING ITS POSITIVE
DUTY OF GIVING DUE IMPORTANCE ON THE SUBSTANTIVE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE A CLEAR
PRESENCE OF SUCH VIOLATION OF LAW AS DEFINED BY PETITIONER IN
HER PETITION WHICH COULD HAVE MERIT A FULL DECISION BY A HIGHER
COURT.17

Petitioner acknowledged18 the procedural lapse of filing a petition for

certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal
before the CA. She also fully grasped19 the effects of her erroneous filing of the
Motion for Reconsideration to challenge the MeTC Decision finding her guilty of
six counts of violation of BP 22. Knowing that her conviction had already attained
finality, petitioner seeks the relaxation of the rules of procedure so that the
alleged erroneous penalty imposed by the MeTC can be modified to make it in
accord with existing law and jurisprudence.

Respondent countered that the right to appeal being a mere statutory

privilege can only be exercised in accordance with the rules, and the lost appeal
cannot be resurrected through the present remedial recourse of a petition for
review on certiorari.

The main issue to be resolved is whether the penalty imposed in the MeTC
Decision dated January 14, 2009, which is already final and executory, may still
be modified.

The petition is meritorious.

Petitioner does not dispute the finality of the Decision dated January 14,
2009 in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 rendered by the MeTC, finding
her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of BP 22. For every
count of violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face value of ₱6,667.00,
petitioner was meted a penalty of fine of P50,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of non-payment. She assails the penalty for being out of
the range of the penalty prescribed in Section 1 of BP 22, and the subsidiary
imprisonment to be violative of Administrative Circular Nos. 12-2000 and 13-
2001, and the holdings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals.20 Petitioner asserted that
the maximum penalty of fine that can be imposed against her in each count of
violation of BP 22 is double the amount of the face value of the dishonored check
only or ₱13,334.00. The fine of PS0,000.00 for each count is thus excessive. She
further implied that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment contravened
Section 20 of Article III of the Constitution which proscribes imprisonment as a
punishment for not paying a debt.

Section 1 of BP 22 provides:
 SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or
draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check
is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or
by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The court may thus impose any of the following alternative penalties
against an accused found criminally liable for violating BP 22: (1) imprisonment
of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year; or (2) a fine of not less or
more than double the amount of the check, and shall in no case exceed
₱200,000.00; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment. The discretion to impose
a single (imprisonment or fine) or conjunctive (fine and imprisonment) penalty
pertains to the court.

If fine alone is the penalty imposed, the maximum shall be double the
amount of the face value of the rubber check which in no case should exceed
₱200,000.00.

Here, the face value of each of the six checks that bounced is ₱6,667.00.
Under Section 1 of BP 22, the maximum penalty of fine that can be imposed on
petitioner is only 1!13,334.00, or the amount double the face value of each check.
Indubitably, the MeTC meted the petitioner a penalty of fine way beyond the
maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22. The fine of ₱80,000.00 is
more than 11 times the amount of the face value of each check that was
dishonored.

Instead of using as basis the face value of each check (₱6,667.00), the
MeTC incorrectly computed the amount of fine using the total face value of the
six checks (₱40,002.00). The same error occurred in Abarquez v. Court of
Appeals,21 where we modified the penalty of fine imposed in one of the
consolidated cases therein (Criminal Case No. D-8137) to only double the
amount of the face value of the subject check.

Unfortunately, in the present case, the MeTC Decision is already final and
executory after petitioner failed to timely file a Notice of Appeal. Under the
doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions
of fact or law, and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land.22 Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.23

Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast

rule. The Court has the power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to
exempt a case from their operation if and when justice requires it.24 After all,
procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent
application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of
substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter,25 as specifically mandated
under Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 2. Construction. - These rules shall be liberally construed in order to

promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.

Consequently final and executory judgments were reversed when the

interest of substantial justice is at stake and where special and compelling
reasons called for such actions.26 In Barnes v. Judge Padilla,27 we declared as
follows:

x x x a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by

any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the
highest court of the land.

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial
justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence
of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to

facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle.
The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling
as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be final.

The judgment of conviction was already final in Rigor v. The

Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison28 when the Court corrected the minimum and
maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence imposed on the accused which
exceeded the period of the imposable penalty. The correction was made in the
interest of justice and only for the penalty imposed against petitioner to be in
accordance with law and nothing else.29
 Both People v. Gatward,30 and People v. Barro31 cited the duty and
inherent power of the Court to correct the erroneous penalties meted on the
accused in a final and executory judgments, and make it conform to the penalty
prescribed by law.

The interest of justice and the duty and inherent power of the Court were
the reasons anchored upon in Estrada v. People32 in ruling that it is befitting to
modify the penalty imposed on petitioner even though the notice of appeal was
belatedly filed.

In Almuete v. People,33 the penalty imposed upon the petitioner which is

outside the range of the penalty prescribed by law was duly corrected even if it
was already final on the ground of substantial justice, thus:

In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and
liberty of petitioner. If his penalty of imprisonment remains uncorrected, it
would be not conformable with law and he would be made to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as
minimum, to 40 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, which is outside the
range of the penalty prescribed by law. Contrast this to the proper imposable
penalty the minimum of which should only be within the range of 2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional, while the maximum should
only be anywhere between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor to 13
years of reclusion temporal. Substantial justice demands that we suspend our
Rules in this case. "It is always within the power of the court to suspend its own
[R]ules or except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of
justice require. x x x Indeed, when there is a strong showing that a grave
miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, this
Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice."
Suspending the Rules is justified "where there exist strong compelling reasons,
such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof." After
all, the Court's "primordial and most important duty is to render justice x x
x."34 All the accused in Almuete v. People,35 People v. Barro,36Estrada v.
People,37 and Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison,38 failed to perfect
their appeal on their respective judgments of conviction, but the Court corrected
the penalties imposed, notwithstanding the finality of the decisions because they
were outside the range of penalty prescribed by law. There is, thus, no reason to
deprive the petitioner in the present case of the relief afforded the accused in the
cited cases. Verily, a sentence which imposes upon the defendant in a criminal
prosecution a penalty in excess of the maximum which the court is authorized
by law to impose for the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is void
for want or excess of jurisdiction as to the excess.39

Here, the penalty imposed is obviously out of range of that prescribed in

Section 1 of BP 22. Moreover, since the term of the subsidiary imprisonment is
based on the total amount of the fine or one day for each amount equivalent to
the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the
rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court,40 if petitioner is insolvent,
she will suffer a longer prison sentence. Substantial justice dictates that the
penalty of fine meted on the petitioner be accordingly corrected within the
maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22. Hence, the penalty of fine
of ₱80,000.00 meted on petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 for
each count of violation of BP 22 is corrected to double the face value of each
rubber check involved or ₱13,334.00 only.

Anent the alleged violation of Vaca v. Court of Appeals,41 and

Administrative Circular No. 12-200042 that supposedly limited to fine the
imposable penalty for violation of BP 22, and without any subsidiary
imprisonment, suffice it to quote the clarifications in Administrative Circular No.
13-2001, issued on February 14, 2001:

x x x queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges to

1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa

Big. 22; and

2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused, who is

found guilty of violating the provisions of B. P Big. 2 2, is unable to pay
the fine which he is sentenced to pay considering that Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 adopted the rulings in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 656) and Rosa
Lim v. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000) as
a policy of the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties
for violations of B. P Big. 22, without mentioning whether subsidiary
imprisonment could be resorted to in case of the accused's inability to pay
the fine.

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is

not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Big. 22.

The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of
imprisonment for violators of B.P. Big. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative
intent behind the law.

Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference

in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Big. 22 such that where the
circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or
a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone
should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the
determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine
alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment
is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not
be deemed a hindrance.

It is, therefore, understood that

1 . Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an

alternative penalty for violations of B.P Big. 22;

xxxx

3. Should only a fine be imposed and tile accused be unable to pay the
fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.
x x x x43 (Italics in the original; emphasis added)

In like manner, the issue of whether BP 22 violates Section 20 of Article III

of the Constitution which proscribes imprisonment as a punishment for not
paying a debt was already settled in the negative in Lozano v.
Martinez.44Pertinent portions of the Decision in the Lozano case read:

Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against

imprisonment for debt? x x x

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and

issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation
for payment.1âwphi1 It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making
of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious
effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public
order.

xxxx

In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power

and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt.45 (Emphasis added) WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. In the
interest of justice, the Decision dated January 14, 2009 of Branch 67,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174
is MODIFIED.

Accused Julie S. Sumbilla is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22, and is sentenced to
pay a FINE of THIRTEEN THOUSAND AND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR
PESOS (₱13,334.00) for each count, and to indemnify private complainant
Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of ₱40,002.00 plus 6% interest per
annum from September 21, 2002 until full payment.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

Footnotes
* Designated Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 207 l dated June
23, 2015.
** Designated additional Member per Raffle dated May 13, 2015.
*** Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 2072-C dated June
23, 2015.
1 Rollo, pp. 70-71. Penned by Judge Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag.
2 Id. at 71.
3 Id. at 72-76.
4 Id. at 82.
5 Id. at 89.
6 Id. at 90-101.
7 Id. at 103-108. Penned by Presiding Judge J. Cedrick O. Ruiz.
8 CA rollo, pp. 28-31.
9 Rollo, p. 114.
10 CA rollo, pp. 7-18.
11 Rollo, p. 49-A. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice

Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a Member of this Court) with Associate Justices

Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now also a Member of this Court) and Elihu A.
Ybañez concurring.
12 Id. at 64-66.
13 Id. at 50-57.
14 Id. at 3-4.
15 Id. at 7-24.
16 Id. at 115-116.
17 Id. at 14.
18 Id. at 17-18. Paragraphs 35 and 36 of the Petition.
19 Id. at 20. Paragraph 39 of the Petition.
20 359 Phil. 187 (1998).
21 455 Phil. 964, 978 (2003).
22 Delfino, Sr. v. Anasao, G.R. No. 197486, September 10, 2014, p. 9;

Escalante v. People, G.R. No. 192727, January 9, 2013, 688 SCRA 362,
375, citing FGU Insurance Corporation v. RTC of Makati City, Branch 66,
et al., 659 Phil. 117, 123 (2011 ).
23 City Government of Makati v. Odena, G.R. No. 191661, August 13,
2013, 703 SCRA 460, 495, citing Bongcac v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 606
Phil. 48, 55 (2009).
24 Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr., et al., 658 Phil. 156, 178 (2011), citing Destileria

Limtuaco & Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 241 Phil. 753, 764
(1988).
25 Hilario v. People, 574 Phil. 348, 362 (2008), citing Basco v. Court of

Appeals, 392 Phil. 251, 266 (2000).

26 See Apo Fruits Corporation, et al. v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 647

Phil. 251, 288 (2010).

27 482 Phil. 903, 915 (2004). Citations omitted.
28 458 Phil. 561 (2003).
29 Id. at 568.
30 335 Phil. 440, 460 (1997).
31 392 Phil. 857, 876 (2000).
32 505 Phil. 339, 357-360 (2005).
33 G.R. No. 179611, March 12, 2013, 693 SCRA 167.
34 Id. at 185-186.
35 Supra note 33.
36 Supra note 31.
37 Supra note 32.
38 Supra note 28.
39 Caluag v. Pees on, 82 Phil. 8, 14-15 ( 1948). See also Cruz v. Director of

Prisons, 17 Phil. 269, 272-273 (1910).

40 Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.

10159, provides:
Art. 39. Subsidiary Penalty. - If the convict has no property with
which to meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next
preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal
liability at the rate of one day for each amount equivalent to the
highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time
of the rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court, subject
to the following rules:
xxxx
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary
imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have
been prosecuted for a rave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed
fifteen days, if for a light felony.
xxxx
41 Supra note 20.
42 This Circular was issued to implement the policy espoused in the case

of Vaca v. Court of Appeals, supra note 20.

43 Quoted in Jao Yu v. People, 481 Phil. 780, 788-789 (2004).
44 230 Phil. 406 (1986).
45 Id. at 421, 424.