#5 Ramos vs. COL Realty (TORTS)
#5 Ramos vs. COL Realty (TORTS)
#5 Ramos vs. COL Realty (TORTS)
ISSUE: Whether petitioner Lambert can be held solidarily liable with his driver, Rodel
Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent C.O.L. Realty the amount of P51,994.80 as actual
damages suffered in a vehicular collision.
RULING: NO.
There is no doubt in the appellate court's mind that Aquilino's violation of the
MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was
the proximate cause of the accident.
Accordingly, there ought to be no question on C.O.L. Realty's negligence which
resulted in the vehicular mishap.
DOCTRINE: If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the
concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter's negligence is
imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior's action against the third person,
assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury of which complaint is made.
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilino's act of
crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was
prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus
precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the accident.
DOCTRINE: Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom.
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue
from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward
event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and
intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino
had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable
result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on
account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the
Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass.
Hence, it is unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel's contributory
negligence, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino's recklessness which is the
immediate and proximate cause of the accident. Rodel's contributory negligence has
relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever
damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating
the award of damages in his favor. In other words, an assertion of contributory
negligence in this case would benefit only the petitioner; it could not eliminate
respondent's liability for Aquilino's negligence which is the proximate result of the
accident.