BEST EVIDENCE RULE In 1963, she had the remaining 21 ha. or 208.157 sq. m.

relocated by a surveyor upon request of lessee Ramon

G.R. No. L-31189 March 31, 1987 Jover who complained of being prohibited by municipal
officials from cultivating the land. It was then that she
MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS, petitioner, discovered that the parcel of land, more or less 4 ha. or
vs. 33,747 sq.m. used by Petitioner Municipality of Victorias,
THE COURT OF APPEALS, NORMA LEUENBERGER as a cemetery from 1934, is within her property which is
and FRANCISCO SOLIVA, respondents. now Identified as Lot 76 and covered by TCT No. 34546
(TSN, July 1, 1964, pp. 7-9; Exh. "4," Folder of Exhibits,
Enrique I. Soriano, Jr. for private respondents. p. 23 and Exh. "A," Folder of Exhibits, p. 1).

On May 20, 1963, Respondent wrote the Mayor of

PARAS, J.: Victorias regarding her discovery, demanding payment
of past rentals and requesting delivery of the area
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the decision allegedly illegally occupied by Petitioner (Exh. "G, Folder
* of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on of Exhibits, p. 15). When the Mayor replied that
September 29, 1969 in CA-G.R. No. 35036-R (Rollo, p. Petitioner bought the land she asked to be shown the
11) setting aside the decision ** of the Court of First papers concerning the sale but was referred by the
Intance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, dated Mayor to the municipal treasurer who refused to show
September 24, 1964 which dismissed the complaint for the same (TSN, July 1, 1964, pp. 32-33).
recovery of possession in Civil Case No. 181-S and
declared the cemetery site on Lot No. 76 in Victorias as On January 11, 1964, Respondents filed a complaint in
property of the municipality of Victorias (Record on the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch
Appeal, p. 9). 1, for recovery of possession of the parcel of land
occupied by the municipal cemetery (Record on Appeal,
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads p. 1). In its answer, petitioner Municipality, by way of
as follows: special defense, alleged ownership of the lot, subject of
the complaint, having bought it from Simeona Jingco
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Vda. de Ditching sometime in 1934 (Record on Appeal,
lower court is hereby set aside and another is hereby p. 7). The lower court decided in favor of the
rendered: Municipality. On appeal Respondent appellate Court set
aside the decision of the lower court (Record on AppeaL
(1) Ordering the defendant municipality and/or thru p. 9); hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
its appropriate officials to return and deliver the
possession of the portion of Lot 76 used as cemetery or This petition was filed with the Court on November 6,
burial site of the plaintiff-appellant. 1969 (Rollo, p. 2), the Record on Appeal on December
19, 1969 (Rollo, p. 80). On January 5, 1970, the Court
(2) Ordering defendant municipality to pay the gave due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 84).
plaintiff-appellant the sum of P400.00 a year from 1963
until the possession of said land is actually delivered. The Brief for the Petitioner was filed on April 1, 1970
(Rollo, p. 88), the Brief for Respondents was filed on
Lot No. 76 containing an area of 208,157 sq. meters May 18, 1970 (Rollo, p. 92).
forms a part of Cadastral Lot No. 140 (Rollo, p. 11), a
27.2460 ha. sugar land located in Bo. Madaniog, On July 8, 1970, the Court resolved to consider the case
Victorias, Negros Occidental, in the name of the submitted for decision without Petitioner's Reply Brief,
deceased Gonzalo Ditching under Tax Declaration No. Petitioner having failed to file the brief within the period
3429 of Negros Occidental for the year 1941 (Exh. "3," which expired on June 10, 1970 (Rollo. p. 99).
Folder of Exhibits, p. 22). He was survived by his widow
Simeona Jingeo Vda. de Ditching and a daughter, On motion of counsel for the Respondents (Rollo, p.
Isabel, who died in 1928 (TSN, July 1, 1964, p. 7) 104), the Court resolved on June 30, 1972 to allow
leaving one off-spring, respondent Norma Leuenberger, respondent Francisco Soliva to continue the appeal in
who was then only six months old (TSN, July 1, 1964, p. behalf of the estate of respondent Norma Leuenberger
34). who died on January 25, 1972, Respondent Francisco
Soliva having been appointed special administrator in
Respondent Norma Leuenberger, married to Francisco Special Proceedings No. 84-V of the Court of First
Soliva, inherited the whole of Lot No. 140 from her Instance of Negros Occidental (Rollo, p. 110).
grandmother, Simeona J. Vda. de Ditching (not from her
predeceased mother Isabel Ditching). In 1952, she In their brief, petitioner raised the following errors of
donated a portion of Lot No. 140, about 3 ha., to the respondent Court of Appeals: (Brief for the Petitioner, p.
municipality for the ground of a certain high school and 1-3);
had 4 ha. converted into a subdivision. (TSN, July 1,
1964, p. 24). I.

1|Page
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Vendedora: — Simeona Jingco Vda. de Ditching . . .
respondents Norma Leuenberger and Francisco Soliva administradora Abint. G. Ditching
are the lawful owners of the land in litigation as they are
estopped from questioning the possession and Comprador: — Municipio Victorias, Neg. Occidental . . . .
ownership of herein petitioner which dates back to more por su Pres.Mpal Vicente B. Arnaes
than 30 years.
Valor: — P750.00 ...
II.
Vease copia correspondiente.
The Honorable Court of Appeals also erred in ordering
the petition petitioner to deliver the possession of the Names of-persons Executing/ Acknowledging:
land in question to the respondents Nomia Leuenberger
and Francisco Soliva, by holding that non-annotation on Simeona Vda. de Ditching
the Torrens Certificate of Title could not affect the said
land when the possession by the petitioner of the said Adm. Abint actuacion especial No. 5116
land for over 30 years and using it as a public cemetery
for that length of time are sufficient proof of purchase Jusgado la Instance Neg. Occidental
and transfer of title and non-annotation of the Certificate
of Title did not render the sale ineffectual Vendedora

III. Vicente B. Arnaes

The Honorable Court of Appeals further erred in ordering Pres. Municipal. Victorias
the petitioner Municipality of Victories to pay the
respondents the sum of P400.00 a year from 1963 until Comprador
possession is actually delivered because under the law,
an owner of a piece of land has no obligation to pay Witnesses to the Signatures:
rentals as it owns and possesses the same.
Esteban Jalandoni
There is merit in the petition.
Gregorio Elizalde
It is undisputed that petitioner failed to present before
the Court a Deed of Sale to prove its purchase of the Date: Month
land in question which is included in the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-34546 in the name of private 9 Julio 1934
respondent Norma Leuenberger.
Fees: P2.00
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the
secondary evidence presented by the petitioner Cedulas:
municipality is sufficient to substantiate its claim that it
acquired the disputed land by means of a Deed of Sale. Exenta por susexo

Under the Best Evidence Rule when the original writing F1027880 Enero 26/34 Victories, Neg. Occidental
is lost or otherwise unavailable, the law in point provides:
Remarks.
Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or
destroyed. — When the original writing has been lost or En Victorias, Neg. Occidental
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of
its execution and loss or destruction or unavailability, its Los annexes A. y B. estan unidos
contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the solamente en el original de la
recollection of witnesses. (Rule 130, Rules of Court).
escritura.
In lieu of a Deed of Sale, petitioner presented a
certificate issued by the Archives Division of the Bureau Respondent Court of Appeals was of the view (Rollo, p.
of Records Management in Manila, of a page of the 16) that a mere entry in the notarial register of a notary
1934 Notarial Register of Vicente D. Aragon with the public of an alleged sale cannot prove that a particular
following entries: piece of land was sold by one person to another, one of
the important requirements being the indication of the
Nature of Instrument — Compra venta 2 porciones area and the technical description of the land being sold.
Terrenos: Lotes Nos. 140-A y 140-B, Victorias, Neg. In the present case, since no deed of sale could be
Occidental pago por esso despues aprobacion Jusgado produced, there is no way of telling what particular
la Instance, Neg. Occidental causa civil 5116 portion of the property was sold to defendant

2|Page
municipality and how big was the sale of the land The area under this declaration includes 3,746 sq.
conveyed to the defendant municipality. meters donated by Mrs. Simeona Jingco Vda. de
Ditching and used as road leading to the cemetery. "
It will be observed that the entries in the notarial register (EXIL 4; Original Exhibits, p. 23).
clearly show: (a) the nature of the instrument. — a deed
of sale; (b) the subject of the sale — two parcels of land, The above-mentioned testimonies and documentary
Lot Nos. 140-A and 140-B; (c) the parties of the contract evidence sufficiently Identify the land sold by the
— the vendor Simeona J. Vda. de Ditching in her predecessors-in-interest of private respondent. To insist
capacity as Administrator in Civil Case No. 5116 of the on the technical description of the land in dispute would
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and the be to sacrifice substance to form which would
vendee, Vicente B. Ananosa, Municipal Mayor of undoubtedly result in manifest injustice to the petitioner.
Victorias; (d) the consideration P750.00; (e) the names
of the witnesses Esteban Jalandoni and Gregoria Moreover, it is expressly provided by law that the thing
Elizado; and the date of the sale on July 9, 1934. sold shall be understood as delivered, when it is placed
in the control and possession of the vendee. (Civil Code
It is beyond question that the foregoing certificate is an Art. 1497). Where there is no express provision that title
authentic document clearly corroborated and supported shall not pass until payment of the price, and the thing
by: (a) the testimony of the municipal councilor of gold has been delivered, title passes from the moment
Victorias, Ricardo Suarez, (Original TSN Hearing of the thing sold is placed in the possession and control of
September 14, 1964, pp. 1222) who negotiated the sale; the buyer. (Kuenzle & Streiff vs. Watson & Co., 13 PhiL
(b) the testimony of Emilio Cuesta, (Original TSN 26 [1909]). Delivery produces its natural effects in law,
Hearing of September 14, 1964, pp. 2238) the municipal the principal and most important of which being the
treasurer of said municipality, since 1932 up to the date conveyance of ownership, without prejudice to the right
of trial on September 14, 1964, who personally paid the of the vendor to payment of the price. (Ocejo, Perez &
amount of P750.00 to Felipe Leuenberger as Co. vs. International Banking Corp., 37 PhiL 631 [1918]).
consideration of the Contract of Sale; (c) Certificate of
Settlement (Original Exhibits, p. 20) "as evidence of said Similarly, when the sale is made through a public
payment;" (d) Tax Declaration No. 429 (Ibid., p. 22) instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to
which was cancelled and was substituted by Tax the delivery of the thing which is the object of the
Declaration No. 3600 covering the portion of the property contract, if from the deed, the contrary does not appear
unsold (Decision, CFI, Neg. Occidental Orig. Record on or cannot be clearly inferred. (Civil Code Art. 1498). The
Appeal, p. 6) and (e) Tax Declaration No. 3601 (Ibid, p. execution of the public instrument operates as a formal
23) in the name of the Municipal Government of Victorias or symbolic delivery of the property sold and authorizes
covering the portion occupied as cemetery. the buyer to use the document as proof of ownership.
(Florendo v. Foz, 20 PhiL 388 [1911]).
Tax Declaration No. 3601 shows on its face the
boundaries as follows: In the case at bar it is undisputed that petitioner had
been in open, public, adverse and continuous
North — NE — Lot No. 140-C of the Subdivision possession of the land for a period of more than thirty
years. In fact, according to the municipal treasurer there
South — SW — Lot No. 140-C of the Subdivision are over 1000 graves in the cemetery. (Decision, Court
of Appeals, Rollo, pp. 11-22).
West — NW — Lots Nos. 140-C & 140-B of the
Subdivision. As correctly observed by Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan in
his dissenting opinion (Rollo, pp. 23-28) in the decision
The area is 33,747 sq.m. of this case by the Court of Appeals, the evidence
establishes without debate that the property was
At the back Exh. 4-A, the sale of a portion of the lot to originally registered in 1916. Plaintiff was born only in
the Municipality of Victorias was clearly explained as 1928 and cannot possibly be the registered owner of the
follows: original lot 140 at the time. Indeed, according to her own
evidence, (Exhibit A; Original Record pp. 13) she
Note: The whole Lot No. 140, belongs to Norma became the registered owner only in 1963. Likewise, it is
Leuenberger as evidenced by a Transfer of Cert. of Title undisputed that in the intestate estate of Gonzalo
No. 18672. Portion of this Lot, (30,000 sq.m. was sold to Ditching, the grandfather of private respondent Norma
Municipality of Victories for Cemetery Site as evidenced Leunberger, it was her grandmother, Simeona, the
by a Deed of Sale executed by Simeona Jingco Vda. de surviving spouse of Gonzalo who was named judicial
Ditching in favor of the aforesaid Municipality and ratified administratrix. According to Norma's own testimony,
by Notary Public Mr. Vicente Aragon under Doc. No. Isabel her mother, died in 1928 (TSN Aug. 12, 1964, p.
132; Page No. 2; Book No. 10, Series of 1934. 34) while Simeona the grandmother died in 1942. (Ibid.)
Therefore, as of 1934 when a document of sale was
At the lowest portion under Memoranda it was explained executed by Simeona in favor of the municipality of
that — Victories as indubitably shown in the notarial register
(Exhibit 5.A) in question, Simeona was still the
administratrix of the properties left by her husband,

3|Page
Gonzalo and of their conjugal partnership. While an inherently defective Torrens title may not
Consequently, she is the only person who could legally ordinarily be cancelled even after proof of its defect, the
dispose of by sale this particular four- hectare portion of law nevertheless safeguards the rightful party's interest
Lot 140. And so it is, that in 1934, Simeona Ditching in in the titled land from fraud and improper use of
her capacity as judicial administratrix made and technicalities by snowing such party, in appropriate
executed the document described in the Report as Lots cases, to judicially seek reconveyance to him of
140-A and 140-B, showing clearly that they are portions whatever he has been deprived of as long as the land
of the original big Lot 140. As this conveyance was has not been transferred or conveyed to a purchaser in
executed by the judicial administratrix, unquestionably good faith. (Pedro Pascua, et al., vs. Mariano Gopuyoc
the party authorized to dispose of the same, the et al., L-23197, May 31, 1977.)
presumption must be that she did so upon proper
authority of the Court of First Instance. The Civil Code provides:

As to the description of the property sold, the fact that a Art. 1456. If the property is acquired through mistake or
notarial report shows that they are portions of Lot 140 fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
and the property in question occupied by the public considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of
cemetery is admittedly a portion of said lot in the the person from whom the property comes.
absence of evidence that there were other portions of
Lot 140 ceded unto the petitioner municipality, the Thus, it has been held that where the land is decreed in
inevitable conclusion is that the sale executed in the the name of a person through fraud or mistake, such
Notarial Register refers to the disputed lot. person is by operation of law considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the persons from whom
Unfortunately, the purchaser Municipality of Victorias the property comes. The beneficiary shag have the right
failed to register said Deed of Sale; hence, when t• enforce the trust, notwithstanding the irrevocability of
Simeona Jingco Vda. de Ditching died, her grand- the Torrens title and the trustee and his successors-in-
daughter, respondent Norma Leuenberger claimed to interest are bound to execute the deed of reconveyance.
have inherited the land in dispute and succeeded in (Pacheco vs. Arro, 85 Phil. 505; Escobar vs. Locsin, 74
registering said land under the Torrens system. Said Phil. 86).
land is now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-34036 (Exhibit A, supra) issued by the Register of As the land in dispute is held by private respondents in
Deeds of -Negros Occidental on March 11, 1963 in the trust for the Municipality of Victorias, it is logical to
name of Norma Leuenberger, married to Francisco conclude that the latter can neither be deprived of its
Soliva, containing an area of 208,157 square meters. As possession nor be made to pay rentals thereof. Private
registered owner, she is unquestionably entitled to the respondent is in equity bound to reconvey the subject
protection afforded to a holder of a Torrens Title. land to the cestui que trust the Municipality of Victorias.
The Torrens system was never calculated to foment
Admittedly, it is well-settled that under the Torrens betrayal in the performance of a trust. (Escobar vs.
System "Every person receiving a certificate of title in Locsin, 74 Phil. 86).
pursuance of a decree of registration, . . . shall hold the
same free of all encumbrance except those noted on For a more expeditious disposition of the case at bar,
said certificate ... " (Sec. 39, Act 496; now Sec. 43, PD Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
1529).
SEC. 10. Judgment for Specific acts; vesting title. — ... If
In the instant case, however, respondent Norma real or personal property is within the Philippines, the
Leuenberger admitted that she inherited the land court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may enter
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34036 from judgment divesting the title of any party and vesting it in
her grandmother, who had already sold the land to the others and such judgment shall have the force and effect
petitioner in 1934; hence, she merely stepped into the of a conveyance executed in due form of law.
shoes of her grandmother and she cannot claim a better
right than her predecessor-in-interest. When she applied Finally, the conclusions and findings of fact by the trial
for registration of the disputed land, she had no legal court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should
right to do so as she had no ownership of the land since not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons
land registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership because the trial court is in a better position to examine
but only of confirming ownership of the land. (Grande, et real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the
al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 115 Phil. 521.)"The witnesses while testifying in the case. (Chase v.
Torrens System was not established as a means for the Buencamino, Sr., 136 SCRA 365 [1985]).
acquisition of title to private land, ..." It is intended merely
to confirm and register the title which one may already PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment of the
have on the land. Where the applicant possesses no title respondent appellate court is hereby SET ASIDE and
or ownership over the parcel of land, he cannot acquire the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros
one under the Torrens system of Registration. (Torela, et Occidental, Branch I-Silay City in Civil Case No. 181-S
al., vs. Torela, et al., L-27843, October 11, 1979). declaring the cemetery site (Exh. E-2) on Lot No. 76 in
Victories as the property of the municipality of Victorias,
is hereby REINSTATED. Additionally, We hereby order

4|Page
(a) the petitioner to have the disputed land segregated
by a licensed surveyor from the rest of Lot No. 76 The disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners
described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34036 and Basilio and Felipe de Vera to a certain Atty. Leonardo
to have the corresponding subdivision plan, duly Bordador. When the mortgage had matured, the
approved by the Land Registration Commission, respondents redeemed the property from Atty. Leonardo
submitted to the court of origin for approval; (b) the Bordador and in turn Marcosa Bernabe sold the same to
private respondents Norma Leuenberger and Francisco them as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated
Soliva to be divested of their title to the disputed land February 11, 1956.
under Rule 39, Sec. 10, Rules of Court; and (c) the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to cancel On February 13, 1956, the respondents registered the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34036 and issue, in lieu deed with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan resulting in
thereof, one title in the name of the Municipality of the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of
Victories for the disputed land and another title in the Marcosa Bernabe and the issuance of another in the
names of the private respondents Norma Leuenberger name of the Aguilars. Since then and up to the present,
and Francisco Soliva for the rest of Lot No. 76. Without the Aguilars have been paying taxes on the land.
costs.
On July 20, 1977, respondent Mariano Aguilar was
SO ORDERED. issued a free patent to the land on the basis of which
Original Certificate of Title No. P-1356(M) was issued in
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin, and his name.
Cortes, JJ., concur.
On September 1, 1980, the petitioners wrote to the
respondents claiming that as children of Marcosa
G.R. No. 83377 February 9, 1993 Bernabe, they were co-owners of the property and
demanded partition thereof on threats that the
BASILIO DE VERA, LUIS DE VERA, FELIPE DE respondents would be charged with perjury and/or
VERA, HEIRS OF EUSTAQUIA DE VERA-PAPA falsification. The petitioners also claimed that the
represented by GLICERIA PAPA-FRANCISCO, et al., respondents had resold the property to Marcosa
petitioners, Bernabe on April 28, 1959.
vs.
SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR and LEONA V. On September 27, 1980, the respondents wrote in reply
AGUILAR, respondents. to the petitioners that they were the sole owners of the
disputed parcel of land and denied that the land was
Pablo M. Gancayaco for petitioners. resold to Marcosa Bernabe.

De Mesa, Villarica & Associates for respondents. True to petitioners' threat, they filed a falsification case
against the respondents. However, on March 31, 1981,
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Arsenio N. Mercado of
CAMPOS, JR., J.: Bulacan recommended dismissal of the charge of
falsification of public document against the respondents
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * for lack of a prima facie case.
of the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 1987 in CA-
GR CV No. 07448 entitled, "Basilio de Vera, Luis de On March 26, 1981, petitioners filed a suit for
Vera, Felipe de Vera, Heirs of Eustaquia de Vera-Papa, reconveyance of the lot covered by Original Certificate of
represented by Gliceria Papa-Francisco, and Heirs of Title No. P-1356(M).
Maria de Vera-Torres, represented by Luis V. Torres,
plaintiffs-appellees versus Spouses Mariano Aguilar and On July 31, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision ***
Leona V. Aguilar, defendants-appellants", which the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
reversed the decision ** of the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan, Third Judicial Region, Branch 14, for failure of WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
petitioners to prove the loss or destruction of the original defendants:
deed of sale and of all its duplicate original copies.
1. To reconvey the property in question to the
The undisputed facts are as follows: plaintiffs;

Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria, all 2. To pay plaintiffs P10,000.00 as litigation
surnamed de Vera and respondent Leona, married to expenses;
respondent Mariano Aguilar, are the children and heirs
of the late Marcosa Bernabe who died on May 10, 1960. 3. To pay plaintiffs P5,000.00 as exemplary
In her lifetime, Marcosa Bernabe owned the disputed damages;
parcel of land situated in Camalig, Meycauayan,
Bulacan, with an area of 4,195 square meters, 4. To pay P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
designated as Cadastral Lot No. 3621, Cad. 337, Case
No. 4, Meycauayan Cadastre. SO ORDERED.1

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 judicial discretion of the trial court under all the
In ruling in favor of the petitioners, the trial court circumstances of the particular case.2
admitted, over the objection of the respondents, Exhibit
A purporting to be a xeroxed copy of an alleged deed of A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it
sale executed on April 28, 1959 by the respondents merely ruled on the existence and due execution of the
selling, transferring and conveying unto Marcosa alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959. It failed to look
Bernabe the disputed parcel of land for and in into the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss or
consideration of P1,500.00. destruction of the original copies of the alleged deed of
sale.
Not contented with the decision, respondents appealed
to the Court of Appeals contending that they never sold In the case at bar, the existence of an alleged sale of a
back to Marcosa Bernabe the disputed parcel of land. parcel of land was proved by the presentation of a
Furthermore, respondents contended that since the xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale.
petitioners have failed to produce the original of the
alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959, the same was In establishing the execution of a document the same
not the best evidence of the alleged sale hence it should may be established by the person or persons who
have been excluded and should not have been accorded executed it, by the person before whom its execution
any evidentiary value. On the other hand, the petitioners was acknowledged, or by any person who was present
claimed that the existence of the document of sale dated and saw it executed or who, after its execution, saw it
April 28, 1959 had been duly established by the and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom
testimony of the notary public before whom it was the parties to the instrument had previously confessed
acknowledged and by Luis de Vera who was present the execution thereof.3
during its execution and that the loss of the original
document had been proven by the testimony of the We agree with the trial court's findings that petitioners
representatives of the offices of the National Archives have sufficiently established the due execution of the
and the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan. alleged deed of sale through the testimony of the notary
public to wit:
On November 29, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered
its decision reversing the trial court's decision. It found Preponderance of evidence clearly disclosed the facts
that the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale that Atty. Ismael Estela prepared Exhibit A. Atty.
has not been duly proven by the petitioners. Hence, Emiliano Ibasco, Jr. positively identified the signatures
secondary evidence, i.e., presentation of the xeroxed appearing therein to be that (sic) of the spouses and
copy of the alleged deed of sale is inadmissible. witnesses Luis de Vera and Ismael Estela, in his
capacity as Notary Public who ratified the document.4
Hence this petition.
After the due execution of the document has been
The crux of this case is whether or not the petitioners established, it must next be proved that said document
have satisfactorily proven the loss of the original deed of has been lost or destroyed. The destruction of the
sale so as to allow the presentation of the xeroxed copy instrument may be proved by any person knowing the
of the same. fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew
the fact of its loss, or by any one who had made, in the
We rule in the negative. judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the
place or places where the document or papers of similar
Section 4 of Rule 130 (now Section 5, Rule 130) of the character are usually kept by the person in whose
Rules of Court on Secondary Evidence states: custody the document lost was, and has been unable to
find it; or who has made any other investigation which is
Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed
destroyed. — When the original writing has been lost or lost.5
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of
its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its However, all duplicates or counterparts must be
contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its accounted for before using copies. For, since all the
contents in some authentic document, or by the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to
recollection of witnesses. be proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing
itself can be regarded as established until it appears that
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original all of its parts are unavailable (i.e. lost, retained by the
documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to opponent or by a third person or the like).6
the introduction of such secondary evidence, the
proponent must establish the former existence of the In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary
instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: public who notarized the document testified that the
Existence; execution; loss; contents although this order alleged deed of sale has about four or five original
may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the copies.7 Hence, all originals must be accounted for
court. The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for before secondary evidence can be given of any one.
the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the This petitioners failed to do. Records show that

6|Page
petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or five WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
original copies. dated November 27, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED.

In reversing the trial court, the respondent Court of SO ORDERED.

Appeals considered the following points:
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ.,
Asked on the witness stand where the original of the concur.
document (Exhibit A) was, plaintiff-appellee Luis de Vera
answered that it was with the Provincial Assessor in
Malolos, Bulacan, whereupon the appellees reserved its
(sic) right to present it in evidence (p. 11, tsn., August
11, 1981, Steno, Tecson). The same question FIRST DIVISION
propounded to the same witness at the next hearing, he
replied that in the early part of 1976 his sister Maria [G.R. No. 80505 : December 4, 1990.]
borrowed from him the original document and a certified
true copy thereof and brought them to the Office of the 192 SCRA 28
Register of Deeds in Malolos "for the purpose of having
it registered;" and that when she returned she told him THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
that the original copy of the document was submitted to Appellee, vs. MARIO TANDOY y LIM, Defendant-
that office "and it (the property) was transferred in the Appellant.
name of Marcosa Bernabe instead of Mariano Aguilar"
(p. 8, tsn., December 10, 1981, Steno, Crisostomo; p. 9,
tsn., Mar. 16, 1982, Steno, Vallarta).
DECISION
Indeed, upon the appellees' own evidence the original of
the deed of sale in question, a purported xerox copy and
certified true copy of which are marked as Exhibits A and
B, has not been lost or destroyed. It was submitted to CRUZ, J.:
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Malolos for
registration. The appellees, therefore, should have
asked the office to produce it in court and if it could not
be produced for one reason or another should have The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
called the Register of Deeds or his representative to Branch 133 dated October 13, 1987, convicting Mario
explain why. That they failed to do. The loss or Tandoy of the crime of violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of Rep.
destruction of the original of the document in question Act No. 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
has not, therefore, been established. Hence, secondary 1972, is before us on appeal.
evidence of it is inadmissible . . . .
The information against the accused-appellant read as
Neither did the testimony of notary public Ibasco, Jr. to follows:
the effect that he did not have a copy of the deed of sale
in question because his files were burned when his That on or about the 27th day of May 1986, in the
office at Ronquillo Street, Manila was gutted by fire in Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
1971 and 1972 (p. 4, tsn., November 10, 1981, Steno, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
Crisostomo) establish the loss or destruction of the named accused without being authorized by law, did
original document in question. What was lost or then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell
destroyed in the custody of Atty. Ibasco, Jr. was but one eight (8) pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops, two (2)
of the duplicate original copies on file with him. Nor did pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops and crushed
the testimony of Hipolito Timoteo, representative of the dried marijuana flowering tops, which are prohibited
Assessor's Office of Bulacan, to the effect that he failed drug, for and in consideration of P20.00.
to see the deed of absolute sale annotated on the simple
copy of tax declaration No. 15412 (p. 7, tsn., Aug. 12, Upon arraignment, Tandoy entered a plea of not guilty.
1982, Steno, Vallarta) and of David Montenegro, Jr. of After trial, Judge Buenaventura J. Guerrero rendered a
the National Archives to the effect that his office had no decision the dispositive portion of which declared:
copy of the document in question because the notary
public might not have submitted a copy thereof; or that it WHEREFORE, the Court finds Mario Tandoy y Lim guilty
was lost or destroyed during the transmittal; and that beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 4, Art. II,
most of the record before 1960 were destroyed by Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby
termites (pp. 8-12, tsn., Oct. 5, 1982, Steno, Tecson), sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
prove loss or destruction of the original and of all the P20,000.00 and cost.: nad
duplicate original copies of the document in question.8
The marijuana confiscated in this case is declared
We find no cogent reason to rule otherwise. confiscated and forfeited and ordered turned over to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposal.

7|Page
SO ORDERED. "cara y cruz" player) were caught and taken to the
Narcotics Command headquarters in Makati. There they
The accused-appellant raises the following assignment were mauled and warned that if they did not point to their
of errors in this appeal: fellow pushers, they would rot in jail. The accused-
appellant denied he had sold marijuana to Singayan and
1. The Court a quo erred in finding accused guilty insisted the bills taken from him were the bet money he
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite had grabbed at the "cara y cruz" game. 3
lack of evidence to prove that he sold marijuana to the
poseur-buyer. The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses and to listen to their
2. The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against respective testimonies, gave more credence to the
the accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a xerox copy statements of the arresting officers. Applying the
of the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money. presumption that they had performed their duties in a
regular manner, it rejected Tandoy's uncorroborated
The evidence of the prosecution may be summarized as allegation that he had been manhandled and framed.
follows: Tandoy had not submitted sufficient evidence of his
charges, let alone his admission that he had no quarrel
On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. Lt. Salido, Jr. of the with the peace officers whom he had met only on the
Makati Police Station dispatched Pfc. Herino de la Cruz, day of his arrest.
and Detectives Pablo R. Singayan, Nicanor Candolesas,
Luisito de la Cruz, Estanislao Dalumpines, Antonio In People v. Patog, 4 this Court held:
Manalastas and Virgilio Padua to conduct a buy-bust
operation at Solchuaga St., Barangay Singkamas, When there is no evidence and nothing to indicate the
Makati. principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by
improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so
The target area was a store along the said street, and actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and
Singayan was to pose as the buyer. He stood alone near credit.
the store waiting for any pusher to approach. The other
members of the team strategically positioned Tandoy submits that "one will not sell this prohibited drug
themselves. Soon, three men approached Singayan. to another who is a total stranger until the seller is
One of them was the accused-appellant, who said certain of the identity of the buyer."
without preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?"
Singayan said yes. The exchange was made then and The conjecture must be rejected.: nad
there — two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00
and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti- In People v. Paco, 5 this Court observed:
Narcotics Unit).
Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case
The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at
Manalastas and Candolesas made a body search of the anytime and at any place. After the offer to buy is
accused-appellant and took from him the marked accepted and the exchange is made, the illegal
money, as well as eight more rolls/foils of marijuana and transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that
crushed leaves.: nad the parties are in a public place and in the presence of
other people may not always discourage them from
The arresting officers brought Tandoy to the Office of the pursuing their illegal trade as these factors may even
Anti-Narcotics Unit, Makati Police Station, for serve to camouflage the same. Hence, the Court has
investigation by Detective Marvin Pajilan. The accused- sustained the conviction of drug pushers caught selling
appellant chose to remain silent after having been illegal drugs in a billiard hall (People v. Rubio, G.R. No.
informed of his constitutional rights. 66875, June 19, 1986, 142 SCRA 329; People v.
Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141, January 12, 1987, 147
These events were narrated under oath by De la Cruz, SCRA 252), in front of a store (People vs. Khan, supra)
Singayan and Pajilan. 1 Microscopic, chemical and along a street at 1:45 p.m. (People v. Toledo, G.R. No.
chromotographic examination was performed on the 67609, November 22, 1985, 140 SCRA 259), and in
confiscated marijuana by Raquel P. Angeles, forensic front of a house (People v. Policarpio, G.R. No. 69844,
chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation, who February 23, 1988).
later testified that the findings were positive. The
marijuana was offered as an exhibit. 2 As the Court has also held, "What matters is not an
existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller but
As might be expected, the accused-appellant had a their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and
different story. His testimony was that from 1:30 to 4:00 delivery of the marijuana leaves." 6
p.m. of the day in question, he was playing "cara y cruz"
with 15 other persons along Solchuaga St. when Under the second assigned error, the accused-appellant
somebody suddenly said that policemen were making invokes the best evidence rule and questions the
arrests. The players grabbed the bet money and admission by the trial court of the xerox copy only of the
scampered. However, he and a certain Danny (another marked P10.00 bill.

8|Page
 AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees,
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly refuted ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.
that contention thus:
Luciano A. Joson for petitioner-appellant.
This assigned error centers on the trial court's admission
of the P10.00 bill marked money (Exh. E-2-A) which, Cesar Paralejo for oppositor-appellee.
according to the appellant, is excluded under the best
evidence rule for being a mere xerox copy. Apparently,
appellant erroneously thinks that said marked money is RELOVA, J.:
an ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court which excludes the This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of
introduction of secondary evidence except in the five (5) Appeals for final determination pursuant to Section 3,
instances mentioned therein.:-cralaw Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.

The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of As found by the Court of Appeals:
the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue
is only as to whether or not such document was actually ... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with
executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the
or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of
not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. (Cf. letters testamentary in her favor. The petition, docketed
Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-77; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78.) as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was opposed by the appellees
Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the
the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its following grounds:
existence and not its contents, other substitutionary
evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore (1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the
admissible without the need of accounting for the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within
original. twenty days of the death of the testator as required by
Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust
money" was not indispensable to the conviction of the (2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did
accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana not contain a disposition of property after death and was
had been adequately proved by the testimony of the not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it
police officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold by was not a will
the accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit,
the failure to produce the marked money itself would not (3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged
constitute a fatal omission. copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would
produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509;
We are convinced from the evidence on record that the and
prosecution has overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused- (4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or
appellant with proof beyond reasonable doubt of his otherwise, executed and attested as required by law.
guilt. He must therefore suffer the penalty prescribed by
law for those who would visit the scourge of drug The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of
addiction upon our people. the case with another case Sp. Proc. No, 8275). Their
motion was granted by the court in an order dated April
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the 4, 1977.
challenged decision AFFIRMED in toto, with costs
against the accused-appellant.: nad On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of
the cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss the
SO ORDERED petition for the probate of the will. They argued that:

Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and (1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but
Medialdea, JJ., concur. merely an instruction as to the management and
improvement of the schools and colleges founded by
decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and

G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982 (2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved
by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE
THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased, Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss
MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant, was denied by the court in its order of February 23,
vs. 1979.

9|Page
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
the ground that the order was contrary to law and settled comparison can be made with the standard writings of
pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court, to the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509,
which the appellant in turn filed an opposition. On July the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a
23, 1979, the court set aside its order of February 23, lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by
1979 and dismissed the petition for the probate of the the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or
will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said: read such will. The will itself must be presented;
otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the
... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in
of the holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may
stand in lieu of the original. be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a
mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the
Supreme Court held that 'in the matter of holographic handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and
wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the tested before the probate court," Evidently, the
document itself as the material proof of authenticity of photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed
said wills. holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be
MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged determined by the probate court.
holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while
Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated
lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the October 3, 1979, denying appellant's motion for
execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order
fact that the original of the will could not be located dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve
shows to our mind that the decedent had discarded the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET
before his death his allegedly missing Holographic Will. ASIDE.

Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. SO ORDERED.

Hence, an appeal to the Court of Appeals in which it is
contended that the dismissal of appellant's petition is Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence. Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to

this Court on the ground that the appeal does not involve
question of fact and alleged that the trial court committed PAROL EVIDENCE
the following assigned errors:
G.R. No. L-62741 May 29, 1987
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT A LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY NOT BE FILIPINAS MANUFACTURERS BANK, plaintiff-
PROVED BY A COPY THEREOF; appellee,
vs.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EASTERN RIZAL FABRICATORS, defendant-
THE DECEDENT HAS DISCARDED BEFORE HIS appellant.
DEATH THE MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;
Emerito M. Salva & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
APPELLANT'S WILL. Eulogio E. Gatdula for defendant-appellant.

The only question here is whether a holographic will

which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by FERNAN, J.:
means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of
the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the This appeal was certified by the Appellate Court to this
allowance of the will by the court after its due execution Court, the question involved being purely legal. That
has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or question concerned the propriety of a judgment on the
not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is pleadings.
required and, if no witness is available, experts may be
resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying On March 2, 1979, Filipinas Manufacturers Bank [the
witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will surviving bank after a merger with the Filipinas Bank and
has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is Trust Co.] filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
available, the will can not be probated because the best Pasig branch, a complaint against Eastern Rizal
and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in Fabricators. It alleged inter alia that defendant Eastern
said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison Rizal Fabricators had executed on July 30, 1976, a
between sample handwritten statements of the testator promissory note for P370,000.00 evidencing a money
and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox market loan, with interest thereon at the rate of 14% plus

10 | P a g e
2% handling fee per annum until paid; that among the question of whether or not appellee bank had agreed to
terms and conditions of said promissory note was that forbear collection on the note was an issue which
the interest not paid when due would be added to and required a hearing.
become part of the principal, the same to be computed
monthly and would bear the same rate of interest as the Appellant avers that it had borrowed P370,000.00 from
principal and an additional sum equivalent to 10% of the plaintiff-appellee bank to make an advance payment for
amount due as and for attorney's fees; that the note scrap metals purchased from Jose Lecaros Abel. Abel
matured on August 30, 1976; and that despite repeated failed to deliver the entire merchandise. Appellant sued
demands, defendant refused to pay without any valid Abel for the return of the advance payment. They
and legal grounds. 1 subsequently entered into a compromise agreement
which the court approved. In that agreement, Abel
In its answer, defendant admitted its indebtedness but promised to pay appellant the amount due not later than
interposed the special and affirmative defense that the 180 banking days from December 2, 1978. Appellee
action by plaintiff bank was premature because the latter bank had been made aware of that compromise and in
had agreed to forbear collection of the note at least "until fact it agreed to forbear collection of the promissory note
arrival of the aforesaid date [not later than 180 banking until such time when appellant would receive payment
days from December 2, 1978] when defendant will be which would in turn be applied to the satisfaction of
receiving payment which will be applied to the appellant's indebtedness to appellee bank.6
satisfaction of defendant's indebtedness to plaintiff." 2
Defendant expected to recover about P300,000.00 from On its part, appellee bank belies the existence of any
Jose Lecaros Abel, its supplier of scrap metals, agreement to defer enforcement of the loan transaction
and argues that even assuming there was such an
Thereupon, plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the agreement, it did not constitute a genuine defense
pleadings on the grounds that defendant's answer sufficient to defeat the complaint.
admitted that material allegations of the complaint and
that it failed to tender an issue. Amplifying on its motion, The lower court, in rendering judgment on the pleadings,
plaintiff maintained that the affirmative defense that upheld appellee's contention that it would be a mistake
plaintiff, through its president, had agreed to postpone to receive evidence as to the alleged verbal
the enforcement of the note is untenable. It is contrary to understanding because it would be permitting parol
the parol evidence rule which provides that when the evidence to alter or vary a written contract. It will be
terms of an agreement had been reduced to writing, it is borne in mind that appellant's claimed understanding
to be considered as containing all such terms and with the appellee was purportedly entered into after the
therefore there can be, as between the parties and their appellant had encountered financial difficulties in paying
successor-in-interest, no evidence of the terms of the the loan.
agreement other than the contents of the writing itself. 3
The lower court is in error. The parol evidence rule which
Plaintiff also noted that it is "unthinkable" for the bank to prohibits the admission of oral evidence to vary or
have agreed to defer collection of the obligation until contradict a written contract does not apply to or prohibit
after 180 banking days from December 2, 1978 which is a subsequent modification by parol evidence. 7 In other
"two years and four months after the promissory note words, subsequent agreements to written contracts may
has matured." be made orally and evidence in reference thereto does
not violate the parol evidence rule. 8
Plaintiff stressed that it is not privy to any alleged
compromise agreement between defendant and its Wigmore illustrates: Where a document, for example, is
supplier. Its main concern is the settlement of executed on July 1, it may be held to embody the final
defendant's money market loan which is long overdue. and exclusive result of negotiations before and up to the
time of execution; but a transaction on August 1 must be
On July 23, 1979, despite defendant's opposition, the a separate one and therefore can never be excluded, so
trial court issued the challenged order granting plaintiff's far as the effect of the document of July 1, is concerned.
motion for judgment on the pleadings. It ordered It may be that some rule or form may make that
defendant Eastern Rizal Fabricators to pay to plaintiff transaction of August 1 invalid but the present rule can
Filipinas Manufacturers Bank the sum of P370,000.00 interpose no obstacle. 9
plus interest at 14% per annum and 2% as handling
damages with additional 10% of the principal obligation The reason for the rule is fundamental. The parties
as attorney's fees and to pay the costs of the suit.4 cannot be presumed to have intended the written
instrument to cover all their possible subsequent
As earlier stated, defendant Eastern Rizal Fabricators agreements. Moreover, parol evidence does not in any
appealed the judgment to the Appellate Court which in way deny that the original agreement was that which the
turn certified the case to this Court on a pure question of writing purports to express, but merely shows that the
law.5 parties have exercised their right to change or abrogate
their original understanding or to make a new and
In its brief, defendant-appellant Eastern Rizal independent one. It makes no difference how soon after
Fabricators argues that the lower court erred in the execution of the written contract the parol one was
rendering a judgement on the pleadings because the

11 | P a g e
made. If it was in fact subsequent and is otherwise
unobjectionable, it may be proved and enforced. 10
SYLLABUS
The inescapable conclusion therefore is that the
judgment on the pleadings was improper. Appellant's
defense of forbearance indubitably raised a material 1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PAROL
issue which could not be simply brushed aside without EVIDENCE RULE; WHEN THE TERMS OF A
the presentation of evidence. Reversal of the judgment CONTRACT WERE REDUCED TO WRITING, IT IS
and remand of the case to the court of origin for hearing DEEMED TO CONTAIN ALL THE TERMS AGREED
on the merits should follow as a matter of course. UPON. — Private respondents’ oral testimony on the
alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an
Considering however that this case has remained interest in the outcome of the case, depending
pending for almost a decade now, so that even the exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as
claimed forbearance has long lapsed, there was marked written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could
reluctance among the members of the Court to remand be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which
the case to the court below. A consensus was therefore speaks of a uniform language. Thus, under the general
reached to seek a more expeditious manner to resolve rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when
the case. The parties were required to inform the Court the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in
whether or not the loan of P370,000.00, which is the this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed
subject matter of the present dispute, was still upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted
outstanding and if no full payment has been made, to other than the contents thereof. Considering that the
submit memoranda substantiating their respective written deeds of sale were the only repository of the
allegations concerning the defense of forbearance. The truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must
appellant complied and submitted its memorandum, have been waived and abandoned by the parties.
stating in part that it still had "an outstanding balance of Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an
P230,000.00 on its aforesaid account" with the appellee inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a
bank. It reiterated its prayer that the judgment contract, it is the law between the parties.
complained of be reversed. The appellee bank did not
file its memorandum despite notices sent to its counsel 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LAND SETTLEMENT AND
of record. DEVELOPMENT CORP. CASE (117 PHIL. [1963], NOT
APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — To buttress their
Appellee bank's unexplained inaction has left us with no argument, private respondents rely on the case of Land
other recourse but to order the appellant to discharge its Settlement and Development Corp. v. Garcia Plantation
debt to the admitted amount of P230,000.00. Remanding where the Court ruled that a condition precedent to a
the case to the court of origin merely to ascertain contract may be established by parol evidence.
whether there was in fact a prior agreement to defer However, the material facts of the case are different from
payment on the promissory note will serve no useful this case. In the former, the contract sought to be
purpose and will only delay the termination of this case. enforced expressly stated that it is subject to an
By its silence we can assume that the appellee bank has agreement containing the conditions-precedent which
no objections to the amount owing, as acknowledged by were proven through parol evidence. Whereas, the
the appellant. deeds of sale in this case, made no reference to any
preconditions or other agreement. In fact, the sale is
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby set denominated as absolute in its own terms.
aside for being inappropriate. Appellant Eastern Rizal
Fabricators is ordered to pay appellee Filipinas 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT VARY, CONTRADICT OR
Manufacturers Bank the sum of P230,000.00 plus DEFEAT THE OPERATION OF A VALID
interest at 14% per annum computed from July 30, 1976, INSTRUMENT. — The parol evidence herein sought to
2% of the principal obligation as handling damages and be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the
10% of the total amount due as attorney's fees in full operation of a valid instrument, hence, contrary to the
settlement of the loan in question. rule that: "The parol evidence rule forbids any addition . .
. the terms of a written instrument by testimony
This decision is immediately executory. purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the
document, other or different terms were orally agreed
SO ORDERED. upon by the parties."cralaw virtua1aw library

Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT INCORPORATE
concur. ADDITIONAL CONTEMPORANEOUS CONDITIONS. —
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the
meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the purpose of
[G.R. No. 107372. January 23, 1997.] incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at
RAFAEL S. ORTAÑEZ, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake."
APPEALS, OSCAR INOCENTES, and ASUNCION No such fraud or mistake exists in this case.
LLANES INOCENTES, Respondents.

12 | P a g e
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; INADMISSIBLE WHERE THE That for and in consideration of the sum of TWENTY
CONTRACTS ARE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. — THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS receipt of which in full
We disagree with private respondents’ argument that is hereby acknowledged, we have sold, transferred and
their parol evidence is admissible under the exceptions conveyed, as we hereby sell, transfer and convey, that
provided by the Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of consolidated-subdivided portion of the property covered
the agreement to express the true intent of the parties. In by TCT No. 243273 known as Lot No. 5 in favor of
this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any RAFAEL S. ORTAÑEZ, of legal age, Filipino, whose
ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity marriage is under a regime of complete separation of
or doubt in the terms thereof. property, and a resident of 942 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City his heirs or assigns. 2
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; GROUND THEREFOR MUST BE
EXPRESSLY PLEADED. — We are not persuaded by Private respondents received the payments for the
private respondents’ contention that they "put in issue by above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the titles to
the pleadings" the failure of the written agreement to petitioner. On April 9, 1990 the latter demanded from the
express the true intent of the parties. Record shows that former the delivery of said titles. 3 Private respondents,
private respondents did not expressly plead that the however, refused on the ground that the title of the first
deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did not reflect lot is in the possession of another person, 4 and
the intention of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller petitioner’s acquisition of the title of the other lot is
(private respondents). Such issue must be "squarely subject to certain conditions.
presented." Private respondents merely alleged that the
sale was subject to four (4) conditions which they tried to Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific
prove during trial by parol evidence. Obviously, this performance before the RTC. In their answer with
cannot be done, because they did not plead any of the counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the
exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule. Their existence of the following oral conditions 5 which were
case is covered by the general rule that the contents of never reflected in the deeds of sale: 6
the writing are the only repository of the terms of the
agreement. Considering that private respondent Oscar "3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273)
Inocentes is a lawyer (and former Judge) he was remains with the defendants (private respondents) until
"supposed to be steeped in legal knowledge and plaintiff (petitioner) shows proof that all the following
practices" and was "expected to know the requirements have been met:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
consequences" of his signing a deed of absolute sale. library
Had he given an iota’s attention to scrutinize the deeds,
he would have incorporated important stipulations that (i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way
the transfer of title to said lots were conditional. amounting to 398 sq. m.;

(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved

RESOLUTION plan for the segregation;

(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property

FRANCISCO, J.: and that of defendants’ lot to segregate his right of way;

(iv) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other
On September 30, 1982, private respondents sold to expenses that may be incurred by reason of sale. . . .
petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land in Quezon
City for a consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a
respectively. The first deed of absolute sale covering former judge, orally testified that the sale was subject to
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 258628 provides in the above conditions, 7 although such conditions were
part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph not incorporated in the deeds of sale. Despite
petitioner’s timely objections on the ground that the
"That for and in consideration of the sum of THIRTY introduction of said oral conditions was barred by the
FIVE THOUSAND (P35,000.00) PESOS, receipt of parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless,
which in full is hereby acknowledged, we have sold, admitted them and eventually dismissed the complaint
transferred and conveyed, as we hereby sell, transfer as well as the counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of
and convey, that subdivided portion of the property Appeals (CA) affirmed the court a quo. Hence, this
covered by TCT No. 258628 known as Lot No. 684-G-1- petition.
B-2 in favor of RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, of legal age,
Filipino, whose marriage is under a regime of complete We are tasked to resolve the issue on the admissibility of
separation of property, and a resident of 942 Aurora parol evidence to establish the alleged oral conditions-
Blvd., Quezon City, his heirs or assigns." 1 precedent to a contract of sale, when the deeds of sale
are silent on such conditions.
while the second deed of absolute sale covering TCT
No. 243273 provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible.
First, private respondents’ oral testimony on the alleged
conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in

13 | P a g e
the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on may be received to enable the court to make a proper
human memory, is not as reliable as written or interpretation of the instrument. 19
documentary evidence. 8 Spoken words could be
notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any
speaks of a uniform language. 9 Thus, under the general ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity
rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 10 of the Rules of Court, or doubt in the terms thereof.
when the terms of an agreement were reduced to
writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the Fifth, we are not persuaded by private respondents
terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can contention that they "put in issue by the pleadings" the
be admitted other than the contents thereof. 11 failure of the written agreement to express the true intent
Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only of the parties. Record shows 20 that private respondents
repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said did not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were
instruments must have been waived and abandoned by incomplete or that it did not reflect the intention 21 of the
the parties. 12 Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot buyer (petitioner) and the seller (private respondents).
even make an inference that the sale was subject to any Such issue must be "squarely presented." 22 Private
condition. As a contract, it is the law between the parties. respondents merely alleged that the sale was subject to
13 four (4) conditions which they tried to prove during trial
by parol evidence. 23 Obviously, this cannot be done,
Secondly, to buttress their argument, private because they did not plead any of the exceptions
respondents rely on the case of Land Settlement mentioned in the parol evidence rule. 24 Their case is
Development, Co. v. Garcia Plantation 14 where the covered by the general rule that the contents of the
Court ruled that a condition precedent to a contract may writing are the only repository of the terms of the
be established by parol evidence. However, the material agreement. Considering that private respondent Oscar
facts of that case are different from this case. In the Inocentes is a lawyer (and former judge) he was
former, the contract sought to be enforced 15 expressly "supposed to be steeped in legal knowledge and
stated that it is subject to an agreement containing the practices" and was expected to know the consequences"
conditions-precedent which were proven through parol 25 of his signing a deed of absolute sale. Had he given
evidence. Whereas, the deeds of sale in this case, made an iota’s attention to scrutinize the deeds, he would have
no reference to any pre-conditions or other agreement. incorporated important stipulations that the transfer of
In fact, the sale is denominated as absolute in its own title to said lots were conditional. 26
terms. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
One last thing, assuming arguendo that the parol
Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced evidence is admissible, it should nonetheless be
would vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid disbelieved as no other evidence appears from the
instrument, 16 hence, contrary to the rule record to sustain the existence of the alleged conditions.
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Not even the other seller, Asuncion Inocentes, was
presented to testify on such conditions.
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to . . . the
terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is REVERSED
show that, at or before the signing of the document, and the records of this case REMANDED to the trial
other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the court for proper disposition in accordance with this ruling.
parties. 17
SO ORDERED.
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the
meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the purpose of Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ.,
incorporating into the contract additional concur.
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at
all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake." THIRD DIVISION
18 No such fraud or mistake exists in this case.
[G.R. No. 79962 : December 10, 1990.]
Fourth, we disagree with private respondents’ argument
that their parol evidence is admissible under the 192 SCRA 209
exceptions provided by the Rules, specifically, the
alleged failure of the agreement to express the true LUCIO R. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
intent of the parties. Such exception obtains only in the AND CONRADO Q. SALONGA, Respondents.
following instance:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

[W]here the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure

in terms that the contractual intention of the parties DECISION
cannot be understood from a mere reading of the
instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the
subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the
parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances CRUZ, J.:
surrounding them when they entered into the contract

14 | P a g e
 1) That plaintiff Conrado Salonga entered into a contract
The private respondent Conrado Salonga filed a of what is commonly called as 'pakyawan' with defendant
complaint for collection and damages against petitioner Lucio Cruz on the fishes contained in a fishpond which
Lucio Cruz ** in the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City defendant Lucio Cruz was taking care of as lessee from
alleging that in the course of their business transactions the owner Mr. Nemesio Yabut, with a verbal contract for
of buying and selling fish, the petitioner borrowed from the sum of P28,000.00 sometime in May 1982.
him an amount of P35,000.00, evidenced by a receipt
dated May 4, 1982, marked as Exhibit D, reading as 2) That because of the necessity, defendant Lucio Cruz
follows: at that time needed money, he requested plaintiff
Conrado Salonga to advance the money of not only
5/4/82 P28,000.00 but P35,000.00 in order that Lucio Cruz
could meet his obligation with the owner of the fishpond
Received the amount of Thirty Five Thousand Cash from in question, Mr. Nemesio Yabut;
Rodrigo Quiambao and Conrado Salonga on the day of
May 4, 1982. 3) That the amount of P35,000.00 as requested by
defendant Lucio Cruz was in fact delivered by plaintiff
Sgd. Lucio Cruz Conrado Salonga duly received by the defendant Lucio
Cruz, as evidenced by a receipt dated May 4, 1982, duly
The plaintiff claimed that of this amount, only P20,000.00 signed by defendant Lucio Cruz
had been paid, leaving a balance of P10,000.00; that in
August 1982, he and the defendant agreed that the latter 4) That pursuant to said contract of "pakyaw," plaintiff
would grant him an exclusive right to purchase the Conrado Salonga was able to harvest the fishes
harvest of certain fishponds leased by Cruz in exchange contained in the fishpond administered by Lucio Cruz in
for certain loan accommodations; that pursuant thereto, August 1982.
Salonga delivered to Cruz various loans totaling
P15,250.00, evidenced by four receipts and an 5) Immediately thereafter the aforesaid harvest thereon,
additional P4,000.00, the receipt of which had been lost; they entered again on a verbal agreement whereby
and that Cruz failed to comply with his part of the plaintiff Conrado Salonga and defendant Lucio Cruz had
agreement by refusing to deliver the alleged harvest of agreed that defendant Lucio Cruz will sublease and had
the fishpond and the amount of his indebtedness. in fact subleased the fishpond of Nemesio Yabut to the
herein plaintiff for the amount of P28,000.00 for a period
Cruz denied having contracted any loan from Salonga. of one year beginning August 15, 1982.
By way of special defense, he alleged that he was a
lessee of several hectares of a fishpond owned by 6) That sometime on June 15, 1983, Mayor Nemesio
Nemesio Yabut and that sometime in May 1982, he Yabut, who is the owner of the fishpond, took back the
entered into an agreement with Salonga whereby the subject matter of this case from the defendant Lucio
latter would purchase (pakyaw) fish in certain areas of Cruz.
the fishpond from May 1982 to August 15, 1982. They
also agreed that immediately thereafter, Salonga would 7) That defendant Lucio Cruz in compliance with their
sublease (bubuwisan) the same fishpond for a period of verbal sublease agreement had received from the
one year. Cruz admitted having received on May 4, plaintiff Conrado Salonga the following sums of money:
1982, the amount of P35,000.00 and on several
occasions from August 15, 1982, to September 30, a) P8,000.00 on August 15, 1982 as evidenced by
1982, an aggregate amount of P15,250.00. He Annex "B" of the Complaint. (Exh. E);
contended however, that these amounts were received
by him not as loans but as consideration for their b) The sum of P500.00 on September 4, 1982, as
"pakyaw" agreement and payment for the sublease of evidenced by Annex "C" of the complaint (Exh. F);
the fishpond. He added that it was the private
respondent who owed him money since Salonga still had c) The sum of P3,000.00 on September 19, 1982 as
unpaid rentals for the 10-month period that he actually evidenced by Annex "D" of the complaint (Exh. G); and
occupied the fishpond. Cruz also claimed that Salonga
owed him an additional P4,000.00 arising from another d) The sum of P3,750.00 on September 30, 1982 as
purchase of fish from other areas of his leased fishpond. Annex "E" of the complaint (Exh. H).

In a pre-trial conference held on August 24, 1984, At the trial, the private respondent claimed that aside
petitioner and private respondent entered into the from the amounts of P35,000.00 (Exh. D), P8,000.00
following partial stipulation of facts. (Exh. E), P500.00 (Exh. F), P3,000.00 (Exh. G) and
P3,750.00 (Exh. H) mentioned in the partial stipulation of
COURT: facts, he also delivered to the petitioner P28,000.00,
which constituted the consideration for their "pakyaw"
Plaintiff and defendant, through their respective counsel, agreement. This was evidenced by a receipt dated May
during the pre-trial conference, agreed on the following 14, 1982 marked as Exhibit I and reading as follows:
stipulation of facts:

15 | P a g e
May 14, 1982 given by the defendant and his two witnesses. On the
other hand, Exhibit "I" is very clear in its language. Thus,
Tinatanggap ko ang halagang dalawampu't walong its tenor must not be clouded by any parol evidence
libong piso (P28,000.00) bilang halaga sa pakyaw nila introduced by the defendant. And with the tenor of
sa akin sa sangla sa kahong bilang #8 maliit at sa Exhibit "I" remaining unembellished, the conclusion that
kaputol na sapa sa gawing may bomba. Ito ay tatagal Exhibit "D" is a mere tentative receipt becomes
hanggang Agosto 1982. untenable.

SGD. LUCIO CRUZ The trial court erred when it relied on the self-serving
testimonies of the defendant and his witness as against
Salonga also claimed that he had paid Cruz the amount the receipts both parties presented and adopted as their
of P4,000 but the receipt of which had been lost and own exhibits. As said before, Exhibit "I" is very clear in its
denied being indebted to the petitioner for P4,000 for the tenor. And if it is really the intention of Exhibit "I" to
lease of other portions of the fishpond. explain the contents of Exhibit "D", such manifestation or
intention is not found in the four corners of the former
For his part, the petitioner testified that he entered into a document.
"pakyaw" and sublease agreement with the private
respondent for a consideration of P28,000 for each The respondent court also found that the amounts of
transaction. Out of the P35,000 he received from the P35,000.00, P8,000.00, P500.00, P3,000.00, P3,750.00
private respondent on May 4, 1982, P28,000 covered full and P4,000.00 were not payments for the "pakyaw" and
payment of their "pakyaw" agreement while the sublease agreement but for loans extended by Salonga
remaining P7,000 constituted the advance payment for to Cruz. It also accepted Salonga's claim that the
their sublease agreement. The petitioner denied having amount of P28,000.00 was delivered to the petitioner on
received another amount of P28,000 from Salonga on May 14, 1982, as payment on the "pakyaw" agreement
May 14, 1982. He contended that the instrument dated apart from the P35,000.00 (Exh. D) that was paid on
May 14, 1982 (Exh. I) was executed to evidence their May 4, 1982. However, it agreed that the amount of
"pakyaw" agreement and to fix its duration. He was P6,000.00 received by the private respondent from the
corroborated by Sonny Viray, who testified that it was he petitioner should be credited in favor of the latter.
who prepared the May 4, 1982, receipt of P35,000.00,
P28,000 of which was payment for the "pakyaw" and the The petitioner is now before this Court, raising the
excess of P7,000.00 as advance for the sublease. following issues:

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered 1. The public respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred
the private respondent to pay the former the sum of in (1) disregarding parol evidence to Exhibits "D" and "I"
P3,054.00 plus P1,000.00 as litigation expenses and despite the fact that these documents fall under the
attorney's fees, and the costs. Judge Eriberto U. exceptions provided for in Sec. 7, Rule 130 of the Rules
Rosario, Jr. found that the transactions between the of Court and thereby in (2) making a sweeping
petitioner and the private respondent were indeed conclusion that the transaction effected between the
"pakyaw" and sublease agreements, each having a private respondent and petitioner is one of contract of
consideration of P28,000.00, for a total of P56,000.00. loan and not a contract of lease.
Pursuant to these agreements, Salonga paid Cruz
P35,000.00 on May 4, 1982 (Exh. D); P8,000.00 on 2. Assuming for the sake of argument that exhibits "D"
August 15, 1982 (Exh. E); P500.00 on September 4, and "I" evidence separate transactions, the latter
1982 (Exh. F); P3,000 on September 19, 1982; P3,750 document should be disregarded, the same not having
on September 30, 1982 (Exh. H) and P4,000.00 on an been pleaded as a cause of action.
unspecified date. The trial court noted an earlier
admission of the private respondent that on an 3. Whether or not the Stipulation of Facts entered into by
unspecified date he received the sum of P6,000.00 from the parties herein relative to their executed transactions
the petitioner. This amount was credited to the petitioner during the hearing of their case a quo, are binding upon
and deducted from the total amount paid by the private them and as well as, upon the public respondent?
respondent. As the one-year contract of sublease was
pre-terminated two months short of the stipulated period, Our ruling follows:
the rentals were correspondingly reduced.
Rule 130, Sec. 7, of the Revised Rules of Court
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed. provides: 1
The respondent court instead ordered the petitioner to
pay the private respondent the sum of P24,916.00 plus Sec. 7. Evidence of Written Agreements. — When the
P1,500.00 as litigation expenses and attorney's fees, on terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it
the following justification: is to be considered as containing all such terms, and
therefore, there can be, between the parties and their
Exhibit "I" is very clear in its non-reference to the successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the
transaction behind Exhibit "D." What only gives the agreement other than the contents of the writing, except
semblance that Exhibit "I" is an explanation of the in the following cases:
transaction behind Exhibit "D" are the oral testimonies

16 | P a g e
a) When a mistake or imperfection of the writing or its A distinction should be made between a statement of
failure to express the true intent and agreement of the fact expressed in the instrument and the terms of the
parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by contractual act. The former may be varied by parol
the pleadings; evidence but not the latter. 5 Section 7 of Rule 130
clearly refers to the terms of an agreement and provides
b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The that "there can be, between the parties and their
term "agreement" includes wills. successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the
agreement other than the contents of the writing."
The reason for the rule is the presumption that when the
parties have reduced their agreement to writing they The statement in Exhibit I of the petitioner's receipt of the
have made such writing the only repository and P28,000.00 is just a statement of fact. It is a mere
memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the acknowledgment of the distinct act of payment made by
writing must be understood to have been waived or the private respondent. Its reference to the amount of
abandoned. 2 P28,000.00 as consideration of the "pakyaw" contract
does not make it part of the terms of their agreement.
The rule, however, is not applicable in the case at bar, Parol evidence may therefore be introduced to explain
Section 7, Rule 130 is predicated on the existence of a Exhibit I, particularly with respect to the petitioner's
document embodying the terms of an agreement, but receipt of the amount of P28,000.00 and of the date
Exhibit D does not contain such an agreement. It is only when the said amount was received.
a receipt attesting to the fact that on May 4, 1982, the
petitioner received from the private respondent the Even if it were assumed that Exhibits D and I are
amount of P35,000. It is not and could have not been covered by the parol evidence rule, its application by the
intended by the parties to be the sole memorial of their Court of Appeals was improper. The record shows that
agreement. As a matter of fact, Exhibit D does not even no objection was made by the private respondent when
mention the transaction that gave rise to its issuance. At the petitioner introduced evidence to explain the
most, Exhibit D can only be considered a casual circumstances behind the execution and issuance of the
memorandum of a transaction between the parties and said instruments. The rule is that objections to evidence
an acknowledgment of the receipt of money executed by must be made as soon as the grounds therefor become
the petitioner for the private respondent's satisfaction. A reasonably apparent. 6 In the case of testimonial
writing of this nature, as Wigmore observed is not evidence, the objection must be made when the
covered by the parol evidence rule. objectionable question is asked or after the answer is
given if the objectionable features become apparent only
A receipt — i.e. a written acknowledgment, handed by by reason of such answer. 7
one party to the other, of the manual custody of money
or other personality — will in general fall without the line For failure of the private respondent to object to the
of the rule; i.e. it is not intended to be an exclusive evidence introduced by the petitioner, he is deemed to
memorial, and the facts may be shown irrespective of have waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule. Thus,
the terms of the receipt. This is because usually a receipt in Abrenica v. Gonda, 8 this Court held:
is merely a written admission of a transaction
independently existing, and, like other admissions, is not . . . it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of
conclusive. 3 evidence that a protest or objection against the
admission of any evidence must be made at the proper
The "pakyaw" was mentioned only in Exhibit I, which time, and that if not so made it will be understood to
also declared the petitioner's receipt of the amount of have been waived. The proper time to make a protest or
P28,000.00 as consideration for the agreement. The objection is when, from the question addressed to the
petitioner and his witnesses testified to show when and witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the
under what circumstances the amount of P28,000.00 presentation of proof, the inadmissibility of evidence is,
was received. Their testimonies do not in any way vary or may be inferred.
or contradict the terms of Exhibit I. While Exhibit I is
dated May 14, 1982, it does not make any categorical It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence
declaration that the amount of P28,000.00 stated therein which would ordinarily be incompetent under the rules
was received by the petitioner on that same date. That but has been rendered admissible by the failure of a
date may not therefore be considered conclusive as to party to object thereto. Thus:
when the amount of P28,000.00 was actually received.
. . . The acceptance of an incompetent witness to testify
A deed is not conclusive evidence of everything it may in a civil suit, as well as the allowance of improper
contain. For instance, it is not the only evidence of the questions that may be put to him while on the stand is a
date of its execution, nor its omission of a consideration matter resting in the discretion of the litigant. He may
conclusive evidence that none passed, nor is its assert his right by timely objection or he may waive it,
acknowledgment of a particular consideration an expressly or by silence. In any case the option rests with
objection to other proof of other and consistent him. Once admitted, the testimony is in the case for what
considerations; and, by analogy, the acknowledgment in it is worth and the judge has no power to disregard it for
a deed is not conclusive of the fact. 4 the sole reason that it could have been excluded, if it

17 | P a g e
had been objected to, nor to strike it out on its own We find, however, that the Court of Appeals did not act
motion. (Emphasis supplied.) 9 in excess of its jurisdiction when it appreciated Exhibit I
despite the fact that it was not pleaded as a cause of
We find that it was error for the Court of Appeals to action and was objected to by the petitioner. According
disregard the parol evidence introduced by the petitioner to Rule 10 of the Rules of Court:
and to conclude that the amount of P35,000.00 received
on May 4, 1982 by the petitioner was in the nature of a Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize
loan accommodation. The Court of Appeals should have presentation of evidence. — When issues not raised by
considered the partial stipulation of facts and the the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of
testimonies of the witnesses which sought to explain the the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they
circumstances surrounding the execution of Exhibits D had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of
and I and their relation to one another. the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may
We are satisfied that the amount of P35,000.00 was be made upon motion of any party at any time, even
received by the petitioner as full payment of their after judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the
"pakyaw" agreement for P28,000.00 and the remaining result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected
P7,000.00 as advance rentals for their sublease to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues
agreement. The claim that the excess of P7,000.00 was made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
advance payment of the sublease agreement is pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when
bolstered by the testimony of the private respondent the presentation of the merits of the action will be
himself when during the cross examination he testified subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy
that: the court that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon
ATTY. CRUZ: the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable
the objecting party to meet such evidence.
Q And during the time you were leasing the fishpond, is
it not a fact that you pay lease rental to the defendant? In Co Tiamco v. Diaz, 12 the Supreme Court held:

SALONGA: . . . When evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in

the pleadings, the court may admit it even against the
A No sir, because I have already advanced him money. objection of the adverse party, when the latter fails to
satisfy the court that the admission of the evidence
Q What advance money are you referring to? would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the
merits, and the court may grant him continuance to
A Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00), sir. 10 enable him to meet the situation created by the evidence
...
It was also error to treat the amounts received by the
petitioner from August 15, 1982, to September 30, 1982, While it is true that the private respondent did not even
from the private respondent as loan accommodations file a motion to amend his complaint in order that it could
when the partial stipulation of facts clearly stated that conform to the evidence presented, this did not prevent
these were payments for the sublease agreement. The the court from rendering a valid judgment on the issues
pertinent portions read: proved. As we held in the Co Tiamco case:

7) That defendant Lucio Cruz in compliance with their . . . where the failure to order an amendment does not
verbal sublease agreement had received from the appear to have caused a surprise or prejudice to the
plaintiff Conrado Salonga the following sums of money: objecting party, it may be allowed as a harmless error.
(Emphasis Supplied.) Well-known is the rule that departures from procedure
may be forgiven when they do not appear to have
(a) P8,000.00 on August 15, 1982, as evidenced by impaired the substantial rights of the parties.
Annex "B" of the complaint;
The following computation indicates the accountability of
(b) the sum of P500.00 on September 4, 1982, as the private respondent to the petitioner:
evidenced by Annex "C" of the complaint;
Exh. D, May 4, 1982 — P35,000.00
(c) the sum of P3,000.00 on September 19, 1982, as
evidenced by Annex "D" of the complaint; Exh. E, Aug. 15, 1982 — 8,000.00

(d) the sum of P3,750.00 on September 30, 1982, as Exh. F, Sept. 4, 1982 — 500.00
Annex "E" of the complaint; 11
Exh. G, Sept. 19, 1982 — 3,000.00
These admissions bind not only the parties but also the
court, unless modified upon request before the trial to Exh. H, Sept. 30, 1982 — 3,750.00
prevent manifest injustice.
Lost receipt 4,000.00

18 | P a g e
 G.R. No. 96405 June 26, 1996
————
BALDOMERO INCIONG, JR., petitioner,
P54,250.00 vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE BANK OF
Less: (amount received by the COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.

private respondent from the

petitioner) (6,000.00) ROMERO, J.:p

———— This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of

the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial
Total amount paid by the Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18,1 which disposed
of Civil Case No. 10507 for collection of a sum of money
private respondent to and damages, as follows:

the petitioner 48,250.00 WHEREFORE, defendant BALDOMERO L. INCIONG,

JR. is adjudged solidarily liable and ordered to pay to the
Amount to be paid by the private respondent to the plaintiff Philippine Bank of Communications, Cagayan de
petitioner: Oro City, the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00), with interest thereon from May 5, 1983 at
1. Pakyaw P28,000.00 16% per annum until fully paid; and 6% per annum on
the total amount due, as liquidated damages or penalty
2. Sublease — 28,000 per annum from May 5, 1983 until fully paid; plus 10% of the total
amount due for expenses of litigation and attorney's
Less: 2 months: 4,666 23,334.00 fees; and to pay the costs.

———— The counterclaim, as well as the cross claim, are

dismissed for lack of merit.
Total amount to be paid by
SO ORDERED.
the private respondent to
Petitioner's liability resulted from the promissory note in
the petitioner P51,334.00 the amount of P50,000.00 which he signed with Rene C.
Naybe and Gregorio D. Pantanosas on February 3,
Total amount to be paid 1983, holding themselves jointly and severally liable to
private respondent Philippine Bank of Communications,
by the private respondent P51,334.00 Cagayan de Oro City branch. The promissory note was
due on May 5, 1983.
Total amount paid by
Said due date expired without the promissors having
the private respondent 48,250.00 paid their obligation. Consequently, on November 14,
1983 and on June 8, 1984, private respondent sent
———— petitioner telegrams demanding payment thereof.2 On
December 11, 1984 private respondent also sent by
Deficiency in the amount registered mail a final letter of demand to Rene C.
Naybe. Since both obligors did not respond to the
paid by the private respondent P3,084.00 demands made, private respondent filed on January 24,
1986 a complaint for collection of the sum of P50,000.00
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the respondent Court of against the three obligors.
Appeals is REVERSED and that of the Regional Trial
Court of Laguna AFFIRMED, with the modification that On November 25, 1986, the complaint was dismissed for
the private respondent shall pay the petitioner the sum of failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the case. However, on
P3,084.00 instead of P3,054.00, plus costs. It is so January 9, 1987, the lower court reconsidered the
ordered. dismissal order and required the sheriff to serve the
summonses. On January 27, 1987, the lower court
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., dismissed the case against defendant Pantanosas as
concur. prayed for by the private respondent herein. Meanwhile,
only the summons addressed to petitioner was served
as the sheriff learned that defendant Naybe had gone to
Saudi Arabia.

19 | P a g e
In his answer, petitioner alleged that sometime in 1991, the Court denied. In the same Resolution, the
January 1983, he was approached by his friend, Rudy Court ordered the entry of judgment in this case.6
Campos, who told him that he was a partner of Pio Tio,
the branch manager of private respondent in Cagayan Unfazed, petitioner filed a notion for leave to file a
de Oro City, in the falcata logs operation business. motion for clarification. In the latter motion, he asserted
Campos also intimated to him that Rene C. Naybe was that he had attached Registry Receipt No. 3268 to page
interested in the business and would contribute a 14 of the petition in compliance with Circular No. 1-88.
chainsaw to the venture. He added that, although Naybe Thus, on August 7, 1991, the Court granted his prayer
had no money to buy the equipment, Pio Tio had that his petition be given due course and reinstated the
assured Naybe of the approval of a loan he would make same.7
with private respondent. Campos then persuaded
petitioner to act as a "co-maker" in the said loan. Nonetheless, we find the petition unmeritorious.
Petitioner allegedly acceded but with the understanding
that he would only be a co-maker for the loan of Annexed to the petition is a copy of an affidavit executed
P50,000.00. on May 3, 1988, or after the rendition of the decision of
the lower court, by Gregorio Pantanosas, Jr., an MTCC
Petitioner alleged further that five (5) copies of a blank judge and petitioner's co-maker in the promissory note. It
promissory note were brought to him by Campos at his supports petitioner's allegation that they were induced to
office. He affixed his signature thereto but in one copy, sign the promissory note on the belief that it was only for
he indicated that he bound himself only for the amount of P5,000.00, adding that it was Campos who caused the
P5,000.00. Thus, it was by trickery, fraud and amount of the loan to be increased to P50,000.00.
misrepresentation that he was made liable for the
amount of P50,000.00. The affidavit is clearly intended to buttress petitioner's
contention in the instant petition that the Court of
In the aforementioned decision of the lower court, it Appeals should have declared the promissory note null
noted that the typewritten figure "-- 50,000 --" clearly and void on the following grounds: (a) the promissory
appears directly below the admitted signature of the note was signed in the office of Judge Pantanosas,
petitioner in the promissory note. 3 Hence, the latter's outside the premises of the bank; (b) the loan was
uncorroborated testimony on his limited liability cannot incurred for the purpose of buying a second-hand
prevail over the presumed regularity and fairness of the chainsaw which cost only P5,000.00; (c) even a new
transaction, under Sec. 5 (q) of Rule 131. The lower chainsaw would cost only P27,500.00; (d) the loan was
court added that it was "rather odd" for petitioner to have not approved by the board or credit committee which
indicated in a copy and not in the original, of the was the practice, as it exceeded P5,000.00; (e) the loan
promissory note, his supposed obligation in the amount had no collateral; (f) petitioner and Judge Pantanosas
of P5,000.00 only. Finally, the lower court held that, even were not present at the time the loan was released in
granting that said limited amount had actually been contravention of the bank practice, and (g) notices of
agreed upon, the same would have been merely default are sent simultaneously and separately but no
collateral between him and Naybe and, therefore, not notice was validly sent to him.8 Finally, petitioner
binding upon the private respondent as creditor-bank. contends that in signing the promissory note, his consent
was vitiated by fraud as, contrary to their agreement that
The lower court also noted that petitioner was a holder of the loan was only for the amount of P5,000.00, the
a Bachelor of Laws degree and a labor consultant who promissory note stated the amount of P50,000.00.
was supposed to take due care of his concerns, and
that, on the witness stand, Pio Tio denied having The above-stated points are clearly factual. Petitioner is
participated in the alleged business venture although he to be reminded of the basic rule that this Court is not a
knew for a fact that the falcata logs operation was trier of facts. Having lost the chance to fully ventilate his
encouraged by the bank for its export potential. factual claims below, petitioner may no longer be
accorded the same opportunity in the absence of grave
Petitioner appealed the said decision to the Court of abuse of discretion on the part of the court below. Had
Appeals which, in its decision of August 31, 1990, he presented Judge Pantanosas affidavit before the
affirmed that of the lower court. His motion for lower court, it would have strengthened his claim that the
reconsideration of the said decision having been denied, promissory note did not reflect the correct amount of the
he filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. loan.

On February 6, 1991, the Court denied the petition for Nor is there merit in petitioner's assertion that since the
failure of petitioner to comply with the Rules of Court and promissory note "is not a public deed with the formalities
paragraph 2 of Circular prescribed by law but . . . a mere commercial paper
No. 1-88, and to sufficiently show that respondent court which does not bear the signature of . . . attesting
had committed any reversible error in its questioned witnesses," parol evidence may "overcome" the contents
decision.4 His motion for the reconsideration of the of the promissory note.9 The first paragraph of the parol
denial of his petition was likewise denied with finality in evidence rule 10 states:
the Resolution of April 24, 1991.5 Thereafter, petitioner
filed a motion for leave to file a second motion for When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
reconsideration which, in the Resolution of May 27, writing, it is considered as containing all the terms

20 | P a g e
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and creditor is entitled to demand the whole obligation. 17 on
their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms the other hand, Article 2047 of the Civil Code states:
other than the contents of the written agreement.
By guaranty a person, called the guarantor, binds
Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written himself to the creditor to fulfill the obligation of the
agreement be a public document. principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so.

What is required is that the agreement be in writing as If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal
the rule is in fact founded on "long experience that debtor, the provisions of Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I of
written evidence is so much more certain and accurate this Book shall be observed. In such a case the contract
than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it is called a suretyship. (Emphasis supplied.)
would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the
terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker While a guarantor may bind himself solidarily with the
evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show principal debtor, the liability of a guarantor is different
that the from that of a solidary debtor. Thus, Tolentino explains:
parties intended a different contract from that expressed
in the writing signed by them." 11 Thus, for the parol A guarantor who binds himself in solidum with the
evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in principal debtor under the provisions of the second
any particular form, or be signed by both parties. 12 As a paragraph does not become a solidary co-debtor to all
general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a intents and purposes. There is a difference between a
similar nature are not subject to be varied or solidary co-debtor and a fiador in solidum (surety). The
contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence. 13 latter, outside of the liability he assumes to pay the debt
before the property of the principal debtor has been
By alleging fraud in his answer, 14 petitioner was exhausted, retains all the other rights, actions and
actually in the right direction towards proving that he and benefits which pertain to him by reason of the fiansa;
his co-makers agreed to a loan of P5,000.00 only while a solidary co-debtor has no other rights than those
considering that, where a parol contemporaneous bestowed upon him in Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I, Book
agreement was the inducing and moving cause of the IV of the Civil Code. 18
written contract, it may be shown by parol evidence. 15
However, fraud must be established by clear and Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I, Book IV of the Civil Code
convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence, states the law on joint and several obligations. Under
not even being adequate. 16 Petitioner's attempt to Art. 1207 thereof, when there are two or more debtors in
prove fraud must, therefore, fail as it was evidenced only one and the same obligation, the presumption is that the
by his own uncorroborated and, expectedly, self-serving obligation is joint so that each of the debtors is liable
testimony. only for a proportionate part of the debt. There is a
solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so
Petitioner also argues that the dismissal of the complaint states, when the law so provides or when the nature of
against Naybe, the principal debtor, and against the obligation so requires. 19
Pantanosas, his co-maker, constituted a release of his
obligation, especially because the dismissal of the case Because the promissory note involved in this case
against Pantanosas was upon the motion of private expressly states that the three signatories therein are
respondent itself. He cites as basis for his argument, jointly and severally liable, any one, some or all of them
Article 2080 of the Civil Code which provides that: may be proceeded against for the entire obligation. 20
The choice is left to the solidary creditor to determine
The guarantors, even though they be solidary, are against whom he will enforce collection. 21
released from their obligation whenever by some act of Consequently, the dismissal of the case against Judge
the creditor, they cannot be subrogated to the rights, Pontanosas may not be deemed as having discharged
mortgages, and preferences of the latter. petitioner from liability as well. As regards Naybe, suffice
it to say that the court never acquired jurisdiction over
It is to be noted, however, that petitioner signed the him. Petitioner, therefore, may only have recourse
promissory note as a solidary co-maker and not as a against his co-makers, as provided by law.
guarantor. This is patent even from the first sentence of
the promissory note which states as follows: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on
certiorari is hereby DENIED and the questioned decision
Ninety one (91) days after date, for value received, I/we, of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
JOINTLY and SEVERALLY promise to pay to the petitioner.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS at its office
in the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines the sum of SO ORDERED.
FIFTY THOUSAND ONLY (P50,000.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency, together with interest . . . at the rate Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
of SIXTEEN (16) per cent per annum until fully paid.

A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which

each debtor is liable for the entire obligation, and each

21 | P a g e
G.R. No. L-46943 June 8, 1978 office at tutuban Terminal, Azcarraga, Manila, herein
represented by P. T. CASES, its general Manager,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, petitioner, hereinafter called the DONEE.
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ALBAY, Branch I, WITNESSETH
presided by JUDGE ROMULO P. UNTALAN,
CARMEN MYRICK SALVACION MYRICK, CELSO That the DONOR is theowner in fee simple of that
MILLABAS, JOSEFINA MILLABAS, and CELERINA certain real property with the buildings and/or
MILLABAS, respondents. improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of
Taladong, Camalig, Albay, and more particularly
Jose B. Calimlim, Marcelino B. Bermudez & Natividad G. described in Original/Transfer Certificate of title no. Lot
Gepiga for petitioner. 3118 of the Land Registry of ALBAY PROVINCE, as
follows, to wit:
Madrid Law Office for private respondents.
A portion or 1/4 o fparcel of land situated in the barrio of
Taladong, Camalig, Albay, Philippines containing an
AQUINO, J.: area of THIRTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THREE
(13, 603) square meters more or less bounded on the N,
This certiorari and prohibition case is about the parol by Meliton Naz; on the E, by Pedro Moron; on the S, by
evidence rule. Louis Myrik; and on the W, by Pedro Moros; declared
under tax No. 19739 in the name of Cenon Zamora and
On September 28, 1971, Carmen Myrick, Salvacion assessed for ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
Myrick, and Celso, Josefina and Celerina, all surnamed THIRTY PESOS (P1,230.00). Said property was
Millabas, filed in the Court of First Instance of Albay a acquired by the donor by way of inheritance from his late
complaint to annul a supposed conditional donation of father Louis Myrik who likewise acquired the property by
two parcels of land located at Comum Camalig, Albay, way of Abslute Sale from Felix Nimo.
with areas of "47-52" and "1-25-00" square meters, a
donation which they had allegedly made in !963 to the That for and in consideration of his generosity and
Philippine National Railways (PNR). benevolence, as well as his love for public service, the
DONOR by this presents, transfers and conveys by way
The ground for the annulment was the alleged non- of DONATION, unto the said DONEE, its successors
fulfillment of the five conditions of the donation (Civil and assigns, a portion of the above-described real
Case No. 4507). No deed of donation or actionable property free from all liens and encumbrances,
document was annexed to the complaint. (See. sec. 7, tentatively described, as follows:
Rule 8, Rules of Court.)
A portion of SIX THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-
The PNR in its answer denied the donation for lack of EIGHT (6,188) square meters more or less traversed
sufficient knowledge thereof but it contradicted 'that and encroached by the MRRCo. Sorsogon RR Ext.
denial by stating in its affirmative defenses that the Project's right-of-way at Km. 464 ÷ 780 - ÷ 888.86 in the
donation was unconditionally made by the late Antonio J. above described property bounded on the N, by Antonio
A. Myrick and that the plaijtiffs are guilty of laches. No Myrik; on the E, by Dominador Muyo; on the S, by
deed of donation was attached to the answer to sustain Antonio J. A. Myrik and on the W, by Lot Nos. 3120-A &
the defense that the donation was pure and 3119-A; subject to the technical description that may
unconditional. (In the complaint it was alleged that hereinafter be made by the Survey TEam of the
Antonio was deceased brother of plaintiffs Carmen MMRCo, and the plan thereof approved by the Director
Myrick and Salvacion Myrick but it was not alleged that of lands; said donated portion will be used for railway
he was the donor or that the plaintiffs are his legal heirs.) tracks or railroad purposes.

At the hearing of the case on March 6 (11), 1974, while That the DONOR does hereby state, for the purpose of
plaintiff Salvacion Myrick was testifying, she was asked giving full effect to this donation that he/she has
to identify a deed of donation dated August 23, 1962 reserved for himself/herself in full ownership sufficient
made by her brother, Antonio, which is reproduced property to support him/her in a manner appropriate to
below (Exh. B or 1): his/her needs.

DEED OF DONATION That the DONEE does hereby accept this donation of
the above-described real property, and does hereby
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS express their gratitutde for the kindness and liberality of
the DONOR, and the acceptance thereof is to be
This DEED OF DONATION made and executed by executed in a separate instrument in the City of Manila,
ANTONIO J. A. MYRICK, of legal age, single/married to , Philippines.
with residence at , hereinafter called the DONOR, in
favor of the Manila Railroad Company, a government- IN WITNESS WHEREOF, THE DONOR have hereunto
owned corporation, duly organized and existed under set his/her hand this 23rd day of August, 1962, at
and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with principal Municipality of Camalig, Albay, Philippines.

22 | P a g e
 Q. Will you tell this Court the promise of the PNR
(Sgd.) ANTONIO J.A. MYRIK with respect to the execution of this Deed of Donation,
Exhibit B
DONOR
A. ATTY. ABELLERA (counsel of the PNR): I firmly
WITNESSES object to the question. Counsel is trying to elicit oral
evidence which is violative of the parol evidence rule.
1. (Sgd.) SALVACION E. A. MYRIK The Deed of Donation is very clear. It has no condition
whatsoever. If the condition now is place on the record
2. (Sgd.) LIBORIO MARMOL that will alter the condition of the donation.

(NOTARIAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT IS OMITTED) In view of that objection, the hearing was suspended.
The trial court ordered the parties to submit memoranda
DEED OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE AFORECITED on the issue of Whether or not that question should be
allowed under the parol evidence rule. That issue
DONATION: remained pending until the lower court, through
respondent Judge, resolved it ill the third of July 7, 1977,
The undersigned duly appointed General Manager of the now being assailed herein.
MRRCo. hereby these presents accept and receive the
abovementioned donation. The lower court held that the question should be allowed
the objection should be overruled because to allow the
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY witness answer the question would not be a
transgression of tilt parol evidence rule.
By
We hold that, under the pleadings and considering the
(Sgd.) P. T. CASES defense of lack of cause of action interposed by the
PNR, that lower court committed a grave abuse of
General Manager discretion in not sustaining petitioner's objection based
on the parol evidence rule. That rule is found in Rule 130
WITNESSES of the Rules of Court which provides:

1. (Sgd.)ILLEGIBLE 2. (Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. — When the

terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it
(NOTARIAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT IS OMITTED) is to be considered as containing all such terms and.
therefore, there can be, between the parties and their
It may be noted that the alleged donation was made in successors in interest, no evidence of the terms The
1962 to the Manila Railroad Company that it was made agreement other than the contents of the writing, except
by Antonio J. A. Myrick (Myrick) and not by the plaintiffs, in the following case:
now the private respondents; that the land donated is
located at Barrio Taladong (not Comun) Camalig and (a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing,
that the area of the land donated is 6,188 square meters. or it failure to express The true intent and agreement of
the parties, or the of the agreement is put in issue by the
After Salvacion Myrick had Identified the deed of pleadings;
donation quoted above, her counsel propounded the
following questions: (b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the
writing,
Q. You said that you know of the execution of this
Deed of Donation which is marked Exhibit 1 for the The term 'agreement' includes wills.
defendant and also marked as Exhibit B for the plaintiffs
during the pre-trial, and which I am also adopting now Section 7 requires that in order that parol or extrinsic
that the same be marked Exhibit B for the trial on the evidence may be admitted to vary the terms of the
merits, writing, the mistake or imperfection thereof or its failure
to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
Having known of the execution of this Deed of Donation. should be put in issue by the pleadings. In the instant
will not tell this Honorable Court why as a brother (sic) case, the plaintiffs did not expressly plead that the deed
and co-heir of your late brother Antonio, why you did not of donation was incomplete or that its execution was
sign in this Deed of Donation? vitiated by mistake or that it did not reflect the intention
of the donor and the donee.
A. (of Salvacion Myrick) Because the Philippine
National Railways should first comply with the promise in The plaintiffs in paragraph four of their complaint merely
the donation. alleged that the donation was subject to five conditions.
Then, they prayed that the donation should be annulled
or rescinded for noncompliance with those conditions.

23 | P a g e
At the trial they tried to prove those conditions by parol that five conditions were engrafted on the deed of
evidence. Obviously, they could not introduce parol donation which to the does not take any condition at all.
evidence to vary the terms of the agreement because How they came to know of those conditions, when they
they did not plead any of the exceptions mentioned in were not the donors, was not pleaded in their complaint.
the parol evidence rule. Their case is covered by the
general rule that the contents of the writing constitute the The private respondents contend that the rulings ot a
sole repository of the terms of the agreement between trial judge on the admission of evidence are reviewable
the parties. on appeal and cannot be assailed by means of certiorari
(Philippine Air Lines, Inc vs. Teodoro, 9 7 Phi1. 461);
Thus, it was held that where there is no allegation in the
complaint that there was any mistake or imperfection in That is the general rule, Where, as in this case,
the written agreement or that it failed to express the true petitioner's contention is clearly tenable and the lower
intent of the parties, parol evidence is inadmissible to court, in overruling the objection to the evidence,
vary the terms of the agreement (Villanueva vs. Yulo, committed a patent mistake amounting to a grave abuse
106 Phil. 1170). of discretion, the error may be corrected by means of
certiorari (De Laureano vs. Adil, L-43345, July 29, 1976,
On the other hand, if the defendant set up the affirmative 72 SCRA 148, 161).
defense that the contract mentioned in the complaint
does not express the true agreement of the parties, then As to private respondents' contention in their
parol evidence is admissible to prove the true agreement memorandum in the lower court that Antonio J.A. Myrick
of the parties (Enriquez vs. Ramos, 11 6 Phil. 525, 531; was not the absolute owner of the donated properties
Philippine Sugar E. D. Co. vs. Philippines, 62 L. Ed. See page 41 of Rollo). that ultimate fact should likewise
1177, 247 U. S. 385; Heirs of De la Rama vs. Talisay- have been alleged in their complaint,
Silay Milling Co., 54 Phil. 580, 588; Land Settlement and
Dev. Corp. vs. Garcia Plantation Co., Inc., 117 Phil. 761, WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of July 7, 1977 is
765). reversed and set aside. Costs against the private
respondents.
The plaintiffs or their predecessor, the donor, Antonio J.
A. Myrick, could have asked for the reformation of the SO ORDERED.
deed of donation. Instead of doing so, they asked for its
annulment or rescission on the theory that there was Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Santos, JJ.,
non-compliance with the supra resolutory conditions of concur.
the donation (See art. 764, Civil Code: Parks vs.
Province of Tarlac, 49 Phil. 142). Concepcion, J., took no part.

But whether the action is for revocation or reformation, it

was necessary for the plaintiffs, in order to prove that the
donation was conditional, to plead that the deed of G.R. No. L-39972 & L-40300 August 6, 1986
donation did not express the true intent of the parties.
Not having done so, their parol evidence on the alleged VICTORIA LECHUGAS, petitioner,
conditions is dismissible upon seasonable objection vs.
interposed during the trial by the donee's counsel. (Yu HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARINA LOZA,
Tek & Co. vs. Gonzalez, 29 Phil. 384; Soriano vs. Cia. SALVADOR LOZA, ISIDRO LOZA, CARMELITA
General de Tabacos de Filipinas, L-17392, December LOZA, DAVID LOZA, AMPARO LOZA, ERLINDA
17, 1966. 18 SCRA 999, 1015.) LOZA and ALEJANDRA LOZA, respondents.

Other considerations may be adduced to fortify the A.R. Montemayor for petitioner.
holding that the plaintiffs cannot prove the conditional
character of the donation. Arturo L. Limoso for private respondents.

It should be observed that the action for annulment was

brought by the alleged collateral relatives of the GUTIERREZ, JR., J:
deceased donor. Their capacity to bring the action has
not been specifically pleaded (See sec. 4, Rule 8, Rules This petition for review invokes the parol evidence rule
of Court: Concepcion vs. Sta. Ana, 87 Phil. 787). as it imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
appellate court for admitting and giving credence to the
The anomalous or odd situation in this case is that the testimony of the vendor regarding the sale of the
plaintiffs belatedly filed an action to annul (not reform) a disputed lot. The testimony is contrary to the contents of
donation made by their collateral relative. Evidently, they the deed of sale executed by the vendor in favor of the
had no copy of the deed of donation because they did petitioner.
not attach a copy thereof to their complaint. They were
not cognizant of the terms thereof. They did not know The petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry with
the exact date of the donation and the description, damages against the private respondents, alleging that
location and area of the lands donated- They pretended the latter by means of force, intimidation, strategy and

24 | P a g e
stealth, unlawfully entered lots A and B, corresponding BECAUSE LEONCIA LASANGUE CAN NOT SELL THE
to the middle and northern portion of the property owned LAND IN QUESTION IN 1950 SINCE IT WAS
by the petitioner known as Lot No. 5456. She alleged ALLEGEDLY SOLD IN 1941 BY HER FATHER
that they appropriated the produce thereof for EMETERIO LASANGUE.
themselves, and refused to surrender the possession of
the same despite demands made by the petitioner. The III
complaint was dismissed. Petitioner appealed to the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo where the case THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT CANNOT REFORM
was docketed as Civil Case No. 5055. THE DEED OF DEFINITE SALE BY CHANGING ITS
SUBJECT MATTER IN THE ABSENCE OF STRONG,
While the above appeal was pending, the petitioner CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND ON THE
instituted another action before the CFI of Iloilo for STRENGTH OF LONG TESTIMONY OF THE VENDOR
recovery and possession of the same property against AND ALTHOUGH NO DIRECT ACTION FOR
the private respondents. REFORMATION WAS FILED IN THE COURT OF
ORIGIN.
This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5303. The two
cases were tried jointly. After trial, the court rendered A summary of the facts which brought about the
judgment. The dispositive portion of the decision states: controversy is contained in the findings of the appellate
court:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is rendered,
to wit: Plaintiff (petitioner) Victoria Lechugas testified that she
bought the land now subject of this litigation from
a. dismissing the complaints in two cases; Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced by a public "Deed of
Absolute Sale" which plaintiff had caused to be
b. declaring defendants except Salvador Anona and registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds;
Jose Lozada as owners and lawful possessors of the preparatory to the execution of the deed Exhibit "A",
land in question together with all the improvements plaintiff had the land segregated from the bigger portion
thereon; of 12 hectares owned by Leoncia Lasangue by
contracting a private land surveyor, the Sirilan Surveying
c. dismissing the claim for damages of all Office, to survey the land on December 3, 1950 and
defendants except that of Jose Lozada; establish its boundaries, shape, form and area in
accordance with the said plan which was attached to
d. ordering plaintiff to pay defendant Jose Lozada the exhibit A as Annex A thereof. She also states that she
sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees and the amount of caused the declaration of the said portion of six hectares
P300.00 as litigation expenses; and subject of Exhibit A in her name beginning the year 1951
under tax declaration No. 7912, paid taxes on the same
e. ordering plaintiff to pay the costs of both proceedings. land, and has taken possession of the land through her
tenants Jesus Leoncio, Roberta Losarita and Simeon
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but the Guinta, who shared one-half of the produce of the
latter sustained the dismissal of the cases. Hence, this riceland with her, while she shouldered some of the
petition with the petitioner making the following expenses in cultivation and seeds, and one-third share
assignments of errors: in other crops, like coffee beans, bamboos, coconuts,
corn and the like.
I
xxx xxx xxx
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
CONSIDERING PAROL EVIDENCE OVER THE Plaintiff's declaration is corroborated by her tenant
OBJECTION OF THE PETITIONER IN ORDER TO Simeon Guinta who testifies that the land subject of the
VARY THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE DEED OF complaint was worked on by him 1954 when its former
DEFINITE SALE (EXHIBIT A) ALTHOUGH THE LAND tenant, Roberto Lazarita, now deceased, left the land. As
THEREIN IS DESCRIBED AND DELIMITED BY METES tenant thereof, he planted rice, corn peanuts, coffee, and
AND BOUNDS AND IdENTIFIED AS LOT NO. 5456 OF other minor products, sharing the same with the owner,
LAMBUNAO CADASTRE. plaintiff Victoria Lechugas; that on June 14, 1958, while
witness was plowing Lot A preparatory to rice planting,
II defendants entered the land and forced him to stop his
work. Salvador Anona and Carmelita Losa, particularly,
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN told witness that if he (witness) would sign an affidavit
CONSIDERING THE THEORY OF THE DEFENDANTS- recognizing them as his landlords, they would allow him
APPELLEES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL THAT to continue plowing the land. On that occasion, Salvador
THE LAND DESCRIBED IN THE DEED OF SALE Anona, David Loza and Jose Loza were carrying
(EXHIBIT A) IS LOT NO. 5522 INSTEAD OF LOT NO. unsheathed bolos, which made this witness very afraid,
5456 OF THE LAMBUNAO CADASTRE, THEIR so much so that he left the land and reported the matter
ORIGINAL THEORY BEING THAT THE DEED OF to Victoria Lechugas who reportedly went to the Chief of
SALE (EXHIBIT A) IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO Police of Lambunao to ask the latter to intervene. The

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advise however of the chief of police, who responded to Victoria Limor, and which sale was duly evidenced by a
the call of plaintiff, was not heeded by the defendants public instrument (exhibit 2, pp. 35-36, folder of exhibits).
who stayed adamantly on Lot A and refused to surrender This property had the following boundaries, to wit: on the
the possession thereof to plaintiff appropriating the north by Eladio Luno, on the south, by Simeon
harvest to themselves. This witness further declares that Lasangue, on the west, by Gregorio Militar and Emeterio
on June 24, 1958, defendants entered Lot B of the land Lasangue and on the east, by Maximo Lasangue and
in question, situated on the northern portion, and cut the Hipolito Lastica (exhibit 2, exhibit 2-B, p. 37, Id). After the
bamboo poles growing thereof counted by plaintiff's execution of the deed of sale, Exhibit 2, Hugo Loza
brother and overseer in the land, Bienvenido Laranja, to cause the transfer of the declaration in his own name
be 620 bamboo poles all in all. Despite the warning of (tax declaration No. 8832, exh. 2-C, p. 38, Id.) beginning
the overseer Laranja, defendants did not stop cutting the 1945, and started paying the taxes on the land (exhibits
bamboos, and they remained on the land, refusing to 2-d to 2-i, pp. 39-44, Id.). These two parcels of land (that
leave the same. To top it all, in June of 1959, purchased by Hugo Loza in 1941 from Emeterio
defendants, not contended with just occupying the Lasangue, and a portion of that bought by him from
middle and northern portions of the land (Lots A and B), Victoria Limor sometime in 1931) were consolidated and
grabbed the whole parcel containing six hectares to the designated, during the cadastral survey of Lambunao,
damage and prejudice of herein plaintiff, so that plaintiff Iloilo in 1959 as Lot No. 5456; while the remaining
was left with no other recourse but to file Civil Case No. portion of the lot bought from Victorina Limor, adjoining
5303 for ownership, recovery of possession and Lot 5456 on the east, was designated as Lot No. 5515 in
damages. the name of the Heirs of Hugo Loza. Defendants claim
that the lot bought by plaintiff from Leoncia Lasangue as
Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that the land evidenced by exhibit A, is situated south of the land now
which plaintiff bought from Leoncia Lasangue in 1950 as subject of this action and designated during cadastral
evidenced by the deed exhibit A, is different from the survey of Lambunao as Lot No. 5522, in the name of
land now subject of this action, and described in Victoria Lechugas.
paragraph 2 of plaintiff's complaint. To prove this point,
defendants called as their first witness plaintiff herself xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 6167, t.s.n., Tuble), to elicit from her the reason why
it was that although her vendor Leoncia Lasangue was Leoncia Lasangue, plaintiff's vendor in exhibit A,
also residing at the municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, testifying for defendants (pp. 182-115, t.s.n., Tambagan;
plaintiff did not care to call her to the witness stand to pp. 69-88, t.s.n., Tuble) declared that during his lifetime
testify regarding the Identity of the land which she her father, Emeterio Lasangue, owned a parcel of land in
(plaintiff) bought from said vendor Leoncia Lasangue; to Lambunao, Iloilo, containing an area of 36 hectares; that
which query witness Lechugas countered that she had said Emeterio Lasangue sold a slice of 4 hectares of this
tried to call her vendor, but the latter refused, saying that property to Hugo Loza evidenced by a deed of sale
she (Lasangue) had already testified in plaintiff's favor in (Exh. 2) dated March 17, 1941; that other sales were
the forcible entry case in the Justice of the Peace Court. made to other persons, leaving only some twelve
In connection with her testimony regarding the true hectares out of the original 36; that these 12 hectares
Identity of the land plaintiff, as witness of defendants, were transferred by her parents in her (witness) name,
stated that before the execution of Exhibit "A" on being the only child and heir; that on December 8, 1950,
December 8, 1950 the lot in question was surveyed (on she (Leoncia Lasangue) sold six hectares of her
December 3, 1950) by the Sirilan Surveyor Company inherited property to Victoria Lechugas under a public
after due notice to the boundary owners including instrument (exhibit A) which was prepared at the
Leoncia Lasangue. instance of Victoria Lechugas and thumbmarked by
herself (the vendor).
Defendant's evidence in chief, as testified to by
Carmelita Lozada (pp. 100-130, t.s.n., Trespeces; pp. Refuting plaintiff's contention that the land sold to her is
131-192, t.s.n., Tuble) shows that on April 6, 1931 Hugo the very land under question, vendor Leoncia Lasangue
Loza father of Carmelita Loza and predecessor-in- testifies that:
interest of the rest of the heirs of herein defendants,
(with the exception of Jose Loza and Salvador Anona) Q. But Victoria Lechugas declared here that, by means
purchased a parcel of land from one Victorina Limor as of this document, exhibit 'A', you sold to her this very
evidenced by the deed "Venta Definitiva" (exhibit 3, pp. land in litigation; while you declared here now that this
49-50, folder of exhibits). This land, containing 53,327 land in litigation was not included in the sale you made
square meters is bounded on the north by Ramon of another parcel of land in her favor. What do you say
Lasangue, on the south by Emeterio Lasangue and about that?
covered by tax declaration No. 7346 (exhibit 3-9, p. 67,
Id.) in vendor's name; that immediately after the sale, A. I only sold six (6) hectares to her.
Hugo Loza took possession of the said parcel of land
and declared the same in his name (exhibit 3-10, p. 67, Q. And that was included in this land in litigation?
folder of exhibits) starting the year 1935. On March 17,
1941, Hugo Loza bought from Emeterio Lasangue a A. No.
parcel of land with an area of four hectares more or less,
adjoining the land he (Loza) had earlier bought from xxx xxx xxx

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 conclusive. Petitioner maintains, moreover, that the
Q. Did you tell her where that land you were selling to respondent Court relied so much on the testimony of the
her was situated? vendor who did not even file a case for the reformation
of Exhibit A.
xxx xxx xxx
The contentions are without merit.
A. On the South.
The appellate court acted correctly in upholding the trial
Q. South side of what land, of the land in litigation? court's action in admitting the testimony of Leoncia
Lasangue. The petitioner claims that Leoncia Lasangue
A. The land I sold to her is south of the land in litigation. was the vendor of the disputed land. The petitioner
denies that Leoncia Lasangue sold Lot No. 5522 to her.
xxx xxx xxx She alleges that this lot was sold to her by one Leonora
Lasangue, who, however, was never presented as
Q. What portion of these thirty-six (36) hectares of witness in any of the proceedings below by herein
land did you sell actually, according to your agreement petitioner.
with Victoria Lechugas, and was it inside the thirty-six
(36) hectares of land or a portion on one of the sides of As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of
thirty-six (36) hectares? Court, the parol evidence rule does not apply, and may
not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation
A. It is on the edge of the whole land. against the other, where at least one of the parties to the
suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written
Q. Where is that edge? on the north, east, west or instrument in question and does not base a claim on the
south? instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument
or the relation established thereby. (Francisco on
A . This edge. (witness indicating the lower edge of the Evidence, Vol. VII, part I of the Rules of Court, p. 155
piece of paper shown into her) citing 32 C.J.S. 79.)

Q. Do you know what is east, that is, the direction where In Horn v. Hansen (57 N.W. 315), the court ruled:
the sun rises?
...and the rule therefore applies, that as between parties
A. I know what is east. to a written agreement, or their privies, parol evidence
cannot be received to contradict or vary its terms.
Q. Do you know where the sun sets ? Strangers to a contract are, of course, not bound by it,
and the rule excluding extrinsic evidence in the
A. The sun sets on the west. construction of writings is inapplicable in such cases;
and it is relaxed where either one of the parties between
Q. If you are standing in the middle of your land whom the question arises is a stranger to the written
containing thirty-six (36) hectares and facing the east, agreement, and does not claim under or through one
that is, the direction where the sun rises, where is that who is party to it. In such case the rule is binding upon
portion of land sold to Victoria Lechugas, on your left, on neither. ...
your right, front of you or behind you?
In the case of Camacho v. Municipality of Baliuag, 28
A. On my right side. (Witness indicating south). Phil. 466, this Court held that parol evidence which was
(Testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, pp. 209-211, rollo) introduced by the municipality was competent to defeat
(emphasis supplied). the terms of the plaintiff's deed which the latter executed
with the Insular Government. In his concurring opinion,
On the basis of the above findings and the testimony of Justice Moreland stated:
vendor Leoncia Lasangue herself, who although illiterate
was able to specifically point out the land which she sold It should be noted in the first place, that there is no
to the petitioner, the appellate court upheld the trial written instrument between the plaintiff and the
court's decision except that the deed of sale (Exhibit A) municipality, that is, between the parties to the action;
was declared as not null and void ab initio insofar as and there is, therefore, no possibility of the question
Leoncia Lasangue was concerned because it could pass arising as to the admissibility of parol evidence to vary or
ownership of the lot in the south known as Lot No. 5522 contradict the terms of an instrument. The written
of the Lambunao Cadastre which Leoncia Lasangue instrument that is, the conveyance on which plaintiff
intended to sell and actually sold to her vendee, bases his action was between the Insular Government
petitioner Victoria Lechugas. and the plaintiff, and not between the municipality and
the plaintiff; and therefore, there can arise, as between
In her first assignment of error, the petitioner contends the plaintiff and defendant no question relative to the
that the respondent Court had no legal justification when varying or contradicting the terms of a written instrument
it subjected the true intent and agreement to parol between them ...
evidence over the objection of petitioner and that to
impugn a written agreement, the evidence must be

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The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is The fact that vendor Lasangue did not bring an action for
misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the the reformation of Exhibit "A" is of no moment. The
controversy is between one of the parties to the undisputed fact is that the respondents have timely
document and third persons. The deed of sale was questioned the validity of the instrument and have
executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria proven that, indeed Exhibit "A" does not reflect the true
Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold is intention of the vendor.
between petitioner and the private respondents. In the
case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, There is likewise no merit in the contention of the
it was shown that what she really intended to sell and to petitioner that the respondents changed their theory on
be the subject of Exhibit A was Lot No. 5522 but not appeal.
being able to read and write and fully relying on the good
faith of her first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed her Respondents, from the very start, had questioned and
thumbmark on a piece of paper which petitioner told her denied Leoncia Lasangue's capacity to sell the disputed
was the document evidencing the sale of land. The deed lot to petitioner. It was their contention that the lot was
of sale described the disputed lot instead. sold by Leoncia's father Emeterio Lasangue to their
father, Hugo Loza wayback in 1941 while the alleged
This fact was clearly shown in Lasangue's testimony: sale by Leoncia to the petitioner took place only in 1950.
In essence, therefore, the respondents were already
Q. And how did you know that that was the attacking the validity of Exhibit "A". Moreover, although
description of the land that you wanted to sell to Victoria the prior sale of the lot to their father may have been
Lechugas? emphasized in their defenses in the civil cases filed
against them by the petitioner in the lower court,
R. I know that because that land came from me. nevertheless in their affirmative defense, the
respondents already raised doubt on the true intention of
S. But how were you able to read the description or Leoncia Lasangue in signing Exhibit "A" when they
do you know the description? alleged that..." Leoncia Lasangue, publicly, and in writing
repudiated said allegation and pretension of the plaintiff,
A. Because, since I do not know how to read and write to the effect that the parcel of land now in litigation in the
and after the document was prepared, she made me present case "WAS NOT INCLUDED in the sale she
sign it. So I just signed because I do not know how to executed in favor of the plaintiff ... .
read.
Consequently, petitioner cannot impute grave abuse on
xxx xxx xxx the part of the appellate court and state that it allowed a
change of theory by the respondents for the first time on
Q. What explanation did she make to you? appeal for in reality, there was no such change.

A. She said to me, 'Manang, let us have a The third issue raised by the petitioner has no merit.
document prepared for you to sign on the land you sold There is strong, clear, and convincing evidence as to
to me.' So, after the document was prepared, I signed. which lot was actually sold to her. We see no reason to
reverse the factual findings of both the Court of First
Q. Did you tell her where that land you were selling Instance and the Court of Appeals on this point. The
to her was situated? "reformation" which the petitioner questions was, in fact,
intended to favor her. Instead of declaring the deed of
xxx xxx xxx sale null and void for all purposes, the Court upheld its
having passed ownership of Lot No. 5522 to the
A. On the South. petitioner.

Q. South side of what land, of the land in litigation? WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit with costs
A. The land I sold to her is south of the land in against the petitioner.
litigation.
SO ORDERED.
Q. Did you tell her that before preparing the
document you signed? Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ.,
concur.
A. Yes, I told her so because I had confidence in
her because she is my first cousin. (pp. 198-207, rollo)

From the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion but

that Lasangue did not intend to sell as she could not
have sold, a piece of land already sold by her father to
the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents.

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