Corrosion, Metallurgy, Failure Analysis & Prevention
Corrosion, Metallurgy, Failure Analysis & Prevention
1.0 Introduction
1.1 Corrosion theory:
Corrosion is the disintegration of metal through unintentional chemical or electrochemical action,
starting at its surface. The best known case is the rusting of steel.
Corrosion process (anodic reaction) of the metal dissolving as ions generates some electrons, as
shown in Figure-1, that are consumed by a secondary process (cathodic reaction). The sites
hosting these two processes can be located close to each other on the metal’s surface, or far apart
depending on the circumstances. This simple observation has a major impact in many aspects of
corrosion prevention and control, for designing new corrosion monitoring techniques to avoid the
most insidious or localized forms of corrosion.
Corrosion processes are usually electrochemical in nature, having the essential features of a
battery. When metal atoms are exposed to an environment containing water molecules they can
give up electrons, becoming themselves positively charges ions provided an electrical circuit can
be completed. This effect can be concentrated locally to form a pit or, sometimes, a crack, or it
can extend across a wide area to produce general wastage.
According to this study, the attribution of responsibility for corrosion failures investigated was
broken down into the following –
Contributing factor % of total failures
Lack of proving: new design, material or 36 %
process
Lack of or wrong specifications 16 %
Bad inspection 10 %
Human error (operational) 12 %
Poor planning or coordination 14 %
Others 4%
Unforeseen 8%
Total 100 %
This data set clearly indicates that only 8% of corrosion failures were unforeseeable. In other
words, 92% of the corrosion failures could be preventable.
In deformed metals, the grains are deformed and grain structures are completely disrupted. In this
condition, the material is somewhat more reactive in electrochemical environments. Additionally,
the influence of impurities, inclusions, grain boundaries and differences in grain orientation may
also result significantly different electrochemical reactivates in metals and alloys.
Existence of more than one phase in an alloy usually results in poorer corrosion resistance than
equivalent single phase materials. Figure-4 shows multiphase steel alloys of different carbon
contents. While designing a corrosion resistant alloy, it is important to have a good combination
of mechanical, physical and fabrication qualities which tend to make the material structurally and
economically useful.
Sensitized stainless steels can deteriorate completely in strongly acidic solutions. Figure-5 shows
schematic illustration of stainless steel intergranular corrosion.
Figure-6 SCC in 316 stainless steel chemical process piping system (X300)
Macroscopically, SCC fractures have a brittle appearance. As detection of such fine cracks is
difficult, SCC is the most catastrophic for of corrosion. Figure-6 illustrates intergranular SCC of
a chemical process piping with crack following the grain boundaries. Chloride SCC in austenitic
stainless steel is characterized by multi-branched “lightning bolt” trans-granular pattern. SCC
cracks grow over a range of velocities (10 -3 to 10mm/h) depending on combination of alloy and
environment involved.
Preventing or reducing corrosion processes increases the productivity and efficiency of any plant.
The identification of the factors associated with the forms of corrosion can guide failure
investigators. A listing of the most important factors would ensure awareness of the complexity
and multitude of variables involved. Corrosion failure of metallic materials causes billions of
dollars globally every year. The lack of understanding will not only cost a lot of money it will
also cost human life. Some of the factors and information to be collected before, during and after
a corrosion failure investigation include the following:
1. Analysis of material failures
2. On-site investigations
3. Welding, soldering & brazing analysis
4. Chemical and mechanical testing (ASTM and NACE)
5. Metallographic analysis and investigations
6. Fracture mechanics
7. Engineering calculations
8. Atmospheric testing
9. Accident investigations and recreation of failure
10. Plastic & rubber investigation
11. Micro- and macro-photography
12. Surface analysis
13. Fractography: Fracture mode determination
14. Engineering mechanics analysis
15. Product specification
16. Corrosion testing & investigations (electrochemical and chemical exposure tests)
17. Root-cause failure determination
Failure itself is a human concept. Materials do not fail in and of themselves. They follow the laws
of nature perfectly. A part or equipment will fail only if it is loaded beyond its strength or made to
perform in environment for which it is not designed.
However, the increasing cost to replace equipment is forcing people and organizations to extend
the useful life of their systems. Mechanical forces, which have normally little effect on the
general corrosion of metals, can act in synergy with operational environments to cause the most
sudden failures by a localized corrosion mechanism. This necessitates adequate training of
personnel to predict damage caused by operating environments.
9.1 Rupture and Fire Near Carlsbad New Mexico August 19, 2000 - EPNG
Accident Synopsis:
5:26 a.m., Saturday, August 19, 2000 – A 30 inch diameter natural gas transmission pipeline
(from Texas and New Mexico to Arizona and California) operated by El Paso Natural Gas
Company (EPNG) ruptured adjacent to the Pecos River near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The released
gas ignited and burned for 55 minutes. Twelve persons who were camping under a concrete-
decked steel bridge that supported the pipeline across the river were killed and their three vehicles
destroyed. Two nearby steel suspension bridges (one bridge supported a water pipeline and a gas
gathering pipeline) for gas pipelines crossing the river were extensively damaged. According to
EPNG, property and other damages or losses totaled $998,296.
All three ejected pieces showed evidence of internal corrosion damage, but one of the pieces
showed significantly more corrosion damage than the other two. Pits were visible on the inside
surface of this piece, and various locations showed significant thinning of pipe wall. At one
location, a through-wall perforation was visible. No significant external corrosion damage was
visible in the three pieces or on the two ends of the pipeline remaining in the crater. Pieces were
cut from the ruptured pipeline segments and shipped to the Safety Board's Materials Laboratory
in Washington, D.C., for further evaluation.
The drip between block valve No. 6 and the rupture site, on examination, showed a blackish oily
powdery grainy material. At about 13 feet from the drip opening, this material filled
approximately 70 percent of the cross-sectional area of the drip. No significant material was
observed in the area just underneath and several inches away from the siphon drain at the closed
end of the drip. No significant internal corrosion was observed in the drip.
Dissolved O2 in an electrolyte could cause pitting and CO 2 being soluble in water, will form
carbonic acid, which is corrosive to carbon steel. H2S when dissolved in water, forms a weak acid
that could corrode carbon steel. These potentially corrosive constituents were present in the gas
that was being transported in the pipeline. Chlorides (enhances pitting corrosion) were observed
in all corrosion product/deposit samples
Chemical analyses showed that the pH (6.7-6.8) of the liquid collected at the Pecos River
compressor station plant inlet separator scrubber was more acidic than the pH (8.2) of the liquid
collected at Keystone compressor station inlet scrubber. Also, the material collected at pig
receivers (pH 6.2-6.3) and the inside material collected from a low spot on pipeline west of the
rupture (pH - 6.4) were more acidic than the material collected near the siphon drain area of the
drip (pH 8.9). The observed low pH in the samples could be a result of dissolved CO 2, and/or H2S
in the water, and/or intrusion of low-pH ground water into the gas supply.
Conclusion:
Water and contaminants such as chlorides, O 2, CO2, and H2S all likely contributed to the observed
corrosion damage. The Safety Board therefore concludes that the corrosion that was found in line
1103 at the rupture site was likely caused by a combination within the pipeline of microbes and
such contaminants as moisture, chlorides, O2, CO2, and H2S.
9.2 Explosion in railroad tank car at Bogalusa, Louisiana in October 23, 1995 - Gaylord
Accident synopsis:
3:55 p.m., Monday, October 23, 1995 – Yellow-brown vapors began leaking from the dome of a
railroad tank car that contained a mixture of nitrogen tetroxide (which is a liquefied poisonous
gas and oxidizer) and water stationed at the Gaylord Chemical Corporation plant in Bogalusa,
Louisiana, USA. The head on the B-end of the tank car failed about 4:45 p.m., resulting in one
end of the tank car jacket being torn away and thrown about 350 feet. The tank car was then
propelled 35 feet down the track and derailed at a track bumping block. Vapors continued to be
released from the opening in the tank car for another 36 hours until the chemical reaction that had
occurred within the tank was brought under control through neutralization and dilution. 3,000
people were evacuated from the area as a result of the vapor cloud. Of 4,710 people who were
treated at local hospitals, 81 people were admitted.