Islamic Studies (Islamabad) 28:1 (1989)

ISLAMIZATION IN PAKISTAN 1977 -1985

THE ULAMA AND THEIRPLACES OF LEARNING
S. JAMAL MAL'IK

As a dependent country Pakistan has been developing its

policies and implementing its development strategies in pursuance of
the aspirations raised by the metropoles reflected in the demands
of the worldmarket as defined by the world system theory1. The
process of determination had started before the creation of
Pakistan.

Not only was the economic and administrative set-up of

British India developed on colonial perceptions but also the
educational system rendering it 'to a 'dependent. education". At the
same time the traditional education as represented in the dini
madad (schools for religious education) was neglected by State
authorities and thus became marginalizeds. This tradition was
further pursued by the rulers of Pakistan. The theologians
('1TlamFi9)-since the majority of them was not directly part of the
strategies implemented by the representatives of metropolitan
interests and demands-became more conservative and individualis-
tic, leaving the secular functional approach to the formal
education sector. The dysfunctional education of the Ulamh*, the
policy-makers thought, could hardly contribute anything to their
conception of national process and progress. Accordingly the dini
m a d W and the &a* were considered outdated; outdatedness had
no place in modernizing Pakistan. However, both, the dini madcizh
as well as the formal education display particular functions in a
dependent system. The dini madiid have been senring the purpose
of absorbing a large part of the society that is not able to afford
formal education. In this regard one may mention the high ratio of
'drop outs' from the formal sector going into religious schools. Thus
the marginalized sector of education fulfilled certain functions. But
it also inherited a high degree of potential which could be
mobilized by the State by introducing certain measures, if needed,
in political as well as in economic crises.

In contemporary Pakistan these measures can be under-

stood as part of the Islamization process under General Zia ul
Haq which itself reflected the high degree of depehdence in

© Dr Muhammad Hamidullah Library, IIU, Islamabad. http://iri.iiu.edu.pk/

6 Islamic Studies, 28: 1 (1989)

economic as well as in normatic terms. Even i f the Islamization

might seem to be something very indigenous, it was reducible to
symbolisms or. the one hand and the State's desire to control
autochthonous and autonomous institutions on the other; both in
order to trickle down its ideology.

The paper is mainly based on empirical data which will

display the theorems given above.
I t is divided into three periods:
1. theAyubianEra(1958-1969)
2. the Bhutto Era (1971-1977) and
3. the Zia Era (1977-1985).
The measures undertaken by the three regimes are high-
lighted while those of the last one are dealt with at length.
Accordingly, the proposals of a National Committee on D.ini Madiib
(NCDEM), the curricular developments, the equivalence of the dini
m a d m certificates with those of the formal sector of education,
the Zakdt issue and the reactions of the %lam5' vis h vis these
measures are elab-orated. It has been assumed that the dini rnadiid
and the 'UlarnB' are realizing new functions and are displaying new
developments in the wake of the massive State intervention.
However, the approaches of all the different regimes are charac-
terized by State intekention and the tendency towards
centralization and uqification thus reflecting a continuity of State
interests.

THE AYUBIAN ERA

(1958-1969)
The Ulama of Pakistan seem not to have felt the need to
organize themselves and their places of learning vis h vis the
Pakistani state until 1959 although a few minor attempts were made
in the 1950s.

In 1959 the Government had promulgated the 'West Pakistan

Waqf Property Ordinance 1959' not only to "improve the quality of
Waqf properties"' but also to curb the UZama's position and to
establish Government rule over these autonomous institutions.
However, since there was no monolithic block of 'UlamB' to face
the official threat from a common platform, groups of religious
scholars formed according to different schools of thought, schools
that had emerged mostly in 19th century British India5.

In Pakistan four main organizations of dini madad emerged:

The Deobandis founded the "Wa6aq d-madad at-'amtzjyah"

in Multan in 1959.
The Brelwis the "Tan@n d-madad d-'aaabjqah" in Dera
Ghazi Khan in 1959.
I s l a i c Studies, 28: 1 (1989) 7

The Ahl-i-ljadith founded the "MaakazZ jambiyyat AM-i-

Ha&&' in Lyallpur (Now Fayval Abiid) in 1955.
The ~hi'ah dini madzris came together under the "Maj&A-i
na@&at-i@ah madiihid-i 6ambiyqah11in Lahore in 1958.
The Jamz'at-i Islami has been organizing its religious schools
since 1982 under the "Rabitat d-mad&& d-iA&miyyah" with
its centre in Lahore. One may assume that the incentives of
the jamzht display the politics of the "Rdbitat d-6ii&m d
h&miyyah", the Muslim World League.

These newly formed organizations of the dini madZris have

affiliations to politicaI parties which recruit their members mostly
from the students of their respective school of thought.
The main tasks of these organizations were to update the
curricula, to organize the dini madaris and to unify the
examination systems. A l l the four organizations did not succeed in
enacting their demands and programmes. Rather, the failures of
these madiiris organizations show the incapability of the religious
schools and the 'UlamB' to tackle the 'challenges' as were felt by
the Islamic avantgarde. This avantgarde is a product of colonial
traditions and pursues integrationist interests, i.e. integrating the
Islamic value-system into colonial structures. A considerable part
of the 'UlamZi' on the other hand seem to pursue an isolationist
approach rejecting the integration of colonial norms c .

In the curricular field these developments implied that the

Ulama had adopted the perception of their being backward, a
perception being cultivated since the colonial penetration
especially among the '~slamicavantgarde!

Analogous to the formation phase of the dini rnadaris not

only the Auqaf Ordinance 1961 was promulgated but also a
strategy elaborated to modify and to modernize the religious
schools attempting to convert the 'UlamB' into 'modem mullas'. This
strategy was further pursued by the setting up of the 'Advisory
Council of Islamic Ideology' and the 'Islamic Research Institute' in
1960 and 1962 respectively. The intention was to make Islam
compatible with the "challenges of time".

Regarding the reconstruction of the dini madaris curriculum a

National Committee was set ufi to elaborate a new syllabus.
According to the report of this committee the 'Ulama' were to
take "full part as citizens ..."
while the task was to "...
widen the
outlook of the D S r al-'Ulm students and to increase their mental
horizon". This was, however, only possible i f "unneccessary
non-religious subjects" were reduced from the current syllabi.'
The secondary level (classes 6 to 12) included subjects i.e.
Mathematics, English, Social Sciences, Modem Arabic Grammar,
Modem Arabic Rehtorics, more ljadith and Qur'Zn (at the cost of
8 Islamic Studies. 28: 1 ( 1989)

Philosophy, Logic) and certain books on Islamic Law. The highest

level (classes 13 to 15) included Modern Philosophy, English and
Hadith.

This approach implied a different notion of Islam by the

bureaucracy, a notion aiming at implementing modernity and
development strategies. Thus, religious education was not only
confined to Qur'Zin ljadith and Fiqh but implied the teaching of
modern subjects. The underlying policies of these attempts were not
only to curtail the ' ~ l a m ~ ' influence
s throughtState agencies like
the Awqaf Departments, but also to integrate them to a certain
degree. They should modernize the nation "help(ing1 the Government
and the society by selling fertilizers, opening poultry . farms,
distributing high yield seeds to farmers" etc.', indicating the
overall strategy of the time, that was the "Green Revolution".
These strategies aimed i.a. at reaching at least 45 thousand
students and teachers in more than 400 dini madzris.
THE BHUTTO ERA
(1971-1977)

While Ayub's approach towards the Ulama was a more

aggressive oney Bhutto prefered to propagate the obscure Islamic
Socialism pursuing rather a pacifying strategy towards the Maulanas
and Muftis. The Bhutto constitution being an outcome of mutual
consensus cf nearly all segments of the society gave a handsome
portion of power to the 'UliuG' through the 'Islamic Provisions'.
Accordingly the composition of the Council of Islamic Ideology
(CII) was changed: While there had been very few Ulama in this
institution during the Ayub regime their share under Bhutto
increased up to 5 in relation to 8 'seculars' (laymen, non-'urn').

In fact, the CII was to produce yearly reports of its activi-

ties and had to submit a final report after seven years of its
appointment. On the basis of that report the Parliament and the
Assemblies were to bring the laws of the Republic in accordance
with the Sharidah within two years. Thus Pakistan was supposed to
be islamized by 1981 '.
Regarding the religious schools, the certificates of these
institutions were proposed to be recognized as equivalent to B.A.
for the purpose of the dini rnadaris graduates to teach Islamic
Studies and Islamic Ideology in colleges. In order to have access
to other institutions and positions English was made compulsory for
the young rnau&asl1. This compulsion, however, was rejected by
the Ulama while the universities mostly did not appreciate the
equivalence scheme.

The proposals of the CII in 1975/76 reaffirmed these sugges-

tions: There should be total integration of the dini m a d m with
the formal system while the overall problem of lack of schools was
to be tackled through the mobilization of the dini ma&* as
Islanric Studies, 28: 1 (1989) 9

centres of learning. This displayed a pragmatic rather than a

religious approach. By the end of the Bhutto era the Government
felt the desire to revise the dini madaris cuMcula which could not
materialize due to internal pressures the regime had to face.
However, an attempt was made to introduce i.a. "the new scientific
and economic sciences" to the I m k and Khalibs under the
auspices of the Auqaf Department via the newly established Ulama
Academy.

THE Z I A ERA
(1977-1985)
With the promulgation of the Islamic system by General Z i a
ul Haq the Ulama and the dini mad- underwent certain changes.

The military regime seemed to have capitalized from the fact

that the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), vindicated by a
considerable part of the society was demanding 'ni@m-e mwtafii',
(the Muhammadan order); hence the Islamization was proclaimed as
the only way to adopt. Islamization thus being the policy for the
next years to come, i t was a basic requirement for t h e &@me to
bring the Ulama and the religious schools in line with its policy
and to secure their support as constituency of the islamizing junta.
Moreover, the regime had been organizing 'LJlarna- and Mashaikh-
Conventions' from time to time. The CII was to be one more
catalyst in this regard: In fact, the number of Ulama increased
from five in 1974 to eight in 1977 compared with 8 and 6
'seculars' respectively. This tendency became even more vigorous in
the composition of the CII in 1981: 11 Ulama vis a vis 8 'seculars'.
National Education Policy 1979 (NIP)
Just in the light of the National Education Conference 1977
which had stressed ideology and pragmatism as the fountainheads of
the education policies, the NEP and Implementation Programme 1979
stated to be "recognizing the great potentials of our indigenous
institutions and patronizing them". Once more integrative steps
were proposed by the State functionaries and a whole chapter was
dedicated to the' dini madSr5.s system. Realizing that the religious
schools "are do* all this (i.e. free education, boarding and
lodging) on self-fGancing basis by raising donations and through
other measures without costing anything to the national exchequer"
the concerned policy makers set up a five years 'budget for the
dini mad-. -
heavilv underestimating the financial needs of these
religious institutions representing only- 9% of the ma&risl income
in 1979.

The National Comrd.ttee on Dini bkd&k and its aftezmath

Consequently a committee was set up in order to conduct a
survey. Its proposals once more aimed at bringing the "madrassahs
in consonance with the requirements of modem age on the one
10 I s l d c Studies, 28: 1 (1989)

hand and the basic tenets and spirit of Islam on the other"I2
implying a different notion of Islam and what ought to be taught
in the religious institutions.

Accordingly a modernized curriculum was produced granting

a t least one third of the teaching time to modem subjects and
enlarging the time frame. The modem subjects were Islamic History,
General Science, Economics, Political Sciences, Comparative Religion,
Urdu, Persian while the books for most of the new subjects were to
be prescribed by the Department of Education (see also Appendix:
Different Curricula).

Concerning the administrative set-up a 'National Organization

of D-mi MadZtris' was proposed which was partially to be supenrized
by the Government while financially the dini m a r i s were to be
sponsored by the Central Government and the Auqaf Departments.
However, it was stated clearly that the Government had no
intention to intervene in the internal affairs of the dini ma&risls.

This approach meant not only to unify the dini mad&is and
to streamline them with the concept of 'basic needs' but was also
to produce material desires among the Ulama and their disciples1*.
These m a t e 6 1 desires were to be fulfilled through 'Islamic
technics' like the implementation of the Zakat system (Islamic
taxes; a divine duty).
The !slam propagated by the State-the official or State
Islam-has always had the tendency to curb autonomous and
autochthonous developments. As can be seen from the conception
of State-lslmi stated above, it is quite different from that being
prevalent a t the grassroots level, be i t the "Tariqah-lslam" as
represented by the vast majority of Pakistanis or be it the
"Shadah-Islam" as represented by the religious authorities, the
fuqahz' and ' u l d ' . In order to stabilize the power of the State
and its defenders and thus to cement the status quo the official
Islam-in contrast to Swab-and Tariqah-Islam-is used in a
way to overrun all autonomous movements.

The need for reform (is%?&) was felt by different segments

of the society, except a part of the 'Ularrd' from the Deobandi
school of thought (the Shia will not be considered here). They
rejected the proposals of the National Committee on D-mi Madi3r-k
by launching a nation-wide campaign calling the Government
'secular' (IZ h i ; lit. without religion) and expressing their fear of
becoming its toys and thus be controlled and subjected. The
campaign succeeded partially because of a well planned organiza-
tion of the Wafiiq al-Ma&ris aL6arabiyyah having an elaborate
network of religious schools.
 Islarnic Studies, 28:l (1989) 11

T& I : Maslak-wise Dini Madkis and their affiliations in Pakistan

1960 1971 1979 1983184 Jan. 1984

Deobandi 233 292 354(158) (945) (1097)

Brelwi 98 123 267(189) (557)
Ahle Hadith 55 47 126(67) (56) (76)
~hi'ah 18 15 41(16) (116)
JaZ4at I s l k i (13) (41) (57) (107)
not available 55 390 900

Sources: Ahmad 1 Pp. 705-708; Ahmad 11 pp. 691; ff&pota

RtpoJit pp. 194-197; different lists and registers of the respective
schools of thought as well as personal talks in ~an./Feb. 1986 in
Lahore and Multan with the concerned authorities.

Figures in parantheses display the affiliated d%i madHris only.

Table 1 indicates the popularity of the different schools of thought

(popularity is quantified according to the numbers of bii mad-).
The Deobandi school of thought is the most popular in Pakistan
followed by the Brelwi and the Ahle Hadith. These are followed by
the Shia and the Jama'at-e lslami madaris. A l l schools of thought
except the Deobandis manifest their concentration in the Punjab
a& display very little dissemination through dini madzris in other
provinces, at least upto 1979.
Besides this elaborate network there is the possibility of
influencing through family ties: I t is argued that the main bii
madark that led the campaign are the property of one or two
families being descendants of the famous Maulh6 Ashraf 'Ali
Thanawi. (d. 1941) Finally the campaign received momentum by
the non-conformist approach of Mufti Mahmud (d. 1980) the
leader of the PNA against Bhutto and the president of the Wafaq
al-MadIris. Accordingly the Draft Ordinance for the diii madZris,
elaborated by the concerned Ministry and resembling very much the
Ordinance of the lslamic University 1980 had to be given up.

Fipivalence and Cumicula

With the new announcement of the equivalence of the dini
madaris certificates with the formal school certificates in 1982 a
new dimension emerged. This equivalence was to be granted only if
the dini madZris .were to produce a 16 years curriculum with a
considerable part of 'modem ~ u b j e c t * ~ ,just in conformity with
12 Islanic Studies. 28: 1 (1989)

the demands of the Halepota Report. The Wafaq as well as the

Brelwi Tanzim produced modified syllabi, nevertheless not changing
much of their subjects. Both schools of thought were able to
stretch their curricula from 8 to 9 years to 16 years thus claiming
the entitlement of equivalence (subjects like Diniyat, Urdu and
Persian were prerequisits for the Dars-i Nizami anyway (compare
Appendix. different C u r r i ~ u l a ) ) ' ~ .Once more the dini mafiris
organizatiors succeeded in preserving parts of their autonomy at
least for the time being.

As can be seen from Table 1 the number of affiliated dini

maaris of each school of thought increased considerably during
the last years. This is due to the equivalence of the d-mi ma&&
certificates on the one hand and the financial support through the
Zakat system on the other. In fact, the affiliation is being
undertaken with the view towards being recognized by official
norms. An interesting development, however, is-what can be called
a formative phase-among the different dini madgris and the
Wafaqsflanzims as can be seen from Table 1; the Deobandis have
been able to disseminate their cause even in other provinces,
especially in Sindh. Similar tendencies can be disclosed for some
other schools of thought. While the majority of the Ekelwis and the
Ahle Hadith is still confined to the Punjab the Shia have been
developing the Northern Areas to be their stronghold. The
Jama'at-e Islami on the other hand have preferred to propagate
their cause in the NWFP.

With the equivalence scheme we not onIy witness a sharp

increase in the number of dini ma- but als; in the number of
graduates which has been spectacular. While the production of
Ularna was 5,611 during 1960 to 1980 it increased during 1981 to
1985 to 6,230 (see: The boom of graduates).

These developments imply a considerable potential and

mobility among the dimi m a d W and their leaders, in fact of all
schools of thought. However, they have been developing this
eagerness of dissemination and institutionalization only in reaction
to the attempts of intervention made by the State, that is to say
that the motivational incentive was produced by the officials.
Moreover, one may see a tendency towards regionalization among
different schools of thought and thus a concentration of different
Islams in different regions.

The main measure introduced by the Government was,

however, the Zakat system that was implemented in 1980 and which
brought about a considerable change in the financial matters and
pattern of the dim1 ma&&. The Zakat and Ushr Ckdinance 1980 :

(ZUO) once more is an example for a religious matter elaborated

upon not by religious scholars but basically by a secular body and
implemented in its most pragmatic form. The ZUO had been a target
Islanric Studies, 28:1 ( 1989) 13

of severe criticism, both from the Ulama as well as from the

'seculars'. However, in order to pacify the theologians-who,
however, mostly considered and still consider the ZUO not to be in
accordance with Shari'ah-a Zakat scheme was installed according
to which a considerable part of the society was to benefit, i.a.
the Ulama and their disciples. In accordance with the pattern of
disbursement prescribed by the Central Zakat Administration (CZA)
the Provincial Zakat Administrations (PZAs) have to disburse the
total amount of Zakat received from the former in compliance with
a fixed scheme providing i.a. 10% for the dini maGris and their
students annually from the Provincial Zakat Funds (PZ Funds). But
in the years 1980-84 merely Rs 98,303,700 were transferred to the
dini maGris representing 3.5% of the total Zakat money disbursed.
The following year, however 9.4% was transferred to the dini
madZris alone. This meant a remarkable increase in the money
disbursed to the Ulama and their students.

Zakat money is the right of the poor and as such had to be

disbursed accordingly. Thus i t should be assumed that Zakat from
the PZ Funds was to be disbursed among those dini ma&ris which
have low incomes and could not look after their students properly.
Cne main finding of the Halepota Report was that the diii madiiris
had lower incomes than expenditures. Accordingly, i t was one of
the main demands of the Committee on D-mi Madaris to support the
dini maGris financially. The policy-makers, however, tended to
sponsor the 'prominent' madaris and their students. In fact, those
receiving Zakat a t least during the first disbursements were well
established dini ma&ris and hence had considerable budgets1'.

The start of disbursement was made by giving Zakat to 825

dini ma&ris through PZAs making only 47% of the 1,745 dini
madiiris surveyed in the Report of 1979. In the subsequent years
we see a steady increase of dini mad&% as well as beneficiaries
except in 1983/84. The number of 825 din7 maGris increased to
1,373 in 1982/83 and reached 2,273 in 1984/85, a nearly three fold
increase. Simultaneously, the number of benefiting students
increased from 67,201 in the first year to 111,050 in 1984/85
impIying that nearly twice as many students benefited in 1984/851'.

In order to benefit from the Zakat scheme the dini madikis

have to be registered and hence are subject to scrutiny. This
scrutiny also implies an exposure of the privacy and autonomy of
the dini ma&ris, a fact that produced problems as we will see
later.

A PZ Ulama Committee, consisting of Ulama of different

schools of thought of equal members-at least in Punjab-looks
after the dini mai . r i s affairs. This committee has framed a scheme
according to which the dini m a w were to be sponsored. The first
scheme which only provided funds ranging from Rs. 10,000 to
Rs. 20,000 annually/dini ma&& was too limited to bring about a
change in the dini ma&ris pattern and was therefore enhanced.
14 I s l d c Studies. 28: 1 ( 1989)

While the first scheme had categorised the blni mad&% into three
levels, the scheme of 1981/82 provided ten categories, ranging from
Rs. 15,000 to Rs. 70,000 annually/dini mad&%. Moreover, the
criteria to receive a certain Zakat amount were no more confined
to the number of students only but were enlarged to the curricula
also. Now the first three categories of dini mad&& had to offer
the highest standards of learning (dawmh &dtth; since in the
equivalence scheme this stage is equal to M.A.). These three
categories are followed by two 'secondary' categories (mawqiid
'a4ayh; now equal to B.A.) and two dars-i ni@ni categories (the
classical religious course in the Subcontinent, usually six years of
study). These seven categories are folLwed by three categories of
memorization and reading of the holy Qur'k (Qifz and Mzirah).
The scheme in 1982/83 enhanced the funds for the dini m a d W
reaching its peak in 1983/84: now the highest amount for those
institutions having more than 200 boarders and offering dawmh
ha&& as well as dars-i ni@mi and spending more than Rs. 300,000
bn construction costs annually, received Rs. 300,000 from the PZ
Council. This amount meant an increase of 300% for the higher
levels during the years 1981-84 while the middle categories
(secondary=mawqiif) display a somewhat modest increase. The
categories from 'mawqiiP downwards to the tenth category (!if?
and Mzirah) however suffer from a policy neglecting them.
In fact, we witness relatively little increase in these
categories ranging from 33% to 50% during the same period19. This
implies a particular policy towards the bli madFxk displaying the
intention to support the larger dini madris which are mainly to be
found in urbanized areas a t the cost of smaller ones which are
prevalent in rural areas. Notwithstanding the increase of the
number of beneficiaries- which is primarily because of the
tremendous increase of small and new established mab.tabo (small
6-i mad5x-k)-there seems to be further urban hegemony a t the
cost of what is called "ruralization of education".

It has been estimated that the Zakat, being disbursed by the

Government among the dini madZris, bears a significant impact. The
overall increase in the budgets of the dini mad&.% is mainly
because of the Zakat money pouring in from the PZ Councils.
Admittedly, there are some differences among the dini madaris
concerning Zakat share in their budgets. I t can, however, roughly
be said that this share amounts to one third of the total income
of a m a h u h per year. At the same time the PZA's donations are
equal to 50% of the traditional Zakat income received by din1
ma&ris through private channels. The PZ fund amount has been
increasing steadily-as we have seen-thus bearing a momentum of
dependence. However, a t the same time, i t is calculated that the
traditional sources of income for the bli m a w were not
affected by the ZUO.

The reluctance of the CZA towards smaller dirii mad- poses

the question as to how indigenous institutions can eradicate
Islamic Studies. 28:l (1989) 15

illiteracy if they are not sponsored properly. The decline of Zakat

payments to the smaller and remote dini rna&ris was probably to
stop the 'mushroom-growth' of the bini ma&ris (see also:
Equivalence and Curricula).

Table 2 ?tegistered institutions in Punjab, 1974-1985' shows

the tremendous -increase of the d-mi madiiris in Punjab from 1974 to
1985. Other provinces display similar tendencies.

-- - - --
T& 2: Registered institutions in Punjab, 1974-1985(+)
Year of Total dini Private
registration nunber Z madaris (Z) Schools < Z)
of regd.
instit.

Saurce: Investigations in the Punjab Stock Company (Punch

House, Lahore, 16./17./23. Feb. 1986)

(+) = For the years 1984 and 1985 Sargodha and Gujranwala
Divisions have not been subject t o investigations.

In fact, the increase of these institutions has outnumbered

all other kinds of institutions registered during this period for
educational and religious purposes under the Societies Act 1860.
This is especially true for the more remote areas where formal
education-here represented through private schools,-is restricted
due to different problems. In the rural areas, we witness the
substratum for the mushroom-growth of the dini m a w being
mostly confined to the teaching of Qur'k, some degree of primary
education and being located in mosques. Accordingly, the
percentage of dimi ma&ris in relation to the total number of
registered institutions in urbanized divisions like Rawalpindi and
Lahore is much lower than that in rural divisions like Dera Ghazi
Khan and Bahawalpur. While the former two display 58 and 140 dini
madzris (both 17% of their total number of registered institutions)
16 I s l d c Studies, 28:l (1989)

respectively in 1984, the corresponding figures for Dera Ghazi Khan

and Bahawalpur divisions are 85 dini m a w (58%) and 134 dini
ma&ris (60%) respectively. The data on the 'private schools',
however, reflect a different but corresponding picture: here the
divisions of Rawalpindi and Lahore show many more private schools
than the other two divisions.

The peak of both, the dini ma&ris and the private schools
was in 1983/84 while both declined in 1984/85. Concerning the
private schools this might indicate the saturation of the market in
the more urbanized areas. The diii ma&*, however, seemed to
have responded to the Zakat disbursement policy indicating a
commercial character of the new established dini ma&ris. Moreover,
i t has been possible for the State to channel and control the dini
madZris via Zakat.

THE BO(IM OF GRADUATES

A s hinted a t earlier there has been a signjficant increase

among the maulanas in general and among different schools of
thought in particular. From Chart 1 we may derive the following
statements: From 1960 to 1985 (26 years) a total number of 11,841
'registered9 maulanas were produced in Pakistan. Out of these
11,841 maulanas 69% were produced only between 1978 and 1985
while in the 18 years, from 1960 to 1977 i t had been merely 3,643
or 31%.

Since 1981, which was the year of the implementation of the

Equivalence scheme as well as the consolidation of the Zakat
scheme, the number of graduates increased spectacularly. While
there were only 1,968 graduates during the early period of General
Zia (1978-801, their number became 2,629 during 1981-83. In the
following- two years the production of the maulanas reached its
culminating point with 3,601 or 30% of all graduates (this tendency
might go on for the next years to come).

A s can further be seen from the chart we may witness a

very sharp increase of the number of graduates of the Ahle Hadith,
who have been organizing its graduates from 1978 onwards. Their
relative share is but only 11%.
The Brelwis, who have been organizing their graduates more
comprehensively since 1974 have been producing 30% of all
'registered' maulanas (3,557). A constant number of graduates can
be seen from 1978 onwards.

The Deobandis once more display the most popular stand. The
WafZq has been producing 57% of all the 11,841 maulanas during
the years under scrutiny. As can be seen, the Waf2q is active
since 1960. The sharpest increase, however, is during 1984 and
1985. The Shia have been starting to produce graduates under the
I s l d c Studies. 28: 1 (1989) 17

auspices of their WafFiq since 1984 and have been able to produce
at least 299 graduates or 2.56% of the total number of the
graduated maulanas.

It can further be elaborated that the Brelwis and the Ahle

Hadith seem to have reacted much earlier to the official measures
implemented by the Government than the Deobandis and the Shi'ah.
While we can see a sharp increase of the first two schools of
thought since 1978, we witness an equivalent increase for the
latter two only from 1984 onwards.

There is no doubt that the Shi'ah and parts of the

Deobandis are not conformists; this might be a reason of their
delayed positive reaction to the official policies. The Brelwis and
the Ahle Hadith who have heavily been profiting from the Zakat
scheme seem to reflect a more conformist character even if there
are some exceptions among their 'Uam1'.

We may conclude that the number of graduates has been

increasing significantly just-as it seems to be-in conformity with
the Zia regme's policies. The problem, however, will arise when
these officially recognized maulanas will not be integrated
properly, i.e. if they become a mismatch. Then there is the
possibility of their becoming a boomerang for the government.

Identifying the graduates

While identifying the graduates of the dini m a a r k regarding

their places of origin as well as places of graduation one may
acquire insight into the geographical and social background of the
'clergy) in Pakistan. This has been done here paradigmatically for
the students and maulanas of the Brelwi school of thought. These
students have been candidates in the examinations conducted under
the guidelines of the 'Tanzj~n a1 MadZris al-'arabiyyah' in dawrah
Qadith, the highest degree of religious learning.

According to Table 3, 'Province and year-wise dissemination

of Brelwi graduates' the majority of the Brelwi candidates belong
to the Punjab province (73%) followed by Azad Kashmir (A.K.),
NWFP, Sindh and Baluchistan.
 18 I s l d c Studies. 28: 1 (1989)

Tub& 3: Pn>vince and year-vise d- m tion of Brelwi graduates

Province 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 t o t a l 2 Population

o f origin i n 1981

PUII;IAB 110 89 82 61 107 316 765 73.0 47,292,441

SIN0 10 7 4 10 13 37 81 7.7 19,028,666
NUFP 14 17 9 6 4 38 88 8.4 11,061,328
BALUCH. 1 1 4 2 2 10 20 1.9 4,332,376
A.K. 10 11 10 5 14 36 86 8.2
OTHERS - - - 1 7 8 0.8

TOTAL 145 125 109 85 140 444 1048 100.0 84,253,644

Source: Registers of the graduates of the Tanzim al-Mad6ris a l -

'arabiyyah for the years 1974-1979, Lahore (cyclostyled), calculations
thereof and 1981 C ~ W Repoat 06 Paki4tan (Islamabad, 1984).

The main centers of origin are Sahiwal (143=13.6%) and

Multan districts (86=8.2%) while Dera Ghazi Khan and Muzaffargarh
districts together comprise 91 graduates (8.7%). I t may be noted
that very few graduates come from Lahore, Rawalpindi and
Faisalabad districts (total 66 graduates=6.3%), implying a rural
rather than urban background of the maulanas of the Brelwi school
of thought. In fact, most of the graduates originate from remote
areas around the respective dim1 mad&% usually staying there upto
graduation. Their family background is that of s m a l l landholders
and/or landless peasants while only 214 graduates (20.4%) could
claim to descend from traditional religious familiesL'.

Concerning the places of graduation 840 graduates (80.2%)

who have graduated in Punjab have been analysed in the Table -4:
 I s l a i c Studies, 28:1 ( 1989) 19

Tab& 4: Places of graduation of Brelwi Ulama in Punjab, 1974-79

District/Town N-r o f graduates

LAHORE 162

RAUALPINDI 64
OTHERS 104

TOTAL 840

Source: Registers of the graduates of the Tanzim a1 Madiris

al-'arabiyyah for the years 1974-1979, Lahore (cyclostyled), calculations
thereof.

Once more Multan and Sahiwal districts turn out to be the

main centres while Lahore and Faisalabad have been gaining
students because of their having traditional Brelwi centres of
learning. Rawalpindi attracts merely 64 graduates. The total number
of Ulama having been graduated in Sindh is 180 while 144
-
qraduated in the din1 madzris of Karachi. T k NWFP represents 20
graduates mainly in Peshawar, Mardan and Bannu. Baluchistan
comprises only 0.8% of the students.

These findings display the areas of recruitment a s well a s

settlement of the Brelwi Ularna. I t has been argued that before
partition the Brelwi school of thought was not very popular in the
present Pakistan and was confined to what is now India. With the
migration (hijrah) in 1947 lots of East-Punjabi refugees became
residents of those areas which are called canal colonies. From here
the Hindu citizens had migrated to India and thus a place of living
was provided for the Muslim migrants. Moreover, the predominance
of veneration of holy men in the Punjab-especially in and around
Multan, Sahiwal and Dera Ghazi Khan districts-gave room for the
dissemination of the popular, peasant oriented Brelwi school of
thought.

The Deobandi graduates have different ideological centres,

their stronghold being the NWFP and Afghanistan while DZr al-'ULk
Ijaqqkiyyah, Akora Khattak (Peshawar district) is the centre of
the production of the Deobandi 'UlamZt9, a t least up to 1980. Once
more the graduates originate from rural areas, few of them coming
20 Islamic Studies. 28: 1 (1989)

from religious families. The centres of recruitment are Mansehra,

Afghanistan, Mardan, Peshawar, Bannu, D i r and Dera Ismail Khan
districts (according to predominance) while the only outstanding
districts of a province other than the NWFP are Multan and
Muzaffargarh. I t may be pointed out that 1/3 of the Deobandi
Ulama are produced in the DZr al-'Ulk Haqqsniyyah while about
22% of these graduates originate from Afghanistan. Indeed, the ties
to Afghanistan are very old and date from the days of the
beginning of the DZr al-'Ulk Deoband in India".

The Ahle Hadith graduates display a different picture, being

confinable mainly to a few districts of the Punjab which can be
called the commercial centres of this province like Faisalabad,
Okara, Qasur, Sahiwal and Gujranwala, while only 7.1% could claim
to descend from religious background.

It may be concluded that the majority of the d-mi madzris

graduates-and thus the 'ulamZP-originate from areas not having
been directly targets of development strategies on the one hand
and displaying a relatively high number of tenants on the other".
This can be traced for the Brelwis as well as for the Deobandis as
well as for the Ahle Hadith schools of thought. One may say that
the migration even in this sector of education towards u r k n
c e n t r e s can be seen as a result of regional disparities brought
about by tendentious planning. This is very striking since there has
been a large shift from the graduate producing areas like Peshawar
and Multan to Karachi during the last few years. The emerging
conflict potential in Karachi can also be seen on that background.
Jihad, Islamization and the Ulama
In order to mobilize the masses for the defence of the
geographical borders, old traditions and perceptions of 'Gh~zi',
'Shahid', 'Jihad' and 'Muj1hid' have been revived from time to time
as has been for example the case during the Ayub regime. The
'Soviet Threat* to ideological Pakistan has been a nightmare for
the regimes; the reasons for which may be varied and numerous.
Being determined externally, the Pakistan/Islam ideology is to build
a buffer against the communist chimare. In fact, the Ularna of
Pakistan felt tantalized by socialism, even if i t was an 'Islamic
Socialism' (whatever i t may be). With the prelude of 'ni@m-e
mtqiafZ' and the Zia regime the maulanas, muftis and their students
seem to have gained ground fighting against the irreligiousness (11
dimiyyat) of communist ideology. The CII on the other hand has
always been proposing to suspend all agnostic and socialist
tendencies and the removal especially of teachers and professors
from their posts if they were known to hold such views. These
proposals have been put into practice by the Zia regime.

The Jama4at-i IslZmi, one of the political parties in Pakistan,

which is known for its close cooperation with the Zia Government
Islanu'c Studies, 28: 1 ( 1989 21

seems to have a clear-cut approach towards socialism. It is

assumed, that the Jama'at is heavily engaged in the Afghanistan
Jihad. This is not only indicated by its contribution to the Jihad by
material it publishes but also by the fact that the Jarnadat has
been constantly building up religious schools in the NWFP. It is
striking that 19 out of 20 d-mi maaris in these areas were
established after the Soviet intervention 1979 and 13 out of these
20 were established in Dir district and Bajor Agencyz3, both areas
directly linked to the Afghanistan territory.

This is only one branch of the diii madaris and Ularna

engaged in Jihad. The Deobandi school of thought for its part
claims to be the actual leader in the Jihad being fought in
Afghanistan. Especially the Dlr aLLUIk ljaqqaniyyah in Akora
Khattak (which has been producing 1/3 of the Pakistani Deobandi
Ularna) is of the view that the leading mujzhidin have studied in
this DBr al-'Ulk. Consequently the Afghan issue is dealt with
exhaustively in its monthly magazine 'al-ljaqqSz5. Although any
evidence of direct military training in this madrasah could not be
located, there is no doubt that Jihad is disseminated a t least
morally; in fact, about 40% of the 600 boarders there are from
Afghanistan and a lot of them reportedly go for Jihad and "this
does not disturb the classes during the year". This indicates the
support of Jihad in Afghanistan by this DZr al-'Ulum. The latest
official survey on diii madaris conducted by the Ministry of
Education displays a keen interest in the religious educational
institutions of the NWFP which were surveyed exhaustively while all
other provinces were neglected. One reason for this tendency might
be the consideration t o mobilize the dini rnadBris as centres-of
resistance to the Soviet threat in one way or the other. According
to the information from the concerned Ministry there were 7002
Afghan students in the dini madiiris of the NWFP in 1982
representing 9% of the students of that province. Accepting ethnic
links among the Pakhtuns of Pakistan and Afghanistan a
mobilization-of diii madaris students for the Jihad seems to be very
easy.

RESISTANCE

The Moaning Newh from Karachi stated: "Since the

introduction of the Zakat system, the Deeni Madaris have voiced
complaints that their source of private donations have dried" while
according to our calculations this is not the case and cannot be
verified. However, a considerable resistance among the dini madgris
and the 'UlamB' during the Islamization period under General Zia ul
Haq cannot be denied. Zakat, therein proves to be one of the main
pegs of criticism and political resistance.

While the CZA was of the view that the diii ma&ris should
be subject to bookkeeping and auditing and should be supervised in
order to guarantee a proper Zakatflow, this bureaucratization of
22 Isl&c Studies. 28: 1 (1989)

religious education was rejected by a large number of 'UlamS'. They

argued that this meant a supervision of the internal affairs of the
dini m a d m and an usurpation of the Ulama's status not only by
the State but also by the students. Moreover, since the dini
ma- were affiliated to one political party or the other, this
intervention implied a political supervision and control of the
parties by the state.

The CZA cited the daily Urdu Jtv&at according to which the
Sindhi dini madris were not accepting the Zakat amounts disbursed
by the PZA. Formally i t was because the Zakat system was not
according to the Shari'ah and the muftis had not agreed upon it
yetz5, basically this approach had political implications.

Once more this was a campaign launched by the Deobandi

organization Wa@q &-Mad&& &-'anabiyyah which had proclaimed
the boycott of the Zakat system in June 1981. According to the
'education director' of the Wafaq the Zakat is held to be a
political bribe ~ w a t and
] could not be accepted. This was
in line with the fatwa given by Mufti Mahmud in 1980, the then
leader of the PNA. It has been said that nearly all Sindhi dini
mad5ris affiliated with the Wafaq were not taking Zakat "because
of the particular situation of Sindh"z6. This can be verified by
the fact that neither the PZA Sindh has yet (autumn 1986) chalked
out a scheme for the disbursement of Zakat among the dini m a w s
nor was the amount distributed among the religious schools worth
mentioning. In fact, during the first three years of the Zakat
system the Sindhi dini mad3ris received merely 1.8% out of the
total amount disbursed among them from the PZAs. Similarly there
were only 45 dini macaris (1.3% of all benefiting religious schools
in the three years) profiting from the scheme in Sindh. Admittedly
the numbers of both, the d b i madaris and the students as well as
the amounts disbursed increased rapidly since 1984. But this was
mainly because of the recipients belonging to schools of thought
other than the Deobandi one.
As has been said earlier the Deobandi dim1 mafiris were
increasing in number in the province of Sindh and a t the same time
do not receive Zakat. Simultaneously there is a heavy resistance in
Sindh, forcing the State to intervene even more radically. On the
other hand those schools of thought that are not very popular in
Sindh (vide page 9 and 10) are being supported heavily by the
State. Thus the State might have the opportunity to intervene into
provincial upheavals through conformist Ulama and their places of
learning.

We may state that the Zakat has been trickling down to the
dinl ma&& especially among the Brelwis and the Ahle Hadith even
in Sindh. A fraction of the Deobandis continue the tradition of
political resistance that was reflected also in the 16 years
curriculum dealt with earlier (Table 5. Different Curricula).
Moreover, since every school of thought and WafSq/Tanz-%n is
Islamic Studies, 28:l (1989) 23

affiliated with a political party in one . way or the other the

resistance of the &mi ma&ris might be reflected in the political
parties which have been legalized lately. One may say that some
dini m a a r k represent vehicles of regional nationalism.

CONCLUSION
The issues of Zakat and curricula only constitute a fraction
of the Islamization policy and the resistance which is voiced by
heavy criticism not only among the mama.

The basic idea underlying the reformist approach of the Z i a

regime towards the Ularna was to reintegrate them into given
structures-only up to a certain degree-and mobilize them for its
interests. Pakistan has been displaying a high degree of dependency
on external and alien pressures enacted mostly by a small ruling
elite in Pakistan. This segment being part of the international
system and being integrated into the internal circles of the world
culture aims a t subjecting all other segments of, the society-as
defined by world system theory, one of them being the Ulama and
the dini madris. - In fact, the victims are not only integrated
partially into the establishment but are also given new tasks. Jihad
and the defence of the ideological borders is only one of the
facets. The other-the more far-reaching one-is to disseminate
the official policy through media and students of the din1 rnadris
themselves, mainly in order to pave the way for the establishment
of new markets even in remote areas and to consolidate areas
which have not directly been subjected to modernizing development
strategies. How far this approach through the media has been
successful is yet to be seen. But considering the increase in the
number of dini madiiris and the students as well as the increase in
the budgets of these religious schools one might expect some
results.
The dini m a a r k themselves have been pragmatic-by
receiving financial remunerations from the companies (mostly joint
ventures with foreign enterprises) advertising in their magazines on
the one hand and appreciating Zakat on the other. The price they
pay is their submission under the imperatives of the world-market
which is inherent in the Islamization policy.

The new formation phase among the dim1 madkis and the
Ulama, as a result of State intervention, may furthermore facilitate
a total taking over of the d-mi m a a r k by the Government that
would finally mean the internationalization of the internal markets.

The patronism that the dini ma&& and the Ularna

experienced from the Zia regime is not just an altruistic approach
but an attempt to get the official ideology trickled down to the
grass-roots. In this regard we may conclude that the Islamization
of the Ulama and the religious schools as i t was pursued by the
 I s ~ Studies.
~ c 28: 1 (1989)

T A W 5: Different Currimla

Subjectmatter la lb lc 2 3 4

Qur'Bn, reading, memorizing

Morphology
Syntax
Arabic
Biography of the FTophet ( F i a t )
Arithmatic
Pakistan Studies
General Sciences
English
Islamic Lawflradition
Natural Sciences
Social Sciences
Islamic Law
Methods of Islamic Law
Logic
Arabic Literature
Tradition o r Literature
Rhetorics
Qur'gn interpretation
Tradition
Methods of Tradition
Principles and Scholastic
Philosophy
Islamic History
Economics
Political Science
Cultural Sciences
Methods of Qur'h interpretation
Law of Tradition
Comparative Religion
Discussions ( M u ~ z a r a h )
Prosody
Religious studies (DiniyBt
Urdu
Persian
Exercises (Tamfin)
Morals ( Akhlaqiyylt )
Law of Inheritance (FarZ'id)
Dictation

# = These subjects are supposed to be taught after ~ t i o v( W l g h d ) in

a special course h h j a h - i tab-1; canpate 3 pp. 7. 21 and 39).
( = Persian is prerequisite for the Tarqim courses,

la = Dars-i nizami; see HaPepota Repoat pp. 122, 135 and 147-155.
lb = Eight years curriculum of the WafZq al-MadZris aL6arabiyyah see
HaPepota Repoat ibid.
lc = Proposal by the National Committee on Dini Madaris 1979; see
HaQepota Rep04t ibid.
 Idarnic Studies. 28:l (1989) 25

2 = Wafiiq proposal only partially implemented in 1983; see SiiPah .%hh

N w b - i ta'a Itaj&zl, (Multan: WafZq al-Ma&-, 1983).
3 = Wafiiq proposal implemented in 1984; see S&h Si&h N w b - i t a l f i
Imangii~cl (Multan: Wafsq al-MadZris, 1984)
4 = Tanzzm proposal implemented in 1983; see Scihh S&h NMb-i tad&
[manzG/LI, (Lahore; Tan?-m a1 MadSris, 1984) and own elaborations.
State is running successfully, however if not with dubious means
then at least with a clear integrationist approach. Moreover, the
Islamization has proved to be more what can be called a strategy
of continuity and pragmatism rather than a 'nativistic' approach
even if there are some instances of indigenization by using 'Islamic
techniques' and idioms.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See D. Senghaas, (ed.): Peipheaea Kapitdbmw (Frankfurt a.M.

1981:3); D. Senghaas: W W k h u 6 & a d n u n g und Enturick4unghpatib;
pfidoyea 6A D h z k t i o n , (Frankfurt a&., 1987:2); and K.Coughfi.P.
Sharma, (eds.): I m p c x k d L m and Rev&tion i n South Aain (New York,
1973); H. GardeziIJ. Rashid, (eds.): P a U n , the Roob 06
2J-ictabdi.p - the poUticd economy 04 a prtaetomhn (London:
Zed Press 1982); H. A l a d . Shanin, (eds.): Intnoduction b the
S o W g y 06 'Developing Sooieties' (London, 1982).
2. Compare D. Goldschmidt, e t al. (eds.): "Die Dritte Welt als Gegen-
stand erziehungswissenschaftlicher forschung", in: ZeitsCWt 6k-t
Padagogik, (Weinheim, 1981) who give a good account on these
developments.
3. Literature on religious or traditional education is very scarce
especially for the period after the creation of Pakistan. One may
mention S. Muh. Salim: Hind b P a U n mhn mumhniin~n kii *am-e
taL&-o-tnnbjyat (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1980). (Urdu), and
Ziaul Haque: "Muslim .Religious Education in Indo-Pakistan", 'I&&
S I d i e A (IS) Vol. 14/1, Islamabad 1975, pp. 271-292. Besides these
two comprehensive works one finds a couple of surveys: N. Ahmad:
Ja'izah madallid-i 'aaabjyah h&imi.yyah m a g h b i P a w n (Lahore:
Anjuman-e Himayar-e lslam Press, 1960), (Urdu) (Ahmad 1); N.
Ahmad I: M'kh m a d W - i ' m a b j y a h m a g h b i P a w n (Lahore:
Himayat-e Islam Press. 1972). (Urdu) (Ahmad 11); Government of
Pakistan (GoP), Ministry of Religious Affairs: Repmt Qawmi kamiti
b a a 4 dinZ m a d d a Pahidan, (Islamabad. 1979). (Urdu) (Halepota
Report); Govemment of Pakistan Ministry of education, Islamic
education Research Cell: Pakhtan kP dini madallid tLi
(Islamabad, 1984, Urdu).
4. Waqf, pl. Auqaf a r e religions endowments.
5. See B.D. Metcalf, Zdea& R e v b d in W India: Deoband,
1860- 1900, (Princeton University Press. 1982).
 I s l a i c Studies. 28: 1 (1989) 25

2 = WafZq proposal only partially implemented in 1983; see S&h S&h

N w b - 4 b'fi ( b j k l , (Multan: Wafiiq al-Maclkis, 1983).
3 = Waf5q proposal implemented in 1984; see S&h Siiexh N e b 4 b'fi
Irnan@d (Multan: Wafiiq al-MadZris, 1984)
4 = Tan?-m proposal implemented in 1983; see S&h S&h N w b - i b6&n
(man~iifil,(Lahore; Tan?-m a1 Maaris, 1984) and own elaborations.
State is running successfully, however if not with dubious means
then at least with a clear integrationist approach. Moreover, the
lslamization has proved to be more what can be called a strategy
of continuity and pragmatism rather than a 'nativistic* approach
even if there are some instances of indigenization by using 'Islamic
techniques' and idioms.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See D. Senghaas. (ed.): P e i p h m m Kap&z&mw (Frankfurt a.M.

1981:3); D. Senghaas: WeIzh1&txha6t~-tdnungund Entwick!un94pa&ik;
pEd0ye-t d i h D.&oziation, (Frankfurt a.M., 19875'); and K. Cough/H.P.
S h a m , (eds.): I m p & d h m and Revohtion C South Aaia (New York,
1973); H. Gardezi/J. Rashid, (eds.): P a W n , the ROob 06
DLtatot&p - the po4tiCal economy 06 a ryloetohn state (London:
Zed Press 1982); H. Alavi/T. Shanin, (eds.): Inthoduction to the
Socioeogy 06 'Dev&pLng Societien' (London, 1982).
2. Compare D. Goldschmidt, et al. (eds.): "Die Dritte Welt als Gegen-
stand erziehungswissenschaftlicher forschung", in: ZQdkhJti.&
Padagopk, (Weinheim. 1981) who give a good account on these
developments.
3. Literature on religious or traditional education is very scarce
especially for the period after the creation of Pakistan. One may
mention S. Muh. Salim: Hind ii P a W n mkn mudmanan ha nifam-e
ta'h-0-tcMbiyyat (Lahore: Islamic Publications. 19801, (Urdu), and
Ziaul Haque: "Muslim .Religious Education in Indo-Pakistan", IdPamic
S l d i e n (IS) Vol. 14/1, Islamabad 1975, pp. 271-292. Besides these
two comprehensive works one finds a couple of surveys: N. Ahmad:
J c i ' u d madii&-i 6 a m b j y a h i&mjyah maghmbi Paki6tiin (Lahore:
Anjuman-e Hirnayar-e Islam Press, 19601, (Urdu) (Ahmad 1); N.
Ahrnad I: Ja'iah madlid-i 'aaabiyyah maghmbi Pakiatiin (Lahore:
Himayat-e Islam Press, 19721, (Urdu) (Ahmad 11); Government of
Pakistan (W). Ministry of Religious Affairs: Repoat Qawmi kanriti
b&-.i diVLi m a d a d P a W n , (Islamabad, 1979). (Urdu) (Halepota
Report); Government of Pakistan Ministry of education, Islamic
education Research Cell: P a w n kB dini m a d a d ki
(Islamabad, 1984, Urdu).
4. Waqf, pl. Auqaf are religions endowments.
5. See B.D. Metcalf. L5ki.c Revival h India: Deoband.
1 860- 1900, (Princeton University Press, 1982).
 Islanic Studies. 28 :1 ( 1989)

For the development of Islam as a theology towards ideology see R.

Schulze: "Die Politisierune des Islam im 19. lahrhundert". in Die
W& d w JAkm. Vol. XX11 -(1982) pp. 103-116. -For the concept of
integrationist and isolationist see R. Schulze: "Islamische Kultur und
soziale Bewegung", in P e e h e t i e N4. 18/19 (1985) pp. 60-84.
See: Report of the Committee set up by the Governor of West
Pakistan for Recommending improved Syllabus for the various Dam1
Ulooms and Arabic Madrasas in West Pakistan, Lahore, 1962, pp. 1
and 9.
It may be noted here that the first survey on Cmi ma&ris in 1960
was mainly financed by the American based Asia Foundation.
Pahiatan O b ~ s v eDecca
~ 13.3.1968.
Ayub Khan, not m&RA, ((Oxford University Press, 1967)
specially pp. 194.
See C o ~ ~ t i 06 o nthe W m i c RepuMk 06 Pakhtar~ 1 9 7 5 , i'ar.1 IX,
Para 230(1).
Qistm 'am&i/PMniimah ba4a-e katnZt2 maJad&h & a d d i M wa jam74
25.8.1982 UGC. (Ishabad, 1982) (Urdu); see also UGC: A W e tO the
EqcLivdencw 06 Degtew and DipPomu in Pakhtan, (Islamabad, 19781,
pp. 84.
Hdepoh Repost, pp. 115.
H a p o h Repost, p. 89 and pp. 102-109; similar demands had been
raised by the CII in 1978: Consolidated Recommendations etc. pp.
34.
It had been categorically rejected by the founder-member of the
DZr al-'uliim Deoband Maul-anZ @sim NSnataG (1832-1880) to
receive any kind of official andlor Government aid; compare Ahmad I
pp. 732-734, ~hmadII, pp. 684-686 and Haque p. 282; see also Z.H.
Fasuqk The Deoband hod and the Demand 604 P a w n (Lahore:
ad.), p. 26.
UGC (Publ.): Highes Education Newo, Vol. 11/10, Islamabad October
1982, pp. 1 and 8. see also: Noti&cation: EqcLivaP'nce 04 D i n i Aonad
with the univeuihj degaee, UGC 17.11.1982 (rnimeo).
The Ahle Hadith are still in the process to produce an enlarged
syllabus while the ~ama'at-e Islami is in its embryonic phase
concerning curriculum development and is accordingly not recognized
by the Ministry of Education.
F.e. the twelve largest dini madZris in NWFP that received at least
40.000 Rs (hiehest amounts) from the PZ Council in the first vear's
disbursement \ere running well and had surplus budgets in '1970;
compare also Ahmad I7 pp. 404-449.
Calculations on the basis of data provided by the CZA, Islamabad.
Compare Az-Zakat, Vol. IA, Islamabad 1981, p. 22; the calculations
have been made on the basis of data provided by the PZA Punjab.
Calculations are based on the registers. For the religious background
the titles of the father (maukS, hgfi?, q Z f i etc.) have been
assumed to be the criteria.
See also S. Mahbub Rizvi: Tadkh Dcis al-sUPiim Deoband, (Dehli, 1977)
Vol. I pp. 295 et passim (Urdu) and Metcalf, op. ciL p. 134.
The Deobandis had always had a good connection to Afghanistan via
Lahore and Peshawar.
For the land patterns see Mahmood H. Khan: Undeuievebpment .and
A g t a h n Stzuctme in Pakidan, (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd. 1981).
 I s l a i c Studies, 28:l (1989) 27

23. See Ta'atu6; Rabitatrr-1 m a d a ~2 &migyah Pakhtan, (Lahore,

1984). see also Hamld, July 1986: Interview with Ataullah Mengal. p.
56 and The M a , 4.2.1986.
24. Thls D&r al-'Ulh is easily accessable being located on the Grand
Trunk Road about 50 km from Peshawar next to the military
compound of Nowshera.
For the Jihad propaganda see at-Haqq, VoI. 19/3 pp. 6-9; Vol. 20/12
pp. 9-15; Vol. 21/1 pp. 5-13 et passim.
25. CZA, P&oceeding~,Vol. 11 (Islamabad 1983); pp. 249 and p. 303
(Urdu
26. The information on the Sindhi situation was provided by the
concerned officer of the Wafaq in Multan on 2.2.1986.
The Sindhi situation is characterized by the increasing ratio of
criminaIity on the one hand and by a strong nationalistic stand on
the other. Both, however, can be seen as outcomes of deprivation;
compare also H a w , especially Sept.-Dec. 1986.