Dilemmas of Higher Education in Pakistan: A Political Perspective

Author(s): Lawrence Ziring

Source: Asian Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 5 (May - Jun., 1978), pp. 307-324
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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Dilemmasof HigherEducationin Pakistan:
A Political Perspective

LAWRENCE ZIRING

E DUCATIONhas been a key variable in promoting national in-

tegration well as economic development. It can also be a negative
as
factor in so far as it raises the expectations and consciousness of hereto-
fore relatively quiescent young people in ways that either cannot or will
not be satisfied. This is especially true in Third World countries, where
the abrupt transition from rural to urban lifestyles, from a stratified and
controlled environmentto a mobile-often anarchical-condition, from
passive role-playing to expressive public involvement, is most pro-
nounced. Educational systems in Third World countries often have
substantial difficultiesin directing the critical student mass toward goals
of academic excellence and professional achievement. Moreover, edu-
cational systems are usually random, jerry-builtaffairs. In the absence
of a modern educational tradition, a clear perception of what education
is supposed to produce, and a modicum of harmony and mutual respect
among teachers, students, administrators,and government officials, it is
doubtful that the schools can fulfill their social mission.
This essay examines some of the problems of higher education in
Pakistan, where students have long been immersedin politics, and where
classic struggles have and are being waged over the preservation of
traditional and modern versions of Islamic society. Islam has thus far
failed to live up to its reputation as the great unifier; and in the case of
Pakistan, where religion provided the impetus for the creation of the
state, it has not been able to sustain union. In considerable measure, the
dismembermentof Pakistan in 1971 can be traced to student involve-
ment in politics from an early period, and the inability of the authorities
to cope with the consequences of that involvement. Nor has student
activism been confined to East Pakistan. Students in Sind, the Punjab,
Baluchistan, and on the Northwest Frontier have been no less deter-

307

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308 Asian Affairs

mined to register their interests and to force the government to yield to

their demands. The fact that many of these students are in the vanguard
of regionalist and/or Marxist movements raises significant questions
about the survivability of the Pakistani nation. It cannot be overlooked
that the country's national unity has always been tenuous, and that it is
the only country in the world since World War II to lose a substantial
portion of its territoryand population as a direct result of civil war. The
tragedy of East Pakistan could not be avoided by references to Islamic
unity and brotherhood. Nor can anyone be assured that Pakistanis have
learned their lesson, and that they will prevent additional fissures from
opening.
Ever since its inception, Pakistani leaders have cautioned the na-
tion, and particularly the university students, against the "poison" of
provincialism. Provincialism has come to mean the elevation of province
or local region over country, a preference for a particular ethnic, lin-
guistic, or tribal group at the expense of the larger nation. It is usually
the student communities in the respective provinces that have cham-
pioned and nurtured such notions. Pakistan, which was born as the
result of an appeal to the Muslims of South Asia to protect their religion
from the larger community of Hindus in their midst, has had enormous
difficulty in sustaining itself by that same appeal. Although Islam re-
mains a dominant life-force and Pakistanis are considered devout fol-
lowers of the Prophet Mohammad, faith has not in the past-and may
not in the future-prevent the different nationalities that make up the
state from harming one another, and thereby undermining the national
structure. A major theme of this essay suggests that once Pakistan was
achieved, its leaders were less inclined to emphasize Islam; and this de-
emphasis influenced university officials to follow a course different from
that envisaged by those who called for the establishment of an Islamic
state. The confusion caused by the idea of Pakistan as an Islamic state is
mirroredin the actions, statements, and policies of leaders like Moham-
mad Ali Jinnah, who believed in the Two-Nation Theory, but obscured
what others have identified (if not always articulated) as the Many-
Nation Theory.
The Two-Nation Theory was a negative reaction to events that
were reshaping the destiny of South Asia in the first half of the 20th cen-
tury. Muslims living in areas where the Hindus predominated felt a

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Dilemmas of Higher Education in Pakistan: 309

helplessness which could only be reckoned with by the creation of a

separate, self-governing Muslim nation in India. Their demand, how-
ever, was for a state to be carved out of those regions where the Muslims
were in a majority and where essentially they were not threatened by
the larger community. They did not insist on the acquisition of all the
territoryin which they lived, and with which they were familiar. Instead,
the call went out to all Muslims to rally behind the cause of their prin-
cipal party, the Muslim League, and together to save their endangered
religion. In the fury of the charge toward freedom and independence,
and for what now must be considered a brief historical moment, the
promise of a new Muslim state in India temporarily drove out or sub-
dued other loyalties and national claims. When the dust had settled,
however, the Pakistan which had been created-or rather superimposed
--over Muslim regions that were to a greater or lesser extent distinct
Muslim political entities in themselves, showed itself to be something
less than the hoped-forpromised land. Moreover, the exodus of millions
of frightened and impoverishedMuslims from India and their entry into
Pakistan brought the Two-Nation Theory into regions that were not
fully preparedto adapt to the new situation.
To date, Pakistan's educational system has been unable to bridge
the gap between student identification with the larger world of Islam
and their intimate association with their immediate surroundings. Stu-
dent grievances range from examinations and the scarcity of textbooks
to calls for social equity and political freedom. But they seem to be most
intense in two areas. Externally, they readily identify with their Muslim
brethrenelsewhere in the world, and internally they are passionate devo-
tees of their subnational, regional culture. In the outer world, they want
to be known as Muslims. In their inner world, they are proudest when
stressing their Pathan, Baluchi, Sindhi, or Punjabi lineage. Pakistan's
martial law government seems to understand this. It is, therefore, ad-
justing its policies to permit more provincial autonomy than any gov-
ernment before it. At the same time, it has given new importance to
traditional Islamic orthodoxy, and obviously hopes thereby to maintain
the fundamental integrity of the nation by frequent appeals to Muslim
solidarity. It remains to be seen if controlled decentralization of the
decisionmaking process will quiet the political voice of the student
legions. But at the very least, it has already muffled a 30-year debate

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310 Asian fairs

involving the advocates of secular education and those who insist on a

doctrinaireIslamic program.

II
The most ambitious Indian Muslim educational effort of the 19th cen-
tury was the creation of the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College,
which later was known as Aligarh University. Aligarh endeavored to
provide the Muslims of South Asia with an educational experience that
combined religion with modern, secular instruction, and thereby sought
to prepare future Muslim leaders with the scientific and technical skills
identified with the Western world, while sustaining their commitment to
the tenets of their faith and their ultimate responsibility to the Muslim
masses. Given the history of British India following the Mutiny of 1857
and the dissolution of the last vestige of Moghul rule, it was quite
natural that Aligarh should become the focal point for the renaissance
of political Islam in the Subcontinent. Students, teachers, and alumni of
Aligarh had thrust upon them the future of the Muslim community, and
they responded by promoting a form of cultural nationalism that even-
tually crystallized in the call for Islamic unity and political self-determi-
nation. Indeed, the preservation of the Muslim community in India
fostered by graduates of Aligarh gave rise to the demand for a separate
Muslim state within South Asia; and it was not surprising to find
Aligarh-trainedindividuals in the vanguard of the struggle to establish
an independentPakistan.
But when Pakistan achieved its independence, the leaders of the
new state were not yet clear on how the country was to be organized or
what its policies should be. Islam was instrumental in the creation of
Pakistan; but there was considerable indecision on whether the new
entity should focus on strengtheningits Islamic substructure,or whether
the political superstructurewas to be fashioned along secular and hence
materialistic lines. This conflict among the leaders of the new Muslim
state was never clearly expressed because, on the one side, they seemed
to believe that the two approacheswere intertwined,and on the other, be-
cause they feared that a public debate would degenerate into widespread
social conflict. The latter fear was particularlypronounced in view of the
elite's conscious or subconscious desire to promote their version of a
modern, progressive state unencumbered by references to a traditional
past with all its perceived obstacles. Few people in Pakistan, however,

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Dilemmas of Higher Education in Pakistan: 311

were preparedto accept the elite notion that religious sentimentwas sim-
ply a strengtheningsubstance, and that the real power of the state lay in
its capacity to promote national growth and prosperity. Nevertheless,
they pressed their secular goals while paying lip-service to Pakistan's
religious orientation. As I. H. Qureshi has noted: "Morality, spiritual
fervor, religious conviction, and even patriotismwere to take back seats"
to physical and technological development.'
Pakistan's educational institutions were hardly prepared for the
tasks imposed upon them; and when Pakistan became an independent
state, only fragmentarythought had been given to the form and type of
educational system that the country should adopt. Qureshi recalls that it
was a casual remark by Mohammad Ali Jinnah to a group of academic
types from Pakistan's Constituent Assembly who were attending a re-
ception at Government House that led to the first conference concerned
with educational planning and policy.
Fazlur Rahman, an East Pakistani but not an educationist, became
Pakistan's first Minister of Education. He was a controversial figure
within the political and bureaucraticpower centers of the Pakistan state.
But he was dedicated to the cause of education, and forcefully argued
that it must receive priority attention. Pakistan's future, he was con-
vinced, was dependent upon the success of its educational program;and
he was equally insistent that the teaching of Islamic principles must be
at the heart of any programof pedagogy. Although Fazlur Rahman had
the support of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, the government bureau-
cracy-and particularly the Ministry of Finance, which was dominated
by Ghulam Mohammad (later to become Governor General of Paki-
stan) -did not see eye-to-eye with the Education Minister. Given the
Finance Ministry's power over the allocation of scarce funds, Fazlur
Rahman never obtained the money necessary to promote a coherent,
multipurpose education system. There was also no mistaking Ghulam
Mohammad's personal dissatisfaction with Fazlur Rahman's emphasis
on Islamic teaching at all levels of instruction. It is also worth recalling
that one of the incidents leading up to Governor General Ghulam
Mohammad's dismissal of Khwaja Nazimuddin as Prime Minister of
Pakistan in 1953 were the student riots in Karachi that were really di-
rected at Fazlur Rahman. Fazlur Rahman was removed from office with
1 I. H. Qureshi, Education in Pakisian, An Inquiry into Objectivesand Achievements (Karachi:
Ma'Aref Publishers,1975), p. 25.

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312 Asian flairs

Nazimuddin. There was never any question in Fazlur Rahman's mind

that Ghulam Mohammad was behind the riots, and that a conspiracy
had been perpetrated by the highest Pakistani authorities to discredit
him and his educational program.2
In point of fact, Pakistan's educational system never received the
support of those in positions of genuine power. The ruling bureaucratic
elite that gained control of the central government following Jinnah's
death and Liaquat's assassination was suspicious about the real inten-
tions of the country's indigenous educators; and in large measure, they
also questioned their expertise. The frequent references to Islam, they
argued, betrayed the gross inadequacy of their capacities as trained, dis-
ciplined scholars. These powerful practitionersof government and busi-
ness harbored a different philosophy of education which stressed Paki-
stan's need for material development. Such a focus, however, could not
take into account more than a tiny fraction of Pakistan's youth; and
men like Fazlur Rahman could only wonder how the larger population
could be readied for the responsibilities of citizenship.3

The possession of a vote by a person ignorant of the privileges

and responsibilitiesof citizenship is like the playing of a child with
dynamite and is responsible for endless corruption and political in-
stability. Our education must, therefore, instil into the young mind
the fundamental maxim of democracy that the price of liberty is
eternal vigilance; it must aim, also, at cultivating the civil virtues
of discipline, integrity, and useful public service.

Fazlur Rahman was especially haunted by the specter of provin-

cialism and the exclusivist propensities of the several nationalities com-
prising Pakistan. He felt that national integration hinged on the abil-
ity of the educational institution to inculcate values of solidarity and
loyalty to the larger nation. Unless an elaborate national education pro-
gram were launched to draw Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, Ba-
luchis, and Muhajirs (refugees from India) into a larger community, he
saw little likelihood of the country holding together. His frustrationwith

2 Personal interview with Fazlur Rahman at his residence in Karachi on July 17, 1960.
3 Fazlur Rahman, New Education in the Making of Pakistan (London: Longmans, 1953), p. 7.
See also Fazlur Rahman, Pakistan One and Indivisible (Karachi: Pakistan Educational Pub-
lishers, 1960).

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Dilemmas of Higher Education in Pakistan: 313

those in key positions of power was all the greater when he was forced
to watch from the sidelines as their policies propelled the country into
one crisis after another.
But although government officials bear considerable responsibility
for blocking the development of a purposeful education system in Paki-
stan, it is only fair to note that even herculean efforts in this respect
could not have cured the country's ills. At the time of partition, there
were two universities in Pakistan-one in Lahore and the other in
Dacca. Both were in disarray as a result of events leading to and imme-
diately following independence. Another universityhad been established
in Karachi, but it did not yet have a teaching staff and its statutes and
ordinances were still being written. Most important, however, was the
scarcity of able, experienced teaching personnel for the universities.
Many of the key seats had been occupied by Hindu educators who mi-
grated to India before and after partition. Of the Muslims who replaced
them, some were drawn from Aligarh and Osmania Universities, both in
India. But they were few in number;and given the need, vacancies were
filled by less than competent teachers with only a minimum of academic
qualifications.Hence the universitieswere hardly in a position to mount
a sophisticated campaign aimed at convincing those in authority that
they ought to be given more support.
When student activism is added to this picture, the malaise pervad-
ing the educational system in the first years following the founding of
Pakistan can readily be understood. Students had ceased working at
their studies for a considerable period preceding partition. According to
most accounts, they played an indispensable role in assisting the Muslim
League to win an independent Pakistan. With Pakistan won, however,
the students did not return to the classroom. In part, this was due to
their now-politicized inclinations. But in other ways, the classroom was
itself disorganized, inchoate, and ill-equipped to meet the needs of a
volatile generation.
Pakistan emerged as an independent, sovereign state without the
time necessary to develop a blueprint for constructing a new nation. Its
leaders were hard-pressedto sustain the fledgling entity through those
first difficultmonths. Later, when its external survival was more or less
assured, there was less inclination to dabble with experiments concerned
with social and psychological engineering. The country's leaders opted
for the tangible projects that suggested progress and growth, while edu-

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314 Asian Affairs

cation continued to flounder, especially that form of education which

addressed itself to civic responsibilities and the need for an informed
citizenry. The question of national unity loomed large to everyone. But
those at the center of power, namely, the higher bureaucrats, assumed
that economic achievement and lip-service to Islam were all that was
needed. They failed to take the measure of Pakistani society. Given their
narrow pragmatism, the country was pressed onto an aimless course.
And an aimless government, as Qureshi has commented, only promotes
an aimless educational system.'
III
Most of the principal educational commissions, reports, and policies
since Pakistan'sinception are identified with the bureaucracy.The Com-
mission on National Education (1959), the Commission on Student
Problems and Welfare (1966), the Manpower and Education Commis-
sion (1968), the New Education Policy (1970), Education for the
Masses (1972), and the Education Policy 1972-80 (1973) were all
either the result of administrativeinitiative or heavy bureaucratic influ-
ence. These deliberations and studies, spanning a period of 20 years,
have had little value and even less effect on Pakistan's substandardedu-
cational system. The explanation for this conclusion is multidimensional.
But at the core of the problem is the political turmoil that has ravaged
the country since independence, and the direct linkages between the
educational system and the nation's political life. No educational insti-
tution, and especially those in higher education, could ignore or keep
from becoming embroiled in the political struggles gripping the country.
It is of little more than academic relevance whether members of the
educational community were the prime movers or merely the camp fol-
lowers behind the political unrest. The strategic placement of the uni-
versities in Karachi, Lahore, Dacca, and Peshawar guaranteed that they
would be plunged into the political wars that plagued those metropolitan
centers. Moreover, the streets were early on the most important forum
for the airing of public grievances. Little satisfaction was derived from
the proceedings of parliament, where the politicians engaged in debates
that had precious little to do with the well-being or real concerns of the
generality of the population. The politics of agitation, not the politics

4 Qureshi, op. cit., pp. 49-72.

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Dilemmas of Higher Education in Pakistan: 315

of persuasion and compromise, became the vogue. Hence the student

community had a vital role to play in articulating, if not exploiting,
public frustration.
The ruling bureaucrats, however, were most concerned with law
and order, and they viewed student involvement in politics as a primary
challenge to their leadership. Thus the stage was set for a confrontation
between the student community and a paternalistic bureaucracy. With
the collapse of the first parliamentary experiment in 1958, the bureau-
crats-both civil and military-had their way. Martial law was clamped
on the country; a constitution which had been painstakingly developed
and adopted in 1956 was abrogated; the central and provincial legisla-
tures were closed; and most important, all political party activity was
prohibited. It was during this period that the new government of Field
MarshalMohammad Ayub Khan moved to ease the students back to the
classroom.
The depoliticization of the education system was forecast when the
Sharif Report of 1959 was published and its recommendations trans-
formed into policy." Ayub emphasized political stability in all his pro-
grams, and insisted on concentrating power at the center. This led to the
creation of a presidential system with particular emphasis on the use of
arbitrary decisionmaking, or government by executive ordinance. For
the universities, this meant the loss of their autonomy, the suspension of
their representativegoverning bodies, and the demand (on pain of pen-
alty) that both teachers and students address themselves to their aca-
demic pursuits with greater diligence and discipline. Vocational and
technical skills were stressed over the older, more familiar liberal arts
curriculum. Students were required to spend a longer period of time
working on their degree programs, and their teachers were threatend
(by a 1961 ordinance) with the loss of their degrees or dismissal, or
both, if they engaged in or induced others under their charge to adopt
politics as a way of life during their tenure at the university. These mea-
sures were poorly calculated to get the teachers and students back to the
classroom, or indeed, to instil in them the desire to teach and learn.
By 1962, Ayub was under sufficient pressure from the general ur-
ban community to lift martial law and resuscitate the political parties.

5Government of Pakistan, Ministryof Education, Report of the Commission on National Edu-

cation (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1959), otherwise known as the Sharif Report.

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316 Asian Affairs

A new constitution was promulgated and politics resumed in somewhat

the traditional form. In such circumstances, there was little likelihood
that the students could be confined to the classroom, or that their studies
could be made so attractive that they would forego their interest in
politics. The large majority of students were drawn from the lower mid-
dle class, and there was only the remotest possibility that they would
find significantjobs after obtaining their degrees. Hence, there was only
minimum concern for education. The university was a place to go be-
cause it offered excitement and the opportunity to participate in local
and national affairs. It was not the proverbial springboardto a good job
and a brighter future. Thus, Ayub's policies incensed everyone in the
academic environment, and the students in particular returned to the
political wars with a vengeance.
This was especially true after the Indo-PakistaniWar of 1965 and
Ayub's refusal to prolong the fighting. When Ayub accepted an agree-
ment with India to return to the status quo ante, the students were out-
raged and rioted on a grand scale. The Hamoodur Rahman Commission
examined the continuing phenomenon of student discontent and made
some pious recommendations aimed at reducing their unhappiness;but
by this time, matters were out of hand."In his last days, Ayub indicated
a willingness to loosen the restrictionsimposed on the universities,but it
was too little and too late. The students were again in the forefront of
the demonstrations in 1968-69, when Ayub was forced to relinquish
control of the country and Yahya Khan assumed the dominant position
in the ruling military junta, which once again imposed marital law on
the country.7

IV

Air Marshal Nur Khan was called upon by Yahya to chair a new com-
mission charged with developing a forward-looking education policy.
Its report was released for public scrutiny in the Summer of 1969.8 The

6 Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, Report of the Commission on Student Prob-

lems and Welfare (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1966), also known as the Hamoo-
dur Rahman Report.
7 Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era, Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969 (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 1971).
s Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education and Scientific Research, The New Education
Policy of the Government of Pakistan (Islamabad: March 1970), otherwise known as the Nur
Khan Report.

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Dilemmas of HigherEducation in Pakistan: 317

commission's recommendationsgave considerable attention to primary

and secondary schooling, but also attempted to address the controversy
which Ayub's reforms had stirred up in the universities. The New Edu-
cation Policy reinstated autonomous university governing boards and
withdrew the threatening 1961 ordinance. In return for a greater say in
their own affairs, the universities were called upon to establish "centers
of excellence," and generally to raise educational standards. Nur Khan
also sought to calm the storm raised by the de-emphasisof Islamic edu-
cation. His commission expressed the view that Islamic values had to be
made a feature of each student'scurriculum.This was grudgingly agreed
to by the higher bureaucracy,but the gesture was hardly sufficientto pla-
cate the more outspoken religious orders in the country.
Sensing the government's weakness in this area, the ulema urged
more sweeping reforms that would eventually transform Pakistan into
the much-heralded Islamic state. In point of fact, the religious orders
opposed the Nur Khan Report. While the Report called for greater
academic freedom in the hope that it would elevate academic standards,
the religious elements insisted on more prohibitions, restrictions, and
censorship. They were intent on purifying society and purging it of alien
ideas and manners. It was obvious that this meant Western and Euro-
pean influences, which was a perspective that the Yahya Khan govern-
ment could not realistically entertain. In view of this difference of opin-
ion, the Nur Khan Report could never be fully implemented. The
controversy over its implementation,however, was caught up in the civil
war that consumed the country in 1971; and one of the lesser conse-
quences of that war was to bury the report and its recommendations.
After more than 13 years of military-bureaucraticrule, Pakistan's
educational system was no better off than it had been in the first years
following independence, and a good case could be made that it had
seriously deteriorated.Another university was opened at Islamabad, the
new capital outside of Rawalpindi, but educational standards had not
improved. Students were still poorly prepared for life, and teachers
and administratorscontinued to scrap over wages, conditions of labor,
and the meaning of scholastic competence. Although vernacular lan-
guages had been introduced into the course of study and some experi-
mentation was done with the semester system in vogue in the United
States, the overall impression was that teachers and students were less
able to handle their material than previously. There was also an obvious

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318 Asian Affairs

slippage in the use of the English language, which could not be made up
by the employment of the more limited and largely inferior vernacular
texts. Another experimentintroduced the internal examination system in
certain classes in KarachiUniversity, but this also ran into difficulty and
"had to be abandoned because of its gross abuse by many individ-
uals. .. This unfortunate experience (put) the ethical sense of some
teachers in a most deplorable light."'9It was impossible to run a sound
educational system when teachers could be bought off by students de-
sirous of getting higher grades. The situation was symbolic of the plight
of the whole educational system when Pakistan returned to civilian rule
at the end of 1971, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People's
Party began their re-examinationof education in the country.
V
Bhutto gave considerable attention to educational problems. He came to
power as the leader of a broad coalition of social groups, among which
the student community was perhaps most prominent. Bhutto had culti-
vated the university students during his tenure as minister of numerous
portfolios in the Ayub Khan government. He became especially attrac-
tive to Pakistani youth when he took the lead position in criticizing the
United States for its assistance to India and Israel; when he praised
Communist China; and finally when he broke with Ayub over the Tash-
kent Agreement that terminated the 1965 war with India. Bhutto was
young enough to identify with the student generation, and his oratory
and posturing was tailor-made to win their affection and respect. More-
over, despite Bhutto's reputation as an aristocrat, he was considered
sympathetic to Socialist programs and methods; and this, too, was at-
tractive to his young followers. Hence, when Bhutto insisted on building
a new political party rather than join an older organization, the univer-
sity students flocked to his banner and became eager and useful instru-
ments in his climb toward political power.
The students assisted Bhutto in toppling Ayub. They were also in-
strumental in convincing the ruling military junta that Yahya was a
liability, and that power ought to be transferredback to civilian hands
-and particularly to Bhutto, who after the loss of East Pakistan was
the only political leader in the country with a national following. The

Qureshi, op. cit., p. 246.

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Dilemmas of Higher Education in Pakistan: 319

junta did not have to be reminded that, with student support, Bhutto's
Pakistan People's Party had won the Punjab and Sind in the 1970 elec-
tions and that the PPP was the only viable political organization in the
country. Thus, when Bhutto became first President and then Prime
Minister of Pakistan, he was aware of the importance of the student
community, and he wasted no time in addressing his attention to them.
His closest confidant, the youthful Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, was appointed
Minister of Education, and he immediately set about developing an
educational program that the PPP hoped would sustain student loyalty.
It soon became evident that the PPP was interested in more than
simply maintaining student affection. Bhutto and his party were intent
on recreating Pakistan in a new image, and with a mobilization of soci-
ety based on the younger generation. Bhutto leaned toward the estab-
lishment of a one-party state; and one of his early programs was to
expand the PPP militia, or People's Guards, which was primarily com-
posed of secondary school and university students. The PPP also sanc-
tioned the development of a National Development Volunteer Program,
which was to employ university students in various government projects,
both during their tenure at the university and after graduation. The PPP
let it be known that the students could count upon the party for employ-
ment opportunities, and that their essential needs would be met. Its
educational policy also envisaged a People's Open University aimed at
making education, especially in the vocational field, available to those
who could not attend the conventional universities. Indeed, Bhutto an-
nounced that a central purpose of his government was to expand educa-
tional opportunities for the poorer classes. This approach dovetailed
with other Socialist pronouncementswhich, at least in the first year after
Bhutto came to power, stressed programs of distributivejustice.
The Socialist aspects of Bhutto's posturing led to the nationaliza-
tion of the educational system in March 1972. Tuition fees were elimi-
nated, theoretically making it possible for the poor to enter the system.
But as Dawn and Rodney Jones have commented, the "major benefi-
ciaries of the abolished school fees and reduced college fees resulting
from nationalization were urban upper and middle class families who
could most easily pay for their education."10In view of their intellectual
10Dawn E. Jones and Rodney W. Jones, "EducationalPolicy Developments in Pakistan: Quest
for a National Program,"unpublishedpaper presented at the Symposium on Pakistan, Colum-
bia University, March 8-10, 1978, p. 7.

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320 Asian Affairs

deficiencies and other social-psychologicalproblems, it was obvious that

Pakistan's poor could not take full advantage of these new educational
opportunities. But nationalization did do something for those teachers
who otherwise could not have improved their economic status. Under
government control, educational institutions were provided with blanket
public support, and salary scales, fringe benefits, and promotion possi-
bilities were markedly improved. In another departure, students who
would otherwise have withdrawn from school during their first year
because of substandardperformancewere automatically promoted. This
policy was hardly calculated to elevate educational standardsor to instil
in students or teachers the need to excel. By ignoring examination cri-
teria, the government undoubtedly won some political adherents; but
the quality of Pakistan'suniversities was still further undermined.
Despite efforts aimed at socializing and politicizing the student
body, as well as mollifying the teachers, Bhutto could not permanently
wean them away from their traditional opposition role. The Jamaat-i-
Islami had been cultivating university students long before the organiza-
tion of the PPP, and the rigid discipline of this conservative party
enabled it to wield considerable influence in virtually all the universities.
Organized in India before partition, the Jamaat was brought to Pakistan
by its creator, Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi. It has been almost solely
concerned with the political education of the young, and has been more
or less indifferent to election contests. Its small nucleus of followers has
always been drawn from the educated middle and professional classes;
and by 1975, "all the student unions in the country's universities and
colleges" were in the hands of the Jamiat-e-Tuleba-e-Islam,which was
the Jamaat'sstudent wing."
The Jamaat's appeal among the students can be attributed to their
disillusionmentwith the PPP. The young people of Pakistan are reason-
ably idealistic, and they were alienated by the Bhutto government's ap-
parent abandonment of its oft-stated Socialist goals, as well as by the
imprisonmentof numerous individuals who dared to criticize PPP poli-
cies. Bhutto found it impossible to retain student respect, and their ideal-
ism led them toward a movement that seemed less crassly opportunistic.
Moreover, the Jamaat's strict adherence to its ideology, the consistency
of its argument, the austerity practiced by its leaders, and the discipline
demanded of its members had a peculiar attraction to young scholars
11 Manzur-ul-Hasan, "Mulla Power: An Analysis," Tempo, January-February 1975, p. 17.

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Dilemmas of Higher Education in Pakistan: 321

seeking a new beginning for Pakistan. It is also important to note that

the PPP frowned upon students engaging in politics, unless it meant sup-
porting the party in power; and Pakistani students are not necessarily
constructed that way. Thus, in spite of PPP educational programs cater-
ing to the least common denominator among the students, their support
could not be retained. And as the government resorted more and more
to secret police strong-armtactics and intimidation, dissatisfaction with-
in the student communitymounted."12
The 1977 election campaign and its aftermath bore witness to the
growing conflict between the universitystudents and Bhutto. The Jamaat
joined the Pakistan National Alliance in order to provide a united front
against the PPP. Students organized street demonstrations, convened
rallies and public meetings, and used every opportunity to discredit
Bhutto and his regime, despite strenuous attempts to stifle them. Their
main grievances related to Bhutto's dictatorial methods, his allegedly
anti-Islamic behavior, and his personal greed. These charges became
even more strident in the period following the election, when Bhutto and
the PPP were accused of electoral fraud and various ballot-box irregu-
larities. The PNA soon called for Bhutto's resignation. When he refused
to step down, riots broke out in the principal metropolitancenters. In an
effort to quell the demonstrators,Bhutto gave shoot-to-killorders to the
police and military, and several hundred persons died in the weeks that
followed, a number of them university students. Bhutto's dependence on
the armed forces and the bureaucracy to handle the disturbances under-
mined his mystique. His coalition was shattered; and when the political
opposition refused to make any concessions, the military decided to re-
move him. On July 5, 1977, Genera Zia ul-Haq seized control of the
government and imposed martial law on the country.
Bhutto had made the most concerted effort thus far to recruit the
students into a political arrangement that would reinforce rather than

12 This was particularlytrue in Baluchistan, where an armed insurrectionhad broken out when
Bhutto arrested the indigenous leadership and deprived the Baluchis of a government of their
own choice. The Baluchistan Student Organization violently opposed Bhutto's administration
and provided recruits for the Popular Front of Armed Resistance Against National Oppression
and Exploitation. In the Northwest Frontier Province, a similar organization known as the
Pushtu Student Federation continued to agitate and sow the seeds of revolution. At one point
in 1974, it was believed that the two student movements had merged their programs. The call
for a free Baluchistanand an independentPushtunistaninvolved guerrilla warfare and random
terrorism,which the Pakistani military had to deal with as best it could. Although Bhutto spoke
of his determinationto preserve the Pakistan state, his policies seemed almost designed to pro-
mote the opposite.

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322 Asian Affairs

challenge government authority. But Pakistan's emerging intellectual

class is difficult to tame and almost impossible to regiment. In a sense,
the student community performs the function of social conscience for
Pakistan's illiterate masses, and they have been cast in a role which de-
mands that they remain outside the government-as the watchmen
(chowdikars) and praetorians (gazis) of traditional Islamic culture.
This is a role they have come to cherish, and any future government
must be prepared to adapt to it. But it also means that Pakistan's edu-
cational system will continue to run off-trackfor some time to come, and
that little if any improvement in academic practice or performance can
be prophesied.

VI

General Zia ul-Haq appears to understand the student question. But it

remains to be seen if he will be any more successful than his predecessor
in getting the students to concentrate on their studies. He has demon-
strated his sensitivity to the issue of Islamic custom by adopting an
austere life-style and by publicizing his Muslim devotions. He has rein-
stated aspects of Islamic law, and punishments for some criminal acts
are being meted out in accordance with Koranic principle. Similarly, or-
dinances have been issued enforcing Islamic prohibitions on gambling
and the use of alcoholic beverages. The general inference drawn from
these policies is that the martial law government seriously intends to
refashion Pakistani society along orthodox Islamic lines. Zia has com-
mented that Pakistan can only be held together by strengthening its
Islamic fabric. There is no reason to doubt his sincerity in this. At the
same time, his actions have had a salutary-if possibly transitory-
effect upon the student community, and this breathing period may pro-
vide the government with the time necessary to repair the general edu-
cational system. Indeed, there are signs that this is the intention.
In view of Zia's own propensities and the pressure on him from his
colleagues and various segments of public opinion, it is not surprisingto
find the new government dismantling Bhutto's more secular edifice. A
partial denationalization of the educational system is also under way,
and the various Islamic sects (as well as Pakistan's religious minorities)
have been granted the right to start or reopen their own schools. The
government has pledged itself to follow the dictates of the Nizam-i-

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Dilemmas of Higher Education in Pakistan: 323

Mustafa (Order of the Prophet). To promote Islamic education while

protecting non-Muslims within the society is traditional Muslim prac-
tice. The Nizam-i-Mustafa also tends to legitimate government policy
that seeks to reintroduce a more conservative approach in social and
economic affairs.
The group that is most dissatisfied with the turn of events in the
educational field are those teachers whose status had improved under
the nationalized system or who had been rewarded by the PPP regime
for services rendered to it. They now see their status dclining and their
chances for advancement neutralized. Many fear that retaliatory mea-
sures will be taken against them, and that they will be removed from
their positions and perhaps even physically harmed. Their present situa-
tion threatens to weaken still further the teaching side of higher educa-
tion. A related problem which has surfaced with General Zia's dena-
tionalization program is the less-than-sophisticatedlevel of some of the
private institutions, particularly those that are organized around a reli-
gious curriculum.The more secular-mindedteachers fear an exaggerated
Islamic emphasis, and they question the value of such instruction in
preparingstudents for life in a highly complex, often business-likeworld.
But while the teachers display concern over the course of educational
policy, they are more troubled over their personal status. The Zia gov-
ernment's tendency to support private schools, they feel, invites abuse
of teacher rights; and without the government to safeguard their inter-
ests, they fear that they will again sink to the low end of the social-
economic scale.
General Zia appears unmoved by teacher criticism of his policies;
and perhaps because they were supportive of the PPP, he has ordered
them to be excluded from the processes of educational policy formula-
tion. He has made it clear that he expects them to teach and not engage
in politics of any kind. Although prepared to offer words of encourage-
ment to students identified with the Jamaat's Jamiat-e-Tuleba-e-Islam,
Zia's government has also clamped down on students engaging in politi-
cal activity. Martial Law Regulation 28, issued on November 12, 1977,
even prohibits elections in student and professional organizations. Vio-
lators run the risk of three years' rigorous imprisonment and/or whip-
ping. According to one commentary:'"

13 Jones and Jones, op. cit., p. 15.

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324 Asian Affairs

The rationalemay be twofold, to stifle the electioneeringin or-

ganizationsthat so frequentlyspill over into antigovernmentagita-
tion, andto ensurethat the studentunionsremainlargelyunderthe
control of the Jamiat-e-Tulebaor other Islam-passandgroups. In
any case, MLR 28 is an effortto put the lid on educationalorgani-
zationsratherthanto integratetheminto the governmentalprocess,
andlidsbuildup pressure.

At this writing,governmentpolicyis intendedto controlthe educa-

tionalsector,not primeit for a renaissance.The structuralaspectsof the
Bhuttoperiodarebeingdismantled.Socialism,or the PPP interpretation
of Islamicsocialism,has been cast aside and traditionalIslam is being
stressed.The governmenthas clearlyopted for stability;the immediate
futurewill be a periodof consolidation,of stocktakingand calculation.
Pakistan'snew leadersare drawnprimarilyfrom the militaryand bu-
reaucracy,the traditionalframeworkof preindependence BritishIndian
government.In major part, however, they are membersof the post-
colonialgenerationwhose roots are deep in the soil of the country.Un-
like their predecessors,they have limited ties abroadand virtuallyno
recollectionof the "goldendays"at Sandhurst,Oxford,or Cambridge.
Trainedlargelyin Pakistan,theirworld-viewis influencedprimarilyby
events since WorldWar II, and especiallythe 31 years since Pakistan
gainedits freedom.Theirperceptionof Islamicinstructionis not clouded
by Westernsecularviews. Firmnessand consistencyare morelikely to
be theirwatchwords,and Muslimsolidaritya centralthemein all their
policies and programs.Another attemptto erect an Islamic state in
Pakistanis in the offing.This time it may be morethanrhetoric.
Pakistanhas weatheredseveralsearingstormsin its shorthistory.
It is problematicalwhetherit can withstandmany more. Its primary
dilemmacontinuesto be national unity, and its future is very much
predicatedon a capacityto integratethe variousregionsinto a single
coherentnation.Sometimein the not-too-distant future,Pakistan'slead-
ers mustcome to gripswith the nation's educational system,andthrough
it attemptto reconstructand invigoratethe whole society.Whenit does
so, Islamwill hold a pre-eminentpositionin the policiesthey ultimately
choose.

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