Focus Article

Climate change adaptation

and peace
Dennis Tänzler, Achim Maas and Alexander Carius∗

Climate change may have dramatic consequences for several regions. Most
vulnerable are fragile countries with limited capacities to adapt. Without timely
action, the stresses induced by climate change may increase the risk of violent
conflict. Designing and implementing adaptation strategies is becoming imperative
to mitigate conflict potentials and prevent escalation. This article will discuss
existing national and international approaches with focus on the UNFCCC process.
It will be emphasized that a purely technical understanding of adaptation is
insufficient to cope with the socio-political consequences of climate change.
Indeed, adaptation may even contribute to conflict potentials if ill-designed.
Thus, it is necessary to develop conflict-sensitive approaches complemented by
internationally supported capacity development measures.  2010 John Wiley & Sons,
Ltd. WIREs Clim Change 2010 1 741–750

INTRODUCTION However, despite the plausible relationship

between climate and conflict, many remain sceptical
T he IPCC’s (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change) analysis of the scientific findings on
climate change paints a sometimes dramatic picture of
in the field of peace and security research. They
point to a lack of empirical basis.3,4,a Furthermore,
they believe it is important to avoid one-dimensional
the regional impacts of climate change.1 Countries
causal explanations when assessing whether there will
with low adaptation capacities will be hit the
be an increase of violent conflicts related to the
hardest. What is more, studies such as the 2007
distribution of natural resources such as water and
annual report on climate change and security by
land. Possible conflicts will not be caused by climate
the German Advisory Council on Global Change
change alone; rather climate change is seen as a factor
(WGBU) and analyses by other research institutes
which multiplies the menacing effects of deficits such
and think tanks reveal a growing potential for conflict
and an increase in social tension as a result of the as social and economic injustice, no or little rule of
impending changes in our climate. These reports law, and so on. A worsening of conflict situations as a
warn of diverse societal conflicts which may be result of climate change is only one possible scenario
exacerbated by the impact of climate change. Thus, and the peaceful avoidance of new conflict situations
according to the WBGU, conflicts may arise as a is another. Indeed, there has been substantial
result of water and food shortages, caused in turn research about how environmental cooperation
by an increase in extreme weather events and climate toward common challenges could support confidence-
change-induced mass migration.2 Weak and fragile building between former antagonists and support
states are considered particularly vulnerable as their peacebuilding efforts.5,6 The uneven and in some
already limited capacities are unlikely to be able to regions potentially dramatic impacts of climate
bear the strain of climate change. Further weakening change may catalyze cooperation and transcend
of the public sector can be expected to lead to national enmities.
and regional destabilization, with societal and political Political reactions to this discussion are many
tensions potentially developing into violent conflict. and varied. In 2007, the UN Security Council held a
debate on the impact of climate change on global peace
∗ Correspondence
to: carius@adelphi-research.de and security. The United Nations General Assembly
Adelphi Research, Caspar-Theyss-Strasse 14a, Berlin 14193, has held multiple debates on the political consequences
Germany of the IPCC status reports. In the summer of 2009, the
DOI: 10.1002/wcc.66 General Assembly called on the UN Secretary-General

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 Focus Article wires.wiley.com/climatechange

(UNSG) to prepare a comprehensive report on the ADAPTATION IN THE DEBATE ON

security implications of climate change, incorporating CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY
the views of both member states and regional and
international organizations.7 UN member states were The UNFCCC defines adaptation as ‘adjustment in
invited to present their perspective as well, and the natural or human systems in response to actual
report was released in late 2009.8 On the basis of a or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which
joint report by EU High Representative Javier Solana moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities’.b
and the European Commission published in 2008, Adaptation is an idea that has taken center stage
the European Union has now developed a road map in the debate on the security-related implications
for dealing with the security-related consequences of of climate change. It is no longer possible to avoid
climate change and is discussing which instruments adaptation measures, as greenhouse gases emissions
of foreign policy, security policy, and development (GGEs) to date have already triggered irreversible
policy can be used to prevent conflicts. global warming. Even if we were hypothetically to
Both research findings and political opinion lean cease all GGEs tomorrow, certain changes in our
climate would still be inevitable.2,9,10
more and more toward adaptation as a key lever for
Although adaptation measures as a topic are
avoiding conflicts influenced by climate change among
given central priority in most studies and political
other factors. A study commissioned by the German
treatises on climate change and security, it is often
Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)
unclear what concrete form they should take. The
also examines this question, describing in concrete
joint report by EU High Representative Javier Solana
terms the potential implications and consequences of
and the European Commission11 —the key document
climate change for security policy. It also identifies
in the European context—underscores the relevance
those regions which are most likely—as a result of
of climate change adaptation processes as an element
the impact of climate change and other factors—to
of conflict prevention. However, it limits itself to
be susceptible to violent conflict.9 Yet climate change
the general aim of better integrating adaptation into
adaptation as an area of policy remains a relatively
appropriate policy areas such as regional strategies.11
young and as yet ill-defined area. Likewise, the necessity of adaptation was repeatedly
This article attempts to define more clearly what drawn attention to during the United Nations Security
adaptation policy is, its goals and its means. We take Council (UNSC) debate on climate change on April
a close look at the challenges of this policy area, at the 17, 2007. However, these demands by and large
juncture of international climate policy, approaches remained as general as statements that adaptation
to crisis prevention, and development policy, and measures alone would represent a contribution to
define possibilities for integrating these areas. To conflict avoidance.12 Two years after the publication
this end, we first critically examine the different of the fourth IPCC status report, debates on security
views of adaptation policy, taking into account the policy are mostly still only threat assessments. One
uncertainty of climate science and conflict analysis. reason for this may be that policy debates are isolated
We then look at existing potentials for adaptation from one another. Discussions of security policy
policy and highlight opportunities for political action. and debates on adaptation (see Section Adaptation
Our focus in this section is on the ability of in the International Climate Debate) take place in
national adaptation schemes to develop preventative different political arenas, and exchange to date has
strategies and avoid the predicted destabilization of been marginal. Furthermore, there are a very large
states. We hypothesize that strengthening adaptation number of stakeholder viewpoints on the question
capacities not only reduces the risk of the expected of climate change and security, making it difficult to
socio-economic consequences of climate change, create strong connections between threat assessments
but also contributes to curbing potential conflicts and recommendations for political action. Opinions
and defusing conflict constellations. One central run the gamut from defining climate change as a
instrument is the local and national adaptation national security threat to negating any potential
processes as laid down by the Framework Convention security risks as a result of climate change.c
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in the form of Adjusting natural and human systems to
National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs). expected climate stimuli can take a variety of
Our discussion of conflict-prevention measures is ways—from building dams against sea-level rise
intended to reveal the specific challenges involved in to relocating populations. The implications of this
developing conflict-sensitive adaptation strategies in variety of measures are highly diverse. Generally,
(post-)conflict situations as well as the extent to which in academic debate, which mostly takes the form
the political scope of action must be broadened. of analyses and regional studies by think tanks

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 WIREs Climate Change Climate change, adaptation and peace

(sometimes commissioned by various governments), This political perspective is also necessary with
four different perspectives on adaptation are respect to the transfer of financial resources if
discernable. We examine these different viewpoints adaptation measures are to move forward. Many
more closely below. They are developing countries are demanding the unconditional
flow of resources as compensation for the impacts
1. Adaptation as a technical challenge; of climate change, caused mostly by industrialized
countries. Here it is almost impossible to avoid
2. Adaptation as socio-political transformation;
questions of justice between North and South, a
3. Adaptation as the cause of conflicts; and fact that quickly overtaxes the narrow framework
4. Adaptation as conflict transformation. of international climate change negotiations. For
their part, many industrialized countries want to
One of the most widespread approaches is to help determine how adaptation funds are used, in
view adaptation as primarily a technical challenge. particular when the recipient is a state in which
The negative consequences of climate change should corruption is rife. Debates on adaptation can become
be in the main absorbed by measures such as politically highly charged, depending on the degree to
technology transfer, capacity building in the area which such demands by industrialized countries are
of resource management, and developing resistant seen as interference in domestic affairs or touching on
crops.1,13 The European Commission White Paper questions of sovereignty.
on Adaptation, published in April 2009, states that This is especially true where climate change
the framework for action should build on various leads to a fundamental change in individual living
pillars. The focus should be on the management situations—as is the case with small island states
and conservation of water, soil, and biological that threaten to sink due to rising sea levels, or
resources. In this manner, ecosystems should remain the potential desertification of Brazil, one of the
fully functional and resilient against climate change. possible tipping points of the global climate system.5
Adaptation processes should therefore not only focus This is the main focus of the second perspective:
on protecting physical infrastructure, but also on the adaptation as socio-political transformation. In the
ability of nature to absorb the impact on urban and aforementioned cases, adaptation means no less
rural areas. An example of this ‘Green Infrastructure’ than the fundamental redistribution of the chances
is the ability of soil to store carbon and water, and resources of an entire society.15 This kind
conserving water in natural systems as a way of of reform also opens up opportunities to build a
countering the effects of drought, floods, soil erosion, more sustainable society,16 particularly as historically,
and desertification.14 clinging to the status quo has more often contributed
Multi-sectoral strategies such as these should to societal collapse.17 However, friction and resistance
be developed equally for industrialized, developing, are to be expected as a result of such transformation
and threshold countries, whereby the latter two processes, predominantly from those who profit from
will be hit much harder by the impacts of climate the status quo or are interested in embezzle adaptation
change. The WGBU, in its 2007 annual report, funds for other purposes. Depending on how
recommends taking the bio-geographical changes adaptation processes manifest themselves, they can
caused by a global warming of +2◦ Cd as a also contribute to the erosion of established societal
gauge for adaptation measures.2 To make this structures and thus to the destabilization of states.18,19
possible, development cooperation funds and funds This links it closely to the third perspective:
for the implementation of the Climate Framework adaptation as a possible cause of conflict. But whereas
Convention should be increased. It is also necessary in the second perspective adaptation, measures are
to anticipate the potential social and political not designed in a conflict-sensitive manner and
implications of adaptation measures and to avoid exacerbated conflicts are seen as a sort of ‘collateral
negative impacts, for example, by applying the Do damage’ of the intended political goal, in the third
No Harm principle.10,e This necessitates a multi-level perspective adaptation, measures are potentially the
approach in the project development phase. Although direct cause of conflict. One example of this is
at first glance adaptation appears to be a purely patterns of use of transboundary rivers. The risk
technical or financial question, it also has a political of conflict between up-river and down-river states
dimension, particularly when it takes place in an area increases when the adaptation measures of an up-river
of conflict. It is therefore necessary for adaptation country further reduce water supply in the down-
measures to be conflict-sensitive, especially in fragile river country in addition to the impact of climate
contexts.9 change. Such a scenario is found in Central Asia and

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elsewhere.20 Alongside this direct connection with it is important to harness the direct co-benefits of
possible conflict, militarization and increased security adaptation for peacebuilding on a more local, project-
due to climate change are seen as possible areas based level. This, e.g., includes the creation of conflict-
that could spark conflict.18,21 Prognoses of resource sensitive adaptation programmes with a positive
scarcity and climate-induced conflict22,23 threaten transformative effect. Below we examine the extent to
to develop a momentum of their own. They can, which these challenges are currently being met within
in this interpretation, cause a security dilemma in the political framework for action on adaptation.
countries that are attempting to prepare their defence
sector for possible conflicts. In this manner, countries
intensify or even trigger the very conflicts which ADAPTATION IN THE
they were trying to avoid. Studies on the security INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE DEBATE
implications of climate change such as that of the The international debate on climate protection to
Centre for Naval Analysis (CNA), which in part makes date has been characterized mainly by attempts to
explicit proposals to the US defence department, can mitigate the dangers of climate change by reducing
themselves contribute to this. This study calls among the level of GGE. The discussion about the impact
other things for the adaptation of military planning on security of climate change is more reason than
in a world affected by climate change. In its threat ever to take comprehensive measures to counter
analysis, it takes into account further causes of conflict climate change. In its fourth status report, the IPCC
such as the increase of failing states, radicalization, set a required target corridor of 25–40% emission
and the possible spread of terrorist networks.24 reductions for industrialized countries by 2020.26
The fourth perspective looks at conflict transfor- It is much less clear how building a sustainable
mation and adaptation as complementary measures adaptation structure can in the future be measured
which strengthen each other.9,25 This perspective by performance goals. However, adaptation to the
is based on two observations. On the one hand, negative effects of anthropogenic climate change has
joint resource management by potential conflict par- been an issue since the beginning of international
ties can act as a trust-building measure and cre- climate protection negotiations. Its importance is
ate interdependencies.25 On the other hand, climate stressed both in the UN Framework Convention
change adaptation processes and conflict transforma- on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and in the Kyoto
tion processes share a desire to create change. By Protocol, thus ensuring its position as a key element
adapting to a changing environment, socio-economic in the climate protection regime. Article 4 of the
conditions should be further developed in such a way UNFCCC requires all parties to formulate and
as to avoid negative effects such as water or food implement ‘measures to facilitate adequate adaptation
scarcity and consequently also circumvent social and to climate change’ and to ‘cooperate in preparing for
political tensions. Similarly, conflict transformation adaptation to the impacts of climate change’ (Article
processes aim to create a society in which conflicts are 4.1 UNFCCC). In so doing, parties shall, according
solved non-violently. Non-violent conflict resolution to Article 4.8 UNFCCC, ‘give full consideration to
skills may well be crucial to easing the implementation what actions are necessary [. . .] to meet the specific
of necessary but unpopular adaptation measures such needs and concerns of developing country Parties
as unavoidable resettlement programmes or the nego- arising from the adverse effects of climate change
tiation of suitable compensation. At the same time, it and/or the impact of the implementation of response
is quite probable that as the ability to adapt to climate measures’. This includes, according to Article 4.4
change increases, so does the potential for peaceful UNFCCC, the costs incurred by adaptation to the
conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Both effects of climate change. This applies especially to
thus aim to strengthen social resilience, that is to say particularly vulnerable parties. According to Article
the ability to withstand social and economic stress fac- 4.9 UNFCCC, all parties must take full account of
tors without societal structures being fundamentally the special situation of least developed countries. This
destabilized.25 applies not only to funding, but also to technology
Considering the four approaches, particularly, transfer. The Kyoto Protocol reiterates signatories’
the second and fourth approaches are of key relevance responsibility for adaptation and calls on them in
in preventing or mitigating conflict: socio-political Article 10 to formulate and facilitate adaptation to
transformation toward a society capable to resolve climate change.
potential or actual resource conflicts may also be able Actual progress in establishing a robust
to resolve disputes in other areas. In addition, to framework of facilitation is, however, rather slow.27
confront the security risks induced by climate change With the adoption of the Marrakesh Accords in

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 WIREs Climate Change Climate change, adaptation and peace

2001, a system for supporting adaptation measures the emissions market will develop. However, the total
in developing countries was developed which allowed possible volume by 2012 is estimated by some to be
three funds to be set up28 : almost USD 1 billion.29 It makes sense to generate
the monies needed for adaptation directly from the
1. Under the Kyoto Protocol, an Adaptation Fund architecture of international climate protection. This
was set up to finance concrete adaptation guarantees the flow of cash and also decouples
projects and programmes in developing coun- it from one-sided commitments by industrialized
tries. The fund’s revenues stem from 2% of the countries, for example. Whether such commitments
income generated by Clean Development Mech- are upheld is often uncertain, as they are the result
anism (CDM) projects. It is expected that the of complex national and international negotiation
final agreement shall in the course of 2009 fill processes. Linking funds for adaptation measures to
in the gaps in the regulations for the support of the global carbon dioxide market creates a financial
concrete projects. procedure within the climate regime. This connects
2. Voluntary contributions by Annex I parties the polluters to those most affected by climate change.
will go into a Special Climate Change Fund Using money generated by emissions trading
under the UNFCCC to finance supplementary creates new scope for political action and creative
measures to the activities of the Global leeway. This is shown, for example, by the
Environment Facility (GEF). This fund also international climate protection initiative recently
supports technology transfer programmes and launched by the German federal government,31
measures in greenhouse gas-emitting sectors under which the proceeds from auctioned emissions
to diversify economic systems that would be certificates are used in climate protection projects.
adversely affected by GGE reductions. Currently, EUR 60 million annually is earmarked
for the implementation of international adaptation
3. A Least Developed Countries Fund under the
projects. However, the quality of an international
UNFCCC to support the development of work-
framework for supporting climate change adaptation
ing programmes for these countries. This should
measures should not be measured simply by the
help to implement the Framework Convention
amount of money it generates. Rather it must be
on Climate Change, including the preparation
ensured that when financial support is provided,
of National Adaptation Programmes of Action
it is accompanied by vital administrative capacity
(NAPAs—see further below).
building. This is also a priority in order to
avoid any misappropriation of funds. The efficient
These three funds are run by the GEF and are
use of funds must be guaranteed, as well as
meant to complement each another. The structure
coherency between adaptation measures and other
for funding adaptation is still under construction
national development processes. In the worst case,
at the GEF. To establish a viable funding structure
an influx of cash inadequately supported by other
that supports the development and implementation
programmes can strengthen corrupt elites and
of adaptation strategies, both guidelines for and
exacerbate existing conflict-producing trends in the
methods of assessing vulnerability and adaptation
receiving countries. Below we discuss how existing
requirements are needed.29 For the introduction
adaptation programmes already integrate elements of
of positive transformative adaptation processes, a
a conflict-sensitive approach.
massive redistribution of financial means is required.
However, a preliminary analysis of the money
expected to flow into the two adaptation funds already NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
set up and of GEF activities specifically targeted at ADAPTATION EFFORTS IN AREAS
adaptation reveals that only USD 200 million will be
OF CONFLICT
available until 2012.29 The impact of these funds
is comparatively modest compared to the volume Existing activities have already made some progress
deemed necessary—estimated to be in the area of in creating strategic support for future adaptation
tens of billions per year.29,30 processes: By the spring of 2009, 40 NAPAs for
Great hopes rest on the Adaptation Fund as least developed countries (LDCs) were submitted to
a way of providing this sort of money. The fund the UNFCCC. These programmes identify national
receives 2% of the income generated by the sale priorities for future adaptation processes. They are the
of emission certificates for CDM projects.f Estimates result of national consultation processes supported by
of the amount money which can be raised in this the United Nations Institute for Training and Research
manner vary greatly due to uncertainty about how (UNITAR) and other UN institutions. The money

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needed to implement the NAPAs in the next 5 years is into the design of adaptation measures. This also
an estimated USD 5 billion.32 Of the 40 programmes, lies behind demands to integrate planned adaptation
16 were developed in countries that, according to the processes into ongoing efforts at development plan-
2008 analysis by the Fund for Peace, are failed states ning and poverty alleviation.25,37 A United Nations
at high risk of becoming destabilized.33 A total of Development Programme (UNDP) assessment of the
35 states were assessed as showing this risk level in importance of fresh water resources in NAPAs shows
2008. A further 19 countries for which NAPAs were that the initial stages of an integrative approach are
developed show increased risk. According to the Fund already in effect.38 Countries such as Bhutan, Rwanda,
for Peace assessment, over 90 countries in total fall and Sudan have at least integrated much-needed adap-
into this category. tation measures into their poverty reduction strategies.
This makes it clear that schemes do exist on Nevertheless, integration is often superficial. Crucial
the international level for introducing climate change to ensuring coherency with larger relevant political
adaptation measures in conflict areas. However, it may processes—not least national water laws—is the estab-
well be necessary to supplement national processes lishment of good governance structures in the area of
in many further countries with political procedures. adaptation. Coordinating the various political pro-
Bhutan is to be the first country to receive funds cesses is a major challenge even for industrialized
for implementing urgent climate change adaptation countries with adequate administrative capacity. In
projects, with three projects initially selected from post-war societies, the difficulties of coordination are
among the many priorities to receive support. The disproportionately greater and meet with resistance
slow initiation of concrete projects not only illustrates from a wide range of quarters.39
the as yet insufficient funding available, but also It is possible to institutionalize responsibility for
contributes to an increasing loss of credibility for a coherent implementation of adaptation measures
international climate protection measures in those in individual countries by assigning them to a
countries most severely impacted by climate change. specific state institution or inter-ministerial body.
In the meantime, preliminary assessments are It is also conceivable that, like CDM projects,
available for the national adaptation priorities set by adaptation measures should be supported by so-
NAPAs. Triggers of possible climate change-related called Designated National Authorities (DNA) which
conflicts such as water and food scarcity play a oversee implementation in developing and threshold
central role,34,35 as does strengthening early warning countries.g National Implementing Entities (NIE)
and disaster management capacities.36 The sectoral may be appropriate to serve this purpose. If
approach of NAPAs enables a deficit analysis, for such an authority does not exist, it not only
example, in the water sector. This makes it possible jeopardizes the integration of adaptation measures
to identify the most urgent priorities for improving into other development processes, but also makes
the urban and rural water supply infrastructure, it extremely difficult to incorporate conflict-sensitive
preventing further water pollution (e.g., salt water considerations into national planning processes.
penetration in coastal areas) and developing methods However, it is also important to keep in mind that
of water storage, say. Similar analyses are available for in a conflict-ridden, polarized, and fragile country, a
agricultural approaches to improving food security. DNA may actually serve one-sided purposes. Indeed,
Projects planned in this area would in part mean a caution is needed, as in a country in a state of conflict
break with traditional cultivation patterns, or at least or emerging from unbiased planning.
the diversification of cultivated goods, and hence call The UNDP assessment of the significance of
for significant transformation processes. The method the water sector for NAPAs makes it clear that a
by which NAPAs are created thus results not only in further aspect should be considered in any evaluation
a list of national priorities in the area of adaptation, of the relevance of adaptation programmes for
but ideally also sensitises different groups to the future conflict areas. Thus references to institutional pacts
challenges of climate change and makes societies better on transboundary fresh water resources, such as the
able to respond to these challenges. Nile Basin Initiative, are almost completely absent,
Yet this rigid demarcation into sectoral tasks missing the chance to embed adaptation measures
can sometimes fall short of the mark, parti- regionally.38 This lack of regional focus in NAPAs
cularly with regard to conflict sensitivity. Usually is on the one hand most likely due to the fact that
a systematic approach is needed in order to give this comparatively new method of anticipating the
sufficient consideration to the conflict situation and local and national impact of climate change is in
to incorporate existing conflict dynamics and the itself a great challenge for these societies and ties
overarching socio-political and economic conditions up a great deal of capacity. On the other hand, the

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‘state-oriented’,40 conventional focus of the UNFCCC on a large scale, possibly intensifying national
makes it difficult to develop regional approaches. and transboundary tensions.37 In large portions
Thus, the regional contextualization of adaptation of Africa, there have also been mass, sometimes
needs can hardly be expected at this early stage. temporary and mostly intra-state migrations toward
Nonetheless, limiting NAPAs to a national cities in the past, triggered by an increase in
perspective often ignores the transboundary nature of environmental degradation.42 In light of the expected
resource scarcity, particularly with regard to adequate population growth, a further increase in migration in
water supplies. As mentioned above, an isolated conjunction with worsening environmental conditions
national approach can in the worst-case scenario lead is possible—even if it is too early in many cases to draw
to new conflicts, for example, where water-related conclusions about possible conflict trends, or where
measures taken in an up-river country have a negative such statements are not based on reliable scientific
impact on a country further down river. Furthermore, findings.43 Ideas such as temporary migration as an
the stabilizing and trust-building potential often adaptation strategy are already under discussion and
demonstrated by transboundary cooperation in the should be integrated into planning processes.44
water sector39 is in this way ignored by the adaptation Within the climate security debate, migration
programmes. In addition, examples from the local has been often framed negatively as potential conflict
how cooperation could be trust between alienated constellation.2 However, there are many advantages
communities within a country can also be imagined.6 migration may yield as well—such as remittances
Cooperation between countries with bordering which could be used for adaptation measures at home
watersheds has long been a focus of the international or the benefits of industrialized societies accessing
donor community. As a result, it is often possible highly trained migrant workers. However, assessing
to make use of existing structures. However, an the positive and negative aspects of migration as an
assessment of donor activities in transboundary river adaptation strategy for host and moving communities
areas in Africa shows that funding is limited to just is beyond the scope of this article.
a few catchment areas and pre-existing institutions,
and that conflict-torn regions are barely integrated at
all.41 Yet it is just these politically sensitive regions
CONCLUSION: CONFLICT-SENSITIVE
that need to be focused on most if future water ADAPTATION AS A PATHWAY
distribution conflicts are to be avoided. At an EU TO PEACE?
level, regional strategies offer an important starting The possible impact of climate change on conflicts
point for addressing this issue. The EU strategies is the subject of much debate. Its true role is highly
for Central Asia and Africa adopted in 2007 can controversial. However, there are many indications
help further regional integration through shared that the challenges for states which are already
sustainable resource management and a collective weak will grow as a result of climate change. To
approach to adaptation. The importance given to prevent further destabilization, possibly leading to the
water in these strategies, for instance, mirrors the outbreak of violent conflict, it will be necessary to
critical appraisal of a variety of risk assessments on introduce adaptation processes despite the diversity of
the security implications of climate change. The above- approaches and associated risks. In any case, a purely
mentioned 2008 report by High Representative Javier technical approach to these strategies does not go far
Solana and the European Commission also examines enough in light of the potentially conflict-exacerbating
the importance of EU regional strategies for conflict impact of climate change. This is particularly true
prevention. However, it remains to be seen whether for weak and fragile states, where strategies must
the EU and its member states actually translate the include a much stronger political dimension.3 Creating
security-related impact of climate change into policy. conflict-sensitive adaptation processes which also have
Added to this rather unsystematic approach to a positive, transformative effect is an ambitious task.
adaptation and the lack of a regional perspective To help it along, a variety of requirements must be met:
is a third aspect. This aspect also needs to be
taken into account when looking at the conflict First, the sectors critically affected by
constellations most likely to be severely impacted by climate change and the role they play
climate change. In the NAPAs completed to date, in national and regional policy must be
the possibility of migration as a result of increasing identified. This will enable the situa-
resource degradation have been mentioned. However, tion with regard to possible conflict to
it is hardly addressed in a systematic way. Yet in be understood at the outset, and ensure
Bangladesh, for instance, this development is expected coherency and coordination with other

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planning processes. If necessary, addi- Sixth, the UNFCCC conferences of par-

tional peace and conflict assessments can ties should, as part of the international
be used to reduce the danger of maladap- financial architecture for the fight against
tation. Thus conflict-sensitive adaptation climate change, adopt a broader frame-
processes must be approached using a work for adaptation than currently exists.
multi-dimensional system that incorpo- This will provide funding for sustainable
rates different levels, both administrative approaches. Recent developments of the
and societal. Adaptation Fund Board under the Kyoto
Protocol are encouraging in this regard
Second, having government and non-
since it has started to adopt concrete adap-
government stakeholders work together to
tation projects. Solving financing woes is
identify risks and formulate strategies and
only the first step in a thorough examina-
programmes can help to raise awareness
tion of national and regional governance
among civil society of the impact of
structures. Mismanagement would lead to
climate change. In this way, it is possible
a severe loss of credibility for interna-
to win acceptance for the transformation
tional climate policy, particularly if funds
processes necessary to secure the supply of
allocated for adaptation measures were
food and water, and to improve disaster
appropriated by corrupt elites who then
preparedness.
misused them to retain their power.
Third, given these requirements, institu-
tional support is imperative. A national It will be necessary to strengthen regional
steering committee setup by the respec- cooperation arrangements to meet the challenges of
tive country should be responsible for, adaptation created by global climate change. The
among other tasks, monitoring the adap- systematic extension of existing river area agreements
tation programme, coordinating public to cover the expected impact of climate change is one
authorities and external stakeholders such example among many of how regional adaptation pro-
as donor organizations, and establishing grammes could be furthered. Additionally, methods
mediation bodies. and instruments need to be developed for enabling civil
society and decision makers in fragile states to develop
Fourth, to meet these challenges it will and implement conflict-sensitive adaptation strategies.
be necessary to significantly expand the Participative processes for the mutual identification of
political scope of action for adaptation the impacts of climate change specific to the region
measures and substantially increase capac- are only the beginning. For example, divergent inter-
ity on a national and regional level. At ests must be contained in discussions on water or
the moment, proposals for strengthening land distribution. To ensure that social and economic
adaptation capacity are largely in their injustices are not exacerbated by climate change, the
infancy. international community must make a substantial
Fifth, the funds provided by the interna- commitment—and not only a financial one. Indeed,
tional community to date allow only a vigorous dialogue needs to be established across the
limited number of countries to identify climate change, development, and peacebuilding com-
adaptation priorities using a stakeholder- munities to harness the co-benefits adaptation may
based approach. Initial assessments sug- have for peace and security across the world.
gest that NAPAs could form a central
element of capacity building. However,
adaptation measures should also be bet-
NOTES
ter integrated into development processes a See also, in this volume, Nils Petter Gleditsch and
and the fight against poverty, and institu- Ragnhild Nordås, ‘Climate Change and Conflict: A
tional support for adaptation programmes Critical Overview’.
should be expanded. Failure to apply a sys- b Taken from the glossary of www.unfccc.int

temic approach to the creation of NAPAs (December 2009).

has meant that they are not integrated at c For an overview, see the UNSC debate of April 17,

present into the larger regional context, 2007 (UNSC).

making conflict-sensitive implementation d There is broad scientific consensus that global

difficult under current conditions. warming must be limited to 2◦ C above pre-industrial

748  2010 Jo h n Wiley & So n s, L td. Vo lu me 1, September/Octo ber 2010

 WIREs Climate Change Climate change, adaptation and peace

levels to avoid the worst possible effects of climate developing countries which could not have been
change. This goal has been the reference point in realized without this mechanism (the ‘additionality’
European climate policy since 1996 (Council of the criterion). The emission rights thus acquired can be
European Union. Press release 8518/96). e The Do No sold on the international certificates market.
Harm principle, developed by Anderson45 , is widely g It has been shown that setting up DNAs has a decisive
taken to mean shaping development cooperation in
effect on building climate policy capacity both in gov-
such a way that it does not to exacerbate conflicts in
ernments and civil society.46 At the same time, there
crisis areas, for example, by distributing humanitarian
aid in a way which is perceived to be unfair. has been much criticism of the unbalanced global dis-
f In CDM projects, industrialized countries (or their tribution of CDM projects and the lack of stakeholder
companies) invest in climate protection projects in participation in projects, for example.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank the reviewers for many helpful comments as well as Arne Janssen for editorial
support.

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FURTHER READING
Wolf A. A Long Term View of Water and Security: International Waters, National Issues, and Regional Tensions. Berlin:
WBGU; 2007.
Tänzler D. Entwicklungsrisiko Klimawandel. Die Notwendigkeit kooperativer Ansätze. Berlin: SWP Working Paper
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; 2009.

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