THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 190922. October 11, 2017.]

FRANCISCA TAAR, JOAQUINA TAAR, LUCIA TAAR and HEIRS OF

OSCAR L. GALO , petitioners, vs . CLAUDIO LAWAN, MARCELINO L.
GALO, ARTEMIO ABARQUEZ, AUGUSTO B. LAWAN, ADOLFO L. GALO
and EDUARDO R. ERMITA , respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN , J : p

A judgment approving the subdivision of a parcel of land does not preclude other
parties with a better right from instituting free patent applications over it. Entitlement
to agricultural lands of the public domain requires a clear showing of compliance with
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Resolutions
dated July 20, 2009 2 and January 15, 2010 3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
109390. These assailed judgments dismissed outright the Petition for Certiorari led
by herein petitioners Francisca Taar (Francisca), Joaquina Taar (Joaquina), Lucia Taar
(Lucia), and the Heirs of Oscar L. Galo 4 for being an inappropriate remedy to annul the
October 20, 2008 Decision and the March 26, 2009 Resolution of the O ce of the
President.
The present case involves two (2) free patent applications 5 over a 71,014-
square-meter parcel of land (the Property) located in Barangay Parsolingan, Genova,
Tarlac. 6
Narcisa Taar (Narcisa), Alipio Duenas (Alipio), Fortunata Duenas (Fortunata), and
Pantaleon Taar (Pantaleon) inherited two (2) vast tracts of land situated in Tarlac. One
(1) parcel of land was adjudicated exclusively in favor of Pantaleon while the other
parcel of land was given to Pantaleon, Narcisa, Alipio, and Fortunata. 7 Narcisa sold her
share to Spouses Primitivo T. Adaoag and Pilar Tandoc (the Adaoag Spouses) and to
Spouses Ignacio Gragasin and Genoveva Adaoag (the Gragasin Spouses). 8
Later, Pantaleon, Alipio, Fortunata, the Adaoag Spouses, and the Gragasin
Spouses executed an agreement to partition the second parcel of land. This agreement
was approved by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its February 18, 1948 Decision.
9

Pantaleon, Alipio, and Fortunata were the predecessors-in-interest of Francisca,

10 Joaquina, Lucia, and Oscar L. Galo. 1 1
Based on the February 18, 1948 Decision, petitioners prepared a subdivision plan
1 2 over the Property in 2000. 1 3 The subdivision plan, denominated as Subdivision Plan
No. Ccs-03-000964-D, was approved on February 6, 2001. 1 4 Petitioners then applied
for free patents over the Property. 1 5
On March 16, 2001, Claudio Lawan (Claudio), Marcelino M. Galo (Marcelino),
Artemio Abarquez (Artemio), Augusto B. Lawan (Augusto), and Adolfo L. Galo (herein
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 private respondents) led a veri ed protest 1 6 alleging that their predecessors-in-
interest had been in "actual, physical, exclusive[,] and notorious possession and
occupation of the land . . . since 1948." 1 7 Petitioners countered that private
respondents occupied the property as tenants. 1 8
The Regional O ce of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in
Region III conducted an ocular inspection of the Property and required the parties to
submit their respective documentary evidence. 1 9
In its May 29, 2002 Order, 2 0 Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Regional Executive Director for Region III Leonardo R. Sibbaluca (Director Sibbaluca)
found that private respondents were the actual occupants of the Property. There were
no improvements or other traces of possession by petitioners. Based on his ndings,
Director Sibbaluca cancelled Subdivision Plan No. Ccs-03-000964-D and denied
petitioners' free patent applications. 2 1
Neither of the parties interposed an appeal or moved for reconsideration. 2 2
Hence, Director Sibbaluca's May 29, 2002 Order attained finality. 2 3
Later that year, private respondents led their free patent applications before the
Tarlac Community Environment and Natural Resources O ce. 2 4 Their applications
covered the Property, which was also claimed by petitioners. 2 5
On January 23, 2004, private respondents' applications were approved. 2 6 The
corresponding free patents 2 7 and certi cates of title denominated as "Katibayan ng
Orihinal na Titulo" were then issued in their favor. 2 8
On July 29, 2004, 2 9 petitioners led before the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources 3 0 a Veri ed Petition 3 1 to annul Director
Sibbaluca's May 29, 2002 Order on the ground of extrinsic fraud and to cancel private
respondents' free patents and certi cates of title. 3 2 Petitioners alleged that they were
deprived of due process. 3 3
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources Undersecretary for Legal
Affairs formed an investigating team 3 4 to ascertain the actual occupants of the
Property. 3 5 During the ocular inspection, the investigating team found "concrete
residential houses of [petitioners] with fences, fruit trees[,] and coconut trees" and
"other houses . . . owned [by] relatives and friends of the parties." 3 6 The investigating
team gathered documentary evidence, discovered several leasehold contracts between
the parties, 3 7 and saw rice elds cultivated by Augusto, Marcelino, Claudio, Artemio
Tabuyo, Artemio Abarquez, and Romy Tabuyo. 3 8 Based on their ndings, the team
concluded that petitioners were entitled to the Property. 3 9
In his Decision 4 0 dated January 18, 2007, then Secretary of Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Angelo T. Reyes (Secretary Reyes) adopted the
ndings of the investigating team and ordered the cancellation of the free patents and
the certificates of title issued in favor of private respondents.
Private respondents moved for reconsideration but their Motion was denied in
the June 14, 2007 Order. 4 1 Hence, they appealed Secretary Reyes' January 18, 2007
Decision before the Office of the President. 4 2
In its October 20, 2008 Decision, 4 3 the O ce of the President, through then
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (Executive Secretary Ermita), reversed Secretary
Reyes' January 18, 2007 Decision and reinstated Director Sibbaluca's May 29, 2002
Order. The O ce of the President held that Secretary Reyes erred in reversing Director
Sibbaluca's May 29, 2002 Order as it had already attained finality. 4 4
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 Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their Motion was denied in the
Resolution 4 5 dated March 26, 2009.
Petitioners led a petition for certiorari 4 6 against private respondents and
Executive Secretary Ermita before the Court of Appeals. 4 7 They alleged that the O ce
of the President committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating Director
Sibbaluca's May 29, 2002 Order considering that their predecessors-in-interest had
been declared ipso jure owners of the Property as early as 1948 by the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac. 4 8
In its July 20, 2009 Resolution, 4 9 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
certiorari outright for being an inappropriate remedy. The Court of Appeals noted that
an appeal could have been taken from the Decision and the Resolution of the O ce of
the President. 5 0 Instead of ling an original action for certiorari, they should have led
a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. 5 1
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their Motion was denied for lack of
merit in the Resolution 5 2 dated January 15, 2010.
On March 4, 2010, petitioners 5 3 filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari 5 4 before
this Court assailing the Resolutions dated July 20, 2009 and January 15, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals.
In its April 5, 2010 Resolution, 5 5 this Court required private and public
respondents to comment on the petition for review.
Private respondents led their Comment 5 6 on June 17, 2010 while public
respondent Executive Secretary Ermita, through the O ce of the Solicitor General, led
his Comment 5 7 on August 15, 2011. Petitioners then led their Consolidated Reply on
December 5, 2011. 5 8
In its January 23, 2013 Resolution, 5 9 this Court gave due course to the Petition
and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. CAIHTE

Petitioners led their Memorandum 6 0 on April 12, 2013. On the other hand, the
O ce of the Solicitor General manifested that it would no longer le a memorandum
considering that it had exhaustively discussed its arguments in the Comment. 6 1
Private respondents filed their Memorandum on July 19, 2013. 6 2
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their petition for
certiorari and that the O ce of the President acted with grave abuse of discretion in
reinstating Director Sibbaluca's May 29, 2002 Order. Petitioners insist that their
predecessors-in-interest were declared ipso jure owners of the Property by the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac in its February 18, 1948 Decision. 6 3 According to petitioners,
the Court of First Instance recognized that their predecessors-in-interest "possessed,
occupied[,] and cultivated the . . . lots for more than thirty (30) years since 1915." 6 4
Therefore, the principle of res judicata bars private respondents from asserting title to
the Property. 6 5
Petitioners add that private respondents procured their free patents through
fraud and misrepresentation. 6 6 They pray for the cancellation of private respondents'
free patents and certificates of title. 6 7
On the other hand, private respondents assert that the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed the petition for certiorari. They claim that petitioners led their petition "after
the lapse of more than two (2) months from the date they received the adverse
decision of the O ce of the President." 6 8 Moreover, they allege that petitioners raised
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 errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. 6 9
Private respondents contend that they are not bound by the February 18, 1948
Decision of the Court of First Instance. They assert that the principle of res judicata
does not apply because there is no identity of parties and subject matter. 7 0 The O ce
of the Solicitor General shares this view and points out that the February 18, 1948
Decision of the Court of First Instance simply adopted an agreement of partition, which
arose out of a dispute "between and among petitioners' . . . predecessors-in-[interest]."
7 1 Private respondents insist that petitioners are bound by Director Sibbaluca's May 29,
2002 Order, which had already attained finality. 7 2
The present case presents the following issues for this Court's resolution:
First, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for
certiorari led by Francisca Taar, Joaquina Taar, Lucia Taar, and the Heirs of Oscar L.
Galo; 7 3
Second, whether or not the February 18, 1948 Decision of the Court of First
Instance bars Claudio Lawan, Marcelino L. Galo, Artemio Abarquez, Augusto B. Lawan,
and Adolfo L. Galo from applying for free patents over the Property; 7 4
Lastly, whether or not the free patents and certi cates of title issued in favor of
Claudio Lawan, Marcelino L. Galo, Artemio Abarquez, Augusto B. Lawan, and Adolfo L.
Galo are valid and were secured through fraud and misrepresentation. 7 5
The Petition is denied.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an extraordinary

remedy. 7 6 Its scope of review is narrow, limited only to errors of jurisdiction. Errors of
judgment can only be reviewed through an appeal. In Fernando v. Vasquez, 7 7 this Court
made a general distinction between errors of jurisdiction and errors of judgment, thus:
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction renders an order or judgment void or
voidable. Errors of jurisdiction are reviewable on certiorari; errors of judgment
only by appeal. Let us not lose sight of the true function of the writ of certiorari
— "to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it
from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction." And, abuse of discretion must be so grave and patent to justify the
issuance of the writ. 7 8 (Citation omitted)
Errors of judgment may involve a court's appreciation of the facts and
conclusions of law drawn from such facts. 7 9 If a court acts within its jurisdiction, then
"any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing
more than mere errors of judgment[.]" 8 0 In Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday
Holdings Corporation: 8 1
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of
certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic
correctness of a judgment of the lower court — on the basis either of the law or
the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even
if the ndings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the
case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the
error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact — a mistake of
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 judgment — appeal is the remedy. 8 2 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
On the other hand, errors of jurisdiction are those where the act or acts
complained of were done without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 8 3 Milwaukee Industries
Corporation v. Court of Tax Appeals 8 4 discussed these concepts; thus:
Without jurisdiction denotes that the tribunal, board, or o cer acted with
absolute lack of authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the public
respondent exceeds its power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave
abuse of discretion connotes such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; otherwise stated,
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 8 5 (Emphasis in the
original)
The mere allegation of grave abuse of discretion in a petition for certiorari does
not mean that the petition will automatically be given due course. The general
invocation of grave abuse of discretion is insu cient. Parties must satisfy other
exacting requirements under the Rules of Court.
A petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is
speci cally required to have "no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law." Ordinarily, if an appeal can be taken from a judgment or
order, then the remedy of certiorari will not lie. The mere possibility of delay arising
from an appeal does not warrant direct recourse to a petition for certiorari. 8 6
However, there are exceptions to this rule. For instance, the availability of an
appeal does not necessarily proscribe the institution of a petition for certiorari if it is
shown that an appeal is "inadequate, slow, insu cient and will not promptly relieve a
party from the injurious effects of the order complained of." 8 7 In Silvestre v. Torres: 8 8
[T]he availability of the ordinary recourse of appeal does not constitute
su cient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari; but it is necessary, besides, that the ordinary appeal be an
adequate remedy, that is, "a remedy which is equally bene cial, speedy and
su cient, not merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring about
a revival of the judgment of the lower court complained of in the certiorari
proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal[.]"
8 9 (Emphasis supplied)

This was reiterated later in Jaca v. Davao Lumber Company , 9 0 where this Court
underscored the standard in determining the propriety of a petition for certiorari, thus:
The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute su cient
ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari where the appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally bene cial,
speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy — not the mere absence — of all other
legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must
usually determine the propriety of certiorari. 9 1 (Citation omitted, emphasis
supplied)
In the present case, petitioners' allegation that the O ce of the President,
through then Executive Secretary Ermita, gravely abused its discretion in failing to
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 appreciate the merits of the February 18, 1948 Decision of the Court of First Instance
9 2 involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction. Assuming that the issue raised by
petitioners pertains to an error of jurisdiction, there is no showing that the O ce of the
President exercised its power in an "arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility." 9 3
Petitioners could have taken an appeal from the October 20, 2008 Decision and
March 26, 2009 Resolution of the O ce of the President by ling a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which governs appeals from judgments rendered
by quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of quasi-judicial powers. 9 4
While it is true that courts may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari despite
the availability of appeal, 9 5 petitioners failed to allege and prove that appeal would be
inadequate to promptly relieve them of the effects of the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the O ce of the President. Well-settled is the rule that a petition for
certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal "especially if one's own
negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse." 9 6
In this regard, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for
certiorari outright.

II

The core of the controversy lies in whether or not private respondents are barred
by the principle of res judicata from instituting free patent applications over the
Property claimed by petitioners.
The rule on res judicata states that a " nal judgment or decree rendered on the
merits . . . by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies, in all other [subsequent] actions or suits" and on all points and
matters determined in the first suit. 9 7
Res judicata has two (2) aspects. The rst aspect refers to bar by prior judgment
while the second refers to conclusiveness of judgment. 9 8
In bar by prior judgment, the rst judgment "precludes the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action." 9 9 On the other hand,
conclusiveness of judgment states that "issues actually and directly resolved in a
former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties
involving a different cause of action." 1 0 0 Thus, the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment is also known as preclusion of issues. 1 0 1 All that is required is identity of
issues. 1 0 2
Parties invoking the application of res judicata must establish the following
elements:
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be as between the rst and second action identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. 1 0 3
In this case, only the first three (3) elements of res judicata are present.
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 The February 18, 1948 Decision of the Court of First Instance is a nal judgment
on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. However, it does not bar
private respondents from instituting their free patent applications over the Property.
There is no identity or substantial identity of parties and identity of subject matter
between the February 18, 1948 Decision of the Court of First Instance and private
respondents' free patent applications.
The principle of res judicata does not require absolute identity of parties. It
requires, at the very least, substantial identity of parties. There is substantial identity of
parties when there exists a "community of interest between a party in the rst case and
a party in the second case even if the latter was not impleaded in the rst case." 1 0 4 For
instance, there is substantial identity of parties when one intervenes as a party-
defendant and creates a common cause with the original defendant. 1 0 5
The February 18, 1948 Decision of the Court of First Instance involved an
agreement between petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, namely: Alipio Duenas,
Fortunata Duenas, Spouses Primitivo T. Adaoag and Pilar Tandoc, Spouses Ignacio
Gragasin and Genoveva Adaoag, Pantaleon Taar, Lucia Taar, Joaquina Taar, Feliciano
Taar, Paulino Taar, and Oscar Galo. 1 0 6 Clearly, private respondents were not parties to
the agreement. Moreover, there is no clear showing that private respondents or their
predecessors-in-interest shared a common interest with any of the parties to the
agreement.
However, assuming that there is identity or substantial identity of parties, there is
no identity of subject matter between the February 18, 1948 Decision of the Court of
First Instance and private respondents' free patent applications. Although both relate to
the same Property, the February 18, 1948 Decision of the Court of First Instance was
simply an agreement partitioning the bigger parcel of land, which embraced the smaller
portion claimed by petitioners and private respondents. On the other hand, private
respondents' free patent applications involved the establishment of their rights as the
purported occupants and cultivators of the Property. Evidently, there is no identity of
subject matter. The principle of res judicata does not apply.
In addition, the Court of First Instance did not recognize, expressly or impliedly,
that private petitioners' predecessors-in-interest occupied and cultivated the Property
for more than 30 years since 1915. It also did not declare petitioners' predecessors-in-
interest as the ipso jure owners of the same. HEITAD

Therefore, the February 18, 1948 Decision of the Court of First Instance cannot
bar the ling of a subsequent free patent application over the Property. Likewise,
petitioners cannot rely solely on this Decision to obtain free patents. Entitlement to
agricultural lands of the public domain requires compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.
There are four (4) modes of disposition of agricultural lands under Section 11 of
the Public Land Act, namely: "(1) for homestead settlement; (2) by sale; (3) by lease; or
(4) by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles[.]" 1 0 7
The applicant of a homestead must be a "citizen of the Philippines over the age
of eighteen years, or the head of a family[.]" 1 0 8 The applicant must prove compliance
with the residency and cultivation requirements under Chapter IV of Public Land Act.
Under the Constitution, only 12 hectares of agricultural land of the public domain may
be acquired through homestead. 1 0 9
Sales patents are governed by Chapter V of the Public Land Act. The applicant
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 must be a citizen of the Philippines who is of legal age or a head of the family. 1 1 0 The
land must rst be appraised before it can be sold through public bidding. 1 1 1 As an
additional requirement, the purchaser must "have not less than one- fth of the land
broken and cultivated within ve years after the date of the award." 1 1 2 The purchaser
must also show "actual occupancy, cultivation, and improvement of at least one- fth of
the land applied for until the date on which nal payment is made" before the issuance
of a sales patent. 1 1 3 Only 12 hectares of agricultural land of the public domain may be
acquired through a sales patent. 1 1 4 The Public Land Act authorized domestic
corporations to apply for sales patents over agricultural lands. However, under the
present Constitution, private corporations and associations can only lease agricultural
lands. 1 1 5
The third mode of disposition of agricultural lands of the public domain is
through a lease. The government can only award the right to lease through an auction,
the procedure of which shall be the same as that prescribed for sales patents. 1 1 6 An
inherent condition of the lease is that the lessee should have cultivated 1/3 of the land
"within ve years after the date of the approval of the lease." 1 1 7 Under the Constitution,
citizens may lease not more than 500 hectares of agricultural lands of the public
domain. For private corporations and associations, they may lease a maximum of 1,000
hectares of agricultural lands for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.
118

The last mode of disposition is by con rmation of imperfect or incomplete titles

either through judicial legalization or through administrative legalization. The second
sub-category refers to the grant of free patents. 1 1 9
Judicial legalization or judicial con rmation of imperfect or incomplete titles is
governed by Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 3872
and Presidential Decree No. 1073, which states:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
con rmation of their claims and the issuance of a certi cate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona de claim of acquisition or
ownership, except as against the government, since [June 12,
1945], immediately preceding the ling of the applications for
con rmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
I n Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines , 1 2 0 this Court made an
important quali cation regarding the registration of lands through judicial con rmation
of imperfect title, thus:
If the mode is judicial con rmation of imperfect title under Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be
classi ed as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application,
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 provided the applicant's possession and occupation of the land dated back to
June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant
has performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises, and the
applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete
title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain
and has become private property. 1 2 1 (Citations omitted)
On the other hand, the grant of free patents is governed by Section 44, paragraph
1 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 6940, which states:
Section 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner
of more than twelve (12) hectares and who, for at least thirty (30) years prior to
the effectivity of this amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated,
either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest a tract or tracts of
agricultural public lands subject to disposition, who shall have paid the real
estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be
entitled, under the provisions of this Chapter, to have a free patent issued to him
for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twelve (12) hectares.
The applicant for a free patent should comply with the following requisites: (1)
the applicant must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) the applicant must
not own more than 12 hectares of land; (3) the applicant or his or her predecessors-in-
interest must have continuously occupied and cultivated the land; (4) the continuous
occupation and cultivation must be for a period of at least 30 years before April 15,
1990, which is the date of effectivity of Republic Act No. 6940; 1 2 2 and (5) payment of
real estate taxes on the land while it has not been occupied by other persons.
Applicants are free to avail any of the two (2) modes. Both judicial legalization
and administrative legalization involve agricultural lands of the public domain and
require "continuous occupation and cultivation either by the applicant himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest for a certain length of time." 1 2 3
In judicial legalization or judicial con rmation, the applicant "already holds an
imperfect title to an agricultural land of the public domain after having occupied it from
June 12, 1945 or earlier." 1 2 4 On the other hand, the applicant of a free patent does not
claim that the land is his or her private property but acknowledges that the land is still
part of the public domain. 1 2 5 This distinction was reiterated in De Leon v. De Leon-
Reyes, 1 2 6 thus:
Under Section 11 of the Public Land Act (PLA), there are two modes of
disposing public lands through con rmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(1) by judicial con rmation; and (2) by administrative legalization, otherwise
known as the grant of free patents.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 48 of the PLA particularly speci es who are entitled to judicial
confirmation or completion of imperfect titles:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and, occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since
June 12, 1945, immediately preceding the ling of the application
for con rmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
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 Upon compliance with the conditions of Sec. 48 (b) of the PLA, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, right to a grant over
the land. For all legal intents and purposes, the land is segregated from the
public domain, because the bene ciary is conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant. The land
becomes private in character and is now beyond the authority of the director of
lands to dispose of.
At that point, original registration of the title, via judicial proceedings,
takes place as a matter of course; the registration court does not grant the
applicant title over the property but merely recognizes the applicant's existing
title which had already vested upon the applicant's compliance with the
requirement of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land since June 12, 1945.
On the other hand, Chapter VII (Sections 44-46) of the PLA substantively
governs administrative legalization through the grant of free patents. Section 44
particularly identifies who are entitled to a grant of a free patent[.]
Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not
the owner of more than twelve (12) hectares and who, for at least
thirty (30) years prior to the effectivity of this amendatory Act, has
continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest a tract or tracts of agricultural public
lands subject to disposition, who shall have paid the real estate
tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person
shall be entitled, under the provisions of this Chapter, to have a
free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not
to exceed twelve (12) hectares . . .
Unlike an applicant in judicial con rmation of title who claims ownership
over the land, the applicant for a free patent recognizes that the land applied for
belongs to the government. A patent, by its very de nition, is a governmental
grant of a right, a privilege, or authority. A free patent [. . .] is an instrument by
which the government conveys a grant of public land to a private person. ATICcS

Pursuant to the Administrative Code and the PLA, the DENR has exclusive
jurisdiction over the management and disposition of public lands. In the
exercise of this jurisdiction, the DENR has the power to resolve con icting
claims over public lands and determine an applicant's entitlement to the grant
of a free patent. 1 2 1 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Petitioners, in choosing to apply for free patents, acknowledged that the land
covered by their application still belongs to the government and is still part of the
public domain. 1 2 8 Under Section 44 of the Public Land Act as amended by Republic
Act No. 6940, they are required to prove continuous occupation and cultivation for 30
years prior to April 15, 1990 and payment of real estate taxes while the land has not
been occupied by other persons. Petitioners insist that the February 18, 1948 Decision
of the Court of First Instance automatically vests them with ownership over the
property. This Decision cannot be used as proof of compliance with the requirements
of the Public Land Act. Again, the Court of First Instance simply approved an agreement
of partition. If at all, the February 18, 1948 Decision could only be used as the basis of a
subdivision plan.

III
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 Section 91 of the Public Land Act provides the automatic cancellation of the
applications filed on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation, thus:
Section 91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as
essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the
basis of such application, and any false statements therein or omission of facts
altering, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such
statements, and any subsequent modi cation, alteration, or change of the
material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the
cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be the duty of the
Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deem it advisable, to
make the necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
material facts set out in the application are true, or whether they continue to
exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith, and for the purposes of
such investigation, the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to issue
subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if necessary, to obtain
compulsory process from the courts. In every investigation made in accordance
with this section, the existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent
and illegal modi cation of essential facts shall be presumed if the grantee or
possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoena or subpoena duces
tecum lawfully issued by the Director of Lands or his authorized delegates or
agents, or shall refuse or fail to give direct and speci c answers to pertinent
questions, and on the basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation may
issue without further proceedings.
Only extrinsic fraud may be raised as a ground to "review or reopen a decree of
registration." 1 2 9 Extrinsic fraud has a speci c meaning under the law. It refers to that
type of fraud that "is employed to deprive parties of their day in court and thus prevent
them from asserting their right to the property registered in the name of the applicant."
130

Petitioners invoke Section 91 of the Public Land Act impliedly by insisting that
private respondents procured their free patents and certi cates of title through
extrinsic fraud and misrepresentation. However, petitioners failed to substantiate their
claims. Petitioners allege that private respondents committed extrinsic fraud and
misrepresentation but failed to establish the circumstances constituting them. They
could have pointed to irregularities 1 3 1 during the proceedings to prove that the
issuance of the free patents was not made in accordance with the Public Land Act. 1 3 2
The determination on the existence or nonexistence of fraud is a factual matter
that is beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari. 1 3 3 Although there are
exceptions to this rule, 1 3 4 petitioners failed to allege and prove that this case falls
under the exceptions. Assuming that private respondents procured their free patents
and certi cates of title through extrinsic fraud and misrepresentation, the petition must
still be denied.
While it is true that "a title emanating from a free patent which was secured
through fraud does not become indefeasible . . . because the patent from whence the
title sprung is itself void[,]" 1 3 5 petitioners are not the proper parties to bring an action
for the cancellation of free patents and certi cates of title. The validity or invalidity of
free patents granted by the government and the corresponding certi cates of title is a
matter between the grantee and the government. In explaining this rule, this Court in
Sumail v. Court of First Instance of Cotabato 1 3 6 underscored the nature of a free
patent application, thus:
Consequently, Sumail may not bring such action or any action which would
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 have the effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certi cate of
title issued on the basis thereof, with the result that the land covered thereby will
again form part of the public domain. Furthermore, there is another reason for
withholding legal personality from Sumail. He does not claim the land to be his
private property. In fact, by his application for a free patent, he had formally
acknowledged and recognized the land to be a part of the public domain; this,
aside from the declaration made by the cadastral court that lot 3633 was public
land. Consequently, even if the parcel were declared reverted to the public
domain, Sumail does not automatically become owner thereof. He is a mere
public land applicant like others who might apply for the same. 1 3 7 (Emphasis
supplied)
This principle was reiterated later in Cawis v. Cerilles , 138 a case involving the
validity of a sales patent. Thus:
[W]e must point out that petitioners' complaint questioning the validity of the
sales patent and the original certi cate of title over Lot No. 47 is, in reality, a
reversion suit. The objective of an action for reversion of public land is the
cancellation of the certi cate of title and the resulting reversion of the land
covered by the title to the State. This is why an action for reversion is oftentimes
designated as an annulment suit or a cancellation suit.
Coming now to the first issue, Section 101 of the Public Land Act clearly states:
SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of
lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be
instituted by the Solicitor General or the o cer acting in his stead,
in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
Even assuming that private respondent indeed acquired title to Lot No. 47
in bad faith, only the State can institute reversion proceedings, pursuant to
Section 101 of the Public Land Act and our ruling in Alvarico v. Sola . Private
persons may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have
the effect of canceling a land patent and the corresponding certi cate of title
issued on the basis of the patent, such that the land covered thereby will again
form part of the public domain. Only the O[ ce] [of the] S[olicitor] G[eneral] or
the o cer acting in his stead may do so. Since the title originated from a grant
by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the
grantee.
Similarly, in Urquiaga v. CA , this Court held that there is no need to pass
upon any allegation of actual fraud in the acquisition of a title based on a sales
patent. Private persons have no right or interest over land considered public at
the time the sales application was led. They have no personality to question
the validity of the title. We further stated that granting, for the sake of argument,
that fraud was committed in obtaining the title, it is the State, in a reversion
case, which is the proper party to le the necessary action . 1 3 9 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted) TIADCc

Lorzano v. Tabayag , 1 4 0 citing Kayaban v. Republic , 1 4 1 explained the purpose of

the rule:
In Kayaban, et al. v. Republic, et al. , this Court explained the reason for the rule
that only the government, through the OSG, upon the recommendation of the
Director of Lands, may bring an action assailing a certi cate of title issued
pursuant to a fraudulently acquired free patent:
Since it was the Director of Lands who processed and approved
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 the applications of the appellants and who ordered the issuance
of the corresponding free patents in their favor in his capacity as
administrator of the disposable lands of the public domain, the
action for annulment should have been initiated by him, or at least
with his prior authority and consent. 1 4 2
WHEREFORE , the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED . The Resolutions
dated July 20, 2009 and January 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
109390 are AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Bersamin and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Martires, J., * is on official leave.
Footnotes

* On official leave.
1. Rollo, pp. 10-22.

2. Id. at 23-25. The Resolution was penned by then Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe
and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Apolinario D. Bruselas,
Jr. of the Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3. Id. at 33. The Resolution was penned by then Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and
concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. of
the Former Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4. The Heirs of Oscar Galo were not named in the petition or in any of the annexes.

5. Rollo, pp. 108-109.

6. Id. at 77.
7. Id. at 34-35, February 18, 1948 Decision of the Court of First Instance.

8. Id. at 35.

9. Id. at 34-37. The Decision, docketed as Civil Case No. 140, was penned by Judge Francisco E.
Jose.

10. Id. at 69.

11. Id. at 34.

12. Id. at 35 and 38-39.

13. Id. at 271, Petitioners' Memorandum.

14. Id.

15. Id. at 77, May 29, 2002 Order of the DENR.

16. Id. at 108-109, Private Respondents' Comment.

17. Id. at 77, May 29, 2002 Order of the DENR.

18. Id. at 79, May 29, 2002 Order of the DENR.

19. Id. at 109, Private Respondents' Comment.
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 20. Id. at 77-80.

21. Id.
22. Id. at 272, Petitioners' Memorandum.

23. Id. at 123, Certificate of Finality dated September 23, 2002.

24. Id. at 109, Private Respondents' Comment.

25. Id. at 272, Petitioners' Memorandum.

26. Id. at 109-110, Private Respondents' Comment.

27. Id.

28. Id. at 234, OSG's Comment.

29. Id. at 110, Private Respondents' Comment.

30. Id. at 272, Petitioners' Memorandum.

31. Id. at 124-130.

32. Id. at 124, Verified Petition.

33. Id. at 126, Verified Petition.

34. Id. at 68.

35. Id. at 272.

36. Id. at 72, Investigation Report dated October 4, 2006.

37. Id. at 73-75, Investigation Report dated October 4, 2006.

38. Id. at 72, Investigation Report dated October 4, 2006.

39. Id. at 75-76, Investigation Report dated October 4, 2006.

40. Id. at 55-67.

41. Id. at 110, Comment.

42. Id.

43. Id. at 81-84.

44. Id. at 83.

45. Id. at 85-86.

46. Id. at 40-53.

47. Id. at 273.

48. Id. at 45-50.

49. Id. at 23-25.

50. Id. at 24.

51. Id.
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 52. Id. at 33.

53. Id. at 20. The Heirs of Oscar Galo were represented by Adela Galo.

54. Id. at 10-22.

55. Id. at 87-88.

56. Id. at 107-118.

57. Id. at 231-247.

58. Id. at 258-265.

59. Id. at 269-270.

60. Id. at 271-286.

61. Id. at 287-291.

62. Id. at 303-316.

63. Id. at 15-20.

64. Id. at 277.

65. Id. at 278-281.

66. Id. at 281-284.

67. Id. at 285-286.

68. Id. at 113.

69. Id. at 112-114.

70. Id. at 114-115.

71. Id. at 243.

72. Id. at 115-117.

73. Id. at 278.

74. Id.
75. Id.

76. Fernando v. Vasquez , 142 Phil. 266, 271 (1970) [Per J. Sanchez, First Division] citing
Herrera v. Barretto, 25 Phil. 245 (1913) [Per J. Moreland, First Division].
77. 142 Phil. 266 (1970) [Per J. Sanchez, First Division].

78. Id. at 271.

79. Suyat, Jr. v. Torres, 484 Phil. 230, 240 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
80. Id.

81. 479 Phil. 768 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

82. Id. at 780.

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 83. Biñan Rural Bank v. Carlos, 459 Phil. 416, 422 (2015) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
84. 650 Phil. 429 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

85. Id. at 435-436.

86. Bimeda v. Perez, 93 Phil. 636, 639 (1953) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc].
87. Hualam Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals , 289 Phil. 222
(1992) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Second Division] citing St. Peter Memorial Park v. Campos, 159
Phil. 781 (1975) [Per J. Fernandez, First Division].

88. 57 Phil. 885 (1933) [Per J. Villa-Real, Second Division].

89. Id. at 893.

90. 198 Phil. 493 (1982) [Per J. Fernandez, First Division].

91. Id. at 517.

92. Rollo, pp. 191-A-204, Verified Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition dated July 4, 2009.

93. Milwaukee Industries Corporation v. Court of Tax Appeals , 650 Phil. 429, 435 (2010) [Per J.
Mendoza, Second Division).

94. RULES OF COURT, Rule 43, sec. 1 provides:

  Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or nal orders of
the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, nal orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, O ce of the President, Land
Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electri cation Administration,
Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of
Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System,
Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance
Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.

95. See Jaca v. Davao Lumber Company , 198 Phil. 493 (1982) [Per J. Fernandez, First Division].
96. Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation , 479 Phil. 768, 782-783 (2004)
[Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

97. Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, 441 Phil. 551, 563 (2002) [Per
J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
98. Club Filipino, Inc. v. Bautista , 750 Phil. 599, 618 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]
citing Orendain v. BF Homes, Inc. , 536 Phil. 1059 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third
Division].

99. Id.
100. Id.

101. Tan v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 675, 681-682 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
102. Id.

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 103. Club Filipino, Inc. v. Bautista, 750 Phil. 599, 618 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

104. Sendon v. Ruiz, 415 Phil. 376, 385 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
105. University of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals , 291-A Phil. 770, 780-781 (1993) [Per J.
Romero, Third Division].

106. Rollo, p. 37.

107. Com. Act No. 141, sec. 11.

108. Com. Act No. 141, sec. 12.

109. CONST., art. XII, sec. 3, par. 1 provides:

  Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classi ed into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further
classi ed by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease,
for a period not exceeding twenty- ve years, renewable for not more than twenty- ve
years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may
lease not more than ve hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares
thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.

110. Com. Act No. 141, sec. 22.

111. Com. Act No. 141, secs. 22-27.

112. Com. Act No. 141, sec. 28.

113. Com. Act No. 141, sec. 28.

114. CONST., art. XII, sec. 3, par. 1.

115. CONST., art. XII, sec. 3, par. 1.

116. Com. Act No. 141, sec. 36.

117. Com. Act No. 141, sec. 39.

118. CONST., art. XII, sec. 3, par. 1.

119. Com. Act No. 141, sec. 11.

120. 717 Phil. 141 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

121. Id. at 168-169.

122. Rep. Act No. 6940, sec. 6 provides:

    Section 6. This Act shall take effect fteen (15) days after its publication in two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation.
  Republic Act No. 6940 was published on March 31, 1990.

123. Kayaban v. Republic, 152 Phil. 323, 328 (1973) [Per J. Makalintal, C.J., En Banc].
124. Republic v. Spouses Go , G.R. No. 197297, August 2, 2017
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
le=/jurisprudence/2017/august2017/197297.pdf> 7 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]
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 citing Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 717 Phil. 141 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
125. Sumail v. Court of First Instance of Cotabato , 96 Phil. 946 (1955) [Per J. Montemayor, En
Banc].

126. G.R. No. 205711, May 30, 2016, 791 SCRA 407 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
127. Id. at 421-424.

128. See Republic v. Spouses Go , G.R. No. 197297, August 2, 2017

<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
le=/jurisprudence/2017/august2017/197297.pdf> 6 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]
where this Court stated that "[a]ny application for con rmation of title under
Commonwealth Act No. 141 already concedes that the land is previously public."

129. Encinares v. Achero , 613 Phil. 391, 404 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division] citing
Republic v. Guerrero, 520 Phil. 296 (2006) [Per J. Garcia, Second Division].
130. Mendoza v. Valte , 768 Phil. 539, 564 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] citing
Republic of the Philippines v. Guerrero , 520 Phil. 296 (2006) [Per J. Garcia, Second
Division].

131. Id. at 403-406.

132. Republic v. Alejaga, Sr., 441 Phil. 656, 668-673 (2002) [Per J. Puno, Third Division].

133. Mendoza v. Valte, 768 Phil. 539, 542 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

134. See Pascual v. Burgos , G.R. No. 171722, January 11, 2016 [Per J. Leonen, Second
Division] citing Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr. 269 Phil. 225 (1990) [Per J. Bidin, Third
Division].

135. Lorzano v. Tabayag, 681 Phil. 39, 53 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, Second Division].
136. 96 Phil. 946 (1955) [Per J. Montemayor, En Banc].

137. Id. at 953.

138. 632 Phil. 367 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

139. Id. at 375-376.

140. 681 Phil. 39 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, Second Division].

141. 152 Phil. 323 (1973) [Per C.J. Makalintal, En Banc].

142. 681 Phil. 39, 53-54 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, Second Division].

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