I.

Prerogative Writs
1. Writ of Amparo
2. Writ of Habeas Data
3. Rules on Environmental Cases
a. Writ of Kalikasan
b. Writ of Continuing Mandamus
Cases:
1. Tapuz vs. Del Rosario, 554 SCRA
2. Caram vs Segui, August 5 2014
3. Vivares et Al. vs. St. Theres College et Al. Sept 29 2014
4. Razon vs. Tagitis, 606 SCRA
5. Roxas vs GMA, 630 SCRA
6. Burgos vs. Esperon, 715 SCRA, February 2014
7. Dolot vs. Paje, 703 SCRA (continuing Mandamus).
8. Meralco vs. Lim, 632 SCRA (10/5/2010)
9. Lee vs. Ilagan, 738 SCRA 59
10. Arigo vs. Swift, 735 SCRA 102

2015 Supreme Court Decisions:

11. Paje vs. Casino, 749 SCRA 39
12. Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait vs. Angelo
Reyes
et Al., 756 SCRA 513, April 21 2015
13. West Tower Condominium vs. Phil. Ind. Corp., 758 SCRA 289
(on precautionary principle)
1. DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ et al. vs. HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL
ROSARIO, et al. G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008

FACTS:
Private respondents’ spouses Sanson claiming to be owners of 1+ hectare parcel
of land located at Boracay filed complaint for forcible entry on the ground of force,
intimidation and threats and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners. The MCTC rendered a
decision in the private respondents' favor. On appeal with RTC, RTC upheld the decision
of MCTC and subsequently issued a writ of permanent mandatory injunction and order
of demolition. Assailing the RTC decision, petitioners filed a petition for review with the
CA. CA denied the petition but petitioners filed an MR. Pending resolution of the MR,
petitioners filed herein petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs of amparo
and habeas data Contrary to the factual findings of the MCTC, the factual allegations of
the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo provides that the private respondents
availed of the help of armed men and intrude into the property alleged to be owned by
petitioners by firing shotguns and burning their houses.

Petition for a writ of habeas data is prayed for so that the PNP may release the report on
the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence allegedly employed
against them by the private respondents.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not, a petition for issuance of writ of amparo may be availed of against an
alleged violence or threats committed against a person’s life, property and security
arising from property dispute.
(2) Whether or not writ of habeas data may be availed of for purposes of mandating the
authorities to release an information on alleged arson committed in relation to a
property dispute where such information was never sought in the main action over
possession of the property in dispute.

HELD:
(1) The answer is in the negative. Writ of Amparo is not a writ to protect concerns that
are purely property or commercial. The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond
those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules.

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence
of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the
circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life,
liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.

Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the
petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and
focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the
alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of
ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the
writ of amparo.

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the
possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in
separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear
prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security - the personal concern that
the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the
danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the
issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on
certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a
separately filed criminal case.

(2) The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency
of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the
prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing
expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in
mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the
outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.

2. Caram vs Segui, August 5 2014

FACTS:

               Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually

became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting
pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in
fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she
intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children in
Parañaque City.

               On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez
Memorial Medical Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and
medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian
by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.

               On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby
Julian as “Legally Available for Adoption.” On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was
“matched” with Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was then commenced.

                On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption,
wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption
proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back together.
           On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a
Memorandum to DSWD Assistant Secretary Cabrera informing her that
the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality
on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary
Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian
a ward of the State.

                 On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo
before the RTC seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for
obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child.

HELD:

The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there
was no enforced disappearance in this case.

             As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v. Pardico

enumerated the elements constituting “enforced disappearances” as the term is
statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:

1. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of

liberty;
2. That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or a political organization;
3. That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge
or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo
petition; and,
4. That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

             The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent

DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a
copy of the DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody
of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even
admitted in her petition that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian
before the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as
used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.

               Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her
child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the
necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is
not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and
contesting custody over him.
               Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue
of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and
purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be
properly applied.

3. Vivares et Al. vs. St. Theres College et Al. Sept 29 2014

The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an
equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal
adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for
disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the
environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.

– Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

FACTS:

Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s
College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their
swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with
several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments.
These pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.

At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned

from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves
from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres.  Escudero then asked her students if they
knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne,
among others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal

Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a)
Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b)
Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show
virtually the entirety of their black brassieres.

Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the
availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook
friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.

Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved were barred
from joining the commencement exercises.

Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data on the
following grounds:
1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the
minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas
data.
2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who
may view them, lost their privacy in some way.
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that
is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case. (Is there a right to
informational privacy in online social network activities of its users?)

HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions and check the ruling at the
latter part)

Nature of Writ of Habeas Data

It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.

It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,

honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect
a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined
habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from
abuse in the information age.”

Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements

1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy

2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security
of the victim (proven by at least substantial evidence)

Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized  access to
information about a person.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances

The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s
right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed
of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or

information

Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of
private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the
aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family.
Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.

To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business

endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does
not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a
business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or
storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether
such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and
is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at
all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.

As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a school like STC.

Right to informational privacy

Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control

information about themselves. Several commentators regarding privacy and social
networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, “in this Social
Networking environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but
rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.” So the underlying
question now is: Up to what extent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs?

Facebook Privacy Tools

To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s
profile as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng High
Court recognized this ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings,” but did so
 with this caveat: “Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to
protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not foolproof.”

For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images (photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or “wall,” except for the user’s
profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:

1. Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
2. Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view
the photo;
3. Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
4. Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of
the Facebook user; and
5. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers
to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and
photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook
extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook
activities reflect their choice as to “when and to what extent to disclose
facts about themselves – and to put others in the position of receiving such
confidences.”

LONE ISSUE:

NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to
privacy as the subject digital photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook
friends, or by the public at large.

Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images were visible
only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other
students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus
deserving scant consideration.

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her
students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their
own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to view
the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1)
their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised
that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any
proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If
such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy.
US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely
intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or
devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.

United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the less
privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room
or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of
privacy.

The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s or profile detail’s
privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who
is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend
can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also,
when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of
the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting
of which was set at “Friends.” Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a
post, with visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot easily, more so
automatically, be said to be “very private,” contrary to petitioners’
argument.

No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors

Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it
was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were
mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of
gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the
minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.

Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”

Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original
uploader, through the “Me Only” privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been
screened to limit access to a select few, through the “Custom” setting, the result may
have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular
post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en
masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.

4. GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON vs. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS G.R. No. 182498,
February 16, 2010

FACTS:
On December 3, 2009, the Supreme Court rendered confirming the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granting the Writ of Amparo.
The decision was based, among other considerations, on the finding that Col. Julasirim
Ahadin Kasim (Col. Kasim) informed the respondent Mary Jean Tagitis (respondent)
and her friends that her husband had been under surveillance since January 2007
because an informant notified the authorities, through a letter, that Tagitis was a liaison
for the JI;5 that he was "in good hands" and under custodial investigation for complicity
with the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of
Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism (Kasim evidence).

The Supreme Court considered Col. Kasim’s information, together with the consistent
denials by government authorities of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, the
dismissive approach of the police authorities to the report of the disappearance, as well
as the haphazard investigations conducted that did not translate into any meaningful
results, to be indicative of government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis.

Herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that there was no
sufficient evidence to conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure unequivocally points to
some government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, the petitioners
contend that Supreme Court erred in unduly relying on the raw information given to
Col. Kasim by a personal intelligence "asset" without any other evidence to support it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of Writ of Amparo on the basis of a hearsay evidence is
valid.

HELD:
Yes. although the Kasim evidence was patently hearsay (and was thus incompetent and
inadmissible under our rules of evidence), the unique evidentiary difficulties posed by
enforced disappearance cases compel us to adopt standards that were appropriate and
responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. We noted that while we must follow the
substantial evidence rule, we must also observe flexibility in considering the evidence
that we shall take into account. Thus, we introduced a new evidentiary standard for Writ
of Amparo cases in this wise:

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in
their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules
to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words,
we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the
evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all the other pieces of adduced
evidence, Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this minimum test.

5. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND

THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA
C. ROXAS vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO et al. G.R. No. 189155,
September 7, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner, an American citizen of Filipino descent, filed a Petition for the Writs
of Amparo and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court. She alleged that while doing a
volunteer work in La Paz, Tarlacm she and her companions were abducted and tortured
for five day. Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of
the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government
agents who were behind her abduction and torture.

In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the
case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.
CA granted the petition for issuance of writ of habeas data. However, the Court of
Appeals was not convinced that the military or any other person acting under the
acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction and torture of the
petitioner.

Petitioner contested the CA decision and filed a petitioner for review on certiorari.
Petitioner argues that (1) the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried
out, as well as the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in
detention, as these were detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court,
are already sufficient evidence to prove government involvement; and (2) petitioner
invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian
and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a government official may be impleaded as respondent in a writ of
amparo on the ground of command responsibility.

HELD: The answer is in the negative. The use by the petitioner of the doctrine of
command responsibility is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command
responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account,
cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition

According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict."

Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of

individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative
case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature
of the writ itself.

The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of
the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in
order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to
life, liberty or security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats
thereof had transpired—the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such
disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative
under the applicable substantive law.

The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the
petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.

It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command

responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading
military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition
were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders
may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on
the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.

Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in
the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance.

6. EDITA T. BURGOS vs. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON et al. G.R. No.

178497, February 4, 2014

FACTS: This case relates the proceedings on the enforced disappearance of Jonas
Burgos. A petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus and writ of amparo was filed
before the SC.

SC, pursuant to CHR’s initial report, issued a writ of habeas corpus but hold in abeyance
the ruling on the merits of Amparo and referred the same to CA to allow Lt. Baliaga, Jr.
to comment on the CHR Report. CA denied petition for issuance of writ of habeas
corpus (The CA held that the issue in the petition for habeas corpus is not the illegal
confinement or detention of Jonas, but his enforced disappearance) and granted the
issuance of writ of amparo. The CA found that the totality of the evidence supports the
petitioner’s allegation that the military was involved in the enforced disappearance of
Jonas. Thus, the CA held that Lt. Baliaga was responsible and the AFP and the PNP were
accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas.
CA directed PNP and AFT to conduct an exhaustive investigation of the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos. CHR was also directed to continue with its own
independent investigation on the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos with the same
degree of diligence required under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

On April 1, 2013, the petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela asking
the Court among others to: xxx (2) issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of the newly
discovered evidence (the sealed attachment to the motion); and (3) refer the cases to the
CA for further hearing on the newly discovered evidence.

The petitioner alleged that she received from a source (who requested to remain
anonymous) documentary evidence proving that an intelligence unit of the 7th Infantry
Division of the Philippine Army and 56th Infantry Battalion, operating together,
captured Jonas on April 28, 2007 at Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue,
Quezon City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not after the grant of petition for issuance of writ of amparo, a new writ of
amparo may be issued on the basis of newly discovered evidence

HELD:
No. The SC resolved to deny the motion for re-issuance of the writ of amparo and to
refer the case to the CA based on newly discovered evidence.

It should be emphasized that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court a
wide latitude in crafting remedies to address an enforced disappearance, it cannot
(without violating the nature of the writ of Amparo as a summary remedy that provides
rapid judicial relief) grant remedies that would complicate and prolong rather than
expedite the investigations already ongoing. Note that the CA has already determined
with finality that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance.

The ROLE of SC in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether an

enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or
accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance.

As we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the writ merely embodies the Court’s directives to
police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the enforced

disappearance of an individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and a

curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators
through the investigation and remedial action that it directs. The focus is on procedural
curative remedies rather than on the tracking of a specific criminal or the resolution of
administrative liabilities.

In this case, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served with the CA’s
final determination of the persons responsible and accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Jonas and the commencement of criminal action against Lt. Baliaga.
At this stage, criminal, investigation and prosecution proceedings are already beyond
the reach of the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before us.

7. MARICRIS D. DOLOT vs. HON. RAMON PAJE (DENR) G.R. No. 199199,
August 27, 2013

FACTS:
On September 15, 2011, petitioners filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages
and attorney’s fees with the RTC of Sorsogon. On September 16, 2011, the case was
summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. RTC relied on SC Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12,
and Administrative Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 23-2008, designating the
environmental courts "to try and decide violations of environmental laws x x x
committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions."

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. RTC further ruled
that: (1) there was no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials
allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing
mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial
affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency,
as required by the rules. Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions
of law.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not RTC may motu proprio dismiss a petition for continuing mandamus
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction following A.O. No. 7 defining the territorial areas of
the Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12. (2) Whether or not a final judgment finding
that the public officials failed to act on the contemplated environmental issue is a
condition precedent for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus. (3) Whether
or not a petition for issuance of continuing mandamus requires the attachment of
judicial affidavits.

HELD:
(1) Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and
Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself within its four corners in determining
whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners.

This administrative order issued by the Court merely provide for the venue where an
action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on any
court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress. It also
cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government.

Venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an action or
proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is
intended to accord convenience to the parties, as it relates to the place of trial, and does
not restrict their access to the courts. Consequently, the RTC’s motu proprio dismissal of
Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently incorrect. At
most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon
was that of improper venue.

Similarly, it would serve the higher interest of justice if the Court orders the transfer of
Civil Case No. 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper and speedy resolution, with the
RTC applying the Rules in its disposition of the case.

(2) The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is
apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section
4(c), Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit: Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an
environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer
thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain
effective until judgment is fully satisfied.

The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually
pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an
environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall
subsequently become final.

Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8,
Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction
over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as
mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon
full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ
shall be made to the court and if the court finds that

8. Meralco vs. Lim, 632 SCRA (10/5/2010)

FACTS:
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, an administrative clerk at the
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), learned of an anonymous letter that was posted
at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel,
Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter
reads:

“Cherry Lim:

MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN

AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG
GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA
LOOB…”

By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource

Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in
Muntinlupa as “A/F OTMS Clerk,” in light of the receipt of “… reports that there were
accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which
could possibly compromise [her] safety and security.”

Respondent questions the propriety of MERALCO’s action in a letter as “highly

suspicious…” and being “punitive”, but the latter never responded. Respondent filed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to
the MERALCO Alabang Sector.

The trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent’s
transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required.

ISSUES:

[1] Whether the RTC lacked jurisdiction to over the case and cannot restrain
MERALCO’s prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees.
[2] Is the issuance of the writ outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data?

HELD:

[1] YES.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint
the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It
is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life,
liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology. It bears
reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given
the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those
provided under prevailing Rules.

[W]rits of …habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process
clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real
reasons for her transfer – a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of
one’s employment – are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of
habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiters.

[2] YES.
There is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to
life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of
reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of
her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and
accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her letter as
“highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.” And she even
suspects that her transfer to another place of work “betray[s] the real intent of
management]” and could be a “punitive move.” Her posture unwittingly concedes that
the issue is labor-related.

9. Lee vs. Ilagan, 738 SCRA 59

FACTS:

In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data, Ilagan alleged that he and
petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee were former common law partners. Sometime in July
2011, he visited Lee at the latter’s condominium, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera
was missing. Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter’s office regarding a purported sex video
she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another woman.

Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail. During
the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his office
and walked away.

Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing various complaints against
Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for violation of R.A. 9262; and (b) an
administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the NAPOLCOM.

Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to
distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the
internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of
the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is
warranted.

The RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in Ilagan’s favor, and ordered
the implementing officer to turn-over copies of the subject video to him, and enjoined
Lee from further reproducing the same.

Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in
favor of Ilagan.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.

The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was conceived as a response, given the lack of
effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals, which is defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use,
and dissemination of data about oneself.”

As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.”

Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas
Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he
manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” Corollarily, the allegations in the petition
must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of
the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.

In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect
purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to
privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video.

As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually
proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or
security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account
certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.

Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of
substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss
the habeas data petition.
10. Arigo vs. Swift, 735 SCRA 102
FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US

Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic
clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines
and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for
Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of
call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu
Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs,
about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there
have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations

of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-
Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS
Guardian.
Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”

Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls
for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a
procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
 In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right”
of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution
for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to
exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa,
this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the
enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and
future generations.

Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers

of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew.
The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian
on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties.
Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed
to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and
Robling.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the
position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted
area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings
the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign
immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an
exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of
the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the
territorial sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy
sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for
compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the
territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the
coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship
operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention
or other rules of international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31,
nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government
ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry
into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in
which the above provisions may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a
matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international
rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was
centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI)
which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing
out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’ acceptance of customary international
rules on navigation.”

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a
Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear
“international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian
grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the
country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation
to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters.
Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international
affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in
the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article
197 of UNCLOS
Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly
or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating
international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent
with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment,
taking into account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond

dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the
jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States
shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and
regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their
warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under
Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal

jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a
writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a
criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be
filed separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application

of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the
province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such
waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages
which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the
recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No.
10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action
charging the same violation of an environmental law.

2015 Supreme Court Decisions:

11. Paje vs. Casino, 749 SCRA 39

Facts:
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA)
Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC)... expressing their... intention to build a power
plant in Subic Bay... coal-fired power plant.

SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)

Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Zambale... opposing the establishment of a coal-fired

thermal power plant at Sitio Naglatore, Brgy. Cawag, Subic, Zambales.

filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of kalikasan against RP Energy,... first set of
allegations deals with the actual environmental damage... second set of allegations deals
with the failure to comply with certain laws and rules governing or relating to the
issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto.

Issues:

Whether or not Energy complied with the Certification Precondition as required under
Section 59 of Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997
('IPRA Law,' x x x);... without prior consultation with and approval of the concerned
local government unit

The question then... is, can the validity of an ECC be challenged via a writ of kalikasan?

Ruling:

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

CA rendered a Decision denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan... r an environment

protection order due to the failure of the Casiño Group to prove that its constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology was... violated or threatened

CA resolved to invalidate the ECC... for failure of Luis Miguel Aboitiz (Mr. Aboitiz),
Director of

RP Energy, to affix his signature in the Sworn Statement of Full Responsibility...

invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energ

We answer in the affirmative subject to certain qualifications.

but to show a causal link or reasonable connection with the environmental damage of
the magnitude contemplated under the Rules

In... the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even
attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the
perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC. This would have been
sufficient reason to... disallow the resolution of such issues in a writ of kalikasan case... e
issuance of the ECC violated the IPRA Law and LGC and that the LDA, likewise, violated
the IPRA Law, we find the same not to be within the coverage of the writ of kalikasan
because... three witnesses presented by the Casiño Group are not experts on the CFB
technology or on environmental matters.

The Casiño Group failed to contest, with proof, the adequacy of the mitigating measures
stated in the aforesaid EMP.

None of these alleged experts testified before the appellate court to confirm the
pertinent contents of the Final Report.

After due consideration, we find that, based on the statements in the Final Report, there
is no sufficiently compelling reason to compel the testimonies of these alleged expert
witnesses for the following reasons.

First, the statements are not sufficiently specific to point to us a flaw (or flaws) in the
study or design/implementation (or some other aspect) of the project which provides a
causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the construction and operation
of... the project vis-à-vis potential grave environmental damage.

Second, some of the concerns raised in the alleged statements, like acid rain, warming
and acidification of the seawater, and discharge of pollutants were, as previously
discussed, addressed by the evidence presented by RP Energy before the appellate court.

Third, the key observations of Dr. Cruz, while concededly assailing certain aspects of the
EIS, do not clearly and specifically establish how these omissions have led to the
issuance of an ECC that will pose significant negative environmental impacts once the
project is... constructed and becomes operational.

The appellate court ruled that the ECC is invalid because Mr. Aboitiz failed to sign the
Statement of Accountability portion of the ECC.

A review of the voluminous records indicates that the matter of the lack of signature was
discussed, developed or surfaced only in the course of the hearings, specifically, on
clarificatory questions from the appellate court,... At any rate, we shall disregard the
procedural defect and rule directly on whether the lack of signature invalidated the ECC
in the interest of substantial justice.

The question then is, was the absence of the signature of Mr. Aboitiz, as representative
of RP Energy, in the Statement of Accountability sufficient ground to invalidate the
ECC?

Viewed within the particular circumstances of this case, we answer in the negative

Due to the inadequacy of the transcript and the apparent lack of opportunity for the
witness to explain the lack of signature, we find that the witness' testimony does not, by
itself, indicate that there was a deliberate or malicious intent not to sign the Statement
of
Accountability.

As previously noted, the DENR and RP Energy were not properly apprised that the issue
relative to the lack of signature would be decisive in the determination of the validity of
the ECC.

appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC on the ground of lack of signature of
Mr. Aboitiz in the ECC's Statement of Accountability relative to the copy of the ECC
submitted by RP Energy to the appellate court

This brings us to the next logical question, did the EPRMP provide the necessary
information in order for the DENR-EMB to assess the environmental impact of RP
Energy's request relative to the first amendment?

We answer in the affirmative.

We answer in the affirmativ... it does not follow that the ECC is the "license" or

"permit" contemplated under Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its implementing rules.

the ECC is intended to, among others, provide guidance or act as a decision-making tool
to other government agencies and LGUs which have the final authority to grant licenses
or permits, such as building permits or licenses to operate, that... will ultimately result
in, or authorize the implementation of the project or the conduct of specific activities.

In the case at bar, we find, applying this rule of action, that the SBMA should have first
secured a CNO before entering into the LDA with RP Energy for the following reasons.

First, the Subic area is historically known to be the home of our brothers and sisters
belonging to the Aeta communities

Second, SBMA and RP Energy claim that the SBMA Ecology Center verified with the
NCIP that the project site does not overlap with an ancestral domain.

Third, that the project site was formerly used as the firing range of the U.S. Armed
Forces does not preclude the possibility that a present or future claim of ancestral
domain may be made over the aforesaid site

Fourth, that the project site was subsequently classified by the SBMA as forming part of
an industrial zone does not exempt it from the CNO requirement.

Fifth, SBMA argues that the CNO issued to HHIC should, for all intents and purposes,
be applicable to RP Energy.

All in all, we find, applying the foregoing rule of action, that SBMA should have secured
a CNO before entering into the LDA with RP Energy.
We, thus, limit the discussion as to whether the approval of the concerned sanggunian
requirement should have been complied with prior to the consummation of the LDA,
considering that the LDA is part of the implementation of the subject project and
already vests in RP

Energy the right to the use and enjoyment of the project site, as in fact horizontal
clearing activities were already undertaken by RP Energy at the project site by virtue of
the LDA

In sum, we find that the implementation of the project is not subject to the prior
approval of the concerned sanggunians, under Section 27 of the LGC, and the SBMA's
decision to approve the project prevails over the apparent objections of the concerned
sanggunians... of the LGUs, by virtue of the clear provisions of RA 7227. Thus, there was
no infirmity when the LDA was entered into between SBMA and RP Energy despite the
lack of approval of the concerned sanggunians.

Principles:

Rules on the Writ of kalikasan,[ Rules of Procedure for Environm... s

Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,... pursuant to its power to promulgate

rules for the protection and enforcement of... constitutional rights... in particular, the
individual's... right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

Section 1. Nature of the writ. -

The writ is a... remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by
law, people's organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group
accredited by or registered with any government... agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such... magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

provide judicial relief from threatened or actual violation/s of the constitutional right to
a balanced and healthful ecology of a magnitude or degree of... damage that transcends
political and territorial boundaries... following requisites

(1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an... unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private in... dividual or entity; and (3) the
actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more...
cities or provinces.

If the petition is granted, the court may grant the reliefs provided for under Section
15 of Rule 7, to wit:

Section 15. Judgment... sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision,... granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.

cease and desis... protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;... monitor
strict compliance with the decision and orders of the court;... periodic reports on the
execution of the final judgment; and... people to a balanced and healthful ecology... non-
exhaustive... damage that will occur if the power plant project is implemente

The laws governing the ECC, i.e., Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1151 and PD 1586, do not
specifically state that the lack of signature in the Statement of Accountability has the
effect of invalidating the ECC.

a helpful overview of the stages of the EIA process... signing of the Statement of
Accountability takes place at the Decision-Making Stage.

Screening determines if a project is covered or not covered by the PEISS... definition of

the ECC in the Revised Manual highlights

Scoping is a Proponent-driven multi-sectoral formal process of determining the focused

Terms of Reference of the EIA Stud

EIA Study involves a description of the proposed project and its alternatives,
characterization of the project environment, impact identification and prediction,
evaluation of impact significance, impact mitigation, formulation of Environmental
Management... and Monitoring Plan, with corresponding cost estimates and
institutional support commitment.

R... eview of EIA Reports normally entails an EMB procedural screening for compliance
with minimum requirements specified dur... ing Scoping, followed by a substantive
review

Decision Making involves evaluation of EIA recommendations and the draft decision
document, resulting to the issuance of an ECC, CNC or Denial Letter.

Moreover, the Proponent signs a sworn statement of full responsibility... on

implementation of its commitments prior to the release of the ECC. The ECC is then
transmitted to concerned LGUs and other GAs for integration into their decision-
making process.

It is a document issued by the DENR/EMB after a positive review of an ECC

application,... certifying that the Proponent has complied with all the requirements of
the EIS System and has committed to implement its approved Environmental
Management Plan. The ECC also provides guidance to other agencies and to LGUs on
EIA findings and recommendations, which need to be... considered in their respective
decision-making process.[157] (Emphasis supplied)
Monitoring, Validation and Evaluation/Audit stage assesses performance of the
Proponent against the ECC and its commitments in the Environmental Management
and Monitoring Plans to ensure actual impacts of the project are adequately prevented
or mitigated.

Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) - a certificate of Environmental

Compliance Commitment to which the Proponent conforms with, after DENR-EMB
explains the ECC conditions, by signing the sworn undertaking of full responsibility over
implementation of... specified measures which are necessary to comply with existing
environmental regulations or to operate within best environmental practices that are
not currently covered by existing laws.

PD 1151 set the Philippine Environment Policy. Notably, this law recognized the right of
the people to a healthful environment.[160] Pursuant thereto, in every action, project or
undertaking, which significantly affects the quality of the... environment, all agencies
and instrumentalities of the national government, including government-owned or
-controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms, and entities were
required to prepare, file and include a statement (i.e., Environmental Impact

Statement or EIS) containing:

(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking.

(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented.

(c) alternative to the proposed action.

(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the environment are
consistent with the maintenance and enhancement of the long-term productivity of the
same; and

(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or non-renewable resources, a

finding must be made that such use and commitment are warranted.

To further strengthen and develop the EIS, PD 1586 was promulgated, which
established the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System (PEISS). The PEISS
is "a systems-oriented and integrated approach to the EIS system to ensure a rational
balance between socio-economic... development and environmental protection for the
benefit of present and future generations."[162] The ECC requirement is mandated
under Section 4 thereof:

The PEISS consists of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process, which is
mandatory for private or public projects that may significantly affect the quality of the
environment. It involves evaluating and predicting the likely impacts of the project on
the environment... designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement
measures addressing these consequences to protect the environment and the
community's welfare.

PD 1586 was implemented by DAO 2003-30 which, in turn, set up a system or

procedure to determine when a project is required to secure an ECC and when it is not

When an ECC is not required, the project proponent procures a Certificate of Non-
Coverage (CNC

SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects.

The President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of
the National Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain
projects, undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person,
partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared
environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate issued by the President... or his duly authorized representative

12. Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait vs. Angelo Reyes
et Al., 756 SCRA 513, April 21 2015

13. West Tower Condominium vs. Phil. Ind. Corp., 758 SCRA 289
(on precautionary principle)