G.R. No.

174472              June 19, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENIGNO FETALINO y GABALDON

FACTS: Appellant stood charged with two counts of acts of lasciviousness and three counts of rape allegedly committed
against the person of his own daughter, AAA.

Arraignment was held and the appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges of acts of lasciviousness and entered a similar plea
to the three counts of rape. Joint trial of the five cases thereafter ensued with the prosecution presenting five witnesses,
namely: AAA, the private complainant; BBB, AAA’s mother and appellant’s live-in partner; Dr. Winston S. Tan (Dr. Tan),
Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City; SPO4
Julieta Espiritu (SPO4 Espiritu), Chief of the Women’s Desk of the PNP, XXX City; and POS Rolando Tejada (POS
Tejada).

Prosecution: AAA was called to the witness stand as a hostile witness by the prosecution. The reason behind this unusual
move was explained by the prosecutor during the offer of AAA’s testimony:

Before we proceed your honor, may we manifest that we are presenting this witness as our hostile witness in view of her
declaration before this representation that she is no longer interested in prosecuting this case against the accused your honor,
and in view likewise, of the manifestation given before this honorable court by the counsel for the accused that the victim
and the mother of the victim came to see him to ask her (sic) to desist. 11

AAA testified that appellant raped her on three separate instances in March 1999. She recalled that the events transpired in
their house which was then undergoing renovation. 12 Appellant allegedly undressed her and inserted his private organ into
her vagina for which she felt pain and cried. She claimed that she tried to resist appellant’s bestial attack and that she
struggled with him by trying to remove his hands. She could not shout for help as appellant threatened her with harm. After
satisfying his lust, appellant told her not to report the incident to anybody or else he would kill her and her mother. She,
however, finally revealed her sad experiences to her mother sometime in 1999. Thereafter, she was brought to the crime
laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for a medical examination. The physical examination was conducted by Dr. Tan
whose test confirmed that AAA was already in a non-virgin state physically.

Dr. Tan confirmed having performed the medical examination on the person of AAA. According to him, their office
received a request from the XXX Police Station for the conduct of a "medico-legal/physical examination" on AAA who was
a victim of an "alleged sexual abuse/molestation perpetrated by her biological father." 14 AAA and BBB were then subjected
to a brief interview after which they both signed the consent form for the said examination. 15Dr. Tan likewise explained that
the most common cause of a hymenal laceration is the insertion into the vagina of an erect male genitalia or any other object
of the same consistency.16

BBB, AAA’s mother, stated that she and appellant were engaged in a common law relationship and together they begot five
children17 including AAA. On the evening of 25 March 1999, BBB came home from Divisoria where she earned a living as a
vendor. When she reached their house, a certain Paul Quiambao, a carpenter she hired to do some minor repairs in their
abode, came to see her and informed her that he saw appellant on top of AAA. In the vernacular, Paul allegedly told BBB
that AAA was "ginagalaw" by appellant. Immediately after Paul left, BBB talked to AAA to confirm the harrowing news
that she had just received. AAA finally had the courage to reveal to her mother that her predicament in the hands of her own
father started on 22 March 1999 and it occurred everyday thereafter until 25 March 1999. She and AAA then proceeded to
the barangay hall to report the misdeeds of appellant. After this, their barangay captain and members of the police came to
their house to look for appellant who allegedly tried to flee after seeing the authorities. He was eventually arrested and taken
to the police station. The barangay officials then instructed her and AAA to go to the police station in order for them to file a
complaint against appellant.

In the police station, she and AAA gave their respective sworn statements to the investigating officer. 18

SPO4 Espiritu testified that she was the investigator assigned to the case. During her investigation, AAA complained that in
the afternoon of 21 March 1999, when the latter arrived home from school, appellant entered her room and, at knife point,
embraced and kissed her. Unsatisfied with these initial condemnable acts, appellant thereafter inserted his finger into AAA’s
vagina. This incident would be repeated the following day, 22 March 1999.

Unfortunately for AAA, her ordeal would even take a turn for the worse for on 23 March 1999, appellant apparently became
more emboldened and could no longer contain his bestial desires; thus, he proceeded to have carnal knowledge of AAA.
AAA had to suffer such abuse on two more separate instances which occurred on 24 and 25 March 1999.

The prosecution presented, as its last witness, POS Tejada, who was a member of the team which responded to the complaint
of AAA and BBB on 26 March 1999. His turn at the witness stand was brief, as appellant’s counsel admitted the substance
of POS Tejada’s would-be testimony which pertained mainly to the circumstances surrounding the arrest of appellant.

Defense: For his part, appellant offered the hackneyed defense of denial to refute the charges brought against him. Appellant
narrated that he and BBB had been live-in lovers for almost 25 years. He admitted that AAA was indeed one of their
children.19 In 1977, he was imprisoned for murder and was ordered released from detention on 23 February 1996. From the
time he regained freedom, he allegedly stayed in the house of one of his legitimate children located somewhere in Paco,
Manila. During the time material to the case, however, he was at the house he used to share with BBB and their children.
Said house was undergoing renovation at that time.

Appellant claimed that the present criminal charges were brought against him in retaliation for the physical injuries he
inflicted upon BBB during one of their heated arguments which became frequent as he wanted BBB and her new live-in
partner to move out of their house. In fact, according to appellant, BBB even charged him with physical injuries.

To bolster appellant’s claim of innocence, the defense presented CCC, another one of his children with BBB. In CCC’s
recollection, at the time the criminal acts complained of took place, she was in their house together with AAA, their brother
DDD, and appellant. She, however, insisted that nothing unusual happened during those dates. She remembered that
although appellant was in their house, he spent most of his time inside his room fixing his belongings.

As for its last witness, the defense recalled BBB to the witness stand in order to prove that the only reason she executed her
sworn statement before the police was because she was angry with appellant for having stabbed her during one of their
fights.

Lower court ruling: After trial, the court a quo found appellant guilty as charged in all the cases filed against him.

In view of the death penalty imposed by the trial court, the cases were automatically elevated to this Court for review.
However, in our Resolution dated 13 December 2005, 21 we ordered the remand of these cases to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to our holding in People v. Mateo.22

In its assailed Decision, the appellate court modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting appellant of the two charges
of rape and by downgrading the penalty imposed for the crime of rape from death to reclusion perpetua –

ISSUES: WON THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE [CRIMES] CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

WON THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

WON THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE SUPREME
PENALTY OF DEATH AS THE AGE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY
PROVED

RULING: The Court held that the proper charge that should have been filed against appellant for the incidents that transpired
on 21 and 22 March 1999, during which he inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA. For these acts, which spawned
Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1445 and MC-99-1446, appellant was indicted merely for two counts of acts of lasciviousness
when the appropriate charges should have been two separate counts of rape under Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal
Code.

Appellant’s contention: He contends that in this case, the fact that the prosecution presented AAA as a hostile witness casts
doubt as to the culpability of appellant. He also insists that the testimony of AAA was unconvincing and vague.

The seeming reluctance of AAA, as punctuated by appellant, is precisely one of the principal motivations which propelled
our legislature to reclassify the crime of rape as a crime against person.

Thus, despite the claimed disinterest of AAA in pursuing the charges against appellant, the choice of whether the cases
would prosper was no longer hers alone. Besides, at the time AAA was presented as a witness, almost three years had
already lapsed. Events must have taken place or influence might have been exerted upon her that could have weakened her
resolve to seek justice for what was done to her. However, the fact remains that AAA never categorically denied in open
court the charges she hurled at appellant. On the contrary, when AAA was subjected to cross-examination, she affirmed that
appellant had indeed raped her

Complementary to AAA’s oral testimony, she confirmed the sworn statement which she executed before SPO4 Espiritu on
26 March 1999 upon redirect examination by the prosecutor. As we had elucidated in the case of People v. Servano, 33 the
evidence which should be considered by the court in criminal cases need not be limited to the statements made in
open court; rather, it should include all documents, affidavits or sworn statements of the witnesses, and other
supporting evidence. We explained –

x x x [W]hen a sworn statement has been formally offered as evidence, it forms an integral part of the prosecution
evidence which should not be ignored for it complements and completes the testimony on the witness stand. A sworn
statement is a written declaration of facts to which the declarant has sworn before an officer authorized to administer
oaths. This oath vests credibility and trustworthiness on the document. The fact that a witness fails to reiterate,
during trial, the contents of his sworn statement should not affect his credibility and render the sworn statement
useless and insignificant, as long as it is presented as evidence in open court. This is not to say, however, that the
sworn statement should be given more probative value than the actual testimony. Rather, the sworn statement and
the open court declarations must be evaluated and examined together in toto so that a full and thorough
determination of the merits of the case may be achieved. Giving weight to a witness’ oral testimony during the trial
should not mean being oblivious to the other pieces of available evidence such as the sworn statement. In like manner,
the court cannot give probative value to the sworn statement to the exclusion of the oral testimony. In every case, the
court should review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence presented by the parties. x x x.34

In this case, AAA’s sworn statement which forms part of the records of this case supplied the details of the incidents she
experienced during those fateful days in March 1999.

Against the categorical statements of AAA, appellant could only offer the defense of denial and point to BBB as the
brains behind the institution of these criminal charges against him. Such bare-faced defense is obviously insufficient
to overcome AAA’s categorical claim of being raped and sexually molested by appellant. The rule is settled that
against the positive identification by the private complainant, the mere denials of an accused cannot prevail to
overcome conviction by the trial court.

Appellant’s contention is unavailing. Although BBB admitted that she was mad at appellant for the physical injuries he
inflicted upon her, still, she stated that what drove her to issue her sworn statement was appellant’s rape of AAA.
Furthermore, a mother like BBB certainly would not expose her own daughter to the ignominy of a rape trial simply to
retaliate against her husband for the transgressions, knowing fully well the life-long stigma and scars that such a public trial
could bring.37 Such selfish motive on the part of a mother runs counter to her natural instinct to protect her offspring from all
kinds of harm and to safeguard the latter’s well-being.

We, however, sustain the appellate court’s acquittal of appellant for the second and third rape charges. It must be
remembered that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each of the other rape charges should
be proven beyond reasonable doubt. 38 Thus, it is incumbent on the prosecution to present the quantum of proof necessary for
the conviction of an accused.

In this case, we have gone over the testimony of AAA and her sworn statement and cannot agree in the trial court’s
conclusion that appellant’s guilt had been sufficiently established. AAA’s testimony pertaining to the second and third
incidents of rape merely consists of the following:

Q. What about the second rape, what did he do to you?

A. The same.
Q. Meaning he undressed you and he inserted his private organ to your private organ?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. What about the third rape, how did he did (sic) it to you?
A. The same procedure, ma’am.39

Such laconic responses on the part of AAA to the prosecutor’s queries are grossly inadequate to sustain appellant’s
conviction. Her answers during the prosecutor’s examination are utterly lacking in material details that would warrant a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In this regard, we cannot overemphasize the need for the prosecution to ask the necessary probing questions in order to elicit
from a witness crucial details to establish the elements of the crime charged.

Likewise, AAA’s sworn statement cannot be the basis for appellant’s conviction for the second and third incidents of rape.
To recall, AAA declared in said statement that the rape which allegedly occurred on 24 March 1999 was the one witnessed
by their carpenter Quiambao. However, on the witness stand, she declared that when Quiambao saw appellant on top of her,
appellant had not yet inserted his penis into her vagina. In fact, her testimony does not even state whether appellant’s penis
even touched her vagina at all. In the absence of a statement that appellant’s penis touched even just her labia majora, we
have to acquit him for the 24 March 1999 incident.

As regards the rape purportedly committed on 25 March 1999, AAA’s sworn statement, like her testimony, contained a mere
conclusion that she was raped by appellant on that day which we find insufficient to support a finding of appellant’s guilt.

Appellant contends, and the Court of Appeals and the Office of the Solicitor General agree with him, that the trial court erred
in appreciating AAA’s minority in determining the imposable penalties on him. We find merit in this contention.

While it is alleged in the Informations that AAA was only 16 years old at the time the crimes charged were committed,
nevertheless, the prosecution failed to substantiate said allegation. In establishing the minority of the alleged victim, the
courts are to be guided by our pronouncement in the case of People v. Pruna, 42 to wit:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth
of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records
which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives
concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. 43

In the case at bar, we cannot simply rely on BBB’s unsubstantiated claim with regard to AAA’s age, particularly since the
loss of her birth certificate was not sufficiently established. We cannot overemphasize the importance of fixing with
exactitude AAA’s age, for under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, rape by sexual intercourse is punishable by the
supreme penalty of death in case "the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim." The severity, permanence and irreversible nature of the penalty prescribed by law makes the decision-making
process in capital offenses, such as qualified rape, subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence. 44

With respect to Criminal Case No. M-99-1447-H, because of the prosecution’s failure to establish with certainty that AAA
was still a minor at the time the incestuous rape was committed by appellant, the appropriate penalty should only be
reclusion perpetua in accordance with the first sentence of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code which states that rape
under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, or rape by sexual intercourse, shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

G.R. No. 127240             March 27, 2000

ONG CHIA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of
Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and
eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he
filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in §2, and lack of the disqualifications
enumerated in §3 of the law, stated —

17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of Instruction No. 270
with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No.
031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization was
not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by
administrative process was suspended;

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So
impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court
whether the State intended to present any witness present any witness against him, he remarked:

Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the sense that he
seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced,
Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines . And for this
reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the
petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself. 3

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The
State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which he is or had been known; (2)
failed to state all his former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or
occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to
support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. 4

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with the Special
Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, 5 in which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong
Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other
name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail. 6 The state also annexed income tax
returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly support himself and his
family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the
Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once
before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of
marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage
contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract 8 and a Joint-Affidavit9 executed
by petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no
marriage license had been required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel
had been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according to the State, belies
his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been married.

The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence,  10 petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa
Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the
importance of naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and
brought up for the first time on appeal. 

ISSUES: WON THE CA GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN NATURALIZATION CASES,
THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF
DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF
THE CASE

WON THE FINDING OF THE CA THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT
STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD

WON THE FINDING OF THE CA THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND
IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD

Petitioner’s contention: The appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State
to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented
and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," so it was argued,
because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.

RULING: The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that —

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added).

The rule on formal offer of evidence now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a
petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is
when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State
for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that
decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment
does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.

Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the
trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to
procedural due process.

We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally
offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived
of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have
included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals.

Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a typographical
error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the
correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also
docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the
documents presented by the State.

Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents — namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's marriage
contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax returns — are all public documents. As
such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of
any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate
court did not err in relying upon them.
The effect of petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with §7, C.A. No.
473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as
Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but
argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, with the petition and the
other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7. This is allegedly because the publication
effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement,  i.e., to give investigating agencies of the
government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding
any possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have lived at one time or another. It is settled,
however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against
the applicant. As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in
the petition his present and former places of residence. This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in
naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised
Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.

G.R. No. 129296               September 25, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ

FACTS: Appellant was charged for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (plant, cultivate and culture
marijuana plants). He was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then
ensued.

The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.
He testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence
of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited
plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report. The team was composed of SPO3
Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut.
Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same."

At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for the site
where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the
police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They,
then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering
marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the
prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. The police uprooted the seven marijuana
plants. The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants. Appellant was then arrested. One of the
plants was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis. Inspector
Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic examination of said plant, she
found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana. She next conducted a chemical
examination, the results of which confirmed her initial impressions.

The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that the land
cultivated by appellant, on which the growing marijuana plants were found formed part of the Integrated Social Forestry
Area in Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. This lot was part of the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the certification
as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.

As its sole witness, the defense presented appellant. He testified that at around 10:00 o'clock A.M., September 25, 1996, he
was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was
asked to go with the latter to "see something."   This unknown person then brought appellant to the place where the marijuana
plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made
him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he
denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. Appellant
was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana.

The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He was then made to uproot five of the
cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to a bundle of uprooted
marijuana plants. The police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a
barangay peace officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge against him,
because of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal logging activities, threatened him to admit owning the marijuana,
otherwise he would "be put in a bad situation." At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about
the marijuana plants seized by the police.

On cross-examination, appellant declared that there were ten other houses around the vicinity of his kaingin, the nearest
house being 100 meters away. The latter house belonged to one Carlito (Lito) Pascua, an uncle of the barangay peace officer
who had a grudge against him. The spot where the marijuana plants were found was located between his house and Carlito
Pascua's.
The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness. His testimony was offered to rebut appellant's claim that the
marijuana plants were not planted in the lot he was cultivating. Tipay presented a sketch he made, which showed the location
of marijuana plants in relation to the old and new nipa huts of appellant, as well as the closest neighbor. According to Tipay,
the marijuana plot was located 40 meters away from the old hut of Valdez and 250 meters distant from the hut of Carlito
Pascua. Tipay admitted on cross-examination that no surveyor accompanied him when he made the measurements. He
further stated that his basis for claiming that appellant was the owner or planter of the seized plants was the information
given him by the police informer and the proximity of appellant's hut to the location of said plants.

The trial court held appellant liable as charged for cultivation and ownership of marijuana plants.

ISSUES: WON the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is lawful
WON the seized plants are admissible in evidence against the accused
WON the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Contentions: Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had more than
ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove
appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. He relies on the ruling of the US
Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio to the effect that the protection against unreasonable government intrusion protects people,
not places.

For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records clearly show that there was no search made by
the police team, in the first place. The OSG points out that the marijuana plants in question were grown in an unfenced lot
and as each grew about five (5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact, immediately spotted by the police
officers when they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of the police officers. The instant
case must, therefore, be treated as a warrantless lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine.

RULING: In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of
probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day to obtain
a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place where the cannabis plants
were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was
probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the
accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the
protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches
allowed without warrants .The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike
against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.

We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to
apply, the following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit
of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

In the instant case, PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a
warrant. Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's premises. The police team was
dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain
view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of
SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants.
Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the
marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be
made to apply.

Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot, appellant
could not invoke the protection afforded by the Charter against unreasonable searches by agents of the State. The right
against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which includes his residence, his papers, and
other possessions. The guarantee refers to "the right of personal security" of the individual. As appellant correctly points out,
what is sought to be protected against the State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not places.

We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal
search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the
prosecution, we find that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence
against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of
the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.

In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the police officers to the effect that appellant
admitted ownership of the marijuana when he was asked who planted them.
Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana plants in question cannot be used against him for
being violative of his right to counsel during the police investigation. Hence, it was error for the trial court to have relied
upon said admission of ownership. He submits that the investigation conducted by the police officers was not a general
inquiry, but was meant to elicit information on the ownership of the marijuana plants. Appellant theorizes that since the
investigation had narrowed down to him, competent and independent counsel should have assisted him, when the police
sought information from him regarding the ownership of the prohibited plants. Appellant claims the presumption of
regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply to his purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the marijuana
plants. Nor can it override his constitutional right to counsel during investigation.

The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers that appellant was not yet under custodial
investigation when he admitted to the police that he owned the marijuana plants. His right to competent and independent
counsel, accordingly, had not yet attached. Moreover, appellant’s failure to impute any false motive for the police officers to
falsely accuse him indicates that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by police officers was not
sufficiently rebutted.

An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e.,
when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged
offense. The moment the police try to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a person suspected of
having committed an offense, he should at that juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in
the presence of counsel.

In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police appellant's name as well as the location of
appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. While the police operation was supposedly meant
to merely "verify" said information, the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected
marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter was already under investigation as
a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry.

In trying to elicit information from appellant, the police was already investigating appellant as a suspect. At this point, he
was already under custodial investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had not yet been arrested. As a suspect, two
armed policemen interrogated appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace officer and three other armed
policemen. All had been dispatched to arrest him. From these circumstances, we may infer that appellant had already been
deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way, even before the actual arrest. Note that even before he was arrested,
the police made him incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the marijuana plants.

Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its admissibility. For a confession to be
admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. The records
show that the admission by appellant was verbal and uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by an accused during
the investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and even before his formal investigation is not
only inadmissible for being violative of the right to counsel during criminal investigations, it is also hearsay. Even if the
confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such
assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given.

It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish
by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. The evidence
arrayed against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason,  it must likewise be credible and competent.
Competent evidence is "generally admissible" evidence. Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence "of such a
character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial."

In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter to convict appellant of the offense charged. These
were the seized marijuana plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary confession of ownership of said marijuana plants to
the police. Other than these proofs, there was no other evidence presented to link appellant with the offense charged. As
earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have admitted both of these proofs against the accused and to have
relied upon said proofs to convict him. For said evidence is doubly tainted.

In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to appellant's voluntary confession of ownership of the
prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional competence.

The Court is declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
For that is what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor
of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law." 64
G.R. No. 107383             February 20, 1996
CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered
the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The case
was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent. The writ of
preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives
were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that
they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court
declared the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private
respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that the documents and papers were admissible in evidence and,
therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this reason
it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private
respondent's complaint.

RULING: Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things,
private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty.
Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the
privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable"  is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who
thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each
one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

G.R. No. 150224             May 19, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT”

FACTS: On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba, were on the
ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz
Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to
appellant earlier that morning.

At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in Nagbitayan some
two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao,
but in the event she would not be able to leave, she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their
aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the house.

Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. They saw appellant at
the back of the house. They went inside the house through the back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked
appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother.

At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the ladder from the second
floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the house. She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a
white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as
appellant and his wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang.
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing a black shirt without
collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it.
She noticed that appellant’s eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something
important to tell him. Judilyn’s husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the house
of Isabel.

In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off. She called out
for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the water container she asked
Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn
was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark,
she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.

Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn.
She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw
Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived
to offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police.

At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in Isabel Dawang’s house.
Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple
stab wounds.

The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder of the house of Isabel
Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.

The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver at the scene of
the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.

When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns’s death, however, he was placed
under police custody.

On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar Abagan accompanied
him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano
dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He’s running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and
saw appellant running away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan
recaptured him. He was charged with Rape with Homicide. He was arraigned and he pleaded "not guilty." After trial,
appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide.

ISSUES: WON THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS

WON THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.

RULING: Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.

The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant. This Court will not
interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted. Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the
reason being that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing firsthand the witnesses and observing their
deportment, conduct and attitude.

The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which provides that an accused
can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the
prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime. 17

Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised, were found on the
victim’s abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to spill out of her body. 18 Rigor mortis of the vicitm’s
body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death
may be approximated from between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of  rigor mortis.19 In other words,
the estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe
within which the lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.

It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates
that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim, 20 Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of
semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the
vaginal canal could only be done through sexual intercourse with the victim. 21 In addition, it is apparent from the pictures
submitted by the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her
right forearm indicating resistance to the appellant’s assault on her virtue. 22

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen from the vagina of
the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.

DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. 23 A person’s DNA is the same in each cell
and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his
saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. 24 Most
importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable
exception of identical twins.25

DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to
exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA
identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more
accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the
innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.

DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the same
principle as fingerprints are used. 26 Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin
tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing,
carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victim’s body during the assault. 27Forensic DNA evidence is
helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim,
crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime. 28

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider,  inter alia, the following factors: how the samples
were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing
the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the
analyst who conducted the tests.

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on
DNA print or identification techniques. 30 Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA
profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. Verily, a DNA match exists between the
semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence. The DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the
court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and
molecular biology.

Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated
the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and
his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s
wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his
estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at
1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt
with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white
shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a
was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel
on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied
by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the
second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery;
(10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white
shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with
the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was
subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt.

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and
reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there
is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA
tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12
and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. 37 The
right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of
guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no
testimonial compulsion involved.

It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted in open court on
March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.

Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional on the ground that
resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law.

This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves the
admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an  ex-post facto law
refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence
presented.

Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied shirt,
notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawang’s house during the time when the crime was
committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing
evidence an impossibility to be in two places at the same time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the
same barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five
minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens his alibi.

Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere conjectures or
suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more than a minimum of probative value," suggesting that
such evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus value." 41 This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being
satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus
value" may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the
probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that would result from its admission.

The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the court can properly find
or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt
in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and
satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable
doubt.42 This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the
whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged. 43 In view of the totality
of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that the present case passes the test of moral certainty.

However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit. 44

Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw the victim alive in the
morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang. 45 She witnessed the appellant running down the stairs of Isabel’s
house and proceeding to the back of the same house. 46 She also testified that a few days before the victim was raped and
killed, the latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from the school." 47 The victim told
Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her naked and violated body was found
dead in her grandmother’s house on June 25, 1998. 48 In addition, Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang
Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family." 49 According to Judilyn,
who was personally present during an argument between her aunt and the appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to
his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will kill all your family and your relatives x x x." 50 These statements
were not contradicted by appellant.

Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is a rule in criminal law that
motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or
immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which his motive or reason for
committing it may be inferred.51

Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of rape
with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his
lustful deed, permanently sealed the victim’s lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.

In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than the victim Kathylyn Uba. Before
he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-law, together with the victim and his wife. After the
separation, appellant moved to the house of his parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-law’s
house. Being a relative by affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral
ascendancy over the victim.

G.R. No. 97525. April 7, 1993.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL SARTAGODA y BOCANEGRA, JIMMY BASCUÑA y LAZARTE,
VICENTE STA. ANA y GUTIERREZ and JOHN DOE

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINGERPRINTS; ABSENCE THEREOF DOES NOT ELIMINATE POSSIBILITY
THAT ACCUSED COULD HAVE BEEN AT SCENE OF THE CRIME. — Although We agree with their opinion that a
positive finding of matching fingerprints has great significance, We cannot sustain their theory that from the negative
findings in the fingerprint examination conducted in the course of the investigation in the instant case, it must be concluded
that they could not have been at the scene of the crime. Negative findings do not at all times lead to a valid conclusion for
there may be logical explanations for the absence of identifiable latent prints other than their not being present at the scene of
the crime. Only latent fingerprints found on smooth surface are useful for purposes of comparison in a crime laboratory
because prints left on rough surfaces result in dotted lines or broken lines instead of complete and continuous lines. Such
kind of specimen cannot be relied upon in a fingerprint examination. The latent fingerprints are actually oily substance
adhering to the surfaces of objects that come in contact with the fingers. By their very nature, oily substances easily spread
such that when the fingers slide against the surface they touch, no identifiable latent print is left, only smudges instead. Not
all police investigators are aware of the nature of latent fingerprints so as to be guided accordingly in deciding which objects
to submit for fingerprint lifting and examination. Noting the interplay of many circumstances involved in the successful
lifting and identification of proper latent fingerprints in a particular crime scene, the absence of one does not immediately
eliminate the possibility that the accused-appellants could have been at the scene of the crime. They may be there yet they
had not left any identifiable latent fingerprint. Besides, in the case at bar, only ten latent fingerprints are involved. The
findings in this particular fingerprint examination are not sufficient to case even just a reasonable doubt in their finding of
guilt for the crime charged.

2. ID.; ID.; IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED; POLICE LINE-UP NOT REQUIRED BY LAW FOR PROPER
IDENTIFICATION; FACE AND BODY MOVEMENT OF ASSAILANT CREATE LASTING IMPRESSION ON
VICTIM. — Whether or not there was a previous police line-up, the fact is that they were positively identified at the trial.
There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. The complainant's recognition of the
accused-appellants as her attackers cannot be doubted for she had during the carnal acts ample opportunity to see the faces of
the men who ravaged her. It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces
of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant and body
movement thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot easily be erased from their memory.

3. ID.; ID.; NON-FLIGHT NOT PROOF OF INNOCENCE; CASE AT BAR. — They claim that the fact that Vicente Sta.
Ana and Jimmy Bascuña did not flee, even when they had all the opportunities to do so, prove their innocence. When they
were allowed to go home after Vilma failed to identify them during the first confrontation at the police station, they stayed
home and did not flee until they were again required to appear at the police station for the second time. The accused-
appellants in effect posit that if flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight or the decision not to flee, having the opportunity to
do so, is a sign of innocence. We do not agree. Although it is settled that unexplained flight indicates guilt, it does not
necessarily follow that absence thereof proves innocence, specially so when there is overwhelming evidence to establish
their guilt.

4. ID.; APPEAL; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL JUDGE ENTITLED TO HIGHEST RESPECT; EXCEPTION. — this
Court finds no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in convicting the three accused-appellants for the
crime of robbery with multiple rape under Article 294 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. We affirm its findings of fact which
are firmly grounded on the evidence presented at the trial. We reiterate our ruling thus: "There is need to stress anew that this
Court has long been committed to the principle that the determination by a trial judge who could weigh and appraise the
testimony as to the facts fully proved is entitled to the highest respect, unless it could be shown that he ignored or
disregarded circumstances of weight or influence sufficient to call for a different finding."

5. CRIMINAL LAW; CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERSONS GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY; INDEMNITY TO
VICTIM FOR MULTIPLE RAPE ATTENDED BY CONSPIRACY; ACCUSED SOLIDARILY LIABLE THEREFOR. —
With regard to the indemnity to Vilma de Belen for multiple rape, there having been evidence of conspiracy, the act of one
being the act of all, each must be liable for all the three rapes committed, they must be held solidarily liable for said
indemnity which the trial court fixed at P30,000.00 for each offender or a total of P90,000.00.

6. ID.; ID.; IN MULTIPLE RAPE ACCUSED NOT REQUIRED TO RECOGNIZE OFFSPRING. — This Court cannot
uphold the trial court's ruling ordering each of the accused to "recognize the offspring if there by any." In multiple rape, not
one maybe required to recognized the offspring of the offended woman. In a case where three persons, one after another,
raped a woman, neither of the accuse was ordered to recognize the offspring simply because it was impossible to determine
the paternity thereof.

FACTS: It was the evening of July 2, 1988 while Rogelio de Belen, his two daughters and his sister Vilma de Belen were
sleeping in their house at Calamba, Laguna, when appellant broke in and woke him up, poking a knife at him. They tied up
his hands and made him lie flat on his stomach and asked for the key to his cabinet. Fearing for his life and that of his
companions, he reluctantly told them where the key was kept.
Just on the other room was Vilma, who heard whispers (kaluskos) but simply played possum. When the three saw her on the
bed, they approached her. One covered her mouth as another poked a knife at her neck. They threatened to kill her if she
should make an outcry. They raised her blouse and removed her underwear. They tied both her hands so that she could offer
no resistance. She was at such a pitiful state when the accused Jimmy Bascuña went on top of her, kissing her on different
parts of her body, while Vicente Sta. Ana held her legs apart. Jimmy finally inserted his sex organ inside her and satisfied his
bestial desire. After Jimmy was over, Vicente took his turn and then Joel. After the three of them had successfully
deflowered Vilma, they left, carrying with them the money and other personal belongings of the de Belen family.

After the three men left, Rogelio, with his hands and feet still tied up, tried to get up from the bed and switched the lights on
and called to his neighbors for help. Vilma, meanwhile, had lost consciousness due to shock.

Meanwhile, Petra Lamire, his sister-in-law who lives right next to his house responded to his cry for help. She went to their
house and untied Rogelio. She saw Vilma with her upper body naked and sobbing so she covered Vilma with a blanket.
Soon after, his other sister-in-law also arrived. They reported the incident to the Barangay Captain.

They had Vilma examined by Dr. Danilo A. Ramirez at Dr. Jose Rizal Memorial Hospital at about 10:00 that same morning.
He conducted external and internal examinations which showed no physical injuries except that he noted several abrasions at
the genital area and fresh lacerations of the hymen. The vagina admitted two fingers with ease.

ISSUE: WON THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING (THAT) THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION UTTERLY FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

RULING: This appeal has no merit. The accused-appellants fault the trial court of ignoring the fingerprint examination
report submitted by the Crime Laboratory of the PC/INP Camp Crame which stated that none of the specimen latent
fingerprints were found to be positive. It is their contention that since their fingerprints were not found in the objects found
in the scene of the crime they cannot be held guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

Although We agree with their opinion that a positive finding of matching fingerprints has great significance, We cannot
sustain their theory that from the negative findings in the fingerprint examination conducted in the course of the
investigation in the instant case, it must be concluded that they could not have been at the scene of the crime. Negative
findings do not at all times lead to a valid conclusion for there may be logical explanations for the absence of identifiable
latent prints other than their not being present at the scene of the crime.

Only latent fingerprints found on smooth surface are useful for purposes of comparison in a crime laboratory because prints
left on rough surfaces result in dotted lines or broken lines instead of complete and continuous lines. Such kind of specimen
cannot be relied upon in a fingerprint examination. The latent fingerprints are actually oily substances adhering to the
surfaces of objects that come in contact with the fingers. By their very nature, oily substances easily spread such that when
the fingers slide against the surface they touch, no identifiable latent print is left, only smudges instead. Not all police
investigators are aware of the nature of latent fingerprints so as to be guided accordingly in deciding which objects to submit
for fingerprint lifting and examination. Noting the interplay of many circumstances involved in the successful lifting and
identification of proper latent fingerprints in a particular crime scene, the absence of one does not immediately eliminate the
possibility that the accused-appellants could have been at the scene of the crime. They may be there yet they had not left any
identifiable latent fingerprint. Besides, in the case at bar, only ten latent fingerprints are involved. The findings in this
particular fingerprint examination are not sufficient to cast even just a reasonable doubt in their finding of guilt for the crime
charged.

The accused-appellants likewise contend that the police line-up had been irregularly conducted revealing suggestibility to
their prejudice. They accused Pat. Reyes of coaching complainant Vilma de Belen when she identified her three assailants.
They claim that it was Pat. Reyes' fault that "they were not allowed to select their positions at the line-up; that they were not
placed in line under a numeral against a wall marked to indicate their respective height in feet and inches; that there was no
record made of their descriptions and physical characteristics; that the witness/victim was not out of view of the three (3)
accused lined-up for identification purposes."

We find these claims of irregularities of little if not, of no significance at all when considered in the light of the natural desire
in the victim to seek retribution not simply from anybody who may be put before her but from the very same offenders who
actually did violence against her. It would be most illogical for an outraged victim to direct her anger against anyone other
than her three offenders. We cannot accept the accused-appellants' claim that it was on Pat. Reyes' suggestion that the victim
pointed to the accused-appellants as her assailants. No amount of coaching will be sufficient to counter the natural outrage of
a rape victim against her abuser when said abuser is presented before her in a police line-up. The outrage displayed by the
rape victim was a spontaneous reaction. She identified her assailants because of no other reason except to let people know
who hurt her.

Whether or not there was a previous police line-up, the fact is that they were positively identified at the trial. There is no law
requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. The complainant's recognition of the accused-appellants as
her attackers cannot be doubted for she had, during the carnal acts, ample opportunity to see the faces of the men who
ravaged her. It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their
assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant and body
movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot easily be erased from their memory.
The accused-appellants further claim that "the Medical Findings of Dr. Danilo Ramirez concludes that the alleged victim of
rape, Vilma de Belen must have had sexual experienced (sic) five (5) to six (6) days before the alleged incident happened on
July 2, 1988 at about 3 to 4 o'clock in the morning". There is no truth to this claim. In fact, there was no categorical or
positive assertion on the part of Dr. Ramirez that the sexual intercourse with Vilma was committed on the very date when the
alleged "robbery with rape" took place on July 2, 1988.

It is evident that Dr. Ramirez never categorically concluded that the sexual intercourse causing the fresh hymenal lacerations
took place five to six days before the date of her examination. The accused-appellants' claim that the sexual intercourse took
place on June 26 or 27, 1988 is conjectural and without factual basis.

The claim of the accused-appellants that the prosecution failed to present rebuttal evidence to refute the averments of Joel
Sartagoda that they tried in vain to persuade him to admit the charge against him and to implicate his two (2) co-accused did
not deserve the attention of the trial court nor does it deserve Ours, being per se unacceptable and unbelievable in the light of
human experience.

Finally, they claim that the fact that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascuña did not flee, even when they had all the
opportunities to do so, prove their innocence. When they were allowed to go home after Vilma failed to identify them during
the first confrontation at the police station, they stayed home and did not flee until they were again required to appear at the
police station for the second time. The accused-appellants in effect posit that if flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight or
the decision not to flee, having the opportunity to do so, is a sign of innocence.

We do not agree. Although it is settled that unexplained flight indicates guilt, it does, not necessarily follow that absence
thereof proves innocence, especially so when there is overwhelming evidence to establish their guilt.

This Court finds no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in convicting the three accused-appellants for
the crime of robbery with multiple rape under Article 294 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. We affirm its findings of fact
which are firmly grounded on the evidence presented at the trial. There is need to stress anew that this Court has long been
committed to the principle that the determination by a trial judge who could weigh and appraise the testimony as to the facts
duly proved is entitled to the highest respect, unless it could be shown that he ignored or disregarded circumstances of
weight or influence sufficient to call for a different finding.

However, this Court cannot uphold the trial court's ruling ordering each of the accused to "recognize the offspring if there be
any". In multiple rape, not one maybe required to recognized the offspring of the offended woman. In a case where three
persons, one after another, raped a woman, neither of the accused was ordered to recognize the offspring simply because it
was impossible to determine the paternity thereof.

G.R. No. 119288 August 18, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and JOSEFA GACOT

FACTS: The entire lot 5367 is being claimed by Josefa Gacot. It appears from the record that the lot is located in Barangay
Los Angeles, Magsaysay, Palawan but the area was not indicated. It also appeared that Ceferino Sabenacio is her co-owner.

This case was set for hearing and the petitioner was represented by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Reynaldo Guayco and
Rogelio Paglinawan, Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Puerto Princesa City while the
claimant appeared without counsel. In view thereof, the hearing was reset. Before the scheduled hearing, the Court received
a report from the Land Registration Authority calling the Court's attention of the decision rendered by Judge Lorenzo
Garlitos declaring this lot as property of the Republic of the Philippines. Despite this declaration however, the petitioner nor
the government did not bar the claimant from filing her answer, possessing and occupying the lot and in fact accepted her tax
payments and issuing her tax declaraton on the same.

The claimant presented herself as witness as well as her son, Vicente Dantic, Jr. The witnesses testified that Josefa Gacot
was married to Vicente Dantic, Sr. in 1940 and were in actual possession of the property for more than 30 years, having
bought the same from Cipriana Dantic-Llanera as per deed of sale dated April 22, 1955 in Cuyono dialect. Since she
acquired the property from Cipriana Llanera, she continued her occupation and introduced improvements thereon as well as
declared Lot 5367 for taxation purposes in her name and paid the corresponding taxes thereon up to the present time.

Cipriano Sabenacio, the alleged co-owner of claimant Josefa Gacot appeared in Court and manifested that he is waiving his
claim over Lot 5367 in favor of Josefa Gacot who is in actual possession of the property as he is only a boundary owner.

After the presentation of claimant and her son, they offered their exhibits and rested their case. Thereafter, the petitioner thru
counsel manifested that it is not presenting controverting evidence and is submitting the case for resolution. The trial court
rendered judgment adjudicating Lot No. 5367 to Josefa Gacot.

The Republic, through the Solicitor General, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, the Office of the Solicitor General was able to verify that Lot 5367 was earlier declared
to be the property of the Republic in a decision rendered by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos following an order of general default.
The Solicitor General thus filed a motion with the appellate court to have the case reopened and remanded to the court  a
quo to allow the Republic of the Philippines to present the decision of Judge Garlitos. The Court of Appeals granted the
motion. The trial court however held that there is no reason to disturb its previous decision.

An appeal was taken by the Republic from the decision of the trial court and the CA affirmed its ruling.

It is the rule that "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." (Rule 132, Sec. 34)
"Records of the rehearing show that on October 20, 1950, an order was, indeed, issued by Judge Lorenzo C.
Garlitos . . . ." For, during the rehearing, as reflected in the appealed decision, the government did not present any
evidence nor any memorandum despite having been ordered by the court a quo.

"Neither can We take judicial notice of the Order of Judge Garlitos. As a general rule, courts are not authorized to
take judicial knowledge of the contents of the record of other cases, in the adjudication of cases pending before
them, even though the trial judge in fact knows or remembers the contents thereof, or even when said other cases
have been heard or are pending in the same court and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard
or are really pending before the same judge. (Municipal Council vs. Colegio de San Jose, et al., G.R. No. L-45460;
31 C.J.S. 623-624; cited in p. 25, Evidence, Second Ed.; R.J. Francisco) Indeed, the Government missed its
opportunity to have the claim of Josefa Gacot, the herein appellee, declared as a nullity, considering that no
evidence was presented by it in opposition thereto. 4

ISSUE: WON THE CA HAS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO BASIS FOR PETITIONER TO INVOKE R.A.
No. 2061 TO SUPPORT ITS CLAIM THAT JOSEFA GACOT FILED HER ANSWER BEYOND THE PERIOD FIXED
BY THE SAID LAW AND THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE, SINCE IT (HAS) FAILED TO OFFER AS ITS EXHIBIT THE ORDER, DATED OCTOBER 20, 1950 OF JUDGE
LORENZO GARLITOS.5

RULING: The Court realizes the points observed by the appellate court over which there should be no quarrel.  Firstly, that
the rules of procedure6 and jurisprudence,7 do not sanction the grant of evidentiary value, 8 in ordinary trials,9 of evidence
which is not formally offered, and secondly, that adjective law is not to be taken lightly for, without it, the enforcement of
substantive law may not remain assured. The Court must add, nevertheless, that technical rules of procedure are not ends in
themselves but primarily devised and designed to help in the proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate
cases, therefore, the rules may have to be so construed liberally as to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice.

Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court provides the instances where j udicial notice is mandatory. Which
includes the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines.

A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the
same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the
same court, and of public records on file in the same court. In addition judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleadings
or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record
of another case between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will also be taken of court personnel. 12

The remand of the case would likewise seem to be unavoidable. The area of Lot No. 5367 claimed and awarded to the late
Josefa Gacot had not been specified in the records. Indeed, on the basis of the Certification of the Forest Management
Services of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Lot No. 5367, per Land Classification (LC) No. 1246 of
15 January 1936, would appear to contain an area of 394,043 square meters, 300,000 square meters of which were classified
as Alienable and Disposable land and 94,043 square meters as Timberland, which under Proclamation No. 2152, dated 29
December 1981, had been included to form part of the Mangrove Swamp Forest Reserve, closed for entry, exploitation and
settlement.13

It behooves all concerned that the above matters be carefully looked into, albeit with reasonable dispatch, for the final
resolution of this case. The case was REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings for it to ascertain and resolve the
conflicting claims of the parties conformably with the foregoing opinion of the Court. No costs.

G.R. No. 100901 July 16, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS @ "Commander
Falcasantos," AWALON KAMLON HASSAN @ "Commander Kamlon," MAJID SAMSON @ "Commander
Bungi," JUMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL
y MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH,
JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL @ "Ajid" and several JOHN and JANE DOES, accused,
JAILON KULAIS

The trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in another case, also pending before it, does not
affect the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and
overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to remind the bench and the
bar that reclusion perpetua is not synonymous with life imprisonment.

FACTS: On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom and three Informations for were filed  before the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de
Kulais, Jalina Hassan de Kamming, Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam 3 Taruk Alah, Freddie
Manuel alias "Ajid," and several John and Jane Does.

Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais,
Salvador Mamaril Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel. 8

On their arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the merits ensued. The lower court rendered the
following decision:

1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias "AJID" and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot [g]uilty of the eight
charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping, their guilt not having been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA and

HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as principals by conspiracy in all these 8 cases for [k]idnapping
for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping

3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges of [k]idnapping and
she is acquitted of these charges

But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five charges of [k]idnapping for
[r]ansom.

4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN (charged as Jalina Hassan
de Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges for [k]idnapping and are, therefore,
ACQUITTED of these three charges.

But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as accomplices in the five charges
for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being miners, they are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority which lowers the penalty imposable on them by one degree.

Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of
Appeal. The same appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of their application for "amnesty." In our
March 19, 1997 Resolution, we granted their motion. Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for the consideration of this
Court. 

The Version of the Prosecution: On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government agencies,
organized themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government projects in Zamboanga City. The group was composed of
Virginia Gara, as the head of the team; Armando Bacarro, representing the Commission on Audit; Felix del Rosario,
representing the non-government: Edilberto Perez, representing the City Assessor's Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan Basa
of the City Budget Office and Monico Saavedra, the driver from the City Engineer's Office. On that particular day, the group
headed to the Lincomo Elementary School to check on two of its classrooms. After inspecting the same, they proceeded to
the Talaga Footbridge. The group was not able to reach the place because on their way, they were stopped by nine (9) armed
men who pointed their guns at them. The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of their personal
belongings. They were then ordered to walk to the mountain by the leader of the armed men who introduced himself as
Commander Falcasantos. While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government troops which caused
their group to be divided. Finally, they were able to regroup themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men joined the others.
The kidnappers held their captives for 54 days in the forest. During their captivity, the victims were able to recognize their
captors who were at all times armed with guns. The wives of the kidnappers performed the basic chores like cooking.
Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes which demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 and
P14,000.00 in exchange for twenty (20) sets of uniform. On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 o'clock noontime, the victims
were informed that they would be released. They started walking until around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of that day. At
around 12:00 o'clock midnight, the victims were released after Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received the ransom
money. The total amount paid was P122,000.00. The same was reached after several negotiations between Mayor Vitaliano
Agan of Zamboanga City and the representatives of the kidnappers.

The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims themselves: Jessica Calunod, Armando
Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Calixto Francisco, and Monico Saavedra.

The Version of the Defense: On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, while weeding their farm in Sinaburan,
Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya Amlani was picked up by soldiers and brought to a place where one army
battalion was stationed. Thereat, her five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin, Imam
Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel were already detained. In the afternoon of the same day, appellants spouses Jailon Kulais
and Norma Sahiddan were brought to the battalion station and likewise detained thereat. On May 30, 1990, the 8 accused
were transported to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City. Here on the same date, they were joined by accused-appellant Jaliha
Hussin. At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from the captivity of Carlos Falcasantos and
company who in 1988 kidnapped and brought her to the mountains. Against their will, she stayed with Falcasantos and his
two wives for two months, during which she slept with Falcasantos as aide of the wives and was made to cook food, wash
clothes, fetch water and run other errands for everybody. An armed guard was assigned to watch her, so that, for sometime,
she had to bear the ill-treatment of Falcasantos' other wives one of whom was armed. After about two months, while she was
cooking and Falcasantos and his two wives were bathing in the river, and while her guard was not looking, she took her
chance and made a successful dash for freedom. Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who
was thirteen years old at the time (she was fifteen years old when the trial of the instant cases commenced). She was
kidnapped by Daing Kamming and brought to the mountains where he slept with her. She stayed with him for less than a
month sleeping on forest ground and otherwise performing housekeeping errands for Kamming and his men. She made good
her escape during an encounter between the group of Kamming and military troops. She hid in the bushes and came out at
Ligui-an where she took a "bachelor" bus in going back to her mother's house at Pudos, Guiligan, Tungawan, Zamboanga
del Sur. One day, at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while she was harvesting palay at the neighboring village of
Tigbalangao, military men picked her up to Ticbanuang where there was an army battalion detachment. From Ticbawuang,
she was brought to Vitali, then to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City, where on her arrival, she met all the other accused for the
first time except Freddie Manuel.

Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of Sinaburan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del
Sur. At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of a day in May, while she and her husband were in their
farm, soldiers arrested them. The soldiers did not tell them why they were being arrested, neither were
they shown any papers. The two of them were just made to board a six by six truck. There were no other
civilians in the truck. The truck brought the spouses to the army battalion and placed them inside the
building where there were civilians and soldiers. Among the civilians present were her six co-accused
Hadjirul Plasin, Salvador Mamaril, Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel and
Jumatiya Amlani. That night, the eight of them were brought to Tictapul, Zamboanga City; then to
Vitali; and, finally, to the Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City where they stayed for six days and six nights.
On the seventh day, the accused were brought to the City Jail, Zamboanga City. (TSN, January 30, 1991,
pp. 6-11)

The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore narrated, was arrested with his wife
the day the soldiers came to their farm on May 28, 1990. He has shared with his wife the ordeals that
followed in the wake of their arrest and in the duration of their confinement up to the present. (TSN,
January 22, 1991 pp. 2-4).

The Trial Court's Ruling

The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one count of kidnapping a woman
and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six terms of "life imprisonment." It also found him guilty of two
counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated
as follows:

Principally, the issue here is one of credibility — both of the witnesses and their version of what had
happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989. On this pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to
[p]rosecution witnesses and their testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and convincing. No
taint of evil or dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to [p]rosecution witnesses. To this Court,
who saw all the witnesses testify, [p]rosecution witnesses testified only because they were impelled by
[a] sense of justice, of duty and of truth.

Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of alibis. The individual
testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on what happened to each of them on May 27, 28 and
29, 1990. None of the accused explained where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to
February 3, 1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven of the nine accused were
keeping the five or six hostages named by [p]rosecution evidence.

The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the course of the captivity of the five
kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1) Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4)
Jailon Kulais; (5) Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.

The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid", and Imam Taruk Alah.
These two must, therefore, be declared acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty as conspirators as charged in
the eight Informations; or only as accomplices? Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping group to
which the seven accused belonged had formed themselves into an armed band for the purpose of
kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut themselves off from established communities, lived in
 the mountains and forests, moved from place to place in order to hide their hostages. The wives of these
armed band moved along with their husbands, attending to their needs, giving them material and moral
support. These wives also attended to the needs of the kidnap victims, sleeping with them or comforting
them.

x x x           x x x          x x x

II The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin. The Court holds
these four men guilty as conspirators in the 8 cases of kidnapping. Unlike the three women-accused,
these male accused were armed. They actively participated in keeping their hostages by fighting off the
military and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from place to place, and in guarding the kidnap
hostages. Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais were positively identified as among the nine armed men
who had kidnapped the eight kidnap victims on December 12, 1988.

The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is supported by the rulings of
our Supreme Court quoted below.

(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy. It may be
shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions and circumstances which may vary according to the
purposes to be accomplished and from which may logically be inferred that there was a common design,
understanding or agreement among the conspirators to commit the offense charged. (People vs. Cabrera,
43 Phil 64; People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)

(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the
sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible for the murder in question. (U.S. vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)

(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical
volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively
contribute to the wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by
himself alone. (People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA 759, 772 (1968).) 14

The Assigned Errors

The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:

The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in another case by Lt.
Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team leader of the government troops which allegedly
captured the accused-appellants in an encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their right to
cross-examine him.

II

On the assumption that Lt. Feliciano's testimony could be validly taken judicial notice of, the trial court,
nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the same for being highly improbable and contradictory.

III

The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma
Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al., with material and moral comfort, hence, are guilty as
accomplices in all the kidnapping for ransom cases.

IV

The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan the benefits of
suspension of sentence given to youth offenders considering that they were minors at the time of the
commission of the offense. 15

As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had withdrawn their appeal, and as such, the third and
fourth assigned errors, which pertain to them only, will no longer be dealt with. Only the following issues pertaining to
Appellant Jailon Kulais will be discussed: (1) judicial notice of other pending cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence, and (3) denial as a defense. In addition, the Court will pass upon the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial
court.
 The Court's Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

First Issue:

Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process

Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice of the testimony given in
another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of the government troops that captured him and his
purported cohorts. 16 Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross-examine a material witness in the person of
Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the latter's testimony should not be used against him. 17

True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these
have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same judge.  18 This
is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him.

Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the testimony of Lieutenant
Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied
due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely,
Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations
conducted by appellant's counsel. At best, then, the trial court's mention of Lieutenant Feliciano's testimony is a decisional
surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais.

Second Issue:

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latter's testimony:

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons?

A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.

Q And during those days did you come to know any of the persons who were with
the group?

A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed there for fifty-four
days.

Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you know them?

A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and Commander Kamlon we

came to know first our foster parents, those who were assigned to give us some food.

Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men who will take care of
you?

A Yes.

Q And to whom were you assigned?

A To Ila Abdurasa.

Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you are assigned to, who
else did you come to know?

A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2) wives of Commander
Falcasantos — Mating and Janira — another brother in-law of Commander Kamlon,
Usman, the wife of Kamlon, Tira.
 x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days and you really
came to know them. Will you still be able to recognize these persons if you will see
the[m] again?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any of those you
mentioned are here?

A Yes, they are here.

Q Some of them are here?

A Some of them are here.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing?

A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was one of those nine
armed men who took us from the highway.

RTC INTERPRETER:

Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his name, he gave his
name as JAILON KULAIS.

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle and made you
alight, what else was he doing while you were in their captivity?

A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband of Nana.

COURT:

Q Who?

A Tangkong.

xxx xxx xxx 19

Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarro's testimony pointing to appellant as one of the culprits:

FISCAL CAJAYON:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q And what happened then?

A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who will be the one [to]
g[i]ve food to us.

Q [To] whom were you assigned?

A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana.

x x x           x x x          x x x
 Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife. [D]o you remember
how he looks like?

A Yes.

Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that said Tangkong and
his wife are here?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us?

A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name he identified

[himself] as Jailon Kulais.

Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get that name?

A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the camp.

x x x           x x x          x x x

ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)

Q When did you first meet Tangkong?

A That was on December 11, because I remember he was the one who took us.

Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you stated that Mr. Mamaril
was one of those who stopped the bus and took you to the hill and you did not
mention Tangkong?

A I did not mention but I can remember his face.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host even if he did not tell
you that he [was] one of those who stopped you, you would not recognize him?

A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my shoes.

COURT:

Q Who?

A Tangkong, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx 20

Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez' candid narration:

FISCAL CAJAYON:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Who else?

A The last man.

Q Did you come to know his name?

A Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in Court who identified

himself as Jailon Kulais.)
 Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain?

A The same, guarding us.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK.

Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine armed men on your way
from [the] Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot Bridge. [W]hat do you mean by ambushed?

A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.

Q They did not fire any shots?

A But they were pointing their guns at us.

Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to [the] Talaga
Footbridge, you stated [that] one of them [was] Commander Falcasantos?

A Yes.

Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that group?

A Yes.

Q Will you please identify?

A That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting in court who identified
himself as Jailon Kulais.)

x x x           x x x          x x x

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN.

Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the camp?

FISCAL CAJAYON:

Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he used the word
Tangkong.

ATTY. FABIAN

Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean?

A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have their time two hours
another will be on duty guarding us.

Q Where did you meet Tangkong?

A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us.

xxx xxx xxx 21

It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that kidnapping or detention did take place: the
five victims were held, against their will, for fifty-three days from December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident
that Appellant Kulais was a member of the group of armed men who staged the kidnapping, and that he was one of those
who guarded the victims during the entire period of their captivity. His participation gives credence to the conclusion of the
trial court that he was a conspirator.

Kidnapping

for Ransom
That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is also apparent from the testimony of
Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying the accused and narrating the circumstances surrounding the writing of the
ransom letters.

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there were these
meetings for possible negotiation with the City Government. What do you mean by
this? What were you supposed to negotiate?

A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after the terms. 22

Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms?

A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by Commander
Falcasantos to write the letter, the ransom letter.

Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were you asked to write for
your ransom?

A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them.

Q Why will you able to identify the same?

A Because I was the one who wrote it.

Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship?

A Yes.

Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us by the Honorable
City Mayor Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 — there are five letters all handwritten.

COURT:

Original?

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Original, your Honor.

Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any of these were the
ones you were asked to write.

A (Witness going over [letters])

This one — 2 pages. This one — 2 pages. No more.

Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in these letters, what else
will make you remember that these are really the ones you wrote while there?

A The signature is there.

Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.

A And over it is a signature.

Q That is your signature?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?

 A Yes, there is the other signature.

Q There are names — other names here — Eddie Perez, Allan Basa, Armando
Bacarro, Felix Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there are signatures above the same. Did
you come up to know who signed this one?

A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons. [sic].

Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan, and there is the
signature above the same. Did you come to know who signed it?

A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Jessica, I am going over this letter . . . Could you please read to us the portion here
which says the terms? . . .

A (Witness reading) "Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo ang kantidad nga
P100,000 ug P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga uniforms sa Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989). 23

x x x           x x x          x x x

INTERPRETER (Translation):

This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00
in exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform on Friday, February 3, 1989.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is dated January 21,
1988. 24 Now, could you please explain to us why it is dated January 21, 1988 and
the other one Enero 31, 1989 or January 31, 1989?

A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989.

Q January 21, 1989?

A Yes.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned?

Please go over this.

A (Going over the letter)

Yes, ma'am.

Q Could you please read it aloud to us?

A (Witness reading)

Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga completong uniformer (7

colors marine type wala nay labot ang sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large size. 25

x x x           x x x          x x x

INTERPRETER:
 They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete uniform (7 colors,
marine-type not including the shoes), one half medium, one half large.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q After having written these letters, did you come to know after [they were] signed
by your companions and all of you, do you know if these letters were sent? If you
know only.

A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me by Falcasantos to
inform the City Mayor that initial as P500,000.00, and when we were already — I
was asked again to write, we were ordered to affix our signature to serve as proof
that all of us are alive. 26 [sic]

Calunod's testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro 27 and Edilberto Perez. 28 The receipt of the
ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver the ransom, and the release of the hostages upon payment of the money
were testified to by Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano Agan 29 and Teddy Mejia. 30

The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,  31 having been sufficiently
proven, and the appellant, a private individual, having been clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms
the trial court's finding of appellant's guilt on five counts of kidnapping for ransom.

Kidnapping of

Public Officers

Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members of the government monitoring
team abducted by appellant's group. The three testified to the fact of kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify the
appellant. Even so, appellant's identity as one of the kidnappers was sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez,
who were with Gara, Saavedra and Francisco when the abduction occurred.

That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours 32 does nor matter. In People vs. Domasian, 33 the
victim was similarly held for three hours, and was released even before his parents received the ransom note. The accused
therein argued that they could not be held guilty of kidnapping as no enclosure was involved, and that only grave coercion
was committed, if at all. 34 Convicting appellants of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised
Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his liberty when he was restrained from
going home. The Court justified the conviction by holding that the offense consisted not only in placing a person in an
enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, in any manner, of his liberty. 35 Likewise, in People vs. Santos, 36 the Court
held that since the appellant was charged and convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4, it was  not the duration of the
deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact that the victim, a minor, was locked up.

Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a few hours is immaterial. The clear fact is
that the victims were public officers 37 — Gara was a fiscal analyst for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City
Engineer's Office, and Francisco was a barangay councilman at the time the kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais should
be punished, therefore, under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art, 268, as the trial court held.

The present case is different from People vs. Astorga, 38 which held that the crime committed was not kidnapping under
Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave coercion. The appellant in that case had tricked his seven-year-old victim into going
with him to a place he alone knew. His plans, however, were foiled when a group of people became suspicious and rescued
the girl from him. The Court noted that the victim's testimony and the other pieces of evidence did not indicate that the
appellant wanted to detain her, or that he actually detained her.

In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably established that the victims were detained, albeit
for a few hours. There is proof beyond reasonable doubt that kidnapping took place, and that appellant was a member of the
armed group which abducted the victims.

Third Issue:

Denial and Alibi

The appellant's bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the prosecution witnesses' positive
identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the
negative testimonies of the defense. 39 Between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one
hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails. 40 Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez
testified in a clear, straightforward and frank manner; and their testimonies were compatible on material points. Moreover,
no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap victims and none was found by this Court.
We agree with the trial court's observation that the appellant did not meet the charges against him head on. His testimony
dwelt on what happened to him on the day he was arrested and on subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did not explain
where he was during the questioned dates (December 12, 1988 to February 3, 1989); neither did he rebut Calunod, Bacarro
and Perez, when they identified him as one of their kidnappers.

Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment

The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life imprisonment. The penalty for kidnapping with
ransom, under the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the crimes happened in 1988, when the capital
penalty was proscribed by the Constitution, the maximum penalty that could have been imposed was reclusion perpetua.
Life imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it
accessory penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a definite extent or duration. Life imprisonment is invariably
imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the
Revised Penal Code. 41

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of kidnapping for ransom and in three
counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty imposed is hereby MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to
five terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of his five convictions for kidnapping for ransom; and to three terms
of reclusion perpetua, one each for the kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto
Francisco. Like the other accused who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the personal effects, or their
monetary value, taken from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to pay the amount of P122,000 representing
the ransom money paid to the kidnappers. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 114776           February 2, 2000

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED

The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:

Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then Director of Flight Operations and
Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant company [herein private respondent] through its
Area Manager in Manila.

On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote to plaintiff, offering a contract of
employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of two (2) years commencing on January 21,
1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced working on January 20, 1979. After passing the six-month
probation period, plaintiffs appointment was confirmed effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).

On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five (5) years effective
January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the contract of employment,
which the latter accepted (Annex "C" p. 31, Rec.).

During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in command of a flight, committed a noise
violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff apologized.(Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).

Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail of the aircraft scraped or touched
the runway during landing. He was suspended for a few days until he was investigated by board headed by Capt.
Choy. He was reprimanded.

On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion training at Aeroformacion,
Toulouse, France at dependant's expense. Having successfully completed and passed the training course, plaintiff
was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo duty as captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed as captain
of the A-300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp.
34-38, Rec.).

Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures. Seventeen (17) expatriate
captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant's requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11).
Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised them to take
advance leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.)

Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to terminate its excess personnel
(t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however, immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their
qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were
found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the twelve.
 On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1, 1982 and that he will
be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not
uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff requested a three-month notice to afford him time to exhaust all
possible avenues for reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1) month
salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).

Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant
moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before the
court a quo (Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).

Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant
case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and
in the course of plaintiffs employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction
pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of
his employment contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore laws
should apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).

In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the items demanded in a complaint are the
natural consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation and not labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil
dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is beyond the field of specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if the
complaint is grounded not on the employee's dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal and the
consequence thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)

On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss (pp. 82-84, Ibid). The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid.)

On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds relied upon in its motion to dismiss and
further arguing that plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel from instituting the complaint and that he
has no cause of action . (pp. 102-115)1

On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano and against defendant
Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts of —

SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at the time of payment, as
and for unearned compensation with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;

SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at the time of payment;
and the further amounts of P67,500.00 as consequential damages with legal interest from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid;

P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 as and
for attorney's fees.

Costs against defendant.

SO ORDERED.2

Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of jurisdiction, validity of termination,
estoppel, and damages.

On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,

. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-appellee only on
January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982.
Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied.
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:

1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS UNDER
ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO THE
RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE?

2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER?

3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE THE EXPECTED
PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?

At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus:

Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the Singapore Laws because
of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore.
The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The
defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied. 4

Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said court. 5 On this matter,
respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction. 6

Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or on Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
According to him, his termination of employment effective November 1, 1982, was based on an employment contract which
is under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10 years as provided for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of
the appellate court based on Article 1146 where prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court concluded
that the action for illegal dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was withdrawn,
then filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court, had already prescribed.

In our view, neither Article 1144 7 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here pertinent. What is applicable is Article 291 of
the Labor Code, viz:

Art. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employee-employer relations accruing during the
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise
they shall be forever barred.

xxx     xxx     xxx

What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is
settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for
the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now
Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations. 9

More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim was based on a written contract, the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:

. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to "money claims specifically
recoverable under said Code" but covers all money claims arising from an employee-employer relations" (Citing
Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v. National Labor Relations Commission,
261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .

It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable to money claims arising
from employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that "where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the one designed therefore should prevail." (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157
SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.11

In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's action for damages due
to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effective date of his dismissal on
November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.

In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-appelle only on January
8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly,
plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.
We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which sets the prescription period at three (3) years and
which governs under this jurisdiction.

Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his complaint for illegal dismissal
before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission. However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it
has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc., vs., Court of Appeals, we held that "although the commencement
of a civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the
plaintiff leaves in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all." 12

Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was valid, the appellate court found that
the employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals when
it said,

It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties. From the moment the same is perfected,
the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all consequences
which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee
accepted the offer of employment, he was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the contract, among
others, the right of mutual termination by giving three months written notice or by payment of three months salary.
Such provision is clear and readily understandable, hence, there is no room for interpretation.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the provisions of the Agreement, as he is not a
signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must be noted that when plaintiff-appellee's employment was confirmed, he
applied for membership with the Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the signatory to the
aforementioned Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped from questioning the legality of the said
agreement or any proviso contained therein.13

Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision is amply supported by evidence and it
did not err in its findings, including the reason for the retrenchment:

When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline industry resulting in a slow down
in the company's growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had
no choice but to adopt cost cutting measures, such as cutting down services, number of frequencies of flights, and
reduction of the number of flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As a result, defendant-
appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots, including plaintiff-appellee, which it found to be in excess of what is
reasonably needed.14

All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that petitioner's termination from employment
was for an authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice and opportunity to be heard, by respondent company. No
error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be attributed to respondent appellate court.1âwphi1.nêt

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. CV No. 34476 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 143276             July 20, 2004

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL

Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19.3422 hectares of agricultural land situated
in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6296. A portion of the land consisting
of 6.2330 hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to coconut and 0.7600 planted to palay) was compulsorily acquired by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, 1 as amended, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, 2 as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, 3 the Land Bank of the Philippines 4 (Landbank), petitioner, made the following
valuation of the property:

Acquired property Area in hectares Value

Coconut land 5.4730 P148,675.19

 Riceland 0.7600 25,243.36

P173,918.55

Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as amended, a summary
administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the
valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the Landbank's valuation.

Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet,
Camarines Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a petition for determination of just compensation, docketed as
Civil Case No. 6806. Impleaded as respondents were the DAR and the Landbank. Petitioners therein prayed for a
compensation of P100,000.00 per hectare for both coconut land and riceland, or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00.

During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC the following admissions of facts: (1) the
subject property is governed by the provisions of R.A. 6657, as amended; (2) it was distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries;
and (3) the Landbank deposited the provisional compensation based on the valuation made by the DAR. 5

On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and directing the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.6

In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed the just compensation for the coconut land at  P657,137.00
and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00, which is beyond respondents' valuation of P623,000.00. The
court further awarded compounded interest at P79,732.00 in cash. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses Dr. Vicente Banal and Leonidas Arenas-
Banal, for the 5.4730 hectares of coconut land the sum of SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN PESOS (P657,137.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law;

2. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners for the .7600 hectares of riceland the sum of FORTY-SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (P46,000.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law; and

3. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum of SEVENTY-NINE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P79,732.00) as the compounded interest in cash.

IT IS SO ORDERED."7

In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts established in another case pending before
it (Civil Case No. 6679, "Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al."), using the following formula:

For the coconut land

1. Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of coconut) = Net Income (NI)

2. NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization formula under  Republic Act No.
38448 )

For the riceland

1. 2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH (using the formula
under Executive Order No. 2289 )

2. AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest (pursuant to DAR AO No. 13, Series
of 1994)

Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52163.

On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision 10 affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court. The
Landbank's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. 11

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court's valuation of the
land. As earlier mentioned, there was no trial on the merits.

To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the Landbank is charged "primarily" with "the
determination of the land valuation and compensation for all private lands suitable for agriculture under the Voluntary Offer
to Sell or Compulsory Acquisition arrangement…" For its part, the DAR relies on the determination of the land valuation
and compensation by the Landbank.12

Based on the Landbank's valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner. 13 If the landowner accepts the
offer, the Landbank shall pay him the purchase price of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and
surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the government. 14 In case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto,
the DAR adjudicator15 conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by
requiring the landowner, the Landbank and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the
land.16 These functions by the DAR are in accordance with its quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, as
amended, which provides:

"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

x x x."

A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special
Agrarian Court17 "for final determination of just compensation."18

In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court 19 and, on its own initiative or at the instance of
any of the parties, "appoint one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute,
including the valuation of properties, and to file a written report thereof x x x." 20 In determining just compensation, the RTC
is required to consider several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, thus:

"Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the
land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the
tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property, as well as the
non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its valuation."

These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by
DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued pursuant to the DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object
and purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended.21

The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows:

"LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

LV = Land Value

CNI = Capitalized Net Income

CS = Comparable Sales

MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable.

A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

 A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = MV x 2"

Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental requirements in determining just
compensation for the property. Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely ordered the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous since the determination of just compensation involves the
examination of the following factors specified in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended:

1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;

2. the current value of like properties;

3. its nature, actual use and income;

4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;

5. the assessment made by government assessors;

6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the
property; and

7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any.

Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only during a hearing wherein the contending
parties present their respective evidence. In fact, to underscore the intricate nature of determining the valuation of the land,
Section 58 of the same law even authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to appoint commissioners for such purpose.

Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents' property is P703,137.00, merely took judicial notice of
the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and applied the same to this case without
conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the parties, thus:

"x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares, defendants determined the average
gross production per year at 506.95 kilos only, but in the very recent case of Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al.,
filed and decided by this court in Civil Case No. 6679 also for just compensation for coconut lands and Riceland
situated at Basud, Camarines Norte wherein also the lands in the above-entitled case are situated,  the value fixed
therein was 1,061.52 kilos per annum per hectare for coconut land and the price per kilo is P8.82, but in the
instant case the price per kilo is P9.70. In the present case, we consider 506.95 kilos average gross production
per year per hectare to be very low considering that farm practice for coconut lands is harvest every forty-five
days. We cannot also comprehended why in the Rodriguez case and in this case there is a great variance in
average production per year when in the two cases the lands are both coconut lands and in the same place of
Basud, Camarines Norte. We believe that it is more fair to adapt the 1,061.52 kilos per hectare per year as average
gross production. In the Rodriguezcase, the defendants fixed the average gross production of palay at 3,000 kilos
or 60 cavans per year. The court is also constrained to apply this yearly palay production in the Rodriguez
case to the case at bar.

xxx   xxx   xxx

"As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the area of the coconut land taken under CARP is 5.4730
hectares. But as already noted, the average gross production a year of 506.96 kilos per hectare fixed by
Landbank is too low as compared to the Rodriguez case which was 1,061 kilos when the coconut land in
both cases are in the same town of Basud, Camarines Norte, compelling this court then to adapt 1,061 kilos
as the average gross production a year of the coconut land in this case. We have to apply also the price
of P9.70 per kilo as this is the value that Landbank fixed for this case.

"The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of the gross income. So, the net income of the coconut land is
1,061 x .70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per hectare. Applying the capitalization formula of R.A. 3844 to the net
income of P7,204.19 divided by 6%, the legal rate of interest, equals P120,069.00 per hectare. Therefore, the just
compensation for the 5.4730 hectares is P657,137.00.

"The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as of October 21, 1972 has an area of .7600 hectare. If in
the Rodriguez case the Landbank fixed the average gross production of 3000 kilos or 60 cavans of palay per year,
then the .7600 hectare in this case would be 46 cavans. The value of the riceland therefore in this case is 46 cavans
x 2.5 x P400.00 equals P46,000.00.22
 "PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO 13, granted interest on the
compensation at 6% compounded annually. The compounded interest on the 46 cavans for 26 years is 199.33
cavans. At P400.00 per cavan, the value of the compounded interest is P79,732.00."23 (emphasis added)

Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even
when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. 24 They may only do so "in the
absence of objection" and "with the knowledge of the opposing party," 25 which are not obtaining here.

Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this
regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes
judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:

"SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request
of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon.

"After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party,
may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a
material issue in the case." (emphasis added)

The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.

Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No. 228 26 and R.A. No. 3844,27 as
amended, in determining the valuation of the property; and in granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR Administrative
Order No. 13, Series of 1994. 28 It must be stressed that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural lands primarily devoted to
rice and corn, while R.A. 3844 governs agricultural leasehold relation between "the person who furnishes the
landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the
same."29 Here, the land is planted to coconut and rice and does not involve agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial court
should have applied is the formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11
discussed earlier.

As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 does
not apply to the subject land but to those lands taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 30 and Executive Order No. 228 whose
owners have not been compensated. In this case, the property is covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have
been paid the provisional compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.

While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial discretion, however, such discretion must be
discharged within the bounds of the law. Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing
rules and regulations. (DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No.11).

In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the valuation of the subject land. Thus, we deem
it proper to remand this case to the RTC for trial on the merits wherein the parties may present their respective evidence. In
determining the valuation of the subject property, the trial court shall consider the factors provided under Section 17 of R.A.
6657, as amended, mentioned earlier. The formula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, shall be used in the valuation of the land. Furthermore, upon
its own initiative, or at the instance of any of the parties, the trial court may appoint one or more commissioners to examine,
investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 20, 2000 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 52163 is REVERSED. Civil Case No. 6806 is REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte,
for trial on the merits with dispatch. The trial judge is directed to observe strictly the procedures specified above in
determining the proper valuation of the subject property.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 144413             July 30, 2004

REPUBLIC GLASS CORPORATION and GERVEL, INC vs. LAWRENCE C. QUA

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the 6 March 2000 Decision 2 and the 26 July 2000 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54737. The Court of Appeals set aside the Order 3 of 3 May 1996 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 63 ("RTC-Branch 63"), in Civil Case No. 88-2643 and reinstated the Decision 4 of 12 January 1996 in
respondent’s favor.
The Facts

Petitioners Republic Glass Corporation ("RGC") and Gervel, Inc. ("Gervel") together with respondent Lawrence C. Qua
("Qua") were stockholders of Ladtek, Inc. ("Ladtek"). Ladtek obtained loans from Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
("Metrobank")5 and Private Development Corporation of the Philippines 6 ("PDCP") with RGC, Gervel and Qua as sureties.
Among themselves, RGC, Gervel and Qua executed Agreements for Contribution, Indemnity and Pledge of Shares of Stocks
("Agreements").7

The Agreements all state that in case of default in the payment of Ladtek’s loans, the parties would reimburse each other the
proportionate share of any sum that any might pay to the creditors. 8 Thus, a common provision appears in the Agreements:

RGC, GERVEL and QUA each covenant that each will respectively reimburse the party made to pay the Lenders
to the extent and subject to the limitations set forth herein, all sums of money which the party made to pay the
Lenders shall pay or become liable to pay by reason of any of the foregoing, and will make such payments within
five (5) days from the date that the party made to pay the Lenders gives written notice to the parties hereto that it
shall have become liable therefor and has advised the Lenders of its willingness to pay whether or not it shall have
already paid out such sum or any part thereof to the Lenders or to the persons entitled thereto. (Emphasis
supplied)

Under the same Agreements, Qua pledged 1,892,360 common shares of stock of General Milling Corporation ("GMC") in
favor of RGC and Gervel. The pledged shares of stock served as security for the payment of any sum which RGC and Gervel
may be held liable under the Agreements.

Ladtek defaulted on its loan obligations to Metrobank and PDCP. Hence, Metrobank filed a collection case against Ladtek,
RGC, Gervel and Qua docketed as Civil Case No. 8364 ("Collection Case No. 8364") which was raffled to the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149 ("RTC-Branch 149"). During the pendency of Collection Case No. 8364, RGC and
Gervel paid Metrobank P7 million. Later, Metrobank executed a waiver and quitclaim dated 7 September 1988 in favor of
RGC and Gervel. Based on this waiver and quitclaim, 9 Metrobank, RGC and Gervel filed on 16 September 1988 a joint
motion to dismiss Collection Case No. 8364 against RGC and Gervel. Accordingly, RTC-Branch 149 dismissed the case
against RGC and Gervel, leaving Ladtek and Qua as defendants. 10

In a letter dated 7 November 1988, RGC and Gervel’s counsel, Atty. Antonio C. Pastelero, demanded that Qua pay
P3,860,646, or 42.22% of P8,730,543.55, 11 as reimbursement of the total amount RGC and Gervel paid to Metrobank and
PDCP. Qua refused to reimburse the amount to RGC and Gervel. Subsequently, RGC and Gervel furnished Qua with notices
of foreclosure of Qua’s pledged shares.

Qua filed a complaint for injunction and damages with application for a temporary restraining order, docketed as Civil Case
No. 88-2643 ("Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643"), with RTC-Branch 63 to prevent RGC and Gervel from foreclosing the
pledged shares. Although it issued a temporary restraining order on 9 December 1988, RTC-Branch 63 denied on 2 January
1989 Qua’s "Urgent Petition to Suspend Foreclosure Sale." RGC and Gervel eventually foreclosed all the pledged shares of
stock at public auction. Thus, Qua’s application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction became moot. 12

Trial in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643 ensued. RGC and Gervel offered Qua’s Motion to Dismiss 13 in Collection Case No.
8364 as basis for the foreclosure of Qua’s pledged shares. Qua’s Motion to Dismiss states:

8. The foregoing facts show that the payment of defendants Republic Glass Corporation and Gervel, Inc.
was for the entire obligation covered by the Continuing Surety Agreements which were Annexes "B" and "C" of
the Complaint, and that the same naturally redound[ed] to the benefit of defendant Qua herein, as provided for by
law, specifically Article 1217 of the Civil Code, which states that:

xxx

10. It is very clear that the payment of defendants Republic Glass Corporation and Gervel, Inc. was much more
than the amount stipulated in the Continuing Surety Agreement which is the basis for the action against them and
defendant Qua, which was just SIX MILLION TWO HUNDRED [THOUSAND] PESOS (P6,200,000.00), hence,
logically the said alleged obligation must now be considered as fully paid and extinguished.

RGC and Gervel likewise offered as evidence in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643 the Order dismissing Collection Case No.
8364,14 which RTC-Branch 149 subsequently reversed on Metrobank’s motion for reconsideration. Thus, RTC-Branch 149
reinstated Collection Case No. 8364 against Qua.

On 12 January 1996, RTC-Branch 63 rendered a Decision in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643 ("12 January 1996 Decision")
ordering RGC and Gervel to return the foreclosed shares of stock to Qua. The dispositive portion of the 12 January 1996
Decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment ordering defendants jointly and severally
liable to return to plaintiff the 1,892,360 shares of common stock of General Milling Corporation which they
foreclosed on December 9, 1988, or should the return of these shares be no longer possible then to pay to plaintiff
the amount of P3,860,646.00 with interest at 6% per annum from December 9, 1988 until fully paid and to pay
plaintiff P100,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees. The costs will be for defendants’ account.

SO ORDERED.15

However, on RGC and Gervel’s Motion for Reconsideration, RTC-Branch 63 issued its Order of 3 May 1996 ("3 May 1996
Order") reconsidering and setting aside the 12 January 1996 Decision. The 3 May 1996 Order states:

After a thorough review of the records of the case, and an evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties as well
as their contentions, the issues to be resolved boil down to the following:

1. Whether or not the parties’ obligation to reimburse, under the Indemnity Agreements was premised on
the payment by any of them of the entire obligation;

2. Whether or not there is basis to plaintiff’s apprehension that he would be made to pay twice for the
single obligation; and

3. Whether or not plaintiff was benefited by the payments made by defendants.

Regarding the first issue, a closer scrutiny of the pertinent provisions of the Indemnity Agreements executed by the
parties would not reveal any significant indication that the parties’ liabilities are indeed premised on the payment
by any of them of the entire obligation. These agreements clearly provide that the parties’ obligation to reimburse
accrues upon mere advice that one of them has paid or will so pay the obligation. It is not specified whether the
payment is for the entire obligation or not.

Accordingly, the Court stands corrected in this regard. The obvious conclusion that can be seen now is that
payment of the entire obligation is not a condition sine qua non for the paying party to demand
reimbursement. The parties have expressly contracted that each will reimburse whoever is made to pay the
obligation whether entirely or just a portion thereof.

On the second issue, plaintiff’s apprehension that he would be made to pay twice for the single obligation is
unfounded. Under the above-mentioned Indemnity Agreements, in the event that the creditors are able to collect
from him, he has the right to ask defendants to pay their proportionate share, in the same way defendants had
collected from the plaintiff, by foreclosing his pledged shares of stock, his proportionate share, after they had made
payments. From all indications, the provisions of the Indemnity Agreements have remained binding between the
parties.

On the third issue, there is merit to defendants’ assertion that plaintiff has benefited from the payments made by
defendants. As alleged by defendants, and this has not been denied by plaintiff, in Civil Case No. 8364 filed
before Branch 149 of this Court, where the creditors were enforcing the parties’ liabilities as sureties,
plaintiff succeeded in having the case dismissed by arguing that defendants’ payments [were] for the entire
obligation, hence, the obligation should be considered fully paid and extinguished. With the dismissal of the
case, the indications are that the creditors are no longer running after plaintiff to enforce his liabilities as surety of
Ladtek.

Whether or not the surety agreements signed by the parties and the creditors were novated is not material in this
controversy. The fact is that there was payment of the obligation. Hence, the Indemnity Agreements govern.

In the final analysis, defendants’ payments gave rise to plaintiff’s obligation to reimburse the former. Having
failed to do so, upon demand, defendants were justified in foreclosing the pledged shares of stocks.

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated January 12, 1996 is reconsidered and set aside. The
above-entitled complaint against defendants is DISMISSED.

Likewise, defendants’ counterclaim is also dismissed.

SO ORDERED.16 (Emphasis supplied)

Qua filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 May 1996 Order which RTC-Branch 63 denied.
Aggrieved, Qua appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, Qua filed a Manifestation 17with the
Court of Appeals attaching the Decision 18 of 21 November 1996 rendered in Collection Case No. 8364. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants Ladtek, Inc. and Lawrence
C. Qua:

1. To pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the amount of P44,552,738.34 as of October 31, 1987 plus the
stipulated interest of 30.73% per annum and penalty charges of 12% per annum from November 1, 1987 until the
whole amount is fully paid, less P7,000,000.00 paid by defendants Republic Glass Corporation and Gervel, Inc.,
but the liability of defendant Lawrence C. Qua should be limited only to P5,000,000.00 and P1,200,000.00,
the amount stated in the Continuing Suretyship dated June 15, 1983, Exh. "D" and Continuing Suretyship
dated December 14, 1981, Exh. "D-1", respectively, plus the stipulated interest and expenses incurred by the
plaintiff.

2. To pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff an amount equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total amount due as
and by way of attorney’s fees;

3. To pay the cost of suit.

The Counterclaims of the defendants Ladtek, Inc. and Lawrence C. Qua against the plaintiff are hereby dismissed.

Likewise, the cross-claims of the defendants are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.19 (Emphasis supplied)

On 6 March 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered the questioned Decision setting aside the 3 May 1996 Order of RTC-
Branch 63 and reinstating the 12 January 1996 Decision ordering RGC and Gervel to return the foreclosed shares of stock to
Qua.20

Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In reversing the 3 May 1996 Order and reinstating the 12 January 1996 Decision, the appellate court quoted the RTC-Branch
63’s 12 January 1996 Decision:

The liability of each party under the indemnity agreements therefore is premised on the payment by any of them of
the entire obligation. Without such payment, there would be no corresponding share to reimburse. Payment of the
entire obligation naturally redounds to the benefit of the other solidary debtors who must then reimburse the
paying co-debtors to the extent of his corresponding share.

In the case at bar, Republic Glass and Gervel made partial payments only, and so they did not extinguish the entire
obligation. But Republic Glass and Gervel nevertheless obtained quitclaims in their favor and so they ceased to be
solidarily liable with plaintiff for the balance of the debt (Exhs. "D", "E", and "I"). Plaintiff thus became solely
liable for the unpaid portion of the debt even as he is being held liable for reimbursement on the said portion.

What happened therefore, was that Metrobank and PDCP in effect enforced the Suretyship Agreements jointly as
against plaintiff and defendants. Consequently, the solidary obligation under the Suretyship Agreements was
novated by the substantial modification of its principal conditions. xxx The resulting change was from one with
three solidary debtors to one in which Lawrence Qua became the sole solidary co-debtor of Ladtek.

Defendants cannot simply pay off a portion of the debt and then absolve themselves from any further liability
when the obligation has not been totally extinguished.

xxx

In the final reckoning, this Court finds that the foreclosure and sale of the shares pledged by plaintiff was totally
unjustified and without basis because the obligation secured by the underlying pledge had been extinguished by
novation. xxx21

The Court of Appeals further held that there was an implied novation or substantial incompatibility in the surety’s mode or
manner of payment from one for the entire obligation to one merely of proportionate share. The appellate court ruled that
RGC and Gervel’s payment to the creditors only amounted to their proportionate shares of the obligation, considering the
following evidence:
 The letter of the Republic to the appellant, Exhibit "G", dated June 25, 1987, which mentioned the letter from
PDCP confirming its willingness to release the joint and solidary obligation of the Republic and Gervel subject to
some terms and conditions, one of which is the appellant’s acceptable repayment plan of his "pro-rata share"; and
the letter of PDCP to the Republic, Exhibit "H", mentioning full payment of the "pro rata share" of the Republic
and Gervel, and the need of the appellant to submit an acceptable repayment plan covering his "pro-rata share"’,
the release from solidary liability by PDCP, Exhibit "J", mentioning full payment by the Republic and Gervel of
their "pro rata share" in the loan, as solidary obligors, subject however to the terms and conditions of the hold out
agreement; and the non-payment in full of the loan, subject of the May 10, 1984 Promissory Note, except the 7
million payment by both Republic and Gervel, as mentioned in the Decision (Case No. 8364, Metrobank vs.
Ladtek, et al). Precisely, Ladtek and the appellant, in said Decision were directed to pay Metrobank the balance of
P9,560,798, supposedly due and unpaid.

Thus, the payment did not extinguish the entire obligation and did not benefit Qua. Accordingly, RGC and Gervel cannot
demand reimbursement. The Court of Appeals also held that Qua even became solely answerable for the unpaid balance of
the obligations by virtue of the quitclaims executed by Metrobank and PDCP in favor of RGC and Gervel. RGC and Gervel
ceased to be solidarily liable for Ladtek’s loan obligations. 22

The Issues

RGC and Gervel raise the following issues for resolution:

I.

WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL APPLIES TO QUA’S JUDICIAL STATEMENTS THAT RGC
AND GERVEL PAID THE ENTIRE OBLIGATION.

II.

WHETHER PAYMENT OF THE ENTIRE OBLIGATION IS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON FOR RGC AND
GERVEL TO DEMAND REIMBURSEMENT FROM QUA UNDER THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS
EXECUTED BY THEM AFTER RGC AND GERVEL PAID METROBANK UNDER THE SURETY
AGREEMENT.

III.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS NOVATION OF THE SURETY AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY

THE PARTIES AND THE CREDITORS, WHETHER THE NOVATION IS MATERIAL IN THIS CASE. 23

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the petition.

Whether Qua was in estoppel

RGC and Gervel contend that Qua is in estoppel for making conflicting statements in two different and separate cases. Qua
cannot now claim that the payment made to Metrobank was not for the entire obligation because of his Motion to Dismiss
Collection Case No. 8364 where he stated that RGC and Gervel’s payment was for the entireobligation.

The essential elements of estoppel in pais are considered in relation to the party to be estopped, and to the party invoking the
estoppel in his favor. On the party to be estopped, such party (1) commits conduct amounting to false representation or
concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the facts are inconsistent with those which
the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) has the intent, or at least expectation that his conduct shall at least influence the
other party; and (3) has knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. On the  party claiming the estoppel, such party
(1) has lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth on the facts in question; (2) has relied, in good faith, on
the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; (3) has acted or refrained from acting based on such conduct or
statements as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment or prejudice.24

In this case, the essential elements of estoppel are inexistent.

While Qua’s statements in Collection Case No. 8364 conflict with his statements in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643, RGC and
Gervel miserably failed to show that Qua, in making those statements, intended to falsely represent or conceal the material
facts. Both parties undeniably know the real facts.

Nothing in the records shows that RGC and Gervel relied on Qua’s statements in Collection Case No. 8364 such that they
changed their position or status, to their injury, detriment or prejudice. RGC and Gervel repeatedly point out that it was the
presiding judge25 in Collection Case No. 8364 who relied on Qua’s statements in Collection Case No. 8364. RGC and Gervel
claim that Qua "deliberately led the Presiding Judge to believe" that their payment to Metrobank was for the entire
obligation. As a result, the presiding judge ordered the dismissal of Collection Case No. 8364 against Qua. 26

RGC and Gervel further invoke Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court to support their stance:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in
the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings filed by the parties, (b) during the trial either by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. 27

The elements of judicial admissions are absent in this case. Qua made conflicting statements in Collection Case No. 8364
and in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643, and not in the "same case" as required in Section 4 of Rule 129. To constitute judicial
admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered. If made in another case or in another court,
the fact of such admission must be proved as in the case of any other fact, although if made in a judicial proceeding it is
entitled to greater weight.28

RGC and Gervel introduced Qua’s Motion to Dismiss and the Order dismissing Collection Case No. 8364 to prove Qua’s
claim that the payment was for the entire obligation. Qua does not deny making such statement but explained that he
"honestly believed and pleaded in the lower court and in CA-G.R. CV No. 58550 that the entire debt was fully extinguished
when the petitioners paid P7 million to Metrobank."29

We find Qua’s explanation substantiated by the evidence on record. As stated in the Agreements, Ladtek’s original loan from
Metrobank was only P6.2 million. Therefore, Qua reasonably believed that RGC and Gervel’s P7 million payment to
Metrobank pertained to the entire obligation. However, subsequent facts indisputably show that RGC and Gervel’s payment
was not for the entire obligation. RTC-Branch 149 reinstated Collection Case No. 8364 against Qua and ruled in
Metrobank’s favor, ordering Qua to pay P6.2 million.

Whether payment of the entire obligation is an essential condition for reimbursement

RGC and Gervel assail the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the parties’ liabilities under the Agreements depend on the full
payment of the obligation. RGC and Gervel insist that it is not an essential condition that the entire obligation must first be
paid before they can seek reimbursement from Qua. RGC and Gervel contend that Qua should pay 42.22% of any
amount which they paid or would pay Metrobank and PDCP.

RGC and Gervels’ contention is partly meritorious.

Payment of the entire obligation by one or some of the solidary debtors results in a corresponding obligation of the other
debtors to reimburse the paying debtor. 30 However, we agree with RGC and Gervel’s contention that in this case payment of
the entire obligation is not an essential condition before they can seek reimbursement from Qua. The words of the
Agreements are clear.

RGC, GERVEL and QUA each covenant that each will respectively reimburse the party made to pay the Lenders
to the extent and subject to the limitations set forth herein, all sums of money which the party made to pay the
Lenders shall pay or become liable to pay by reason of any of the foregoing, and will make such payments
within five (5) days from the date that the party made to pay the Lenders gives written notice to the parties hereto
that it shall have become liable therefor and has advised the Lenders of its willingness to pay whether or not it
shall have already paid out such sum or any part thereof to the Lenders or to the persons entitled thereto.
(Emphasis supplied)

The Agreements are contracts of indemnity not only against actual loss but against liability as well. In  Associated Insurance
& Surety Co., Inc. v. Chua,31 we distinguished between a contract of indemnity against loss and a contract of indemnity
against liability, thus:32

The agreement here sued upon is not only one of indemnity against loss but of indemnity against liability. While
the first does not render the indemnitor liable until the person to be indemnified makes payment or sustains
loss, the second becomes operative as soon as the liability of the person indemnified arises irrespective of
whether or not he has suffered actual loss. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, whether the solidary debtor has paid the creditor, the other solidary debtors should indemnify the former once his
liability becomes absolute. However, in this case, the liability of RGC, Gervel and Qua became absolute simultaneously
when Ladtek defaulted in its loan payment. As a result, RGC, Gervel and Qua all became directly liable at the same time to
Metrobank and PDCP. Thus, RGC and Gervel cannot automatically claim for indemnity from Qua because Qua himself is
liable directly to Metrobank and PDCP.
If we allow RGC and Gervel to collect from Qua his proportionate share, then Qua would pay much more than his stipulated
liability under the Agreements. In addition to the P3,860,646 claimed by RGC and Gervel, Qua would have to pay his
liability of P6.2 million to Metrobank and more than P1 million to PDCP. Since Qua would surely exceed his proportionate
share, he would then recover from RGC and Gervel the excess payment. This situation is absurd and circuitous.

Contrary to RGC and Gervel’s claim, payment of any amount will not automatically result in reimbursement. If a solidary
debtor pays the obligation in part, he can recover reimbursement from the co-debtors only in so far as his
payment exceeded his share in the obligation.33 This is precisely because if a solidary debtor pays an amount equal to his
proportionate share in the obligation, then he in effect pays only what is due from him. If the debtor pays less than his share
in the obligation, he cannot demand reimbursement because his payment is less than his actual debt.

To determine whether RGC and Gervel have a right to reimbursement, it is indispensable to ascertain the total obligation of
the parties. At this point, it becomes necessary to consider the decision in Collection Case No. 8364 on the parties’
obligation to Metrobank. To repeat, Metrobank filed Collection Case No. 8364 against Ladtek, RGC, Gervel and Qua to
collect Ladtek’s unpaid loan.

RGC and Gervel assail the Court of Appeals’ consideration of the decision in Collection Case No. 8364 34 because Qua did
not offer the decision in evidence during the trial in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643 subject of this petition. RTC-Branch
6235 rendered the decision in Collection Case No. 8364 on 21 November 1996 while Qua filed his Notice of Appeal of the 3
May 1996 Order on 19 June 1996. Qua could not have possibly offered in evidence the decision in Collection Case No. 8364
because RTC-Branch 62 rendered the decision only after Qua elevated the present case to the Court of Appeals. Hence, Qua
submitted the decision in Collection Case No. 8364 during the pendency of the appeal of Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643 in
the Court of Appeals.

As found by RTC-Branch 62, RGC, Gervel and Qua’s total obligation was P14,200,854.37 as of 31 October 1987. 36During
the pendency of Collection Case No. 8364, RGC and Gervel paid Metrobank P7 million. Because of the payment,
Metrobank executed a quitclaim37 in favor of RGC and Gervel. By virtue of Metrobank’s quitclaim, RTC-Branch 62
dismissed Collection Case No. 8364 against RGC and Gervel, leaving Ladtek and Qua as defendants. Considering that RGC
and Gervel paid only P7 million out of the total obligation of P14,200,854.37, which payment was less than RGC and
Gervel’s combined shares in the obligation, 38 it was clearly partial payment. Moreover, if it were full payment, then the
obligation would have been extinguished. Metrobank would have also released Qua from his obligation.

RGC and Gervel also made partial payment to PDCP. Proof of this is the Release from Solidary Liability that PDCP
executed in RGC and Gervel’s favor which stated that their payment of P1,730,543.55 served as "full payment of their
corresponding proportionate share" in Ladtek’s foreign currency loan. 39 Moreover, PDCP filed a collection case against Qua
alone, docketed as Civil Case No. 2259, in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 150. 40

Since they only made partial payments, RGC and Gervel should clearly and convincingly show that their payments to
Metrobank and PDCP exceeded their proportionate shares in the obligations before they can seek reimbursement from Qua.
This RGC and Gervel failed to do. RGC and Gervel, in fact, never claimed that their payments exceeded their shares in the
obligations. Consequently, RGC and Gervel cannot validly seek reimbursement from Qua.

Whether there was novation of the Agreements

RGC and Gervel contend that there was no novation of the Agreements. RGC and Gervel further contend that any novation
of the Agreements is immaterial to this case. RGC and Gervel disagreed with the Court of Appeals on the effect of the
"implied novation" which supposedly transpired in this case. The Court of Appeals found that "there was an implied
novation or substantial incompatibility in the mode or manner of payment by the surety from the entire obligation, to one
merely of proportionate share." RGC and Gervel claim that if it is true that an implied novation occurred, then the effect
"would be to release respondent (Qua) as the entire obligation is considered extinguished by operation of law." Thus, Qua
should now reimburse RGC and Gervel his proportionate share under the surety agreements.

Novation extinguishes an obligation by (1) changing its object or principal conditions; (2) substituting the person of the
debtor; and (3) subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. Article 1292 of the Civil Code clearly provides that in
order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitutes the same, it should be declared in unequivocal
terms, or that the old and new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other. 41Novation may either be extinctive
or modificatory. Novation is extinctive when an old obligation is terminated by the creation of a new obligation that takes
the place of the former. Novation is merely modificatory when the old obligation subsists to the extent it remains compatible
with the amendatory agreement.42

We find that there was no novation of the Agreements. The parties did not constitute a new obligation to substitute the
Agreements. The terms and conditions of the Agreements remain the same. There was also no showing of complete
incompatibility in the manner of payment of the parties’ obligations. Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ ruling, the mode or
manner of payment by the parties did not change from one for the entire obligation to one merely of proportionate share. The
creditors, namely Metrobank and PDCP, merely proceeded against RGC and Gervel for their proportionate shares
only.43 This preference is within the creditors’ discretion which did not necessarily affect the nature of the obligations as well
as the terms and conditions of the Agreements. A creditor may choose to proceed only against some and not all of the
solidary debtors. The creditor may also choose to collect part of the debt from some of the solidary debtors, and the
remaining debt from the other solidary debtors.

In sum, RGC and Gervel have no legal basis to seek reimbursement from Qua. Consequently, RGC and Gervel cannot
validly foreclose the pledge of Qua’s GMC shares of stock which secured his obligation to reimburse. 44Therefore, the
foreclosure of the pledged shares of stock has no leg to stand on.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision dated 6 March 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
54737 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155110. March 31, 2005

HABAGAT GRILL Through LOUIE BIRAOGO, Proprietor/Manager vs. DMC-URBAN PROPERTY

DEVELOPER, INC.,

The Facts

The antecedents were ably summarized by the CA as follows:

"On June 11, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. acquired and became the owner of a residential lot situated in Matina, Davao
City and covered by TCT No. T-82338. This lot shall henceforth be called the lot in question. On June 13, 1981, David M.
Consunji, Inc. transferred said lot to its sister company, the DMC Urban Property Developers, Inc. (DMC) in whose favor
TCT No. T-279042 was issued. Alleging that Louie Biraogo forcibly entered said lot and built thereon the Habagat Grill in
December, 1993, DMC filed on March 28, 1994 a Complaint for Forcible Entry against Habagat Grill and/or Louie Biraogo.
The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1233-D-94 in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, in Davao City.
The Complaint alleged that as owner DMC possessed the lot in question from June 11, 1981 until December 1, 1993; that on
that day, December 1, 1993, Louie Biraogo, by means of strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered into the lot in question and
constructed the Habagat Grill thereon, thus illegally depriving DMC of the possession of said lot since then up to the present;
that the reasonable rental value of said lot is ₱10,000.00 a month.

"Louie Biraogo in his Answer denied illegally entering the lot in question. He averred that Habagat Grill was built in 1992
inside Municipal Reservation No. 1050 (Presidential Proclamation No. 20) and so DMC has no cause of action against him.
Since one of the vital issues in the case was the location of Habagat Grill, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities constituted a
team composed of three members, one a Geodetic Engineer representing the DMC, another Geodetic Engineer representing
Biraogo and the third from the DENR which was tasked with the duty of determining where precisely was Habagat Grill
located, on the lot in question or on Municipal Reservation No. 1050. Biraogo was directed by the court to furnish the team
with a copy of Municipal Reservation No. 20. Biraogo never complied. Worse, his designated Geodetic Engineer Panfilo
Jayme never took oath as such and did not participate in the Relocation survey. The ones who conducted the survey were
Engr. Edmindo Dida of the DENR and Engr. Jose Cordero, DMC’s representative. After conducting the relocation survey on
March 30, 1998, engineers Dida and Cordero submitted their report to the Court specifically stating that the Habagat Grill
Restaurant was occupying 934 square meters of the lot in question.

"After necessary proceedings, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered a Decision on August 6, 1998 dismissing the case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. DMC appealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial
Court and the same was docketed in Branch 12, in Davao City as Civil Case No. x x x 26,860.98. On February 16, 1999, said
court rendered judgment affirming the appealed Decision. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but was denied in the
court’s Order dated April 21, 1999."5

Consequently, respondent interposed an appeal to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Granting respondent’s appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the court of origin had jurisdiction over the Complaint for
Forcible Entry.6 The CA gave greater weight to the testimony of respondent’s real property manager, Bienamer Garcia, that
Habagat Grill had been built on December 1, 1993. 7 The appellate court opined that his testimony was credible, because he
had personal knowledge of the facts he had testified to -- it was his task to know such matters. On the other hand, it was not
clear in what capacity petitioner’s witness, Samuel Ruiz, came to know of the facts he had testified to. 8 The CA further held
that the minutes of the Urban Planning and Economic Development hearings -- submitted by petitioner to prove the
construction of Habagat Grill in 1992 -- were immaterial, as these referred to another establishment. 9

The CA faulted petitioner for not presenting any other documentary evidence to establish the date of Habagat Grill’s
construction.10 It added that the court of origin had improperly adjudged the subject property as part of the public domain.
The appellate court explained that the lower court could take cognizance of Presidential Proclamation No. 20, but not of the
situational relation between the property covered by the Proclamation and the land in question. The CA further criticized
petitioner for not presenting any evidence to show the basis of the latter’s alleged authority to build Habagat Grill on the
property.11

Hence, this Petition.12

The Issues

In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

"1. That, with due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Honorable Court of First Level has
no jurisdiction over this case as petitioner’s possession and occupation of the lot where Habagat Grill was constructed on the
subject premises was yet in 1992 or for more than one (1) year prior to the filing of this case on April 7, 1994 and that
respondent’s predecessor (David M. Consunji, Inc.) had not been in prior and physical possession of the subject premises, as
a matter of fact, it failed to allege the same in its Complaint in this case; and

"2. That, with due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Complaint of respondent’s
predecessor (David M. Consunji, Inc.) in this case failed to state a valid cause of action as the lot referred to therein is not
particularly described and is different from the lot on which the Habagat Grill was constructed." 13

Simplified, the issues are (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the case, and (2) whether respondent alleged a sufficient
cause of action in its Complaint.

This Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:

Jurisdiction

Petitioner argues that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, because mere allegation of ownership did
not, by itself, show that respondent had prior possession of the property. 14

We disagree. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. 15 As long as these
allegations demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction
over the subject matter. This principle holds, even if the facts proved during the trial do not support the cause of action thus
alleged, in which instance the court -- after acquiring jurisdiction -- may resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of
evidence.

The necessary allegations in a Complaint for ejectment are set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which
reads thus:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person
deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or
assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs.

In the present case, the Complaint filed before the trial court on March 28, 1994, stated:

"2. That [respondent] had been in lawful and peaceful possession of a residential lot at Tulip Drive, Ecoland and Subdivision
covered by TCT T-82338 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City being owner thereof, since June 11, 1981, until the day and
incident in the following paragraph hereof.

"3. That on or about December 1, 1993, [petitioner] by means of strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered and occupied a
portion of said residential lot and constructed what is now known as the ‘Habagat Grill’, thereby illegally depriving
[respondent] of the possession of the premises."16

Notably, petitioner alleged (1) prior possession, (2) deprivation thereof by strategy and stealth, and (3) the date such
unlawful deprivation started, which was less than one year from the filing of the Complaint. Considering the presence in the
Complaint of all the necessary allegations, 17 the trial court evidently acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
Date of Entry

Petitioner further contends that, as determined by the court of origin and the regional trial court, respondent has not adduced
preponderance of evidence to prove that this case was filed within the one-year prescriptive period. 18Petitioner presented the
testimony of a certain Samuel Ruiz and offered the minutes of the hearings conducted by the Urban Planning and Economic
Development (UPED) to prove that the construction of the Habagat Grill began in 1992. 19

Respondent counters that the CA properly relied on the testimony of the former’s real property manager, Bienamer Garcia,
as he had personal knowledge of the facts. 20 On the other hand, the two trial courts allegedly relied on the hearings conducted
by the UPED in resolving that petitioner had been in possession of the property since 1992. Respondent avers that those
hearings referred to a restaurant located 330 meters away, not to Habagat Grill. 21

The determination of the date of entry into the subject lot is a question of fact. This Court has held in a long line of cases that
the review of cases brought before it via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to errors of law. Findings of fact by the CA
are conclusive except in a number of instances, one of which is when its factual findings are contrary to those of the courts
below, as in the present case.22

The appellate court held that the minutes of the UPED hearing pertained to matters relating to a different establishment, the
Kawayan Restaurant.23 Thus, the UPED minutes did not have any material bearing on the resolution of the present case.
Consequently, the determination of the date of entry into the subject lot boils down to the appreciation of the testimonies of
Garcia and Ruiz.

"Preponderance of evidence" means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight
than that of the other.24 Where the evidence presented by one side is insufficient to ascertain the claim, there is no
preponderance of evidence. 25 In criminal cases in which the quantum of evidence required is greater than in civil cases, the
testimony of only one witness -- if credible, straightforward, and worthy of belief -- is sufficient to convict. 26 With more
reason then, Garcia’s testimony, if clear and positive, may be sufficient to establish respondent’s claim.

Under Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, among the facts and circumstances to be considered by the court in
determining which of the presented evidence has superior weight is the witnesses’ means and opportunity to know the facts
to which they testify.27

The extent of such means and opportunity are determined by the following considerations:

"First, the ‘Actor Rule.’ This rule maintains that a person’s recollection of his own acts and of the attendant circumstances is
more definite and trustworthy than another person’s recollection of it, especially if it was an act done in the performance of a
duty, or if the other person’s testimony is little more than an expression of opinion or judgment. Apart from comparative
tenacity of memory, the actor usually knows better than any one else what he did or did not do, and his testimony is
generally, but not always, entitled to superior weight on that account. Thus, the execution and attestation of a will or other
legal document may be so far regarded as the act of the lawyer who superintends the transactions and knows the formalities
required by law, and his testimony to the circumstances will generally outweigh that of a non-professional witness.

"The ‘Actor Rule’ has been applied in a multitude of admiralty cases and any other cases where a person’s testimony
concerning his own conduct conflicts with the testimony of a non-participating observer or with inconclusive inferences
from facts proved, especially where the ‘actor’ witness testifies to an act which the duties of his employment required him to
perform. But it said that the testimony of one who evidently speaks rather to his custom than to his acts on the particular
occasion will hardly suffice to put him in the category of those who are specially favored by the Actor Rule.

"Second, the witness who had the greater interest in noticing and remembering the facts is to be believed in preference to the
one that had a slighter interest to observe or was wholly indifferent. Interest has effect on the power of observation of
witness. Thus, it has been held that it was not remarkable that witnesses would not have observed traces of blood along the
route through which the deceased was taken because said witnesses had no reason to suspect that the crime was not
committed in the place where the dead body was found. Similarly, the failure of witnesses to notice whether or not there
were houses at the place where they say the accused maltreat the offended party was attributed as due to the fact that their
attention was concentrated to what they say, and they had no interest in knowing whether or not there were houses in or
around the place.

"Third, the witness who gives reasons for the accuracy of his observations is preferred to him who merely states the fact to
be so, without adverting to any circumstances showing that his attention was particularly called to it. Thus, the testimony of
the crew of a vessel that their light on the night of a collision was red, and nothing more, was easily overcome by testimony
of witnesses on the other vessel that the light was white, not red, and that fact was a matter of remark among them when the
light was observed.

"Fourth, the witness in a state of excitement, fear, or terror is generally incapable of observing accurately. This is so
because, if men perceive the most insignificant facts in the most diverse ways, even when it is impossible that these facts
should produce on the observer any emotion preventing him from observing with absolute calm, even much more will their
impressions be diversified under circumstances calculated to produce in the onlookers excitement, fear or terror.
"Fifth, intoxication tends to impair accuracy both of observation and memory of a witness." 28 (Citations omitted)

Based on the foregoing criteria, the testimony of Garcia must be given greater weight, considering that it was his task -- as
the real property manager of respondent -- to know about matters involving the latter’s properties. In contrast, it was not
explained how Ruiz could be deemed competent and credible in his testimony as to those matters.

The lower courts dismissed the testimony of Garcia -- regardless of how clear, positive and straightforward it was -- solely
on the ground that he was not a disinterested witness. True, he was an employee of respondent; relationship, however, will
not by itself determine the true worth of one’s testimony. 29 The essential test is whether such testimony is disencumbered,
credible, and in accord with human experience. 30 It cannot easily be dismissed by the mere invocation of the witness’
relationship with respondent. In sum, we have no reason to disagree with the CA’s evaluation that, being credible, Garcia’s
direct testimony was sufficient to establish respondent’s claim that petitioner had entered the premises on December 1, 1993.

Second Issue:

Cause of Action

Petitioner avers that no cause of action was alleged by respondent, as shown by the following circumstances: (1) the latter’s
property was not encroached upon by Habagat Grill, which had allegedly been constructed on a portion of land owned by the
City Government of Davao;31 and (2) respondent failed to prove that its predecessor-in-interest had prior possession of the
property.32

On the other hand, respondent argues that the trial court indiscriminately ignored the Report of the survey team that had been
constituted to determine the exact location of Habagat Grill. Respondent further contends that the trial court erred in taking
judicial notice of the metes and bounds of the property covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 20. 33 Although the lower
court may take judicial notice of PD No. 20, it may not do so in regard to the metes and bounds of Times Beach. Neither,
may it claim knowledge of the situational relation between the land in question and Times Beach.

Location of the Property

We agree with respondent. "Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on
without proof because they already know them." 34 Its object is to save time, labor and expense in securing and introducing
evidence on matters that are not ordinarily capable of dispute or actually bona fide disputed, and the tenor of which can
safely be assumed from the tribunal’s general knowledge or from a slight search on its part.

Indeed, municipal courts may take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the municipality in which they
sit.35 Such notice, however, is limited to what the law is and what it states. 36 As can be gleaned from its discussions, the trial
court took judicial notice of the existence of Presidential Proclamation No. 20, which declared Times Beach a recreation
center. The MTC also took judicial notice of the location of the beach, which was from the shoreline to the "road towards the
shoreline." On the basis of these premises, the trial court resolved that the lot on which petitioner’s restaurant was located
should necessarily be inside Times Beach, which was owned by the City of Davao. Hence, it was the City -- not respondent
-- that had a cause of action against petitioner. To arrive at this conclusion, the MTC made its own estimate of the location of
the metes and bounds of the property mentioned by the law. 37

The location of Habagat Grill cannot be resolved by merely taking judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 20; such
location is precisely at the core of the dispute in this case. Moreover, considering respondent’s allegation that the supposed
lot covered by the Ordinance has been lost due to inundation by the sea, we cannot fathom how the trial court could have
known of the actual location of the metes and bounds of the subject lot.

Neither may the MTC take discretionary judicial notice under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, because the exact
boundaries of the lot covered by that law are not a matter of public knowledge capable of unquestionable demonstration.
Neither may these be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

Hence, the CA was correct in disregarding the findings of the trial courts, because they had erred in taking judicial notice of
the exact metes and bounds of the property. The appellate court aptly relied on the Report submitted by the survey team that
had been constituted by the trial court, precisely for the purpose of determining the location of Habagat Grill in relation to
respondent’s lot.

Prior Possession

Finally, petitioner avers that respondent failed to prove that the latter’s predecessor-in-interest had prior possession of the
property.38 Conversely, respondent alleges that its predecessor was in prior physical possession of the property as the
registered owner thereof since June 11, 1981.39 Again, we rule for respondent.
There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to physical or material possession of the premises; that is,
to possession de facto, not possession de jure? Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not involved in the
action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. 40

The two forms of ejectment suits -- forcible entry or unlawful detainer -- may be distinguished from each other mainly by the
fact that in forcible entry, the plaintiffs must prove that they were in prior possession of the premises until they were
deprived thereof by the defendant; in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession. 41

Spouses Benitez v. CA42 has held that possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a
thing is subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.

Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. "These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples
of these are donations, succession, x x x execution and registration of public instruments, and the inscription of possessory
information titles."43 For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation 44 of every
square inch of the property at all times. In the present case, prior possession of the lot by respondent’s predecessor was
sufficiently proven by evidence of the execution and registration of public instruments and by the fact that the lot was subject
to its will from then until December 1, 1993, when petitioner unlawfully entered the premises and deprived the former of
possession thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the challenged Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148372               June 27, 2005

CLARION PRINTING HOUSE, INC., and EULOGIO YUTINGCO vs. THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division) and MICHELLE MICLAT

Respondent Michelle Miclat (Miclat) was employed on April 21, 1997 on a probationary basis as marketing assistant with a
monthly salary of ₱6,500.00 by petitioner Clarion Printing House (CLARION) owned by its co-petitioner Eulogio Yutingco.
At the time of her employment, she was not informed of the standards that would qualify her as a regular employee.

On September 16, 1997, the EYCO Group of Companies of which CLARION formed part filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) a "Petition for the Declaration of Suspension of Payment, Formation and Appointment of
Rehabilitation Receiver/ Committee, Approval of Rehabilitation Plan with Alternative Prayer for Liquidation and
Dissolution of Corporation"1 the pertinent allegations of which read:

xxx

5. The situation was that since all these companies were sister companies and were operating under a unified and
centralized management team, the financial requirements of one company would normally be backed up or
supported by one of the available fundings from the other companies.

6. The expansion exhausted the cash availability of Nikon, NKI, and 2000 because those fundings were absorbed
by the requirements of NPI and EYCO Properties, Inc. which were placed on real estate investments. However, at
the time that those investments and expansions were made, there was no cause for alarm because the market
situation was very bright and very promising, hence, the decision of the management to implement the expansion.

7. The situation resulted in the cash position being spread thin. However, despite the thin cash positioning, the
management still was very positive and saw a very viable proposition since the expansion and the additional
investments would result in a bigger real estate base which would be very credible collateral for further
expansions. It was envisioned that in the end, there would be bigger cash procurement which would result in
greater volume of production, profitability and other good results based on the expectations and projections of the
team itself.

8. Unfortunately, factors beyond the control and anticipation of the management came into play  which caught the
petitioners flat-footed, such as:

a) The glut in the real estate market which has resulted in the bubble economy for the real estate
demand which right now has resulted in a severe slow down in the sales of properties;
 b) The economic interplay consisting of the inflation and the erratic changes in the peso-
dollarexchange rate which precipitated a soaring banking interest.

c) Labor problems that has precipitated adverse company effect on the media and in the financial
circuit.

d) Liberalization of the industry (GATT) which has resulted in flooding the market with imported

goods;

e) Other related adverse matters.

9. The inability of the EYCO Group of Companies to meet the obligations as they fall due on the schedule agreed
with the bank has now become a stark reality. The situation therefore is that since the obligations would not be met
within the scheduled due date, complications and problems would definitely arise that would impair
and affect the operations of the entire conglomerate comprising the EYCO Group of Companies.

xxx

12. By virtue of this development, there is a need for suspension of all accounts o[r] obligations incurred by the
petitioners in their separate and combined capacities in the meantime that they are working for the rehabilitation of
the companies that would eventually redound to the benefit of these creditors.

13. The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the present combined financial condition of the petitioners clearly
indicates that their assets are more than enough to pay off the credits.

x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)2

On September 19, 1997, the SEC issued an Order3 the pertinent portions of which read:

xxx

It appearing that the petition is sufficient in form and

substance, the corporate petitioners’ prayer for the creation ofmanagement or receivership committee and creditors’ approval 
of the proposed Rehabilitation Plan is hereby set forhearing on October 22, 1997 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon at the
SICD, SEC Bldg., EDSA, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City.

xxx

Finally, the petitioners are hereby enjoined from disposing any and all of their properties in any manner, whatsoever, except
in the ordinary course of business and from making any payment outside of the legitimate business expenses during the
pendency of the proceedings and as a consequence of the filing of the Petition, all actions, claims and proceedings against
herein petitioners pending before any court, tribunal, office board and/or commission are deemed SUSPENDED until further
orders from this Hearing Panel pursuant to the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of RCBC v. IAC et al., 213 SCRA
830 and BPI v. CA, 229 SCRA 223. (Underscoring supplied)

And on September 30, 1997, the SEC issued an Order 4 approving the creation of an interim receiver for the EYCO Group of
Companies.

On October 10, 1997, the EYCO Group of Companies issued to its employees the following Memorandum: 5

This is to formally announce the entry of the Interim Receiver Group  represented by SGV from today until October 22,
1997 or until further formal notice from the SEC.

This interim receiver group’s function is to make sure that all assets of the company are secured and accounted for both for
the protection of us and our creditors.

Their function will involve familiarization with the different processes and controls in our organization & keeping physical
track of our assets like inventories and machineries.

Anything that would be required from you would need to be in writing and duly approved by the top management in order
for us to maintain a clear line.

We trust that this temporary inconvenience will benefit all of us in the spirit of goodwill. Let’s extend our full cooperation to
them.
Thank you. (Underscoring supplied)

On October 22, 1997, the Assistant Personnel Manager of CLARION informed Miclat by telephone that her employment
contract had been terminated effective October 23, 1997. No reason was given for the termination.

The following day or on October 23, 1997, on reporting for work, Miclat was informed by the General Sales Manager that
her termination was part of CLARION’s cost-cutting measures.

On November 17, 1997, Miclat filed a complaint6 for illegal dismissal against CLARION and Yutingco (petitioners) before
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

In the meantime, or on January 7, 1998, the EYCO Group of Companies issued a Memorandum 7 addressed to company
managers advising them of "a temporary partial shutdown of some operations of the Company" commencing on January 12,
1998 up to February 28, 1998:

In view of the numerous external factors such as slowdown in business and consumer demand  and consistent with Art. 286
of the Revised Labor Code of the Philippines, we are constrained to go on a temporary partial shutdown of some operations
of the Company.

To implement this measure, please submit to my office through your local HRAD the list of those whom you will require to
report for work and their specific schedules. Upon revalidation and approval of this list, all those not in the list will not
receive any pay nor will it be credited against their VL.

Please submit the listing no later than the morning of Friday, January 09, 1998.

Shutdown shall commence on January 12, 1998 up to February 28, 1998, unless otherwise recalled at an earlier date.

Implementation of th[ese] directives will be done through your HRAD departments. (Underscoring supplied)

In her Position Paper8 dated March 3, 1998 filed before the labor arbiter, Miclat claimed that she was never informed of the
standards which would qualify her as a regular employee. She asserted, however, that she qualified as a regular employee
since her immediate supervisor even submitted a written recommendation in her favor before she was terminated without
just or authorized cause.

Respecting the alleged financial losses cited by petitioners as basis for her termination, Miclat disputed the same, she
contending that as marketing assistant tasked to receive sales calls, produce sales reports and conduct market surveys, a
credible assessment on production and sales showed otherwise.

In any event, Miclat claimed that assuming that her termination was necessary, the manner in which it was carried out was
illegal, no written notice thereof having been served on her, and she merely learned of it only a day before it became
effective.

Additionally, Miclat claimed that she did not receive separation pay, 13th month pay and salaries for October 21, 22 and 23,
1997.

On the other hand, petitioners claimed that they could not be faulted for retrenching some of its employees including Miclat,
they drawing attention to the EYCO Group of Companies’ being placed under receivership, notice of which was sent to its
supervisors and rank and file employees via a Memorandum of July 21, 1997; that in the same memorandum, the EYCO
Group of Companies advised them of a scheme for voluntary separation from employment with payment of severance pay;
and that CLARION was only adopting the "LAST IN, FIRST OUT PRINCIPLE" when it terminated Miclat who was
relatively new in the company.

Contending that Miclat’s termination was made with due process, petitioners referred to the EYCO Group of Companies’
abovesaid July 21, 1997 Memorandum which, so they claimed, substantially complied with the notice requirement, it having
been issued more than one month before Miclat was terminated on October 23, 1997.

By Decision9 of November 23, 1998, the labor arbiter found that Miclat was illegally dismissed and directed her
reinstatement. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent
to reinstatecomplainant to her former or equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and benefits and to pay her
backwages, from the time of dismissal to actual reinstatement, proportionate 13th month pay and two (2)
days salary computed as follows:

a.1) Backwages – 10/23/97 to 11/30/98

 ₱6,500.00 x 13.25 months = ₱86,125.00

a.2) Proportionate 13th month pay

1/12 of ₱86,125 = 7,177.08

b) 13th month pay - 1997

=₱6,500 x 9.75 months/12 = 5,281.25

c) Two days salary

=₱6,500/26 x 2 days = 500.00

TOTAL ₱ 99,083.33

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to which petitioners appealed, they argued that: 10

1. [CLARION] was placed under receivership thereby evidencing the fact that it sustained business losses to
warrant the termination of [Miclat] from her employment.

2. The dismissal of [Miclat] from her employment having been effected in accordance with the law and in good
faith, [Miclat] does not deserve to be reinstated and paid backwages, 13th month pay and two (2) days salary.

And petitioners pointed out that CLARION had expressed its decision to shutdown its operations by Memorandum 11of
January 7, 1998 to its company managers.

Appended to petitioners’ appeal before the NLRC were photocopies of their balance sheets from 1997 to November 1998
which they claimed to "unanimously show that x x x [petitioner] company experienced business reverses which were made
the basis x x x in retrenching x x x."12

By Resolution13 of June 17, 1999, the NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision. The pertinent portion of the NLRC
Resolution reads:

There are three (3) valid requisites for valid retrenchment: (1) the retrenchment is necessary to prevent losses and such losses
are proven; (2) written notices to the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month
prior to the intended date of retrenchment; and (3) payment of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least ½
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. The two notices are mandatory. If the notice to the workers is later
than the notices sent to DOLE, the date of termination should be at least one month from the date of notice to the workers.

In Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers Philippine Labor Union Association (PLUA-NACUSIP) and
National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Court had the occasion to set forth four standards which would justify
retrenchment, being, firstly, - the losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent. If the loss
purportedly sought to be forestalled by retrenchment is clearly shown to be insubstantial and inconsequential in character,
the bona fide nature of the retrenchment would appear to be seriously in question; secondly, - the substantial loss
apprehended must be reasonably imminent, as such imminence can be perceived objectively and in good faith by the
employer. There should, in other words, be a certain degree of urgency for the retrenchment, which is after all a drastic
course with serious consequences for the livelihood of the employees retired or otherwise laid-off; thirdly, - because of the
consequential nature of retrenchment, it must be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses.
The employer should have taken other measures prior or parallel to retrenchment to forestall losses, i.e., cut other cost than
labor costs; and lastly, - the alleged losses if already realized and the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, must
be proven by sufficient and convincing evidence.

The records show that these requirements were not substantially complied with. And proofs presented by respondents-
appellants were short of being sufficient and convincing to justify valid retrenchment. Their position must therefore fail. The
reason is simple. Evidences on record presented fall short of the requirement of substantial, sufficient and convincing
evidence to persuade this Commission to declare the validity of retrenchment espoused by respondents-appellants.  The
petition before the Securit[ies] and Exchange Commission for suspension of payment does not prove anything to come
within the bounds of justifying retrenchment. In fact, the petition itself lends credence to the fact that retrenchment was not
actually reinstated under the circumstances prevailing when it stated, " The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the present
combined financial condition of the petitioners clearly indicates that their assets are more than enough to pay off the
credits." Verily, reading further into the petition, We are not ready to disregard the fact that the petition merely seeks to
suspend payments of their obligation from creditor banks and other financing institutions, and not because of imminent
substantial financial loss. On this account, We take note of paragraph 7 of the petition which stated: " The situation resulted
in cash position being spread thin. However, despite the thin cash positioning, the management was very positive and saw a
very viable proposition since the expansion and the additional investments would result in a bigger real estate base which
would be a very credible collateral for further expansions. It was envisioned that in the end, there would a bigger cash
procurement which would result in greater volume of production, profitability and other good results based on the
expectations and projections of the team itself." Admittedly, this does not create a picture of retrenchable business
atmosphere pursuant to Article 283 of the Labor Code.

We cannot disregard the fact that respondent-appellants failed in almost all of the criteria set by law and jurisprudence in
justifying valid retrenchment. The two (2) mandatory notices were violated. The supposed notice to the DOLE (Annex "4,"
List of Employees on Shutdown) is of no moment, the same having no bearing in this case. Herein complainant-appellee was
not even listed therein and the date of receipt by DOLE, that is, January 18, 1999, was way out of time in relation to this
case. And no proof was adduced to evidence cost cutting measures, to say the least. Nor was there proof shown that
separation pay had been awarded to complainant-appellee.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding no grave abuse of discretion on the findings of Labor Arbiter Nieves V. De
Castro, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit.

The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC resolution having been denied by Resolution 14 of July 29, 1999,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari15 before the Court of Appeals (CA) raising the following arguments:

1. PETITIONER CLARION WAS PLACED UNDER RECEIVERSHIP THEREBY EVIDENCING THE FACT

THAT IT SUSTAINED BUSINESS LOSSES TO WARRANT THE TERMINATION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT MICLAT FROM HER EMPLOYMENT.

2. THE DISMISSAL OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICLAT FROM HER EMPLOYMENT HAVING

BEEN EFFECTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW AND IN GOOD FAITH, PRIVATE RESPONDENT
DOES NOT DESERVE TO BE REINSTATED AND PAID BACKWAGES, 13th MONTH PAY AND TWO (2)
DAYS SALARY. (Underscoring supplied)

By Decision16 of November 24, 2000, the CA sustained the resolutions of the NLRC in this wise:

In the instant case, Clarion failed to prove its ground for retrenchment as well as compliance with the mandated procedure
of furnishing the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment (hereafter, DOLE) with one (1) month written
notice and payment of separation pay to the employee.  Clarion’s failure to discharge its burden of proof is evident from the
following instances:

First, Clarion presented no evidence whatsoever before the Labor Arbiter. To prove serious business
losses, Clarion presented its 1997 and 1998 financial statements and the SEC Order for the Creation of an Interim
Receiver, for the first time on appeal before the NLRC. The Supreme Court has consistently disallowed such
practice unless the party making the belated submission of evidence had satisfactorily explained the delay. In the
instant case, said financial statements are not admissible in evidence due to Clarion’s failure to explain the delay.

Second, even if such financial statements were admitted in evidence, they would not alter the outcome of the case
as statements have weak probative value. The required method of proof in such case is the presentation of financial
statements prepared by independent auditors and not merely by company accountants. Again, petitioner failed in
this regard.

Third, even audited financial statements are not enough. The employer must present the statement for the year
immediately preceding the year the employee was retrenched, which Clarion failed to do in the instant case, to
prove not only the fact of business losses but more importantly, the fact that such losses were substantial,
continuing and without immediate prospect of abatement. Hence, neither the NLRC nor the courts must blindly
accept such audited financial statements. They must examine and make inferences from the data presented to
establish business losses. Furthermore, they must be cautioned by the fact that "sliding incomes" or decreasing
gross revenues alone are not necessarily business losses within the meaning of Art. 283 since in the nature of
things, the possibility of incurring losses is constantly present in business operations.

Last, even if business losses were indeed sufficiently proven, the employer must still prove that retrenchment was
resorted to only after less drastic measures  such as the reduction of both management and rank-and-file bonuses
and salaries, going on reduced time, improving manufacturing efficiency, reduction of marketing and advertising
costs, faster collection of customer accounts, reduction of raw materials investment and others, have been tried and
 found wanting. Again, petitioner failed to prove the exhaustion of less drastic measures short of retrenchment as it
had failed with the other requisites.

It is interesting to note that Miclat started as a probationary employee on 21 April 1997. There being no stipulation to the
contrary, her probation period had a duration of six (6) months from her date of employment. Thus, after the end of the
probation period on 22 October 1997, she became a regular employee as of 23 October 1997 since she was allowed to work
after the end of said period. It is also clear that her probationary employment was not terminated at the end of the probation
period on the ground that the employee failed to qualify in accordance with reasonable standards made known to her at the
time of engagement.

However, 23 October 1997 was also the day of Miclat’s termination from employment on the ground of retrenchment.
Thus, we have a bizarre situation when the first day of an employee’s regular employment was also the day of her
termination. However, this is entirely possible, as had in fact happened in the instant case, where the employer’s basis for
termination is Art. 288, instead of Art. 281 of the Labor Code. If petitioner terminated Miclat with Art. 281 in mind, it would
have been too late to present such theory at this stage and it would have been equally devastating for petitioner had it done so
because no evidence exists to show that Miclat failed to qualify with petitioner’s standards for regularization. Failure to
discharge its burden of proof would still be petitioner’s undoing.

Whichever way We examine the case, the conclusion is the same – Miclat was illegally dismissed. Consequently,
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and full backwages from date of dismissal on 23 October 1997 until actual
reinstatement is in order.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the 29 July 1999 and 7 June 1999 resolutions of the NLRC
are SUSTAINED. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By Resolution17 of May 23, 2001, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the decision.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contending that:

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE
ASSAILED DECISIONS OF HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION:

A. HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICLAT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED; and

B. ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICLAT TO HER FORMER

OR EQUIVALENT POSITION WITHOUT LOSS OF SENIORITY RIGHTS AND BENEFITS AND
PAYMENT OF BACKWAGES, 1[3]th MONTH PAY AND TWO (2) DAYS SALARY.18

Petitioners argue that the conclusion of the CA that no sufficient proof of financial losses on the part of CLARION was
adduced is patently erroneous, given the serious business reverses it had gravely suffered as reflected in its financial
statements/balance sheets, thereby leaving as its only option the retrenchment of its employees including Miclat. 19

Petitioners further argue that when a company is under receivership and a receiver is appointed to take control of its
management and corporate affairs, one of the evident reasons is to prevent further losses of said company and protect its
remaining assets from being dissipated; and that the submission of financial reports/statements prepared by independent
auditors had been rendered moot and academic, the company having shutdown its operations and having been placed under
receivership by the SEC due to its inability to pay or comply with its obligations. 20

Respecting the CA’s holding that the financial statements CLARION submitted for the first time on appeal  before the NLRC
are inadmissible in evidence due to its failure to explain the delay in the submission thereof, petitioners lament the CA’s
failure to consider that technical rules on evidence prevailing in the courts are not controlling in proceedings before the
NLRC which may consider evidence such as documents and affidavits submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. 21

As to the CA’s holding that CLARION failed to prove the exhaustion of less drastic measures short of retrenching,
petitioners advance that prior to the termination of Miclat, CLARION, together with the other companies under the EYCO
Group of Companies, was placed under receivership during which drastic measures to continue business operations of the
company and eventually rehabilitate itself were implemented. 22

Denying Miclat’s entitlement to backwages, petitioners proffer that her dismissal rested upon a valid and authorized cause.
And petitioners assail as grossly erroneous the award of 13th month pay to Miclat, she not having sought it and, therefore,
there was no jurisdiction to award the same.23

The petition is partly meritorious.

Contrary to the CA’s ruling, petitioners could present evidence for the first time on appeal to the NLRC. It is well-settled
that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technical rules of
procedure are not binding in labor cases.

The settled rule is that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal as technical rules of evidence are not
binding in labor cases. In fact, labor officials are mandated by the Labor Code to use every and  all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the
interest of due process. Thus, in Lawin Security Services v. NLRC, and Bristol Laboratories Employees’ Association-DFA v.
NLRC, we held that even if the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was duly introduced on appeal
to the NLRC is enough basis for the latter to be more judicious in admitting the same, instead of falling back on the mere
technicality that said evidence can no longer be considered on appeal. Certainly, the first course of action would be more
consistent with equity and the basic notions of fairness. (Italics in the original; citations omitted) 24

It is likewise well-settled that for retrenchment to be justified, any claim of actual or potential business losses must satisfy
the following standards: (1) the losses are substantial and not de minimis; (2) the losses are actual or reasonably imminent;
(3) the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and is likely to be effective in preventing expected losses; and (4) the alleged
losses, if already incurred, or the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, are  proven by sufficient and convincing
evidence.25 And it is the employer who has the onus of proving the presence of these standards.

Sections 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A (P.D. 902-A) ("reorganization of the securities and exchange commission
with additional powers and placing said agency under the administrative supervision of the office of the president"), 26 as
amended, read:

SEC. 5 In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws
and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:

xxx

(d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations declared in the state of suspension of payments in cases
where the corporation, partnership or association possesses sufficient property to cover all debts but foresees the
impossibility of meeting them when they respectively fall due or in cases where the corporation, partnership,
association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but is under the management of a Rehabilitation Receiver or
Management Committee created pursuant to this Decree.

SEC. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following powers:

xxx

(c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real and personal, which is the subject of the action pending before
the Commission in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court in such other cases whenever necessary in order to
preserve the rights of the parties-litigants and/or protect the interest of the investing public and creditors: Provided,
however, That the Commission may in appropriate cases, appoint a rehabilitation receiver  of corporations,
partnerships or other associations not supervised or regulated by other government agencies who shall have, in
addition to powers of the regular receiver under the provisions of the Rules of Court, such functions and powers as
are provided for in the succeeding paragraph (d) hereof: x x x

(d) To create and appoint a management committee, board or body upon petition or motu propio to undertake the
management of corporations, partnership or other associations not supervised or regulated by other government agencies in
appropriate cases when there is imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of assets or other
properties or paralization of business operations of such corporations or entities which may be prejudicial to the
interest of minority stockholders, parties-litigants of the general public: x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

From the above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, the appointment of a receiver or management committee
by the SEC presupposes a finding that, inter alia, a company possesses sufficient property to cover all its debts but "foresees
the impossibility of meeting them when they respectively fall due" and "there is imminent danger of dissipation, loss,
wastage or destruction of assets of other properties or paralization of business operations."

That the SEC, mandated by law to have regulatory functions over corporations, partnerships or associations, 27appointed an
interim receiver for the EYCO Group of Companies on its petition in light of, as quoted above, the therein enumerated
"factors beyond the control and anticipation of the management" rendering it unable to meet its obligation as they fall due,
and thus resulting to "complications and problems . . . to arise that would impair and affect [its] operations . . ." shows that
CLARION, together with the other member-companies of the EYCO Group of Companies, was suffering business reverses
justifying, among other things, the retrenchment of its employees.

This Court in fact takes judicial notice of the Decision 28 of the Court of Appeals dated June 11, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
55208, "Nikon Industrial Corp., Nikolite Industrial Corp., et al. [including CLARION], otherwise known as the EYCO
Group of Companies v. Philippine National Bank, Solidbank Corporation, et al., collectively known and referred as the
‘Consortium of Creditor Banks,’" which was elevated to this Court via Petition for Certiorari and docketed as G.R. No.
145977, but which petition this Court dismissed by Resolution dated May 3, 2005:

Considering the joint manifestation and motion to dismiss  of petitioners and respondents dated February 24, 2003, stating
that the parties have reached a final and comprehensive settlement  of all the claims and counterclaims subject matter of the
case and accordingly, agreed to the dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition
for certiorari (Underscoring supplied).

The parties in G.R. No. 145977 having sought, and this Court having granted, the dismissal of the appeal of the therein
petitioners including CLARION, the CA decision which affirmed in  toto the September 14, 1999 Order of the SEC, the
dispositive portion of which SEC Order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is as it is hereby, granted and the Order dated 18 December 1998 is set
aside. The Petition to be Declared in State of Suspension of payments is hereby  disapproved and the SAC Plan terminated.
Consequently, all committee, conservator/ receivers created pursuant to said Order are dissolved and discharged and all acts
and orders issued therein are vacated.

The Commission, likewise, orders the liquidation and dissolution of the appellee corporations. The case is hereby
remanded to the hearing panel below for that purpose.

x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

has now become final and executory. Ergo, the SEC’s disapproval of the EYCO Group of Companies’ "Petition for the
Declaration of Suspension of Payment . . ." and the order for the liquidation and dissolution of these companies including
CLARION, must be deemed to have been unassailed.

That judicial notice can be taken of the above-said case of Nikon Industrial Corp. et al. v. PNB et al., there should be no
doubt.

As provided in Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of
the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law
of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

which Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras interpreted as follows:

A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the
same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the
same court, and of public records on file in the same court. In addition judicial notice will be taken of the record,
pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of
the record of another case between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will also be taken of court personnel.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)29

In fine, CLARION’s claim that at the time it terminated Miclat it was experiencing business reverses gains more light from
the SEC’s disapproval of the EYCO Group of Companies’ petition to be declared in state of suspension of payment, filed
before Miclat’s termination, and of the SEC’s consequent order for the group of companies’ dissolution and liquidation.

This Court’s finding that Miclat’s termination was justified notwithstanding, since at the time she was hired on probationary
basis she was not informed of the standards that would qualify her as a regular employee, under Section 6, Rule I of the
Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code which reads:

SEC. 6. Probationary employment. There is probationary employment where the employee, upon his engagement, is made to
undergo a trial period during which the employer determines his fitness to qualify for regular employment, based on
reasonable standards made known to him at the time of engagement.

"Probationary employment shall be governed by the following rules:

xxx
(d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the employee the standards under
which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement.  Where no standards are made known to the
employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee" (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

she was deemed to have been hired from day one as a regular employee. 30

CLARION, however, failed to comply with the notice requirement provided for in Article 283 of the Labor Code, to wit:

ART. 283. CLOSURE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND REDUCTION OF PERSONNEL. – The employer may also terminate
the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses
or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the Ministry of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

This Court thus deems it proper to award the amount equivalent to Miclat’s one (1) month salary of ₱6,500.00 as nominal
damages to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. 31

Since Article 283 of the Labor Code also provides that "[i]n case of retrenchment to prevent losses, . . . the separation pay
shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay  for every year of service, whichever is
higher. . . , [a] fraction of at least six (6) months [being] considered one (1) whole year," this Court holds that Miclat is
entitled to separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary.

As to Miclat’s entitlement to 13th month pay, paragraph 6 of the Revised Guidelines on the 13th Month Pay Law provides:

6. 13th Month Pay of Resigned or Separated Employee

An employee x x x whose services were terminated any time before the time for payment of the 13th month pay is entitled to
this monetary benefit in proportion to the length of time he worked during the calendar year up to the time of his resignation
or termination from the service. Thus if he worked only from January up to September his proportionate 13th month pay
shall be equivalent to 1/12 of his total basic salary he earned during that period.

xxx

Having worked at CLARION for six months, Miclat’s 13th month pay should be computed as follows:

(Monthly Salary x 6 ) / 12 = Proportionate 13th month pay

(₱6,500.00 x 6) / 12 = ₱3,250.00

With the appointment of a management receiver in September 1997, however, all claims and proceedings against
CLARION, including labor claims, 32 were deemed suspended during the existence of the receivership. 33 The labor arbiter,
the NLRC, as well as the CA should not have proceeded to resolve respondent’s complaint for illegal dismissal and should
instead have directed respondent to lodge her claim before the then duly-appointed receiver of CLARION. To still require
respondent, however, at this time to refile her labor claim against CLARION under the peculiar circumstances of the case —
that 8 years have lapsed since her termination and that all the arguments and defenses of both parties were already ventilated
before the labor arbiter, NLRC and the CA; and that CLARION is already in the course of liquidation — this Court deems it
most expedient and advantageous for both parties that CLARION’s liability be determined with finality, instead of still
requiring respondent to lodge her claim at this time before the liquidators of CLARION which would just entail a mere
reiteration of what has been already argued and pleaded. Furthermore, it would be in the best interest of the other creditors of
CLARION that claims against the company be finally settled and determined so as to further expedite the liquidation
proceedings. For the lesser number of claims to be proved, the sooner the claims of all creditors of CLARION are processed
and settled.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals November 24, 2000 Decision, together with its May 23, 2001 Resolution, is SET
ASIDE and another rendered declaring the legality of the dismissal of respondent, Michelle Miclat. Petitioners are
ORDERED, however, to PAY her the following in accordance with the foregoing discussions:

1) ₱6,500.00 as nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process;

2) ₱6,500.00 as separation pay; and

3) ₱3,250.00 as 13th month pay.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the SEC Hearing Panel charged with the liquidation and dissolution of petitioner
corporation for inclusion, in the list of claims of its creditors, respondent Michelle Miclat’s claims, to be satisfied in
accordance with Article 110 of the Labor Code in relation to the Civil Code provisions on Concurrence and Preference of
Credits.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.