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GUIDELINE
PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
This revision of PTS 60.2209 – Hazards and Operability Study (HAZOP) (December 2010, Rev
2) has been updated to incorporate PETRONAS Lessons Learnt, Best Practice and new
information issued by relevant industry code and standards.
The previous version of this PTS 60.2209 (June 2006) will be removed from PTS binder/e-
repository from herein onwards.
The custodian of this PTS is: Manager - HSE MS, Standards & Regulations, GHSED.
Document Approval
Revision History
Date Version Description of Updates Author
Oct 2004 Original New PTS 60.153 HAZOP
Jun 2006 Rev 1 Renumbering from PTS 60.153 to PTS 60.2209
Dec 2010 Rev 2 PTS Periodically Review. Restructure flow of this PTS IWG HAZOP
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PREFACE
PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) publications reflect the views, at the time of
publication, of PETRONAS Group of Companies.
They are based on the experience acquired during the involvement with the design,
construction, operation and maintenance of processing units and facilities. Where
appropriate they are based on, or reference is made to, national and international standards
and codes of practice.
The objective is to set the recommended standard for good technical practice to be applied
by PETRONAS' Group of Companies in oil and gas production facilities, refineries, gas
processing plants, chemical plants, marketing facilities or any other such facility, and thereby
to achieve maximum technical and economic benefit from standardisation.
The information set forth in these publications is provided to users for their consideration and
decision to implement. This is of particular importance where PTS may not cover every
requirement or diversity of condition at each locality. The system of PTS is expected to be
sufficiently flexible to allow individual operating units to adapt the information set forth in PTS
to their own environment and requirements.
When Contractors or Manufacturers/Suppliers use PTS they shall be solely responsible for
the quality of work and the attainment of the required design and engineering standards. In
particular, for those requirements not specifically covered, the Principal will expect them to
follow those design and engineering practices which will achieve the same level of integrity
as reflected in the PTS. If in doubt, the Contractor or Manufacturer/Supplier shall, without
detracting from his own responsibility, consult the Principal or its technical advisor.
2) Other parties who are authorised to use PTS subject to appropriate contractual
arrangements.
Subject to any particular terms and conditions as may be set forth in specific agreements
with users, PETRONAS disclaims any liability of whatsoever nature for any damage
(including injury or death) suffered by any company or person whomsoever as a result of or
in connection with the use, application or implementation of any PTS, combination of PTS or
any part thereof. The benefit of this disclaimer shall inure in all respects to PETRONAS
and/or any company affiliated to PETRONAS that may issue PTS or require the use of PTS.
Without prejudice to any specific terms in respect of confidentiality under relevant contractual
arrangements, PTS shall not, without the prior written consent of PETRONAS, be disclosed
by users to any company or person whomsoever and the PTS shall be used exclusively for
the purpose they have been provided to the user. They shall be returned after use, including
any copies which shall only be made by users with the express prior written consent of
PETRONAS. The copyright of PTS vests in PETRONAS. Users shall arrange for PTS to be
held in safe custody and PETRONAS may at any time require information satisfactory to
PETRONAS in order to ascertain how users implement this requirement.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This document was jointly prepared with contribution from the following organizations:
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TABLE OF CONTENT
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1.0 INTRODUCTION OBJECTIVES
Each OPU / JV shall develop their site specific HAZOP procedures based on this PTS.
The objective of a HAZOP is to carry out a rigorous and systematic evaluation of process
systems with respect to operational safety and potential hazards with foreseeable
upsetting conditions. This can be summarized as follows:
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Figure 1.1: Time / Benefit / Cost Graph
1.3 SCOPE
The document shall be applied to the development, planning, implementation, follow up,
auditing and reviewing of all HAZOP study within PETRONAS Group of Companies
activities.
This scope encompasses all PETRONAS HCU / OPU / JV existing facilities and any
future developments
2.0 OVERVIEW
HSE management is a key consideration for all plant, driven both by company philosophy and
external requirements. New technologies and the trend towards complex integrated designs have
resulted in the need for more thorough and systematic methods to identify and assess hazards.
BRAINSTORM
CAUSE
DEVIATION
ASSESS
NO CAUSE
Is it possibly?
Is it likely?
YES
NO CONSEQUENCES
Can safeguards fail?
Does it matters?
YES
RECOMMENDATION
HAZOP represent one of the methods available to be applied in the Hazard Identification phase
of HEMP, which is the methodology employed to achieve demonstrably the HSE objectives which
are defined in, and to be managed by, the HSE MS. The relationship between this document and
its component parts and HSE MS is shown schematically in Figure 2.2
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Figure 2.2: HSEMS Relations with HAZOP
Procedures
Coarse Final
Main
HSE HAZID HAZOP
HAZOP HAZOP
Minor Change
Mini HAZOP
The selection of the nodes for a modification HAZOP should reflect the
interfaces with, and allow analysis of, the effects on the surrounding
systems.
The interfaces between the new and existing plant (tie-in points, etc) must
be sufficiently understood and documented so that the team can establish if
any hazards can cross the boundary.
The physical interfaces of the new with the existing installation shall be
clearly shown on the HAZOP drawings. Prior to the study the process
engineer shall analyse the extent to which the process parameters change
within the existing facilities due to the modification (including those that have
to be made to other systems to accommodate the new facilities, e.g.
changes in relief valve sizes). He shall mark up the HAZOP drawings
accordingly. Nodes should include all parts of the existing facilities where a
change in process conditions is caused as a result of the modification.
Likewise the operator shall analyse the applicability of existing procedures to
the modification and the applicability of any modified procedures to the
modifications as well as to the existing plant.
Sufficient design and operating information must be available for all common
systems (vents, drains, etc) as well as the existing plant local to the tie-in
points liable to be affected by the new development.
If the design codes and practices differ for the existing and new plant the
consequences must be fully understood and screened. A particular problem
with major modification projects is the potential compatibility problems
between old and new design codes and project standards. The scope of the
application of new codes and standards should be established as part of the
project philosophy. The HAZOP should focus on ensuring that the
philosophy is consistently applied across the modifications.
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The design must clearly identify and address intermediate operating modes
whilst the new plant is being constructed and commissioned. Sufficient
information must be available to the HAZOP team to assess the
intermediate operating mode risks.
A part from the normal HAZOP Technique or also known as the Continuous HAZOP,
there are other variation of HAZOP Technique for special cases or situations e.g. Batch
Process, Activity Base, Procedural and Instrumentation and Control.
The HAZOP method for batch processes deals with each part of the plant in
exactly the same manner as the more familiar method for continuous processes.
Differences occur when the team examines the changes in plant configuration as
the steps in the batch process are progressed.
The status of the system changes frequently and in order to perform an adequate
study, the valve positions and process conditions must be adequately described
for each separate stage. As these are normally cyclical operations, it may be
necessary to prepare diagrams showing the status of each line and vessel
throughout the process. Operating instructions, including logic diagrams or
instrument sequence diagrams, are essential in understanding the steps.
The activity HAZOP technique consists of the systematic critical search for
deviations and hazards applied to activities and the facilities involved in
operations. The technique examines sequences of mechanical and manual
handling operations. The study can be held at any time during the project phase,
the level of detail and study technique being dependent on the timing chosen.
Activity-based studies may however be required for the small number of
potentially difficult activities that are not continuous, and do not form a part of the
daily operations workload. Such activities may be:
Drilling
Unloading at a jetty
Well workover
Shutdown.
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The basic technique is the same as other HAZOPs. Specific activity guide words,
etc., are used. These include incorrect activity and the time/movement elements
of movement and early/late operation. Additional parameters included are: time,
decision and position
The recommendations from an activity HAZOP are not necessarily limited to the
operating procedures. Changes both to the design of the equipment and the
operating procedures may be suggested.
Procedural HAZOP meetings may include any operating procedure written for a
plant and may be conducted in addition to the normal HAZOP for that equipment
item or dealt with separately. They are usually conducted however on the
activities such as:
commissioning
pigging
inspections
start-up
maintenance
plant testing
safety critical operating procedures.
The standard guide words of No, More, Less, As Well As, Part of, Reverse and
Other Than take slightly different meanings. The results will specifically affect
the operating procedures and in some cases may have an impact on the design
of the equipment
Normal HAZOP does not identify all the potential I & C system related hazards
because the P&IDs give only the brief I & C system information. A more detailed
HAZOP on the I & C system will identify causes and consequences of I & C
system failure.
I & C HAZOP should be done after the normal HAZOP where more detailed
study of critical I & C loops identified during the P&ID HAZOP and Process
design is frozen following the Normal HAZOP therefore providing fixed functional
specification for I & C system.
Technique for the I & C HAZOP is similar to that for the conventional HAZOP and
also similar guidewords are used but on the control diagrams/specifications and
information are reviewed section by section. The result will affect design of the
control system and modifications are made if necessary.
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2.4 INTERFACE WITH THE HSE CASE
There is a relationship between a HAZOP study (or any other HEMP study) and an HSE
Case. This is best considered separately for existing facilities and new developments.
New developments
An HSE Case is likely to be planned for any significant new development. As a means of
commencing the process of compiling the HSE Case, but particularly part 5 - the Hazard
Register - an HAZID study may have been performed. Alternatively during the initial
design phase a separate study or process may have been put in place specifically to
collect information for the Hazard Register.
This information may thus be available to the HAZOP team as part of the information
pack, i.e. as an inventory of the HSE hazards pertinent to the development. It should be
noted however that the Hazard Register may not at this stage have identified all the
hazards inherent in the design, nor assessed the hazards in any significant depth.
There are no specific guidelines on the process of documenting the HSE Case as a
project design matures, however it is most likely that the HSE Case will evolve either
progressively or step-wise throughout the engineering phase, and be published around
the time of plant startup. The HSE Case (Hazard Register) may then contain reference to
HAZOP study findings, and/or transcribe/summarise from the HAZOP report information
on the safety critical equipment, systems and procedures, in order to comprehensively
demonstrate management of hazards. It may include such items as the sequential
analysis and protection measures discussed in the HAZOP report for a particular
deviation from design intent, i.e. where the consequence of that deviation presents
significant risk. The HAZOP study therefore is of one of the important information sources
for completion of HSE Case.
Existing Facilities
For existing facilities the compilation of a HSE Case may indeed be the cause of the
HAZOP study, i.e. as a means to demonstrate adequate assessment of the hazards
inherent to the process. In such situations the HSE Case will also refer to or transcribe
information from the HAZOP report. Even if this is not the case, the relationship between
HSE Case and HAZOP report is similar.
Modification Projects
Where a plant is undergoing modification or revamp, the HAZOP study should draw on
the HSE Case as part of the information pack, and similarly on completion of the study
the results of the HAZOP should be incorporated into the HSE Case.
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3.0 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A HAZOP TEAM
The HAZOP team shall consist of multi-disciplined personnel and the brainstorming procedure
relies on the broad experience of the team to identify potential hazards and operability problems.
A balanced team is required to provide an appropriate level of project/process knowledge coupled
with independent members providing relevant expertise.
A HAZOP team usually consists of five to eight people although a smaller team may be sufficient
for a small facility or a minor modification, and in these cases three to four is adequate. More may
be required in a hand-over meeting where two project teams are represented. This is often the
case for studies where there is some duplication in client and contractor representation.
If the team is too large, the group approach fails because so many people are trying to
communicate with one another and are inhibited from working closely. It is also highly
probable that a large team will result in high number of spectators in the team. On the other
hand, if the group is too small, it may lack the breadth of knowledge needed to help assure
completeness and creativity generated by interactions of multiple-disciplined members.
The main role of the HAZOP Leader can be broken down into the following sections:
Preparation
Facilitate the HAZOP study
Produce HAZOP report
Action response follow up
Competency
HAZOP leader shall have minimum competency requirement as follow but not limited to:
Experience
- Sufficient experience in the oil and gas industry or an equivalent process
industry, both in theoretical and practical application of the design and operation
of oil and gas production/processing facilities.
- Adequate knowledge of equipment, procedural and human failures that can lead
to major incidents, with a sound appreciation of process design and
safeguarding.
- Aware of technical standards and regulations
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Training
- Attended both the HAZOP and management techniques including a recognized
HAZOP leadership course, which meets requirements this PTS.
- Undergone mentoring with competent HAZOP leader.
- Appreciation of other risk assessment techniques.
Facilitation skills
- Hazard identification skill.
- Suitable application of the HAZOP methodology to identify significant hazards
and issues.
Time management skills
- Ability to plan the study in depth and estimate the time required for the HAZOP.
This includes maintaining the pace and momentum of study and suitable
allocation of time for deliberation of issues.
Communications/motivation skills
- Able to keep the team’s focus and working together and motivate all members of
the team.
- Form a good working relationship with the Scribe and supervise the Scribe's work
to ensure that adequate minutes are recorded.
Competency
HAZOP scribes should have training and experience similar to that required by the Leader.
The Scribe should also be able to take minutes in a concise and accurate manner using
plain language.
Competency
HAZOP team member should have minimum competency requirement as follow but not
limited to
Sufficient experience and knowledge of respective area and discipline both in theoretical
and practical application of the design and operation of the facility / unit under study.
At least one team member should have sound knowledge in codes, standards.
Adequate knowledge to anticipate potential equipment, procedural and human failures
operational with a sound appreciation of process design and safeguarding.
Detail description of function for individual discipline for HAZOP team member is
summarized in Appendix 2.
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4.0 HAZOP METHODOLOGY
4.1 PREPARATION
Activities that shall be carried out prior to HAZOP study sessions to ensure effectiveness of
the HAZOP study is described below:
HAZOP Leader shall select and determine the HAZOP team members. This is
normally based on the scope of HAZOP study. Appendix 2 provides a guideline on
selecting HAZOP team members.
HAZOP Leader should plan and schedule the study to optimize time and resources.
Required time to complete HAZOP of one PEFS depends on the complexity of the
facility. Correct estimation of HAZOP duration is important to ensure availability and
commitment of team members. If the study includes several operating modes this
will add significantly to the time required. The best assessment method is to estimate
the number of additional case nodes that will be studied and allow about half the
time of the original node for each one.
For identical process units / trains, the time estimation for the second and following
unit maybe reduced but specific issues shall be reviewed and addressed adequately
e.g. maintainability, interconnection between trains, equipment siting, preferential
flow. Typically, time frame for HAZOP can be estimated using table in Appendix 3.
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4.2 CONDUCTING HAZOP
The Typical HAZOP work flow is summarized in figure 4.1 below. The work flow is also
applicable for other HAZOP techniques e.g Batch Process, Activity Base, Procedural and
Instrumentation and Control.
No
Last Deviation?
Yes
No
Last Node?
Yes
END
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4.2.1 Establish Scope of HAZOP study
HAZOP leader shall establish the scope of the study, appropriate HAZOP technique
and the assumptions with agreement with team members to be applied throughout
the studies. Typical assumptions for HAZOP study is as follow but not limited to;
HAZOP Leader and with agreement with team members shall determine the
selection of the node sizes and the route through the system s before starting the
study.
The HAZOP Leader shall select the nodes based on the stage of the project life
cycle and the amount of information available.
HAZOP Leader should mark up the nodes in the document for differentiation and
assist the study.
HAZOP Leader with assistant with team member shall define and record the node
and its design intent.
The design intent should provide specific information on how the node will be
operated under all system operating conditions (described parameters such as
pressure, temperature, flow rate, level, etc.).
HAZOP team member should give a brief description of the design intent and also
specific hazard at the beginning of each node. Similarly they should give a brief step-
by-step description of start-up and shutdown actions before these topics are
addressed.
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4.2.4 Select Parameter and Deviation
HAZOP Leader shall select and record the parameter and deviation relevant to the
nodes, mode of operation and HAZOP technique applied.
Parameters and Deviations are the key to the HAZOP process. They are difference
from the design intent of the process and are identified by the systematic application
of the appropriate parameter/guide word combinations
Not all parameters are applicable to each node. A parameter may only be left out if
the Leader thinks fit. He should tell the team why it is not relevant, e.g. level on a
flow line.
Appendix 4 shows the list of parameters and guidewords normally used in various
types of HAZOP technique.
HAZOP Team shall identify and record all possible causes of a node guided by the
parameter and deviation selected.
The possible causes shall be within the node (Except for nodes at interfaces, battery
limit or beginning of a system), credible and specific in the description. Avoid double
jeopardy scenarios but not to be mistaken with latent failure.
Brainstorm and list all the possible cause before proceeding with the consequence
HAZOP Team shall assess and record the credible consequences of each cause by
assuming assume there is no safeguard in place.
The consequence statement shall consist of the initial system response to the worst
credible consequence. Consequence also can be upstream or downstream of the
node under study but not as detail as within node.
HAZOP Team shall identify and record the existing safeguards. The safeguards can
be within or outside the node (upstream or downstream)
Safeguard shall be able to address causes and consequences. E.g. alarms shall be
together with operator actions and must be adequate for the system.
Prevention - prevents deviation from happening (e.g., check valves, relief, trip
system)
Detection - detects causes or consequences (e.g., alarms)
Mitigation - control or reduce the consequences (e.g., ERP, Tank bund )
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4.2.8 Propose Recommendations
HAZOP Team shall propose and record recommendations when they feel that
existing safeguarding system is not adequate to protect the system under study. The
recommendation shall address the cause and the consequences.
The HAZOP Team should generate specific recommendations that address the risk
exposure, and be clear on what they consider to be the most appropriate option.
Recommendations can generally come in two forms:
HAZOP Leader should identify the responsible person and due date for any
recommendation(s) issued.
HAZOP discussion shall be recorded in HAZOP worksheet (See Appendix 5 for typical
HAZOP worksheet). The record shall complete & accurate. This includes recording all
deviation discussed even though the deviation does not cause significant consequences and
no recommendation generated.
HAZOP Leader shall prepare the HAZOP Report after completion of a study. The HAZOP
report is an important document describing the objectives and success of the whole study
and is used to compile and preserve the results of the study for future reference.
HAZOP final report format should follow reporting format as shown in Appendix 6. The draft
final report should be reviewed by team members prior to the formal and, timely issue.
HAZOP Final report shall be distributed to relevant parties affected by the HAZOP studies.
The relevant Facility/Project Owner for each HAZOP is accountable for the implementation
of the recommendations. The recommendations arising from the HAZOP study shall be
presented to the Facility/Project Owner by the HAZOP Leader or representative. This
provides an opportunity to challenge the recommendations and to agree on actions, assign
responsibilities and define priorities for implementation. Where the priority of a
recommendation is downgraded or the recommendation is rejected, this shall be supported
by a sound justification. Alternative recommendations shall be provided to justify rejection of
recommendations.
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Some of the HAZOP recommendations may require the MOC process be invoked. The
Facility/Project Owner shall ensure that the MOC system is applied for the agreed project
scope. If another alternative is being proposed or if the recommendation is cancelled upon
detailed study, this shall be formally documented by the Facility/Project Owner. This is
important to record the justification or assumptions.
At an established and agreed period after the recommendation has been implemented, the
Facility/Project Owner shall be responsible for assessing the effectiveness of the
recommendation (i.e. did it adequately address the risk?). If the recommendation is found to
be ineffective, remedial action shall be taken.
The Facility/Project Owner shall monitor the ongoing implementation of the safeguards. All
the recommendations arising from the HAZOP studies shall be tracked in accordance with
the Facility/Project Owner’s plan and progress reported to the HCU/OPU Management on a
regular basis. If recommendations cannot be implemented in a timely manner, the
Facility/Project Owner shall provide a rationale and revised timeframe to the HCU/OPU
Management.
5.0 ASSURANCE
HCU/OPUs shall assess the quality, adequacy, and effectiveness of the HAZOP study
through Assurance process. The purposes of the Assurance are to:
Determine whether HCU/OPU’s HAZOP procedures and practices are complete, up-to-
date and compliant with applicable governmental regulations, policies and good HSE
management practices.
Determine whether HAZOP study is conducted, effective, apply good engineering
practices and meet the requirements of the HAZOP methodology.
Determine the status and quality of HAZOP recommendations versus identified
objectives, goals and/or other targets.
6.0 GLOSSARY
A glossary of commonly used terms in HSE is given in both PTS 60.0101 HSE Management
Systems and PTS 60.0401 Hazards and Effects Management Process.
7.0 REFERENCE
The following references are considered to provide useful guidance to support the HAZOP
process.
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APPENDIX 1 – DETAILS OF HAZOP TYPES IN PROJECT LIFE CYCLE
HAZOP
Description Timing & Documentation Scope & Purpose Results
Types
This is a hazards and effects Described in PTS 60.2004 Hazards Described in PTS 60.2004 Described in PTS
identification technique using similar Identification (HAZID) Hazards Identification (HAZID) 60.2004 Hazards
analysis and brainstorming techniques Identification
to HAZOP, but designed to be used at (HAZID)
a much earlier stage in the project.
Concentrates on wider health, safety
and environmental issues with less of
HAZID a process focus. HAZID is included
here because it is complementary to
Coarse HAZOP and in certain
circumstances the two study types can
be combined.
This uses the full HAZOP The requirement for a coarse HAZOP The Coarse HAZOP would This project stage is
methodology but is intended to be is that the design has progressed to the usually be the first HAZOP study the most appropriate
used early in a project's life where point where the Process Flow Scheme for a project. It often represents time to call for
there is still the 'ability to change the (PFS) has been developed showing all the first opportunity for all the detailed QRA
design, operating and maintenance major lines and equipment. Typically design disciplines, project studies or other
policy'. The plant is divided into a this is at the end of the development management and operations to be supporting
small number of large nodes of the project's basis for design. The involved in a complete review of investigations.
appropriate for an early stage in the documents required are: the project. The key objective is Qualitative Risk
design development. to optimise the design and Analysis is helpful
This study has the objective of Process Flow Schemes (PFS) minimise any significant rework, in identifying the
making the plant inherently safe full mass balance information which would cause slippage of issues or giving
before many detailed engineering plot layout the schedule. All the project major concerns.
COARSE
decisions have been made. It is process description including all disciplines should have senior
HAZOP
particularly useful before the award operating modes representation and the
may be of particular use prior to the project definition including life- composition of the team is critical
letting of a design contract to ensure cycle issues and planned plant to the HAZOP's success. This
that the consultant/contractor is flexibility study presents the best
provided with a sound design. HSE policy opportunity to challenge many of
preliminary operating and the basic process assumptions
used in the design. It may be a
maintenance philosophy and
relatively short study applying the
product off-take constraints.
full HAZOP technique to large
nodes appropriate to the limited
engineering details that are
available
This study should be held at the end The study should be held at the end of The main HAZOP is the most The detailed report
of the project specification phase the project specification phase. The comprehensive study in the of the study should
(front end engineering phase) of a Process Engineering Flowsheets project and examines in great catalogue all the
project. Its objective is the assurance (PEFS) or Process and detail all aspects of the design. hazards identified
of the HSE safety of the current Instrumentation Diagram (P&IDs) and all areas where
design ('Will it Work?') rather than should almost be of Approved For there was
making radical recommendations for Design (AFD) quality and signed off insufficient
change. by the Project Manager as suitable for information or gaps
This is the primary HAZOP study for HAZOP purposes. Any changes to the in the knowledge of
MAIN any project using the full technique PEFS or P&IDs following this the team. It should
HAZOP and addressing all the details of the HAZOP should be covered by formal be remembered that
plant. Management of Cchange control the Main HAZOP is
objective is to look in detail at all procedures, which itself should usually too late to
aspects of the design, and the main potentially include a Minor Change start challenging
HAZOP will be the most (Mini-) HAZOP. basic concepts in the
comprehensive HAZOP study within The documents required are: design of the plant.
the project. Process Engineering Flowsheets
(PEFS) or P&IDs
Process Flowsheets (PFS)
Plot Plans
Cause and Effect Diagrams
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HAZOP
Description Timing & Documentation Scope & Purpose Results
Types
Process Safeguarding Drawings
Interconnection Diagrams and old
PEFS
legend details
Local population densities and
infrastructure, areas of particular
sensitivity (local rivers, marshes,
etc).
Operating Philosophy
HSE Safety Policy Philosophy
Evacuation Philosophy
previous HAZOP meeting
minutes/action lists
This study is held at the end of the The PEFS or P&IDs should be of pre- The concept is to extend the Main At the end of this
detailed design stage when drawings Approved For Construction (AFC) HAZOP, picking up on details meeting the design
are ready to Approve for standard and signed off as agreed for that were not available at the last should be frozen
Construction. The technique is the the HAZOP. Any changes to the meeting, and concentrating on the and the HAZOP
same as the Main HAZOP except that PEFS or P&IDs following this study changes to the design, and the exercise complete.
the study focuses on changes since the should use a Variation Change additional vendor details. This The AFC drawings
Main HAZOP, rather than reviewing Control (VCC) procedure which itself should be a shorter meeting than should be frozen
the agreed design. should include a Minor Change (Mini- the Main HAZOP but the time once the
FINAL
The final study is required to look at ) HAZOP required depends significantly on recommendations
HAZOP
changes made to the Approved For the quality of the AFD drawings of this study have
Design (AFD) drawings resulting used for the Main study and the been reviewed and
from the contractor's detailed design number and control of subsequent incorporated.
effort and the availability of vendor's design changes
information. The technique is the
same as the Main study but the team
is limited to looking at changes rather
than reviewing the agreed design
This study, usually linked to a The documents require are similar to It is necessary to carry out The detailed report
Management of Change control MAIN HAZOP but focus on the formally HAZOP studies for of the study should
procedure, can be applied at any stage change. minor changes to the drawings catalogue all the
in the design development or following the Main HAZOP. hazards identified
subsequent operation of the facility to Such a meeting would not require and all areas where
assess proposed changes or vendor the full team used for the Main there was
MINOR package details. The methodology is HAZOP but just the core insufficient
CHANGE similar to that of a HAZOP for a members involved in that area of information or gaps
MINI- brown-field development the plant. in the knowledge of
HAZOP A safety statement should be issued the team.
on each change to confirm that it does
not affect the safety of the main plant.
Several minor changes can be studied
together once the net effect is seen to
have a significant effect on the design
or operation of the plant.
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APPENDIX 2 – HAZOP TEAM MEMBER FUNCTIONS
HSE For many studies the HSE engineer is included in the core
Engineer/ team. If the project or process engineer is responsible for
specialist undertaking the QRA studies and assessing the overall
level of process risk, then part-time involvement of the P P P P P P P P
HSE engineer is adequate. He may provide the expertise to
the team on consequence assessment (flame length, etc)
and on historical failure probabilities.
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APPENDIX 4 – LIST OF PARAMETERS AND GUIDEWORDS
Guideline for Guideword Selection for Various Types of HAZOP
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APPENDIX 5 – SAMPLE GUIDEWORDS AND CAUSES
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PARAMETER GUIDEWORD EXAMPLES
HAZARDS: Toxicity , fire/explosion potential , high pressure , temperature ,
potential off-site impact, possible RMP worst case or alternate release scenario,
impact on surroundings, DETECTION: methods, time required, detectors, visibility,
odour thresholds, video monitors, routine checks, MITIGATION: methods
available, isolation points, duration of leak, containment methods, emergency
operations in spill area, procedures/training, inventory reduction, PROTECTIVE
RUPTURE / LEAK OTHER THAN
SYSTEMS: turret coverage, fire crew availability, deluge system, fire fighting
strategy, required response, alarms, evacuation procedures, emergency
showers/eyewash stations, location of SCBA , PREVENTION: root cause
elimination, materials of construction, maintenance/mechanical integrity procedures,
mechanical stress – overhead lifting procedures, overpressure protection – defect
identification, inspection methods.
STATIC ELECTRICITY, grounding arrangements, insulated vessels/equipment,
low conductance fluids, splash filling of vessels, insulated strainers and valve
components, dust generation and handling, hoses, temporary grounding for
loading/unloading, PM for grounding systems, OPEN FLAMES, flares, pilot lights,
IGNITION OTHER THAN
fired heaters, OTHER SOURCES – vehicle entry, electrical classifications, lightning,
hot surfaces, hot work/welding, hot work permits, people in area,
FLAMMABILITY - Auto ignition, upper and lower flammability limits, flash point,
fire triangle, SURROUNDING AREA
Failure of instrument air/steam/nitrogen/cooling water/hydraulic power/water or
other , contamination of instrument air, nitrogen, etc., telecommunications, heating
SERVICE FAILURE OTHER THAN
and ventilating systems, computers, backup systems, protection systems, previous
failures, etc.
Purging, flushing, start-up, normal shutdown, emergency shutdown , operations
under emergency conditions, severe weather conditions, spills, fire, turnarounds, off
shift operations, shift change, flaring, bypassed safety devices, time (sequence),
ABNORMAL
OTHER THAN startup
OPERATION
following emergency shutdown, regeneration, decoking, spills/spill containment,
evacuation plans, bypassing procedures, using extraordinary effort, extended shift
schedules, previous incidents and near misses, use of contractors, etc.
Personnel exposure, purpose of sample, sampling apparatus, environmental, spill and
leakage monitoring, sampling procedure, time for analysis result, calibration of
SAMPLING OTHER THAN automatic samplers, reliability, accuracy, or representative sample , diagnosis of
result, industrial hygiene (personnel exposure/monitoring), sample disposal, operator
intervention, process changes because of sample result, etc.
Maintenance procedures (verbal, written), working on operating ("live", "hot",
"active") equipment, preventive maintenance, predictive maintenance, isolation
philosophy, drainage, purging, cleaning, drying, blinding, hot bolting, hot and cold
MAINTENANCE OTHER THAN taps, access, rescue plan, training, pressure testing, work permit system, breaker
identification, confined space, contractors, installed/non-installed spare equipment,
availability of spares, modified specification, storage of spares, catalogue of spares,
etc., test running of spare equipment, etc.
Engineering specifications , internal/external corrosion protection, corrosion under
CORROSION / insulation, cathodic protection arrangement, embrittlement, stress corrosion cracking,
OTHER THAN
EROSION fluid velocities, inspection (testing/monitoring of piping, vessels, heat exchangers,
etc.), etc.
Training , written operating and maintenance procedures (accurate, updated,
enforced), fitness for duty, fire and gas detection systems/alarms, emergency
shutdown arrangements, contingency plans, previous near miss incidents, effluent
disposal, hazards created by others (adjacent storage areas/process plants), testing of
emergency
equipment, compliance with local/national regulations and codes, chemical storage
SAFETY OTHER THAN
excess inventory, lighting, industrial hygiene: personal protective equipment (PPE),
location of safety showers/eye wash, community awareness and emergency response
program (CAER), material safety data sheets (MSDS), fire fighting response time,
emergency training, threshold limit values (TLVs) of process materials and
methods of detection, first aid/medical resources, noise levels, lifting (back injury),
etc.
Skipped step, event does not occur, e.g., valve does not open/close, timer
NO
fails/malfunctions, service failure, relay logic prevents occurrence, etc.
Valve malfunction, timer fails, more reaction, accumulation, improper batch recipe,
MORE
TIME product quality, unwanted by-products, interruption, etc.
Improper settings on controls, failure/malfunction batch logic, increased production
LESS rates, shift change, improper instructions, operator preference, inadequate mixing,
shortcuts, etc.
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PARAMETER GUIDEWORD EXAMPLES
Out of sequence, procedure/recipe error – software bug, solenoid failure, catalyst
WRONG
activity, operator interruption/error, missed communications, etc.
Two or more steps/events occur simultaneously, common cause failure (e.g., service
SAME
failure), crossed connections, parallel operation, etc.
Other Environmental Hazards Odour, Noise, Traffic movements
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APPENDIX 6 – HAZOP WORKSHEET
HAZOP Worksheet Project Title Company Name
Project Contract No.
Meeting Date: Leader: Node : 1.01
Node Details: Scribe: PEFS:
PROTECTION / RECOMMENDA
G. WORD PARAMETER DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES BY
SAFEGUARDS TIONS
No Flow No Flow
More Flow More Flow
Less Flow Less Flow
As Well Flow As well as
As Flow
Part of Flow Part of Flow
Reverse Flow Reverse Flow
Other than Flow Other Than
Flow
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APPENDIX 7 – HAZOP REPORT FORMAT
1.0 Introduction
The introduction to the HAZOP report should contain short descriptions of the following:
The terms of reference given prior to the HAZOP and other safety studies or HAZOP
minutes used for reference.
The composition and affiliation of the team including the attendance of part-time
members at each session.
Methodology of HAZOP adopted stating any variations from normal HAZOP practice
for the study.
Plant / Facility areas not covered because they were outside the scope of the study or
documentation or key personnel were not available.
The main study findings should be discussed in the report. A list of the (top ten or so) major
issues is helpful to the response co-ordinator in expediting the important ones first.
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7.0 Highlight Areas for Next HAZOP
Identification of areas that are unresolved should be made for use by the Leader of
subsequent HAZOPs or by the project safety co-ordinator.
9.0 Appendices
The appendices should contain the following information:
Node list
Worksheets
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