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PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS

HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT

GUIDELINE

HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY STUDY - HAZOP

PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010

© 2010 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS)


All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in
any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the
permission of the copyright owner.
PTS Circular
2010

PTS No: 60.2209


PTS Title: Hazards and Operability Study - HAZOP

This revision of PTS 60.2209 – Hazards and Operability Study (HAZOP) (December 2010, Rev
2) has been updated to incorporate PETRONAS Lessons Learnt, Best Practice and new
information issued by relevant industry code and standards.

The previous version of this PTS 60.2209 (June 2006) will be removed from PTS binder/e-
repository from herein onwards.

The custodian of this PTS is: Manager - HSE MS, Standards & Regulations, GHSED.

Please direct any questions regarding this PTS to the above-mentioned.

Document Approval

Name Designation Date Signature


Custodian, Safety Management
Prepared Morris Kho Kee Wee
Operations, Group HSE Division

Technical Custodian, Safety Management


Morris Kho Kee Wee
Approved Operations, Group HSE Division
General Manager,
Maureen Song Chai
Verified Group HSE Strategy and
Kee
Performance, Group HSE Division
Mohd Tarmizi Bin Head,
Approved
Munir Group HSE Division

Revision History
Date Version Description of Updates Author
Oct 2004 Original New PTS 60.153 HAZOP
Jun 2006 Rev 1 Renumbering from PTS 60.153 to PTS 60.2209
Dec 2010 Rev 2 PTS Periodically Review. Restructure flow of this PTS IWG HAZOP
2 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
PREFACE

PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) publications reflect the views, at the time of
publication, of PETRONAS Group of Companies.

They are based on the experience acquired during the involvement with the design,
construction, operation and maintenance of processing units and facilities. Where
appropriate they are based on, or reference is made to, national and international standards
and codes of practice.

The objective is to set the recommended standard for good technical practice to be applied
by PETRONAS' Group of Companies in oil and gas production facilities, refineries, gas
processing plants, chemical plants, marketing facilities or any other such facility, and thereby
to achieve maximum technical and economic benefit from standardisation.

The information set forth in these publications is provided to users for their consideration and
decision to implement. This is of particular importance where PTS may not cover every
requirement or diversity of condition at each locality. The system of PTS is expected to be
sufficiently flexible to allow individual operating units to adapt the information set forth in PTS
to their own environment and requirements.

When Contractors or Manufacturers/Suppliers use PTS they shall be solely responsible for
the quality of work and the attainment of the required design and engineering standards. In
particular, for those requirements not specifically covered, the Principal will expect them to
follow those design and engineering practices which will achieve the same level of integrity
as reflected in the PTS. If in doubt, the Contractor or Manufacturer/Supplier shall, without
detracting from his own responsibility, consult the Principal or its technical advisor.

The right to use PTS rests with three categories of users:

1) PETRONAS and its affiliates.

2) Other parties who are authorised to use PTS subject to appropriate contractual
arrangements.

3) Contractors/subcontractors and Manufacturers/Suppliers under a contract with users


referred to under 1) and 2) which requires that tenders for projects materials supplied
or - generally - work performed on behalf of the said users comply with the relevant
standards.

Subject to any particular terms and conditions as may be set forth in specific agreements
with users, PETRONAS disclaims any liability of whatsoever nature for any damage
(including injury or death) suffered by any company or person whomsoever as a result of or
in connection with the use, application or implementation of any PTS, combination of PTS or
any part thereof. The benefit of this disclaimer shall inure in all respects to PETRONAS
and/or any company affiliated to PETRONAS that may issue PTS or require the use of PTS.

Without prejudice to any specific terms in respect of confidentiality under relevant contractual
arrangements, PTS shall not, without the prior written consent of PETRONAS, be disclosed
by users to any company or person whomsoever and the PTS shall be used exclusively for
the purpose they have been provided to the user. They shall be returned after use, including
any copies which shall only be made by users with the express prior written consent of
PETRONAS. The copyright of PTS vests in PETRONAS. Users shall arrange for PTS to be
held in safe custody and PETRONAS may at any time require information satisfactory to
PETRONAS in order to ascertain how users implement this requirement.
3 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This document was jointly prepared with contribution from the following organizations:

No. Name Designation OPUs/HCUs

1. Morris Kho Custodian, Operations Safety GHSED

2. Busari Jabar Principal, Operations Safety GHSED

3. Syed M Nasir Manager, Process Safety Management GTS

4. Amirzudin Mizuar Staff, Process Risk Assessment GTS

5. M Fazaly M Ali Staff, Process Risk Assessment GTS

6. M Shaik Fareed M Naja Buddin Staff, Process Risk Assessment GTS

7. M Redza Harriz Zainal HSEMS Operations Safety Exec GHSED

4 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
TABLE OF CONTENT

1.0 INTRODUCTION OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................ 7


1.1 OBJECTIVES OF THIS DOCUMENT ................................................................... 7
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF HAZOP .................................................................................... 7
1.3 SCOPE................................................................................................................. 8
2.0 OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................................... 8
2.1 THE ROLE OF HAZOP IN A PROJECT LIFECYCLE......................................... 10
2.2 THE ROLE OF HAZOP IN EXISTING PLANT .................................................... 11
2.2.1 Plant in Operation .............................................................................. 11
2.2.2 Revamp/modification projects (brown-field developments) ............ 11
2.3 OTHER TYPE OF HAZOP TECHNIQUE ............................................................ 12
2.3.1 Batch Process HAZOP....................................................................... 12
2.3.2 Activity Base HAZOP ......................................................................... 12
2.3.3 Procedural HAZOP............................................................................. 13
2.3.4 Instrumentation and Control (I&C) HAZOP ....................................... 13
2.4 INTERFACE WITH THE HSE CASE .................................................................. 14
3.0 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A HAZOP TEAM ..................................................15
3.1 HAZOP LEADER ............................................................................................... 15
3.2 HAZOP SCRIBE ................................................................................................ 16
3.3 HAZOP TEAM MEMBERS ................................................................................. 16
4.0 HAZOP METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................17
4.1 PREPARATION ................................................................................................. 17
4.1.1 Team Selection .................................................................................. 17
4.1.2 Resource Planning and Scheduling.................................................. 17
4.2 CONDUCTING HAZOP ...................................................................................... 18
4.2.1 Establish Scope of HAZOP study ..................................................... 19
4.2.2 Divide System into Node ................................................................... 19
4.2.3 Define a Node and Design Intent....................................................... 19
4.2.4 Select Parameter and Deviation ........................................................ 20
4.2.5 Identify all possible Causes .............................................................. 20
4.2.6 Assess all Credible Consequences .................................................. 20
4.2.7 Identify Existing Safeguard ............................................................... 20
4.2.8 Propose Recommendations .............................................................. 21
4.3 HAZOP RECORDING AND REPORTING .......................................................... 21
4.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS AND FOLLOW UP ....................................... 21
5.0 ASSURANCE ...................................................................................................................22
6.0 GLOSSARY .....................................................................................................................22
5 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
7.0 REFERENCE ...................................................................................................................22
APPENDIX 1 – DETAILS OF HAZOP TYPES IN PROJECT LIFE CYCLE...................................23
APPENDIX 2 – HAZOP TEAM MEMBER FUNCTIONS ...............................................................25
APPENDIX 3 – GUIDELINE FOR HAZOP STUDY SCHEDULING ...............................................26
APPENDIX 4 – LIST OF PARAMETERS AND GUIDEWORDS ...................................................27
APPENDIX 5 – SAMPLE GUIDEWORDS AND CAUSES ............................................................28
APPENDIX 6 – HAZOP WORKSHEET ........................................................................................31
APPENDIX 7 – HAZOP REPORT FORMAT ................................................................................32

6 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
1.0 INTRODUCTION OBJECTIVES

1.1 OBJECTIVES OF THIS DOCUMENT

The objectives of this document are to:

 Provide an overall understanding of the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) process


and its optimum application within a project, or plant modification or Process Hazard
Analysis.
 A reference for HCU / OPU and project managers needing guidance in implementing
a HAZOP process.
 Provide recommended practices for undertaking studies which HAZOP leaders,
scribes and team members can use as a useful reference.
 Ensure consistent and effective management of HAZOP studies.

Each OPU / JV shall develop their site specific HAZOP procedures based on this PTS.

1.2 OBJECTIVES OF HAZOP

The objective of a HAZOP is to carry out a rigorous and systematic evaluation of process
systems with respect to operational safety and potential hazards with foreseeable
upsetting conditions. This can be summarized as follows:

 To identify/analyze potential hazards and operability issues due to deviations from


normal process or operating conditions or intended design in a systematic manner.
 To evaluate the adequacy of the existing safeguards with respect to safety and
operations to address the causes and / or the consequences.
 To identify additional safeguards required for the system under study to address the
causes and minimise the consequences of deviation.
 To recommend ways to mitigate the Consequences of deviations and return to
normal and safe operations.

It is beneficial to undertake HAZOP early in the lifecycle of the facility as it is easier to


change the design of the facility rather than modify it later as shown in Figure 1.1 -
Time/Benefit/Cost Graph below. This does not mean that it is not beneficial to undertake
HAZOP on operational facilities. However, it is to note that implementing the
recommendations is easier during the design stage of the facility lifecycle.

7 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
Figure 1.1: Time / Benefit / Cost Graph

1.3 SCOPE

The document shall be applied to the development, planning, implementation, follow up,
auditing and reviewing of all HAZOP study within PETRONAS Group of Companies
activities.

This scope encompasses all PETRONAS HCU / OPU / JV existing facilities and any
future developments

2.0 OVERVIEW

HSE management is a key consideration for all plant, driven both by company philosophy and
external requirements. New technologies and the trend towards complex integrated designs have
resulted in the need for more thorough and systematic methods to identify and assess hazards.

HAZOP is a structured hazard identification tool using deviation analysis by a multi-disciplined


team. It has become accepted as the main technique for the identification of process hazards in
the design and operation of a facility. Other hazards identification techniques by discipline review
or compliance with checklists are limited by their reliance on previous experience and constrained
by their approach. HAZOP is based on brainstorming and has advantages over other techniques
for non-standard designs. The strength of HAZOP technique is it allows personnel from all
disciplines to interact and question aspects of the facilities beyond their usual sphere of activity.
One formal definition would be 'The application of a formal systematic examination to the process
and engineering intentions of new or existing facilities to assess the potential of mal-operation or
malfunction of individual items of equipment and their consequential effects on the facility as a
whole.

The method is applicable to:

 Periodically assessing hazard (PHA) in existing plant (Refer to PTS 60.2204).


8 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
 Plant modifications as identified by MOC (refer to PTS 60.2201).
 Greenfield developments.
 Brownfield projects.
 Operating procedures
 Instrumentation and Control.
 Preparation for CIMAH Report, DOSO Report, HSE Case and other relevant statutory
requirements.

The HAZOP methodology can be summarized by schematic in Figure 2.1.

Select NODE, State INTENT, Select PARAAMETER + GUIDEWORD


IDENTIFY

BRAINSTORM
CAUSE

DEVIATION

ASSESS
NO CAUSE
Is it possibly?
Is it likely?

YES

NO CONSEQUENCES
Can safeguards fail?
Does it matters?

YES

RECOMMENDATION

Figure 2.1 HAZOP methodology

HAZOP represent one of the methods available to be applied in the Hazard Identification phase
of HEMP, which is the methodology employed to achieve demonstrably the HSE objectives which
are defined in, and to be managed by, the HSE MS. The relationship between this document and
its component parts and HSE MS is shown schematically in Figure 2.2

9 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
Figure 2.2: HSEMS Relations with HAZOP

2.1 THE ROLE OF HAZOP IN A PROJECT LIFECYCLE

In a project lifecycle normally different type of HAZOP is applied at different stage of


project as demonstrated in Figure 3.1. The sequence of HAZOP studies should be
planned, varying in scope from conceptual to detail. Planned HAZOP studies should be
included in the Project Schedule on the critical path, with the timing determined by the
availability of the PSI (Refer to PTS 60.2203). It is the responsibility of the project
manager to determine whether HAZOPs are needed, when they are required, and which
type of study is appropriate (Refer to 60.2206, DI). Details of each type of HAZOP in a
project lifecycle are described in Appendix 1.

Procedures

Coarse Final
Main
HSE HAZID HAZOP
HAZOP HAZOP

Minor Change
Mini HAZOP

Identification Definition Execution


Phase Phase Phase

FRONT END LOADING


START UP
FRAMING EXECUTE
FEL 1 FEL 2 FEL 3 OPERATION

Figure 3.1: Sequence of HAZOP Studies throughout a Project Lifecycle


10 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
2.2 THE ROLE OF HAZOP IN EXISTING PLANT

2.2.1 Plant in Operation

Existing plants have an inherent hazard potential. Plants can continue in


operation for several years and may undergo minor modifications and de-
bottlenecking several times. Older plants may also never have been subject to a
HAZOP study. There is an increasing need to demonstrate adequate
management of hazards for existing facilities, especially those that require a HSE
Case. HAZOP is a valuable tool for this purpose for existing plant.

2.2.2 Revamp/modification projects (brown-field developments)

The objective of a HAZOP of a brown-field development is to ensure that the


proposed modification is safe and operable. Interfaces between the modification
and the existing facilities must not jeopardise the original design basis of the
facilities.

Essentially a brown-field HAZOP is conducted identically with a green-field


project. Difficulties may arise however when establishing the scope and
information required for the study. In summary the main concerns when
preparing for a HAZOP on a brown-field project are:

 The selection of the nodes for a modification HAZOP should reflect the
interfaces with, and allow analysis of, the effects on the surrounding
systems.

 The interfaces between the new and existing plant (tie-in points, etc) must
be sufficiently understood and documented so that the team can establish if
any hazards can cross the boundary.

 The physical interfaces of the new with the existing installation shall be
clearly shown on the HAZOP drawings. Prior to the study the process
engineer shall analyse the extent to which the process parameters change
within the existing facilities due to the modification (including those that have
to be made to other systems to accommodate the new facilities, e.g.
changes in relief valve sizes). He shall mark up the HAZOP drawings
accordingly. Nodes should include all parts of the existing facilities where a
change in process conditions is caused as a result of the modification.
Likewise the operator shall analyse the applicability of existing procedures to
the modification and the applicability of any modified procedures to the
modifications as well as to the existing plant.

 Sufficient design and operating information must be available for all common
systems (vents, drains, etc) as well as the existing plant local to the tie-in
points liable to be affected by the new development.

 If the design codes and practices differ for the existing and new plant the
consequences must be fully understood and screened. A particular problem
with major modification projects is the potential compatibility problems
between old and new design codes and project standards. The scope of the
application of new codes and standards should be established as part of the
project philosophy. The HAZOP should focus on ensuring that the
philosophy is consistently applied across the modifications.

11 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
 The design must clearly identify and address intermediate operating modes
whilst the new plant is being constructed and commissioned. Sufficient
information must be available to the HAZOP team to assess the
intermediate operating mode risks.

On brown-field projects there is often a concern to minimise disruption and lost


production, with commissioning of new equipment in parallel with the existing
equipment. This may result in a series of short-term hook-up arrangements,
which are potential sources of hazards. Consideration should also be given to the
increased numbers of personnel likely to be required during modification projects.
The intermediate phase of the change-over from old to new systems should be
treated as a separate operating phase. This may mean that the modifications
require a number of individual HAZOPs to ensure the inter-stage steps of the
revamp work are adequately considered.

2.3 OTHER TYPE OF HAZOP TECHNIQUE

A part from the normal HAZOP Technique or also known as the Continuous HAZOP,
there are other variation of HAZOP Technique for special cases or situations e.g. Batch
Process, Activity Base, Procedural and Instrumentation and Control.

2.3.1 Batch Process HAZOP

The HAZOP method for batch processes deals with each part of the plant in
exactly the same manner as the more familiar method for continuous processes.
Differences occur when the team examines the changes in plant configuration as
the steps in the batch process are progressed.

The status of the system changes frequently and in order to perform an adequate
study, the valve positions and process conditions must be adequately described
for each separate stage. As these are normally cyclical operations, it may be
necessary to prepare diagrams showing the status of each line and vessel
throughout the process. Operating instructions, including logic diagrams or
instrument sequence diagrams, are essential in understanding the steps.

Time-dependent concepts (sooner/later) are added to the guide words. The


method is the same as normal but examines the changes in plant configuration
as the steps in the batch process are progressed

2.3.2 Activity Base HAZOP

The activity HAZOP technique consists of the systematic critical search for
deviations and hazards applied to activities and the facilities involved in
operations. The technique examines sequences of mechanical and manual
handling operations. The study can be held at any time during the project phase,
the level of detail and study technique being dependent on the timing chosen.
Activity-based studies may however be required for the small number of
potentially difficult activities that are not continuous, and do not form a part of the
daily operations workload. Such activities may be:

 Drilling
 Unloading at a jetty
 Well workover
 Shutdown.
12 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
The basic technique is the same as other HAZOPs. Specific activity guide words,
etc., are used. These include incorrect activity and the time/movement elements
of movement and early/late operation. Additional parameters included are: time,
decision and position

The recommendations from an activity HAZOP are not necessarily limited to the
operating procedures. Changes both to the design of the equipment and the
operating procedures may be suggested.

2.3.3 Procedural HAZOP

Safety-critical procedures should be explicitly studied as a primary document,


with guide words applied directly to the steps in the procedure. Procedures are
unlikely to be available in sufficient detail until the Main or even Final HAZOP.
Procedural HAZOPs may be particularly beneficial for an existing (older) plant.

Procedural HAZOP meetings may include any operating procedure written for a
plant and may be conducted in addition to the normal HAZOP for that equipment
item or dealt with separately. They are usually conducted however on the
activities such as:

 commissioning
 pigging
 inspections
 start-up
 maintenance
 plant testing
 safety critical operating procedures.

The standard guide words of No, More, Less, As Well As, Part of, Reverse and
Other Than take slightly different meanings. The results will specifically affect
the operating procedures and in some cases may have an impact on the design
of the equipment

2.3.4 Instrumentation and Control (I&C) HAZOP

Normal HAZOP does not identify all the potential I & C system related hazards
because the P&IDs give only the brief I & C system information. A more detailed
HAZOP on the I & C system will identify causes and consequences of I & C
system failure.

I & C HAZOP should be done after the normal HAZOP where more detailed
study of critical I & C loops identified during the P&ID HAZOP and Process
design is frozen following the Normal HAZOP therefore providing fixed functional
specification for I & C system.

Technique for the I & C HAZOP is similar to that for the conventional HAZOP and
also similar guidewords are used but on the control diagrams/specifications and
information are reviewed section by section. The result will affect design of the
control system and modifications are made if necessary.

13 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
2.4 INTERFACE WITH THE HSE CASE

There is a relationship between a HAZOP study (or any other HEMP study) and an HSE
Case. This is best considered separately for existing facilities and new developments.

New developments

An HSE Case is likely to be planned for any significant new development. As a means of
commencing the process of compiling the HSE Case, but particularly part 5 - the Hazard
Register - an HAZID study may have been performed. Alternatively during the initial
design phase a separate study or process may have been put in place specifically to
collect information for the Hazard Register.

This information may thus be available to the HAZOP team as part of the information
pack, i.e. as an inventory of the HSE hazards pertinent to the development. It should be
noted however that the Hazard Register may not at this stage have identified all the
hazards inherent in the design, nor assessed the hazards in any significant depth.

There are no specific guidelines on the process of documenting the HSE Case as a
project design matures, however it is most likely that the HSE Case will evolve either
progressively or step-wise throughout the engineering phase, and be published around
the time of plant startup. The HSE Case (Hazard Register) may then contain reference to
HAZOP study findings, and/or transcribe/summarise from the HAZOP report information
on the safety critical equipment, systems and procedures, in order to comprehensively
demonstrate management of hazards. It may include such items as the sequential
analysis and protection measures discussed in the HAZOP report for a particular
deviation from design intent, i.e. where the consequence of that deviation presents
significant risk. The HAZOP study therefore is of one of the important information sources
for completion of HSE Case.

Existing Facilities

For existing facilities the compilation of a HSE Case may indeed be the cause of the
HAZOP study, i.e. as a means to demonstrate adequate assessment of the hazards
inherent to the process. In such situations the HSE Case will also refer to or transcribe
information from the HAZOP report. Even if this is not the case, the relationship between
HSE Case and HAZOP report is similar.

Modification Projects

Where a plant is undergoing modification or revamp, the HAZOP study should draw on
the HSE Case as part of the information pack, and similarly on completion of the study
the results of the HAZOP should be incorporated into the HSE Case.

14 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
3.0 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A HAZOP TEAM

The HAZOP team shall consist of multi-disciplined personnel and the brainstorming procedure
relies on the broad experience of the team to identify potential hazards and operability problems.
A balanced team is required to provide an appropriate level of project/process knowledge coupled
with independent members providing relevant expertise.

A HAZOP team usually consists of five to eight people although a smaller team may be sufficient
for a small facility or a minor modification, and in these cases three to four is adequate. More may
be required in a hand-over meeting where two project teams are represented. This is often the
case for studies where there is some duplication in client and contractor representation.

Generally, a HAZOP team comprises of:


 HAZOP Leader
 Scribe
 HAZOP team members
- Process Engineer
- Project Engineer
- Operation Personnel
- Instrument (Control System) Engineer
- Maintenance Personnel
- Vendor / Contractor representatives
- Specialist Engineers

If the team is too large, the group approach fails because so many people are trying to
communicate with one another and are inhibited from working closely. It is also highly
probable that a large team will result in high number of spectators in the team. On the other
hand, if the group is too small, it may lack the breadth of knowledge needed to help assure
completeness and creativity generated by interactions of multiple-disciplined members.

3.1 HAZOP LEADER

Roles & Responsibilities


HAZOP leader shall be independent of the facility / project under study to ensure impartial
assessment.

The main role of the HAZOP Leader can be broken down into the following sections:
 Preparation
 Facilitate the HAZOP study
 Produce HAZOP report
 Action response follow up

Competency
HAZOP leader shall have minimum competency requirement as follow but not limited to:

 Experience
- Sufficient experience in the oil and gas industry or an equivalent process
industry, both in theoretical and practical application of the design and operation
of oil and gas production/processing facilities.
- Adequate knowledge of equipment, procedural and human failures that can lead
to major incidents, with a sound appreciation of process design and
safeguarding.
- Aware of technical standards and regulations

15 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
 Training
- Attended both the HAZOP and management techniques including a recognized
HAZOP leadership course, which meets requirements this PTS.
- Undergone mentoring with competent HAZOP leader.
- Appreciation of other risk assessment techniques.

 Facilitation skills
- Hazard identification skill.
- Suitable application of the HAZOP methodology to identify significant hazards
and issues.
 Time management skills
- Ability to plan the study in depth and estimate the time required for the HAZOP.
This includes maintaining the pace and momentum of study and suitable
allocation of time for deliberation of issues.

 Communications/motivation skills
- Able to keep the team’s focus and working together and motivate all members of
the team.
- Form a good working relationship with the Scribe and supervise the Scribe's work
to ensure that adequate minutes are recorded.

3.2 HAZOP SCRIBE

Roles & Responsibilities


The role of HAZOP scribe is to record discussions during HAZOP study. The record shall be
complete, clear, and accurate. This includes a complete record of points discussed and not
just a record of recommendation

Competency
HAZOP scribes should have training and experience similar to that required by the Leader.
The Scribe should also be able to take minutes in a concise and accurate manner using
plain language.

3.3 HAZOP TEAM MEMBERS

Roles & Responsibilities


HAZOP team members are responsible for providing essential information and input through
active involvement in workshop and contribute their skills, knowledge and experience to the
process.

Competency
HAZOP team member should have minimum competency requirement as follow but not
limited to

 Sufficient experience and knowledge of respective area and discipline both in theoretical
and practical application of the design and operation of the facility / unit under study.
 At least one team member should have sound knowledge in codes, standards.
 Adequate knowledge to anticipate potential equipment, procedural and human failures
operational with a sound appreciation of process design and safeguarding.

Detail description of function for individual discipline for HAZOP team member is
summarized in Appendix 2.

16 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
4.0 HAZOP METHODOLOGY

4.1 PREPARATION

Activities that shall be carried out prior to HAZOP study sessions to ensure effectiveness of
the HAZOP study is described below:

4.1.1 Team Selection

HAZOP Leader shall select and determine the HAZOP team members. This is
normally based on the scope of HAZOP study. Appendix 2 provides a guideline on
selecting HAZOP team members.

4.1.2 Resource Planning and Scheduling

HAZOP leader shall ensure that administrative requirements (e.g. room,


refreshments, meeting notification), tools (e.g. briefing package, software) and
updated information package (e.g. PEFS, CSDS / MSDS, plot plan) are sufficient to
ensure effective HAZOP. Information package required depends on type of HAZOP
study i.e. Coarse HAZOP, main HAZOP, Final HAZOP, and Mini-HAZOP.

HAZOP Leader should plan and schedule the study to optimize time and resources.
Required time to complete HAZOP of one PEFS depends on the complexity of the
facility. Correct estimation of HAZOP duration is important to ensure availability and
commitment of team members. If the study includes several operating modes this
will add significantly to the time required. The best assessment method is to estimate
the number of additional case nodes that will be studied and allow about half the
time of the original node for each one.

For identical process units / trains, the time estimation for the second and following
unit maybe reduced but specific issues shall be reviewed and addressed adequately
e.g. maintainability, interconnection between trains, equipment siting, preferential
flow. Typically, time frame for HAZOP can be estimated using table in Appendix 3.

17 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
4.2 CONDUCTING HAZOP

The Typical HAZOP work flow is summarized in figure 4.1 below. The work flow is also
applicable for other HAZOP techniques e.g Batch Process, Activity Base, Procedural and
Instrumentation and Control.

Divide System into Node

Define Node and Design Intent

Select Parameter and Deviation

Identify all Possible Causes

Assess all Credible Consequences

Identify Existing Safeguards

Propose Recommendations (if necessary)

No
Last Deviation?

Yes
No
Last Node?

Yes
END

Figure 4.1 Typical HAZOP work flow

18 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
4.2.1 Establish Scope of HAZOP study

HAZOP leader shall establish the scope of the study, appropriate HAZOP technique
and the assumptions with agreement with team members to be applied throughout
the studies. Typical assumptions for HAZOP study is as follow but not limited to;

 In principle, only single failure results in hazard – no double jeopardy


 All equipment were well designed, manufactured and properly installed and
inspected
 Facilities are well maintained and operated with acceptable standard and in
accordance with applicable Operating Procedure.
 The system will perform as the design intents
 Generally, failure of instruments gauges were not considered
 All safety interlocks and PLC for valve sequence considered functioning as
intended.

Careful consideration should be taken when applying these assumptions so that


significant hazard will not be overlooked.

4.2.2 Divide System into Node

HAZOP Leader and with agreement with team members shall determine the
selection of the node sizes and the route through the system s before starting the
study.

The HAZOP Leader shall select the nodes based on the stage of the project life
cycle and the amount of information available.

A HAZOP study progresses through the system node by node. A node is a


manageable segment of system which has distinct design intent. The node, typically
comprise one major equipment (vessels, etc.), associated minor equipment (pumps,
valves, etc.), instrumentation, and other ancillary equipment. Normally, the selection
of node should follow the process flow. Start at an isolation point (valve or
equipment item) of where the line enters or leaves the P&ID.

HAZOP Leader should mark up the nodes in the document for differentiation and
assist the study.

4.2.3 Define a Node and Design Intent

HAZOP Leader with assistant with team member shall define and record the node
and its design intent.

The design intent should provide specific information on how the node will be
operated under all system operating conditions (described parameters such as
pressure, temperature, flow rate, level, etc.).

HAZOP team member should give a brief description of the design intent and also
specific hazard at the beginning of each node. Similarly they should give a brief step-
by-step description of start-up and shutdown actions before these topics are
addressed.

19 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
4.2.4 Select Parameter and Deviation

HAZOP Leader shall select and record the parameter and deviation relevant to the
nodes, mode of operation and HAZOP technique applied.

Parameters and Deviations are the key to the HAZOP process. They are difference
from the design intent of the process and are identified by the systematic application
of the appropriate parameter/guide word combinations

Not all parameters are applicable to each node. A parameter may only be left out if
the Leader thinks fit. He should tell the team why it is not relevant, e.g. level on a
flow line.

Appendix 4 shows the list of parameters and guidewords normally used in various
types of HAZOP technique.

4.2.5 Identify all possible Causes

HAZOP Team shall identify and record all possible causes of a node guided by the
parameter and deviation selected.

The possible causes shall be within the node (Except for nodes at interfaces, battery
limit or beginning of a system), credible and specific in the description. Avoid double
jeopardy scenarios but not to be mistaken with latent failure.

Brainstorm and list all the possible cause before proceeding with the consequence

4.2.6 Assess all Credible Consequences

HAZOP Team shall assess and record the credible consequences of each cause by
assuming assume there is no safeguard in place.

The consequence statement shall consist of the initial system response to the worst
credible consequence. Consequence also can be upstream or downstream of the
node under study but not as detail as within node.

Consequences should consider the effect to People, Environment, Asset and/or


Reputation.

4.2.7 Identify Existing Safeguard

HAZOP Team shall identify and record the existing safeguards. The safeguards can
be within or outside the node (upstream or downstream)

Safeguard shall be able to address causes and consequences. E.g. alarms shall be
together with operator actions and must be adequate for the system.

Safeguards can be categorized into these three types:

 Prevention - prevents deviation from happening (e.g., check valves, relief, trip
system)
 Detection - detects causes or consequences (e.g., alarms)
 Mitigation - control or reduce the consequences (e.g., ERP, Tank bund )

20 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
4.2.8 Propose Recommendations

HAZOP Team shall propose and record recommendations when they feel that
existing safeguarding system is not adequate to protect the system under study. The
recommendation shall address the cause and the consequences.

The HAZOP Team should generate specific recommendations that address the risk
exposure, and be clear on what they consider to be the most appropriate option.
Recommendations can generally come in two forms:

 Definitive – Recommendations that are implementable as they stand.


 Initiating – Recommendations that initiate further work to clarify the required
actions

Preferably, HAZOP team should propose definitive recommendations. However, if


the team could not agree or significant time is required to deliberate in certain issue,
the team may propose initiative recommendation.

Recommendations should be presented in the form:

 What is required to be done


 Where the recommendation applies
 Why the recommendation should be completed

HAZOP Leader should identify the responsible person and due date for any
recommendation(s) issued.

4.3 HAZOP RECORDING AND REPORTING

HAZOP discussion shall be recorded in HAZOP worksheet (See Appendix 5 for typical
HAZOP worksheet). The record shall complete & accurate. This includes recording all
deviation discussed even though the deviation does not cause significant consequences and
no recommendation generated.

HAZOP Leader shall prepare the HAZOP Report after completion of a study. The HAZOP
report is an important document describing the objectives and success of the whole study
and is used to compile and preserve the results of the study for future reference.

HAZOP final report format should follow reporting format as shown in Appendix 6. The draft
final report should be reviewed by team members prior to the formal and, timely issue.
HAZOP Final report shall be distributed to relevant parties affected by the HAZOP studies.

4.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS AND FOLLOW UP

The relevant Facility/Project Owner for each HAZOP is accountable for the implementation
of the recommendations. The recommendations arising from the HAZOP study shall be
presented to the Facility/Project Owner by the HAZOP Leader or representative. This
provides an opportunity to challenge the recommendations and to agree on actions, assign
responsibilities and define priorities for implementation. Where the priority of a
recommendation is downgraded or the recommendation is rejected, this shall be supported
by a sound justification. Alternative recommendations shall be provided to justify rejection of
recommendations.

21 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
Some of the HAZOP recommendations may require the MOC process be invoked. The
Facility/Project Owner shall ensure that the MOC system is applied for the agreed project
scope. If another alternative is being proposed or if the recommendation is cancelled upon
detailed study, this shall be formally documented by the Facility/Project Owner. This is
important to record the justification or assumptions.

At an established and agreed period after the recommendation has been implemented, the
Facility/Project Owner shall be responsible for assessing the effectiveness of the
recommendation (i.e. did it adequately address the risk?). If the recommendation is found to
be ineffective, remedial action shall be taken.

The Facility/Project Owner shall monitor the ongoing implementation of the safeguards. All
the recommendations arising from the HAZOP studies shall be tracked in accordance with
the Facility/Project Owner’s plan and progress reported to the HCU/OPU Management on a
regular basis. If recommendations cannot be implemented in a timely manner, the
Facility/Project Owner shall provide a rationale and revised timeframe to the HCU/OPU
Management.

5.0 ASSURANCE

HCU/OPUs shall assess the quality, adequacy, and effectiveness of the HAZOP study
through Assurance process. The purposes of the Assurance are to:

 Determine whether HCU/OPU’s HAZOP procedures and practices are complete, up-to-
date and compliant with applicable governmental regulations, policies and good HSE
management practices.
 Determine whether HAZOP study is conducted, effective, apply good engineering
practices and meet the requirements of the HAZOP methodology.
 Determine the status and quality of HAZOP recommendations versus identified
objectives, goals and/or other targets.

6.0 GLOSSARY

A glossary of commonly used terms in HSE is given in both PTS 60.0101 HSE Management
Systems and PTS 60.0401 Hazards and Effects Management Process.

7.0 REFERENCE

The following references are considered to provide useful guidance to support the HAZOP
process.

 PTS 60.0401 Hazard and Effect Management Process


 Guideline for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, CCPS
 PTS 60.0101 Health, Safety, and Environmental Management Systems Manual
 PTS 60.0107 Design
 PTS 60.2206 Design Integrity
 PTS 60.2204 Process Hazard Analysis
 PTS 60.2203 Process Safety Information
 PTS 60.2201 Management of Change

22 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
APPENDIX 1 – DETAILS OF HAZOP TYPES IN PROJECT LIFE CYCLE
HAZOP
Description Timing & Documentation Scope & Purpose Results
Types

This is a hazards and effects Described in PTS 60.2004 Hazards Described in PTS 60.2004 Described in PTS
identification technique using similar Identification (HAZID) Hazards Identification (HAZID) 60.2004 Hazards
analysis and brainstorming techniques Identification
to HAZOP, but designed to be used at (HAZID)
a much earlier stage in the project.
Concentrates on wider health, safety
and environmental issues with less of
HAZID a process focus. HAZID is included
here because it is complementary to
Coarse HAZOP and in certain
circumstances the two study types can
be combined.

This uses the full HAZOP The requirement for a coarse HAZOP The Coarse HAZOP would This project stage is
methodology but is intended to be is that the design has progressed to the usually be the first HAZOP study the most appropriate
used early in a project's life where point where the Process Flow Scheme for a project. It often represents time to call for
there is still the 'ability to change the (PFS) has been developed showing all the first opportunity for all the detailed QRA
design, operating and maintenance major lines and equipment. Typically design disciplines, project studies or other
policy'. The plant is divided into a this is at the end of the development management and operations to be supporting
small number of large nodes of the project's basis for design. The involved in a complete review of investigations.
appropriate for an early stage in the documents required are: the project. The key objective is Qualitative Risk
design development. to optimise the design and Analysis is helpful
This study has the objective of  Process Flow Schemes (PFS) minimise any significant rework, in identifying the
making the plant inherently safe  full mass balance information which would cause slippage of issues or giving
before many detailed engineering  plot layout the schedule. All the project major concerns.
COARSE
decisions have been made. It is  process description including all disciplines should have senior
HAZOP
particularly useful before the award operating modes representation and the
may be of particular use prior to the  project definition including life- composition of the team is critical
letting of a design contract to ensure cycle issues and planned plant to the HAZOP's success. This
that the consultant/contractor is flexibility study presents the best
provided with a sound design.  HSE policy opportunity to challenge many of
 preliminary operating and the basic process assumptions
used in the design. It may be a
maintenance philosophy and
relatively short study applying the
product off-take constraints.
full HAZOP technique to large
nodes appropriate to the limited
engineering details that are
available

This study should be held at the end The study should be held at the end of The main HAZOP is the most The detailed report
of the project specification phase the project specification phase. The comprehensive study in the of the study should
(front end engineering phase) of a Process Engineering Flowsheets project and examines in great catalogue all the
project. Its objective is the assurance (PEFS) or Process and detail all aspects of the design. hazards identified
of the HSE safety of the current Instrumentation Diagram (P&IDs) and all areas where
design ('Will it Work?') rather than should almost be of Approved For there was
making radical recommendations for Design (AFD) quality and signed off insufficient
change. by the Project Manager as suitable for information or gaps
This is the primary HAZOP study for HAZOP purposes. Any changes to the in the knowledge of
MAIN any project using the full technique PEFS or P&IDs following this the team. It should
HAZOP and addressing all the details of the HAZOP should be covered by formal be remembered that
plant. Management of Cchange control the Main HAZOP is
objective is to look in detail at all procedures, which itself should usually too late to
aspects of the design, and the main potentially include a Minor Change start challenging
HAZOP will be the most (Mini-) HAZOP. basic concepts in the
comprehensive HAZOP study within The documents required are: design of the plant.
the project.  Process Engineering Flowsheets
(PEFS) or P&IDs
 Process Flowsheets (PFS)
 Plot Plans
 Cause and Effect Diagrams

23 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
HAZOP
Description Timing & Documentation Scope & Purpose Results
Types
 Process Safeguarding Drawings
 Interconnection Diagrams and old
PEFS
 legend details
 Local population densities and
infrastructure, areas of particular
sensitivity (local rivers, marshes,
etc).
 Operating Philosophy
 HSE Safety Policy Philosophy
 Evacuation Philosophy
 previous HAZOP meeting
minutes/action lists

This study is held at the end of the The PEFS or P&IDs should be of pre- The concept is to extend the Main At the end of this
detailed design stage when drawings Approved For Construction (AFC) HAZOP, picking up on details meeting the design
are ready to Approve for standard and signed off as agreed for that were not available at the last should be frozen
Construction. The technique is the the HAZOP. Any changes to the meeting, and concentrating on the and the HAZOP
same as the Main HAZOP except that PEFS or P&IDs following this study changes to the design, and the exercise complete.
the study focuses on changes since the should use a Variation Change additional vendor details. This The AFC drawings
Main HAZOP, rather than reviewing Control (VCC) procedure which itself should be a shorter meeting than should be frozen
the agreed design. should include a Minor Change (Mini- the Main HAZOP but the time once the
FINAL
The final study is required to look at ) HAZOP required depends significantly on recommendations
HAZOP
changes made to the Approved For the quality of the AFD drawings of this study have
Design (AFD) drawings resulting used for the Main study and the been reviewed and
from the contractor's detailed design number and control of subsequent incorporated.
effort and the availability of vendor's design changes
information. The technique is the
same as the Main study but the team
is limited to looking at changes rather
than reviewing the agreed design

This study, usually linked to a The documents require are similar to It is necessary to carry out The detailed report
Management of Change control MAIN HAZOP but focus on the formally HAZOP studies for of the study should
procedure, can be applied at any stage change. minor changes to the drawings catalogue all the
in the design development or following the Main HAZOP. hazards identified
subsequent operation of the facility to Such a meeting would not require and all areas where
assess proposed changes or vendor the full team used for the Main there was
MINOR package details. The methodology is HAZOP but just the core insufficient
CHANGE similar to that of a HAZOP for a members involved in that area of information or gaps
MINI- brown-field development the plant. in the knowledge of
HAZOP A safety statement should be issued the team.
on each change to confirm that it does
not affect the safety of the main plant.
Several minor changes can be studied
together once the net effect is seen to
have a significant effect on the design
or operation of the plant.

24 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
APPENDIX 2 – HAZOP TEAM MEMBER FUNCTIONS

Team Type of HAZOP


ROLE
Member Coarse Main Mini Final Batch Procedural Activities I&C

Process Provide expertise on the process design and intended


Engineer operation of the plant. It is important that the individual
has a full knowledge of the design history of the part of the
plant being studied as well as a deep overall understanding
of the whole plant. For large projects it may be advisable C C C C C C C P
to include the process discipline supervisor who has
knowledge of the whole plant, supported by the
appropriate lead engineers who may have more detailed
knowledge of the area under study for each session.

Project To ensure that the objectives of the project are understood


Engineer throughout the study. These may include commercial as C C C C
well as technical constraints on the plant.

Operations Representation from the eventual operators of the plant is


and/or essential. They can contribute in providing key
Maintenanc information on intended work practices as well as
e Personnel experience of operating issues on similar equipment. If C C C C C C C C
the study is undertaken during a contractor's design phase,
the client should supply the operational input rather than
the Contractor.

Instrument The instrument engineer has a far wider involvement in


(Control the plant design and operation than the other 'specialist'
Systems) engineers. Many of the control and automatic protection C C P C P C
Engineer devices are plant-wide in their application and it is
therefore often advisable that he is a member of the core
team contributing to the whole study.

HSE For many studies the HSE engineer is included in the core
Engineer/ team. If the project or process engineer is responsible for
specialist undertaking the QRA studies and assessing the overall
level of process risk, then part-time involvement of the P P P P P P P P
HSE engineer is adequate. He may provide the expertise to
the team on consequence assessment (flame length, etc)
and on historical failure probabilities.

Machinery Machinery and packaged equipment issues rarely extend


specialists far beyond the machine itself, hence the machinery P P P P P P
specialist is only required whilst the individual equipment
issues are discussed.

Vendor's Once vendor designs are available it is advisable that a


representati vendor representative is present whilst the package is
ves studied. The level of representation will depend on the size
and complexity of the package. It is often advisable to P P P P P P
hold Mini-HAZOPs of complex packages during the
vendor's design rather than wait to review a completed
design.
In most HAZOP studies the requirement for civil
Civil/Struct engineers is limited and it is usual for them to be called
ural upon when required or for specific sections of the plant, P P P P
Engineers e.g. drainage routing.

Specialist The requirement for specialist engineers is similar to civil


Engineers engineers or machinery specialists. Examples would be the
(piping, need for electrical engineers when considering the
instrumentat interface between power utilities and the plant, and the P P P P P P P P
ion, potential for common mode failures.
electrical,
corrosion,
etc)
C = Core team member P = Part time team member
25 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
APPENDIX 3 – GUIDELINE FOR HAZOP STUDY SCHEDULING

26 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
APPENDIX 4 – LIST OF PARAMETERS AND GUIDEWORDS
Guideline for Guideword Selection for Various Types of HAZOP

DEVIATION HAZOP TYPE


PARAMETER GUIDEWORDS CONTINUOUS BATCH PROCEDURAL / I&C
PROCESS PROCESS ACTIVITY
FLOW NO 
MORE 
LESS 
REVERSE 
PRESSURE MORE 
LESS 
LEVEL MORE 
TEMPERATURE MORE  
LESS  
TIME NO  
MORE  
LESS  
WRONG  
SAME  
STEP TOO LATE 
TOO EARLY 
LEFT OUT 
BACKWARD 
ACTION NONE  
REVERSE  
(WRONG)
MORE  
LESS  
SEQUENCE OTHER THAN  
INFORMATION NONE 
REVERSE 
(WRONG)
MORE 
LESS 
CURRENT NO 
REVERSE 
MORE 
LESS 
AIR NO 
VOLTAGE MORE 
LESS 
INTRUMENTATION OTHER THAN   
RELIEF OTHER THAN  
CONTAMINATION OTHER THAN  
PROPERTIES OTHER THAN  
RUPTURE / LEAK OTHER THAN  
IGNITION OTHER THAN  
SERVICE FAILURE OTHER THAN   
ABNORMAL OPERATION OTHER THAN  
SAMPLING OTHER THAN   
SPARE EQUIPMENT OTHER THAN   
MAINTENANCE OTHER THAN   
CORROSION / EROSION OTHER THAN  
SAFETY OTHER THAN    

27 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
APPENDIX 5 – SAMPLE GUIDEWORDS AND CAUSES

PARAMETER GUIDEWORD EXAMPLES


Block valve closed , wrong line up, slip blind installed, incorrectly installed check
valve, equipment failure (control valve, isolation valve, pump, vessel,
NO
Instrumentation, etc.),control valve fails closed , incorrect pressure differential,
isolation in error, power failure - etc.
Bypass valve open, increased pumping capacity, operation of pumps in parallel ,
reduced delivery head , change in fluid density, exchanger tube leaks, worn or
MORE deleted restriction orifice plates , cross connection of systems, control faults, control
valve trim changed, control valve fails open, burst pipe, large leak, wrong
FLOW valve open, fugitive emissions, slug flow
Line restriction, filter fouled , defective pumps , fouling of vessels, lines, valves, or
LESS orifice plates , density or viscosity changes , competing pump heads and flows ,
inadvertently throttled valve , etc.
Malfunctioning or omitted check valves (note that check valves are not usually
bubble tight or positive shutoff devices) , siphon effect , incorrect differential
REVERSE
pressure , two way flow , emergency venting , wrong lineup , in line spare equipment
, etc.
Design pressures, specification of pipes, vessels, fittings, and instruments , surge
problems , leakage from interconnected high pressure system , gas breakthrough
(inadequate venting) , inadequate or defective isolation procedures for relief valves ,
MORE
thermal over pressure , positive displacement pumps , pressure control valves failed
PRESSURE closed or open , increased centrifugal pump suction pressure , more reaction ,
plugged pressure tap , etc.
Generation of vacuum condition , condensation – gas dissolving in liquid , restricted
LESS pump/compressor suction line , undetected leakage , vessel drainage procedure ,
blockage of blanket gas , vacuum relief , etc.
Outlet isolated or blocked , inflow greater than outflow , control failure , faulty level
LEVEL MORE measurement , condensation in vapor lines , vessel overflow , deactivated level alarm
, inadequate time to respond , etc.
Control strategy , location of instruments , lack of instrumentation , information
overload , response time , set points of alarms and trips , time available for
operator intervention , alarm and trip testing , confusing alarms , fire protection ,
panel arrangement and location , auto/manual facility and human error , sample
INSTRUMENTATION OTHER THAN devices , failure mode of transmitter , failure mode of control valve or final control
element – failure mode for out-of-range input , lack of documentation , computer
control , mechanical and PLC interlocks , bypassed interlocks – failure of safety
instrumented
system , defeated alarms , etc.
Path for relief protection , design basis for relief (Process/fire, startup/shutdown
conditions, etc.) , type of relief device and reliability – inspection/testing results ,
relief valve discharge location , environmental implications , two phase flow , effect
of debottleneck on relief capacity requirements , start-up conditions , materials of
RELIEF OTHER THAN construction , temperature of rupture disks, preventive maintenance and isolation
philosophy , failure of administrative controls , blocked relief valves, restricted
inlet/outlet lines , plugging in relief system , frequency of relief valve use , relief
device not exposed to operating temperature or pressure , location of relief
device , near miss incidents , etc.
Leaking valves , leaking exchanger tubes , incorrect feed stock /specification ,
inadequate quality control , process control upset reaction intermediates/by-products
, improper mixing ,ingress of air, water, or rust ,inadvertent mixing , explosive
CONTAMINATION OTHER THAN
mixtures , interconnected systems (especially services, blanket systems) , wrong
additives or catalysts , preparation for shutdown and start-up operations , solvent
flushing , etc.
Reactivity , stability/decomposition , runaway reactions, vapor pressure , saturation
points of chemicals , solubility , crystallization , particle size , settling of
PROPERTIES OTHER THAN
solids , sublimation , viscosity , inadvertent mixing , phase change , phase separation
, flammability , toxicity , MSDS information , etc.

28 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
PARAMETER GUIDEWORD EXAMPLES
HAZARDS: Toxicity , fire/explosion potential , high pressure , temperature ,
potential off-site impact, possible RMP worst case or alternate release scenario,
impact on surroundings, DETECTION: methods, time required, detectors, visibility,
odour thresholds, video monitors, routine checks, MITIGATION: methods
available, isolation points, duration of leak, containment methods, emergency
operations in spill area, procedures/training, inventory reduction, PROTECTIVE
RUPTURE / LEAK OTHER THAN
SYSTEMS: turret coverage, fire crew availability, deluge system, fire fighting
strategy, required response, alarms, evacuation procedures, emergency
showers/eyewash stations, location of SCBA , PREVENTION: root cause
elimination, materials of construction, maintenance/mechanical integrity procedures,
mechanical stress – overhead lifting procedures, overpressure protection – defect
identification, inspection methods.
STATIC ELECTRICITY, grounding arrangements, insulated vessels/equipment,
low conductance fluids, splash filling of vessels, insulated strainers and valve
components, dust generation and handling, hoses, temporary grounding for
loading/unloading, PM for grounding systems, OPEN FLAMES, flares, pilot lights,
IGNITION OTHER THAN
fired heaters, OTHER SOURCES – vehicle entry, electrical classifications, lightning,
hot surfaces, hot work/welding, hot work permits, people in area,
FLAMMABILITY - Auto ignition, upper and lower flammability limits, flash point,
fire triangle, SURROUNDING AREA
Failure of instrument air/steam/nitrogen/cooling water/hydraulic power/water or
other , contamination of instrument air, nitrogen, etc., telecommunications, heating
SERVICE FAILURE OTHER THAN
and ventilating systems, computers, backup systems, protection systems, previous
failures, etc.
Purging, flushing, start-up, normal shutdown, emergency shutdown , operations
under emergency conditions, severe weather conditions, spills, fire, turnarounds, off
shift operations, shift change, flaring, bypassed safety devices, time (sequence),
ABNORMAL
OTHER THAN startup
OPERATION
following emergency shutdown, regeneration, decoking, spills/spill containment,
evacuation plans, bypassing procedures, using extraordinary effort, extended shift
schedules, previous incidents and near misses, use of contractors, etc.
Personnel exposure, purpose of sample, sampling apparatus, environmental, spill and
leakage monitoring, sampling procedure, time for analysis result, calibration of
SAMPLING OTHER THAN automatic samplers, reliability, accuracy, or representative sample , diagnosis of
result, industrial hygiene (personnel exposure/monitoring), sample disposal, operator
intervention, process changes because of sample result, etc.
Maintenance procedures (verbal, written), working on operating ("live", "hot",
"active") equipment, preventive maintenance, predictive maintenance, isolation
philosophy, drainage, purging, cleaning, drying, blinding, hot bolting, hot and cold
MAINTENANCE OTHER THAN taps, access, rescue plan, training, pressure testing, work permit system, breaker
identification, confined space, contractors, installed/non-installed spare equipment,
availability of spares, modified specification, storage of spares, catalogue of spares,
etc., test running of spare equipment, etc.
Engineering specifications , internal/external corrosion protection, corrosion under
CORROSION / insulation, cathodic protection arrangement, embrittlement, stress corrosion cracking,
OTHER THAN
EROSION fluid velocities, inspection (testing/monitoring of piping, vessels, heat exchangers,
etc.), etc.
Training , written operating and maintenance procedures (accurate, updated,
enforced), fitness for duty, fire and gas detection systems/alarms, emergency
shutdown arrangements, contingency plans, previous near miss incidents, effluent
disposal, hazards created by others (adjacent storage areas/process plants), testing of
emergency
equipment, compliance with local/national regulations and codes, chemical storage
SAFETY OTHER THAN
excess inventory, lighting, industrial hygiene: personal protective equipment (PPE),
location of safety showers/eye wash, community awareness and emergency response
program (CAER), material safety data sheets (MSDS), fire fighting response time,
emergency training, threshold limit values (TLVs) of process materials and
methods of detection, first aid/medical resources, noise levels, lifting (back injury),
etc.
Skipped step, event does not occur, e.g., valve does not open/close, timer
NO
fails/malfunctions, service failure, relay logic prevents occurrence, etc.
Valve malfunction, timer fails, more reaction, accumulation, improper batch recipe,
MORE
TIME product quality, unwanted by-products, interruption, etc.
Improper settings on controls, failure/malfunction batch logic, increased production
LESS rates, shift change, improper instructions, operator preference, inadequate mixing,
shortcuts, etc.

29 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
PARAMETER GUIDEWORD EXAMPLES
Out of sequence, procedure/recipe error – software bug, solenoid failure, catalyst
WRONG
activity, operator interruption/error, missed communications, etc.
Two or more steps/events occur simultaneously, common cause failure (e.g., service
SAME
failure), crossed connections, parallel operation, etc.
Other Environmental Hazards Odour, Noise, Traffic movements

30 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010
APPENDIX 6 – HAZOP WORKSHEET
HAZOP Worksheet Project Title Company Name
Project Contract No.
Meeting Date: Leader: Node : 1.01
Node Details: Scribe: PEFS:

PROTECTION / RECOMMENDA
G. WORD PARAMETER DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES BY
SAFEGUARDS TIONS
No Flow No Flow
More Flow More Flow
Less Flow Less Flow
As Well Flow As well as
As Flow
Part of Flow Part of Flow
Reverse Flow Reverse Flow
Other than Flow Other Than
Flow

31
PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2009
APPENDIX 7 – HAZOP REPORT FORMAT

The HAZOP report should contain the following sections:

1.0 Introduction
The introduction to the HAZOP report should contain short descriptions of the following:

 The background to the project and the scope of the HAZOP

 The purpose and achievements of the meeting should be described.

 The terms of reference given prior to the HAZOP and other safety studies or HAZOP
minutes used for reference.

 Schedule of the meeting

 The composition and affiliation of the team including the attendance of part-time
members at each session.

 Methodology of HAZOP adopted stating any variations from normal HAZOP practice
for the study.

 Plant / Facility areas not covered because they were outside the scope of the study or
documentation or key personnel were not available.

 Description of the plant / facility.

2.0 Quality of the Study


An objective assessment of the quality of the study and the reliance, which may be placed
on the results based on team composition, experience and their performance.

3.0 Areas of Potential Weakness


Highlights potential weakness of the study such as a lack of specialist knowledge or
incomplete drawings.

4.0 Comments Applicable to the whole Plant


List and description of the general issues discovered together with their significance to the
progress of the project.

5.0 Major and Priority Findings


Complex HAZOP meetings may produce very large numbers of action items. Obviously
they cannot all be addressed at the same time and the project may have to progress whilst
they are being dealt with.

The main study findings should be discussed in the report. A list of the (top ten or so) major
issues is helpful to the response co-ordinator in expediting the important ones first.

6.0 Further Studies Required


List of recommendations that QRA or other studies (FMEA, Reliability) for easy reference
and priority action.

32
PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2009
7.0 Highlight Areas for Next HAZOP
Identification of areas that are unresolved should be made for use by the Leader of
subsequent HAZOPs or by the project safety co-ordinator.

8.0 Reports and Comments for Other Safety Reviews


Details of issues or action items that in the opinion of the HAZOP team have a direct
relevance to other project safety reviews.

9.0 Appendices
The appendices should contain the following information:

 List of guide words used

 Node list

 Worksheets

 Drawings (master set)

 List of background reference documents.

33 PTS 60.2209
DECEMBER 2010

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