Hazard Identification (HAZID) Study

PETRONAS TECHNICAL GUIDELINES
Hazard Identification (HAZID) Study
PTG 16.71.02
September 2015
© 2015 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS)

All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form
or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the permission of the copyright
owner. PETRONAS Technical Standards are Company’s internal standards and meant for authorized users only.
PTG 16.71.02
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION (HAZID) STUDY September 2015
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FOREWORD
PETRONAS Technical Guidelines (PTG) has been developed based on the accumulated knowledge,
experience, Lessons Learnt and Best Practices of the PETRONAS group supplementing PETRONAS
Technical Standards (PTS), National and International standards where appropriate. The key objective
of PTG is to guide the implementation of technical practices across the PETRONAS group.
Compliance to PTG is optional across the Group. The PTG shall remain confidential within the
PETRONAS Group and shall not be issued to Contractors / Manufacturers / Suppliers. Issuance of PTG
to third parties shall be subject to G-TA approval.
In issuing and making the PTG available, PETRONAS is not making any warranty on the accuracy or
completeness of the information contained in PTG. The end-users shall ensure accuracy and
completeness of the PGT used for the intended application.
PETRONAS is the sole copyright holder of PTG. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored
in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, recording or
otherwise) or be disclosed by users to any company or person whomsoever, without the prior written
consent of PETRONAS.
The PTG shall be used exclusively for the authorised purpose. The users shall arrange for PTG to be
kept in safe custody and shall ensure its secrecy is maintained and provide satisfactory information to
PETRONAS that this requirement is met.
PTG 16.71.02
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Table of Contents
1.0 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 4

1.1 SCOPE ............................................................................................................................ 4
1.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS..................................................................................................... 4
1.3 SUMMARY OF CHANGES ............................................................................................... 5
2.0 GENERAL REQUIREMENT ....................................................................................... 6
2.1 HAZID STUDY LEADER .................................................................................................... 6
2.2 HAZID STUDY SCRIBE ..................................................................................................... 7
2.3 HAZID STUDY TEAM MEMBERS ..................................................................................... 7
3.0 HAZID STUDY METHODOLOGY ............................................................................... 8
3.1 PREPARATION ................................................................................................................ 8
3.2 CONDUCTING HAZID STUDY .......................................................................................... 9
3.3 HAZID STUDY RECORDING AND REPORTING ............................................................... 12
3.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS AND FOLLOW UP ..................................................... 12
4.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................... 13
APPENDIX 1: HAZID STUDY CATEGORY AND GUIDE WORDS ............................................ 14
APPENDIX 2: HAZID STUDY WORKSHEET ......................................................................... 23
APPENDIX 3: SAMPLE OF HAZID STUDY REPORT TEMPLATE ............................................ 24
PTG 16.71.02
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This PTS provides the guideline of Hazard Identification (HAZID) study for early identification
of HSE hazards in developing new projects or modification of existing facilities. HAZID study
forms the essential first step of a risk assessment to review the effectiveness of selected safety
measures to achieve a tolerable residual risk and to establish the hazards and effects register.
1.1 SCOPE
The scope of this PTS covers the guideline of HAZID study for new developments and
modifications, upgrades or re-design of existing facilities where process modifications
associated with consequences for safety or safety related equipment are involved.
1.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS
1.2.1 General Definition of Terms & Abbreviations
Refer to PTS 00.01.03 Requirements, General Definition of Terms, Abbreviations and Reading
Guide for General Definition of Terms & Abbreviations.
A glossary of commonly used terms in HSE is given in both PTS for HSEMS (PTS 18.00.01) and
HEMP (PTS 18.04.02) under GHSE.
1.2.2 Specific Definition of Terms
No Terms Description
Causes / A possible event that will potentially release a hazard and

1
Threats cause an incident
An event or chain of events that results from the hazard

2 Consequence
being released
A hazard is anything that can cause harm, injury to people

3 Hazard or damage to facility and equipment (e.g. physical,
chemical, biological, ergonomic and psychosocial hazards)
The 'release' of a hazard. The undesired event at the end

of the fault tree and at the beginning of an event tree.
Hazardous events include: Loss of Containment,
Hazardous
4 Structural Failure, Dropped Objects, Exceeding
Event
Occupational Exposure Limit, Loss of Control, Falls to
Same Level, Falls to Lower Level, Oxygen Deficiency, Loss
of Separation, Electrical Shock, and Explosion.
A qualitative technique for early identification of

Hazard
5 potential hazards and threats, both from internal and
Identification
external factors that could affect the facilities
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No Terms Description
A term which combines the likelihood that a specified

6 Risk undesired event will occur and the severity of the impact
of the event
Table 1 Specific Definition of Terms

1.2.3 Specific Abbreviations
No Abbreviation Description
1 HAZID Hazard Identification
2 HAZOP Hazards and Operability
3 HEMP Hazards and Effects Management Process
4 HER Hazard and Effect Register
5 HSEMS Health, Safety and Environment Management System
6 LOPA Layer of Protection Analysis
7 P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
8 PFD Process Flow Diagram
9 PHA Process Hazard Analysis
10 TOR Terms of Reference
Table 2 Specific Abbreviations
1.3 SUMMARY OF CHANGES
This PTS 16.71.02 replaces PTS 60.2004 (January, 2011).

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2.0 GENERAL REQUIREMENT

HAZID study shall be conducted to all new projects and modifications of existing facilities and
be documented at an early stage in plant life cycle – conceptual and Front End Engineering
Design stage. HAZID study covers process, utilities including buildings and machinery and
external facility hazards and layout.
HAZID study shall identify qualitatively all types of potential hazards and threats, both from
internal and external factors that could affect the facilities and also identifies scenarios with
consequence affecting beyond plant boundary. This analysis is done on the primary process
and non-process hazards so that possible escalations can be identified base on the structured
manner of the HAZID study technique.
HAZID study shall be led by a HAZID study Leader with experienced multi-discipline team and
uses guide words to assess the potential hazards and HSE issues.
The relevant Facility/Project Owner for each HAZID study shall be accountable for close out
by the identified action parties (e.g. designer, operation, engineers) .
2.1 HAZID STUDY LEADER

2.1.1 Competency
HAZID study Leader shall have the required skills:
i. Trained with the HAZID study methodologies and processes

ii. HAZID study Leader should also experience using other risk assessment tools e.g.
HAZOP, LOPA
iii. HAZID study Leader shall be independent from the project or activity
2.1.2 Roles and Responsibilities
The roles and responsibilities of the HAZID study Leader are as follows:
i. Identify the adequacy of the team members to ensure the effectiveness of the
study
ii. Lead the team through the HAZID study technique
iii. Facilitate the brainstorming effort
iv. Manage the discussion without compromising the quality of the process
v. Identify, discuss and resolve the key issues as they are raised by the team
vi. Record the findings and ensure that the minutes fully reflect the discussion and
resolutions
During facilitation of the HAZID study workshop, the followings should be considered by the
HAZID study Leader:
i. Process and non-process hazards

ii. Global issues i.e. health, environmental, security
iii. Project implementation issues
iv. Location and layout
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v. Regulatory requirements / Local authority requirements
2.2 HAZID STUDY SCRIBE
2.2.1 Competency
HAZID study Scribe should be trained and be familiar with the HAZID methodologies,
processes and format for HAZID documentation and reporting.
2.2.2 Roles and Responsibilities
The role and responsibilities of HAZID study Scribe is to record discussions during HAZID study.
The record shall be complete and accurate with adequate detail. This includes a complete
record of points discussed and not just a record of recommendation.
2.3 HAZID STUDY TEAM MEMBERS
2.3.1 The team member should comprise of disciplines with the right combination of breadth and
depth of the facilities
2.3.2 For project, the key members of the team should include experienced personnel available
from the following disciplines:
i. Project engineering
ii. Process engineering
iii. Mechanical engineering
iv. Operations
v. Specialists in respective field e.g. Reservoir Engineers, HSE, etc. The team
composition should be adjusted to the needs of the study accordingly.
2.3.3 HAZID study Leader should review the team members proposed by the Facility/Project Owner
and identify any other resource requirements.
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3.0 HAZID STUDY METHODOLOGY
3.1 PREPARATION
HAZID study Leader shall prepare a Terms of Reference (TOR) to be submitted to the
Facility/Project Owner detailing the following:
i. Scope of the study – facility and modes of operations, detail of nodes or section
to be covered in the HAZID study workshop
ii. Team members required
iii. Information required
iv. Guide words to be used
v. Schedule and plan
3.1.1 Scope of Study
The scope of the study should be clearly mentioned in the TOR, such as facility and modes of
operations, detail of nodes or sections to be covered.
3.1.2 Team Selection
The team members are selected based on the scope of the HAZID study. Selection of HAZID
study team is described in Section 2.3 above.
3.1.3 Information Required
HAZID study Leader shall identify information required to perform the study depending on the
scope. The following information and document are required for a HAZID study:
i. Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) / Process Flow Diagram (PFD)

ii. Facility layout
iii. Process description including all planned operating cases
iv. Project description including all options, life cycle issues and planned facility
flexibility
v. HSE philosophy
vi. Operating philosophy
HAZID study carried out during project feasibility requires further the following information:
i. Project Initiation Form

ii. Feasibility Studies
iii. Policy Statements (e.g. HSE policy)
iv. Key (development) Discussion Papers
v. Field (Reservoir) Development Plans
vi. Relevant PETRONAS Group Standards
vii. Baseline Surveys
viii. Key Legislative Documents
ix. Description of Operational Environment
x. Environmental Regulations
xi. Key Philosophy Documents
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3.1.4 HAZID Study Guide Words
HAZID study Leader shall identify appropriate HAZID study guide words applicable to the
scope of the study. As a minimum, Appendix 1 provides a list of guide words applicable for
project. The guide words are grouped into different categories which can be applied for global
use (hazards that apply to facility as a whole) or specific unit/area. The HAZID study guide
words are comprehensive but not exhaustive. The HAZID study team can identify other
possible guide words for specific or novel technology.
3.1.5 Schedule and Plan
The TOR shall establish the schedule and duration for the HAZID study. HAZID study Leader
shall plan and schedule the study to optimise time and resources considering the scope and
complexity of the facility.
3.2 CONDUCTING HAZID STUDY
The typical HAZID study work flow is illustrated in Figure 1 below:

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Figure 1: HAZID Study Process Work Flow
3.2.1 Select Unit or Area to be studied
HAZID study Leader and team members are to select unit or area (e.g. Warehouse, non-
process area and scheduled waste storage area) to be analysed, before starting the study.
HAZID study Leader shall ensure the size of unit or area is manageable and not too big to make
the hazard identification process be more structured and focused.
3.2.2 Apply the Appropriate Guide Word from the List
HAZID study Leader shall select appropriate guide words from the agreed list and apply to the
process unit or area to be studied. HAZID study Leader shall explain the intent of the guide
word, to ensure team members understand and be able to identify any potential HSE issues
relevant to the unit or area.
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3.2.3 Identify All Possible Causes
The HAZID study team shall brainstorm and list all the possible causes before proceeding with
the consequences. The possible causes shall be credible and specific for the selected process
unit or area.
The study shall identify hazards for the whole facility or project as a single entity first and
subsequently move on to the specific process unit or area based on the guide words.
3.2.4 Assessment of All Credible Consequences
HAZID study team shall assess and record the credible consequences of each cause by
assuming that there is no safeguard in place.
The consequence statement shall consist of immediate impact to the worst credible
consequence that may happen. For example, passing of drain valve will lead to “spill of
methanol leading to pool fire”.
Consequences shall consider the effect to People, Environment, Asset and/or Reputation and
also from inside or outside of the unit or area under the study.
3.2.5 Identify Existing Safeguards
HAZID study team shall identify and assess the adequacy of the existing safeguards in
preventing or controlling the effect of the hazards. Assessment shall be based on engineering
standards, regulatory requirements and the team consensus.
Safeguards can be categorized into three (3) types:
i. Prevention - prevent causes or consequences from happening (e.g. check valves,

relief devices, trip system)
ii. Detection - detect causes or consequences (e.g. alarms)
iii. Mitigation - control or reduce the consequences (e.g. ERP, tank bund)
Safeguards can be hardware or engineering control (e.g. PSV, bund, ESD) as well as
administrative control (e.g. procedure, policy).
3.2.6 Propose Recommendations
HAZID study team shall propose recommendations when the existing safeguards are not
adequate to protect the unit or area under study. Recommendations may be in the form of
preventing the hazardous event or mitigating its consequences. The aim of the
recommendations shall be to reduce the risks to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
Recommendations should be presented in the form of:
i. What is required to be done

ii. Where the recommendation applies
iii. Why is the recommendation necessary
Each recommendation shall be assigned with action party and a due date.
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3.3 HAZID STUDY RECORDING AND REPORTING
3.3.1 During the study, HAZID study discussion shall be recorded on a HAZID Study Worksheet (see
Appendix 2).
3.3.2 The record shall be complete and accurate. This includes recording all HSE issues discussed
even though the issues do not cause significant consequences and no recommendations are
generated.
3.3.3 HAZID study Leader shall prepare the HAZID study report after completion of a study and be
reviewed by team members prior to the formal and timely issue. Example of HAZID study
report is given in Appendix 3.
3.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS AND FOLLOW UP
3.4.1 The recommendations arising from the HAZID study should be presented to the
Facility/Project Owner by the HAZID study Leader or representative. The relevant
Facility/Project Owner is accountable for the implementation, tracking and close out of HAZID
study recommendations.
3.4.2 When the recommendation is rejected, this shall be supported by a justification and approval
by relevant parties including HSE representative. This shall be properly documented in action
closed out sheet, for future references.
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4.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY
In this PTS, reference is made to the following Standards/Publications. Unless specifically

designated by date, the latest edition of each publication shall be used, together with any
supplements / revisions thereto:
PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS
Index to PTS PTS 00.01.01
PTS Requirements, General Definition of Terms & PTS 00.01.03

Reading Guide
Health, Safety and Environment Management PTS 18.00.01

System – HSEMS
Hazards And Effects Management Process – PTS 18.04.02

HEMP
Process Hazard Analysis - PHA PTS 18.53.04

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APPENDIX 1: HAZID STUDY CATEGORY AND GUIDE WORDS
The list below recognises the major hazards found by experience of previous HAZID studies. It
is not intended to be totally exhaustive and constant feedback from users is appreciated to
maintain the most effective current working version.
The main categories are:
Category 1: External and environmental hazards
 Natural and Environmental Hazards

 Environmental Damage
 Created (Man-made) Hazards
 Effect of the Facility on the Surroundings
 Infrastructure
Category 2: Facility hazards
 Control Methods
 Philosophy
 Fire and Explosion Hazards
 Process Hazards
 Utility Systems
 Maintenance Hazards
 Construction Hazards
Category 3: Health hazards
 Health Hazards
Category 4: Project implementation issues
 Hazards Recognition and Management

 Contracting Strategy
 Contingency
 Planning
 Competency
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CATEGORY 1: External and Environmental Hazards
Sub-Category Guide word Expander

High or low temperature, high waves, wind
Climate Extremes (typhoon, tornado), dust, flooding, sandstorms,
ice, blizzards
Natural and
Lightning
Environmental
Earthquakes
Hazards
Erosion Ground slide, coastal, riverine
Ground structure, foundations, reservoir
Subsidence
depletion
Continuous Plant
Effluent Flares, vents, fugitive emissions,
Discharges to Air
Continuous Plant
Effluent Target/legislative requirements, drainage
Discharges to facilities, oil/water separation
Water
Continuous Plant
Effluent Drainage, chemical storage, spillage
Discharges to Soil
Environmental
Emergency/upset
Damage
Discharges to Flares, vents, drainage
air/water/soil
Contaminated
Previous use or events
Ground
Area minimisation, pipeline routing,
Facility Impact
environmental impact assessment
Waste Disposal
Domestic waste, schedule waste
Options
Timing of
Seasons, periods of environmental significance
Construction
Security Hazards Internal and external security threats
Created (Man-made)
Riots, civil disturbance, strikes, military action,
Hazards Terrorist Activity
political unrest
Geographical Plant/equipment location, facility layout, pipeline
Infrastructure routing, area minimisation
Proximity to
Village, school
Population
Adjacent Land Use Crop burning, airfields, accommodation camps
Effect of the Facility
Proximity to
on the
Transport Shipping lanes, air routes, roads, etc.
Surroundings
Corridors
Environmental Previous land use, vulnerable fauna and
Issues flora, visual impact
Local culture, attitude, sensitive issues,
Social Issues
areas of significance
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Normal
Road links, air links, water links
Communications
Infrastructure Communications
during emergency
Supply Support Consumables/spares holding
CATEGORY 2: Facility Hazards

Manning/operations Effect on design, effect on locality (Manned,
Control Methods
Philosophy unmanned, visited)
Operations Concept 1 train, x-trains, simplification
Plant/train/equipment item, heavy lifting,
Maintenance
access, override, bypass, commonality of
Philosophy
equipment, spare part
Control
Appropriate technology (DCS/local panels)
Philosophy
Accommodations, travel, support
Philosophy
Manning Levels requirements. Consistency with operations
and maintenance, etc.
Isolation, ESD philosophy, blow down, flaring
Emergency Response
requirements
Concurrent
Production, maintenance requirements
Operations
Start-up Shutdown Unit or plant wide
Improper storage, operator error (release),
defect, impact, fire (mitigation measures
Stored Flammables
include: substitute non-flammable, minimise
and separate inventory)
Electricity, flares, sparks hot surfaces.
Mitigation measures include identify,
remove, separate
Fuel - Liquid above flash point, flammable
dust cloud, passing valve, flame-out in
Sources of Ignition furnace, passing valve, combustible material
Fire and Explosion Oxidant – Inadequate purging, inertisation
Hazards failure, air in leak
Static, hot surface above air, hot work,
pyrophoric material, lightning, incinerator
flash-back, metal-to-metal, thermite reaction
Confinement, escalation following release of
explosive or flammable fluid (operator error,
defect, impact process control failure,
Equipment Layout corrosion), module layout/proximity,
orientation of equipment, predominant wind
direction (mitigation measures include:
reduce degree of confinement, spacing based
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on consequence assessment, escalation
barriers)
Active/passive protection, fire/gas detection,
Fire Protection and
blowdown/relief system philosophy, fire
Response
fighting facilities
Means of escape, PPE, communications,
Operator Protection
emergency response, plant evacuation
Excess hazardous material (mitigation
measures include: minimise hazardous
Hazardous Inventory
inventory, alternate processes and utility
systems)
Excessive process stress, impact (penetration
by foreign object, vehicle crash, crane lifting
failure, excavator, construction/excavation
error, knock-on hazard), process control
failure, structural failure, erosion or corrosion
(mitigation measures include: recognise and
Release of Inventory
minimise process hazards during design,
inherently safe plant, containment and
recovery measures), internal corrosion,
external corrosion, erosion, stress corrosion,
high temp corrosion, thermal creep, fatigue,
bearing wear, under lagging corrosion
Block in - Valve closed in error, blocked
equipment, freezing
Pressure - Overheating, control failure,
pressure letdown, pump dead head, roll-
Process Hazards
over, water hammer, tube rupture, regulator
failure, external fire, ambient heating,
High/ Low Pressure
thermal expansion, tank overfill, pressure
surge, chemical reaction, process connected
to utility system
Vacuum – Ambient cooling, control failure,
extraction, pump-out, gravity draining,
condensation, absorption
Atmospheric conditions, blowdown, fire, hot
surfaces, chemical reaction, control failure,
High/Low Temperature
flash cooling, poor heat transfer, rapid
heating/cooling, external fire
Overfill storage tanks, loss of function in
High/Low level separation vessels, blow-by to downstream
vessels
Offsite contamination, failure of separation
Wrong
process, build-up of wrong phase (sand,
composition/Phase
hydrates, etc.), toxic substances
Low or no flow occurs,
High/ Low Flow
High flow occurs/reverse flow occurs
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ADDITIONS - Contamination, wrong
substance, high concentration, water
present, lack of inhibitor, overcharging,
wrong sequence of addition, addition rate
Runaway Reaction too fast/slow
CONDITIONS - Loss of cooling, temperature
control failure, low temperature
accumulation, agitator failure, high ambient
temperature, pump overheating
Tanker drive away, wrong fabrication
material, poor welding, fork truck puncture,
sabotage
Time/Sequence - Not enough time to
respond, too soon/too late, wrong sequence
Human Error Action – Too much/too little, wrong action,
(Mistreatment of incorrect chemical used
process normally Task characteristics
due to inadequate
training or poorly Work organisation
written instructions)
Training
Ergonomics
Surroundings
Information - Too much/too little,
incorrect/incomplete
Equipment failure – level gauge failure, level
control failure, spurious relief, reverse flow,
coupling failure, scrubber failure, control
system fault, passing valve
Mal-operation of Human Error - Valve left open in error,
Openings decontamination, washout, route selection
error, charge full tank in error, manhole open
in error, isolation error during maintenance,
instrument repair error, live equipment
opened in error
 Flammability
 Thermal instability
 Flash points
 Safe storage temperature
Material Problems
 Safe storage pressure
 Toxicity
 Corrosivity
 Two phase Flow
Equipment failure – Seal wear, corroded
Leak bolts, gasket wear, vibration on
pump/agitator
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Human Error – Poor assembly, wrong
fabrication material
Testing schedules should be reviewed
Pumps fail/leak/cavitate,
Compressor fails/leaks/ surge valve fails
closed/fails open/leaks,
Agitator stops/agitation insufficient
Control Instrumentation
Control loop fails (temp, press, flow, level),
Process computer/distributed control system
fails,
Equipment & Failure condition is inappropriate (fail-safe
Instrument Malfunction Philosophy),
Set point of alarms, trips,
SIPS issues.
Safety Instrumentation
Shutdown fails (flow, temp, press, level),
Detector fails (LEL, toxic gas)
Safety Devices
Emergency relief fails (open, closed,
capacity),
Fire protection system fails or inadequate
Analytical or Sampling
Sample not taken, Sample not analysed, Test
Errors (e.g. failure to
Results are delayed, Test Results are
obtain critical process
incorrect, Sample is thermally unstable,
data or injuries to lab
Sample is pressure sensitive
technicians)
Purging, Flushing, Emergency Shutdown,
Abnormal Operation
Start-up
An internal fire occurs, An internal explosion
occurs, A physical overpressure occurs, Fire-
Fighting response time, A toxic release occurs
Emergency Operation
in a nearby unit, Combination failures,
Emergency system inoperative (not tested,
etc.)
The event or scenario is not covered by the
emergency plan, An event of this magnitude
is not addressed by the emergency plan,
Emergency Response
Emergency plan is out of date, Resources for
Plan
coping with scenario are inadequate,
Response team has not been trained to deal
with this type of scenario
Firewater Systems
Fuel Gas
Utility System Heating Medium
Diesel Fuel
Power Supply
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Steam
Open and close drain system
Drains
Process and non-process
Inert Gas
Storage Chemical/Fuel, waste material, sewerage
Potable Water/Cooling
Water
Refrigeration Failure
HVAC Failure
Air Supply Failure
Communication
System Fails
Contamination of
Air, N2, Steam, Oil
Spares availability, Maintenance Schedule,
Preventive Maintenance Plan, Quality
Assurance, Accessibility, Ergonomics, Wrong
tools, Access requirements, Override
maintenance
necessity, Bypasses required, Commonality
activities, preparing
of equipment, Heavy lifting, Transport tie-ins
resources, carrying out
Maintenance Hazard (shutdown requirements) Concurrent
work, failure to do
operations, Reuse of material, common
work, injuries to
equipment capacity, Interface –
workers
shutdown / blowdown / ESD, skid dimensions
(weight handling / equipment congestion),
soil contamination (existing facilities),
Mobilisation / demobilisation
Tie-in to Live Plant Hydrocarbon, Tie-in to Existing Production
and Test Header (Cold Tie-in)
On Land Personal Incompetent Driver, Poor Vehicle Condition
Transfer
Dynamic Situation Use of Hazardous Hand Tools (Grinding,
Hazard Cutting)
Other Flammable Cellulosic Materials (Packing Material, Paper
Material Rubbish)
Pressure Bottled Gases Under Pressure, Hydro Test
Associated with Personnel at height > 2 meters, Personnel
Construction Hazard
Difference in Height Working Inside Trench, Overhead Equipment
Electricity Voltage
Asphyxiates Insufficient Oxygen (O2) Atmosphere
Toxic Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S), Mercury (Hg), Dust
Disease Food Borne Bacteria (Contaminated Food),
Water Borne Bacteria (Legionella, Cholera),
Parasitic Insect (Bed, Bugs, Mosquito, Flies),
Contagious Disease (Cold / Flu Virus / HIV),
Animal (Dogs, Rats), Allergy (Food / Animal
Allergy)
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CATEGORY 3: Health Hazards

Endemic diseases, infection, malarial
mosquitoes, hygiene - personal and/or
Disease Hazards catering, contaminated water or foodstuff,
social, e.g. AIDS, etc. stagnant water, poor
living conditions
Asphyxiating atmospheres, failure to use
Asphyxiation hazards appropriate PPE, vessel entry, working in
confined spaces, smoke, exhaust, vent
Carcinogenic Chemicals in use
Hazardous atmosphere, chemical expose
Toxic
Health Hazards during activity,
Noise, radiation (ionising, e.g. radioactive
Physical scale or non-ionising, e.g. flares, UV,
sunlight), ergonomics, hot surface
Mental Shift patterns, long working hours
Diving, working in water, working at heights,
Working Hazards hazardous equipment, hazardous surfaces,
electricity
Excessive journeys, extreme weather, quality
Transport/Passage of roads (mitigation measures include:
effective journey management)
CATEGORY 4: Project Implementation Issues

Hazard Studies, HSE
HAZOP, QRA, FIREPRAN, PHR, EA, HRA,CHRA
Case, Hazards & Effect
Hazards and Risks etc.
Register
Recognition and
Quality assurance (change control,
Management
Project Controls interdepartmental involvement and
interfaces)
Stability and contractual conditions,
Prevailing Influence
contractor selection constraints
Legislation Governmental contracting requirements
Contracting
Additional engineering and construction
Strategy External Standards
standards
External Environmental
Governmental environmental requirements
Constraints
Geographical
Contingency Facility location, Facility layout
Infrastructure
Medical support, fire fighting support, spill
Emergency
Recovery Measures leak/clean-up support, security/military
Planning
support, evacuation
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Level of Training,
Competency Training Requirements, Quality of local workforce and contractors
Level of Technology
PTG 16.71.02
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APPENDIX 2: HAZID STUDY WORKSHEET
Risk Matrix
Guide Word Causes Consequences Safeguards Recommendation
S L RR
PTG 16.71.02
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APPENDIX 3: SAMPLE OF HAZID STUDY REPORT TEMPLATE
(Front page)
Project Title Piping Tie-in Provision at Y Section of Z Plant

Project Number XXX
Title of HAZID DD/MM/YYYY
Time e.g. 0900hrs – 1700hrs
Venue e.g. Menara Dayabumi, KL
HAZID REPORT DISTRIBUTION LIST

No Name Distribution List
1 Ramlee B Puteh √
2 Lee Cheng Kang √
3 Muthusamy A/L Rajagopal √
PTG 16.71.02
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TABLE OF CONTENT
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2. INTRODUCTION
3. PURPOSE
4. SCOPE
5. DOCUMENTS INVOLVED
6. HAZID TEAM MEMBER
7. BASIS OF STUDY
7.1. HAZID TECHNIQUE
7.2. HAZID ASSUMPTION
7.3. AREAS NOT COVERED
7.4. DISCLAIMER
8. RECOMMENDATIONS
APPENDIX A: HAZID WORKSHEET
APPENDIX B: DRAWINGS
PTG 16.71.02
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Content:
 HAZID Study conducted for what and where (scope and location)
 When was the HAZID study done and by whom (organizations involved) and for
how long
 Key highlights of HAZID study findings
 Number of recommendations
2. INTRODUCTION
 Describe the project/modification being studied, organization that will execute it
and estimated date of execution
3. PURPOSE
The purpose of HAZID, e.g. to identify hazards, assess risks and come out with some risk control
measures to mitigate the identified issues in order to assist the team to come up with a risk
based decision to address the issues.
4. SCOPE
The scope of the study, e.g. confined to identify and analyse the hazards and risk associated
with the current facilities at Plant Z in associated with the piping tie-in works. The focus is on
process safety issues and its impact on people, environment, assets and reputation. The
HAZID shall address preventive and mitigative aspects of hazardous events that may occur
within Plant Z.
5. DOCUMENTS INVOLVED (e.g. Drawing, P&ID, etc.)

The relevant Drawings/P&ID’s had been used extensively in the study (sample as follows):
Drawing No. Drawing Title Place(s) Used

9000-PLANT Z-12-08-DRWGPR- INSTRUMENT AND NITROGEN
System 1
01 SUPPLY SYSTEM
9000-PLANT Z-12-08-DRWGPR-
GAS METERING SKID System 2
02
6. HAZID TEAM MEMBER

The attendance of each team member in the HAZID session is shown in the attendance sheets
below:
Session
Team Members
DD/MM/YYYY
Name Company Expertise Hrs
Ali B Rahim OPU A HAZID Leader Full 8
Razali B Awal OPU B HAZID Scribe Full 8
M Kamal B Umar OPU C Mechanical/Piping Partial 4
PTG 16.71.02
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7. BASIS OF STUDY
7.1. HAZID Technique

HAZID study was conducted as per PTS 16.71.02 HAZID Study.
7.2 HAZID Assumption, e.g.:

Throughout the HAZID study workshop, the following assumptions were adopted:
 In principle, only single failure results in hazard – no double jeopardy unless
credible
 All equipment are well designed, manufactured and properly inspected
 Facilities is well maintained and operated with acceptable standard
 The system will perform as the design intends
 Failure of safeguarding/interlock system were not considered
7.3 Areas Not Covered

Other than scope in Section 4.
7.4 Disclaimer
The results of this HAZID study are based on the collective knowledge of the HAZID study
team at the time of the meeting. Best efforts were employed to identify potential hazards
to this operating unit. However, since the HAZID study is the predictive tool that relies
somewhat on foresight, therefore whilst a robust HAZID study was completed, it is
unrealistic to assume that the team addressed every potential hazards of this operating
unit.
8. RECOMMENDATIONS
e.g. the HAZID study has identified a number of potential operational hazards associated with
the installation and operational of the new facilities. Recommendations were given in light of
the inadequacy of safeguards for each issue or cause within each deviation. A total of 19
recommendations were proposed. The HAZID study’s recommendations and follow up action
items are listed below:
Recommendations Place(s) Used Responsibility

Causes: 1.1.1.1
To use stainless steel valve for
(1st digit: guide word, 2nd
Instrument Air System at new Company/Person’s
digit: causes, 3rd digit:
piping to Plant Z to prevent issue name
consequences, 4th digit:
of leakages for thread joint
recommendations)

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What is the purpose of conducting a HAZID study?

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PETRONAS TECHNICAL GUIDELINES

Hazard Identification (HAZID) Study

© 2015 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS)

1.0 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 4

1.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS

1.2.1 General Definition of Terms & Abbreviations

1.2.2 Specific Definition of Terms

Causes / A possible event that will potentially release a hazard and

An event or chain of events that results from the hazard

A hazard is anything that can cause harm, injury to people

The 'release' of a hazard. The undesired event at the end

A qualitative technique for early identification of

A term which combines the likelihood that a specified

Table 1 Specific Definition of Terms

1 HAZID Hazard Identification

2 HAZOP Hazards and Operability

3 HEMP Hazards and Effects Management Process

4 HER Hazard and Effect Register

5 HSEMS Health, Safety and Environment Management System

6 LOPA Layer of Protection Analysis

7 P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram

8 PFD Process Flow Diagram

9 PHA Process Hazard Analysis

10 TOR Terms of Reference

Table 2 Specific Abbreviations

1.3 SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This PTS 16.71.02 replaces PTS 60.2004 (January, 2011).

2.0 GENERAL REQUIREMENT

2.1 HAZID STUDY LEADER

HAZID study Leader shall have the required skills:

i. Trained with the HAZID study methodologies and processes

2.1.2 Roles and Responsibilities

i. Process and non-process hazards

v. Regulatory requirements / Local authority requirements

2.2 HAZID STUDY SCRIBE

2.2.2 Roles and Responsibilities

2.3 HAZID STUDY TEAM MEMBERS

3.0 HAZID STUDY METHODOLOGY

3.1.1 Scope of Study

3.1.2 Team Selection

3.1.3 Information Required

i. Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) / Process Flow Diagram (PFD)

i. Project Initiation Form

3.1.4 HAZID Study Guide Words

3.1.5 Schedule and Plan

3.2 CONDUCTING HAZID STUDY

The typical HAZID study work flow is illustrated in Figure 1 below:

Figure 1: HAZID Study Process Work Flow

3.2.1 Select Unit or Area to be studied

3.2.2 Apply the Appropriate Guide Word from the List

3.2.3 Identify All Possible Causes

3.2.4 Assessment of All Credible Consequences

3.2.5 Identify Existing Safeguards

Safeguards can be categorized into three (3) types:

i. Prevention - prevent causes or consequences from happening (e.g. check valves,