Leg Forms Reviewer
Leg Forms Reviewer
Leg Forms Reviewer
FORMS
Patrick Edward Balisong
I. NOTARIAL LAW
A. Sources of Notarial Law
ARTICLE 2
EACH CONTRACTING STATE SHALL EXEMPT FROM LEGALISATION
DOCUMENTS TO WHICH THE PRESENT CONVENTION APPLIES AND WHICH
HAVE TO BE PRODUCED IN ITS TERRITORY. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE
PRESENT CONVENTION, LEGALISATION MEANS ONLY THE FORMALITY BY
WHICH THE DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR AGENTS OF THE COUNTRY IN
WHICH THE DOCUMENT HAS TO BE PRODUCED CERTIFY THE AUTHENTICITY
OF THE SIGNATURE, THE CAPACITY IN WHICH THE PERSON SIGNING THE
DOCUMENT HAS ACTED AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, THE IDENTITY OF THE
SEAL OR STAMP WHICH IT BEARS.
ARTICLE 3
THE ONLY FORMALITY THAT MAY BE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO CERTIFY THE
AUTHENTICITY OF THE SIGNATURE, THE CAPACITY IN WHICH THE PERSON
SIGNING THE DOCUMENT HAS ACTED AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, THE
IDENTITY OF THE SEAL OR STAMP WHICH IT BEARS, IS THE ADDITION OF THE
CERTIFICATE DESCRIBED IN ARTICLE 4, ISSUED BY THE COMPETENT
AUTHORITY OF THE STATE FROM WHICH THE DOCUMENT EMANATES.
ARTICLE 4
THE CERTIFICATE REFERRED TO IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 3
SHALL BE PLACED ON THE DOCUMENT ITSELF OR ON AN "ALLONGE"; IT
SHALL BE IN THE FORM OF THE MODEL ANNEXED TO THE PRESENT
CONVENTION.
ARTICLE 5
THE CERTIFICATE SHALL BE ISSUED AT THE REQUEST OF THE PERSON WHO
HAS SIGNED THE DOCUMENT OR OF ANY BEARER.
ARTICLE 6
EACH CONTRACTING STATE SHALL DESIGNATE BY REFERENCE TO THEIR
OFFICIAL FUNCTION, THE AUTHORITIES WHO ARE COMPETENT TO ISSUE
THE CERTIFICATE REFERRED TO IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 3.
ARTICLE 7
EACH OF THE AUTHORITIES DESIGNATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE
6 SHALL KEEP A REGISTER OR CARD INDEX IN WHICH IT SHALL RECORD THE
CERTIFICATES ISSUED, SPECIFYING:
(B) THE NAME OF THE PERSON SIGNING THE PUBLIC DOCUMENT AND
THE CAPACITY IN WHICH HE HAS ACTED, OR IN THE CASE OF
UNSIGNED DOCUMENTS, THE NAME OF THE AUTHORITY WHICH
HAS AFFIXED THE SEAL OR STAMP.
ARTICLE 8
WHEN A TREATY, CONVENTION OR AGREEMENT BETWEEN TWO OR MORE
CONTRACTING STATES CONTAINS PROVISIONS WHICH SUBJECT THE
CERTIFICATION OF A SIGNATURE, SEAL OR STAMP TO CERTAIN
FORMALITIES, THE PRESENT CONVENTION WILL ONLY OVERRIDE SUCH
PROVISIONS IF THOSE FORMALITIES ARE MORE RIGOROUS THAN THE
FORMALITY REFERRED TO IN ARTICLES 3 AND 4.
ARTICLE 9
EACH CONTRACTING STATE SHALL TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO
PREVENT THE PERFORMANCE OF LEGALISATIONS BY ITS DIPLOMATIC OR
CONSULAR AGENTS IN CASES WHERE THE PRESENT CONVENTION
PROVIDES FOR EXEMPTION.
8 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
ARTICLE 10
THE PRESENT CONVENTION SHALL BE OPEN FOR SIGNATURE BY THE
STATES REPRESENTED AT THE NINTH SESSION OF THE HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ICELAND,
IRELAND, LIECHTENSTEIN AND TURKEY.
ARTICLE 11
THE PRESENT CONVENTION SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE ON THE SIXTIETH
DAY AFTER THE DEPOSIT OF THE THIRD INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION
REFERRED TO IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 10.
ARTICLE 12
ANY STATE NOT REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 10 MAY ACCEDE TO THE
PRESENT CONVENTION AFTER IT HAS ENTERED INTO FORCE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 11. THE
INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION SHALL BE DEPOSITED WITH THE MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS.
ARTICLE 13
ANY STATE MAY, AT THE TIME OF SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION OR
ACCESSION, DECLARE THAT THE PRESENT CONVENTION SHALL EXTEND TO
ALL THE TERRITORIES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF WHICH IT IS
RESPONSIBLE, OR TO ONE OR MORE OF THEM. SUCH A DECLARATION SHALL
TAKE EFFECT ON THE DATE OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION
FOR THE STATE CONCERNED.
HAS ACCEDED, THE CONVENTION SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE FOR THE
TERRITORIES CONCERNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 12.
ARTICLE 14
THE PRESENT CONVENTION SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE FOR FIVE YEARS
FROM THE DATE OF ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 11, EVEN FOR STATES WHICH HAVE
RATIFIED IT OR ACCEDED TO IT SUBSEQUENTLY.
ARTICLE 15
THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS SHALL GIVE
NOTICE TO THE STATES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 10, AND TO THE STATES
WHICH HAVE ACCEDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 12, OF THE
FOLLOWING:
DYCOCO v. ORINA
July 30, 2010 | Carpio Morales, J. | Act No. 2103
PETITIONER: Virgilio Dycoco, Cristino Grafilo, Jose Grafilo and Adolfo Grafilo
RESPONDENTS: Adelaida Orina and German Orina
SUMMARY: Dycoco allegedly executed a REM on a property to Orina. Dycoco claims that his
signature was forged. Orina was only able to present a photocopy of the REM. Dycoco calims that
he was not in the Philippines during the date that the REM was signed. RTC and CA sided with
Orina saying that there is no sufficient proof that Dycoco was not in the Philippines, and that he
was not presented as witness to testify regarding the genuineness of the documents he used to
prove that he was not in the Philippines.
The issues in this case are Whether the signature is authentic and Whether Dycoco needed
to be presented as witness.
SC held that it was upon Orina to prove that Dycoco’s signature is genuine. A
mere photocopy of the REM was presented. When the genuineness of signatures on a document is
sought to be proved or disproved through comparison of standard signatures with the questioned
1ST SEM. Laws, Cases, and Notes on Legal Forms 11
signature, the original thereof must be presented. And since Orina was not able to present the
original, the signature cannot be authenticated.
SC also held that Dycoco did not need to be presented as witness since an instrument
acknowledged and authenticated by a foreign country shall be considered authentic according to
PA 2103.
DOCTRINE: Public Act No. 2103 effectively dispenses with the requirement of presenting him on
the witness stand.
recognition of a document in the country where that document was issued — Apostilles are strictly
for use of public documents abroad. It is up to the country where the Apostille is to be used to decide
how much weight to give to the underlying public document.
PRELIMINARY ARTICLE
TITLE OF CHAPTER
ARTICLE I
APPOINTMENT AND QUALIFICATION OF NOTARIES PUBLIC
_______________________
ARTICLE II
JURISDICTION AND POWERS
ARTICLE III
NOTARIES PUBLIC EX OFFICIO
ARTICLE IV
NOTARIAL SEAL
ARTICLE V
NOTARIAL REGISTER
ARTICLE VI
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OF JUDGES OVER NOTARIES PUBLIC
(C) THE FAILURE OF THE NOTARY TO SEND THE COPY OF THE ENTRIES
TO THE PROPER CLERK OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE WITHIN THE
FIRST TEN DAYS OF THE MONTH NEXT FOLLOWING.
ARTICLE VII
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
(A) THE COMMUNITY TAX SHALL ACCRUE ON THE FIRST (1ST) DAY OF
JANUARY OF EACH YEAR WHICH SHALL BE PAID NOT LATER THAN
THE LAST DAY OF FEBRUARY OF EACH YEAR. IF A PERSON REACHES
THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS OR OTHERWISE LOSES THE
BENEFIT OF EXEMPTION ON OR BEFORE THE LAST DAY OF JUNE, HE
SHALL BE LIABLE FOR THE COMMUNITY TAX ON THE DAY HE
REACHES SUCH AGE OR UPON THE DAY THE EXEMPTION ENDS.
HOWEVER, IF A PERSON REACHES THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN (18)
YEARS OR LOSES THE BENEFIT OF EXEMPTION ON OR BEFORE THE
LAST DAY OF MARCH, HE SHALL HAVE TWENTY (20) DAYS TO PAY
THE COMMUNITY TAX WITHOUT BECOMING DELINQUENT.
IF THE TAX IS NOT PAID WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED ABOVE, THERE
SHALL BE ADDED TO THE UNPAID AMOUNT AN INTEREST OF TWENTY-FOUR
PERCENT (24%) PER ANNUM FROM THE DUE DATE UNTIL IT IS PAID.
RESOLUTION
RULE I
IMPLEMENTATION
SAPPAYANI v. GASMEN
September 1, 2015 | Perlas-Bernabe, J. | Notary Public
PETITIONER: Fire Officer I Darwin S. Sappayani
RESPONDENTS: Atty. Renato G. Gasmen
SUMMARY: Sappayani, a fire officer, filed a complaint against Atty. Renato Gasmen for allegedly
notarizing a SPA purportedly signed by him authorizing NGC through one Romeo Maravillas and
an Application for Loan and Promissory Note with AMWSLAI. By virtue of the SPA and notarized
documents, AMWSLAI released to Maravilla a loan amounting to P157,301.43. Sappayani denied
executing the documents. He claims that his signature on the SPA was forged as he did not know
Maravillas and that it was physically impossible for him to personally appear before Atty. Gasmen
and execute the documents. Atty. Gasmen claimed that before the SPA and loan application were
notarized, the proceeds were already released to NGC by AMWSLAI, thus, dispensing with the
need for notarization. Moreover, he insisted that the notarization of said documents was merely
done on a ministerial basis, with proper safeguards, and that it cannot be expected of him to require
the personal appearance of every loan applicant considering the hundreds of loan applications
brought to him for signing. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP
Commissioner's Recommendation and found Atty. Gasmen guilty for violating the Notarial Rules,
ROC, Canon 1 and Canon 10. The issue in this case is Whether the IBP correctly found Atty.
Gasmen liable for violation of the Notarial Rules and the CPR and that he should be held
administratively liable for notarizing the spurious documents? The SC affirmed the decision of the
IBP, but modified the penalty. Atty. Gasmen did not deny notarizing the documents without the
presence of Sappayani and indirectly admitted doing the same with other similar documents and
affiants. The failure of Atty. Gasmen to observe the utmost care in the performance of his duties
caused not only damage to those directly affected by the notarized document, but also undermined
the integrity of a notary public and tainted the function of notarization.
DOCTRINE: In the discharge of his powers and duties, the notary public’s certification is one
impressed with public interest, accuracy and fidelity such that he owes it to the public to notarize
only when the person who signs the document is the same person who executed it and personally
appeared before him to attest to his knowledge of the contents stated therein. Thus, the Court has
repeatedly emphasized the necessity of an affiant’s personal appearance and makes the failure
to observe such rule punishable.
24 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
DE LIMA v. HON. GUERRERO
October 10, 2017 | Velasco, Jr., J. | Jurats
PETITIONER: Leila De Lima
RESPONDENTS: Judge Juanita Guerrero, et. al.
SUMMARY: Congress conducted inquiry in aid of legislation. The same led to filing of
informations before the RTC of Muntinlupa. De Lima believed that the Ombudsman solely has
jurisdiction to investigate, she filed a Rule 65 petition before the CA, challenging the DOJ’s
jurisdiction. 3 informations were accordingly filed before RTC Muntinlupa, one was raffled before
sala of respondent judge. De Lima filed an MTQ raising lack of jurisdiction, duplicity, and that it
does not constitute an offense. Respondent Judge did not act upon the MTQ and instead issued
warrants of arrest. Hence the present petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65.
DOCTRINE: Falsification of jurats: Verification not proper; De Lima did not personally sign the
verification and certification before the notary public contrary to the attestation that the same is
subscribed and sworn before the notary public. Irregular notarization merely reduced the
probative value of the document to that one of a private instrument, however in Rule 65, pleading
must be verified; irregular verification would equate to being unsigned. No justification offered,
merits outright dismissal.
Compliance with hierarchy of courts: Does not fall within the exceptions laid down by case
law. The case is not of first impression, nor transcendentally important. The mere fact of De Lima
being a senator would not exonerate her from complying with the hierarchy of courts.
Petition is premature: Rule 65 requires that there be no appeal nor speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law; here there are adeqauate remedies, such as waiting for MTQ
resolution, proceeding to trial, MR on the adverse resolution, if ever.
Forum-shopping: There is forum shopping. The present case and the one below are
substantially the same. The prayers are generally the same, and that judgment in one would
preclude or render moot the other.
RTC has jurisdiction: RA 9165 is an exception to RA 10660 particularly when the former states
that RTC has the authority to exclusively hear and try cases falling under RA 9165; Information
sufficiently indicts De Lima the crime of illegal drug trading; co-conspirator need not know all the
incidents of the alleged crime.
No grave abuse of discretion: There is no positive duty by the judge to resolve an MTQ before
determining probable cause for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest. The Rules provide no
such duty. Speedy issuance is not grave abuse. The Judge personally determined probable cause
since reliance in the prosecutor’s certification is sufficient as it is attached with other evidence on
record.
LUTESTICA v. BERNABE
24 August 2010 | Per Curiam | Duties of a Notary Public
PETITIONER: Luzviminda R. Lustestica
RESPONDENTS: Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe
SUMMARY: Atty. Bernabe’s notarial commission was revoked and he was disqualified from
reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years, for his failure to properly perform
his duties as notary public when he notarized a document in the absence of one of the affiants. This
is a second case for disbarment against Atty. Bernabe for notarizing a falsified or forged Deed of
Donation of real property despite the non-appearance of the donors, Benvenuto H. Lustestica
(complainant’s father) and his first wife, Cornelia P. Rivero, both of whom were already dead at
the time of execution of the said document. The issue is Whether respondent is guilty of violating
his oath as a notary public and as a lawyer. The Court held that the respondent should be made
liable not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. He not only violated the Notarial Law (Public
Act No. 2103), but also Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
respondent was grossly negligent in discharging his duties as a notary public. He failed to ascertain
the identities of the affiants before him and failed to comply with the most basic function that a
1ST SEM. Laws, Cases, and Notes on Legal Forms 25
notary public must do, i.e., to require the parties presentation of their residence certificates or any
other document to prove their identities.
DOCTRINE: Notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one invested with
substantive public interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a
public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A
notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
RULE II
DEFINITIONS
IRINGAN v. GUMANGAN
16 August 2017 | Leonardo De-Castro, J. | Competent evidence of identity, Notarial Registry,
and effects on written instrument
PETITIONER: Carmelo Iringan
RESPONDENTS: Atty. Clayton B. Gumangan
SUMMARY: Sps. Renato and Cannen Iringan filed an illegal detainer and ejectment with damages
case against Carmelo Iringan before the MTCC of Tabuk, Kalinga. According to the facts culled
from the lower courts, Sps. Iringan owned a parcel of land in Tabuk, Kalinga. The certificate of title
of the subject land is named after Renato (Carmelo’s brother). Later on, Renato and Carmelo both
agreed to enter into a contract of lease which was notarized by Atty. Gumangan. During the
notarization process there is no allegation as to whether proof of identities by the parties were
asked and presented. As the contract of lease expired, Sps. Iringan demanded Carmelo to vacate
the premises but the demands remain unheeded. This prompted the Spouses To file the said civil
case before the courts. The MTCC rendered a decision in favor of the Sps. Iringan saying that the
contract of lease is validly executed and has already expired. The Court did not agree with
Carmelo’s allegations that the contract is spurious and he did not took his oath before Atty.
Gumangan. RTC affirmed the decision in toto. Carmelo then filed a disbarment case before the
Office of the Bar Confidant alleging that Atty. Gumangan failed to ascertain the identity of the
parties and he failed to comply with the requirements mandated by the Rules on Notarial practice.
The IBP commission and board of governors dismissed the disbarment complaint but
recommended that his notarial commission be revoked and be prohibited from being
commissioned for 2 years.
The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation and found Atty. Gumangan guilty for his
failure to comply with the following rules:
First, During the process of notarization of the contract of lease there was no proof that Atty.
Gumangan ascertained the identity of the parties (namely Renato and Carmelo). Although Renato
belatedly gave a CTC, such document is not a credible proof of identity as enunciated in previous
jurisprudence. Furthermore, Carmelo did not provide any proof of identity.
Second, Atty. Gumangan did not submit to the RTC Clerk of Court his Notarial Report and a
duplicate original of the Contract of Lease dated December 30, 2005 between Renato and Carmelo
In conclusion the court said that said infirmities in notarization do not affect the validity of
the instrument but would just merely render the document as a private instrument.
DOCTRINE: On the importance of the requirement of competent evidence of identity of the
parties, the rules explicitly prohibited the notary public who did not know the parties, from
notarizing an instrument or document.
The Rules provide that competent evidence on identity refers to the identification of an
individual based on the following:
(A) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual; or
(B) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who
1ST SEM. Laws, Cases, and Notes on Legal Forms 29
(CBD) found respondent, Diuyan, guilty of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. While it
found no deceit or malice on the part of Diuyan, and even considered the fact that respondent was
a former public official with no previous record of misconduct, as well as the fact that the affiants
in the subject Deed of Partition were farmers who did not have any IDs and only had Community
Tax Certificates (CTCs) to present and prove their identities, the IBP-CBD nonetheless found him
grossly negligent in the performance of his functions. The issue in this case is W/N Diuyan should
be held administratively liable for notarizing a Deed of Partition on the basis of affiant’s CTCs
only? The SC said no. A lawyer cannot be held liable for a violation his duties as Notary-Public
when the law in effect at the time of his complained act does not provide any prohibition to the
same, as in the case at bench... respondent did not violate any of his duties as Notary Public when
he notarized the Deed of Partition on July 23, 2003. Thus, it was incorrect for the IBP to have applied
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice in holding respondent liable for notarizing the Deed of
Partition. To reiterate, the Deed was notarized on July 23, 2003. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
were not yet in effect at that time.
DOCTRINE: A lawyer cannot be held liable for a violation of his duties as Notary Public when the
law in effect at the time of his complained act does not provide any prohibition, to the same, as in
the case at bench.
PENA v. PATERNO
June 10, 2013 | Per Curiam | Revocation of notarial commission
PETITIONER: Anita C. Pena
RESPONDENTS: Atty. Christina C. Paterno
SUMMARY: Pena gave her TCT to Atty. Paterno for the purpose of preparing the documents for
the loan which Pena would apply for from a bank. From time to time, Pena inquired about the
application of the loan but Atty. Pena said that she was still preparing the documents. However,
when Pena visited her property, she discovered that her apartment was already demolished and a
four residential houses were built instead. The property was sold to Kribuilt Trader Company and
Atty. Paterno was the Notary Public before the sale was acknowledged. Pena claims that her
signature was forged. Pena thus filed an administrative case Atty. Paterno. Atty. Paterno on the
other hand claims that it was Pena who negotiated the sale and the TCT was never entrusted to
her.
The issue is Whether the notarial commission of Atty. Paterno shall be revoked – YES. Atty.
Paterno’s failure to fulfill her duty as notary public to submit her notarial register for the month of
November 1986 and a copy of the said Deed of Sale that was notarized by her on the same month
is ground for the revocation of notarial commission.
DOCTRINE: A ground for revocation of a notary public's commission is failure of the notary to
send the copy of the entries to the proper clerk of the Court of First Instance (RTC) within the first
ten days of the month next following or the failure of the notary to forward his notarial register,
when filled, to the proper clerk of court.
RULE III
COMMISSIONING OF NOTARY PUBLIC
(5) MUST NOT HAVE BEEN CONVICTED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE OF ANY
CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.
NOTICE OF HEARING
_____________________
EXECUTIVE JUDGE
________________________
EXECUTIVE JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION
TO PURCHASE A NOTARIAL SEAL
________________________
EXECUTIVE JUDGE
____________________
(OFFICIAL SIGNATURE)
SIRS/MESDAMES :
"B.M. NO. 2493 (IN RE: LETTER OF JUDGE RAMON B. BARONA, RTC,
BRANCH 13, BASCO, BATANES, INQUIRING ABOUT THE RE-APPOINTMENT
OF TWO [2] NON-LAWYERS AS NOTARY PUBLIC). — THE COURT
RESOLVED, UPON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, TO:
Q: Are Notarial Commissions issued to non-members of the bar PRIOR to the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice deemed REVOKED with the effectivity of said Rules?
A: No. Said notarial commissions are valid until their effectivity date, counted from the issuance
thereof or its last renewal. Thereafter, they must comply with all the requirements set forth.
2. I am a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations given in
2009 and having been admitted to the practice of law in 2010. A photocopy of my Certification of
Membership in the Philippine Bar is attached as Annex A.
3. I have paid my professional tax for year 2018 as evidenced by Professional Tax
Receipt (“PTR”) No. 12345 issued by the City of Makati on 12 January 1028. A photocopy of PTR
No. 12345 is attached as Annex B.
5. I possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for the office of
Notary Public. A photocopy of my IBP Certification of Good Standing is attached as Annex D.
40 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
6. I have not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. A photocopy of
my Certification of Good Standing as a lawyer issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court is attached as Annex E.
8. I also attach as Annex G a separate sheet of paper containing three (3) specimens of
my official signature.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court ISSUE and order
APPOINTING Petitioner Juan Dela Cruz as Notary Public for and in Makati City, Philippines for
the years 2018 to 2019, with commission to expire on 31 December 2019.
Respectfully submitted.
Makati City, March __, 2018.
[INSTERT VERIFICATION]
(2) The Executive Judge shall SCHEDULE the petition for summary hearing.
(3) The Executive Judge shall cause a NOTICE OF SUMMARY HEARING to be
PUBLISHED in a newspaper of general circulation in the city or province where the
hearing shall be conducted and POSTED in a conspicuous place in the office of the
Executive Judge and of the Clerk of Court.
(4) Any person who has any cause or reason to object to the grant of the petition may file
a VERIFIED WRITTEN OPPOSITION thereto before the date of the summary hearing.
(5) The Executive Judge shall conduct a SUMMARY HEARING on the petition and shall
grant the same if:
(a) The petition is SUFFICIENT IN FORM and SUBSTANCE;
(b) The petitioner PROVES the allegations contained in the petition; and,
(c) The petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the Executive Judge that he
has READ and FULLY UNDERSTOOD the Notarial Rules.
(6) The Executive Judge shall issue a COMMISSION and a CERTIFICATE OF
AUTHORIZATION TO PURCHASE NOTARIAL SEAL in favor of the Petitioner
LINGAN v. CALUBAQUIB
June 30, 2014 | Leonen, J. | Notarial Law
PETITIONER: Victor Lingan
RESPONDENTS: Atty. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy Baliga
SUMMARY: The Court found guilty and suspended Respondents Atty. Calubaquib and Atty.
Baliga for allowing their secretaries to notarize in their stead, violating Sections 245 and 246 of the
Notarial Law. After this, the CHR issued a resolution likewise suspending Atty. Baliga from his
position as Regional Director/Atty. VI. Complainant Lingan then alleged that Atty. Baliga
continued practicing law despite his suspension, as he was discharging his functions as the
Commission of Human Rights Regional Director. Atty. Baliga filed a motion with the CHR which
reconsidered his suspension and instead admonished him for violating the conditions of his
commission as a notary public.
Atty. Baliga believes that his suspension from the practice of law did not include his
suspension from public office and that as a CHR RD, he performed generally managerial functions.
CHR argued that the penalty imposed on Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and
distinct from any penalty that may be imposed upon him as a public official for the same acts.
Complainant Lingan on the other hand argued that performing the functions of a “lawyer-
manager” under Cayetano v. Monsod constituted the practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Baliga’s motion to lift order of suspension to be granted – NO, the
Court finds that Atty. Baliga violated the Court’s order of suspension, hence the Court suspends
him further from the practice of law for six months.
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice of law.
The powers and functions of the CHR RD are characteristics of the legal profession. Example: Oaths
and affirmations are usually performed by members of the judiciary and notaries public - officers
who are necessarily members of the bar. The exercise of the powers and functions of a CHR RD
constitutes practice of law. Thus, the CHR RD must be an attorney – a member of the bar in good
standing and authorized to practice law.
DOCTRINE: When the CHR RD loses his authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to the
position he or she is holding.
RULE IV
POWERS AND LIMITATIONS OF NOTARIES PUBLIC
(1) ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;
(3) JURATS;
(3) THE NOTARY PUBLIC WRITES BELOW THE THUMB OR OTHER MARK:
"THUMB OR OTHER MARK AFFIXED BY (NAME OF SIGNATORY BY
MARK) IN THE PRESENCE OF (NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF
WITNESSES) AND UNDERSIGNED NOTARY PUBLIC"; AND
(2) PUBLIC FUNCTION AREAS IN HOTELS AND SIMILAR PLACES FOR THE
SIGNING OF INSTRUMENTS OR DOCUMENTS REQUIRING
NOTARIZATION;
(A) THE NOTARY KNOWS OR HAS GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE
NOTARIAL ACT OR TRANSACTION IS UNLAWFUL OR IMMORAL;
Q: What are the rules regarding a Notary Public’s regular place of work or business?
A: GENERAL RULE: It must be STATIONARY and WITHIN the city or province where in the
Notary Public renders legal and Notarial Services.
EXCEPTIONS: A Notarial Act may be performed AT THE REQUEST of the parties in the following
sites located WITHIN HIS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION:
(1) Public Offices, Convention Halls, and similar places WHERE OATHS OF OFFICE
MAY BE ADMINISTERED;
(2) Public Function Areas in Hotels and similar places for the SIGNING OF
INSTRUMENTS OR DOCUMENTS REQUIRING NOTARIZATION;
(3) Hospitals and other medical institutions where a PARTY TO AN INSTRUMENT OR
DOCUMENT IS CONFINED FOR TREATMENT;
(4) Any place where a party to an instrument or document requiring notarization is
UNDER DETENTION.
RULE V
FEES OF NOTARY PUBLIC
YLAYA v. GACOTT
January 30, 2013 | Brion, J. | Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
PETITIONER: Fe A. Ylaya
RESPONDENTS: Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott
SUMMARY: Ylaya filed a disbarment case against Atty. Gacott. It was alleged that Atty. Gacott
briefly represented the complainant and her late husband in the expropriation case as intervenors
for being the new registered owners of the property. Ylaya alleged that the respondent convinced
them to sign a "preparatory deed of sale" for the sale of the property, but he left blank the space for
the name of the buyer and for the amount of consideration. Atty. Gacott then fraudulently –
without their knowledge and consent, and contrary to their understanding – converted the
"preparatory deed of sale" into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001, selling the subject
1ST SEM. Laws, Cases, and Notes on Legal Forms 47
property to Reynold So and Sylvia Carlos So for ₱200,000.00. Atty. Gacott denied all the allegations
in the complaint. He claimed that the sale was their voluntary transaction and that he "simply
ratified the document." He also claimed that Reynold and Laurentino had originally jointly
purchased the properties from Cirilo Arellano on July 10, 2000. The IBP found Atty. Gacott guilty
of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 (A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct), Canon 16 ("A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
that may come into his possession), and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice). The IBP Board adopted the Commissioner’s findings, but increased penalty
of suspension from 6 months to 2 years. ISSUE: Whether the evidence presented supports a finding
that the respondent is administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. NO, because
the Court found nothing constituting clear evidence of the respondent’s specific acts of fraud and
deceit. After examining the whole record of the case, we agree with the respondent and find the
evidence insufficient to prove the charge that he violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. Specifically, (1) the
evidence against the respondent fails to show the alleged fraudulent and deceitful acts he has taken
to mislead the complainant and her husband into signing a "preparatory deed of sale" and the
conversion into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 in favor of Reynold; and (2) no
prohibition exists against the notarization of a document in which any of the parties interested is
the notary’s relative within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity, at that time the
respondent notarized the documents.
DOCTRINE: No prohibition exists against the notarization of a document in which any of the
parties interested is the notary’s relative within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity,
at that time the respondent notarized the documents.
JANDOQUILE v. REVILLA
April 10, 2013 | Villarama, Jr. J. | Disqualifications from Notarizing
PETITIONER (Complainant): Bernard N. Jandoquile
RESPONDENT: Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr.
SUMMARY: Atty. Revilla notarized a complaint-affidavit where two of the affiants were his
relatives within the fourth degree by affinity. He also did not ask for their identification cards. This
is now a case for disbarment against him. The first issue in the case are Whether Revilla violated
Sec 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The Court ruled in the affirmative. The facts
are not disputed as Atty. Revilla himself admits them. He is in clear violation of Sec. 3(c), Rule IV
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, which disqualifies a notary public from performing the
notarial act if he is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree. The second issue is Whether Atty.
Revilla erred in not asking for the identification cards of the affiants. The Court ruled in the
negative saying that he did not violate the 2004 RONP because he had personal knowledge of the
affiants, although he should have stated the same in the complaint-affidavit. The third issue is
Whether a violation of Sec 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice constitute grounds
for disbarment. The Court ruled in the negative. Atty. Revilla’s actions do not warrant his
disbarment. He did not commit any deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or gross immoral
conduct or any other serious ground for disbarment under Sec 27, Rule 138 of the ROC. Atty.
Revilla is reprimanded and disqualified from being commissioned as notary public for three
months.
DOCTRINE: Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
RULE VI
NOTARIAL REGISTER
48 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
SECTION 1. FORM OF NOTARIAL REGISTER. - (A) A NOTARY PUBLIC SHALL
KEEP, MAINTAIN, PROTECT AND PROVIDE FOR LAWFUL INSPECTION AS
PROVIDED IN THESE RULES, A CHRONOLOGICAL OFFICIAL NOTARIAL
REGISTER OF NOTARIAL ACTS CONSISTING OF A PERMANENTLY BOUND
BOOK WITH NUMBERED PAGES.
(B) A NOTARY PUBLIC SHALL KEEP ONLY ONE ACTIVE NOTARIAL REGISTER
AT ANY GIVEN TIME.
(G) AT THE END OF EACH WEEK, THE NOTARY PUBLIC SHALL CERTIFY IN HIS
NOTARIAL REGISTER THE NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS OR DOCUMENTS
EXECUTED, SWORN TO, ACKNOWLEDGED, OR PROTESTED BEFORE HIM; OR
IF NONE, THIS CERTIFICATE SHALL SHOW THIS FACT.
(A) PRINCIPAL;
(5) THE OCA SHALL, WITHIN THE FIRST TEN (10) DAYS OF THE FIRST
MONTH OF EVERY QUARTER REMIT TO THE OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL AN AMOUNT EQUIVALENT TO 10% OF THE
GROSS COLLECTIONS DURING THE PRECEDING QUARTER AS THE
SHARE OF THE OSG IN THE SALE OF THE NOTARIAL REGISTERS.
THE OCA SHALL RESORT TO THE THIRD OPTION ONLY IF THE FIRST TWO
PRINTERS CANNOT ACCOMMODATE THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE COURT.
(B) DENY FOR LACK OF MERIT THE MOTION FILED BY CHIEF PUBLIC
ATTORNEY PERSIDA V. RUEDA-ACOSTA, PRAYING FOR A
1ST SEM. Laws, Cases, and Notes on Legal Forms 53
(E) INFORM MR. AGUNIAS, JR. THAT NEITHER DOES THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON REVISION OF RULES GOVERNING NOTARIES PUBLIC RENDER ADVISORY
OPINIONS;
RULE VII
SIGNATURE AND SEAL OF NOTARY PUBLIC
54 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
SECTION 1. OFFICIAL SIGNATURE. – IN NOTARIZING A PAPER
INSTRUMENT OR DOCUMENT, A NOTARY PUBLIC SHALL:
(C) AFFIX HIS OFFICIAL SIGNATURE ONLY AT THE TIME THE NOTARIAL
ACT IS PERFORMED.
(B) THE OFFICIAL SEAL SHALL BE AFFIXED ONLY AT THE TIME THE
NOTARIAL ACT IS PERFORMED AND SHALL BE CLEARLY IMPRESSED BY THE
NOTARY PUBLIC ON EVERY PAGE OF THE INSTRUMENT OR DOCUMENT
NOTARIZED.
(C) WHEN NOT IN USE, THE OFFICIAL SEAL SHALL BE KEPT SAFE AND
SECURE AND SHALL BE ACCESSIBLE ONLY TO THE NOTARY PUBLIC OR THE
PERSON DULY AUTHORIZED BY HIM.
(D) WITHIN FIVE (5) DAYS AFTER THE OFFICIAL SEAL OF A NOTARY PUBLIC
IS STOLEN, LOST, DAMAGED OR OTHER OTHERWISE RENDERED
UNSERVICEABLE IN AFFIXING A LEGIBLE IMAGE, THE NOTARY PUBLIC,
AFTER INFORMING THE APPROPRIATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, SHALL
NOTIFY THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE IN WRITING, PROVIDING PROPER RECEIPT
OR ACKNOWLEDGMENT, INCLUDING REGISTERED MAIL, AND IN THE EVENT
OF A CRIME COMMITTED, PROVIDE A COPY OR ENTRY NUMBER OF THE
APPROPRIATE POLICE RECORD. UPON RECEIPT OF SUCH NOTICE, IF FOUND
IN ORDER BY THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE, THE LATTER SHALL ORDER THE
NOTARY PUBLIC TO CAUSE NOTICE OF SUCH LOSS OR DAMAGE TO BE
PUBLISHED, ONCE A WEEK FOR THREE (3) CONSECUTIVE WEEKS, IN A
NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE CITY OR PROVINCE WHERE
THE NOTARY PUBLIC IS COMMISSIONED. THEREAFTER, THE EXECUTIVE
JUDGE SHALL ISSUE TO THE NOTARY PUBLIC A NEW CERTIFICATE OF
AUTHORIZATION TO PURCHASE A NOTARIAL SEAL.
(E) WITHIN FIVE (5) DAYS AFTER THE DEATH OR RESIGNATION OF THE
NOTARY PUBLIC, OR THE REVOCATION OR EXPIRATION OF A NOTARIAL
COMMISSION, THE OFFICIAL SEAL SHALL BE SURRENDERED TO THE
EXECUTIVE JUDGE AND SHALL BE DESTROYED OR DEFACED IN PUBLIC
DURING OFFICE HOURS. IN THE EVENT THAT THE MISSING, LOST OR
DAMAGED SEAL IS LATER FOUND OR SURRENDERED, IT SHALL BE
DELIVERED BY THE NOTARY PUBLIC TO THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE TO BE
DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS SECTION. FAILURE TO EFFECT
SUCH SURRENDER SHALL CONSTITUTE CONTEMPT OF COURT. IN THE
EVENT OF DEATH OF THE NOTARY PUBLIC, THE PERSON IN POSSESSION OF
1ST SEM. Laws, Cases, and Notes on Legal Forms 55
SEC. 3. SEAL IMAGE. - THE NOTARY PUBLIC SHALL AFFIX A SINGLE, CLEAR,
LEGIBLE, PERMANENT, AND PHOTOGRAPHICALLY REPRODUCIBLE MARK,
IMAGE OR IMPRESSION OF THE OFFICIAL SEAL BESIDE HIS SIGNATURE ON
THE NOTARIAL CERTIFICATE OF A PAPER INSTRUMENT OR DOCUMENT.
A:
RULE VIII
NOTARIAL CERTIFICATES
(C) THE WORDS "NOTARY PUBLIC" AND THE PROVINCE OR CITY WHERE
THE NOTARY PUBLIC IS COMMISSIONED, THE EXPIRATION DATE OF
THE COMMISSION, THE OFFICE ADDRESS OF THE NOTARY PUBLIC;
AND
RULE IX
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY OF NOTARIES PUBLIC
(OFFICIAL SIGNATURE)
RULE X
CHANGES OF STATUS OF NOTARY PUBLIC
(B) A NEW SEAL BEARING THE NEW NAME HAS BEEN OBTAINED.
RULE XI
REVOCATION OF COMMISSION AND DISCIPLINARY
SANCTIONS
RULE XII
SPECIAL PROVISIONS
RULE XIII
REPEALING AND EFFECTIVITY PROVISIONS
62 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
SECTION 1. REPEAL. - ALL RULES AND PARTS OF RULES, INCLUDING
ISSUANCES OF THE SUPREME COURT INCONSISTENT HEREWITH, ARE
HEREBY REPEALED OR ACCORDINGLY MODIFIED.
SEC. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE. - THESE RULES SHALL TAKE EFFECT ON THE FIRST
DAY OF AUGUST 2004, AND SHALL BE PUBLISHED IN A NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES WHICH PROVIDES
SUFFICIENTLY WIDE CIRCULATION.
MALVAR v. BALEROS
March 8, 2017 | Reyes, J. | Notarial Register; Administrative Liability
PETITIONER: Dr. Basilio Malvar
RESPONDENTS: Atty. Cora Jane Baleros
SUMMARY: Dr. Malvar filed administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Baleros, which
sprang forth from a separate criminal case for falsification of a public document. Dr. Malvar is
assailing that Atty. Baleros notarized a document of an “Application for Certification of Alienable
and Disposable Land” without his presence. This was because Dr. Malvar never visited Atty.
Baleros’ office in La Union during this time as he was attending to patients in Manila. The issue is
Whether Atty. Baleros is administratively liable for her alleged act of notarizing the document
without his presence. The SC held that Atty. Baleros is administratively liable. Since the document
was a jurat, the rules indicate that either physical presence or the notary public’s personal
knowledge of the principal. Since neither of the conditions were met, Atty. Baleros is liable under
Sec. 2(b), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules. Furthermore, based on the evidence presented, the notarial
register of Atty. Baleros does not include such document, thus violating Sec. 2, Rule VI of the 2004
Notarial Rules. Lastly, Atty. Baleros gave the excuse that it was her staff who usually fills the
notarial register, which is another offense in itself violating both the Notarial Rules and the Code
of Professional Conduct. The SC decided that disbarment was too harsh of a punishment for Atty.
Baleros, so she was simply suspended as a notary public and as a lawyer.
DOCTRINE: A lawyer who fails to uphold his or her notarial duties is administratively liable.
“X X X
X X X.”
TUPAL v. ROJO
February 24, 2014 | Leonen, J. | MTC Judge Notarizing Documents
PETITIONER: Rex M. Tupal
RESPONDENTS: Judge Remegio V. Rojo
SUMMARY: Tupal filed a complaint with the OCA against Judge Rojo for violating the Code of
Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law. Tupal alleges that Judge Rojo notarizes
affidavits of cohabitation, which is a violation of Circular No. 1-90. Rojo denies the charges and
argues that such is common practice among courts in Bacolod.
The OCA issued a report finding Rojo guilty of the charges stating that nothing in the
Guidelines authorizes judges to notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they
will solemnize.
The issue is whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for
gross ignorance of law. The Court found Rojo guilty. Municipal trial court and municipal circuit
trial court judges may act as notaries public. However, they may do so only in their ex officio
capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and other conveyances only in the exercise of
their official functions and duties. They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or
notaries public are lacking in their courts’ territorial jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack of
lawyers or notaries public when notarizing documents ex officio.
DOCTRINE: Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries
public. However, they may do so only in their ex officio capacities. They may also act as notaries
public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their courts’ territorial jurisdiction.
GABON v. MERKA
December 14, 2011 | Per Curiam | Notaries public ex-officio
COMPLAINANT: Arthur M. Gabon
RESPONDENT: Rebecca P. Merka, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Trial Court, Liloan, Southern Leyte
SUMMARY: Gabon charged Merka with grave misconduct for (a) writing 8 demand letters in 1993
in behalf of Saint Ignatius Loyola Credit Cooperative, Inc., Simeon C. Maamoy, Jr., Restituta
Claridad using the MTC’s official letterhead and signing the same letters in her official capacity as
the Clerk of Court and for (b) administering oaths in 5 affidavits and a kasunduan in 1995 and 2000
that had no relation with her official duties. OCA directed Merka to comment and she admitted the
charge of using the MTC’s letterhead and signing the demand letters in her official capacity, but she
used the defense that she acted in good faith to aid in declogging the court’s dockets. In his reply,
Gabon said that Merka acted like the counsel of a private party in writing the demand letters and
that her authority to administer oaths extended only to cases filed or pending in her assigned court.
The OCA found Merka guilty of simple misconduct and that she also violated PD No. 26. She was
given a penalty of suspension of 1 month and 1 day for simple misconduct and a fine of 500 for PD
No. 26. The issue is Whether Merka is guilty of the charges against her. The SC ruled in the
affirmative, although they modified the findings and recommendation of the OCA. The SC said that
all court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty, and
uprightness. Merka’s use of the court’s letterhead and of her official designation in the 8 demand
letters shows that she took advantage of her office and position to advance the interests of private
individuals, since she was acting as “counsel” and collecting agent for the 3 persons. Moreover, she
violated PD No. 26. In addition, she also administered oaths in documents involving official
business, in violation of Section 41, as amended by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6733, and Section
242 of the Revised Administrative Code, in relation with Sections G, M, and N, Chapter VIII of the
Manual for Clerks of Court. Under these provisions, Clerks of Court are notaries public ex oficio;
they may notarize documents or administer oaths only when the matter is related to the exercise of
66 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
their official functions. In their ex-officio capacity, clerks of court should not take part in the
execution of private documents bearing no relation at all to their official functions.
DOCTRINE: Clerks of Court are notaries public ex oficio; they may notarize documents or
administer oaths only when the matter is related to the exercise of their official functions. In their
ex-officio capacity, clerks of court should not take part in the execution of private documents bearing
no relation at all to their official functions.
TIGNO v. AQUINO
November 25, 2004 | Tinga, J. | Notarial Acts
PETITIONER: Zenaida B. Tigno, Imelda B. Tigno, and Armi B. Tigno
RESPONDENTS: Spouses Estafino Aquino and Florentino Aquino and the CA
SUMMARY: Spouses Aquino filed a complaint for enforcement of contract and damages against
Bustria (seller) of a fishpond in Dasci, Pangasinan (Civil Case No. A-2157). The property was not
registered. The conveyance was covered by a Deed of Sale. They entered into a compromise
agreement whereby Bustria agreed to recognize the validity of the sale, and the Aquinos agreed to
grant to Bustria the right to repurchase the same property after the lapse of 7 years which was
approved and incorporated in the compromise agreement. Tigno, in substitution of Bustria (died),
attempted to repurchase the property by filing a Motion for Consignation by depositing P200,000
which was denied by the RTC (previously CFI). Tigno filed a Motion for Writ of Execution which
was also denied. Then Tigno filed an action for revival of judgment of Civil Case No. A-2157 so that
it can be enforced. Sps Aquino filed an answer alleging that Bustria sold his right to repurchase
property to them in a deed of sale dated October 17, 1985. It presented de Francia and Judge Cario
who notarized the same. As evidence, Sps Aquino offered the deed of sale executed by Bustria. This
was objected by Tigno on the ground that it was false. RTC refused to admit the Deed of Sale. Then,
RTC ruled in favor of Tigno to execute Civil Case No. A-2157. CA reversed saying that a notarized
document carried in its favor the presumption of regularity with respect to its due execution and
that there must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence to contradict the
same. Issue is Whether the Deed of Sale should have been admitted as evidence?
The SC held that it was not, because the Deed of Sale was not connected with any official duties
of Judge Cario, and there was no reason for him to notarize it.
The document is certified by way of a jurat instead of an acknowledgment. Under Section 127
of the Land Registration Act, which has been replicated in Section 112 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, the Deed of Sale should have been acknowledged before a notary public. Also, the Court
explicitly declared that municipal court judges such as Cario may notarize only documents
connected with the exercise of their official duties. The Deed of Sale was not connected with any
official duties of Judge Cario, and there was no reason for him to notarize it. While there are possible
grounds for leniency in connection with this matter, as Supreme Court Circular No. 1-90 permits
notaries public ex officio to perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public
provided that certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer
or notary public in such municipality or circuit. It is only when there are no lawyers or notaries
public that the exception applies.
DOCTRINE: Municipal court judges such as Cario may notarize only documents connected with
the exercise of their official duties. The Deed of Sale was not connected with any official duties of
Judge Cario, and there was no reason for him to notarize it. While there are possible grounds for
leniency in connection with this matter, as Supreme Court Circular No. 1-90 permits notaries
public ex officio to perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public provided that
certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public
in such municipality or circuit. It is only when there are no lawyers or notaries public that the
exception applies.
Q: What are the rules on notarization by MTC, MeTC, and MCTC judges?
A: GENERAL RULE — MTC, MeTC, and MCTC Judges may only notarize documents in furtherance
of their duties and functions.
1ST SEM. Laws, Cases, and Notes on Legal Forms 67
EXCEPTION — In municipalities where there are no lawyers, or there are lawyers but are not
commissioned Notaries Public, the MTC Judge may perform notarial acts, even those not related to
their functions, subject to the following:
(1) All notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned over to the
municipal treasurer; and
(2) A certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer
or notary public in such municipality or circuit.
Q: May Clerks of Court notarize ALL kinds of documents, i.e. even those not related to their
functions?
A: Yes, subject to the following:
(1) All notarial fees charged in accordance with Section 7(o) of Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, and, with respect to private documents, in accordance with the notarial fee that
the Supreme Court may prescribe in compliance with Section 1, Rule V of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice, shall be for the account of the Judiciary and
(2) They certify in the notarized documents that there are NO NOTARIES PUBLIC within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
B. Importance of Notarization
1. Notarized documents as public instruments
1989 REVISED RULES OF EVIDENCE
RULE 132
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
B. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
SECTION 19. CLASSES OF DOCUMENTS. — FOR THE PURPOSE OF THEIR
PRESENTATION EVIDENCE, DOCUMENTS ARE EITHER PUBLIC OR PRIVATE.
the deed even though the property was co-owned by Pedro Sumulong and Cirila Tapales. In
addition, a copy of the title was not attached to the said Deed of Sale when it was presented for
notarization. The aforementioned circumstances should have alerted respondent. Given the ease
with which community tax certificates are obtained these days, respondent should have been more
vigilant in ascertaining the identity of the persons who appeared before him. His act of certifying
under oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining the identities of the persons
executing the same constitutes gross negligence in the performance of duty as a notary public.
DOCTRINE: By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, the Notary Public proclaimed to the
world that:
(1) All the parties therein personally appeared before him;
(2) They are personally known to him (or identified by him with competent evidence
of identity)
(3) They were the same persons who executed the instruments;
(4) He inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and,
(5) They acknowledged personally before him that they voluntarily and freely executed
the same.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are
the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and the truth of what are stated therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because what
are stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to.
Otherwise, their representatives names should appear in the said documents as the ones who
executed the same.
OCAMPO v. LAND BANK
July 3, 2009 | Peralta, J. | Notarized documents as public instruments
PETITIONER: Gloria Ocampo and Teresita Tan
RESPONDENTS: Land Bank of the Philippines, Urdaneta, Pangasinan Branch and Ex Officio
Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan
SUMMARY: Gloria Ocampo and her daughter, Teresita Tan, obtained a loan from the LBP worth
P10M. Quedancor guaranteed to pay LBP in case of non-payment upon maturity. Pursuant thereto,
they executed a Deed of Assignment/Contract of Pledge covering cavans of palay in favor of LBP;
and they also delivered quedans. Quedancor’s liability, however, only covered 80% of the loan.
Thus, LBP, through a letter, required for additional securities. Ocampo and Tan then constituted a
REM over two parcels of unregistered land (which was subsequently registered and LBP filed a
motion for the registration of the encumbrance as well. Also, LBP registered the mortgage).
Ocampo failed to pay the balance. Thus, LBP filed with Quedancor a claim for guarantee payment.
It also filed, with the RTC, a criminal case for estafa for disposing the cavans of palay covered by
the quedans. With regard to the 20%, LBP petitioned for extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM.
Ocampo and Tan filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity and Damages with Application for
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the LBP and the Sheriff, who set the sale of the mortgaged
properties at a public auction. Ocampo and Tan claimed that the REM is a forgery because LBP did
not inform them that the properties would be used to secure the payment of a P2M loan, which
they allegedly did not apply for. She also claimed that she already paid in full the quedan loan.
RTC ruled in favor of Ocampo and Tan. The CA reversed this. The issue in this case is Whether the
deed of REM is valid. Yes. The SC is not a trier of facts but this case falls under the exceptions. She
admitted during the direct examination that is was her signature and that the blank document was
actually a document with statements although not all blanks are filled. Also, a perusal of the Deed
of REM, shows that in the acknowledgement portion, their names, resident certificate information
and the name of the notary public. (doctrine) Ocampo denied that she appeared before a notary
public. Later on, she said she does not remember this. However, Dasig, an officer of the bank, said
that Ocampo was present before the notary public when the document was being notarized.
70 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
DOCTRINE: It is well settled that a document acknowledged before a notary public is a public
document that enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the
facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution. In addition,
one who denies the due execution of a deed where one's signature appears has the burden of
proving that contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never appeared before the notary public and
acknowledged the deed to be a voluntary act. A notarized instrument is admissible in evidence
without further proof of its due execution and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents,
and has in its favor the presumption of regularity.
Q: What does the Notary Public proclaim to the world when he affixes his Notarial seal on a
document?
A: By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, the Notary Public proclaimed to the world that:
(1) All the parties therein personally appeared before him;
(2) They are personally known to him (or identified by him with competent evidence of
identity)
(3) They were the same persons who executed the instruments;
(4) He inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and,
(5) They acknowledged personally before him that they voluntarily and freely executed
the same.
Disputable presumption of
Overcome by clear &
Public genuiness, due execution, and
Documentary evidence
convincing evidence
facts stated therein
2. Validity of Contracts
a. General Rule: A defective notarization does not affect the validity of a contract
NEW CIVIL CODE
BOOK IV — OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
TITLE II — CONTRACTS
CHAPTER 3 — FORM OF CONTRACTS
ART. 1356. CONTRACTS SHALL BE OBLIGATORY, IN WHATEVER FORM THEY
MAY HAVE BEEN ENTERED INTO, PROVIDED ALL THE ESSENTIAL REQUISITES
FOR THEIR VALIDITY ARE PRESENT. HOWEVER, WHEN THE LAW REQUIRES
THAT A CONTRACT BE IN SOME FORM IN ORDER THAT IT MAY BE VALID OR
ENFORCEABLE, OR THAT A CONTRACT BE PROVED IN A CERTAIN WAY, THAT
REQUIREMENT IS ABSOLUTE AND INDISPENSABLE. IN SUCH CASES, THE
RIGHT OF THE PARTIES STATED IN THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE CANNOT BE
EXERCISED. (1278A)
CHAPTER 8
UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS (N)
ART. 1403. THE FOLLOWING CONTRACTS ARE UNENFORCEABLE, UNLESS
THEY ARE RATIFIED:
embodied in a Deed of Sale which was not notarized. Pedro and Marcos died. The mayor of
Marikina executed a Deed of Absolute Transfer of Real Property over Lots A and C in favor of the
Estate of Pedro. The heirs of Gonzales executed an extrajudicial partition wherein Lot C was
subdivided into 3 lots. As a result, new titles were issued wherein the 370m -portion of Lot C-3 is
2
now denominated as Lot C-1 and the remaining 5-m of the subject lot forms a portion of another
2
lot denominated as Lot C-2. The Heirs of Perez filed an action for “Annulment and/or Rescission
of Deed of Absolute Transfer of Real Property and for Reconveyance with Damages.” RTC
dismissed the complaint. CA reversed. The Heirs of Gonzales argue that Marcos could not have
legally bought the disputed parcel of land from Pedro in September 1966 because during that time,
Pedro had not yet acquired ownership of the subject lot and assuming that Pedro actually executed
the subject of Deed of Sale, the same is not valid because it was not notarized as required under
the provisions of Articles 1403 and 1358 of the Civil Code. The issue is whether the Deed of
Absolute is valid notwithstanding the fact that it was not notarized. The Court ruled in the
affirmative. Under Article 1403 (2), the sale of real property should be in writing and subscribed
by the party charged for it to be enforceable. In this case, the Deed of Sale between Pedro and
Marcos is in writing and subscribed by Pedro and his wife Francisca; hence, it is enforceable under
the Statute of Frauds. However, not having been subscribed and sworn to before a notary public, the Deed
of Sale is not a public document and, therefore, does not comply with Article 1358 of the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, settled is the rule that the failure to observe the proper form prescribed under Article 1358 does
not render the acts or contracts enumerated therein. It has been uniformly held that the form required under
the said Article is not essential to the validity or enforceability of the transaction, but merely for convenience.
A sale of real property, though not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing, is, nevertheless, valid
and binding among the parties, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale of real estate
produces legal effects between the parties.
DOCTRINE: Although a conveyance of land is not made in a public document, it does not affect
the validity of such conveyance. Article 1358 does not require the accomplishment of the acts or
contracts in a public instrument in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy.
74 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
Q; Which contracts must appear in a public instrument FOR CONVENIENCE?
A: The following contract must be solemnized for convenience (CHARP):
(1) Cession, repudiation, or renunciation of
(a) Rights under the CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
(b) HEREDITARY Rights
(2) ADMINISTRATION of property or any other power which has for its object an act
appearing or which should appear in a public instrument, or should prejudice third
persons
(3) Creation, transmission, modification, or extinguishment of REAL RIGHTS over
immovables, EXCEPT sales governed by Arts. 1403 (2) & 1405
(4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an act appearing in a PUBLIC
DOCUMENT
emphasized that she had made payments "beginning June, 2001 up to October, 2004." She further
asserted that the October 4, 2004 Notice did not amount to an "effective cancellation by notarial
act." Filinvest asserted that that Orbe failed to make 24 monthly amortization payments on her
account, and thus, could not benefit from Section 3 of Maceda Law. According to Filinvest, the
P608,648.20 paid by Orbe from June 17, 2001 to July 14, 2004 covered only the reservation fee, down
payment, and late payment charges, exclusive of the monthly amortization payments stipulated in
the Purchase Agreement. Arbiter Soriano of the HLURB Field office then ruled in favor of Orbe. It
said that since Orbe paid from June 17, 2001 to July 14, 2004, a period more than 2 years, all the
payments should be credited to the principal and she was entitled to a refund of the cash surrender
value equivalent to the total payments she made pursuant to Sec. 3. Filinvest appealed to the
HLURB Board of Commissioners which affirmed Arbiter Soriano’s decision. It disagreed with
Arbiter Soriano's conclusion that Orbe had paid two (2) years' installments. It specifically noted
rather, that the buyer's payments fell two (2) months short of the equivalent of two years of
installments. It added, however, that "[e]quity . . . should come in especially where, as here, the
payment period is relatively short and the monthly installment is relatively of substantial
amounts." Thus, it concluded that Orbe was still entitled to a 50% refund. Filinvest then appealed
to the Office of the President which sustained the decision that orbe was entitled to a 50% refund.
It disagreed with the HLURB Board of Commissioners' finding that Section 3's benefits were
available to Orbe purely as a matter of equity. It agreed instead with Arbiter Soriano's reliance on
how Orbe "ha[d] made installment payments for more than two (2) years." The CA reversed the
prior rulings of the Office of the President, of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, and of Arbiter
Soriano; and dismissed Orbe's Complaint.
Whether Obre is entitled to a refund or to any other benefit under RA 6552 (Maceda Law)—
Yes. Considering that Filinvest did not validly cancel its contract with Obre and has also sold the
lot to another person, it is proper that Filinvest be ordered to refund Obre. This case falls under Sec
4, since the installments did not amount to 2 years of installments. To be a valid cancellation under
Sec 4, 3 requisites are needed. First, the buyer must have been given a 60-day grace period but
failed to utilize it. Second, the seller must have sent a notice of cancellation or demand for rescission
by notarial act. And third, the cancellation shall take effect only after 30 days of the buyer's receipt
of the notice of cancellation. The second requisite was not complied with. Filinvest's October 4,
2004 notice indicates that Orbe failed to utilize the 60-day grace period. It also indicates that
cancellation was to take effect "thirty (30) days from [its] receipt". The notice of cancellation was
accompanied by a jurat; thereby making it appear to have been a valid notarial act but this is not
the notarial act contemplated by the Maceda Law.
A jurat is a distinct notarial act, which makes no averment concerning the authority of a
representative. Even if Filinvest's notarization by jurat and not by acknowledgement were to be
condoned, Filinvest's jurat was not even a valid jurat executed according to the requirements of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. In this case, the signatory of Filinvest used a Community Tac
Certificate as competent evidence of identity but it doesn't satisfy this requirement anymore. AM
No. 02-8-13-SC rebuked the validity of a community tax certificate as competent evident of identity
since it was no longer reliable to prove identity.
There being no valid cancellation, the purchase agreement between Obre and Filinvest
"remains valid and subsisting" but since the land was already sold to Ymana, Filinvest should just
refund to Obre, the amount she paid.
DOCTRINE: To be a valid cancellation under Sec 4, 3 requisites are needed. First, the buyer must
have been given a 60-day grace period but failed to utilize it. Second, the seller must have sent a
notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by notarial act. And third, the cancellation shall
take effect only after 30 days of the buyer's receipt of the notice of cancellation
Q: What are the requisites for a valid rescission under Sec. 4 of the Maceda Law?
A: The following requisites must concur (60N30):
(1) The buyer must have been given a 60-day grace period but failed to utilize it.
78 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
(2) The seller must have sent a notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by notarial
act.
(3) The cancellation shall take effect only after 30 days of the buyer's receipt of the notice
of cancellation
GUERRERO v. BIHIS
April 17, 2007 | Corona, J. | Notarial Will
PETITIONER: Bella A. Guerrero
RESPONDENT: Resurreccion A. Bihis
SUMMARY: Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Guerrero and respondent Bihis,
died. Guerrero filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the decedent.
Respondent opposed this on the grounds, one of which is that the will was not executed and
attested as required by law and its attestation clause and acknowledgment did not comply with
the requirements of the law. After Guerrero presented her evidence, Bihis filed a demurrer alleging
that petitioner's evidence failed to establish that the decedent's will complied with Articles 804 and
805. RTC denied the probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied
with because the will was "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's,
1ST SEM. Laws, Cases, and Notes on Legal Forms 79
residence at Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned notary public
for and in Caloocan City.
Guerrero, asserts that the fact that the notary public was acting outside his territorial
jurisdiction did not affect the validity of the notarial will.
Issue: Whether the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses
before a notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement under
Article 806 of the Civil Code? It did not.
Article 806 provides that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses.
One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial will is
that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. This formal
requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a will. An acknowledgment is
the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer and declaring it to
be his act or deed. In the case of a notarial will, that competent officer is the notary public.
A notary public... is authorized to perform notarial acts, including the taking of
acknowledgments, within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his commission,
he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public.
DOCTRINE: Any notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect.
AZUELA v. CA
April 12, 2006 | Tinga, J. | Notarization of a Will is a requisite for its validity
PETITIONERS: Felix Azuela
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, Geralda Aida Castillo substituted by Ernesto G. Castillo
SUMMARRY: Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo. The
probate petition adverted to only 2 heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, namely: Azuela
himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad. However, this was
opposed by Geralda Castillo, who was the attorney-in-fact of “the 12 legitimate heirs” of the
decedent Eugenio. According to her, the will was forged, and imbued with several fatal defects.
She pointed out that decedents signature did not appear on the second page of the will.
Particularly, the issue relevant in this subject is that the will was not properly acknowledged. The
notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, only wrote “Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng
Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.” The issue is WHETHER the will was fatally
defective? - YES. This was not only because of the lack of number of pages and that the attestation
clause was not signed by the witnesses but also because IT WAS NOT PROPERLY
ACKNOWLEDGED before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses as required by Article
806 of the Civil Code. By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before
some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step
undertaken whereby the signore actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document
has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed. It might be possible to
construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual language thereof. Yet
even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless
remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be “acknowledged,” and
not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one
under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their
own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal
safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator.
Focused first on the relevant topic, here are the other defects of the will:
(1) The attestation clause fails to state the number of pages of the will. There was an
incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for
the insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause.
80 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
(2) The attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the
signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will,
they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which after all consists of
their averments before the notary public.
(3) The decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will on the left
margin, her only signature appearing at the so-called logical end of the will on its
first page.
(4) The will itself is not numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but instead
numbered with Arabic numerals. (but take note that taken in isolation, errors 3 and
4 by themselves, may not be sufficient to deny probate to a will)
DOCTRINE: The express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be acknowledged, and not
merely subscribed and sworn to. The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental
witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will
as their own free act or deed.
Q: What are the requisites for registration of instruments with the Registry of Deeds?
A: The following requisites must be complied with:
(1) Signed by the person or persons executing the same;
(2) In the presence of at least two witnesses who shall likewise sign thereon;
(3) Acknowledged before a Notary Public;
(4) The Acknowledgment shall state the number of pages;
(5) Signed on the left margin by the person/s executing it, except on the page where the
signatures appear at the foot thereof;
(6) All pages shall be sealed with the Notarial Seal;
(7) If the act evidenced by the instrument relates to two or more parcels of land, the
number thereof shall be set forth in the acknowledgement.
v. Transfer of ownership
NEW CIVIL CODE
BOOK IV — OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
TITLE IV — SALES
CHAPTER 4 — OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR
SECTION 2 — DELIVERY OF THE THING SOLD
ART. 1498. WHEN THE SALE IS MADE THROUGH A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT,
THE EXECUTION THEREOF SHALL BE EQUIVALENT TO THE DELIVERY OF THE
82 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
THING WHICH IS THE OBJECT OF THE CONTRACT, IF FROM THE DEED THE
CONTRARY DOES NOT APPEAR OR CANNOT CLEARLY BE INFERRED.
ART. 1544. IF THE SAME THING SHOULD HAVE BEEN SOLD TO DIFFERENT
VENDEES, THE OWNERSHIP SHALL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE PERSON WHO
MAY HAVE FIRST TAKEN POSSESSION THEREOF IN GOOD FAITH, IF IT
SHOULD BE MOVABLE PROPERTY.
DY v. COURT OF APPEALS
July 8, 1991 | Guiterrez Jr, J. | Execution of a Public Instrument is Delivery
PETITIONER/S: Perfecto Dy, Jr.
RESPONDENT/S: Court of Appeals, Gelac Trading Inc., and Antonio V. Gonzales
SUMMARY: Perfecto Dy and Wilfredo Dy are brothers. Sometime in 1979, Wilfredo Dy purchased
a truck and a farm tractor through financing extended by Libra Finance and Investment
Corporation (Libra). Both truck and tractor were mortgaged to Libra as security for the loan.
Perfecto wrote a letter to Libra to allow it to purchase the tractor and assume the mortgage of
Wilfredo. Libra agreed. The brother executed a deed of absolute sale to effect the sale. When this
sale happened, the tractor was already in possession of Libra because Wilfredo defaulted in the
payment of amortizations. Libra did not allow the immediate release of the tractor because it was
both the tractor and the truck which were mortgaged to Libra so it wanted full payment of both.
Perfecto convinced his sister to issue a check to pay for both items first. While waiting for the
check’s clearance, Wilfredo lost a case against Gelac Trading, and the latter, with the power of a
writ of execution, the sheriff levied on the tractor. Gelac When Perfecto found out that the tractor
was levied on, it filed a case for replevin. The issue is Whether Wilfredo still owned the tractor
when it was levied on by the sheriff. The SC held that no, the levy was void because it was already
owned by Perfecto at that time. The rule is settled that the chattel mortgagor continues to be the
owner of the property, and therefore, has the power to alienate the same; however, he is obliged
under pain of penal liability, to secure the written consent of the mortgagee. Article 1496 of the
Civil Code states that the ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment
it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501 or in any other manner
signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. Articles
1498 and 1499 are applicable in the case at bar.
DOCTRINE: Here, actual delivery of the subject tractor could not be made. However, there was
constructive delivery already upon the execution of the public instrument pursuant to Article
1498 and upon the consent or agreement of the parties when the thing sold cannot be immediately
transferred to the possession of the vendee.
TEN FORTY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT v. CRUZ
September 10, 2003 | Panganiban, J. | Transfer of ownership
PETITIONER: Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp, Veronica Lorenzana (President)
RESPONDENTS: Marina Cruz
1ST SEM. Laws, Cases, and Notes on Legal Forms 83
SUMMARY: TEN FORTY filed a complaint for ejectment (unlawful detainer) against CRUZ. TEN
FORTY alleged that it acquired the property through a Deed of Absolute Sale from Galino, which
was acknowledged through a Kasunduan. However, TEN FORTY found out that Galino sold the
same property to CRUZ, who immediately occupied the same and was merely tolerated by TEN
FORTY. On the other hand, CRUZ countered that TEN FORTY is not qualified to own a public
land. And that the there was no sale but only a loan. That the allegations were not of the nature of
unlawful detainer, and as such it has already prescribed. The MTCC ruled in favor TEN FORTY,
but was reversed by the RTC. On appeal, the CA held that TEN FORTY failed to establish a case of
Unlawful Detainer. Hence this petition.
The issues before the court are: (1) Whether there was tolerance on the part of TEN FORTY;
(2) Whether the case was for unlawful detainer or forcible entry; (3) Whether there was delivery;
and (4) Whether TEN FORTY is qualified to own public land
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Cruz. As to the first issue (1) tolerance must be present
from the beginning. But in the case beforehand, the complaint does not allege any averment of facts
that would substantiate the claim of tolerance. Rather, bare allegations which contradict such
claim, only bolstering a case of Forcible Entry. (2) Although the allegations provide for unlawful
detainer, what was proven by TEN FORTY was actually a case for forcible entry, thus, was filed
beyond the 1 year period from the date of entry. For the third issue (3) the court held that the
transfer of ownership is not by contract but by delivery. The execution of a public instrument
is generally a mode of delivery, but it does not provide a conclusive presumption of delivery,
but only prima facie. In the present case, the prima facie presumption was negated because of a
legal impediment. TEN FORTY never gained control or possession of the property, rather
Galino was in possession of the property until she surrendered the same to CRUZ when it was
sold. And lastly, (4) based on Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, private corporations are
disqualified from owning public land. But they may acquire private lands. In this case, TEN
FORTY was not able to prove that the land was private at the time of purchase.
DOCTRINE: Nowhere in the Civil Code is it provided that the execution of a Deed of Sale is a
conclusive presumption of delivery of possession of a piece of real estate. This Court had held that
the execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of delivery. Such
presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not effected because of a legal impediment
CALTEX v. CA
August 10, 1992 | Regalado, J. | Assignment of Credit as Against Third Persons
PETITIONER: Caltex (Philippines), Inc.
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Security Bank and Trust Company
SUMMARY: 280 Certificate of Time Deposits (CTDs) were issued to Angel dela Cruz by SBTC
after the latter deposited P1,120,000.00. Angel then delivered these CTDs to Caltex in order to
purchase fuel products. After losing the original CTDs, he submitted a notarized affidavit, upon
which 280 replacement CTDs were again issued. Meanwhile, Angel loaned from SBTC and
executed a Deed of Assignment of Time Deposit which stated that he surrenders to SBTC full
control of the CTDs from and after the date of the assignment and further authorizes SBTC to pre-
terminate, set off, and apply the time deposits to the payment on the loan upon maturity. Credit
Manager of Caltex alleged that the CTDs were delivered to Caltex as security and that Caltex now
wants to pre-terminate the same. SBTC rejected the demand.
When Angel’s loan matured, SBTC applied the time deposits as payment. Because of this,
Caltex demanded that SBTC should pay the aggregate value of the CTDs. RTC dismissed the
complaint. CA affirmed. W/N Caltex can recover the CTDs – NO, the assignment of the CTDs
made by Angel de la Cruz in favor of SBTC was embodied in a public instrument. SBTC complied
with the statutory requirement in Art. 1625.
Under NIL, an instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to another in
such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof, and a holder may be the payee or
indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof. Here, however, there was
no negotiation in the sense of a transfer of the legal title to the CTDs in favor of Caltex in which
situation, for obvious reasons, mere delivery of the bearer CTDs would have sufficed. The
pertinent law on this point is that where the holder has a lien on the instrument arising from
contract, he is deemed a holder for value to the extent of his lien. As such holder of collateral
security, he would be a pledgee but the requirements therefor and the effects thereof, not being
provided for by the Negotiable Instruments Law, shall be governed by the Civil Code provisions
on pledge of incorporeal rights. The mere delivery of the CTDs did not legally vest in Caltex any
right effective against and binding upon SBTC. Furthermore, Caltex, whether as purchaser,
assignee or lienholder of the CTDs, neither proved the amount of its credit or the extent of its lien
nor the execution of any public instrument which could affect or bind SBTC. Necessarily, therefore,
as between Caltex and SBTC, the latter has definitely the better right over the CTDs in question.
DOCTRINE: Art. 1625. An assignment of credit, right or action shall produce no effect as against
third persons, unless it appears in a public instrument, or the instrument is recorded in the Registry
of Property in case the assignment involves real property.
1. Jurat
“Jurat” refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion (AISO):
(1) APPEARS in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;
(2) Is personally known to the notary public through competent evidence of IDENTITY
defined by the Rules;
(3) SIGNS the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and,
(4) Takes an OATH or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or
document
2. Acknowledgement
“Acknowledgement” refers to an act which an individual on a single occasion (ACISVA):
(1) APPEARS in person before the notary public and presents an integrally COMPLETE
instrument or document
(2) Is attested to be personally known to the notary public or IDENTIFIED by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules; and,
(3) Represents to the notary public that the SIGNATURE on the instrument or document
was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document
as his free and VOLUNTARY act and deed and, if he acts in a particular representative
capacity that he has the AUTHORITY to sign in that capacity.
An individual must present his or her community tax certificate 9CTC) when he or she
acknowledges a document before a notary public. Thus, the CTC number, among other details related
to such CTC, must be stated in the acknowledgement.
Documents acknowledged before notary publics (EXCEPT last wills and testaments) are
considered public documents under the Rules of Evidence, and may be presented in evidence
without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgement being prima facie evidence of the due
execution of the instrument or document involved.
1ST SEM. Laws, Cases, and Notes on Legal Forms 87
4. Signature Witnessing
“Signature Witnessing” refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(1) Appears in person before the Notary Public and resents an instrument or document;
(2) Is personally known to the Notary Public or identified by the Notary Public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules; and,
(3) Signs the instrument or document in the presence of the Notary Public
5. Copy Certification
“Copy Certification” refers to a notarial act in which a notary public:
(1) Is presented with an instrument or document that is neither a vital record, a public
record, nor publicly recordable;
(2) Copies or supervises the copying of the instrument or document;
(3) Compares the instrument or document with the copy; and
(4) Determines that the copy is accurate and complete
(2) Both WITNESSES SIGN THEIR OWN NAMES in addition to the thumb or other mark;
(3) The Notary Public writes below the thumb or other mark: “THUMB OR OTHER
MAARK AFFIXED BY (NAME OF SIGNATORY BY MARK) IN THE PRESENCE OF
(NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF WITNESSES) AND UNDERSIGNED NOTARY
PUBLIC;” and,
(4) The Notary Public NOTARIZES the signature by thumb or other mark through an
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, JURAT, or SIGNATURE WITNESSING
NEVADA v. CASUGA
2012 March 20 | Velasco, Jr., J. | Signing on behalf of person physically unable to sign or make a
mark
PETITIONER: Corazon T. Nevada
RESPONDENTS: Atty. Rodolfo D. Casuga
SUMMARY: Nevada filed a disbarment case against Atty. Casuga for violation of his lawyer’s
oath and the notarial law. On March 1, 2006, he entered into a contract of lease with a certain Chul
covering an office space in the Hotel. Notably, Casuga signed the lease contract over the printed
name of one EDWIN T. NEVADA and notarized the document himself. In his comment, Atty.
Casuga claimed that Nevada informally instituted him as the administrator of the Hotel in a
limited capacity but denied receiving Php90,000 from Chul. The issue in this case is WHETHER
Atty. Casuga violated the Notarial Rules. The Court ruled in the affirmative. Sec. 3(a) disqualifies
a notary public from performing a notarial act if he or she is a party to the instrument or document
that is to be notarized. According to Rule IV, Sec. 1(c) of the Notarial Rules, a notary public is
authorized to sign on behalf of a person who is physically unable to sign or make a mark on an
instrument or document if:
(1) the notary public is directed by the person unable to sign or make a mark to sign on
his behalf;
(2) the signature of the notary public is affixed in the presence of two disinterested and
unaffected witnesses to the instrument or document;
(3) both witnesses sign their own names;
(4) the notary public writes below his signature: Signature affixed by notary in presence
of (names and addresses of person and two (2) witnesses);
(5) the notary public notarizes his signature by acknowledgment or jurat.
On the other hand, the succeeding Sec. 3(a) disqualifies a notary public from performing a
notarial act if he or she is a party to the instrument or document that is to be notarized. None of
the requirements contained in Rule IV, Sec. 1(c), as would justify a notary signing in behalf of
a contracting party, was complied with in this case. Moreover, Casugas act of affixing his
90 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
signature above the printed name Edwin T. Nevada, without any qualification, veritably made him
a party to the contract of lease in question. Thus, his act of notarizing a deed to which he is a party
is a plain violation of the aforequoted Rule IV, Sec. 3(a) of the Notarial Rules, for which he can be
disciplinarily sanctioned
DOCTRINE: Non-compliance with the requirements stated in Rule IV, Sec. 1 (c) of the Notarial
Rules disqualifies a Notary Public from signing on behalf of a person physically unable to sign or
make a mark on an instrument or document. Atty. Casuga’s act of affixing his signature above the
printed name Edwin T. Nevada, without any qualification, veritably made him a party to the
contract of lease in question. Being considered as a party to the instrument, Atty. Casuga is
disqualified from performing a notarial act as provided for in Sec. 3(a).
[Letterhead]
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Date:
For:
Re:
Your Query
You asked for our opinion regarding courses of action that may be taken, as well as the defenses
that may be raised, should Mr. Juan Dela Cruz (“Mr. Dela Cruz”) file a case against you based on
the demands set forth in Atty. Jane Doe’s letter dated 2 December 2017 (“Demand Letter”).
The claims set forth in the Demand Letter are as follows:
[insert summary of claims]
Our opinion
The courses of action which may be taken, as well as the defense that may be raised, against Mr.
Dela Cruz’s claims are discussed below. In summary, we believe that:
[insert summary of your recommendations]
1ST SEM. Laws, Cases, and Notes on Legal Forms 91
Discussion
[Discuss each of your recommendations. In doing so:
• Be mindful of your audience. The legal opinion is addressed to the client who
presumably is not a lawyer. Avoid legalese. Try to explain legal concepts in simple
language.
• Cite, quote, and explain applicable laws and/or jurisprudence.
• Give a fair and objective assessment of each of your recommendations. If there really
is no way out for client and you think he should settle, tell him to settle — but explain
why.
• If there are pieces of evidence that could strengthen your client’s case, identify or
describe them.
• At this stage, you should not be acting or thinking as an advocate. You are supposed
to act/think as an impartial assessor of facts and your client’s prospects of winning a
case. The objective is to give sound advice, not to argue or persuade.
]
We trust we have addressed your concerns. Let us know if you have further questions or concerns.
Sincerely,
[name]
B. Affidavit
1997 REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 13 — FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
PAPERS
SEC. 13. PROOF OF SERVICE. PROOF OF PERSONAL SERVICE SHALL CONSIST
OF A WRITTEN ADMISSION OF THE PARTY SERVED, OR THE OFFICIAL RETURN
OF THE SERVER, OR THE AFFIDAVIT OF THE PARTY SERVING, CONTAINING A
FULL STATEMENT OF THE DATE, PLACE AND MANNER OF SERVICE. IF THE
SERVICE IS BY ORDINARY MAIL, PROOF THEREOF SHALL CONSIST OF AN
AFFIDAVIT OF THE PERSON MAILING OF FACTS SHOWING COMPLIANCE
WITH SECTION 7 OF THIS RULE. IF SERVICE IS MADE BY REGISTERED MAIL,
PROOF SHALL BE MADE BY SUCH AFFIDAVIT AND THE REGISTRY RECEIPT
ISSUED BY THE MAILING OFFICE. THE REGISTRY RETURN CARD SHALL BE
FILED IMMEDIATELY UPON ITS RECEIPT BY THE SENDER, OR IN LIEU
THEREOF THE UNCLAIMED LETTER TOGETHER WITH THE CERTIFIED OR
SWORN COPY OF THE NOTICE GIVEN BY THE POSTMASTER TO THE
ADDRESSEE.
Q: What are the various modes of effecting service and how are they proven?
A: The following are the modes of effecting service:
(1) Personal service
(a) By written admission of the party served
(b) By official return of the server
(c) By an affidavit of the party serving, stating
(i) Date
92 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
(ii) Place
(iii) Manner
(2) Service by Ordinary Mail
(a) Affidavit of the person mailing stating that
(i) The documents were sealed
(ii) Addressed to the proper party
(iii) Postage has been paid
(iv) It should be returned if undelivered within 10 days
(3) Registered Mail
(a) Affidavit + Registry receipt
in [insert case number] entitled [insert case title], by registered mail with [or upon]:
[insert names of firms/parties upon whom pleading was served]
by depositing copies of the said [insert title of pleading] on 7 January 2018, in the Makai Central
Post Office, as evidence by Registry Receipt(s) No(s). [insert], indicated after the name(s) of the
addressee(s), and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to sender after 10 days in
undelivered.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have executed this Affidavit this 7th day of January 2018 in the
City of Makati.
[Signature of affiant]
[Name of Affiant]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
CITY OF MAKATI ) S.S.
JURAT
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for Makati City, affiant exhibiting to
me her Passport issued at DFA Manila and expiring on August 24, 2020, who was identified by me
through competent evidence of identity to be the same person who presented the foregoing
instrument, signed the instrument in my presence, and who took an oath before me as to such
instrument.
Witness my hand and seal this 5th day of August 2018.
Q: What are should be stated by the applicant in an Affidavit for Preliminary Attachment?
A: The following should be stated:
(1) That he personally knows the facts
(2) That there is a sufficient cause of action exists
(3) That the case is one of those mentioned in Rule 57, Section 1
CAUSE OF ACTION PREDICATE ACT
Action for recovery About to depart with intent to defraud
Action for embezzlement, fraudulent Same as cause of action
misappropriation, violation of fiduciary duty
Action to recover property unjustly or Concealed, removed, or disposed of
fraudulently taken
Action against party guilty of fraud in Same as cause of action
contracting or executing an obligation
Action against party who has removed or Same as cause of action
disposed of property with intent to defraud
Action against party who may be served with Any
summons by publication
(4) That there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the
action
(5) That the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property sought to be
recovered is as much as the sum for which the attachment is prayed for
RULES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
RULE 74 — SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES
SEC. 1. EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN HEIRS. - IF
THE DECEDENT LEFT NO WILL AND NO DEBTS AND THE HEIRS ARE ALL OF
AGE, OR THE MINORS ARE REPRESENTED BY THEIR JUDICIAL OR LEGAL
REPRESENTATIVES DULY AUTHORIZED FOR THE PURPOSE, THE PARTIES
MAY, WITHOUT SECURING LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVIDE THE
94 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
ESTATE AMONG THEMSELVES AS THEY SEE FIT BY MEANS OF A PUBLIC
INSTRUMENT FILED IN THE OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, AND
SHOULD THEY DISAGREE, THEY MAY DO SO IN AN ORDINARY ACTION OF
PARTITION. IF THERE IS ONLY ONE HEIR, HE MAY ADJUDICATE TO HIMSELF
THE ENTIRE ESTATE BY MEANS OF AN AFFIDAVIT FILED IN THE OFFICE OF
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS. THE PARTIES TO AN EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT,
WHETHER BY PUBLIC INSTRUMENT OR BY STIPULATION IN A PENDING
ACTION FOR PARTITION, OR THE SOLE HEIR WHO ADJUDICATES THE ENTIRE
ESTATE TO HIMSELF BY MEANS OF AN AFFIDAVIT SHALL FILE,
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH AND AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE FILING
OF THE PUBLIC INSTRUMENT, OR STIPULATION IN THE ACTION FOR
PARTITION, OR OF THE AFFIDAVIT IN THE OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS, A BOND WITH THE SAID REGISTER OF DEEDS, IN AN AMOUNT
EQUIVALENT TO THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY INVOLVED AS
CERTIFIED TO UNDER OATH BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED AND
CONDITIONED UPON THE PAYMENT OF ANY JUST CLAIM THAT MAY BE
FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THIS RULE. IT SHALL BE PRESUMED THAT THE
DECEDENT LEFT NO DEBTS IF NO CREDITOR FILES A PETITION FOR LETTERS
OF ADMINISTRATION WITHIN TWO (2) YEARS AFTER THE DEATH OF THE
DECEDENT.
Q: When may the heirs execute an Extrajudicial Settlement or Self-Adjudication of the Estate?
A: When the following requisites concur:
(1) There is no will
(2) There are no debts
(3) All the heirs are of age, and/or the minors are duly represented
1. [Insert recital of acts attested to or affirmed in the affidavit. Note that these facts
must be based in the affiant’s personal knowledge].
2. xxx
3. xxx
WEE v. DE CASTRO
August 20, 2008 | Chico-Nazario, J. | General and Special Powers of Attorney
PETITIONER: Leo Wee
RESPONDENTS: George De Castro (on his behalf, and as attorney-in-fact of Annie De Castro and
Felomina Uban), and Martiniana De Castro
SUMMARY: De Castro et al. rented out a 2-storey building erected on a parcel of land to Leo Wee
on a month to month basis, for Php9,000 a month. Both parties agreed that the rental payment shall
be increased to 15,000. Wee however, failed or refused to pay the corresponding increase on rent.
He only tendered 9,000 The parties failed to amicable settle in Lupon Tagamagpamayapa. Hence,
George de Castro sent a letter to Wee terminating their lease agreement, and demanded him to
1ST SEM. Laws, Cases, and Notes on Legal Forms 97
vacate. Since Wee refused, George, together with his siblings and co-respondents, filed a complaint
for ejectment (unlawful detainer) before the MTC. However, although the complaint stated that it
was filed by all of the respondents (De Castro et al.) the Verification and the Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping were signed by George alone. He then subsequently attached to his position
paper the SPAs executed by his sisters, authorizing to institute the ejectment case. Wee countered
that there was no agreement between the parties to increase the monthly rentals, and the increase
was exorbitant. He also argued that George lacked the authority to sign the Verification and
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. The MTC dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with
prior Barangary conciliation requirement. RTC affirmed the dismissal. The CA reversed and
ordered Wee to vacate the premises and pay the unpaid rent.
The SC held that since the contract of lease did not state a period, and the rentals are being
paid monthly, the period of lease is deemed terminated each month. Hence, De Castro et al. have
every right to demand the ejectment of Wee at the end of the month, for the contract having expired
by operation of law. The lessor’s right to rescind the contract of lease for non-payment of increased
rental is already recognised in Chua v. Victorio.
On the argument that George cannot maintain an action for ejectment w/o adjoining all his
co-owners, Art. 487 of the CC is explicit: Any one of the co-owners may bring an action for
ejectment. Moreover, Respondents Annie, and Felomina (sisters of George), executed a Special
Power of Attorney, giving Goerge the authority to initiate the civil case (see Doctrine). Even
then, the Court views the SPAs as mere surplusage since the lack thereof does not in anyway affect
the validity of the action for ejectment.
DOCTRINE #1: A power of attorney is an instrument in writing by which one person, as principal,
appoints another as his agent and confers upon him the authority to perform certain specified acts
or kinds of acts on behalf of the principal. The written authorization itself is the power of attorney,
and this is clearly indicated by the fact that it has also been called a “letter of attorney.”
This also disposes of Wee’s contention that George lacked the authority to sign the
Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping.
DOCTRINE #2: As held in Mendoza v. Coronel: the execution of the certification against forum
shopping by the attorney-in-fact in the case at bar is not a violation of the requirement that the
parties must personally sign the same. The attorney-in-fact, who has authority to file, and who
actually filed the complaint as the representative of the plaintiff co-owner, pursuant to a Special
Power of Attorney, is a party to the ejectment suit.
Failure by respondent George de Castro to attach the said SPAs to the Complaint is
innocuous, since it is undisputed that he was granted by his sisters the authority to file the action
for ejectment against Wee prior to the institution of Civil Case No. 1990.
Respondent deceased Jesus de Castro’s failure to sign the Verification and Certificate of Non-
Forum Shopping may be excused since he already executed an Affidavit with respondent George
de Castro that he had personal knowledge of the filing of Civil Case No. 1990. In Torres v.
Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, the Court ruled that the personal signing of the
verification requirement was deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, two
out of 25 real parties-in-interest, who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear
to the truth of the allegations in the petition, signed the verification attached to it.
VELOSO v. CA
August 21, 1996 | Torres Jr., J. | General and Special Powers of Attorney
PETITIONER: Francisco A. Veloso
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS, AGLALOMA B. ESCARIO, assisted by her husband
GREGORIO L. ESCARIO, the REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF MANILA
SUMMARY: Francisco Veloso was the owner of a parcel of land in Tondo, Manila. Francisco later
on found out that the title was transferred to a certain Aglaloma B. Escario. The sale was supported
by the documents, General Power of Attorney and Deed of Absolute Sale, executed by his wife,
Irma. Francisco denied executing the power of attorney and alleged that his signature was falsified.
98 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
Francisco contended that the sale of the property, and the subsequent transfer thereof, were null
and void. Francisco prayed that a temporary restraining order be issued to prevent the transfer of
the subject property. Aglaloma Escario alleged that she was a buyer in good faith and denied any
knowledge of the alleged irregularity. She allegedly relied on the general power of attorney of Irma
Veloso that was sufficient in form and substance and was duly notarized. Trial court adjudged
Escaro to be the lawful owner of the property. Whether there was a valid sale – YES, because
Escario was an innocent purchaser for value who just relied on the valid and regular on its face
document, General Power of Attorney that contained the power to sell the subject property. An
examination of the records showed that the assailed power of attorney was valid and regular on
its face. It was notarized and as such, it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
respect to its due execution. While it is true that it was denominated as a general power of attorney,
a perusal thereof revealed that it stated an authority to sell. Thus, there was no need to execute a
separate and special power of attorney since the general power of attorney had expressly
authorized the agent or attorney in fact the power to sell the subject property.
DOCTRINE: The special power of attorney can be included in the general power when it is
specified therein the act or transaction for which the special power is required.
SPOUSES ALCANTARA v. NILDO
April 19, 2010 | Carpio, J. | GPA and SPA
PETITIONER: Spouses Joselina Alcantara And Antonio Alcantara, And Spouses Josefino Rubi
And Annie Distor- Rubi
RESPONDENTS: Brigida L. Nido, As Attorney-In-Fact Of Revelen N. Srivastava,
SUMMARY: Brigida Nido's daughter, Revelen (US resident), owned an unregistered land of
1,939 sqm in Cardona, Rizal. In March 1984, Brigida accepted the offer of Spouses Alcantara and
Spouses Rubi (Spouses A&R) to purchase 200 sqm of the lot (owned by daughter Revelen) on
installment basis. By 1987, the spouses have paid 17,500php, but have since defaulted. Brigida,
acting as Revelen's administrator and attorney-in-fact, filed a complaint for recovery of possession
and damages + preliminary injunction against both Spouses. RTC held that Nido had no authority
to sell the lot, since the authority was not in writing (verbal only), thus the sale was void as per
Art. 1874. Thus, rescission is the proper remedy. CA reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the
case. It reasoned that since Nido did not have a written authority to enter into such contract of sale
the contract entered into between Spouses Rubi and Nido is void. It creates no rights or obligations,
thus its contract cannot be the subject of rescission. ISSUE: WHETHER the contract entered into
by Nido, in representation of her daughter, and Spouses A&R Rubi is void? The SC held in the
affirmative. CONTRACT IS VOID. As provided by our rules of court (Sec. 25, Rule 132 back then,
1984 nangyari, now its Sec. 24, Rule 132) proof of official or public record cannot be admitted in
evidence unless it is certified as such in accordance by an officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the USA. (See Doctrine) Revelen did execute a GPA in the US,
authorizing her mother as her attorney-in-fact and to enter into any and all contracts and
agreements on Revelen’s behalf. But the General Power of Attorney was notarized by Larry A.
Reid, Notary Public in California, U.S.A. Since the document did not conform with the
requisites of the Rules of Court, the document has no probative value.
DOCTRINE: When the special power of attorney is executed and acknowledged before a notary
public or other competent official in a foreign country, it cannot be admitted in evidence unless it
is certified as such in accordance with the foregoing provision of the rules by a secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept of
said public document and authenticated by the seal of his office.
YOSHIZAKI v. JOY TRAINING CENTER OF AURORA
July, 31, 2013 | Brion, J. | General and Special Powers of Attorney
PETITIONER: Sally Yoshizaki
RESPONDENTS: Joy Training Center of Aurora, Inc.
1ST SEM. Laws, Cases, and Notes on Legal Forms 99
SUMMARY: Spouses Richard and Linda Johnson (Spouses Johnson) sold real properties in favor
of the spouses Sally and Yoshio Yoshizaki (Spouses Yoshizaki). These real properties were owned
by Joy Training Center of Aurora (Joy Training) and Spouses Johnson were members of the Board
of Trustees of the former at the time of the sale. Joy Training filed an action for the Cancellation of
the said sale transaction against both spouses Yoshizaki and John, and also the Register of Deeds
(Cecilia). Joy training argues that spouses Johnson sold the properties without authority from the
board of directors and that the board resolution which purportedly granted the spouses Johnson
the authority to sell its real properties was not valid becauses it did not attain majority votes as
required by the Articles of Incorporation (7 members of BOT). The spouses Yoshizaki filed their
answer and claimed that spouses Johnson were authorized by the board and that the actual
members of the BOT consist only of five members. They also assailed the RTC’s jurisdiction over
the case and posited that the issue involves an intra-corporate dispute cognizable by the SEC. To
buttress their claim, the spouses Yoshizaki also offered in evidence photocopies of the resolution
and certification, among others. Joy Training objected to the formal offer of the photocopied
resolution and certification on the ground that they were not the best evidence of their contents.
The RTC denied the admission of the offered copies but nonetheless ruled in favor of the spouses
Yoshizaki and held that the sale was valid because Joy Training authorized the spouses Johnson to
sell the real properties. The CA upheld the RTC’s jurisdiction over the case but reversed its ruling
with respect to the sale of real properties. It maintained that the present action is cognizable by the
RTC because it involves recovery of ownership from third parties. Hence, this petition. Issues are:
First, Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the present case – Yes, the present case involves
a dispute concerning the application of the Civil Code (agency) and thus the RTC as courts of
general jurisdiction have jurisdiction.
Second, Whether there was a contract of agency to sell the real properties between Joy
Training and the spouses Johnson – No. As a general rule, a contract of agency may be oral.
However, it must be written when the law requires a specific form. Specifically, Article 1874 of the
Civil Code provides that the contract of agency must be written for the validity of the sale of a
piece of land or any interest therein. Otherwise, the sale shall be void. A related provision, Article
1878 of the Civil Code, states that special powers of attorney are necessary to convey real rights
over immovable properties. However, in the present case, the documents that were presented by
spouses Yoshizaki were not clear and explicit enough to confer upon the spouses Johnson the right
to sell the land in question. The TCT merely states that Joy Training is represented by the spouses
Johnson. The title does not explicitly confer to the spouses Johnson the authority to sell the parcel
of land and the building thereon. Moreover, the certification is a mere general power of attorney
which comprises all of Joy Training’s business.
Lastly, as a consequence of the second issue, Whether there was a valid contract of sale of the
real properties between Joy Training and the spouses Yoshizaki – No, the absence of a contract of
agency renders the contract of sale unenforceable; Joy Training effectively did not enter into a valid
contract of sale with the spouses Yoshizaki. They also cannot also claim that they were buyers in
good faith. They misapprehended the rule that persons dealing with a registered land have the
legal right to rely on the face of the title and to dispense with the need to inquire further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry. This rule applies when the ownership of a parcel
of land is disputed and not when the fact of agency is contested. Thus, spouses Yoshizaki bought
the real properties at their own risk; they bear the risk of injury occasioned by their transaction
with the spouses Johnson.
DOCTRINE: In cases involving the sale of a piece of land or any interest therein, the special power
of attorney mandated by law must be one that expressly mentions a sale or that includes a sale as
a necessary ingredient of the authorized act. It must express the powers of the agent in clear and
unmistakable language for the principal to confer the right upon an agent to sell real estate.
100 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
Q: What are the rules regarding the validity of the acts of an agent?
A: The GENERAL RULE is that a contract of agency need not be in writing in order that the agent
may validly enter into contracts on behalf of the principal. EXCEPTION: When the law requires the
agency to be in writing, i.e. in the sale of land through an agent.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Before me, a Notary Public in and for Makati City, personally appeared Jane Doe, with CTC No.
432, issued by the City of Makati on January 10, 2018, exhibiting to me his Passport issued at DFA
Manila and expiring on August 24, 2020, who was identified by me through competent evidence
of identity to be the same person who presented the foregoing instrument as his free and voluntary
act and deed.
Witness my hand and seal this 5th day of August 2018.
of a non-existing right to rescind. While it is true that a lessor is not obligated to send a collector, it
has been duly established that it has been customary for private respondents to pay the rentals
through a collector.
DOCTRINE: For the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit, two requisites must concur, namely:
(1) there must be failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease and (2) there must
be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate with in the period specified in Section 2, Rule 70,
namely 15 days in case of lands and 5 days in case of buildings. The first requisite refers to the
existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer while the second refers to the jurisdictional
requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued.
[Letterhead]
[Date]
Re: [SUBJECT]
Dear Ms. Dela Cruz,
We write on behalf of our client, Mr. Juan Dela Cruz (“Mr. Dela Cruz”).
Mr. Dela Cruz has informed us that: [insert summary of basic facts supporting your client’s
demand/comprising your client’s cause of action].
We wish to inform you that your acts constitute clear violations of [insert applicable laws or
regulations violated by the addressee which give rise to a cause of action in your client’s favor].
Accordingly, if Mr. Dela Cruz does not receive full payment of the sum of P1,000,000.00 within 15
days from your receipt of this letter, we will be constrained to file all the appropriate civil and
criminal actions against you in connection with the foregoing facts.
We trust that you will give this demand your most urgent attention.
Yours,
[Name]
Q: If the demand is coursed through counsel, to whom should the response be sent?
104 Ateneo de Manila University School of Law A.Y. 2018-2019
A: Response should be sent to counsel and not to the party, by clear provision of law that if a party
who engages counsel, all communications must be made to the lawyer.
[Letterhead]
[Date]
[Addressee]
[Address]
We write on behalf of our client, Ms. Juana Dela Cruz (“Ms. Dela Cruz”), and in response to your
demand letter dated [insert] (“Demand Letter”).
Your client claims that [insert summary of demands made against your client]. Based on these
assertions, your client has demanded the sum of P1,000,000.00 from our client.
Should your client insist in filing civil and criminal actions against Ms. Dela Cruz notwithstanding
the baseless nature of his claims against her, we will not hesitate to prosecute all counterclaims and
causes of action that our client has against him.
Yours,
[Name]