PRESCRIPTION

July 1, 2015
G.R. No. 200558
CONSUELO V. PANGASINAN and ANNABELLA V. BORROMEO, Petitioners,
vs.
CRISTINA DISONGLOALMAZORA, RENILDA ALMAZORA-CASUBUAN, RODOLFO CASUBUAN, SUSANA
ALMAZORAMENDIOLA, CARLOS MENDIOLA, CECILIO ALMAZORA and NENITA ALMAZORA, Respondents.
On the basis of prescription of actions, the pending petition must also be denied. Petitioners argue that
prescription shall not lie against their action because a registered land under Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529
cannot be acquired through prescription.  The argument is patently erroneous.
34

There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the acquisition of a
right by the lapse of time as expounded in paragraph 1, Article 1106.  Acquisitive prescription is also known
35

as adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions
are lost by the lapse of time as defined in paragraph 2, Article 1106 and Article 1139.  Another name for
36

extinctive prescription is litigation of action. These two kinds of prescription should not be interchanged.
37

In a plethora of cases,  the Court has held that Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529 covers acquisitive prescription. A
38

registered land therein can never be acquired by adverse possession. In the case at bench, however, it was
extinctive prescription, and not acquisitive prescription, which barred the action of petitioners. As the CA
correctly held, the action must fail, not because respondents adversely occupied the property, but because
petitioners failed to institute their suit within the prescriptive period under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.

To determine the applicable period of extinctive prescription, the nature and circumstances of the case
should be considered. According to petitioners, the owner’s duplicate certificate of title was given to Conrado
for safekeeping in 1945. Allegedly, Conrado employed fraud and bad faith when he drafted the Adjudication
and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Registered Land  on January 9, 1949, and transferred the title of the land to
39

his name with the issuance of TCT No. 35282  on June 17, 1965; and because of the purported fraud
40

committed by Conrado against petitioners, an implied constructive trust was created by operation of law,
with Conrado as trustee and Aurora as cestui que trust.

Constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and
prevent unjust enrichment.  Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through
41

fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the
property.  It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or
42

mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to Article
1144.  The prescriptive period to enforce the constructive trust shall be counted from the alleged fraudulent
43

registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.  The ten-year prescriptive period
44

applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of
the property. 45

In this case, the ten-year prescriptive period is squarely applicable because Conrado and his family, not
petitioners, were in possession of the property. The subject property was registered in the name of Conrado
on June 17, 1965, and this should be the starting point of the ten-year period. Petitioners, thus, had until
June 17, 1975 to enforce the implied trust and assert their claim over the land. As properly held by the CA,
petitioners belatedly instituted their judicial claim over the land on May 9, 1996. Indeed, with the lapse of the
prescriptive period to file an action, petitioners could no longer seek relief from the courts.
Heirs of Cullad vs. Gutierrez G.R. No. 212938

In the consolidated cases of Catindig v. V da. de Meneses34 ( Catindig) and Roxas, Sr. v. Court of
Appeals,35 the Court reiterated that:

x x x [I]t is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence
of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein.
Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to
possession thereof. In addition, as the registered owner, [the] right to evict any person illegally
occupying [the] property is imprescriptible.

In the recent case of Gaudencio Labrador, represented by Lulu Labrador Uson, as Attorney-in-}act v. Sps.
Ildefonso Perlas and Pacencia Perlas and Sps. Rogelio Pobre and Melinda Fogata Pobre, the Court held
that:

As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally occupying his property. This
right is imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches. In Bishop v. Court of Appeals, we held, thus:
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person
illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were
aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the
lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession
was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.36

In turn, the imprescriptible right to evict ostensibly proceeds from paragraph 2 of Article 112637 of the
Civil Code in relation to Section 47 of PD 1529, which provides:

SEC. 47. Registered land not subject to prescription. -No title to registered land in derogation of the title
of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

Section 47 of PD 1529 retains most of the wordings of its predecessor Section 4638 of Act No. 49639 or
the Land Registration Act of 1902.

In an ordinary ejectment suit, the certificate of title is never imperiled because the decision of the
ejectment court on the issue of ownership is merely provisional. On the other hand, in a reivindicatory
suit, where the Torrens title or certificate of title is the basis of the complaint's cause of action, there is
always a direct attack on the certificate of title the moment the defendant disputes its validity in a
counterclaim or a negative defense.

As to accion publiciana, this is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
real properly independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one
year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the real
property. 40

However, it should be noted that, unlike forcible entry and unlawful detainer which are procedurally
acknowledged,41 accion publiciana is not. Indeed, there was even a doubt as to whether it continued to
exist after the passage of the old Civil Code. In the 1906 case of The Bishop of Cebu v.
Mangaron42 (The Bishop of Cebu) the Court observed:
But the doubt which now exists is whether, after the promulgation of the Civil Code, the accion
publiciana continued to exist.

The doubt arises from the provisions of article 460 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
"The possessor may lose his possession-
"l. By the abandonment of the thing.
"2. By transfer to another for a good or valuable consideration.
"3. By the destruction or total loss of the thing or by the thing becoming unmarketable.
"4. By the possession of another, even against the will of the former possessor, if the new possession
has lasted more than one year."

The last provision of this article has given rise to the doubt whether possession which is lost by the
occupation of another against the will of the former possessor is merely possession de facto or
possession de Jure.

The most powerful reason why it is thought that it refers to possession both de facto and de Jure is that,
whereas the two are equally lost in the manner indicated in the first three provisions of this article, it
would be rather strange that the fourth provision should only refer to possession de facto. 43

Article 460 of the old Civil Code was amended and became Article 555 of the new Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
( 1) By the abandonment of the thing;
(2) By an assignment made to another either by onerous or gratuitous title;
(3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing, or because it goes out of commerce;
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has
lasted longer than one year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years.

 GR No. 198356, Apr 20, 2015 ]

The cause of action

The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana is dismissible for being filed out of time.

They invoke Article 555 of the Civil Code, which states: Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:

xxxx

(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has
lasted longer than one year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for accion publiciana on March
7, 2008 or more than ten (10) years after the certificate to file action was issued on November 25, 1992.
The respondents contend that the Spouses Supapo may no longer recover possession of the subject
property, the complaint having been filed beyond the period provided by law.

Further, while the respondents concede that the Spouses Supapo hold a TCT over the subject property,
and assuming a Torrens title is imprescriptible and indefeasible, they posit that the latter have lost their
right to recover possession because of laches.

On their part, the Spouses Supapo admit that they filed the complaint for accion publiciana more than
ten (10) years after the certificate to file action was issued. Nonetheless, they argue that their cause of
action is imprescriptible since the subject property is registered and titled under the Torrens system.

We rule that the Spouses Supapo's position is legally correct.

At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. The Spouses
Supapo acquired the TCT on the subject lot in 1979.[46] Interestingly, the respondents do not challenge
the existence, authenticity and genuineness of the Supapo's TCT.[47]

In defense, the respondents rest their entire case on the fact that they have allegedly been in actual,
public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner since
1992. The respondents contend that they built their houses on the subject lot in good faith. Having
possessed the subject lot for more than ten (10) years, they claim that they can no longer be disturbed
in their possession.[48]

Under the undisputed facts of this case, we find that the respondents' contentions have no legal basis.

In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless
when the land involved is a registered land because of Article 1126[49] of the Civil Code in relation to
Act 496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529[50]].[51]

The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under the Torrens system. The
most essential insofar as the present case is concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states:

Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in derogation of the
title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to
the possession thereof.[52] The right to possess and occupy the land is an attribute and a logical
consequence of ownership.[53] Corollary to this rule is the right of the holder of the Torrens Title to
eject any person illegally occupying their property. Again, this right is imprescriptible.[54]

In Bishop v. CA,[55] we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens Title were aware
of the other persons' occupation of the property, regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful
owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was
unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.[56]
Even if the defendant attacks the Torrens Title because of a purported sale or transfer of the property,
we still rule in favor of the holder of the Torrens Title if the defendant cannot adduce, in addition to the
deed of sale, a duly-registered certificate of title proving the alleged transfer or sale.

A case in point is Umpoc v. Mercado[57] in which we gave greater probative weight to the plaintiffs TCT
vis-a-vis the contested unregistered deed of sale of the defendants. Unlike the defendants in Umpoc,
however, the respondents did not adduce a single evidence to refute the Spouses Supapo's TCT. With
more reason therefore that we uphold the indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of the Spouses Supapo's
title.

By respecting the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the Spouses Supapo's TCT, this Court merely
recognizes the value of the Torrens System in ensuring the stability of real estate transactions and
integrity of land registration.

We reiterate for the record the policy behind the Torrens System, viz.:

The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title
thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all,
which will not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in the system
and will force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence will be that land conflicts can be even
more abrasive, if not even violent.[58]

With respect to the respondents' defense[59] of laches, suffice it to say that the same is evidentiary in
nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings.[60] In other words, the party
alleging laches must adduce in court evidence proving such allegation. This Court not being a trier of
facts cannot rule on this issue; especially so since the lower courts did not pass upon the same.

Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to deny the Spouses Supapo's
petition.[61] On the contrary, the facts as culled from the records show the clear intent of the Spouses
Supapo to exercise their right over and recover possession of the subject lot, viz.: (1) they brought the
dispute to the appropriate Lupon; (2) they initiated the criminal complaint for squatting; and (3) finally,
they filed the action publiciana. To our mind, these acts negate the allegation of laches.

With these as premises, we cannot but rule that the Spouses Supapo's right to recover possession of the
subject lot is not barred by prescription.
G.R. No. 167880 : November 14, 2012

JACK ARROYO, Petitioner, v. BOCAGO INLAND DEV'T. CORP. (BIDECO), represented by CARLITO
BOCAGO and/or the HEIRS OF THE DECEASED RAMON BOCAGO, namely, BASILISA VDA. DE BOCAGO,
CARLITO BOCAGO, SANNIE BOCAGO ARRENGO, and INDAY BUENO, Respondents.

At this juncture, it is best to emphasize the Court's ruling in Labrador vs. Perlas,12ςrνll to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

x x x As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally occupying his property.
This right is imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches. In Bishop v. Court of Appeals, we held,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person
illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were
aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the
lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession
was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.

x x x Social justice and equity cannot be used to justify the court's grant of property to one at the
expense of another who may have a better right thereto under the law. These principles are not
intended to favor the under privileged while purposely denying another of his right under the
law.13ςrνll

To rule that herein petitioner is guilty of laches even in the absence of evidence to that effect would
truly run afoul of the principle of justice and equity.

G.R. No. 187451 August 29, 2012

JESUS VIRTUCIO, represented by ABDON VIRTUCIO, Petitioner,

On Acquisitive Prescription

Virtucio insists that the period of acquisitive prescription was interrupted on October 30, 1961 (or in
1954 when Alegarbes filed the protest) when the Director of Lands rendered a decision giving due
course to his homestead application and that of Ulpiano Custodio. Virtucio further claims that since
1954, several extrajudicial demands were also made upon Alegarbes demanding that he vacate said lot.
Those demands constitute the "extrajudicial demand" contemplated in Article 1155, thus, tolling the
period of acquisitive prescription.19

Article 1106 of the New Civil Code, in relation to its Article 712, provides that prescription is a mode of
acquiring ownership through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by
law. Under the same law, it states that acquisitive prescription may either be ordinary or
extraordinary.20 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with
just title for a period of ten years,21 while extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires uninterrupted
adverse possession of thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.22

There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the acquisition
of a right by the lapse of time as expounded in par. 1, Article 1106. Other names for acquisitive
prescription are adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive prescription whereby
rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined in Article 1106 and par. 2, Article 1139.
Another name for extinctive prescription is litigation of action.23 These two kinds of prescription should
not be interchanged.

Article 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the interruption of prescription of actions. Interruption of
acquisitive prescription, on the other hand, is found in Articles 1120-1125 of the same Code. Thus,
Virtucio’s reliance on Article 1155 for purposes of tolling the period of acquisitive prescription is
misplaced. The only kinds of interruption that effectively toll the period of acquisitive prescription are
natural and civil interruption.24

Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor.25 When no action is
filed, then there is no occasion to issue a judicial summons against the respondents. The period of
acquisitive prescription continues to run.

In this case, Virtucio claims that the protest filed by Alegarbes against his homestead application
interrupted the thirty (30)-year period of acquisitive prescription. The law, as well as jurisprudence,
however, dictates that only a judicial summons can effectively toll the said period.

JURIDICAL ACTS ------- POSSESSION/ OCCUPATION

WHAT MUST BE ALLEGED IN AN ACCION PUBLICIANA

HOW TO STATE A PARTY IN PLEADING if name is unknown

Section 14. Unknown identity or name of defendant. — Whenever the identity or name of a