CP - Congress - Michigan7 2020 Starter Pack

CP – Congress – Umich 2020 – Starter Pack
Congress CP – Neg Notes

Congress CP Notes – Forensic Science
I think this area and sentencing will have the most courts AFFs from my initial scope of the literature
base, hence why they have their own dedicated note sections. Forensic science is a bit more
straightforward than sentencing (and has a lot less moving parts) so I’ll start with that.
Forensic science is a relatively new phenomenon in the criminal justice scene for a variety of reasons,
but mostly notable is that the science didn’t really exist until recently. This is where a lot of the
controversy in this section falls because most of the issues with forensic science have to do with
creating verifiable scientific standards, implementing those standards uniformly and consistently,
and/or having those in court accurately interpret, verify, and use evidence put through the process.
Therefore the Congress CP v Court AFF debate for sentencing is mostly about whether the legislature
or the judiciary can more effectively write guidelines for everyone involved in the process and who
will have a better/more accurate scientific understanding when writing said guidelines.
Also slight plug for the Netflix documentary: How to Fix a Drug Scandal (with appropriate permissions
from parents if necessary of course [might even be a fun family evening watch!]). It covers the Annie
Dookhan scandal and another drug lab scandal that put a bunch of cases up in the air.
Now the cards to help put all of this into context –
Forensic science definition

President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology PCAST ’16 , is an advisory group of the Nation’s leading scientists and
engineers, appointed by the President to augment the science and technology advice available to him from inside the White House and from
cabinet departments and other Federal agencies. PCAST is consulted about, and often makes policy recommendations concerning, the full
range of issues where understandings from the domains of science, technology, and innovation bear potentially on the policy choices before
the President, “REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods”,
September 2016, Executive Office of the President – President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology,
http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf
“Forensic science” has been defined as the application of scientific or technical practices to the
recognition, collection, analysis, and interpretation of evidence for criminal and civil law or regulatory
issues. Developments over the past two decades—including the exoneration of defendants who had
been wrongfully convicted based in part on forensic-science evidence, a variety of studies of the
scientific underpinnings of the forensic disciplines, reviews of expert testimony based on forensic
findings, and scandals in state crime laboratories— have called increasing attention to the question of
the validity and reliability of some important forms of forensic evidence and of testimony based upon
them.
2016 PCAST summary of findings and broad areas to improve on

President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology PCAST ’16, is an advisory group of the Nation’s leading scientists and
When President Obama asked the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) in 2015 to consider
whether there are additional steps that could usefully be taken on the scientific side to strengthen the
forensic-science disciplines and ensure the validity of forensic evidence used in the Nation’s legal system, PCAST
concluded that there are two important gaps: (1) the need for clarity about the scientific standards for
the validity and reliability of forensic methods and (2) the need to evaluate specific forensic methods to
determine whether they have been scientifically established to be valid and reliable. This report aims to
help close these gaps for the case of forensic “feature-comparison” methods—that is, methods that
attempt to determine whether an evidentiary sample (e.g., from a crime scene) is or is not associated with a
potential “source” sample (e.g., from a suspect), based on the presence of similar patterns, impressions, or
other features in the sample and the source . Examples of such methods include the analysis of DNA, hair, latent fingerprints,
firearms and spent ammunition, toolmarks and bitemarks, shoeprints and tire tracks, and handwriting.
A large issue with forensic science currently is the ability to train, standardize, and
create a coherent understanding of what labs are testing for
The 2009 National Research Council report was the most comprehensive review to date of the forensic
sciences in this country. The report made clear that some types of problems, irregularities, and
miscarriages of justice cannot simply be attributed to a handful of rogue analysts or underperforming
laboratories, but are systemic and pervasive —the result of factors including a high degree of fragmentation
(including disparate and often inadequate training and educational requirements, resources, and
capacities of laboratories), a lack of standardization of the disciplines, insufficient high-quality research and
education, and a dearth of peerreviewed studies establishing the scientific basis and validity of many
routinely used forensic methods. The 2009 report found that shortcomings in the forensic sciences were
especially prevalent among the featurecomparison disciplines, many of which, the report said, lacked
well-defined systems for determining error rates and had not done studies to establish the uniqueness
or relative rarity or commonality of the particular marks or features examined . In addition, proficiency
testing, where it had been conducted, showed instances of poor performance by specific examiners . In
short, the report concluded that “much forensic evidence —including, for example, bitemarks and firearm and toolmark
identifications—is introduced in criminal trials without any meaningful scientific validation, determination
of error rates, or reliability testing to explain the limits of the discipline.”
The “legal context” of the forensic science issue according to PCAST

Historically, forensic
science has been used primarily in two phases of the criminal-justice process: (1)
investigation, which seeks to identify the likely perpetrator of a crime, and (2) prosecution, which seeks
to prove the guilt of a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt . In recent years, forensic science—particularly DNA
analysis—has also come into wide use for challenging past convictions. Importantly, the investigative and prosecutorial
phases involve different standards for the use of forensic science and other investigative tools. In
investigations, insights and
information may come from both wellestablished science and exploratory approaches. In the
prosecution phase, forensic science must satisfy a higher standard . Specifically, the Federal Rules of Evidence (Rule
702(c,d)) require that expert testimony be based, among other things, on “reliable principles and methods” that have been “reliably applied” to
the facts of the case. And, the Supreme Court has stated that judges must determine “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid.” This is where legal standards and scientific standards intersect . Judges’
decisions about the admissibility of scientific evidence rest solely on legal standards; they are exclusively
the province of the courts and PCAST does not opine on them . But, these decisions require making
determinations about scientific validity. It is the proper province of the scientific community to provide guidance concerning
scientific standards for scientific validity, and it is on those scientific standards that PCAST focuses here. We distinguish here
between two types of scientific validity: foundational validity and validity as applied. (1) Foundational
validity for a forensic-science method requires that it be shown, based on empirical studies, to be
repeatable, reproducible, and accurate, at levels that have been measured and are appropriate to the
intended application. Foundational validity , then, means that a method can, in principle, be reliable. It is the
scientific concept we mean to correspond to the legal requirement, in Rule 702(c), of “reliable principles and methods.” (2) Validity as
applied means that the method has been reliably applied in practice. It is the scientific concept we mean
to correspond to the legal requirement , in Rule 702(d), that an expert “has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.”
In 2013, the state of forensic testing facilities was largely unregulated by the federal
government and there were a lot of questions surrounding whether forensics should
be used beyond DNA testing
Eric Maloney ’13, J.D. Candidate (2014), University of Minnesota Law School, “Two More Problems and Too Little Money: Can
Congress Truly Reform Forensic Science?”, 2013, Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, Vol. 14, Issue 2, Article 11,
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=mjlst
At the moment, forensic testing facilities and employees are largely unregulated by the federal
government.10 While Congress set stringent standards over twenty years ago for clinical laboratory environments running medical
tests,11 forensic facilities have only recently been subject to federal oversight, and such regulation has
been largely circumscribed to their performance of DNA analysis in light of numerous DNA
exonerations.12 However, DNA testing is but a small fraction of the volume of forensic testing
performed in such laboratories nationwide in processing evidence for use in criminal proceedings .13
These disciplines include, but are not limited to, general toxicology, firearm and tool marks, questioned
documents, trace evidence, biological and serological screening, impression evidence, and controlled
substance analysis.14 In fact, testing of suspected controlled substances has been a focus of forensic
laboratories since the 1970s15 and remains the most frequent type of testing performed in labs.16 The
expansive use of forensic testing methods outside of DNA analysis is especially troubling in light of
significant concerns that have been raised with non-DNA forensic methodologies .17 The goal of any of forensic
analysis is to “individualize” a sample and match it to a person or a source for purposes of showing guilt or innocence.18 However, only DNA
has been shown to be able to do this with scientific certainty based on repeated, consistent research results; other disciplines have varying
levels of available research and set protocols to ensure the validity of testing results.19 The
result is a patchwork of different
disciplines with different levels of discriminating power, administered by practitioners who may lack the
necessary training to properly interpret results or may ignore results altogether .20
Congress CP Notes – Sentencing
The Congress CP v Court AFF debate for sentencing is going to center around the question of
whether the legislative or judicial branch is more effective at creating guidelines and pressure
on judges to make consistent, fair judgements for whatever reason the AFF sets up. To
master this debate, one must understand the history of how federal sentencing guidelines
came to exist, what phases of federal sentencing have been experienced over the last couple
of decades, and how sentencing occurs now.
Here is a brief/definitely not comprehensive outline of sentencing history:
Prior to 1970s when sentencing guideline talks started - ad hoc indeterminate sentences
where after 1/3 time served the US parloe board decided whether to release prisoners and
sometimes after 2/3 of the time had been served for sentences 5+ years in length they would
just release people  1984 = creation of the federal guidelines (implemented in 1987)  a
bunch of cases defining the scope and how appellate review is supposed to work (1996 =
Koon v United States)  2003-2004 passage of the PROTECT Act and Feeney Amendment 
more cases on whether these standards are fair and compromise 6th Amendment rights 
2004/2009 Booker and Blakey cases (respectively) radically increase judicial discretion over
sentencing and diminish the federal guidelines to advisory status (i.e. voluntary)
The PROTECT Act was originally drafted to provide stronger protections for children in
abduction and sexual exploitation cases along with other tools to protect children – the
addition of the restrictions on judicial discretion over sentencing was a later addition by
Representative Tom Feeney of Florida (passed 2004 on April 30 th, drafted throughout 2003
and maybe earlier, not sure) – acted as the foundation for sentencing guidelines until
2004/2009 with Booker and Blakely
The Feeney Amendment – paired with the PROTECT Act – requires that appellate courts
review departures de novo in relation to the sentencing guidelines which overturned a prior
decision in Koon v United States that held review of departures should be reviewed for abuse
of discretion which is the spirit of holding judges accountable for their departures (this
amendment was passed in fear of too many downward departures occurring which doesn’t
match with reality)
However the current era of sentencing (Post-Booker) is an attempt to use the federal
guidelines as an advisory guide and then to basically analyze and compile decisions for all
crimes and their sentences to create a sense of “common law” that creates a presumptive
range for what an “appropriate” sentence would entail for a host of different crimes with
different circumstances (we are still waiting to see whether this approach has been
successful/followed up on to a degree).
And now some cards to help describe all of that in a less ranty/half-sentence form --
Prior to the creation of the federal sentencing guidelines, all sentences were
indeterminate and operated (jokingly) according to the “breakfast” rule
Erik Luna ’05, Hugh B. Brown Presidential Endowed Chair in Law and Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law,
“Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing”, Fall 2005, Northwestern University of Law Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,
Vol. 96, Issue 1 – Fall, Article 2, https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7216&context=jclc
Judicial arbitrariness was so widespread, conventional wisdom scoffed, that punishment in any given
case depended upon a sort of "breakfast" rule--" what the judge had for breakfast ." 98 As lampooned by
former U.S. Sentencing Commissioner Michael Goldsmith: Certain culinary items suggested light sentences geared
towards rehabilitation (eggs over easy, instant oatmeal, Sweet 'N Low, Lucky Charms, and Cheerios). However, others evoked
harsher images of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation (hard boiled eggs, bacon extra crisp, and especially Total,
Life, or any type of toast). Of course, if the judge had dined on waffles or Fruit Loops (as often seemed to be the case),
all bets were off .99
1984 is when Congress created the federal sentencing guidelines and implemented the
first phase of federal determinate sentencing
Congressional Research Service CRS ’09, known as Congress's think tank, is a public policy research institute of the United States Congress,
“Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Background, Legal Analysis, and Policy Options”, February 9 2005-March 16 2009, EveryCRSReport.com,
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL32766.html
In 1984, Congress passed legislation that led to the creation of federal sentencing guidelines . The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Chapter II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984; P.L. 98-473), in essence,
eliminated indeterminate sentencing at the federal level. The act created the United States Sentencing
Commission, an independent body within the judicial branch of the federal government and charged it
with promulgating guidelines for federal sentencing . The purpose of the Commission was to examine unwarranted disparity
in federal sentencing policy, among other things.14 In establishing sentencing guidelines for federal judges, the Commission took into
consideration factors such as (1) the nature and degree of harm caused by the offense; (2) the offender's
prior record; (3) public views of the gravity of the offense; (4) the deterrent effect of a particular
sentence; and (5) aggravating or mitigating circumstances .15 In addition to these factors, the Commission also considered
characteristics of the offender, such as age, education, vocational skills, and mental or emotional state, among other things.16 Prior to the
Booker decision (discussed below), the guidelines were binding.17 In summary ,
the Sentencing Reform Act reformed the
federal sentencing system in the following ways : It abandoned one of the traditional goals of
punishment, rehabilitation, and asserted the following goals: retribution, education, deterrence and
incapacitation.18 It consolidated the power that had been exercised by judges and the U.S. Parole Board
to decide the type of punishment and its length by abolishing paroles and creating the U.S. Sentencing
Commission and charging it with establishing sentencing guidelines .19 It made all federal sentences
determinate.20 It authorized appellate review of sentences in which the judge departed from the
guidelines21 and review of other sentences under certain circumstances . 22
Congressional reform started with the intent on eliminating disparities in sentencing
for a variety of reasons – mostly just that the indeterminate, ad hoc system wasn’t
effective – from my read, it seems we have started to come full circle in the legal
language back to this period so CP mechs could focus on making this more of a
legislative thing to be controlled which would circumvent a lot of the solvency deficit
debate – think about how to write the 2NC overviews for this
Mark T. Bailey ’04, J.D. Candidate, The University of Iowa College of Law 2005, “Feeney's Folly: Why Appellate Courts Should Review
Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines with Deference”, 2004, 90 Iowa Law Review, accessed via HeinOnline
Broad judicial discretion was a hallmark of the first 200 years of federal sentencing .'9 Before the
implementation of the Guidelines, federal judges enjoyed an almost unfettered freedom to impose
any sentence S 20they found just, so long as the sentence was below the statutory maximum . There
was no requirement that judges state reasons for their sentences , 21 and there was 22 very little appellate
review of sentences. In the 1960s and 1970s, academics began to criticize this almost 23 complete judicial
discretion. The critics noted that the system allowed two offenders with similar criminal histories to receive vasty different sentences for
the same crime, depending upon whom they "drew" as a judge.2 4 This criticism burgeoned into a strong, bipartisan
sentencing reform movement. Conservatives decried the sentencing system as too lenient on criminals who did not deserve
leniency; liberals feared that unrestricted discretion allowed racial and other inappropriate biases to influence a judge's sentencing decisions;
and conservatives and liberals alike were appalled by statistical studies that purported to demonstrate wide disparities in the sentences of
similarly situated offenders.2 5 Thus, the
overarching goal of the sentencing reform movement was to eliminate
unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly situated offenders .2c The reformers understood
these disparities to result from two infirmities in traditional sentencing practice: the almost unfettered
discretion assumed by sentencing judges, and a parole system that created 27 further sentencing
indeterminacy.
How the sentencing guidelines are used (assuming mandatory status)

Mark T. Bailey ’04, J.D. Candidate, The University of Iowa College of Law 2005, “Feeney's Folly: Why Appellate Courts Should Review
Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines with Deference”, 2004, 90 Iowa Law Review, accessed via HeinOnline
Sentencing under the Guidelines operates as follows . First, the judge, with the assistance of a probation
officer, uses detailed instructions contained in the Guidelines to determine a numerical "criminal history
category" and "offense level" for the offender." Next , as directed by the Guidelines, the judge applies certain
upward or downward adjustments to the offense level and criminal history category .4' These adjustments
pertain to, for example, special traits or behaviors of the victim or offender .2 Finally, the judge plots these
numbers on the Federal Sentencing Grid , 4' which gives the judge a mandatory sentencing range . r The
mandatory range consists of a minimum sentence and a maximum sentence that can exceed the minimum sentence by up to twenty-five
percent.44 Because the goal of the Guidelines was to eliminate "unwarranted sentencing disparities,"45 Congress
intended the
Guidelines to allow departure from the mandatory range in certain circumstances . 6 To this end, the
Sentencing Reform Act provides that a judge must impose a sentence within the range provided by
the grid "unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind,
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described. , 7 The Guidelines give substance to
these words by directing judges to "treat each guideline as carving out a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each
guideline describes." 8 The
Guidelines continue, "when a court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular
guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may
consider whether a departure is warranted." 49 The Guidelines provide substantial guidance to courts attempting to decide
whether an offender's conduct "significantly differs from the norm." 0 As a general matter, the Guidelines discourage
departure ."' Judges are categorically prohibited from considering some factors when making departure
decisions. These factors include the race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic
status of the offender. 2 Also absolutely excluded from the court's consideration are such factors as
the offender's 54 lack of guidance as a youth," physical condition or appearance, drug or alcohol
dependence, 5 and economic hardship. 6 The Guidelines divide the world of permitted departures into
two 57 groups: guided and unguided departures . The first group, guided departures, consists of departures
based on factors that the Guidelines either encourage or discourage as grounds for departure .5 8
Encouraged departures are those that the Commission recognizes may not adequately be taken into
account by the Guidelines' criminal history and offense categories and adjustments . 59 The Guidelines list
twelve encouraged factors for upward departures and five encouraged factors for downward departures. 0 In the
event that the encouraged factor is taken into account by another applicable Guideline section, "departure [from the applicable guideline
range] is warranted only if the factor is present to a degree substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved in the offense.”61
Discouraged factors are those factors that the Commission has decided will not ordinarily be
appropriate grounds for departure. Examples of discouraged factors include physical condition,
including illness and drug 62 63 and alcohol dependence, and family ties and responsibilitie s. These factors
warrant departure "only if the factor is present to an exceptional degree or in some other way makes the case different from the ordinary case
where the factor is present. 64 The second group of departures, unguided
departures, are neither encouraged nor
discouraged by the Guidelines. They are covered by Guideline 5K2.0, which provides for departure if the court finds "that there
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance... of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines that.., should result in a sentence different from that described."65 The Guidelines provide
that unguided departures "will occur rarely and only in exceptional cases. "66
The sentencing commission massively messed up the creation of the guidelines due to
the insistence on “not trusting judges”, disagreements about what “theory of
punishment to follow”, and no agreement on how to take into account context but
balance uniformity – they just seemed to arbitrarily increase sentences across the
board with rapid escalation for certain crimes (white collar, drug, violent)
Some two decades ago, this vision became a reality with the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 .08
Echoing the statements of Frankel and others, Congress demonstrated a supreme suspicion and even fear of judges.
"The present problem with disparity in sentencing," argued one senator, "stems precisely from the
failure of federal judges .... There is little reason to believe that judges will now begin to do what they
have failed to do in the past."' 0 9 A dissenting senator paraphrased the debate as "judges cannot be trusted. You cannot trust a
judge.., you must not trust a judge." 0 The legislative history materialized in parts as a calumnious rant against the
courts, that judges were the problem and needed to be severely disciplined." ' (All that seemed to be missing was a
floor tirade from Rep. Elmer Fudd about those "wascawwy wabbits.") Given the dubious premise of the Sentencing Reform
Act, it is not altogether surprising that the legislation introduced a lengthy, potentially conflicting list of
targets and constraints, 1 2 with the "first and foremost goal" of eliminating disparity by requiring
uniformity in punishment."3 Toward this objective, indeterminate sentencing in the federal system was brought to an end,
eliminating parole and compelling judges to fix an exact sentence (less a small discount for good behavior in prison) that could be reviewed on
appeal. The Act also fulfilled Judge Frankel's dream of an agency on punishment, launching an "independent commission in the judicial branch,"
the U.S. Sentencing Commission, to create and disseminate guidelines that reined in judicial discretion through relatively tight ranges of
punishment. 14 The
Commission had only eighteen months to complete its assignment, one that was
hindered by the sometimes muddled legislative directives, as well as internal disagreement over the
importance and function of punishment theory-all while outside detractors were berating the project
as foolhardy and unconstitutional . The resulting work product, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, could
not help but be warped by the time limit, uncertainties of language, disagreement over philosophy,
and an illconceived institutional process . For instance, the commissioners clashed over the appropriate model-one focused on
utilitarian "crime control" or another linked to retributive assessments of harm-and with time running out, the Commission decided not to
decide, resolving that the Guidelines would not adopt any theory of punishment but instead would rely upon a statistical review of past
sentences. Yet for whatever reason, 1 5 the
Guidelines adopted a hyperdeterministic, incremental-harm approach
that no sane theory demands-generating significant swings in punishment with seemingly trivial
changes in fact' 1 6 -- and in so doing, the system discarded the historical wisdom of theoretically
eclectic, context-sensitive punishment. As for the empirically guided assessment of punishment, the Guidelines simply
increased the average sentences across-the-board, with a sizeable escalation for white-collar and
drug crimes . 1 7 Likewise, violent offenses received boosts in punishment "where the Commission was
convinced that they were inadequate," although it failed to detail exactly what made a sentence
"inadequate" and why the Commission was "convinced" of such deficiency for a given crime . 18
Some think that problem with federal sentencing guidelines is that it transforms
humans into numbers which takes out the human element and leads to crueler
understandings of criminality and that Congress should just stop trying to create
standards for incarceration
Under the Guidelines, judges thus confront defendants as numbers rather than as human beings . The
Guidelines sought "a fully rationalized algebra of criminology and penology" that eliminates discretion in
sentencing, 77 a sort of "sentencing machine," where the court inserts the necessary figures to calculate a
set punishment.7 8 The result is "sentencing by the numbers," converting a trial judge into an
"automaton," "rubberstamp bureaucrat," "notary public," or "accountant, ' 79 whose role is reduced to
"filling in the blanks and applying a rigid, mechanical formula ., 80 As such, federal sentencing purges much
of the human element in order to make defendants fit within the limited dimensions of Gridland . The
cookie-cutter approach of the Guidelines creates all-purpose categories of crimes and criminals,
privileging certain factors and ignoring all others, thereby transforming specific cases involving unique
individuals into uniform patterns amenable to the grid. It is hard not to sense a "certain Kafkaesque aura"8' about the
entire process, lopping off the defendant's individuating traits and mechanically evaluating the remainder-clumps of data, plugged into the
sentencing equation and then charted on a two-dimensional matrix. In Gridland, you might expect that one federal inmate would say to
another, "I'm an offense level 17, criminal history category 3, with a range of 30-37 months-what are you?" Or maybe you might overhear a
federal judge lamenting to a colleague, "It was one § 5Kl.1 after another,82 then hearings filled with § 1B1.3 evidence,83 plus an irate category
VI in the afternoon. But at least a couple showed heartfelt § 3El.1,14 and there were no § 2Al's today.' 85 Such exchanges do not occur (as far as
I know), although possibly due to the inscrutable nature of the Guidelines rather than the stilted character of this dialogue alone. The
rules
are at best puzzling in their hypertechnical variations and at worst a foreign dialect to lay participants,
particularly the individual most directly affected by this cryptic language --Gridland's newest resident, the
defendant at sentencing. Court hearings on punishment are "nearly unintelligible to victims, defendants, and observers, and even to
the very lawyers and judges involved in the proceeding., 86 Widespread difficulties were encountered in implementing
the hypertechnical sentencing system-one that is under constant amendment and subject to a vast body
of jurisprudence-spurring publications, conferences, courses, and the like, all to steer otherwise
perfectly competent people through the puzzling rules of federal sentencing .87 Among other things, the
Commission established an "Office of Education and Sentencing Practice" to tutor the many baffled professionals, and it even created a series
of punishment calculation worksheets (bearing a vague resemblance to an I.R.S. form).88 At the outset, Gridland's
maniacal rules
virtually guaranteed errors in sentencing, from simple mathematical mistakes to using incorrect editions
of the Guidelines Manual, at times producing multi-year punishment blunders .89 But even when a
sentence was arithmetically correct, the people immediately impacted by the punishment-particularly
the newly gridded defendant-would exit the hearing mystified by the process and rationale for the
ultimate judgment. Guidelines sentences can vary widely based on seemingly trivial distinctions with
marginal cognitive impact, distinguishing between "minor" and "minimal" participation in the offense,
for instance, and between "leadership" and "managerial" roles.90 Likewise, relatively small variations in
the amount of money in question or the quantity (and even form) of a given contraband can produce
astounding discrepancies in punishment .91 As is now infamous, convert cocaine for sniffing (powder) to
cocaine for smoking (crack) and the punishment increases 100 fold, despite the lack of any significant
pharmacological or penological distinction.92 But in Gridland, at least, differences need not be intellectually meaningful to
have enormous significance.s So unlike judges drawn from the highest class of circles in Flatland, those who work in the grid seem comparable
to the middle class equilateral or possibly a professional square, but certainly not the polygonal nobility. Criminal defendants, in turn, would
rank no higher than the lowly isosceles or even the (presumably) mindless lines, although flat fodder for the sentencing machine might be more
fitting. But like the centuries of color in Flatland, there was a time when federal sentencing was an art, not a pseudoscience, when the specifics
of an offense and offender mattered, when context and perspective were taken into account rather than expressly ignored. Throughout
most of American history, punishment was "indeterminate" in nature, with lawmakers broadly defining
criminal offenses and potential punishments while judges deliberated on the comparative seriousness of
a specific crime and an appropriate sentence for the offender. "Traditionally," noted the U.S. Supreme Court in
1993, "sentencing judges have considered a wide variety of factors in addition to evidence bearing on
guilt in determining what sentence to impose on a convicted defendant." 93 This eclectic approach
attempted to accommodate the diverse rationales for punishment, from retributive principles of "just
deserts" to consequential considerations of deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation, thus allowing
trial judges to craft a proper sentence based on an array of factors and legitimate conceptions of
justice.94
The later 6th Amendment cases (Booker/Blakley) further complicate this debate a bit
more than normal Congress CPs, but they seem flexible enough that Congress can still
impose direction on the court for sentencing
In a series of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that given the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury, judges cannot impose sentences beyond the prescribed statutory maximum unless the facts
supporting such an increase are found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt .23 In Apprendi v. New Jersey
(Apprendi),24 the Court struck down New Jersey's hate crime law, which allowed a judge to increase a
sentence to double the statutory maximum if he or she found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the defendant acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race . In
reversing the lower court's decision, the Court declared that the jury trial and notification clauses of the Sixth
Amendment and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments embody a principle that
insists that, except in the case of recidivists, 25 a judge could not on his own findings sentence a criminal
defendant to a term of imprisonment greater than the statutory maximum assigned for the crime for
which he had been convicted by the jury . 26 In Blakely v. Washington (Blakely),27 the Court held that
Washington State's sentencing guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a trial by jury in
criminal cases. Washington State guidelines allowed judges, rather than juries, to make certain findings of fact that increased an offender's
sentence. The Court found that the "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence
a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant. In other words, the relevant statutory maximum is not the maximum sentence a judge may
impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional facts .28
After Blakely, federal courts were immediately faced with arguments that the USSG also violated the
Sixth Amendment. The courts were divided sharply on this issue.29
It seems that while the Supreme Court held that 6 th Amendment rights may never be
trumped by “mandatory” guidelines, that “mandatory guidelines” themselves are not
unconstitutional but rather have to be more carefully worded to deal with the issue of
“judicial discretion” not just implementation of the guidelines (I could be reading this
completely wrong though so I should revisit with a close eye)
The Court unanimously agreed that discretionary sentencing guidelines would not implicate a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right.41 Applying its decisions in Apprendi and Blakely, the Court42 held that "[a]ny
fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum
authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." The Court reasoned that the sentencing
guidelines direct a judge in some instances to enhance sentences in a manner which violates this
principle. This violation occurs when a judge makes certain factual findings supported by a preponderance of the evidence43 to enhance a
sentence beyond the range otherwise authorized by the jury's verdict or the defendant's admissions. In rejecting the government's
arguments against Blakely's applicability to the federal sentencing guidelines (guidelines), the Court found
the fact that the guidelines were developed by the United States Sentencing Commission rather than by
Congress was constitutionally insignificant.44 Moreover, the Court found that Blakely's application to the
guidelines was not precluded or contradicted by recent cases dealing with other issues including
perjury45 and the Double Jeopardy clause.46 Finally, the Court noted that a separation of powers argument
was precluded by its decision in Mistretta v. United States .47 In the first opinion, the Court sought to
restore the jury's significance in its finding of the underlying crime .48 However, in the remedial portion of the decision,
the majority gave judges more discretion in sentencing. With Justice Ginsburg joining the four dissenting judges from the
first part (Justices Breyer, O'Connor, Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist), the Court held unconstitutional two provisions
of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA): 18 U.S.C. §3553(b)(1), which makes the guidelines mandatory,
and 18 U.S.C. §3742(e), which sets forth standards of review for appeals of departures from the
mandatory guidelines.49 To reach this conclusion, the majority evaluated the likely effect of the constitutional
requirement on the SRA's language, history and basic purpose. In other words, the Court answered the
question of what "Congress would have intended" in light of the Court's constitutional holding . The
Supreme Court based its decision to delete the mandatory requirement of the guidelines on the
supposition that, given the choice, Congress would not have enacted a mandatory system modified to
accommodate Blakely.50 This majority considered three options: (1) invalidating the act in its entirety;
(2) engrafting the Sixth Amendment "jury trial" requirement; and (3) severance and excision of the
offending parts of the SRA. The Breyer majority opined that Congress would have preferred "the total
invalidation of the Act to an Act with the Court's Sixth Amendment requirement engrafted onto it." 51
In addition, it concluded that Congress would have preferred the "excision of some of the Act, namely the
Act's mandatory language to the invalidation of the entire Act." 52 The Breyer majority noted that severance and
excision was closer to Congress' intended system by "maintaining a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the offender's real
conduct...."53 As such, the Court concluded that 18 U.S.C. §3553(b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. §3742(e) should be severed and excised to match
Congress' intent of increased uniformity of sentencing. The
Court called upon Congress to decide whether its
declaration of judicial discretion merits legislative action .54
Congress has plenty of options to force courts to alter sentencing practices

Historically, the
way in which convicted offenders are sentenced falls under one of two penal policies —
indeterminate and determinate sentences . Indeterminate sentencing practices were predominant for
several decades, leading up to the major reform efforts undertaken by many states and the federal
government in the mid- to-late 1970s and early 1980s . The perceived failure of the indeterminate system to “cure” the
criminal, coupled with renewed concern about the rising crime rate throughout the nation in the mid-1970s, resulted in wide experimentation
with sentencing systems by many states and the creation of sentencing guidelines at the federal level. In
1984, Congress passed a
sentencing reform measure, which abolished indeterminate sentencing at the federal level and created
a determinate sentencing structure through the federal sentencing guidelines . The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
reformed the federal sentencing system by (1) dropping rehabilitation as one of the goals of punishment; (2) creating the U.S. Sentencing
Commission and charging it with establishing sentencing guidelines; (3) making all federal sentences determinate; and (4) authorizing appellate
review of sentences. In United States v. Booker (Booker), an unusual two-part opinion transformed federal criminal
sentencing by restoring to judges much of the discretion that Congress took away when it put
mandatory sentencing guidelines in place. In the first opinion, the United States Supreme Court held that
the mandatory sentencing guidelines violated defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury by
giving judges the power to make factual findings that increased sentences beyond the maximum that
the jury’s finding alone would support . In the second part, a different majority concluded that the
constitutional deficiency could be remedied if the guidelines were treated as discretionary or advisory
rather than mandatory. As a result of the decisions, the Court struck down a provision in law that made the
federal sentencing guidelines mandatory as well as a provision that permitted appellate review of
departures from the guidelines. In essence, the high Court’s ruling gives federal judges discretion in sentencing offenders by not
requiring them to adhere to the guidelines; rather, the guidelines can be used by judges on an advisory basis. In light of the Court
ruling in Booker and subsequent cases, the issue for Congress is whether to amend current law to
require federal judges to follow guided sentences, or permit federal judges to use their discretion in
sentencing under certain circumstances . Congressional options include (1) maintain the sentencing
guidelines by specifying mandatory minimum sentences and increasing the top of each guideline range to a statutory maximum for
specified offenses (hence, codify specified sentencing ranges that are in the guidelines); (2) require jury trials for any
enhancement factor that would increase the sentence for which the defendant did not waive his or
her rights; or (3) take no action, thus permitting judicial discretion in sentencing in cases where
Congress has not specified mandatory sentences .
A non-comprehensive list of actions Congress can take to deal with sentencing
disparities – the provide jury trials plank might be nice in combo with other changes to
the system to help deal with the 6th Amendment solvency deficits that are sure to pop
up – also helps enforce appellate review which gives the CP a court solvency mech to a
degree
In light of the Court's ruling in Booker and its subsequent rulings in Gall and Kimrough, the
issue for Congress is whether to
amend current law to require federal judges to follow guided sentences, or continue to permit federal
judges to use their discretion in sentencing, under certain circumstances . Following is a discussion and
analysis of several selected options Congress could consider . Maintain the Sentencing Guidelines One
option Congress may wish to consider could be to maintain the sentencing guidelines by specifying mandatory minimum sentences and
increasing the top of each guideline range to a statutory maximum for specified offenses (hence, codify specified sentencing ranges that are in
the guidelines). In essence, thisoption would require any upward departures to coincide with the statutory
maximum for the offense in question, in which case a statutory maximum would have to be specified .
This option was first presented to the U.S. Sentencing Commission shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Blakely by Frank Bowman, who concluded with respect to such an option: The practical effect
of such an amendment would be to preserve current federal practice almost unchanged . Guidelines factors
would not be elements. They could still constitutionally be determined by post-conviction judicial findings of fact.... The only theoretical
difference would be that judges could sentence defendants above the top of the current guideline
ranges without the formality of an upward departure ....111 Provide Jury Trials Congress could consider a
measure that has been implemented in Kansas . Kansas had presumptive sentencing guidelines that were invalidated by the
state's supreme court.112 In response to the court ruling, the state's legislature chose to retain the sentencing
structure by incorporating jury fact-finding as the basis for enhanced sentences .113 Under this scheme,
for each enhancement that would increase the sentence beyond the guideline maximum for which the
defendant did not waive his or her rights, the judge has the option of trying aggravating factors before
the jury, either during the main trial or in a separate, bifurcated proceeding . The jury would have to find that the
enhanced factors exist beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the enhanced sentence to be applicable. While this option may
satisfy constitutional questions, it may prove to be an expensive and time-consuming. Permit Judicial
Discretion in Sentencing Congress may also allow federal judges to exercise their discretion in
sentencing in cases where Congress has not specified a mandatory term of sentence . This option could
possibly mirror the indeterminate sentencing scheme that was in place prior to the sentencing reform
effort in 1984. While such an option would allow judges to individualize sentences to the extent that Congress has not established a
mandatory sentence for the offense, it could also result in a lack of uniformity due to judges applying different
sentences across jurisdictions.
Congress CP – Neg
1NC – Congress CP – General CJR
The United States Congress should enact [PLAN].
Congress solves – builds on current legislative momentum and results in state follow-
on
Timothy Head and Gil Kerlikowske ’19, *is the executive director of the Faith & Freedom Coalition, **is the former Director of
the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy and police chief in Buffalo and Seattle, “Let's maintain our bipartisan momentum with
criminal justice reform”, 10/30/19, The Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/468196-lets-maintain-our-bipartisan-momentum-with-
criminal-justice-reform
Ten months ago, Congress passed the FIRST STEP Act, signaling the arrival of bipartisan criminal justice reform
at the federal level. The question for Washington now is: What’s next? Individuals and organizations
across the political spectrum have united around common themes like justice, fairness, equality, and
second chances. They agree that America’s high incarceration and recidivism rates take a toll on
families and communities, and that we need to balance personal responsibility with forgiveness and
rehabilitation. Solutions to these problems will increase public safety, save taxpayer dollars and restore the lives of both offenders and victims. The
Council on Criminal Justice has begun the hard work of identifying top priorities for future federal
reforms. The council convened its inaugural policy summit in the nation’s capital and circulated draft proposals from its first task force, highlighting the next
steps the federal government should take. Unveiled by council leaders and the co-chairs of the task force, the preliminary recommendations
range from restoring Pell grants for justice-involved individuals to fully constituting the U.S. Sentencing
Commission. This is so it can fulfill its duty to make necessary adjustments regarding sentencing
standards and conduct a comprehensive review of the U.S. criminal code . The council task force also is
considering proposals to expand the use of drug, veterans, mental health, and other problem solving
and accountability courts, as well as strengthening oversight of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to improve
conditions of confinement. The past half-century is littered with criminal justice policies and programs that initially seemed like good ideas, but
ultimately fell short or even caused harm to individuals and communities. Fortunately , a growing body of research on what works to
improve criminal justice outcomes is now available to policymakers as they develop reforms at the
federal level. The states are already well on their way, with Texas, Georgia, Oregon, Louisiana and others adopting comprehensive bipartisan reform
packages in recent years. Continued reform at the federal level, if successfully implemented, will encourage
states to deepen their efforts and may spark movement in the few remaining states that have been
reluctant to act . We know that 97 percent of people in prison will eventually go home. Recidivism — when former inmates commit a new crime and
return to prison — has a significant effect on public safety and the viability of our communities. Research has demonstrated that there are proven steps that can
reduce recidivism, making all of us safer while increasing the odds that people who return to our communities come back as contributing members of society,
working in stable jobs and taking care of their families. The
passage of the FIRST STEP Act marked a critical milestone in our
journey toward a more fair and effective criminal justice system . Let’s maintain our bipartisan
momentum — the future of our criminal justice system and our democracy depends on it.
1NC – Congress CP – Abolish Mandatory Minimums
The United States Congress should pass legislation abolishing federal mandatory
minimums from the United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
That solves without Court involvement

Since their advent, mandatory minimums have been assailed by 257 members of the judiciary as thoroughly
unjust and unwise, including Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court .258 At various times in their careers, the past
three U.S. Presidents have also doubted the wisdom of long mandatory sentences , 59 while prominent
federal lawmakers and even a former U.S. Drug Czar and a former U.S. Attorney General have disputed
the efficacy and justice of mandatory minimums . 260 Likewise, numerous organizations have expressed
opposition to mandatory minimums, with, for instance, a 2004 American Bar Association report calling for
the repeal of mandatory minimum sentencing laws . 26 1 Among other things, the critics have pointed out that
the mechanical nature of mandatory minimums can produce "cliff' effects in punishment, whereby an
individual who possesses 5.01 grams of crack cocaine must serve the five-year mandatory prison term,
for instance, but someone who has, say, 4.99 grams of the same drug can be incarcerated for no more
than one year.262 In addition, mandatory minimums (sometimes coupled with liability expanding doctrines like attempt and
conspiracy) permit low-level offenders to receive the same (or disturbingly similar) punishment as drug
kingpins and violent criminals.2 63 Worse yet, because the bit players in a criminal scheme may have no
one to "rat out," they may be subject to severe punishment while major operators avoid hard time by
providing information to federal prosecutors.264 Given these and other flaws, former U.S. District Court Judge
John Martin offered this terse but accurate assessment of mandatory minimums: "They are cruel,
unfair, a waste of resources, and bad law enforcement policy. Other than that they are a great idea., 265 Yet
mandatory minimum sentences remain on the books, due in large part to the "pathological politics, , 266
of federal sentencing law. Lawmakers in Congress have every motivation to support ruthless
punishment in the form of new mandatory minimums, which have a "tough on crime," bumper-sticker
quality that makes them easy to understand by the voting public, thus providing terrific campaign
material for the next election cycle.267 Federal law enforcement also has every incentive to support draconian sentencing laws;
by raising the potential punishment to astronomical levels, prosecutors are provided a sledgehammer that often leaves the accused little choice
but to accept a plea bargain, thereby leading to more and easier convictions.268 "This
is the essential key to an understanding
of federal sentencing policy today," one district court opined with brilliant honesty, the Department [of Justice] is so addicted to
plea bargaining to leverage its law enforcement resources to an overwhelming conviction rate that the focus of our entire criminal justice
system has shifted far away from trials and juries and adjudication to a massive system of sentence bargaining that is heavily rigged against the
accused citizen.2 69 When
individuals demand their day in court or plea negotiations fail, "the govemment
routinely imposes a stiff penalty upon defendants who exercise their constitutional right to trial by
jury.' ,270 The end result can be the mechanical imposition of a long obligatory sentence on an individual
whose crime and personal history call for more lenient treatment . Some lawmakers have claimed that truly shocking
sentences are the exception, with mandatory minimums producing only a few "horror stories."271 But those with real experience in federal
courthouses know otherwise; in responding to such congressional pooh-poohs, Judge Vincent Broderick "respectfully submit[ted] that the
mandatory minimum system in place is itself the 'horror' story .... [M]andatory minimums are the
major obstacle to the development of a fair, rational, honest, and proportional federal criminal justice
sentencing system.' '272 In fact, instances of excessive punishment via federal mandatory minimums
abound, from lowlevel street dealers lacking information or more serious offenders to snitch on, to
girlfriends tangentially involved in their significant others' drug schemes, to defendants hammered with
brutal sentence enhancements because they possessed a firearm somewhere in their home. 273 In the words
of one U.S. Attorney, cooperating with law enforcement is "the only ticket to freedom' 274 in a mandatory
minimum case. If a defendant refuses to play ball with prosecutors and asks for his day at trial, or if he
simply has no information to provide federal agents, his fate is all but sealed by a predetermined
statutory formula-a five-year, ten-year, or even longer term of imprisonment-irrespective of all else,
including the best judgment of the sentencing court . So whatever the benefits of Booker, the very worst rules of Gridland
remain in effect.
1NC – Congress CP – Death Penalty
The United States Congress should pass legislation abolishing the death penalty in the
United States.
Congress solves and is more effective than the aff

John Nichols ’19, is The Nation’s national-affairs correspondent, “Democrats Can Become the Party of Death Penalty Abolitionism”,
9/12/19, The Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/2020-democrats-death-penalty/
EXPLOITING THE DEATH PENALTY FOR POLITICAL GAIN To some extent, this is a required response to Donald Trump, whose attorney general
moved in July to begin scheduling federal executions, after a 16-year moratorium. William Barr’s
action sent a signal to
Democrats that they could well face a 2020 campaign in which the Republican nominee sounds a cynical
cry for vengeance that makes capital punishment central to the domestic debate . To counter that cry, Democratic
presidential contenders must recognize Barr’s announcement for what it is: a political gambit that is rooted in the past but that need not frame
the future. That’s one of the reasons it makes political—as well as moral—sense to use the debate in Texas to push back. A
unified show
of opposition to capital punishment in a state that executes so many would signal that the Democratic
Party will not be derailed and distracted by an issue where it can stand, finally, on the right side of
history. Exploitation of the death penalty for political purposes is nothing new. Republicans and
Democrats have, for generations, engaged in the crudest of political calculations by arguing at election time
that there was an “urgent” need to haul prisoners out of cells where they are securely incarcerated —and
serving long sentences—so that they could be killed . That’s what Trump is doing now. There is a good chance
that the courts and common sense will delay , and perhaps prevent, the deaths by lethal injection that Barr
proposes. But that won’t be the end of it . Rest assured that, whether or not executions occur, Trump will turn up the volume of
the cry for vengeance just in time for the 2020 election season. “The only surprising part of the Trump administration’s choice to restart federal
executions is that it took the president this long to make it. As a matter of pure politics, Donald Trump would probably like nothing more than
to have a national debate over the next year about what sort of justice ought to be meted out to convicted murderers,” explains Brennan
Center for Justice fellow Andrew Cohen. “Such a dialogue during the primary season will likely rile his base, track [with] his ‘American carnage’
motif, and distract reporters away from coverage of the administration’s malfeasance and the president’s own legal troubles.” That’s not
speculation. Trump has a record. Few figures in public life have been so consistently vile in their exploitation of capital punishment for the
purpose of dividing Americans against one another. His 1989 agitation to “bring back the death penalty” in the aftermath of the rape and
assault of a woman who had been jogging in Central Park has been well documented. Trump did everything he could to whip up outrage against
five African American and Hispanic teenagers who were wrongly charged and then convicted in 1990. “All five were exonerated in 2002 after
Matias Reyes confessed to raping the woman, which was backed up by DNA evidence,” USA Today reminds us. Yet, instead of recognizing the
injustice, Trump refuses to apologize. And he refuses to recognize the evolution of the criminal justice debate in recent years. “ It
doesn’t
matter to Trump, or to Barr, that violent crime rates are down in America and at generational lows in
many jurisdictions,” argues Cohen. “It doesn’t matter that, as more states abolish the death penalty,
executions are down across the country and that the imposition of death sentences in murder cases also
is waning for good and practical reasons. It does not matter to this administration that conservative opposition to capital
punishment has grown significantly over the past decade or so. Or that the American people, slowly but surely, are turning away from it as well,
with less than half of Americans saying that the death penalty is applied fairly.” DEMOCRATS ARE RESPONDING But
the shift in the
debate should matter to those who oppose what Trump and Barr are now doing . It is not enough to
wait for the courts . Every Democratic presidential contender should speak up boldly—as some already have. Senator Elizabeth Warren
was appropriately blunt when she said, “Our criminal justice system has a long history of mistakes when it comes to capital punishment—
especially when it comes to Black and Brown people. We cannot let a broken system decide the fate of incarcerated Americans. I oppose the
death penalty.” So was Senator Cory Booker, when he pointed out that Throughout our nation’s history we have seen how the death penalty is
not only ineffective and immoral, but also fraught with biases against people of color, low-income individuals, and those with mental illness. It
is a waste of taxpayer dollars and does nothing to improve public safety. Instead, capital punishment seeks to satisfy a desire for vengeance and
retribution. Our government must represent the best of who we are, not the worst. We can, and should, do better. Even former vice president
Joe Biden, a former supporter of capital punishment, now says “we must eliminate the death penalty.” Polls suggest that the nation
remains divided on the issue. But as Trump seeks to exploit this division, responsible leaders must
address it with information and clear statements of moral conviction. That’s what Massachusetts
Representative Ayanna Pressley has done, in a move that defines a way forward for her party. With significant support
from Democratic House members—and Michigan independent Justin Amash, a former Republican—Pressley has
introduced legislation “to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty for any violation of federal
laws, and for any purposes.”
1NC – Congress CP – Forensic Science (General)
The United States Congress should [PLAN] and strengthen all sanctions for accredited
laboratories who fail to comply with [PLAN STANDARD].
That solves – federal accreditation and funding ensures compliance

Eric Maloney ’13, J.D. Candidate (2014), University of Minnesota Law School, “Two More Problems and Too Little Money: Can
Congress Truly Reform Forensic Science?”, 2013, Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, Vol. 14, Issue 2, Article 11,
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=mjlst
A key component of any effective federal legislation on this issue must include mandatory accreditation
and certification standards enforced through a federal mechanism . By only carrying the threat of monetary sanctions if
laboratories are not in compliance, current and proposed federal regulations lack sufficient means to motivate
states into compliance.168 Congress should take a cue from its previous regulation of clinical service
laboratories and apply similar measures to forensic science providers . This is not a new idea—it was proposed as far
back as 1991169—long before the most recent lab scandals. The 1988 Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA)170
ensured quality clinical laboratory testing in labs receiving Medicare or Medicaid payments, primarily by
requiring laboratory accreditation through either the government or a certified outside agency .171 The
difference between CLIA and regulations of forensic laboratories are the available sanctions: labs
found in non-compliance with CLIA may be subject to a much wider range of sanctions by the
government, including suspension of accreditation, a civil suit, imprisonment, or fines, for those found
guilty of intentionally violating CLIA.172 If strong sanctions such as these were coupled with the
accreditation and certification requirements already present in the Act, it would likely increase the
compliance of forensic labs . At the time of CLIA’s passage, similar legislation for forensic labs was unworkable due to a lack of
standard operating procedures and certification for forensic professionals.173 With the creation of ASCLD/LAB accreditation and other types of
standards, this is no longer the case. Guidelines
exist for laboratory procedure and proper education of forensic
scientists in the Act, and sanctions would then ensure that these guidelines are followed, minimizing
both poor quality lab work and potential misconduct by bad actors . Nonetheless, these strict sanctions may
ultimately be politically unpopular because actors in the criminal justice system are unwilling to have labs completely shut down or have fines
taken from public coffers for violations of these regulations.174
1NC – Congress CP – Sentencing Reform (General)
The United States Congress should instruct the federal judiciary to create a
“sentencing information system” accessible to all relevant decisionmakers to
supplement current federal sentencing guidelines. The United States Congress should
require appellate review of cases of lower courts to ensure effective integration of
new federal guidelines and to review cases with statistically significant departures
from national sentencing averages, respective to type of crime.
That solves ad-hoc sentencing without Congressional overreach – avoids the court clog
DA
Real guidelines and sufficiently wide statutory ranges could be part of the common law of federal
sentencing advocated by many scholars and jurists, with today's courts drawing upon the analysis and
conclusions of prior judicial opinions. The common law model would seem to entail at least three
elements, two of which are already in effect . To begin with, trial courts would need to give written reasons
for their sentences, describing the precise rationale for the given punishment in a manner accessible to
both professionals and lay participants. In turn, appellate judges would review the lower court judgment to
guarantee the fair application of real guidelines or a warranted variation from these benchmarks, free of
racial or classbased bias toward the defendant . The evolving post-Booker jurisprudence necessitates both written sentencing
opinions and appellate review for reasonableness,414 although still employing the formulaic language of the Guidelines. Presumably, however,
both district and appellate courts could continue these valuable practices under a system of real guidelines. Moreover, the
written
reasons of trial judges and the opinions of appellate courts could contribute to a third element of
common law sentencing-the creation of a type of institutional memory for the federal system, where
judges can extract relevant information from a database of prior sentences . Just recently, Professor Marc
Miller described the concept of a "sentencing information system" (SIS): Judges are provided with
sufficient information to determine how other offenders like the offender in front of the judge have
been sentenced before. Judges can ask a series of "what if' questions by varying each of the relevant
factors to see how each variation changes the sentences others have imposed . More complex systems
can allow the "what ifs" to vary over specified time periods (or to show trends) and over different
political units or groups, such as sentences by the same judge, by other judges in the same courthouse, or by other judges in the same
state or country. Unlike sentencing guidelines, an SIS does not tell judges what they must do or should do ;
it tells judges what others have done , thus allowing a better-informed judgment in each case. An SIS
allows for the development and expression of social norms in ways akin to traditional common law reasoning by analogy. 415 Professor
Miller notes that this type of sentencing technology has been adopted in a number of foreign
jurisdictions, including Canada, Scotland, and part of Australia .41 6 To me, at least, it is rather shocking that techsavvy
Americans have failed to employ such techniques. Unlike the formulaic, pseudo-scientific results under the
Guidelines-rightly deplored by Judge Jenkins as a substitute for human judgment-a sentencing information system would
aid the district court in reaching the best possible punishment by providing constructive information
rather than demanding a predetermined outcome . Thoughtful opposition to mechanical law does not resist the use of
technology by the courts, so long as the resulting tools support rather than replace the moral decisionmaking of judges.4 I7 Considerate
reforms would also be mindful of the discretionary decisions existing throughout the criminal justice
system, not merely those made by the judiciary . Legislators, investigators, prosecutors, jurors, and
various other actors play crucial, highly discretionary roles in the punishment process, and any
meaningful changes in federal sentencing would have to consider, for instance, the system-wide impact of
prosecutorial discretion in charging. Conversely, it seems possible that the sharing of advice or even
discretion among decisionmakers might have a positive synergistic effect on the overall quality of
case judgments. Although many reasons exist to empower federal judges with the ultimate decision at sentencing, there would be
nothing untoward about having a jury remain impaneled after conviction to consider the evidence and
arguments regarding punishment and then offer an advisory opinion on a proper sentence . Such an approach
would be consistent with the letter of Booker and the spirit of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.4 18 The federal system
might also incorporate "restorative justice" programs which allow victims, offenders, their families, and
all other stakeholders in a particular case to enter into "a process of group decisionmaking on how to
handle the effects of the crime and its significance for the future., 41 9 Through mediated dialogue, these parties
would attempt to reach agreement on a suitable punishment, which could then be taken into consideration by the sentencing judge.
Another possibility for the federal system would be the creation of a "drug court," a relatively recent
innovation highlighted in a series of concurrences by Judge Donald Lay: In most drug courts, nonviolent, substance-abusing
offenders charged with drugrelated crimes are channeled into judicially supervised substance abuse
treatment, mandatory drugs testing, and other rehabilitative services in an effort to reduce recidivism .
Eligible offenders typically have the charges against them stayed and dropped if treatment is successful, or plead guilty with prosecution
deferred and criminal punishment withheld if treatment is successful. 420
2NC – Congress CP – CJR Solvency (General)
Congress is key to shifting all of the criminal justice system away from flaws in the
system – k2 signaling reform efforts
Ed Chung et. al ’19, *is the vice president for Criminal Justice Reform at the Center for American Progress., **Betsy Pearl is a senior
policy analyst for Criminal Justice Reform at the Center., **Lea Hunter is a research assistant for Criminal Justice Reform at the Center., “The
1994 Crime Bill Continues to Undercut Justice Reform—Here’s How to Stop It”, 3/26/19, Center for American Progress,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2019/03/26/467486/1994-crime-bill-continues-undercut-justice-reform-
heres-stop/
Before considering what additional reforms are needed to fix a severely broken criminal justice system,
U.S. elected leaders must first stop supporting the very mechanisms that caused the failure in the first
place. Borrowing from the field of medicine, lawmakers must embrace the notion of “first, do no harm”—or more accurately, “do no more
harm.”9 This issue brief spotlights four problematic tough-on-crime policies exacerbated by the crime bill that remain in place and continue to
undermine reform efforts. Only
when these destructive policies are reversed can the rebuilding of the
criminal justice system truly take root to prevent harm in the future. Moving from punishment to preventive care
Shifting away from the infrastructure created by the crime bill is not easy, especially because much of
the American public equates public safety with policing, prosecutors, and prisons and jails. Polling
shows that despite significant drops in the crime rate, the majority of the general public believes that
crime has gotten worse.10 When the public feels tense about their safety, the solution they seek is often more police officers, more
convictions, and longer sentences. When tensions diminish or crime rates decrease, mayors or governors proudly stand at a podium with law
enforcement to boast of the achievement. Not surprisingly, the footprint of policing has expanded dramatically in
recent years. The default solution is to call on law enforcement to respond to any issue that has the
potential to affect a community’s safety—whether it is substance misuse and addiction, mental health
issues, truancy, or homelessness. In almost every situation, law enforcement’s main tool is the power to arrest and incarcerate,
thereby unnecessarily enlarging the criminal justice system simply because other solutions or responses are unavailable. Requiring the
law enforcement apparatus to solve societal issues that it is neither trained nor equipped to handle
overburdens the justice system and prevents it from properly executing its limited core responsibilities .
The transition to a paradigm where public safety does not depend exclusively or primarily on the police
and the criminal justice system may be difficult. But a lesson can be taken from the transformation of
the practice of medicine, which in recent years has come to emphasize holistic and preventive care .
Instead of relying on surgical or other invasive interventions to treat illnesses and diseases, medicine now invests heavily in preventing illnesses
by encouraging healthy lifestyles and addressing health issues early with noninvasive treatments.12 As former
Sen. Tom Harkin (D-IA)
noted when Congress was considering the Affordable Care Act, a “truly transformational element” of
the health care law was to “jump-start America’s transition from our current sick care system into a
genuine health care system, one that is focused on keeping us healthy and out of the hospital in the first place.”13 That same
type of transformation must happen with America’s approach to public safety . The criminal justice
system can be likened to hospitalization or a surgical intervention, which is never removed as an
option but is reserved for the most serious situations . Unnecessary arrests and incarcerations, like surgeries, run the risk
of serious complications.14 Even when invasive interventions are necessary, care must always be taken during the procedure to minimize
trauma and promote a quick recovery. But the overall goal and the bulk of resources should be devoted to keeping people out of the operating
room or, in this case, out of the criminal justice system in the first place. First, do no more harm Unfortunately,
the United States’
investments in public safety continue to overwhelmingly prioritize arrests and incarceration over
measures that prevent crime from occurring. As elected leaders reflect on the 1994 crime bill, it is not enough to
state that the country is learning lessons from the bill’s failings . Instead, elected leaders must take
concrete action to halt the very mechanisms that the legislation created —and that continue to
undercut meaningful criminal justice reform. Even the 1994 crime bill included a section devoted to crime prevention
activities.15 But in the end, many of these programs were either repealed or never received any funding in the first place.16 Going
forward, leaders must make the following commitments to stopping the ongoing harm inflicted by
the 1994 crime bill .
2NC – Congress CP – Death Penalty Solvency
Courts have no teeth to abolish the death penalty
Matt Ford ’19, is a staff writer at The New Republic., “We Are All Executioners Now”, 7/25/19, The New Republic,
https://newrepublic.com/article/154551/attorney-general-barr-announce-department-justice-resume-death-penalty
The federal courts have long acted as a check on capital punishment’s worst excesses, but that role is
fading fast. The Supreme Court made it virtually impossible to challenge the constitutionality of
execution methods when it heard the midazolam case in 2015. Even the high court’s highest values
now come second to keeping the machinery of death running . In February, a federal appeals court blocked
Alabama from executing a Muslim prisoner while he challenged a state policy that required a Christian
pastor to be present when he died. Instead of protecting the prisoner’s religious freedom, the Supreme Court’s
conservative majority allowed the execution to go forward, drawing near-universal criticism from the
left and right.
2NC – Congress CP – Forensic Science Solvency (General)
Courts follow legislative precedent – CP is a necessary first step
Jennifer E. Laurin ’13, Assistant Professor, The University of Texas School of Law, “Remapping the Path Forward: Toward a Systemic View
of Forensic Science Reform and Oversight”, 2013, Texas Law Review, Vol. 91, http://texaslawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/Laurin.pdf
For the time being, the Supreme Court has registered its resistance to rethinking any fundamental features
of criminal procedure doctrine in light of the influence of forensic science, although its posture has
been more “wait and see” than “nevermore.”302 Thinking outside existing criminal procedure boxes is therefore more than
a proverbial academic exercise. As the Supreme Court watches and state legislatures and courts pursue more
innovative responses to the pressures of forensic science on our settled understandings of
competence, deference, and oversight in criminal investigation and adjudication, it becomes all the
more important to develop a principled approach to reconciling these accommodations within
existing criminal procedure theory and doctrine. Conclusion The NAS Report has fundamentally altered the landscape for
forensic science in the criminal justice system. This is to be celebrated. But the accomplishments of the Report must not obscure the vast
terrain that remains untouched by the path of reform that it charts. This Article has aimed to illuminate one important
aspect of that currently neglected territory: namely, the manner in which upstream users of forensic
science—police and prosecutors—will select priorities, initiate investigations, collect and submit evidence,
choose investigative techniques, and charge and plead cases in ways that have critical and systematic,
though poorly understood, influences on the accuracy of forensic analysis and the integrity of its
application in criminal cases. By broadening our understanding of how forensic science is created and used in criminal cases—by
adopting a systemic perspective—we begin to see a raft of yet unaddressed issues concerning the meaning of
scientific integrity and reliability in the context of investigative decisions that are by and large committed
to the discretion of decidedly unscientific actors. Moreover, we see that decisions with respect to oversight
of one corner of the system—the laboratory, in the case of the NAS Report—cannot be made in
isolation, lest responses from other corners render that oversight ineffective or counterproductive .
Undoubtedly, this Article has raised at least as many questions as it has answered. This is for the best. The account here only
scratches the surface of the sorts of systemic concerns that we might reflect upon, and that hopefully
the active reform conversations will take up, as we commit our criminal justice system to more and
more institutionally entrenched forensic science .
2NC – Congress CP – Sentencing Solvency (General)
Congressional re-evalution of federal sentencing guidelines is crucial to enacting
lasting change
But as was true of the decisions by Judges Cassell and Adelman, it is impossible for me to fault Judge Gertner for her Jaber opinion. Until
Congress readdresses federal sentencing, district court judges have no other option but to play the
game of Gridland-lite: apply the Commission's formula, place the defendant on the grid, and then use
your considered judgment to determine a just punishment . Certainly, conscientious judges will do their
best in a post-Booker world to explain a sentence and its justification in terms that are comprehendible
to the defendant, victims and other concerned parties, and the public 235 -but any success in this
endeavor will be due to the acumen of the jurist, not the sensibility of the Guidelines . 36
Congress has massive sway over the court – multiple ways to enforce compliance
With the foregoing in mind, I fully appreciate the concerns that animated Judge Cassell's thoughtful decision in Wilson. " Should the
courts fail to carry out congressional will, there should be little doubt what will follow, " Cassell wrote.
"Congress can easily implement its desired level of punitiveness in the criminal justice system, through
such blunderbuss devices as mandatory minimum sentences . '7v Such threats have already been
leveled,276 and in recent times judges who disputed the efficacy and justice of federal sentencing have
been threatened with removal.2 77 "The judges need to be intimidated," Rep. Tom DeLay once said, "If they don't behave, 'we're
going to go after them in a big way.' 278 A House taskforce was even set up to examine legal opinions for examples
of "judicial abuse." According to Rep. DeLay, Congress was "putting America's judges on alert: We are
watching you.' 279 With the likes of DeLay, Feeney, and others on the prowl, a broad swath of Congress stands ready to protect the
American people from those sneaky judges. After all, what does the judiciary think it is-an independent branch of government or something?
H.L. Mencken once quipped that the goal of the political class is "to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by
menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary. 280 Along
these lines, we can rest assured that
certain officials will never cower from an opportunity to score easy points against a group lacking access
to the bully pulpit like the federal judiciary . Such diatribes only damage the reputation of the "least dangerous" 28 I branch-
least dangerous, that is, to the politician, whose harangue is unlikely to be countered by the typical media-reticent jurist.
Congress exerts massive influence over how Courts sentence – creation of the
sentencing guidelines and PROTECT Act/Feeney Amendment
Lydia Brashear Tiede ’09, Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Houston, “THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND REFORM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS”, 6/16/09, The Justice System Journal, Vol. 30, Number 1,
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Publications/Justice%20System%20Journal/The%20Impact%20of%20the%20Federal
%20Sentencing.ashx
The first major change to the Guideline system occurred in 2003 when Congress passed the PROTECT
Act and its Feeney Amendment out of a growing concern that judges and prosecutors had increasingly
been using departures from sentencing-table ranges to avoid the Guidelines’ sentencing mandates ,
especially in cases along the southwestern border and in cases involving child exploitation (USSC, 2003; see Schantzenbach, 2005). Further,
in enacting this law, Congress also voiced concern that prosecutors were using departures and case facts
as bargaining chips to get the sentences that they wanted in blatant disregard of Congress’s intent in
enacting the Sentencing Guidelines (USSC, 2003). In general terms, the PROTECT Act, along with the Feeney
Amendment, limited judicial discretion in two main ways —by reducing the number of statutory reasons
that judges could depart from Guideline ranges and by establishing more-rigorous monitoring
mechanisms for overseeing district courts’ decisions by changing the appellate standard of review for
district court judges’ decisions from reasonableness and due deference to de novo . Further, the PROTECT
Act required that the then attorney general , John Ashcroft, direct assistant U.S. attorneys affirmatively to
oppose sentencing adjustments and downward departures and to establish a system whereby attorneys
would report to Congress on individual federal judges whose sentences were not within the spirit of the
Guidelines (Ashcroft 2003a, b).
2NC – Congress CP – AT: Court Signal (General)
The CP eliminates ambiguity in current statutory interpretation by providing explicit
guidelines for judicial interpretation
Harvard Law Review, 11 (“A CHEVRON FOR THE HOUSE AND SENATE: DEFERRING TO POST-ENACTMENT
CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTIONS THAT INTERPRET AMBIGUOUS STATUTES” 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1507, April,
lexis)
Deference to a House or Senate resolution that interprets an ambiguous statute is more legitimate than
reliance on legislative history because a resolution is a formal, collective decision of the entire legislative
[*1513] chamber. Use of legislative history has declined over the past two decades, n30 partially in response to the critique voiced pithily by
Judge Leventhal that using legislative history is akin to "looking over a crowd and picking out your friends." n31 Congressional
"resolutions express the views of a majority , while other legislative history does not." n32 Moreover, a court's use of the
text of a resolution adopted through majority vote to resolve an ambiguity obviates the need to seek
out any "intent" or "purpose" underlying the statutory text - concepts that may be incoherent when
applied to a collective decision. n33 Courts also occasionally look to post-enactment legislative history and related policy decisions
to determine the meaning of an ambiguous statute. n34 These sources may be helpful when ambiguity arises due to [*1514] changing
circumstances, n35 but like legislative history at the time of enactment, these post-enactment sources rarely speak directly to the ambiguity at
issue and therefore are unreliable guides. n36 A
congressional resolution that explicitly and directly interprets an
ambiguous statute, by contrast, does not require judges to engage in a difficult (perhaps impossible) inquiry
into congressional policies and purposes.
The CP provides guidance to courts about how to interpret prior statutes

Gersen and Posner, 8 - Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law, The University of Chicago (Jacob and Eric,
“Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice” 61 Stan. L. Rev. 573, lexis)
[*611] The second argument rests on a more controversial premise, but if the premise is accepted, then the case for relying on postenactment
soft statutes to interpret previously enacted hard statutes is even stronger. The premise is that when
a court interprets a statute
that was enacted by a past Congress, it should allow itself to be influenced by the views of the current
Congress. n158 Others have argued that, whether courts should be influenced in theory by the current Congress, they will be
influenced in practice, because the current (or future) legislature could overturn the court's decision and
judges dislike seeing their holdings overturned. n159 For these scholars, congressional resolutions should be
reasonable devices for Congress to reveal its evolving policy views to judges . As a possible illustration of this view,
consider the dissent by Justice Souter in Garcetti v. Ceballos. n160 Justice Souter relied, in part, on Congress's endorsement, via concurrent
resolution, of the view that citizens should expose corruption in government to inform his view on the scope of First Amendment protection for
government employees. n161
2NC – Congress CP – AT: No Enforcement (General)
JAG fund alterations or sanctions solve enforcement
Ed Chung et. al ’19, *is the vice president for Criminal Justice Reform at the Center for American Progress., **Betsy Pearl is a senior
policy analyst for Criminal Justice Reform at the Center., **Lea Hunter is a research assistant for Criminal Justice Reform at the Center., “The
1994 Crime Bill Continues to Undercut Justice Reform—Here’s How to Stop It”, 3/26/19, Center for American Progress,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2019/03/26/467486/1994-crime-bill-continues-undercut-justice-reform-
heres-stop/
Any serious effort to halt the ongoing damage wrought by the crime bill must target the money —the law’s
primary vehicle for influencing state and local policy. Every year, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) distributes millions of
dollars to states and localities through funding grants started under the crime bill —the vast majority of
which is funneled directly to law enforcement agencies with few strings attached .17 The single largest
source of federal public safety funding today is the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program,
which has its roots in a massive mid-1990s block grant for local law enforcement agencies.18 Cities and states can use JAG to
support a wide array of public safety functions—from violence prevention to indigent defense to mental
health treatment.19 The reality, however, is that most JAG funds go directly to law enforcement .
Nationally, according to the latest detailed data from 2016, 58 percent of JAG funds were used to support law
enforcement and corrections functions, while only 6 percent went to crime prevention .20 And more than
one-quarter of all JAG funds were used to operate drug taskforces ,21 which have multiplied
exponentially nationwide since the infusion of federal funds .22 These national averages hide an even starker contrast
at the state level. A Center for American Progress analysis shows that in 14 states, more than $9 out of every $10 in JAG funds went to police
departments and prosecutors’ offices.23 Four states—Maine, Montana, West Virginia, and Wyoming—devoted a full 100 percent of JAG funds
to law enforcement.24 In 22 states, crime prevention efforts went completely unfunded.25 JAG and other public safety dollars
from the federal government cannot continue to be structured in a way that results in the vast
majority of the funds going to support law enforcement . The federal government must intentionally
invest in a new vision for stronger, healthier communities and no longer simply distribute money to
states with the hope that they spend it appropriately . This can be accomplished in part by requiring
states to devote substantial percentages of JAG funds to areas besides law enforcement in order to
ensure a comprehensive approach to public safety. Additionally, Congress could change the eligibility
formula for receiving JAG funds so that it is based not only on population and annual crime rate data,
but also on other indicators of community well-being such as measures of poverty, unemployment,
and educational attainment rates. Congress could also substantially increase the amounts that it
appropriates to JAG—but only if that escalation is set aside for purpose areas that are perpetually
underfunded by public safety dollars such as crime prevention and mental health and substance abuse
treatment. Through a radical realignment of DOJ’s investments, lawmakers can reinvest billions of dollars into communities and effectively
reshape the way that jurisdictions think about and carry out public safety efforts.
2NC – Congress CP – AT: Trump
CJR is distinct from other proposals – can garner enough support even without Trump
Katrina vanden Heuvel ’19, columnist for the Washington Post, “For criminal justice reform, the First Step Act is just the start”,
2/12/19, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/for-criminal-justice-reform-the-first-step-act-is-just-the-
start/2019/02/12/2526e97e-2e24-11e9-8ad3-9a5b113ecd3c_story.html
There was little for progressives to cheer in last week’s State of the Union address, but President Trump
received a rare bit of bipartisan applause when he touted the First Step Act, the criminal justice reform
bill that Congress approved in December. Backed by a broad coalition ranging from the ACLU to the Koch network, the
First Step Act includes provisions reducing some federal prison sentences and allowing incarcerated
individuals to qualify for early release. The law does mark real progress, but as its name implies, it is only a
step . Truly fixing America’s broken criminal system means addressing several major problems. Mass incarceration remains one of the
greatest civil rights issues of our time. The United States has the highest rate of incarceration in the world, with more than 2.1 million people
locked up in prisons and jails across the country, including a disproportionate number of black and brown Americans. Since the First Step Act only
applies to those held in federal prisons, it didn’t help the nearly 90 percent of the incarcerated
population in state and local facilities. Many incarcerated Americans are forced to live in brutal,
dehumanizing conditions. At the Brooklyn Metropolitan Detention Center, prisoners recently endured nearly a week of dangerously low temperatures
without power or hot water. While the situation provoked national outrage, little public attention is paid to many more overcrowded and underfunded prisons
where incarcerated people face physical violence, a
lack of adequate health care and excessive isolation that can have
lasting mental health effects. “Every day, people held in prisons and jails wake up to face systemic abuse
and dehumanizing indifference,” write Cardozo Law School professors Betsy Ginsberg and Alexander Reinert. “No one should be
fooled into thinking that what happened at the MDC is unique .” And though nobody should be subjected to systemic abuse and
neglect, it’s important to acknowledge that, like many incarcerated people across the country, most of the people jailed at the MDC have not even been convicted
of a crime. On an average day, hundreds of thousands of Americans are sitting behind bars simply because they are too poor to afford bail. In some cases, innocent
people have spent years incarcerated awaiting their day in court. This
unfair system needlessly deprives people of their
freedom, devastates families and deepens inequality . As The Post’s editorial board wrote last year, “People can lose their
jobs, homes and families. The temptation is strong to admit guilt simply to escape the misery of rotting
in a lockup while the rest of one’s life crumbles. Charged with identical crimes, the wealthy need not
face that choice.” True reform must also eliminate obstacles to reentering and participating fully in
society. Supporting better educational and job training programs inside prisons can help incarcerated
people become more productive citizens upon their release . Making it easier and less expensive for
inmates to stay in contact with their families can help break the cycle of imprisonment and poverty .
Restoring fundamental rights that many formerly incarcerated people are still denied can empower them to have a voice in our democracy. In
Florida, for example, voters approved a constitutional amendment in November to restore voting rights to 1.4 million people who were previously disenfranchised.
But it will take vigilance to stop GOP opponents of the amendment from putting up road blocks to its full implementation. Th ese
are just a few of the
many issues that remain, from providing more resources for public defenders to cracking down on the
insidious use of private prisons that put profit above all else . (Indeed, Trump may want to be seen as a reformer, but the private
prison industry donated heavily to his campaign and has prospered greatly from his presidency.) Much of this work has to occur at the state and local level — and
many states are already pursuing important reforms — but there is significant work to do at the federal level as well. The exit of
former attorney general Jeff Sessions, who was committed to an extremely regressive vision of our criminal justice system, has presented some new opportunities.
Yet there are obvious reasons to question how much progress is feasible under Trump. To that end, it’s
encouraging that criminal justice
reform is already emerging as a key issue in the Democratic presidential primary . Sen. Cory Booker’s (D-N.J.) agenda
includes legalizing marijuana, increasing funding for public defenders and providing financial incentives for states to reduce their prison populations. Sen. Elizabeth
Warren (D-Mass.) has described the criminal justice system as “racist” and called for reform in her official campaign announcement speech Saturday. Last year,
presumed candidate Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) introduced legislation that would abolish money bail at the federal level and encourage states to follow suit. Sen.
Kamala D. Harris (D-Calif.) has called for bail reform, too, though she is also facing criticism over her record as a prosecutor that she will need to address as the
campaign wears on. The
passage of the First Step Act was certainly significant . But that is less because of what it
specifically accomplished than because of what it showed . Across the ideological spectrum, there is
real momentum for more criminal justice reform , including bold ideas that Trump is unlikely to ever
support . As they work to present a real alternative to Trumpism, progressives would be wise to seize
on that momentum and help it grow. The first step was positive, but it shouldn’t be the last.

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Congress CP – Neg Notes

Now the cards to help put all of this into context –

Forensic science definition

2016 PCAST summary of findings and broad areas to improve on

The “legal context” of the forensic science issue according to PCAST

How the sentencing guidelines are used (assuming mandatory status)

Congress has plenty of options to force courts to alter sentencing practices

That solves without Court involvement

Congress solves and is more effective than the aff

That solves – federal accreditation and funding ensures compliance

The CP provides guidance to courts about how to interpret prior statutes

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