The World Bank

Policies to Reduce
Informal Employment
An International Survey
Technical Note for the Government of Ukraine

This short note has been prepared at the request of the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine
to the World Bank.
This note was prepared by Arvo Kuddo and Jan Rutkowski and benefited from comments
and editing by Johannes Koettl (Team leader, Europe and Central Asia Region - Human
Development Sector, ECSHD), Indhira Santos (Young Professional, ECSHD), and Anna Olefir
(ET Consultant, ECSHD).
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the views of the World Bank.

April 2011
Table of Content

Executive summary......................................................................................................................... 2
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 4
II. Informality – key issues ....................................................................................................... 5
III. Policies to reduce informality .............................................................................................. 7
A. Tax policy......................................................................................................................... 7
B. Labor regulations............................................................................................................ 10
C. Business regulations ....................................................................................................... 12
D. Administrative measures ................................................................................................ 13
IV. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 15

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Executive summary

Informal employment—that is, work that in itself is legal but not declared to the authorities for
tax, social security and/or labor law purposes—plays an important role in virtually all
economies. Detecting illegal employment and enforcing the law in cases of undeclared work
remains highly problematic in practice. Due to fiscal losses resulting from undeclared economic
activities and negative economic and social effects of informality, many countries are trying to
enhance formal employment. Based on an international survey, this paper identified a series of
policies that have been successful in reducing informal employment to some degree in a
number of countries. The next step would be to evaluate the extent to which these policies
could also be successful in the Ukrainian context. Here are some of these policies:
 The main instrument available to labor, social security, or tax inspectorates to detect
undeclared work are unannounced visits to the work site, which determines the identity of
all persons found there with subsequent sanctions for non-compliance. While several public
institutions are and will remain involved in addressing informality, international experience
suggests that a single authority should be charged with giving them coherence and pushing
their implementation - a governmental champion. Institutional strengthening (staffing,
training, technical assistance) of the agencies involved with compliance as well as
information exchange (linking computer databases) and more close cooperation between
labor, social security and tax inspectorates is important for achieving better detection.
 Although the strengthened control measures (improved inspections and higher penalties)
have facilitated the increased transfer of people from illegal employment to partly declared
work, they have failed thus far to eliminate or significantly reduce illegal employment.
Transition into the formal market has not been ensured only by prohibiting illegal
employment and increasing penalties for offenders. A combination of both deterrence
policies and policies encouraging transition into the formal market seems to be necessary.
 Preventive measures encompass simplification of procedures and pulling off constraints
which limit the creation and development of businesses, in particular start-ups and small
undertakings; removing disincentives to declare work on both the demand and the supply
sides.
 Reforms of employment regulations ensuring protection of workers but allowing greater
flexibility in the labor market are important to improve incentives for firms to increase
registered employment (see also the separate Technical Note for the Government of
Ukraine ‘Reforms in Employment Regulations: International Experience Applicable to Ukraine’).
 Involving the social partners (registered employers and trade unions) that have strong and
shared motivations is important to reduce the prevalence of undeclared work in their
sectors and workplaces. They could be encouraged to work together to explain the
problems with informality to their constituencies while, at the same time, committing
themselves to fighting undeclared work in collective agreements.
 Altering perceptions about informality is usually also part of the effort to reduce
informality. Public information and education is the final element in a comprehensive
strategy to reduce undeclared economic activity. Many potential beneficiaries may ignore
or are simply unaware of the costs while working informally, such as lack of access to sick

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leave and maternity leave benefits and to unemployment or pension insurance for the years
worked informally, or may not know about available financial or technical support to SMEs
by the public sector, or of simplified requirements for SMEs to promote formalization. The
government could use media, in particular public service campaigns on television and radio,
to spread information on the benefits of formalization of employment, in particular in
SMEs. Campaigns could also focus efforts on sectors where undeclared activities are
significant. Successful enforcement and sanctioning of tax evasion cases involving the rich
and powerful could be widely publicized. Campaigns could be directed especially towards
the younger population.

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I. Introduction

The informal sector is present even in the most developed countries, and has some important
social and economic functions. First, it provides job opportunities to workers who cannot find
jobs in the formal sector. As such – by providing income opportunities of last resort – the
informal sector is a social safety net for the poor. Second, informality is often a way to start a
business and can be a stepping stone to formality. However, the social costs of informality –
forgone tax revenues, lower productivity and lack of social security coverage – outweigh the
potential social benefits outlined above (a social safety net, a trampoline to formal business).
Accordingly, effective policies to promote formal employment enhance social welfare.

This survey is intended to assist the Government of Ukraine in its efforts to promote formal
employment by presenting examples of policies used in other countries. However, the
evaluation of those policies was not carried out and their impact on informal employment is
difficult to estimate. Nonetheless the examples discussed show main directions for reforms
aimed at reducing informality. Workers and firms choose not to register their activity if the
benefits associated with registration fall short of the costs. The benefits of registration include
access to credit and other business services as well as access to social security benefits. The
costs of registration include payment of taxes and social security contributions, costs imposed
by government regulations, and other administrative barriers.

Policies to promote formal employment consist of lowering the costs and raising the benefits
associated with formalization. They also include policies that raise the cost of non-compliance
with statutory regulations, such as inspections. They fall into four groups: (a) tax policy,
including social security contributions, (b) labor regulations, (c) broader business regulations,
and (d) institutional reforms, including sanctions for non-compliance. In the longer run,
formality is fostered by economic and institutional development, including human capital
formation, wider access to finance, and so on. Within those four broad groups governments
were adopting different mix of policies, depending on country specific circumstances. For
example, to lower the costs of formality governments adopted a range of measures meant to
improve the business environment, including lowering taxes and simplifying tax administration,
simplifying the business registration procedures, removing bureaucratic barriers to firm activity
(for example, by reducing the number of permits), and liberalizing labor regulations. In order to
increase the benefits of formality governments tightened the link between social security
contributions and benefits so as to strengthen the incentives for workers to formalize their
employment status. They also have strived to improve access to credit and other business
services to strengthen the incentives for firms – especially small ones – to register their activity
and pay taxes.

The note starts with a brief presentation of main issues related to informal employment. It
then proceeds with a review of policies to reduce informal employment adopted in recent years
in OECD and EU countries. The policies are discussed under four headings, which correspond to

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the policy groups mentioned earlier: taxation, labor regulations, business regulations, and
administrative measures. The last section concludes.

II. Informality – key issues

The informal economy refers to activities and income that are partially or fully outside
government regulation, taxation, and observation. The main attraction of the undeclared
economy is financial. This type of activity allows employers, paid employees, and the self-
employed to increase their take-home earnings or reduce their costs by evading taxation and
social contributions. On the one hand, informal employment can provide a cushion for workers
who cannot find a job in the formal sector. But, on the other hand, it entails a loss in budget
revenues by reducing taxes and social security contributions paid and accordingly less provision
of public goods and services. A large informal sector also invariably leads to a high tax burden
on registered labor and firms because of the narrow tax base.

A high level of informality also can undermine the rule of law and governance. The fact that a
large share of the population is openly ignoring laws, regulations and taxes can weaken the
respect citizens have for the state. This situation also means that a significant share of the
population does not have access to formal social protection instruments to protect itself
against economic risk.

Informal employment (including self-employment) plays an important role in virtually all

economies. It can provide “work of last resort” for displaced workers from contracting
enterprises and others who cannot find jobs in formal sector. In addition to this “safety net”
role, informal employment may represent the beginnings of entrepreneurship. Not surprisingly,
a significant portion of independent or self-employed workers are voluntarily informal,
attaching significant value to the non-pecuniary benefits of autonomous work and choosing to
“exit” from the formal social protection system.

There are various reasons why governments may be concerned about large informal sectors.
These include potentially negative consequences for competitiveness and growth, incomplete
coverage of formal social programs, undermining social cohesion and law and order, and fiscal
losses due to undeclared economic activity. For most governments, these concerns outweigh
any advantages that the informal sector offers as a source of job creation and as a safety net for
the poor. But it also reflects an increasing awareness of the potentially negative economic and
social effects of informality.

Efforts to enhance formal employment have focused not only on removing barriers but also
on improving the incentives to opt for formalization. This requires an understanding of the
motivations for operating informally. Where undeclared economic activity is the result of
exclusion due to constrained opportunities in the formal sector, policy reforms need to be
directed towards minimizing or removing any regulatory barriers. The classic example is a
minimum wage set too high that constrains employment in the formal sector. However, when

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informality is seen through the lens of voluntary exit, policy-makers need to focus more on
reforms that are likely to shift the cost-benefit assessment of entrepreneurs and workers in
favor of operating formally. This includes measures that both increase the relative cost of
undeclared activity (“sticks”) and increase the relative benefits of declared activity (“carrots”).
Identifying effective carrots and sticks requires an understanding of why entrepreneurs and
workers choose not to declare activities and income.

The large informal sector has important ramifications for the economy. Informal firms cost
developing countries between 1-2 percentage points in annual GDP growth, according to
various studies. This is due to two related effects. First, firms and workers who may have
avoided being formal because of the high costs involved, which can lead to significant
productive resources being "trapped" in low productivity operations with little access to capital.
Second, the growth of formal firms can be significantly slowed because of fiscal and regulatory
obligations that prevent these firms from out-competing informal firms, despite the fact that
they are more productive. In other words, a high degree of informality can result in a low-
productivity equilibrium.

A significant portion of self-employed workers are voluntarily informal, attaching significant

value to the nonpecuniary benefits of autonomous work and choosing to ‘exit” from the
formal social protection system. Also, informal employment may reflect exclusion from the
formal job sector, and can be the last resort given the lack of better alternatives.

Workers uninsured against health, old age, and other risks may have lower productivity and
fewer incentives to invest in human capital accumulation. Irregular firms are likely to have a
harder time attracting more educated workers and engaging them in a longer-term
relationship—and that in turn affects their incentives to invest in training and capital goods.

Firms unable to access credit, larger sales/product markets, and sources of innovation, and
those evading taxes may operate at a suboptimal scale. Competition with non-complying firms
leads to productivity losses in formal firms. At the aggregate level, a large concentration of
workers in small firms rather than larger firms may lead to lower productivity growth. On the
other hand, low productivity may be the main reason why many small firms and their
employees remain informal. The fact that many small firms operate in the informal sector (that
is, size dualism) may just be a natural result of their lower managerial ability.

Formality tends to increase rapidly with firm size and productivity, and it is higher among
those who voluntarily enter self-employment. Similarly, young firms tend to have higher costs
and high failure rates and, at the same time, are more likely to be informal. Moreover, in most
countries, the informal sector tends to expand during downturns, partially due to the fact that
as the economy slows, formal sector hiring falls sharply while informal hiring falls much less.
Overall, informality, measured as the share of the workforce, falls with development.

Undeclared activities tend to be concentrated in certain sectors of the economy. The majority
of workers in the informal sector are in marginalized economic activities and in labor-intensive

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sectors such as agriculture, construction, retail trade, catering, and domestic services. Self-
employment accounts for the bulk of employment in the informal sector. In particular, in
Ukraine, the informal sector represents around 22.1 percent of total employment.

III. Policies to reduce informality

In the European Union, relevant policies on the issue are based on four main pillars:

• Preventive actions: the aim is to simplify procedures and reduce the costs and
constraints which limit the creation and development of businesses, in particular start-
ups and small undertakings; to remove disincentives to declare work on both the
demand and the supply sides;
• Sanctions: the aim is to strengthen surveillance and to apply appropriate sanctions in
respect of those who benefit from clandestine labor and also to protect the victims,
notably through better coordination between the relevant authorities (tax offices, labor
inspectorates, police);
• Cooperation between Member States with a view to combating social security fraud and
undeclared work in the framework of transnational economic activities;
• A campaign to raise social awareness as regards the negative implications of undeclared
work for social security and the consequences of undeclared work for solidarity and
fairness.

Therefore, policies to address undeclared work have usually found a balance between
preventative measures and sanctions. Countries in the EU, elsewhere in the OECD, and many
transition countries have had a great deal of experience in attempting to reduce undeclared
work and informal economic activities. Efforts have largely fallen into four broad categories:

 Tax and other direct fiscal measures,

 Labor regulations and other employment interventions,
 Broader business regulations, and
 Administrative measures.

A. Tax policy
Tax policy has been a major instrument in combating informality. The tax and fiscal category
include two types of measures. The first focuses on removing incentives for evading tax
liabilities by lowering payroll taxes, social security contributions, or other taxes for firms and/or
employees. The second category, direct fiscal measures, attempts to capture the people that
would otherwise not pay taxes using tools such as presumptive tax systems which put the
burden of proof on the employer.

Since the mid-1990s, a number of emerging market economies have implemented important
reforms to their tax systems, in particular, aimed at reducing the tax burden on labor,

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particularly at the low-middle end of the pay scale, and at reducing corporate income tax
rates while broadening bases. Slovakia implemented a comprehensive tax reform that unified
tax rates and eliminated most exemptions. Top corporate income tax (CIT) rates now vary
between 28 percent in the Czech Republic and 15 percent in Latvia and Lithuania, while Estonia
has no tax on re-invested earnings. Standard value-added tax (VAT) rates vary between 18
percent in the Baltic countries and 25 percent in Hungary. Slovakia and Estonia have flat rate
personal income tax (PIT). For example, Estonia is going to gradually reduce income tax rate
from 26 percent in 2005 to 18 percent by 2011, and increase tax deduction level to about USD
250 per month.

Bulgaria has increased the level of non-taxable monthly incomes from 100 levas in 2002 to
180 levas in 2006, which is above the level of minimum wages of 160 levas. Moreover,
Bulgaria decided to replace the three-bracket personal income tax rate system with a flat rate
of 10 percent. Also the Government is expected to introduce further a 3 percentage points cut
in the social security burden.

Various countries such as Belgium, Netherlands and France have introduced special payroll
tax reductions for low-wage earners. The estimated employment effect, however, has varied.
In Belgium, for example, the tax cut seems to have had a significant impact on registered
employment but not in the Netherlands.

Many countries have introduced various tax concessions and benefits to certain categories of
employees:

 Ceilings on social security contributions, which make this component of the personal tax
system regressive, are a significant feature in Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and Turkey. However, in several cases, they apply only
to certain categories of contribution, and the schedule for social security contributions
combined with personal income tax may remain progressive.
 The self-employed in the Czech Republic, Greece, and Portugal were allowed to pay
lump-sum contributions or lower contribution rates than employees, and the self-
employed in Hungary, Mexico and Spain had access to special simplified tax regimes.
 A number of OECD countries gave full relief from double taxation on profits distributed
as dividends.
 Several European governments, such as France, Belgium, the Netherlands, have
introduced tax concessions in sectors where the incidence of undeclared work is high
(e.g. domestic staff, home improvement and repair services).

For example, France introduced payroll tax subsidies in 1993 and the system is still in place in
a modified form. The program provides payroll tax exemptions for low-wage workers according
to a sliding scale up to a threshold of 1.33 times the minimum wage, when the subsidy is
stopped.

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Broadening the tax base is important for tax policy reform owing to the urgent need to
increase government revenue, reduce fiscal deficits, and ensure macroeconomic stability. The
potential for raising more revenue through the application of presumptive taxation methods to
bring hard-to-tax groups into the tax net has not yet been fully exploited in the countries with
high informal economies.

Imputed or presumptive taxes are taxes based on notional income calculated based on key
factors which are associated with income generation. These might be sales, turnover, number
of employees, size of firm, assets of the taxpayer, and so on. Presumptive taxation ideally
involves simple and cost-effective techniques to capture domestic transactions and sources of
income that frequently escape taxation under conventional norms. These techniques include
lump-sum levies on small-scale business activities (standard assessments); the assessment of
taxes through indicators or proxies that help estimate a taxpayer's income (estimated
assessments); and the collection of minimum taxes irrespective of a taxpayer's actual level of
business activity (presumptive minimum taxes).

Forms of presumptive taxation can be found in transition countries as well. In Bulgaria since
2003, to improve revenue collection, minimum social security contribution levels are
negotiated between the social partners – by 73 sectors, branches and activities, and nine
professional groups in each of activity. For the self-employed, the minimum monthly taxable
income was established at 220 Leva; in agriculture, 110 Leva; and the maximum taxable income
was set at 1,400 Leva (in 2006). This measure, plus mandatory registration of labor contracts
with the National Social Security Institute (NSSI), and a more rigorous enforcement of labor
legislation by the State Labor Inspectorate, as well as by tax and NSSI authorities, has led to
rapid growth in the number of registered new labor contracts, by almost 600,000 new insured
persons between 2002-2006, and thus in revenues to the social security system.

For a given tax revenue, a partial shift from social contributions to income or consumption
taxes may have favorable employment effects, including reducing incentives for under-
declaring earnings per employee and thus increasing tax revenues. As well, strengthening the
links between taxation and expected benefits may help reduce the adverse employment effect
of the tax wedge -- for example, creating a stronger link between contributions paid and
expected pension benefits or access to health services.

These reforms would often need to be done in a budget neutral manner. While lowering the
tax wedge might partly finance itself through increased revenues due to higher employment
and output, these are likely to be insufficient to fully compensate for the lower contribution or
tax rates. Additional revenue measures or preferably expenditure cuts would likely be required.

Also simplification of tax administration through online filing and tax payment lowers
transaction costs and minimizes opportunities for corruption. Complicated tax systems lead to
high evasion even when rates are low. Moreover, simplifying the tax regime by reducing tax
rates and eliminating exemptions is the main way to reduce corruption in tax administration.

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Finally, criminalization of certain tax offenses in combination with a modernized tax
administration agency has been credited with playing a key role, among other factors, in
Spain’s success in drastically reducing tax evasion and eventually doubling the ratio of tax
revenue to gross domestic product.

B. Labor regulations
Labor regulation and other employment interventions encompass all issues related to hiring
practices and ensuring basic labor rights through minimum wage and various local policies, as
well as employability programs to help workers access formal jobs. Labor market policy
reforms can reduce incentives on the part of firms and workers to operate informally, while
employment programs can better equip workers for the formal labor market. Labor
regulations, in particular, have been an important focus of efforts to reduce informal
employment. For example, improving the flexibility of employment protection laws and
reducing minimum wages can reduce the costs of hiring formal workers and, thus, can improve
incentives for firms to increase registered employment.

Many countries in EU have initiated measures to transform illicit (household) service jobs into
legal jobs, and reducing legislation on temporary work to prevent evasion of taxation
liabilities. For example, in 2002, Germany conducted extensive labor market reform to improve
its efficiency and address concerns of long-term unemployment through recommendations of
the Hartz Committee. The reforms were a series of graduated employment programs, ‘mini-
jobs’ and ‘midi-jobs’, to assist individuals that were unemployed or employed in the informal
sector transition to normal employment. Until 1999, mini-jobs were completely exempt from
social security contributions with a lump sum tax of 23 percent for employers and none for
employees. The program provided liberal eligibility requirements with limits on income and
work hours and was generally enjoyed by students, pensioners, and families as second income
who were considered small enough that tax and social security exemptions were not thought to
be a threat to the state financial system. However, the prevalence of mini-jobs increased
dramatically in the 1990s to 6.5 million and accounted for 60 percent of all catering jobs and 70
percent of all cleaning jobs creating a need for reforms.

Employee rights to social security benefits or employment protection can create an incentive
for employees to inform the authorities when they are laid off, even from undeclared work.
In Japan, the public employment service (PES) accepts claims for unemployment benefit even
when the employer has not actually paid insurance contributions. An enterprise that does not
pay insurance contributions thus runs a risk of detection when a former worker applies for
benefit. A system of insurance benefits, although it may lead to some fraudulent claims, can
make a significant contribution to suppressing undeclared work in the economy as a whole if
workers losing jobs are actively encouraged to claim the benefit.

Incentives to formalize especially casual employment and to combat undeclared employment

have been proposed in many countries. For example, in Hungary, programs such as START;
START PLUSZ, and START EXTRA have been introduced to facilitate the employment of

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underprivileged persons (recent school graduates; people above the age of fifty; job seekers
seeking employment after providing child care or care for other dependant relatives, and on
internship employment) through tax exemptions and reduced tax and social security
contributions.

In the field of labor relations, strengthening the capacities and competencies of labor
inspection authorities is usually a very important tool in the fight against informality.
Improved law enforcement and the application of sanctions can be achieved through (i) better
cooperation between the relevant authorities (inter alia tax offices, labor inspectorates, police);
(ii) reinforcement of the number of labor inspectors, better working conditions and
performance based remuneration systems; (iii) investment in training and participation in
international conferences to update knowledge and develop skills in relevant areas of expertise.

This would lead to more frequent controls of enterprises in order to evaluate the compliance
with labor relations and work conditions legislations. Also it seems that fees and penalties for
violation of labor laws do not have a desired impact given that violations are found in two
thirds of firms and employers under investigation.

Also the European Commission's Green Paper (2006) on Labor Law highlighted a need for
more effective cooperation at national level between different government agencies, such as
labor inspectorates, social security and tax authorities, and stated that "improvements in the
resources and expertise of these law enforcement authorities, and in their cooperation with
partners, can contribute to reductions in the incentives to undeclared work".

Trade unions (or other representatives of the employees) can also play a role in reducing
undeclared work. They are best positioned to assess the situation in their enterprises and
industries and, through collective bargaining, develop rules that determine such important
matters as wages, benefits, and overtime and part-time work arrangements, without sacrificing
an appropriate level of social protection. This would enable workers to benefit from de facto
rather than just de jure employment protection because, by being partners in a negotiated
settlement, their employers would have less incentive for non-compliance, and enforcement
would be easier.

Collective agreements may commit both parties to denounce black-market work. In Belgium,
a recent agreement with the Labor Ministry commits the cleaning and transport sectors to
informing the public about the quality and guarantees offered by enterprises which respect the
law, to notify illegal practices to public authorities and themselves take cases to court. In
Switzerland, collective agreements in construction, plasterwork, painting, hairdressing, heating,
ventilation, plumbing, metalwork and carpentry contain measures against black market work,
and have been extended to all employers in these sectors.

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 C. Business regulations
Business regulation deal with business practices such as registration, procedures, and general
business environment. Business regulations, more generally, can also affect decisions firms
make about whether to operate formally or not. For example, easing requirements and costs
of registration and licensing can improve incentives for firms to declare themselves. Simplifying
procedures can have a similar effect. It is also beneficial for governments to create an
environment where enterprise assets are protected and where disputes can be handled
expediently and fairly. Good governance has been shown to be a positive force in encouraging
formal economic activity.

Thereby, a favorable business environment is essential for promoting creation of new

businesses, growth of established firms, and job creation – especially in the formal sector. In
the last seven years, the World Bank has published a series of annual reports investigating the
regulations that enhance business activity and those that constrain it. Doing Business presents
quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be
compared across economies, and over time.
It would be critical to make the starting and closing a business administratively as easy as
possible. Experience shows that the impact of taking a substantial step in this area is much
more significant than that of a series of small steps. In many EU countries, a fast-track business
registration service has been introduced as a way of facilitating this process.

In Italy, since 1998 in each municipality “one-stop-shops” have been established for existing
and potential entrepreneurs conceived as help-desks and geared towards customer
satisfaction. They provide companies (mainly start-ups) with information in order to reduce
administrative, time and financial burdens on business. Ukraine introduced a one-stop-shop for
new business registration, and Lithuania created a virtual one. Similar programs and
approaches have been developed also in other countries in Europe.

Portugal is singled out as a top performer in business entry in 2005/06. The reform took 5
months. The country managed to reduce the time to register a company from 54 to 8 days
within a year. This success was achieved by introducing a new fast-track registration service,
which provides a choice of pre-approved names at the registry’s website. The registry deals
with tax, social security, and labor registration and publishes the incorporation notice website
of the Ministry of Justice. Standard articles of association make the application fast and error-
free—with no need for a notary. Within a year, the number of companies using the new
service rose from 12 to 75 per day.

Other countries in Europe have also focused on cutting costs or simplifying registration—
eliminating stamp duties in Switzerland for the first EUR1,000,000 of start-up capital;
abolishing the registration fee and piloted online registration in Belgium and reducing
minimum capital requirements by 90 percent in Georgia. The Business Information System
(BIS) introduced in Finland in 2001 is maintained jointly by the National Board of Patents and
Registration and the Finnish Tax Administration. Entrepreneurs only need to fill in a single
registration application when establishing a company submitted to one contact point. In

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connection with this reform, all the entities under this system receive a single common
Business Identity Code instead of the previous register numbers and other codes.

In short, improving the business and investment environment, making it easier for firms to
formalize, has been one of the most fundamental tasks taken by countries seeking to reduce
the size of the informal sector.

D. Administrative measures
Administrative measures have primarily included efforts to strengthen enforcement and
compliance. This includes a wide range of interventions including reorganization of agencies
involved with compliance; strengthening their capacity; and imposing stiffer penalties for non-
compliance. However, administrative measures can also incorporate better public education
and information to shape the perspectives of enterprises and individuals in terms of whether
they choose to operate in the formal sector or not.

While tax policy and business and labor market regulations may define the substantive
conditions governing the formal economy, institutions also matter since they strongly shape
perceptions regarding the costs and benefits of operating formally vs. informally. For
example, the efficiency and reliability of public services such as the provision of health care and
pension benefits affects individual assessments about whether social contributions are pure
taxes (and thus to be avoided) or reasonable payments for important services. Another
important institutional factor is the effectiveness of enforcement which provides the “stick” in
the overall strategy to combat undeclared economic activity.

While several public institutions are and will remain involved in addressing informality,
international experience suggests that a single authority should be charged with giving them
coherence and pushing their implementation—a governmental champion.

The main instrument available to labor, social security, or tax inspectorates to detect
undeclared work is the unannounced visit to a work site, which determines the identity of all
persons found there. This instrument is often effective enough to ensure that the majority of
workers are registered. Belgium even introduced a social security card (SIS) in 1998, with a
requirement on all employees to have the SIS card with them at the workplace: this allows for
faster and more foolproof controls by the social inspectors of the Labor Administration.

To achieve relevant policy objectives, institutional strengthening (staffing, training, technical

assistance) of the labor ministries and coordinating of relevant public agencies (social security
administration, enterprise development agencies, and competitiveness councils) are needed so
that those ministries and agencies can assume their increasingly more complex role of
facilitating labor productivity growth.

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Detection and enforcement measures applied in particular in OECD countries include
information exchange (linking computer files); unique social security numbers; co-operation
between labor, social security and tax inspectorates; administrative requirements for
immediate declaration of new hires; making chief contractors responsible for tax compliance by
subcontractors; encouraging employer and trade union denunciation of unfair competition;
enforcing employees’ rights such as protection against unfair dismissal, even within undeclared
relationships; and strict sanctions. The possibilities of introducing/ expanding e-government,
on-line registration and exchange of information between administrative databases could be
explored in Ukraine.

Public information and education is the final element in a comprehensive strategy to reduce
undeclared economic activity. How employers and individuals assess the costs and benefits of
declaring economic activity or not is influenced by their perceptions and attitudes about the
informal economy, the efficiency of government services, the risk and costs of being detected,
the fairness of the “system”, and so on. When combined with sound framework conditions (i.e.,
reasonable taxes and regulations, strong institutions), public education can make a difference in
bringing a society to a “tipping point” where undeclared work becomes a deviant and irregular
proposition.

A good communication strategy to publicize increased benefits of and reduced costs for
formalization is also an important component of policy reforms oriented toward reducing
informality. Many potential beneficiaries may ignore or are simply unaware of the costs while
working informally, such as lack of access to sick leave and maternity leave benefits and to
unemployment or pension insurance for the years worked informally, or may not know about
available financial or technical support to SMEs by the public sector, or of simplified
requirements for SMEs to promote formalization. Government could use the media, in
particular public service campaigns on television and radio, to spread information on the
benefits of formalization of employment, in particular in SMEs. The emphasis has usually been
on transparency and inclusion. Campaigns have often been directed especially towards the
younger population.

Many countries have launched communication campaigns to change public perceptions.

These campaigns have tried to emphasize different core messages. In 2006, the U.K. focused on
positioning tax evaders as a minority that damaged the interests of the majority. Some
campaigns have targeted high-informality sectors. The Canadian construction industry focused
on consumers, informing them of the legal and financial disadvantages of “cash deals” and
linking quality and professionalism with registered contractors. Hungary’s “Fair Play” campaign
in 2007 emphasized, among other messages, the damage that tax evasion does to the country’s
financial situation. A serious evaluation of the effect of this campaign would be important for
informing future communication efforts.

In Sweden, one of the campaigns was specifically directed towards young people. Through
free information to vocational schools and media campaigns, information was given about the
risks of not participating in the social security system. Publicity has the double effect of

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highlighting the risk of disclosure and strengthening taxpayers’ trust in the system. A poll
conducted in 2003 indicates that the fraction of the young population that considered
undeclared work to be acceptable fell from 29 percent in 2002 to 21 percent.

Measures aimed at altering perceptions about informality in the international experience

have included the following:

 Information campaigns with segmented communication plans. Public opinion polls show
that different groups have different attitudes and behaviors regarding the undeclared
economy. For example, young people appear to have a relatively high acceptance level; this
group could therefore be a priority in communication efforts, with messages that not
declaring work and income are old and outdated practices and underlining their criminal
aspect. A common objective of information campaigns has been to position tax evasion as a
deviant and increasingly marginal activity, with serious personal consequences. For
example, successful enforcement and sanctioning of tax evasion cases involving the rich and
powerful could be widely publicized. Campaigns could also focus efforts on sectors where
undeclared activities are significant.

 Educating the public on the fundamentals of public finance. This involves providing
transparent information about how the government spends tax revenues and showing how
the payments made by entrepreneurs and individuals are linked to the public benefits they
receive.

 Involving the social partners. Registered employers and trade unions have strong and
shared motivations to reduce the prevalence of undeclared work in their sectors and
workplaces. The international experience indicates that these groups should be encouraged
to work together to explain the problems with informality to their constituencies while, at
the same time, committing themselves to fighting undeclared work in collective
agreements.

IV. Conclusions
In sum, there is a wide range of interventions that could be implemented in order to reduce
informality – these, in the international experience, have usually included a combination of
“carrots” and “sticks”. Unfortunately, there has been very little serious evaluation of these
efforts so it is not possible to provide quantitative estimates of the likely effects of individual
actions nor to empirically demonstrate that certain types of interventions have a stronger
impact than others. Much more empirical analysis is required. However, the conclusion of this
review is that effective strategies to reduce undeclared work require a combination of “carrots”
(reforms and actions to facilitate, reduce the costs, and increase the benefits of formalization)
and “sticks” (enhanced, even-handed enforcement of such improved laws and regulations). In
addition to the need to use a number of strategies, the existing studies conducted on
undeclared work emphasize the lack of a one-size-fits-all policy for countries. The next step is to

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evaluate the relevance, desirability and potential effectiveness of these measures for the
specific context of Ukraine. Moreover, selected measures will need to be further tailored to the
political, historical, and economic conditions of Ukraine.

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