Seema Mehla et. al.

/ (IJCSE) International Journal on Computer Science and Engineering

Vol. 02, No. 03, 2010, 664-668

Analyzing security of Authenticated Routing

Protocol (ARAN)
Seema Mehla Bhawna Gupta Preeti Nagrath
Computer Department Computer Department Computer Department
N.C.College of Engineering N.C.College of Engineering Bharti VidyapeethCollege of Engineering
Panipat, India Panipat, India Delhi, India

ABSTRACT routing. Alternatively, the routing protocol should be

Ad hoc network allow nodes to communicate beyond their designed to be immune to malicious nodes.
direct wireless transmission range by introducing Lightweight computations. Many devices connected to an
cooperation in mobile computer (nodes). Many proposed ad hoc network are assumed to be battery powered with
routing protocol for ad hoc network operate in an ad hoc limited computational abilities. Such a node cannot be
fashion, as on demand routing protocol often have low expected to be able to carry out expensive computations. If
overhead and faster reaction time than other type of routing operations such as public key cryptography or shortest path
based on periodic protocol. However variety of attacks algorithms for large networks prove necessary, they should
targeting routing protocol have been identified. By attacking be confined to the least possible number of nodes;
the routing protocol attacker can absorb network traffic, preferably only the route endpoints at route creation time.
inject them in the path between source and destination and Location privacy. Often, the information carried in
can thus control network traffic. So many secure routing message headers is just as valuable as the message itself.
protocols have been developed that deals with these attacks. The routing protocol should protect information about the
This paper analyzes the security aspects of one commonly location of nodes in a network and the network
used secure routing protocol ARAN structure.Self-stabilization. The self-stabilization property
requires that a routing protocol should be able to
KEYWORDS : AODV, ARAN, RREQ, RREP, Black hole,
automatically recover from any problem in a finite amount
Gray Hole, Denial of Service
of time without human intervention. That is, it must not be
possible to permanently disable a network by injecting a
INTRODUCTION small number of malformed packets. If the routing protocol
MANET are the mobile network that do not have any is self-stabilizing, an attacker who wishes to inflict
infrastructure involved in it i.e they have no fixed routers continuous damage must remain in the network and
and all nodes are capable of movement and can be continue sending malicious data to the nodes, which makes
connected dynamically in an arbitrary manner. There are the attacker easier to locate.
many routing protocols that are in use or have been Byzantine robustness. A routing protocol should be able to
proposed for use in MANET. Many of these protocols are function correctly even if some of the nodes participating in
not secure. The most common Routing protocol is Ad-hoc routing are intentionally disrupting its operation. Byzantine
On Demand Distance Vector (AODV)[1] that handles the robustness can be seen as a stricter version of the self-
dynamically changing network well but only performs very stabilization property: the routing protocol must not only
basic security functions. With MANET being used for automatically recover from an attack; it should not cease
applications like on-line banking, business sensitive from functioning even during the attack.
applications, and transfers of military information, security Security also implies identification of threats, attacks and
is much more important. From the viewpoint of security any vulnerability of a certain system. A variety of attacks
routing protocol must satisfy the following criteria targeting routing in network layer have been identified.
Certain discovery. If a route between two points in a Attacks on any routing protocol can be divided into two
network exists, it should always be possible to find it. Also, categories: passive and active. In passive attack, the attacker
the node, which requested the route, should be able to be goal is just to obtain information. This means that the
sure it has found a route to the correct node. attacker does nor modify or harm the system. However
Isolation. The protocol should be able to identify active attacks are those in which attacker may modify or
misbehaving nodes and make them unable to interfere with harm the system. Therefore from integrity and

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 Seema Mehla et. al. / (IJCSE) International Journal on Computer Science and Engineering
Vol. 02, No. 03, 2010, 664-668

authentication point of view active attacks are more This form of attack does not require the attacker to have
dangerous. Some common types of active attacks are: any knowledge of the cryptographic keys.

a) Attacks by dropping the packet SECURE AD HOC ROUTING PROTOCOL

I) Black hole attack: Here the attacker drops all AODV does not satisfy the requirements of certain
type of packet both control as well as data. As discovery, isolation or Byzantine robustness. So secure
any intermediate node responds to the RREQ routing protocol for ad hoc networks were developed, in
message if it has a fresh enough route, the order to offer protection against the attacks. These proposed
malicious node easily disrupts the correct solutions are either completely new stand-alone protocols,
functioning of the routing protocol and make at or in some cases incorporations of security mechanisms into
least part of the network crash. Gray holes: Here existing protocols (e.g. DSR and AODV). A common
the attacker is selective in dropping packets design principle in all the proposals is the performance-
(drops data packets but not control message security trade-off balance. Since routing is an essential
b) Attacks using Modification of Protocol message: function of ad hoc networks, the integrated security
malicious nodes or compromised nodes may participate procedures should not hinder its operation. Another
directly in the route discovery and may intercept and important part of the analysis is the examination of the
filter routing protocol packets to disrupt assumptions and the requirements on which each solution
communication. Malicious nodes can easily cause depends. Although a protocol might be able to satisfy
redirection of network traffic and DOS simply altering certain security constraints, its operational requirements
these fields [2]. might thwart its successful employment. Five most common
I) Redirection with modified Hop count: categories of secure routing protocol are: solutions based on
malicious node can succeed in diverting all the asymmetric cryptography; solutions based on symmetric
traffic to a particular destination through itself by cryptography; hybrid solutions; reputation-based solutions;
advertising a shortest route (very low hop count) and a category of mechanisms that provide security for ad
to that destination. Once the malicious node has hoc routing. In this paper one of most common and most
been able to insert itself between two efficient algorithm that is ARAN is chosen for analysis with
communicating nodes, it is able to do anything respect of security from asymmetric cryptographic solution.
with the packets passing between them. It can This paper firstly presents a short description of ARAN then
choose to drop packets to perform a denial of it briefly describes the analysis of ARAN in presence of
service attack, or alternatively use its place on the above discussed attacks
route as the first step in a man-in-the-middle
attack. ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHIC SOLUTIONS
II) Denial of service: A malicious node might Protocols that use asymmetric cryptography to secure
generate frequent unnecessary route requests to routing in mobile ad hoc networks require the existence of a
make the network resources unavailable to other universally trusted third party (TTP).
nodes ARAN
c) Attacks using Impersonation: A malicious node may ARAN or authenticated routing protocol detects and
impersonate another node while sending the control protects against malicious actions by third party and peers in
packets to create an anomaly update in the routing table ad hoc network. Two distinct stages of ARAN consist of a
d) Attacks using Fabrication: These attacks are classified preliminary certification process followed by a route
into two types: instantiation process that guarantees end-to-end
I) Falsifying route error message: A malicious authentication. ARAN makes the use of cryptographic
node can succeed in launching a denial of service certificate to accomplish its task.
attack against a benign node by sending false a) Route Initiation Step
route error messages against this benign node. Stage 1 each node, before attempting to connect to the ad
II) Routing table overflow: The attacker hoc network, must contact the certification authority and
attempts to create routes to nonexistent nodes. request a certificate for its address and public key.
The goal is to have enough routes so that creation T A: cert A= [IPA, KA+ ,t, e]KT-
of new routes is prevented or the implementation The certificate contains the IP address of A (IPA), the public
of routing protocol is overwhelmed. AODV is key of A (KA+), a timestamp k of when the certificate was
less vulnerable to this attack being reactive rather created, and a time e at which the certificate expires.. These
than proactive variables are concatenated and signed by KT-. The protocol
e) Worm Hole Attack: In wormhole attacks [3], the assumes that each node knows a priori the public key of the
attacker receives packets at one point in the network certification authority.
and tunnels them to another part of the network and
replays them into the network from that point onwards.

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 Seema Mehla et. al. / (IJCSE) International Journal on Computer Science and Engineering
Vol. 02, No. 03, 2010, 664-668

Stage 2 The second operational stage of the protocol Let D’s next hop to the source be node C .
ensures that the intended destination was indeed reached. D C : [[ REP, IPA, NA] KX- ] KD- , cert X, cert D
Each node must maintain a routing table with entries that C validates D 's signature on the received message,
correspond to the source-destination pairs that are currently removes the signature and certificate, then signs the contents
active. The route discovery of the ARAN protocol begins of the message and appends its own certificate before
with a node broadcasting a route discovery packet (RDP) to unicasting the REP to B
its neighbors. C  B : [[ REP, IP A, NA] KX- ] KC- ,certx, cert C
A brdcst: [RDP, IPX, NA] KA-, CertA Each node checks the nonce and signature of the previous
The RDP includes a packet type identifier (“RDP”), the IP hop as the REP is returned to the source. When the source
address of the destination X (IPX ), A 's certificate (cert A) receives the REP, it verifies the destination' s signature and
and a nonce NA , all signed with A 's private key. Note that the nonce returned by the destination.
the RDP is only signed by the source and not encrypted, so b) Route maintenance
the contents can be viewed publicly. The purpose of the When no traffic has occurred on an existing route for that
nonce is to uniquely identify an RDP coming from a source. route' s lifetime, the route is simply de-activated in the route
Each time, A, performs route discovery it monotonically table. Data received on an inactive route causes nodes to
increases the nonce. generate an Error (ERR) message. Nodes also use ERR
Each node validates the signature with the certificate, messages to report links in active routes that are broken due
updates its routing table with the neighbor from which it to node movement. All ERR messages must be signed. For a
received the RDP, signs it, and forwards it to its neighbors route between source A and destination X}, a node B
after removing the certificate and the signature of the generates the ERR message for its neighbor C as follows:
previous node (but not the initiator’s signature and B  C : [ERR, IPA, IPX, Nb ] KB- , certb
certificate). This message is forwarded along the path toward the source
Let B be a neighbor that has received from A the RDP without modification. A nonce ensures that the ERR
broadcast, which it subsequently rebroadcasts. message is fresh. It is extremely difficult to detect when
ERR messages are fabricated for links that are truly active
B  brdcst: [[RDP, IPX, NA] KA-] K B-, CertA, CertB and not broken. However, the signature on the message
Upon receiving the RDP B’s neighbor C validates the prevents impersonation and enables non-repudiation. A
signatures for both the RDP initiator, and B, the neighbor it node that transmits a large number of ERR messages,
received the RDP from, using the certificates in the RDP. C whether the ERR messages are valid or fabricated, should
then removes B’s certificate and signature, records as its be avoided
predecessor, signs the contents of the message originally Key Revocation
broadcast by Y and appends its own certificate C then In the event that a certificate needs to be revoked, the
rebroadcasts the RDP. trusted certificate server, T, sends a broadcast message to
C brdcst: [[RDP, IPX, NA] KA-] KC_, CertA, CertC the ad hoc group that announces the revocation. Calling the
Eventually, the message is received by the destination X, revoked certificate cert X, the transmission appears as:
who replies to the first RDP that it receives for a source and T  brdcst : [ revoke, certT] K T-
a given nonce. This RDP need not have traveled along the Any node receiving this message re-broadcasts it to its
path with the least number of hops; the least-hop path may neighbors. Revocation notices need to be stored until the
have a higher delay, either legitimately or maliciously revoked certificate would have expired normally. Any
manifested. In this case, however, a non-congested, non- neighbor of the node with the revoked certificate needs to
least-hop path is likely to be preferred to a congested least- reform routing as necessary to avoid transmission through
hop path because of the reduction in delay. Because RDP’s the now un trusted node.
do not contain a hop count or specific recorded source route,
and because messages are signed at each hop, malicious SECURITY ANALYSIS
nodes have no opportunity to redirect traffic a) Attacks by dropping the packets: Nodes can drop the
After receiving the RDP, the destination unicasts a Reply packets for no-reason, as there is no mechanism to
(REP) packet back along the reverse path to the source. Let prevent from this attack.
the first node that receives the REP sent by X be node D.
X D: [REP, IPA, NA] KX-, certx b) Attacks Using Modification of Protocol Message:
The REP contains the address of the source node, the ARAN specifies that all fields of RDP and REP packets
destination’s certificate, a nonce, and the associated remain unchanged between source and destination.
timestamp. The destination node signs the REP before Since the initiating node signs both packet types, any
transmitting it. The REP is forwarded back to the initiating alterations in transit would be detected, and the altered
node by a process similar to the process described for the packet would be subsequently discarded. Repeated
route discovery, except that the REP is unicasted along the instances of altering packets could cause other nodes to
reverse path. exclude the errant node from routing, though that

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Vol. 02, No. 03, 2010, 664-668

possibility is not considered here. Thus, modification malicious node is already on one of many quick routes
attacks are prevented. This prevents the attacks that to the destination. Malicious nodes also have the
alter routing messages while in transit or creates routing opportunity in ARAN to lengthen the measured time of
loops. a path by delaying REPs as they propagate, in the worse
case by dropping REPs, as well as delaying routing
I) Redirection with Modified hop-count: ARAN after path instantiation. Finally, malicious nodes using
packets contains only destination address, it do ARAN could also conspire to elongate all routes but
not contain field for hop-count, which prevents it one, forcing the source and destination to pick the
from this attack. unaltered route.[5]
II) Denial of service: Denial-of-service attacks
can be conducted by nodes with or without valid CONCLUSION
ARAN certificates. In the certificate less case, This paper has presented the authenticated routing protocol
all possible attacks are limited to the attacker' s for securing the routing protocols of wireless networks. The
immediate neighbors because unsigned route study has demonstrated that inherent characteristics of ad
requests are dropped. There are more severe hoc network such as lack of infrastructure network, rapidly
attacks available at the MAC and physical layer changing topology adds difficulties to already complicated
than ARAN provides. Nodes with valid problem of secure routing [6]. Additionally, the flexibility
certificates can conduct effective attacks, of ad hoc networks enables them to be deployed in diverse
however, by sending many unnecessary route application scenarios. Each application has its own set of
requests. Because these are broadcast and security requirements and places unique demands on the
forwarded across the network, an attacker can underlying routing protocol. Hence, an additional difficulty
cause widespread congestion and power-loss to in designing a secure protocol lies in the application
all nodes in the network. Because it is difficult to scenario that is going to be protected, and how well the
infer the node' s intent at the network level, it can protocol can handle scenarios different than the scenario for
be hard to differentiate between legitimate and which it has been designed.
malicious RREQs. Authenticated routing protocol requires trusted third party
for obtaining certificates. Therefore is preferable for
c) Attacks using Impersonation: Route discovery packets applications where we can took help of some already
contain the certificate of the source node and are signed existing infrastructure.
with the source' s private key. Similarly, reply packets ARAN protocol is based on Ad hoc on demand distance
include the destination node' s certificate and signature, vector routing so as to take benefit of high performance and
ensuring that only the destination can respond to route low cost due to its on reactive nature.
discovery. This prevents impersonation attacks where In this paper, we have introduced active attacks on AODV.
either the source or destination nodes is spoofed. This paper then discusses 5 types of active attacks.
Generally, active attacks can be avoided by this use of
d) Attacks using Fabrication: Since all routing messages stringer authentication methods This paper firstly presents
must include the sending node' s certificate and the complete working behind ARAN. As some limitations
signature, ARAN ensures non-repudiation and prevents are also attached with every advantage, so is the case for
spoofing and unauthorized participation in routing. ARAN. Apart from achieving so many security goals, it is
ARAN does not prevent fabrication of routing also sufferer of weaknesses. For example ARAN does not
messages, but it does offer a deterrent by ensuring non- have any mechanism that deals with black hole attack,
repudiation. A node that continues to inject false wormhole attack, Denial of service attack.
messages into the network may be excluded from future
route computation.[4]
FUTURE SCOPE
In this paper we identified different attacks on
e) Securing Shortest Paths: Securing a shortest path
Authenticated Routing Protocol. ARAN has solution for
cannot be done by any means except by physical
some attacks but it is also silent about some attacks like
metrics such as a timestamp in routing messages.
black hole attack, denial of service attack etc. some research
Accordingly, ARAN does not guarantee a shortest path,
can be done to add functionality to ARAN that is also able
but offers a quickest path, which is chosen by the RDP
to combat with above said attack.Areas in secure ad hoc
that reaches the destination first. Malicious nodes could
network routing that have been explored are trust
save some processing time by not verifying the
establishment [7, 8, 9, 11], key generation [10], nodes that
previous hop' s signature on the RDP packet, thus
maliciously do not forward packets [14], and security
increasing their chances of being on the quickest route.
requirements for forwarding nodes [13]. These areas are
However such an attack is likely to succeed only if it is
beyond the scope of this paper. Routing protocol intrusion
executed by multiple malicious nodes on a route, or if a

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 Seema Mehla et. al. / (IJCSE) International Journal on Computer Science and Engineering
Vol. 02, No. 03, 2010, 664-668

detection has been studied in wired networks as a

mechanism for detecting misbehaving routers. Cheung and
Levitt [15] and Bradley et al [16] propose intrusion
detection techniques for detecting and identifying routers
that send bogus routing update messages

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