IJETR021751
IJETR021751
IJETR021751
Abstract A mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) is an reactive routing protocols, nodes exchange routing
autonomous wireless network which consists of mobile nodes
that communicate with each other over multi-hop wireless
information when it is needed such as AODV and DSR.
links. Due to the absence of any fixed infrastructure, MANETs Some ad-hoc routing protocols are a combination of the
are unprotected to various types of security attacks. Black hole above two categories which we called as hybrid routing
is one of these attacks. Black hole is a type of routing attack
protocols. The primary goal of such an ad hoc network
where a malicious node advertise itself as having the shortest
path to all nodes in the environment by sending fake route routing protocols are correct and efficient route
reply. By doing this, the malicious node can deprive the traffic establishment between a pair of nodes[3].
from the source node. There are lots of detection and defense
mechanisms to eliminate the intruder that carry out the black
hole attack. Here, a mechanism is proposed for the nodes which
Due to the unique characteristics of MANET, There is no
are deployed in MANETs in order to detect and prevent black centralized gateway device to monitor the network traffic.
hole attacks. We simulated the black hole attack in various Since the medium is open, both legitimate and malicious
wireless ad-hoc network scenarios and have tried to find a
nodes can access it. Moreover, there is no clear separation
response system in simulations. The analysis guides us to the
various performance parameters such as throughput, packet between normal and unusual activities in a mobile
delivery ratio, and number of dropped packets evaluated over environment. Since nodes can move arbitrarily, false routing
different scenarios information can come from a compromised node or a
legitimate node that has outdated information[4].
Index Terms MANET (Mobile ad hoc network),
AODV(On-demand distance vector routing
protocol),Blackhole Attack, IDS(Intrusion detection system The network layer in MANETs is susceptible to
variousattacks viz. eavesdropping with a malicious intent,
I. INTRODUCTION spoofing the control and/or data packets transacted,
A Mobile ad hoc network is a collection of wireless nodes malicious modification/alteration of the packet contents and
that can be dynamically set up ANYWHERE and the Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks -Wormhole attacks,
ANYTIME, without using any pre-existing network
Sinkhole attacks, Blackhole attacks[5]. Here, a mechanism
infrastructure. There are no basic network devices, such as
routers or access points to transfer data among nodes. is proposed for the nodes which are deployed in MANETs in
Instead, each node acts as a router to establish a route and order to detect and prevent black hole attacks.
transfer data by means of multiple hops. Due to the mobility
nature of nodes, the network topology changes rapidly and The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In
erratically over time. MANETs have many potential Section 2, we briefly describe the working of the AODV
applications, like Sensor Networks, Medical Service,
routing protocol, In section 3, we discuss survey of the
Personal Area Network, especially in military and rescue
operations such as connecting soldiers in the battlefield or related work in the area, In section 4, we discuss the
creating a temporary network in place of one, which proposed solution, In Section 5, we describe the simulation
collapsed after a disaster like tsunami [2]. Routing in environment, In Section 6, we describe the simulation
ad-networks has been a challenging task ever since the wire- results and analysis. Finally, we conclude in Section 7 with
less networks came into existence. The major reason for this future scope.
is the constant change in network topology because of high
degree of node mobility [1].
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The available routing protocols are mainly categorized
into proactive routing protocols, reactive routing protocols
and hybrid routing protocol. In proactive routing protocols,
A. Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing
the routing information of nodes is exchanged, sporadically, Protocol
such as DSDV. In
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Simulation and Performance Evaluation of AODV protocol against Blackhole Attacks in MANET
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International Journal of Engineering and Technical Research (IJETR)
ISSN: 2321-0869, Volume-2, Issue-5, May 2014
Fig.1 Propagation of the RREQ message
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Simulation and Performance Evaluation of AODV protocol against Blackhole Attacks in MANET
In an ad-hoc network that uses the AODV protocol, a Black table, and discard the RREPs having a very high destination
Hole node absorbs the network traffic and drops all packets. sequence number. Every node in the network maintains a
To explain the Black Hole Attack we added a malicious node table called Mali_node for storing the malicious node details
that exhibits Black Hole behavior in the scenario of the to isolate the malicious node in the network. Moreover, in
figures of the previous section. order to maintain freshness, the Cmg_RREP_Tab is flushed
once an RREP is chosen from it. However, this solution fails
In this scenario shown in Figure 3, we assume that Node 3 is to detect co-operative black hole attack and it has high
the malicious node. When Node 1 broadcasts the RREQ processing delay.
message for Node 4, Node 3 immediately responds to Node 1
with an RREP message that includes the highest sequence In [8] authors proposed have proposed the method
number of Node 4, as if it is coming from Node 4. Node 1 DPRAODV (A dynamic learning system against black hole
assumes that Node 4 is behind Node 3 with 1 hop and attack in AODV based MANET) to prevent security of black
discards the newly received RREP packet come from Node 2. hole by informing other nodes in the network. In normal
Afterwards Node 1 starts to send out its data packet to the AODV, the node that receives the RREP packet first checks
node 3 trusting that these packets will reach Node 4 but Node the value of sequence number in its routing table. If its
3 will drop all data packets. sequence number is higher than the one in routing table, this
RREP packet is accepted. In this solution, it has an addition
check whether the RREP sequence number is higher than
III. RELATED WORK the threshold value. If it is higher than the threshold value,
then the node is considered to be malicious node and it adds
to the black list. As the node detected as anomaly, it sends
In this section, we will review the several solutions to black ALARM packet to its neighbours. The routing table for that
hole attacks. malicious node is not updated, nor is the packet forwarded
In[7] solution the source node stores all the RREPs in the to another node. The threshold value is dynamically updated
table called Cmg_RREP_Tab until receiving first RREP using the data collected in the time interval. The threshold
packet waits for MOS_WAIT_TIME. Meanwhile, the source value is the average of the difference of destination sequence
node analyses all the stored RREPs from Cmg_RREP_Tab number in each time slot between the sequence number in
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International Journal of Engineering and Technical Research (IJETR)
ISSN: 2321-0869, Volume-2, Issue-5, May 2014
the routing table and the RREP packet. The main advantage intermediate nodes or that of the destination nodes. The
of this protocol is that the source node announces the black approach we follow, basically only modifies the working of
hole to its neighbours in order to be ignored and eliminated the source node, using an additional function RREP. Apart
.An overhead of updating threshold value at every time from this, we also added a new table Coming_RREP_Tab, a
interval along with the generation of ALARM packet will timer WAIT_TIME and a variable Mali_node list to the data
considerably increase the routing overhead. This method is structures in the default AODV protocol, as explained
not support cooperative black hole nodes. further. In the original AODV protocol, by default, the source
node accepts the first fresh enough RREP request coming to
In [9] Authors Ming-Yang Su et.al discussed a mechanism, it. As compared, in our approach, we store all the RREPs in
called an ABM (Anti-Black hole Mechanism), which is the newly created table viz. Coming_RREP_Tab until the
mainly used to estimate the suspicious value of a node time, WAIT_TIME.. In our solution, the source node after
according to the amount of abnormal difference between receiving first RREP control message waits for
RREQs and RREPs transmitted from the node. When a WAIT_TIME. For this time, the source node will save all the
suspicious value exceeds a threshold level, the nearby IDS coming RREP control messages in Coming_RREP_Tab
broadcasted a block message with id of IDS, the identified table. Subsequently, the source node analyses all the stored
black hole node and the time of identification will place the RREPs from Cmg_RREP_Tab table, and discard the RREP
malicious nodes on their blacklists to isolate the malicious having presumably very high destination sequence number.
node in the network cooperatively. The advantage of this As before, the node that sent this RREP is suspected to be the
method is that it can be able to detect cooperative black hole malicious node list. Once, such malicious node is identified,
nodes in the MANETs. The main drawback of this our solution selects a reply having highest destination
technique is that mobile nodes have to maintain an extra sequence number from Coming_RREP_Tab table and
database for training data and its updations, in addition to Broadcast identified MN in the network. when node
the maintenance of their routing table. broadcast identified MN in network then this after receiving
In [10], the authors discuss a protocol that requires the BCT message each node check entrey exit in its RT for
intermediate nodes to send RREP message along with the MN. If exist Then delete all entries from RT for MN.if not
next hop information. When the source node get this exist then add MN to malicious_node list. The proposed
information, it sends a RREQ to the next hop to verify that solution maintains the identity of the malicious node as
the target node (i.e. the node that just sent back the RREP Mali_node, so that in future, it can discard any control
packet) indeed has a route to the intermediate node and to the messages coming from that node. Now since malicious node
destination. When the next hop receives a FurtherRequest, it is identified, the routing table for that node is not maintained.
sends a FurtherReply which includes the check result to the In addition, the control messages from the malicious node,
source node. Based on information in FurtherReply, the too, are not forwarded in the network.
source node judges the validity of the route.
The proposed algorithm will work at Source Node as per
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION following steps:
The solution that we propose here is designed to detect and
prevent any alterations in the default operations of either the
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Simulation and Performance Evaluation of AODV protocol against Blackhole Attacks in MANET
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International Journal of Engineering and Technical Research (IJETR)
ISSN: 2321-0869, Volume-2, Issue-5, May 2014
Table 3: Performance parameter with Blackhole Attack Delivery Ratio is almost 4.57%.For IDSAODV Scenario
with one blackhole node the Packet Delivery Ratio is
improved between 30.99%.
Throughput comparison
9000
8000
A.Simulation Results 165.32 kbps
7000
3000
B.simulation graph
2000 137.61
kbps
1000 119.11 kbps
Packet Delivery Ratio comparison
0
AODV0 idsAODV0 AODV1 idsAODV1
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Simulation and Performance Evaluation of AODV protocol against Blackhole Attacks in MANET
Dropped Packets comparison more than one black hole nodes, for various CBR traffic
models, As part of our future endeavor, we aim to study the
impact of varying pause time on the protocol.
REFERENCES
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IMECS 2010.
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Future Work the proposed strategy is tested be carried for
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