Ignacio vs. Hilario - G.R. No. L-175 - April 30, 1946

G.R. No.
L-175, April 30, 1946
DAMIAN IGNACIO, FRANCISCO IGNACIO and LUIS IGNACIO, petitioners, vs. ELIAS HILARIO
and his wife DIONISIA DRES, and FELIPE NATIVIDAD, Judge of First Instance of Pangasinan,
respondents.
Ponente: Moran, C. J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari arising from a case in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
between respondents Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres as plaintiffs, and petitioners Damian,
Francisco and Luis, surnamed Ignacio, as defendants, concerning the ownership of a parcel of land, partly
rice-land and partly residential. After the trial of the case, the lower court, rendered judgment holding
plaintiffs as the legal owners of the whole property but conceding to defendants the ownership of the
houses and granaries built by them on the residential portion with the rights of a possessor in good faith,
in accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code. It rendered that upon defendant's failure to purchase the
residential lot in question, said defendants shall remove their houses and granaries after this decision
becomes final and within the period of sixty (60) days from the date that the court is informed in writing
of the attitude of the parties in this respect. Subsequently, in a motion filed in the same Court of First
Instance but now presided over by the herein respondent Judge Hon. Felipe Natividad, the plaintiffs
prayed for an order of execution alleging that since they chose neither to pay defendants for the buildings
nor to sell to them the residential lot, said defendants should be ordered to remove the structure at their
own expense and to restore plaintiffs in the possession of said lot. Defendants objected to this motion
which, after hearing, was granted by Judge Natividad. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent’s insistence on the removal of the encroaching structures as
the proper remedy is legally flawed. (YES)
RULING:
ART. 361 of the Labor Code states that, “The owner of land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing or
planting, after the payment of the indemnity stated in articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one who built
or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.” It is supported by
Article 453 stating, “Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in
good faith may retain the thing until such expenses are made good to him. x x x Useful expenses shall be
refunded to the possessor in good faith -with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated
him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or paying the increase
in value which the thing may have acquired in consequence thereof."
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain
the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453. The owner of the
land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361, either to pay for the building or to sell his
land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the
building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is
erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party
fails to pay for the same. But this is not the case before us.
The Court hold, therefore, that compelling defendants-petitioners to remove their buildings from
the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay for such
buildings nor to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be
executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code. There is, however, in the
decision of Judge Felix a question of procedure which calls for clarification, to avoid uncertainty and
delay in the disposition of cases. In that decision, the rights of both parties are well defined under articles
361 and 453 of the Civil Code, but it fails to determine the value of the buildings and of the lot where they
are erected as well as the periods of time within which the option may be exercised and payment should
be made, these particulars having been left for determination apparently after the judgment has become
final. This procedure is erroneous, for after the judgment has become final, no additions can be made
thereto and nothing can be done therewith except its execution. And execution cannot be had, the sheriff
being ignorant as to how, for how much, and within what time may the option be exercised, and certainly
no authority is vested in him to settle these matters which involve exercise of judicial discretion. Thus the
judgment rendered by Judge Felix has never become final, it having left matters to be settled for its
completion in a subsequent proceeding, matters which remained unsettled up to the time the petition is
filed in the instant case.

Ignacio vs. Hilario - G.R. No. L-175 - April 30, 1946

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Ignacio vs. Hilario - G.R. No. L-175 - April 30, 1946

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Ignacio vs. Hilario - G.R. No. L-175 - April 30, 1946

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

G.R. No.

L-175, April 30, 1946

You might also like