Management: Today

Fire
Management today
Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003
WILDLAND FIRE
BEHAVIOR CASE
STUDIES AND
ANALYSES: PART 2
United States Department of Agriculture

Forest Service
Editor’s note: This issue of Fire Management Today continues a series of reprinted articles, some of them
decades old. Although the articles appear in today’s format, the text is reprinted largely verbatim and
therefore reflects the style and usage of the time. We made minor wording changes for clarity, added inter-
titles and metric conversions where needed, and occasionally broke up paragraphs to improve readability.
All illustrations are taken from the original articles.
Erratum
In Fire Management Today 63(3) [Summer 2003], the article by Banks and Little contains an error noted
in Fire Control Notes 26(1) [Winter 1965], page 15. The third sentence in column 3 on page 76 should
read: “More recent burns that left some surface fuel remaining only reduced the damage, but others that
removed nearly all the fuels did stop the fire.”
Fire Management Today is published by the Forest Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC.
The Secretary of Agriculture has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of
the public business required by law of this Department.
Fire Management Today is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, at:
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: 202-512-1800 Fax: 202-512-2250
Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
Fire Management Today is available on the World Wide Web at <http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/fmt/>.
Ann M. Veneman, Secretary April J. Baily

U.S. Department of Agriculture General Manager
Dale Bosworth, Chief Robert H. “Hutch” Brown, Ph.D.

Forest Service Managing Editor
Jerry Williams, Director Madelyn Dillon

Fire and Aviation Management Editor
Carol LoSapio
Guest Editor
Martin E. Alexander, Ph.D., and David A. Thomas

Issue Coordinators
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Management Today.
Fire
Management today
On the Cover: CONTENTS

Wildland Fire Behavior Case Studies and Analyses: Other
Examples, Methods, Reporting Standards, and Some Practical
- Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
M.E. Alexander and D.A. Thomas
The Carolina Blowup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Keith A. Argow
Black Wednesday in Arkansas and Oklahoma—1971 . . . . . . . 15
Rollo T. Davis and Richard M. Ogden
Jet Stream Influence on the Willow Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
John H. Dieterich
Smoke is drawn into the cen- Predicting Major Wildland Fire Occurrence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
ter of a 3,200-acre (1,300-ha) Edward A. Brotak and William E. Reifsnyder
prescribed burn unit on the The Bass River Fire: Weather Conditions Associated With a Fatal
Lower Klamath National Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
E.A. Brotak
Wildlife Refuge in California.
The Mack Lake Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
The growing need for fire use
Albert J. Simard
nationwide makes it more
Behavior of the Life-Threatening Butte Fire: August 27–29, 198531
important than ever for land Richard C. Rothermel and Robert W. Mutch
managers to fully understand New Jersey, April 1963: Can It Happen Again? . . . . . . . . . . 40
fire behavior. The photo was a Joseph Hughes
winner in Fire Management Horizontal Vortices and the New Miner Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Today’s photo contest for 2003 Donald A. Haines
(see page 85 for more on the An Overview of the 1987 Wallace Lake Fire, Manitoba . . . . . 48
contest). Photo: Troy Portnoff, Kelvin G. Hirsch
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Documenting Wildfire Behavior: The 1988 Brereton Lake Fire,
Tulelake, CA, 2002. Manitoba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Kelvin G. Hirsch
Horizontal Roll Vortices in Complex Terrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Donald A. Haines and L. Jack Lyon
The FIRE 21 symbol (shown below and on the
cover) stands for the safe and effective use of Fire Behavior in High-Elevation Timber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
wildland fire, now and throughout the 21st cen-
tury. Its shape represents the fire triangle (oxy-
Mark Beighley and Jim Bishop
gen, heat, and fuel). The three outer red triangles The Haines Index and Idaho Wildfire Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
represent the basic functions of wildland fire
organizations (planning, operations, and aviation
Paul Werth and Richard Ochoa
management), and the three critical aspects of Low-Level Weather Conditions Preceding Major Wildfires . . . . 67
wildland fire management (prevention, suppres-
sion, and prescription). The black interior repre- Edward A. Brotak
sents land affected by fire; the emerging green Those Really Bad Fire Days: What Makes Them So Dangerous?72
points symbolize the growth, restoration, and
sustainability associated with fire-adapted Dan Thorpe
ecosystems. The flame represents fire itself as an
ever-present force in nature. For more informa-
A Race That Couldn’t Be Won . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
tion on FIRE 21 and the science, research, and Richard C. Rothermel and Hutch Brown
innovative thinking behind it, contact Mike
Apicello, National Interagency Fire Center, 208- The South Canyon Fire Revisited: Lessons in Fire Behavior . . . 77
387-5460. Bret W. Butler, Roberta A. Bartlette, Larry S. Bradshaw, Jack D. Cohen, Patricia L.
Andrews, Ted Putnam, Richard J. Mangan, and Hutch Brown
Fire Management Today Announces Winners of 2003 Photo
Contest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Madelyn Dillon
SHORT FEATURES
Firefighter and public safety is Websites on Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
our first priority. Guidelines for Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

3
WILDLAND FIRE BEHAVIOR
CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSES:
OTHER EXAMPLES, METHODS, REPORTING
STANDARDS, AND SOME PRACTICAL ADVICE
M.E. Alexander and D.A. Thomas
ase studies done in one country
C can be applied to another, if

fuel type characteristics are rel-
evant, by interpreting burning con-
The most important thing to record is the position
of the head fire at various times—the more
observations, the better.
ditions through the other country’s
fire danger rating system.
case studies. In the last issue of the Lower Michigan (Simard and
This special issue of Fire Manage- journal, we cited some examples of others 1983);
ment Today constitutes the second other sources (Alexander and • 1990 Dude Fire, northern
installment of articles involving Thomas 2003). Others are cited Arizona (Goens and Andrews
fire behavior case studies and below. 1998); and the
analyses of wildland fires. All arti- • 1994 South Canyon Fire, west-
cles in this series appeared in past USDA Forest Service fire research- central Colorado (Butler and oth-
issues of Fire Management Today ers, in collaboration with other ers 1998).*
or its predecessors. The 18 articles investigators, have published a
in this issue are in chronological number of case studies in the form In the 1990s, the National Fire
order, from 1967 to 2001. of journal articles, conference Protection Association (NFPA) pro-
papers, and in-house station publi- duced several case studies, in very
In the lead article to the first cations. Notable examples include glossy formats, on the following
installment (Fire Management studies on the: wildfires:
Today, volume 63(3) [Summer
2003]), we overviewed the value, • 1965 Hellgate Fire, western • 1989 Black Tiger Fire, central
approaches, and practical uses of Virginia (Taylor and Williams Colorado (NFPA 1990);
fire behavior case studies and 1968); • 1990 Stephan Bridge Road Fire,
analyses (Alexander and Thomas • 1966 Gaston Fire, central South northern Lower Michigan (NFPA
2003). Here we point out examples Carolina (DeCoste and others 1991);
of case studies published elsewhere 1968); • 1991 Spokane area fires, north-
(both nationally and international- • 1966 Loop Fire, southern eastern Washington (NFPA
ly) and offer some general thoughts California (Countryman and oth- 1992a); and
on wildland fire behavior observa- ers 1968); • 1991 Oakland–Berkeley Hills
tion and documentation. • 1967 Sundance Fire, northern Fire, west-central California
Idaho (Anderson 1968); (NFPA 1992b).
Other Examples of • 1968 Canyon Fire, southern
Case Studies California (Countryman and oth- A few of these U.S. case studies are
Fire Management Today and its ers 1969); available on the World Wide Web
predecessors have certainly not • 1971 Little Sioux Fire, northeast- or in hard copy for a nominal fee
been the only source or outlet for ern Minnesota (Sando and through the National Fire
Haines 1972); Equipment System (NFES 2003).
Marty Alexander is a senior fire behavior • 1971 Air Force Bomb Range Fire,
research officer with the Canadian Forest eastern North Carolina (Wade
Service at the Northern Forestry Centre,
Edmonton, Alberta; and Dave Thomas is the and Ward 1973); * For an overview of this excellent publication, see the
very fine summary prepared by Butler and others
regional fuels specialist for the USDA Forest • 1980 Mack Lake Fire, northern (2001) on page 77 in this issue of Fire Management
Service, Intermountain Region, Ogden, UT. Today.
Fire Management Today

4
The challenge of writing a case study report is to distill the mass of
information into a coherent summary.
Canadian Forest Service fire • 2002 Atawhai Fire, South Island 1. Detection,
researchers have also formally pre- of New Zealand (Peace and 2. Initial attack,
pared several case studies over the Anderson 2002); and 3. Later stages of suppression, and
years on the following wildfires: • 2003 Miners Road Fire, South 4. After containment.
Island of New Zealand (Anderson Some of the information on the
• 1964 Gwatkin Lake Fire, eastern 2003). early phases of a wildland fire is
Ontario (Van Wagner 1965); normally recorded as part of the
• 1968 Lesser Slave Fire, central The Australians have also pub- operational procedures related to
Alberta (Kiil and Grigel 1969); lished several case studies analyz- completing the individual fire
• 1971 Thackeray and Whistle ing the effectiveness of fuel reduc- report, although additional data
Lake Fires, northeastern Ontario tion burning on subsequent fire might be requested (e.g., Haines
(Walker and Stocks 1972); behavior and on fire suppression of and others 1985). However, if we
• 1980 DND-4-80 Fire, east-central high-intensity wildfires (e.g., are to acquire high-quality data
Alberta (Alexander and others Buckley 1992; Underwood and oth- (Donoghue 1982), then we need to
1983); ers 1985). emphasize the importance of fire
• 1986 Terrace Bay 7/86 Fire, behavior observation/documenta-
north-central Ontario (Stocks Case studies have been undertaken tion for our initial-attack firefight-
1988); and by fire researchers in other coun- ers so that we get their “buy-in.”
• 2001 Duffield Fire, central tries as well (Cruz and Viegas 1997;
Alberta (Mottus 2002). Dentoni and others 2001). It is Although myriad things might be
worth noting that one can extend recorded between the time of ini-
Australasian fire researchers have the usefulness of wildland fire case tial attack and the time when a fire
also made numerous contribu- studies done in one country to is finally deemed “out,” the most
tions, including studies on the fol- another, provided that the fuel type important thing to record is the
lowing wildfires: characteristics are relevant, simply position of the head fire at various
by interpreting the burning condi- times—the more observations, the
• 1955 Balmoral Fire, South Island tions through the use of the other better. From these observations,
of New Zealand (Prior 1958); country’s fire danger rating system the rates of fire spread and intensi-
• 1958 Wandilo Fire, South (e.g., Alexander 1991, 1992, 2000; ty can be calculated. At times,
Australia (McArthur and others Alexander and Pearce 1992a, 1993). these observations are difficult to
1966); make, for a variety of reasons, such
• 1977 Western District fires, Field Observations as limited visibility and logistical
Victoria (McArthur and others and Records issues (see the sidebar on page 6).
1982); Whereas no recipe or step-by-step When they can be made, they must
• 1979 Caroline Fire, South procedural manual on wildland fire be coupled with observations or
Australia (Geddes and Pfeiffer observations presently exists, a measurements of wind velocity.
1981); good number of general references
• 1983 Ash Wednesday fires, South are available (Alexander and Pearce Although advances in photography,
Australia (Keeves and Douglas 1992b; Burrows 1984; Cheney and remote sensing and weather moni-
1983); Sullivan 1997; Chester and Adams toring technology over the years
• 1991 Tikokino Fire, North Island 1963; Rothermel and Rinehart have greatly facilitated matters
of New Zealand (Rassmusen and 1983; Turner and others 1961). (Anderson 2001; Dibble 1960;
Fogarty 1997); Moreover, the various case studies Lawson 1975; Ogilvie and others
• 1994 Karori fires, North Island of already published offer guidance 1995; Schaefer 1959, 1961; Warren
New Zealand (Fogarty 1996); themselves. and Vance 1981), good representa-
• 1995 Berringa Fire, west-central tive or site-specific wind readings,
Victoria (Tolhurst and Chatto Wildland fire observation and doc- for example, are still difficult to
1998); umentation can be broken into obtain. In this regard, one should
four distinct stages or phases: not discount the relative value of

5
Make it a habit to always prepare at least a one- to two-page case study—
it will hone your skills as a predictor of fire behavior.
field observers using the Beaufort One should consider obtaining ver- case study reports; their bulk should
Wind Scale (Jemison 1934; List tical aerial photography of the fire not discourage you from preparing
1951) as a simple means of acquir- area relatively soon after the fire’s some type of report, no matter how
ing estimates of windspeed. occurrence, especially in forested short.
areas. This is often a very useful The size of a report is often driven
Several forms exist for eventually tool in carrying out a case study by fire size and duration. A brief
developing a wildland fire case investigation. account might suffice for a specific
study (e.g., Rothermel and issue (e.g., Countryman 1969) or
Rinehart 1983; Rothermel and for a particular situation or event
Hartford 1992). However, forms Report Preparation during an incident (e.g., Pirkso
can sometimes deter data gather- and Documentation and others 1965; Sutton 1984). For
ing; an observer might cringe at Case study reports on wildland fire a long incident, a more volumi-
the thought of completing yet behavior vary tremendously in nous publication might be more
another form. Remember, the most length and complexity. They range appropriate, with numerous appen-
important information to gather is from short, very simple descrip- dixes to document the fire (e.g.,
the time/location of the head fire tions (e.g., USDA Forest Service Bushey 1991). Regardless of size,
and the corresponding windspeed. 1960) to very large and extremely all reports have some things in
detailed, comprehensive accounts common, such as descriptions of
The old adage is true: A picture is (e.g., Graham 2003a, 2003b). One the components of the fire envi-
worth a thousand words. In case should not be intimidated by the ronment, although the level of
studies, however, it is worth more sheer size and level of detail in some detail might vary.
to record the time and location.
Distractions From Making Fire Behavior

Observations
Brown and Davis (1973) identify some of the distractions on a fire that can keep one from preparing good
wildland fire behavior case studies.
A common deficiency of most cumstantial evidence. This seri- fully drawn map showing the
analyses of large fires is that the ously limits the validity of conclu- spread of the fire at various time
detail and sequence of what men sions drawn as to the adequacy or intervals. In addition to such
did in their efforts to bring the inadequacy of the efforts made to information, detailed weather
fire under control overshadow control it. measurements are sought …
what the fire did. This is a natural
outcome. Usually all participants The case study can usually correct As better understanding and pre-
are so fully engaged in other this difficulty. Ideally, it is diction of large-fire behavior
emergency duties that no one is planned in advance and carried develops, analysis of action on
available to make objective and out by a trained research team large fires and the more compre-
continuing firsthand observations who moves in as soon as it is hensive case studies as well will
of the fire itself. So the fire’s over- apparent that a blowup fire is in become more meaningful and
all behavior, and particularly the progress. By means of observation consequently more valuable in
time and sequence of significant and measurements, such a team training men and in planning fire
changes in its behavior, are develops a detailed time history of suppression strategy.
uncertain and are likely to be the fire. Usually this is the form a
poorly reconstructed from cir- detailed log of events and a care-

6
If one isn’t careful, the plethora of information can stymie even the most
dedicated case study author.
After compiling all the information people (both firefighters and the ucts (surface and upper air charts
required to produce a case study public), homes, and ecosystems. and profiles of temperature/mois-
report, one must write it up. The The suppression strategy and tac- ture and winds aloft).
challenge is to distill the mass of tics could also be addressed,
information into a coherent sum- including any associated human Some General Advice
mary. To assist in this process, we factors.
suggest a certain format (see the
and Lessons Learned
sidebar below). The case study by However, as Thomas (1994) points We offer the following practical
Pearce and others (1994) is a good out, not all of us are writers. Some advice in preparing wildland fire
example of a very concise report might wish to follow a one- or two- behavior case studies. Our thoughts
based on this format. page format (e.g., McAlpine and and comments are based on actual
others 1990 [figure 2]). Ideally, it lessons learned from preparing case
Other sections could be added to should include a photograph or studies (e.g., Carpenter and others
the format, such as fire effects on two and additional weather prod- 2002; Pearce and others 1994).
Suggested Outline for Preparing a Wildland Fire

Behavior Case Study Report
These guidelines are based in part activity; suppression strategy present hourly weather
on those originally prepared by and tactics employed; mopup observations, if relevant;
M.E. Alexander for use in three difficulty; fire progress map denote location of weather
advanced fire behavior courses showing point of origin; final station(s) on regional map
sponsored by the National Rural area burned and perimeter; or fire progress map and
Fire Authority in New Zealand in ground and aerial photos, comment on the relevance
1992–93. The guidelines were where possible. of the readings to the fire
subsequently used in six wildland 3. Details of the Fire area, including notes about
fire behavior specialist courses Environment: the station’s instrumenta-
sponsored by the Canadian • Topography—Review major tion.**
Interagency Forest Fire Centre in features; include topograph- 4. Analysis of Fire Behavior:
Hinton, Alberta, in 1996–2001. ic map and photos, if perti- For example, discuss the fire’s
nent. behavior in relation to the
1. Introduction: Significance of • Fuels—Describe the princi- characteristics of the fire
the fire, including regional pal fuel type(s); include a environment and the suc-
map with fire location. vegetation cover type map cess/failure of the suppression
2. Fire Chronology and and any photos, if possible.* operations.
Development: Cause; time of • Fire Weather—Describe 5. Concluding Remarks: For
origin and/or detection; initial prefire weather as appropri- example, what did you learn
attack action; forward spread ate; summarize synoptic about predicting fire behavior
and perimeter growth; fire weather features and and fire behavior documenta-
characteristics, such as spot- include surface map; pres- tion from this assignment?
ting distances and crowning ent daily fire weather obser-
**It is a good idea to cultivate a long-term relation-
vations; present fire danger ship with your local fire weather meteorologist/fore-
*Detailed work on fuel characteristics (e.g.,
amounts by fuel complex strata, moisture content ratings, including drought caster and seek their assistance as a cooperator.
of live fuels) will depend on the situation and the indexes, and append month-
specific need. Generalizations are often satisfactory
for most purposes. ly fire weather record form;

7
Form your own view of what happened only after interviewing many
firefighters and getting multiple perspectives.
Motivation. It is often very difficult ple, short case study, told from systematic in your collection of
to find the motivation to write a your individual perspective, is bet- data. An indexed, three-ring note-
case study. On all wildland fires, ter than no case study at all. book constructed around the
other demands and the rapidity of themes of observed fire behavior,
events can be discouraging. Organization. Just as we must such as fuels, topography, and
Moreover, no policy or regulation practice our fire behavior predic- weather, will help you organize
requires a case study. It must come tion skills before going on a wild- pertinent information for easy
from your own motivation and fire, so it is also important to men- retrieval.
sense of professionalism. Lesson tally prepare ourselves for writing a
Learned: As a practitioner, make it case study. Lesson Learned: Get Information Overload. The
a habit to always prepare at least a organized before the fire season amount of information available
one- to two-page case study. You begins. Prethink how you are going about the fire environment can be
will be richly rewarded, for it will to prepare your case studies. Ask overwhelming. If one isn’t careful,
force you to reflect on why a fire yourself what generic fire behavior the plethora of information can
behaved the way it, honing your information you are going to need stymie even the most dedicated case
skills as a predictor of fire behavior (such as fire danger ratings, study author. Lesson Learned:
(see the sidebar). remote automatic weather station Don’t try to use or validate every
data, or fuel moisture readings), fire danger, fire weather, or fire
Your Standard Is Too High. There and prepare yourself to quickly behavior model available. Decide
is a human tendency to establish access the information. Useful which model you want to use for
goals that are nearly impossible to Webpages include the Western your case study and stick to it. For
reach. Lesson Learned: Limit the Regional Climate Center example, ask yourself whether the
length and depth of the report to (http://www.wrcc.dri.edu) and the BEHAVE fire behavior prediction
the time available. Don’t think you U.S. Drought Monitor system would meet your need as
have to write a research report that (http://www.drought.unl.edu). opposed to FARSITE. Think about
meets the quality standards of a Become familiar with such sources the amount of time you have avail-
fire laboratory publication. A sim- before the fire occurs. Finally, be able to run various models. Pick the
Why Write a Case Study?

Luke and McArthur (1978) give a good rationale for writing wildland fire behavior case studies, even on
small incidents:
Inquiries should be made into all A map showing the perimeter of a At the conclusion of the analysis
fires as soon as possible after they fire at progressive time intervals it should be possible to prepare a
have been controlled. Even short provides the best basis for a case précis of the reasons for success
descriptions of very small fires history analysis. This should be or failure, not for the purpose of
have a value.* Recording the accompanied by descriptions of taking people to task for errors of
details of large fires is vital fire behavior related to weather, judgment, but solely to ensure
because success in the future fuel and topography, and details of that the lessons that have been
depends largely on knowledge the manning arrangements, strat- learnt contribute to the success of
gained in the past. egy and tactics employed during future suppression operations.
each suppression phase.
*It is true that we do naturally tend to focus solely
Particular attention should be
on just the conflagration type wildland fires. given to initial attack action.…

8
If every fire manager and fire researcher made it a personal goal to pro-
duce one case study per year, just think how many case studies could be
produced in a 20- to 35-year career!
model that meets the time available. lament the fact that a fire behavior Technology Center in Marana, AZ
Sources of Information. Secondary model did not predict what actually ((http://www.wildfirelessons.net/).
sources of fire behavior informa- happened. But such discrepancies But be careful about including
tion are often as important as pri- are simply part of making fire color digital photographs with your
mary sources. In a way, the prepa- behavior predictions, and they will report. Although photographs are
ration of a fire behavior case study never fully disappear. One of the truly worth a thousand words, they
is like detective work: You are most interesting purposes of a fire can bog down e-mail systems and
always on the hunt for clues behavior case study is to compare limit the distribution of your
explaining why your fire behaved the projection against reality. report, although some of these
the way it did. Lesson Learned: Lesson Learned: In every case obstacles can be overcome
Don’t depend solely on the stan- study, compare the fire behavior (Christenson 2003).
dard sources of fire behavior infor- projection or prediction to what
mation, such as models, Websites, actually happened. Then discuss Just Do It. If fire behavior case
and fire weather forecasts. For why the fire did or did not behave studies are to become routine—our
example, photographs or video as predicted. In so doing, you will hope for more than a decade—then
taken by newspaper or television* be honing your fire behavior pre- you must make a personal commit-
and amateur photographers can be diction skills. ment to prepare them. Lesson
rich sources of fire behavior data. Learned:
Even articles in general magazines Peer Review. A case study, in the
can offer different perspectives on end, is the official fire behavior A fire behavior model cannot make
your case study. record. Your reputation is on the a commitment; only an individual
line. Lesson Learned: Time per- can. We hope that nothing will
Interviewing. Interviews with fire- mitting, get peer review. Simply hold you back. When it comes to
fighters are a common source of ask your colleagues what they fire behavior case studies, we hope
fire behavior information. But be think of your case study. It will ease that you will, as the saying goes,
careful, for recollections are prone your anxiety and improve your final “Just do it!”
to hindsight bias. Recollections of product. But be prepared for con-
fire events are often flawed, and trary opinions, and don’t be intimi- More Case Studies
they always reflect only a single dated when others think differently. Needed!
point of view. Lesson Learned: Always remember that fire behavior In 1976, Craig Chandler, then
When interviewing firefighters, be is complex and not easily captured Director of the Forest Service’s
aware of hindsight bias. Always in a report. You are doing the best Division of Forest Fire and
compare one person’s memory of you can. Atmospheric Sciences Research,
the fire with another’s. Be skepti- pointed out that many wildland fire
cal. Seek information that dis- Case Study Publication. You’ve behavior case studies were pro-
proves strongly held cause–effect prepared a case study. Now how are duced by fire researchers and fire
relationships. Form your own view you going to distribute your report weather meteorologists during the
of what happened only after inter- so that it will be useful to the fire 1950s and 1960s, but that he had
viewing many firefighters and get- community? Lesson Learned: A not seen many lately, presumably
ting multiple perspectives. logical location for case studies are due to “higher priorities elsewhere”
the Websites of local or national (Chandler 1976). He suggested that
Fire Behavior Model Versus Reality. fire management agencies, such as “we reexamine our priorities.”
It is understandable when fire the National Interagency Fire Alexander (2002) has proposed
behavior specialists or analysts Center or the geographic coordina- establishing permanent, full-time
tion centers. Another possible loca- national operational fire behavior
* Inquire as soon as possible (within at least 24 hours) tion is the Lesson’s Learned Center research units. But there is also the
about the availability of videotape footage, because the
complete record is typically not archived. at the National Advanced Research opportunity to help oneself directly.

9
Chandler’s comment is still valid Alexander, M.E. 1992. The 1990 Stephen Burrows, N.D. 1984. Describing forest fires
Bridge Road Fire: A Canadian perspective in Western Australia. Tech. Pap. No. 9.
for everyone involved in wildland on the fire danger conditions. Wildfire Perth, WA: Forests Department of
fire, not just scientists and forecast- News & Notes. 6(1): 6. Western Australia.
ers. Alexander, M.E. 2000. The Mann Gulch Fire Bushey, C.L. 1991. Documentation of the
and the Canadian Forest Fire Danger Canyon Creek Fire, volumes 1 and 2.
Rating System. In: Preprints, Third AMS Contr. Rep. #43–03R6–9–360. Missoula,
We should be observing/document- Symposium on Fire and Forest MT: USDA Forest Service, Lolo National
ing wildland fires and preparing Meteorology; 2000 January 9–14; Long Forest.
case studies not for fear of litiga- Beach, CA: American Meteorological Butler, B.W.; Bartlette, R.A.; Bradshaw, L.S.;
Society: 97–98. Cohen, J.D.; Andrews, P.L.; Putnam, T.;
tion (Underwood 1993), but rather Alexander, M.E. 2002. The staff ride Mangan, R.J. 1998. Fire behavior associ-
to improve our understanding of approach to wildland fire behavior and ated with the 1994 South Canyon Fire on
fire behavior for the safe and effec- firefighter safety awareness training: a Storm King Mountain, Colorado. Res.
commentary. Fire Management Today. Pap. RMRS–RP–9. Fort Collin, CO: USDA
tive management of wildland fires 62(4): 25–30. Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research
(Countryman 1972). If every fire Alexander, M.E.; Janz, B.; Quintilio, D. Station. [http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/
manager and fire researcher made 1983. Analysis of extreme wildfire behav- rmrs_rp09.html]
it a personal goal to produce one ior in east-central Alberta: A case study. Butler, B.W.; Bartlette, R.A.; Bradshaw, L.S.;
In: Preprint Volume, Seventh Conference Cohen, J.D.; Andrews, P.L.; Putnam, T.;
case study per year, regardless of on Fire and Forest Meteorology; 1983 Mangan, R.J.; Brown, H. 2001. The South
size, just think how many case April 25–29; Fort Collins, CO: Boston, Canyon Fire revisited: lessons in fire
studies could be produced in a 20- MA: American Meteorological Society: behavior. Fire Management Today. 61(1):
38–46. 14–20.
to 35-year career! As it stands now, Alexander, M.E.; Pearce, H.G. 1992a. Carpenter, G.A.; Ewing, D.M.; Thomas, D.;
less than one-tenth of 1 percent of Follow-up to the Spokane area Berglund, A.; Lynch, T.; Croft, B. 2002.
all wildland fires are properly ana- Firestorm’91 report: What were the Price Canyon Fire entrapment investiga-
Canadian fire danger indices? Wildfire tion report. Missoula, MT and Price, UT:
lyzed and documented. We must do News & Notes. 6(4): 6–7. USDA Forest Service, Technology and
better. Alexander, M.E.; Pearce, H.G. 1992b. Development Program and USDI Bureau
Guidelines for investigation and docu- of Land Management, Price Field Office.
mentation of wildfires in exotic pine [http://www.fire.blm.gov/textdocuments/
Acknowledgments plantations. Report prepared for 12th PriceBDY.pdf]
The authors offer their sincerest Meeting of the Australian Forestry Chandler, C.C. 1976. Meteorological needs
heartfelt appreciation to Hutch Council Research Working Group (RWG) of fire danger and fire behavior. In: Baker,
No. 6 – Fire Management Research, 1992 D.H.; Fosberg, M.A., tech. coords.
Brown, Madelyn Dillon, and Carol December 9; Creswick, Victoria. Proceedings of the Fourth National
LoSapio, editors of Fire Manage- Alexander, M.E.; Pearce, H.G. 1993. The Conference on Fire and Forest
ment Today, for their significant Canadian fire danger ratings associated Meteorology; 1976 November 16–18; St.
with the 1991 Oakland-Berkeley Hills Louis, MO. Gen. Tech. Rep. RM–32. Fort
contributions to this special issue, Fire. Wildfire News & Notes 7(2): 1, 5. Collins, CO: USDA Forest Service, Rocky
and to April Baily, the journal’s Alexander, M.E.; Thomas, D.A. 2003. Mountain Forest and Range Experiment
general manager, for supporting Wildland fire behavior case studies and Station: 38–41.
analyses: Value, approaches, and practical Cheney, P.; Sullivan, A. 1997. Grassfires:
the concept of these special issues uses. Fire Management Today. 63(3): 4–8. Fuel, weather and fire behaviour.
on wildland fire behavior. Their Anderson, H.E. 1968. Sundance Fire: an Collingwood, VIC: Commonwealth
dedication and outstanding editori- analysis of fire phenomena. Res. Pap. Scientific and Industrial Research
al abilities have brought “life” to INT–56. Ogden, UT: USDA Forest Service, Organisation Publishing: 73–79.
Intermountain Forest and Range Chester, G.S.; Adams, J.L. 1963. Checklist
many of the articles contained in Experiment Station. of wildfire observations and checklist of
this issue that have long been for- Anderson, K. 2001. NIFC RAWS unit sur- equipment for wildfire observation.
gotten. vives burnover. Fire Management Today. Mimeo. Rep. 63–MS–19. Winnipeg, MB:
61(2): 39–42. Canada Department of Forestry, Forest
Anderson, S. 2003. The Miners Road Fire of Research Branch.
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and fire control strategies. FRI Bull. No. in Australia. Canberra, ACT: Australian Pearce, H.G.; Morgan, R.F.; Alexander, M.E.
197, For. Rural Fire Sci. Tech. Ser. Rep. Government Publishing Service: 214. 1994. Wildfire behaviour case study of
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Research Station: 189–193. Western Australian Ecosystems; 1985

12
THE CAROLINA BLOWUP*
Keith A. Argow
pril 1, 1966, was not a day for
A April Fool jokes in the coastal

pinelands of North and South
Carolina. It was an explosive fire
It was a Black Friday for more than 50 families
whose homes were destroyed.
day unrivaled in recent times. In On March 30, a meteorologist from By early afternoon rural residents
those hot 24 hours, 72,000 acres the U.S. Forest Service’s South- and travelers in the Carolinas knew
(29,000 ha) in the two States were eastern Forest Fire Laboratory in there was a serious fire situation.
burned, 3,000 acres (1,200 ha) per Macon, Ga., telephoned the State They didn’t have to be told over the
hour. It was a Black Friday for forestry headquarters in Raleigh, radio or see it in the news. They
more than 50 families whose N.C., and Columbia, outlining the could smell the smoke and feel it
homes were destroyed. full danger of the unstable weather burn their eyes.
conditions. Wind and pressure pat-
A news release from the South terns such as these had come to The steady southwest winds were
Carolina State Forester’s office in the South before. They usually flowing between two areas of high
Columbia summed up the situa- meant trouble on going fires. pressure. One of the systems had
tion: “The driest March in ten years recently passed out into the
created the forest fire danger that The North Carolina State Forester Atlantic. The second, a fast-moving
exploded on Friday, April 1st, into immediately cancelled all burning cold front, was coming in from the
an almost uncontrollable situation. permits and prohibited use of fire Mississippi Valley. At 7 a.m. the
In three days, Friday, Saturday, and near woods. Yet even with this pre- leading edge was over the Great
Sunday, 480 wildfires burned ventive measure, fire crews in the Smoky Mountains. By 1 p.m. it was
70,000 acres (28,000 ha) bringing Tarheel State fought 273 wildfires in the Piedmont crossing over
the total; fire loss since July 1965 covering 18,000 acres (7,200 ha) on Charlotte and Winston-Salem. That
to 4,800 wildfires burning 120,000 the last 2 days of March. evening it reached the Atlantic
acres (48,000 ha) of woodland. coast, bringing thunderstorms to
In South Carolina on the same day, Wilmington, N.C.
This was the greatest loss in 11 the Forestry Commission closed all
years. Before the rains came on State parks to public use. On the As the front hit, prevailing winds
April 4, the forest area burned in evening of March 31, the governor were pushed eastward by the strong
the two Carolinas during this issued a proclamation prohibiting winds within the system. This
explosive period reached 144,000 the use of fire adjacent to wood- meant a 90-degree wind change as
acres (58,000 ha). The largest fires lands—the first time this had ever it passed. Fires that had made a
were in the coastal pinelands, but been done. (The authority was pro- narrow run to the northeast quick-
damage was not limited to that vided in a law passed after the dis- ly turned southeast, their long
area as numerous fires sprang up astrous 1954-55 fire season, when flanks becoming new wide heads.
across the Piedmont. 7,000 fires burned 159,000 acres
The conflagration came as no real
(64,000 ha).) The Ammon Fire
surprise to forest protection per- One of the blazes that got the most
sonnel. A very dry March had fol-
April 1 publicity threatened the little town
lowed a dry winter. April 1 dawned clear and windy. of Ammon, N.C., for 2 days and
The 10 a.m. report from Jones Lake blackened 17,000 acres (6,900 ha)
tower on North Carolina’s Bladen around it. The smoke was first
When this article was originally published,
Keith Argow was an instructor in the
Lakes State Forest showed a high reported at 1:30 p.m. on April 1.
School of Forestry at North Carolina State spread index, fuel moisture of 6 Rumor was that someone had been
College, Raleigh, NC. percent, and a steady wind of 18 burning off an area to improve
* The article is reprinted from Fire Control Notes 28(1)
miles per hour (29 km/h) from the duck hunting, but no one was quite
[Winter 1967]: 3, 15. southwest. sure who it was.

13
By early afternoon rural residents and travelers in the Carolinas knew
there was a serious fire situation.
Forty minutes later a forestry truck spots and were credited with help- Tractor units spent the night plow-
on patrol radioed that a second fire ing volunteer fire companies save ing lines, but without the flames to
was coming out to the highway several homes and outbuildings. guide them it was hard to locate
from nearby Black Lake. Crews just the leading edges in the dark. The
completing control lines on the Evening came with a smoky orange situation was made more difficult
White Oak fire only 15 miles (24 light. Down in the swamp the fire by the many small spot fires that
km) away rushed to both new rumbled. The cane went up with a were scattered out ahead as far as a
blazes. crackle that sounded like a rifle quarter of a mile (0.4 km).
platoon in action.
Reconnaissance aircraft swung over The thundershower was only tem-
from the large Newton Crossroads The cold front hit the Ammon fire porary relief. Severe burning condi-
fire a scant 20 miles (32 km) east- at 7 p.m. As expected, the flames tions were forecast for the next day.
ward and advised ground crews on changed direction. Already the Again and again crews sought to
the course of the flames and the Whiteville District Forester was strengthen their plowlines, but the
best control action. headed toward N.C. Highway 242 backfires would not burn. Without
which now lay in front of the fire. fire, they were unable to construct
The fire towers, now nearly all Control was impossible now, but he a fire-break wide enough to hold a
socked in by smoke, relayed urgent wanted to be sure everyone was out new onslaught.
radio messages between headquar- of the way.
ters and the men on the firelines. As expected, a drying wind came up
“Fire reported across from Melvin’s Flame—150 Feet High with the sun on April 2. By mid-
store.” “Fire has jumped the South Smoke was intense. The fire could morning the scattered embers were
River into Sampson County.” “Fire be heard in the distance, and the fanned to life. Crews worked in
burning two homes and a half- glow of the flames appeared vain. Flames were rolling again and
dozen farm buildings on Beaver through the forest. The pines took little notice of the lines that
Dam Church Road.” Fire was every- across the highway exploded into had been plowed across their path.
where! what he described as a sheet of The Ammon fire had places to go
flame 150 feet (45 m) high. and another 10,000 acres (4,000
By 3 p.m. the Ammon fire had ha) to burn before a general rain
jumped Cedar Creek Road and was Simultaneously, three lightning and a massive control effort would
headed toward the settlements. The bolts from the thunderheads over- contain it 2 days later.
district dispatcher reluctantly head accompanying the cold front
pulled a unit off the Black Lake struck the main fire. As rapidly as it Yes, April 1, 1966, will be long
fire, now only 10 miles (16 km) came, the fire moved on, throwing remembered in the Carolina
away, and committed his last burning limbs and brands 1,000 pinelands. But the severe test was
reserve tractor plow. feet (300 m) ahead of it. Finally, the well met by courageous firecrews
skies opened up with a brief down- and modern equipment.
Still the flames continued their pour that knocked the flames out
advance. Air tankers of the North of the trees until there was nothing
Carolina Forest Service cooled hot but flickering snags in the night.

14
BLACK WEDNESDAY IN ARKANSAS
AND OKLAHOMA*
Rollo T. Davis and Richard M. Ogden
uring the more critical fire
D seasons there always seems to

be one or more days that stand
out as “black days.” On these days
With fuels already bone-dry, an extremely danger-
ous fire situation was in the making. Fires by the
hundreds were being reported in Arkansas
fires burn hotter and are harder to
control than on other days. Fires
and Oklahoma.
blow up on “black days.” Like
Black Wednesday, April 8, 1970, in waiting for: to begin field clearing Oklahoma City and Little Rock
Arkansas and eastern Oklahoma. by burning, brush pile burning, showed the air to be conditionally
and garden and household debris unstable to about 15,000 feet
Fire Season burning. During this period, a (4,800 m). It would become
The fire season in both states usu- great number of fires roared out of absolutely unstable from the sur-
ally ends in late April. Normally by control. face up to 4,000 feet (1,200 m) by
this time, vegetation is turning the middle of the afternoon.
green. Fire control agencies are Synoptic Situation Widespread surface whirlwinds or
shifting to other forestry opera- and the Black dust devils resulted from the great
tions, and seasonal fire control Wednesday Forecast instability in the lower 1,500 feet
crews are leaving. But April 1970 (460 m). Warnings were called to
The dry spell, begun in late March,
was unusual. the State Fire Control Chiefs, as
stretched into April as dry, high
well as to the Ozark and Ouachita
pressure spread over Oklahoma
Rain fell in above-normal amounts National Forests. The warnings
and Arkansas. It blocked frontal
during the early spring months. were for potential blow-up condi-
systems from the area. By April 7,
Periods of rain were so spaced that tions. Hard-to-control fire behavior
high pressure extended upward to
all fuels, except the fine ones, such as rapid crowning, long-dis-
20,000 feet (6,100 m), but the sur-
remained wet. Temperatures tance spotting, and large convec-
face high center had moved to the
remained well below the seasonal tion columns was expected.
lower Mississippi Valley. Moderate-
normal keeping the vegetation in to-strong, southwesterly, low-level
the cured stage. Except for a few winds pumped even drier air over What Happened
border stations, fire danger sta- Arkansas and Oklahoma. Afternoon All conditions were favorable for
tions did not go into the transition relative humidities dropped to the fires in Oklahoma and Arkansas.
stage until mid-April. Rainfall, that 20-percent level, and some places There was a significant deficiency
had been coming in substantial had humidity readings down in the in rainfall during the last half of
amounts, dropped off in late March ’teens. With fuels already bone-dry, March and the first half of April.
to almost nothing. This dry spell an extremely dangerous fire situa- There had been an extended period
continued into mid-April and tem- tion was in the making. Fires by of extremely low relative humidi-
peratures started rising to more the hundreds were being reported ties. When these conditions com-
normal levels. This was just the in Arkansas and Oklahoma. But bined with an unstable atmos-
type of weather the people were most of them were not too difficult phere, all conditions were “go” for
When this article was originally published, to control. blow-up fires. And blow-up fires
Rollo Davis and Richard Ogden were did occur.
forestry meteorologists for the National Wednesday morning, April 8,
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, At 9 p.m. that Black Wednesday
National Weather Service in Oklahoma another dangerous weather feature
City, OK, and Little Rock, AR. entered the weather picture. The evening the Ouachita National
6 a.m. radiosonde observations at Forest called to report one of their
* The article is reprinted from Fire Control Notes 32(1)
[Winter 1971]: 16, 15. worst fires in 3 years had been

15
The key to identifying the stability of the atmosphere is interpretation of the
early morning radiosonde observation, including temperature, humidity, and
wind from the ground upward.
burning out of control. Aerial Air Stability the Key observation, including tempera-
tankers, as well as hand crews, had When fire weather conditions are ture, humidity, and wind from the
been ineffective against this fire. conducive to many fires (i.e. large ground upward, thousands of feet.
The Oklahoma Division of Forestry precipitation deficiency, and low The fire control agency, informed
reported a total of 35 fires that relative humidities) the fire weath- of dangerously unstable atmospher-
burned 7,669 acres (3,103 ha), er meteorologist gives special ic conditions by the fire weather
while one fire roared over 2,080 attention to the stability of the meteorologist, is warned to expect
acres (841 ha). Arkansas (State and atmosphere. The key to identifying erratic fire behavior. ■
National Forests) had a total of 142 this situation is interpretation of
fires which burned 12,559 acres the early morning radiosonde
(5,082 ha).

16
JET STREAM INFLUENCE ON THE WILLOW
FIRE*
John H. Dieterich
n June 13–17, 1956, the
O Dudley Lake Fire burned

21,389 acres (8,555 ha) on the
Chevelon Ranger District of the
The weather pattern on the two fires, particularly
with regard to the jet stream, appeared to have
been generated under nearly identical conditions.
Sitgreaves National Forest in
Arizona. Nineteen years later, on
June 17–19, 1975, the Willow Fire,
burning on the same ranger dis-
trict and under remarkably similar
conditions of fuel, weather, and
topography, burned 2,850 acres
(1,140 ha).
Following the Dudley Lake Fire,

Vincent Schaefer, writing in the
Journal of Forestry (Vol. 55, No. 6,
June 1957), summarized the rela-
tionship between the jet stream
and 23 large fires in the West dur-
ing the 1955 and 1956 fire seasons.
His article was prompted in part by
the unusual fire behavior observed
on the Dudley Lake Fire, and in
part by his interest in the jet
stream as a dominant factor in the
behavior of these problem fires.
As we began to put together the

story of the Willow Fire, it became
apparent that here was another Aerial view of wind-driven smoke column from the Dudley Lake Fire, June 14, 1956. The
case that could be added to smoke column remained remarkably intact for several miles downward and was still
readily identifiable in the vicinity of Mesa Verde National Park, 210 miles (340 km) to the
Schaefer’s list of destructive fires northeast.
that burned under the influence of
the jet stream. While there were similarities to make the two fires while on the Willow Fire, 41 per-
some rather obvious differences interesting from a direct compari- cent of the area burned was being
between the two fires—the most son standpoint. managed, at least in part, by
important being in area burned— Southwest Forest Industries. The
there were a sufficient number of Description of the Forest Service, however, provides
Area fire protection for these lands
When this article was originally published, within the protection boundaries.
John Dieterich was a research forester for The locations of the Dudley Lake
the USDA Forest Service, Forest Hydrology and Willow Fires are shown in fig-
Laboratory, Rocky Mountain Forest and ure 1. On the Dudley Lake Fire, Both fires were man-caused, and
Range Experiment Station, Tempe, AZ.
18 percent of the area was in pri- both occurred in terrain typical of
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes vate holdings (Aztec Land Co.) the Mogollon Rim country—a flat
37(2) [Spring 1976]: 6–8.

17
Forecasting unusually strong surface winds is perhaps the most important
single activity for the fire weather forecaster.
Weather
Both fires burned during the mid-
dle of June—generally considered
to be the most critical period of fire
weather in the Mogollon Rim
country. The weather pattern on
the two fires, particularly with
regard to the jet stream, appeared
to have been generated under near-
ly identical conditions. As indicated
by the weather data, the tempera-
ture and relative humidity condi-
tions were not as critical on the
Willow Fire, but the wind condi-
tions were nearly identical.
One obvious difference between the

two fires was in the length of time
the severe burning conditions per-
sisted. On the Dudley Lake Fire,
the strong winds continued and the
relative humidities remained low
for nearly 72 hours. On the Willow
Fire, the critical burning period
was over in about 36 hours. An
inspection of the 500-millibar
weather map for the Willow Fire
indicated that, indeed, the jet
stream conditions persisted over
Figure 1—Location of the Dudley Lake and Willow Fires on the Apache-Sitgreaves
National Forest. the fire for about 36 hours. Then
the winds dropped and humidities
to rolling landform bisected by were not available for the Dudley began to rise.
steep rocky canyons. (The Willow Lake Fire, but a detailed fuel inven-
Fire quartered across Willow Creek tory on the Willow Fire indicated Two other Class E fires started and
Canyon, while the Dudley Lake Fire that fuel loading, including litter, burned in New Mexico during the
crossed several smaller canyons.) varied from 18 tons per acre same 3- to 4-day period as the
(40,353 kg/ha) on the lighter areas Willow Fire. These fires were
Fuels to about 54 tons per acre (121,060 undoubtedly influenced by the
kg/ha) where slash remained same strong winds that were pass-
The fuels appeared to be remark-
untreated after heavy cutting. Even ing over the Willow Fire.
ably similar on both fires. Since
both public and private land own- on areas where slash disposal had
ership were involved, fuel treat- been fairly complete, sufficient Fire Intensity
ment standards varied from little ground and surface fuels had accu- Maximum fire intensities were esti-
or no fuel treatment to nearly com- mulated to support an intense fire, mated for the Dudley Lake and
plete treatment of slash after log- influenced by low relative humidi- Willow Fires using Byram’s formu-
ging. Estimates of fuel weights ties and fuel moistures and by la (Byram 1959). Fire intensity on
strong winds.

18
By current fuel treatment standards, even our best efforts at fuel reduction
do not appear to provide much assistance in the control of high-intensity
wind-driven fires.
the Dudley Lake Fire was estimated load; in fact, the Willow Fire was jet stream or abrupt changes in
at 15,300 Btu/s/ft (126,378 the first big fire of any conse- pressure patterns, is perhaps the
cal/s/cm) and on the Willow Fire at quence in the Region in 1975. Over most important single activity for
12,750 Btu/s/ft (105,315 cal/s/cm). 1,100 men were used on the Willow the fire weather forecaster.
The difference between these two Fire, while only 750 men were Forecasting units may currently
was not sufficient to explain the employed on the Dudley Lake Fire, be doing this operationally, but
difference in the final size of the even though it was several times additional “red flag” emphasis
two fires. More important is the larger. Fire suppression costs on should be given to these situa-
fact that the Dudley Lake Fire the Willow Fire were estimated at tions when they occur.
burned as a high-intensity fire for nearly $700,000, four times the • Second, when fires start under
nearly twice as long as the Willow suppression costs on the Dudley these severe wind conditions, or
Fire. Lake Fire ($175,000). The per-acre if fires that are burning come
suppression costs were about 30 under the influence of winds over
By way of comparison, the times as high on the Willow Fire 30 miles per hour (48 km/h), the
Sundance Fire in northern Idaho— ($245.61) as they were on the chances are good that they will
considered a very high intensity Dudley Lake Fire ($8.18)—a fact continue to spread until the
fire—yielded an estimated maxi- that shouldn’t surprise anyone. weather changes, or until they
mum intensity of 22,500 Btu/s/ft run out of fuel.
(185,850 cal/s/cm) during its maxi- There were some interesting simi- • Finally, by current fuel treatment
mum run. larities in the fire suppression standards, even our best efforts at
measures taken on the two fires. fuel reduction do not appear to
Fire Suppression Load On the Dudley Lake Fire, only hand be adequate to provide much
There was a considerable difference crews and heavy equipment were assistance in the control of high-
between the fire load being experi- used because, in 1955 and 1956, intensity wind-driven fires such
enced by the Forest Service’s aircraft were just beginning to be as the Dudley Lake and Willow
Southwestern Region in 1956 and tested for dropping water on fires. Fires. If fuel treatment is the
the number of fires burning when On the Willow Fire, most of the answer, it will need to be done on
the Willow Fire broke out. During suppression effort also came from a level that is far more extensive
the 12-day period from June 8 to hand crews and heavy equipment (area) and intensive (fuel reduc-
June 20 in 1956, eight Class E fires because the winds were so strong tion) than we are now accom-
in addition to the Dudley Lake Fire that aircraft use was limited to the plishing—even on our best fuel
were controlled or in the process of early morning hours. breaks.
being controlled. Over 90,000 acres
(36,000 ha) burned in Arizona in Lessons Learned Reference
1956—nearly three times the run- In summary, the following facts are Byram, G.M. 1959. Combustion of forest
fuels. In: Davis, K.P., ed. Forest fires:
ning 5-year average of 32,600 acres evident: Control and use. New York, NY: McGraw-
(13,040 ha). Hill, Inc.: 61–89. ■
• First, forecasting unusually
During the Willow Fire the Region strong surface winds, especially
wasn’t experiencing this type of fire those that are associated with the

19
PREDICTING MAJOR WILDLAND FIRE
OCCURRENCE*
Edward A. Brotak and William E. Reifsnyder
uring a drought period when
D the build-up index is very

high, wildfires are common.
On some days, these small fires
Dangerous frontal situations will be characterized
by strong winds, a tight pressure gradient, and
little or no precipitation with the frontal passage.
quickly get out of hand, and some
become major fires. Obviously, any
forecasting method which could
determine when these major fires
were likely to occur would be most
useful. The following details such a
predictive scheme from readily
available weather maps. No calcu-
lations are necessary, just recogni-
tion of certain clearly defined situ-
ations.
Using Weather Maps

The original data analyzed consist-
ed of 52 fires, each burning 5,000
acres (2,000 ha) or more, in the
Eastern United States from 1963 to
1973 (see fig. 1). Of particular con-
cern were major fire runs, periods
of time when the fire was probably
uncontrollable due to the prevail-
ing weather conditions. Figure 2 is
an idealized surface map showing
where these major fire runs oc- Figure 1—Locations of all fires.
curred in relation to the existing
fronts and high and low pressure apparent cause. Strong southerly conditions in the Plains and Mid-
areas. Certain regions were obvi- winds ahead of the cold front can western States. The other kind of
ously prone to large fires. also cause control difficulties. low was a storm which moved east-
Obviously, if significant precipita- erly through southern Canada pro-
The region immediately behind a tion occurs with the frontal pas- ducing dangerous fire conditions
dry cold front is the most danger- sage, fire danger will not be great. in the Great Lakes States and in
ous. Strong, shifting winds are the northern New England. Major lows
When this article was originally published, Another region of great danger is in the Eastern United States are
E.A. Brotak was a research assistant and the warm sector of a strong low almost always accompanied by pre-
W.E. Reifsnyder was a professor of forest pressure area (as indicated by the cipitation.
meteorology at the Yale School of Forestry
and Environmental Studies, New Haven,
cluster of runs to the east–south-
CT. east of the low in figure 2). There If only the surface maps are avail-
were two different types of low able, then these dangerous situa-
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes
38(2) [Spring 1977]: 5–8. It is based on A Synoptic pressure areas involved with major tions can only be distinguished
Study of the Meteorological Conditions Associated With
Major Wildland Fires, E.A. Brotak’s Ph.D. dissertation at
fires. One was the Rocky Mountain from other similar situations by a
the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies. low which produced dangerous fire closer examination of the map.

20
Fortunately, the development of major low pressure areas and the passage
of strong cold fronts are normally associated with precipitation.
determined by the radius of curva-

ture which was usually 400 miles
(640 km) or less for the study fires.
Figure 3 shows that the most dan-
gerous conditions are associated
with the southeastern portion of
the trough.
The likelihood of precipitation is

best determined from the 850-mil-
libar (~4,900 feet [~1,500 m]) map.
Significant moisture advection at
this level in conjunction with an
upper trough usually produces pre-
cipitation. Only if the dewpoint
depression of the air at this level
Figure 2—Idealized surface map showing locations of all fire runs. (CFA = following cold upwind of an area is 41 ºF (5 ºC) or
frontal passage; CFB = preceding cold frontal passage; WSL = warm sector of low; and more is precipitation unlikely and
WS = warm sector of high.) major fire occurrence possible.
Fortunately, the development of

Dangerous frontal situations will be If the upper air maps are available,
major low pressure areas and the
characterized by strong winds, a these dangerous situations are
passage of strong cold fronts are
tight pressure gradient, and little much easier to determine. Strong
normally associated with precipita-
or no precipitation with the frontal cold fronts are distinguished from
tion. It is on those rare occasions
passage. Dangerous conditions weaker fronts by the presence of
when precipitation does not accom-
around low pressure areas usually intense upper level troughs, readily
pany these systems and fuel condi-
depend on precipitation occur- apparent at the 500-millibar
tions are severe that major fire
rence. (~18,100 feet [~5,500 m]) level.
occurrence is likely.
The intensity of these troughs is
Using Local Wind and
Temperature Profiles
The preceding section describes the
use of readily available weather
maps for the routine prediction of
major wildland fires. In this sec-
tion, we shall describe how to use
local wind and temperature profiles
to determine dangerous fire condi-
tions. For all 52 fires, wind and
temperature data from the surface
to 10,000 feet (3,050 m) were plot-
ted and analyzed for one or two
nearby first order weather stations
for times just before and just after
the fire’s run. From these data,
characteristic profiles were deter-
Figure 3—Idealized 500-millibar map showing locations of all fire runs.

21
Observed surface winds are not always representative of actual conditions,
especially in the morning, when the nocturnal inversion often produces weak
surface winds.
mined which could be used as pre-

dictive models.
Strong surface winds are a prereq-

uisite condition for major wildland
fires. However, an examination of
only the surface winds is not ade-
quate for predictive purposes.
Observed surface winds are not
always representative of actual con-
ditions. This is especially true in
the morning when the nocturnal
inversion often produces weak sur-
face winds. If the winds above the
inversion layer are strong, the
potential for strong surface winds
in the afternoon is great. Topo-
graphic effects can also produce
seemingly low surface wind speeds,
but again if the wind speeds above
the surface are high, strong gusts
can be expected at the surface.
Figure 4—Characteristic wind profile.
A wind profile characteristic of
most major fire situations is shown favorable for the jet’s occurrence. level jet will increase surface wind
in figure 4. Surface wind speeds Most frequent were the prefrontal speeds and gustiness by downward
always reached 15 miles per hour jets, southerly wind maxima just transport of momentum. The
(24 km/h) and are usually 20 miles ahead of the surface cold front. importance of this, especially on
per hour (32 km/h) or greater. Another southerly jet was often the worst fire days, is probably to
Wind speeds at 10,000 feet (3,000 noted in the warm sector of the make bad conditions even worse.
m) were almost always 40 miles per common Rocky Mountain low pres-
hour (64 km/h) or greater. The sure area. A postfrontal jet, a It has long been believed that
above figures can be considered as northerly wind maximum behind atmospheric instability was associ-
critical values for major fire occur- the surface cold front, occurred on ated with major wildland fires. In
rence. a number of occasions. Low-level an attempt to determine some
jets were also occasionally noted characteristic values of this param-
The association of major wildland along the East Coast and seemed to eter, certain lapse rates were exam-
fires with low-level jets (wind maxi- be associated with the sea breeze ined for each fire situation. Using
ma within 10,000 feet [3,000 m] of front. the standard pressure levels given
the surface where the wind speed is in the soundings, the lapse rates
5 miles per hour [8 km/h] greater Although not a prerequisite condi- that were used were 950–850 mil-
than a thousand feet [300 m] above tion, the occurrence of a low-level libar, 850–700 millibar, and
or below) was a significant finding jet happens frequently enough, 850–500 millibar.
of this research. A third of the wind especially under certain patterns, to
profiles showed such a jet. Certain be an important factor. If present,
synoptic situations were more the authors believe that the low-

22
The occurrence of a low-level jet happens frequently enough,
especially under certain patterns, to be an important factor in
major wildland fires.
The 950–850 millibar (~2,000 feet

to ~5,000 feet [~600 to ~1,500 m])
temperature (∆T) avoids the vari-
ability of surface temperatures and
the occurrence of surface based
inversions, but is still greatly influ-
enced by daily solar heating and is
probably a local rather than
macroscale parameter. As shown in
figure 5, the vast majority of fires,
92 percent, occurred when the
lapse rate between these levels was
steeper than the standard atmos-
phere value (∆T = 6.0 ºC). Super-
adiabatic lapse rates were noted on
a number of fires. Thus a tempera-
ture difference of at least 6.0 ºC
between the 950 and 850 millibar
levels appears to be a necessary
condition for major fire occur-
Figure 5—950–850 millibar temperature difference for all fire runs. rence.
The 850–700 millibar (∆T) depicts

the lapse rate between ~5,000 feet
(~1,500 m) and ~10,000 feet
(~3,000 m), and the instability at
those heights would probably be
macroscale. As shown in figure 6,
in general, a temperature difference
of at least 10 ºC is associated with
major fires. This value is close to
the standard atmosphere lapse rate.
The 15.0 ºC to 15.9 ºC category
encompasses the dry adiabatic lapse
rate which is the maximum that
could be expected for these heights.
The 850–500 millibar (∆T) depicts

the lapse rate between ~5,000 feet
(~1,500 m) and ~18,000 feet
(~5,500 m). A temperature differ-
ence of 26 ºC is the standard
atmosphere lapse rate. A tempera-
ture difference of 40 ºC to 41 ºC is
the dry adiabatic lapse rate and
Figure 6—850–700 millibar temperature difference for all fire runs. would be remarkably unstable for

23
this level in the atmosphere. As
shown in figure 7, about 75 percent
of the fire runs occurred with a
temperature difference of 26 ºC or
more.
Acknowledgment
The research project summarized
here was supported by the
Atmospheric Science Section of the
National Science Foundation. ■
Figure 7—850–500 millibar temperature difference for all fire runs.

24
THE BASS RIVER FIRE: WEATHER CONDITIONS
ASSOCIATED WITH A FATAL FIRE*
E.A. Brotak
lthough wildland fires are fair-
A ly common in New Jersey,

fatalities directly caused by fire
are very rare. However, on July 22,
Shifting winds and the intensity of the fire along
the road where the men were trapped made it
impossible for them to escape alive.
1977, a fire in the Bass River State
Forest claimed the lives of four vol-
unteer firefighters. Since these
cause of the fire has not been
men were well trained and experi-
determined, but arson is suspect-
enced, it is likely the fire exhibited
ed. A thick column of black smoke,
unusual behavior, thus trapping
indicating rapid burning, was spot-
them. This article evaluates possi-
ted at 1501 EDT by the lookout
ble causes of the unusual fire
tower several miles to the south.
behavior.
An initial attack group was dis-
Setting patched to the scene. Additional
Traditionally, the Pine Barrens in fire equipment was sent at 1525
southern New Jersey are noted for EDT, so that by 1540 EDT there
major wildland fires during times were nine fire units working the
of drought. The unusual combina- fire. At 1546 EDT, when it was
tion of fuel, soil, and adverse apparent that the initial attack had
weather conditions produces rapid- failed, all units were ordered out of
ly spreading surface and crown the fire area.
fires. Spread rates of these fires are
among the greatest in the country. At 1600 EDT, a call was sent out to
Figure 1—Map of the Bass River Fire. neighboring volunteer fire compa-
Drought conditions were present nies. They were told to report to
in southern New Jersey all through ending the fire season. However, the area and await instructions.
the first half of 1977. At the this year, after some rain in June,
Atlantic City National Weather drought conditions returned in A brush truck from the Eagles-
Service, which is representative of July. A prolonged heat wave wood Fire Company with four men
the Pine Barrens, moisture for the occurred from July 13 to July 21, aboard responded to the call for
6-month period was 41 percent with temperatures above 90 °F (32 help. It is not clear why, but this
below normal. By July, New Jersey °C) on every day at many locations. unit mistakenly proceeded into the
had experienced one of its worst On July 21, readings above 100 °F fire area. At 1800 EDT, a recon-
spring fire seasons, with nearly (38 °C) were reported at some loca- naissance helicopter spotted the
32,000 acres (13,000 ha) burned. tions. This produced tinder dry charred truck on a narrow, dirt
fuels. road between Allen and Coal Roads
Summer normally brings green (fig. 1). At 1815 EDT, a search
foliage and frequent rains, thus Bass River Fire team located the bodies of the four
The Bass River Fire started at men. Since more accurate infor-
When this article was originally published, mation could not be obtained, the
E.A. Brotak was an Assistant Professor of approximately 1500 hours eastern
Meteorology at Kean College of New daylight time (EDT) on July 22 only estimate was that the men
Jersey, Union, NJ. near the intersection of Allen and were trapped sometime between
Oswego Roads (fig. 1). The exact 1600 and 1800 EDT.
40(1) [Winter 1979]: 10–13.

25
The fire itself was not officially con- It is possible that the fire was affected by a sur-
trolled until 1500 EDT the next face pressure trough, causing pressure falls and
day. A total of 2,300 acres (930 ha) changes in wind speed and direction.
were burned. Most of this occurred
in the 3-hour period from 1500 to
1800 EDT on July 22.
Weather Analysis
Early on the morning of the July
22, a dry cold front pushed across
the fire area. By the time of the
fire, the Bass River State Forest was
in the region behind the cold front
(fig. 2). This area is noted for major
fires in New Jersey (Brotak 1977).
An examination of the 500 millibar
map (fig. 3) showed New Jersey to
be in the southeastern portion of a
fairly well developed short wave
trough. Again, this is a region
noted for strong winds and major
fires (Brotak 1977). Surface weath-
er observations in the area (table 1)
indicated warm temperature,
decreasing humidity, and moderate
winds from the north to northwest
during the morning. Figure 2—1400 EDT surface weather map.
Table 1—Hourly observations at Atlantic City National Weather Service Office.

Wind a
Time Pressure Temperature Dewpoint Direction Speed
Remarks
(EDT) (milibar) (°F) (°F) (°) (knots)
0155 094 78 66 330 09 —
0252 098 77 66 330 09 —
0353 102 76 66 330 09 —
0451 105 75 66 340 10 —
0553 112 74 67 350 08 —
0651 120 75 66 350 10 —
0755 128 76 65 010 11 —
0850 136 80 64 010 12 —
0951 142 82 58 010 12 Gusts to 20 knots.
1050 146 85 53 010 11 Gusts to 18 knots.
1156 146 86 52 020 12 —
1254 146 86 55 010 10 —
1355 146 86 51 330 12 Gusts to 19 knots.
1450 142 87 49 340 12 Gusts to 19 knots.
1551 140 87 46 350 14 Gusts to 24 knots, smoke layer NE.
1655 146 85 47 330 15 Gusts to 21 knots, smoke layer NE-E.
1755 146 83 45 340 14 Gusts to 20 knots, smoke layer NE-E.
1857 154 80 46 330 12 Smoke layer NE-E.
1955 162 77 47 340 10 Smoke layer NE-SE.
2057 173 70 47 330 06 —
2156 183 70 48 330 08 —
2255 187 69 48 340 08 —
2355 193 67 45 340 08 —
a. Peak wind at 24 knots from the north at 1548 EDT; fastest observed 1-minute wind speed: 17 mph from 330° at 1655 EDT.

26
Fire managers must know and understand local Fire Behavior
weather patterns and variance to maximize the An investigation at the site where
efficiency and safety of the suppression job. the men were trapped indicated
two major points. First, from the
direction of fire spread, it appears
that the wind shifted from the
northeast during a part of the fire’s
run. This is believed to be responsi-
ble for trapping the men.
The second point noted was that

fire intensity was much greater
along this road than in the sur-
rounding burned woods. This
would indicate fire storm condi-
tions that made it impossible for
the men to survive.
The idea of a classic fire blowup is

supported by observations of the
fire and its convective column. The
spotter in the Bass River fire tower
noted flames reaching above
canopy height which indicates
flame heights of perhaps 40 or 50
feet (12–15 m). An observer a few
miles away noted a prominent con-
Figure 3—0800 EDT 500 millibar map.
vective column over the Bass River
Fire. It was described as being
“capped by a white, billowy cloud”;
a classic cumulus top indicating
extreme convection.
Although there were other fires in

the area, the observer noted that
only this fire had a cumulus top.
The convective column had maxi-
mum development occurring
between 1500 and 1800 EDT, the
time of blow-up at the surface. The
convective column was also picked
up on the Atlantic City radar scope,
indicating a height of at least sever-
al thousand feet.
Atmospheric
Instability
One of the prime ingredients for a
blow-up fire is inherent instability
in the atmosphere. The morning
sounding at New York City (fig. 4)
Figure 4—0700 EDT New York City temperature sounding.

27
Figure 6—1900 EDT New York City wind profile.
Figure 5—1900 EDT New York City temperature sounding.
mon in the east. Such a trough
showed this inherent instability surface map showed no indications could easily be overlooked in the
from the surface to about 6,500 feet other than the fact that winds are synoptic-scale observation network
(2,000 m). The evening sounding known to be variable behind a cold of the National Weather Service.
(fig. 5), which is probably more front. It is possible the fire itself The relationship of major fires and
representative of the conditions induced such a flow through surface troughs has also been noted
during the blow-up, showed indrafts. before in the east (Brotak 1977).
extreme instability with a nearly
dry adiabatic lapse rate from the Pressure Trough Summary
surface to 6,560 feet (2,000 m). However, another possibility exists In order to avert such tragedies in
High surface temperatures (table 1) that was indicated by the hourly the future, the possible causes of
added to the instability. This type of observations at Atlantic City (table blow-ups must be determined and
instability probably allowed the 1). The pressure, which had been understood. Obviously, very heavy
convective column over the fire to rising steadily after the frontal pas- fuel loads and tinder dry conditions
develop rapidly producing the sage, fell (from 1400 to 1600 EDT); are contributing factors. Topo-
blow-up at the surface. then began rising again. The tem- graphic effects, in this case, have
perature climbed steadily through- been ruled out, since there was
An examination of the evening out the day despite the passage of only a very slight slope to this basi-
wind profile at New York City (fig. the cold front, and after 1600 EDT, cally flat land. Where the terrain is
6) showed moderate sustained sur- began to drop off sharply. During steeper this could have a major
face wind; certainly strong enough the period from 1600 to 1800 EDT, impact. Weather conditions play a
to cause fire control problems. It the wind direction went from key role and are extremely com-
also indicated constant wind speeds northwest to north at Atlantic City plex. Fire managers must know and
with height to an elevation of 6,560 with increasing speeds and gusti- understand local patterns and vari-
feet (2,000 m). According to Byram ness. The peak gust for the day was ance to maximize the efficiency and
(1954), this would allow the con- from the north at 24 knots and safety of the suppression job.
vective column to develop more occurred at 1548 EDT.
fully, producing blow-up conditions References
at the surface. It is possible that the fire was affect- Brotak, E.A. 1977. A synoptic study of the
ed by a surface pressure trough. meteorological conditions associated
The cause of the wind shift from Such a trough would cause the with major wildland fires. Ph.D. diss. Yale
northwest to northeast was also University, New Haven, CT.
noted pressure falls and changes in Byram, G.M. 1954. Atmospheric conditions
investigated. A sea breeze was ruled wind speed and direction. The related to blow-up fires. Pap. No. 35.
out since conditions were not occurrence of a surface pressure Asheville, NC: USDA Forest Service,
favorable and such a sea breeze was trough behind a cold front, with the Southeastern Forest Experiment
Station. ■
not observed at Atlantic City. The colder air behind it, is not uncom-
28
THE MACK LAKE FIRE*
Albert J. Simard
t was Monday, May 5, 1980. The
I skies were clear over the Huron

National Forest in northeastern
Michigan. The plan for the Crane
Three hours after the fire escaped, it had
advanced 6 miles and no amount of line or width
of road held or slowed the fire.
Lake prescribed burning unit called
for the establishment of 210 acres
While working the north flank however, the fire front had expand-
(85 ha) of habitat favored by the
about one-half mile (0.8 km) east of ed from 2 to 6 miles (3–10 km)
endangered Kirtland’s warbler.
Highway 33, the tractor was caught wide and was now advancing south-
After a final check of weather con-
between a crown fire burning ward. At this time, firefighters got
ditions was made, firing started at
northward across its path and a their first major break—the fire
10:25 a.m. There was some “spill-
second east-moving crown fire that ran out of jack pine. Although the
over” as firing progressed, but spot
had crossed the plow line behind wind did not diminish during the
fires had been anticipated and were
the tractor. The operator was evening and the nighttime relative
quickly controlled. Around noon,
trapped and killed in the fire. At humidity did not rise above 55 per-
however, the fire jumped into
this time, the main fire front was cent, the forward rate of advance
standing timber and quickly ran
advancing eastward at 2 miles per dropped to about 7 feet per minute
east toward Highway 33. When it
hour (160 chains per hour [3,219 (5 chains per hour [101 m/h]) as
reached the highway, it torched and
m/h]). This partially resulted from the fire burned through hardwood
then spotted 200 feet (60 m) across
spotting at least a quarter of a mile stands.
to the east side of the highway.
(0.4 km) ahead of the fire. One
Thus began the Mack Lake fire.
hour after the fire had escaped, By daybreak on May 6th, major
walls of flame 30 to 50 feet (9–15 control efforts were underway. In
Rapid Spread m) high passed through the town contrast to the previous day, fire-
A tractor-plow unit attacked the of Mack Lake, 2 miles (3.2 km) east fighters experienced little difficulty
escaped fire east of the highway of the escape. Like so many other containing the blaze. The perimeter
within 3 minutes of detection, but large fires, it destroyed many did not change appreciably after
to no avail. The fire torched in homes while leaving other neigh- May 5th.
some reproduction, dropped to the boring houses unscathed.
ground briefly in a patch of mature Environmental
timber, then crowned in a stand of Three hours after the fire escaped, Conditions
jack pine saplings just 100 feet (30 it had advanced 6 miles (10 km).
m) from the highway. The opera- What were the environmental con-
During the afternoon of May 5th, ditions that led to the Mack Lake
tors of a 6 x 6 tanker unit who no amount of line or width of road
caught and passed the tractor later fire, which took one human life,
held or slowed the fire. That after- destroyed or damaged 41 dwellings
reported that, despite progressing noon the fire released the energy
at 4 to 6 miles per hour (6–10 (including 39 summer homes), and
equivalent of 340,000 barrels of oil, consumed 20,000 acres (8,000 ha)
km/hr), they never saw the head of or six times the energy of the
the fire. of jack pine in less than 6 hours?
Hiroshima atomic bomb.
Weather. There was no indication
When this article was originally published, At 4:30 p.m., a frontal passage of drought condition at the time of
Albert Simard was a project leader for fire brought the usual north wind shift the fire. Total precipitation from
management planning. USDA Forest but no rain. By 6 p.m., the fire had
Service, North Central Forest Experiment January 1979 through April 1980
Station, East Lansing, MI. advanced an additional 3 miles (5 was near normal. Spring fire dan-
km) (about 1-1/4 miles per hour [2 ger had been erratic. Except for 2
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes km/hr]). Because of the wind shift,
42(2) [Spring 1981]: 5–6.

29
days of moderate danger, it was The fire released the energy equivalent of
either too wet to burn (14 days) or 340,000 barrels of oil, or six times the energy of
the burning index was high to very
the Hiroshima atomic bomb.
high (19 days). Although 0.7 inch
(0.18 cm) of rain fell on April 30th,
midafternoon relative humidities material per acre. Further evidence developed to tell homeowners
on the 3 days before the fire aver- of the lack of drought was that about the potential for wildfire
aged only 23 percent. As a result, most material larger than 1/2 inch damage and how to locate and
fine fuels had dried completely (1.3 cm) in diameter was not con- landscape their homes to prevent
since the rain. Conditions at 2 p.m. sumed other than in the piled slash loss.
on May 5th were: Temperature, 82 in the prescribed burn area. 3. Fire managers need to plan care-
°F (28 ºC); windspeed, 18 miles per fully the transition from pre-
hour (29 km/h) (gusting to 25+ Topography. Much of the fire area scribed fire to wildfire control,
[40+ km/h]); and relative humidity, is rolling with numerous small because abandoning a prescribed
22 percent. ridges and valleys. Typical slopes fire when control actions begin
average 20 percent, with elevational can allow more escapes that
Fuels. The fire made its major run differences of less than 100 feet (30 threaten initial attack crews.
in stands of jack pine that had m). Roads are the only barriers to 4. Because fires in jack pine can
regenerated after a 16,400-acre fire spread in the terrain. develop from initial attack to
(6,600-ha) fire that burned the project scale in 15 to 30 min-
same area in 1946. Although stock- The Lessons of Mack utes, fire managers need to
ing density, tree height, and stem Lake develop mobilization procedures
diameter varied considerably typi- In summary, three key factors con- so that their organizations can
cal stands contained 1,500 sapling- tributed to the extreme spread of respond within that time.
to pole-size stems per acre, 15 to the Mack Lake fire: Relative humid- 5. Procedures for the safe use and
25 feet (5–6 m) tall. Fine surface ity of 22 percent, windspeed of 18 control of heavy-duty equipment
fuels (duff, grass, ferns, lichen, and miles per hour (29 km/h), and a need to be emphasized. The
shrubs) averaged 10 tons per acre, jack pine timber type. These and speed and ruggedness of the
and scattered larger material and similar conditions are not rare in equipment can allow it to outrun
crown foliage averaged an addition- the Northeast. Crown-fire spread backup forces and to lull the
al 10 tons per acre. rates ranging from 1 to 2 miles per operator into a false sense of
hour (2–3 km/h) and long-range security.
Jack pine foliage moisture was at spotting have been reported previ- 6. Lake States fire managers need
the seasonal low (110 percent of ously and will be observed again. to recognize that, because staff
oven-dry weight). This is much turnovers in this area are more
lower than the post-flush average Fire managers can learn several frequent than major fires, special
moisture content and about 30 per- important lessons from the Mack emphasis on training is needed
cent lower than would be expected Lake Fire: so that firefighters can be pre-
in late summer. Low foliar mois- pared for major outbreaks.
ture probably contributed to the 1. Once a crown fire begins in the
extreme spread rate of the Mack jack pine timber type, only a Nature works on a much grander
Lake fire, but by itself was probably change in weather can slow the scale and longer timetable than
not a major factor. Surface fuels fire. Fire managers should con- people. One or more decades may
were in an early transitional stage, sider creating fuel breaks com- elapse before all circumstances are
but the previous material predomi- posed of hardwoods. just right again, but we must not
nated. Further, because of below allow the passage of time to cloud
2. Because residences near jack the memory of all the lessons that
normal winter snowfall, the fuels
had not been compacted. The fire
pine forests are increasing, an Mack Lake can teach us. ■
expanded program should be
consumed an average of 11 tons of

30
BEHAVIOR OF THE LIFE-THREATENING BUTTE
FIRE: AUGUST 27–29, 1985*
Richard C. Rothermel and Robert W. Mutch
n August 29, 1985, 73 firefight-
O ers were forced into safety

zones, where they took refuge
in their fire shelters for 1 to 2
Seventy-three firefighters were forced into safety
zones; without escape zones and fire shelters, at
least 60 of the 73 firefighters would likely
hours while a very severe crown
fire burned over them. The incident have died.
took place on the Butte Fire on the Immediately after the shelter inci- issues. The results of this review
Salmon National Forest in Idaho. dent, a review team was dispatched are on file in the Forest Service
Five firefighters were hospitalized to the Butte Fire to document the regional office in Ogden, UT.
overnight for heat exhaustion, meteorological conditions and fire
smoke inhalation, and dehydration; behavior that contributed to the Fire Environment
the others escaped uninjured. life-threatening run up Wallace Severe drought characterized
Investigators estimated that with- Creek. Results of the analysis were weather in the Butte Fire area
out the protection of the escape distributed to all wildland fire man- throughout the summer of 1985,
zones and the fire shelters, at least agement agencies early the follow- contributing to critically low fuel
60 of the 73 firefighters would have ing week. The review team was moisture levels. The fire weather
died. Thanks to preparation of safe- composed of Dennis Martin and station at nearby Indianola along
ty zones, the effectiveness of the Hank Walters, Forest Service the Salmon River measured only
fire shelters, and the sensible Intermountain Region; Clyde 0.31 inch (0.79 cm) of precipitation
behavior of the firefighters them- O’Dell, National Weather Service; in June and 0.23 inch (0.58 cm) in
selves, disaster was averted. Dick Rothermel, Intermountain July. Although more than half an
Fire Sciences Laboratory; and Bob inch (2.5 cm) of precipitation fell
Behavior of the Butte Fire, particu- Mutch, Forest Service Northern on two different days in early
larly its explosive movement on the Region. The purpose of this article August, some of this as snow, only
afternoon of August 29, is of vital is to augment and expand the 0.12 inch (0.30 cm) fell between
interest to fire behavior specialists, results of the initial review through August 13 and August 31. At a
individual firefighters, and leaders additional interviews with those remote automatic weather station
who make tactical decisions based who had been on the fireline and near the fire, 1,000-hour fuel mois-
on fire behavior projections. That an analysis of photographs taken ture readings from the National
an already large and intense fire during and after the fire run. Art Fire Danger Rating System were
could rapidly escalate to even high- Jukkala and Ted Putnam of the rated at 8 percent prior to the run
er intensity—some have called it a Missoula Equipment Development up Wallace Creek.
firestorm—and move fast enough Center have also prepared a report
to overrun 73 firefighters warrants on the performance of the fire shel- The weather on the Butte Fire from
review by anyone concerned with ter based on many interviews with Monday, August 26, though Friday,
fire management. those who used it on the Butte Fire August 30, was not unusual consid-
(see Jukkala and Putnam 1986). ering the location. Elevation at
When this article was originally published, Base Camp was 7,400 feet (2,300
Dick Rothermel and Bob Mutch were, A separate review of the Butte Fire m); elevations on the fire ranged
respectively, a project leader, Fire Behavior and adjacent fires in the Salmon
Research Work Unit, USDA Forest Service, from 6,400 feet (2,000 m) near the
Intermountain Research Station, Missoula, River (termed the Long Tom confluence of Wallace and Owl
MT; and a fire use specialist, USDA Forest Complex), conducted by the Forest Creeks to 8,200 feet (2,500 m) near
Service, Northern Region, Missoula, MT. Service Intermountain Region in the two safety zones. Typical late
October 1985, examined such top- afternoon maximum temperature
47(2) [Spring 1986]: 14–24. ics as strategy, tactics, and other reached 70 to 78 °F (21–26 ºC),

31
with minimum relative humidity in At least three large whirlwinds passed over that
the 12 to 21 percent range at were strong enough to knock people off balance.
Sourdough Base Camp. The windi- —Firefighter Steve Karkanen, describing the fire from a safety zone
est period each day occurred
between 1400 and 1500 mountain
first contained on August 5 at just mate, but with gusts of 25 to 30
daylight time. The velocity was gen-
over 20,000 acres (8,100 ha). miles per hour (32–48 km/h).
erally between 10 and 12 miles per
Strong winds fanned smoldering
hour (16–19 km/h), with stronger
fuels and spread fire across control Figure 1 shows the fire area at
gusts. Inversions occurred each day,
lines on August 24 and 25. Fire 0200 in the morning on August 28,
breaking between 1130 and 1330.
activity peaked on August 27, 28, the day before the big run, and its
Weather on the day of the blowup,
and 29, as the fire made runs of extent by 2200 in the evening. By
August 29, was not unusual, either.
1,000, 2,000, and 3,500 acres (400, 0200 in the morning of August 29,
In the afternoon the temperature
800, and 1,400 ha) respectively. the fire had spread considerably
reached the mid-70’s (23–25 ºC),
About 3,000 of the 3,500-acre further, having crossed the lower
and minimum relative humidity
(1,200 of 1,400-ha) growth on end of Wallace Creek and moved up
was in the upper teens. At base
August 29 reportedly occurred in the ridge toward Owl Creek. The
camp, low-level winds were out of
about 90 minutes. burned areas in lower Wallace
the south at 8 to 12 miles per hour
Creek were patchy. Of special
(12–19 km) in the afternoon, with
It was during this run up Wallace importance on the morning of
occasional gusts to 17 to 20 miles
Creek that the 73 firefighters August 29 were the spot fires in the
per hour (27–32 km/h). District
deployed their fire shelters. middle portion of Wallace Creek
personnel reported that fuel load-
Simultaneously, another run of and along Owl Creek at the south-
ings ranged from 80 to 100 tons
lesser severity occurred in Owl east corner of the fire.
per acre in spruce–fir stands in
Creek, the drainage east of Wallace
drainage bottoms, to 25 to 40 tons
Creek. Both columns were charac- An understanding of the fire con-
per acre in higher elevation lodge-
terized by dense black smoke. By trol operations is essential to
pole pine–fir stands. Fuel models 8
midafternoon the Wallace Creek understanding many events during
and 10 characterized most of the
column had reached 15,000 to the 29th. Having had little success
Wallace Creek drainage.
17,000 feet (4,600–5,200 m) above at close-in direct attack on the 26th
terrain and had a firm cumulus and 27th, the overhead team had
One unusual feature of the area
cap. Another area of intense fire decided to use an indirect attack
threatened by fire was the topogra-
activity took place on the western strategy. On the 28th and 29th, a
phy. The upper slopes did not con-
flank where the fire spread north- tractor line was built along the
verge into sharp peaks as is com-
ward but was apparently pulled into main ridge on the north end of the
monly the case in the Rocky
the main fire in Wallace Creek. fire, approximately 1.5 miles (2.4
Mountains, but tended to be dome-
km) north of the nearest spot fires
like, with continuous crown cover.
Wallace Creek itself was a well-
Events of August 29 in Wallace Creek (fig. 1). Fortun-
On August 29 wind velocities were ately, the line construction includ-
defined north–south drainage that
not especially high. In the early ed several safety zones 300 to 400
became progressively steeper at its
afternoon, eye level winds were feet (90–120 m) in diameter at
headwaters near the two shelter
measured at 7 to 8 miles per hour approximately 1/4-mile (0.4-km)
sites.
(11–13 km/h) at the confluence of intervals. The plan for the 29th was
Owl Creek and Wallace Creek. At to conduct a burnout operation in
General Fire Behavior the late afternoon when humidity
the higher elevation near the head
The Butte Fire was started by light- was expected to rise. An aerial drip
of Wallace Creek, the local winds
ning on July 20, 1985. This fire was torch would be used for center fir-
were stronger. Division Supervision
part of the Long Tom Fire Complex ing in the upper end of Wallace
Jim Steele estimated winds to be 10
in the Salmon River drainage, Creek. Crews were to be dispersed
to 15 miles per hour (16–24 km/h),
which included the Corn Lake, along the line to burn out from the
with gusts to 20 miles per hour (32
Bear, Fountain, Goat Lake, and line after a convection column was
km/h) across the ridges. Measure-
Ebenezer Fires. The Butte Fire was developed.
ments nearby confirmed this esti-

32
Each time they were hit by a new wave of fire, the east of Dishpan Springs. Dave
firefighters moved, crawling along the ground Broberg, division supervisor in Owl
inside their shelters searching for cooler areas of Creek, reported two strong
columns developing, one near drop
the safety zone. point 30 at the upper end of
Sourdough Creek and the other
east of Dishpan Springs. Gary Orr,
the division supervisor on the west
side at drop point 30, saw the fire
east of him throwing fire brands
into Wallace Creek. Orr reported
that the fire in this area was
becoming active around 1100.
The spots along Owl Creek also

became active and developed a
strong convection column by 1300
(fig. 2). Smoke from these spots
and from the helitorch fire was
moving to the north. It appeared to
some that these columns were
being pulled to the north by the
larger column developing to the
northwest. With the aid of indrafts
to these columns, the helitorch
was used to burn out hand line and
dozer line in areas C and D near
the confluence of Sourdough and
Owl Creek.
Meanwhile, Gary Orr at drop point

30 reported lots of fire in lower
Wallace Creek. Considerable red
coloration could be seen in the
smoke columns, and at 1300 or
Figure 1—Arrows depict major fire runs on the Butte Fire during the afternoon of August 1400 the fire was intensifying and
29, 1985. The 73 firefighters deployed fire shelters at the lower shelter area and Tin Cup moving up Wallace Creek. The heli-
Hill shelter area. Areas A, B, C, and D indicate where the helitorch burnout operation was
conducted that afternoon. torch continued burning out the
line in area C. Later, at approxi-
During the morning of August 29, were repeated. Bill Williams, the mately 1500, area D was burned
spot fires near the confluence of operations chief, reported that this according to Bill Williams and Dave
Wallace and Owl Creeks threatened fire was ineffective at developing a Broberg. Photographs looking
valuable timber and seemed to have significant fire column necessary north taken from a helicopter just
the potential to outflank the con- for improving the fireline. to the south of the convergence of
trol line to the east. Thus, it was Sourdough, Wallace, and Owl
decided to use the helitorch early While attempts to burn out line Creeks (fig. 2) show the smoke
in the day to burn out and stabilize near Owl Creek were in progress, columns building at about 1515.
the line in this area. Initial at- the fire was developing strength in From this vantage point, the
tempts began just to the north of lower Wallace Creek. Three reports strongest column was from the
Owl Creek (marked A on fig. 1) substantiate the development of burnout operation and spots in Owl
about 1200. The area did not burn fire in Wallace Creek. Bill Williams Creek. All of the smoke was moving
very well, and ignition attempts reported a large convection column northward up Wallace Creek. The

33
firing operation at the south end of After 40 minutes in their shelters, they came out,
the fire was completed successfully but dense smoke forced them back in again for
about 1550, and the fire was con-
another 30 minutes; air entering the shelters
tained along the southern line just
as it was reaching full strength in was remarkably free of smoke.
upper Wallace Creek.
Wallace Creek Run

About 1515, Jim Steele, at the
northeast end of the fire, who later
went into his shelter at Tin Cup
Hill, reported that he was walking
on the trail above the large clearcut
and could see fire coming up over a
ridge to the south. He reported that
at that time he could not see fire in
Wallace Creek because of interven-
ing smoke and trees. The fire he
saw to the south was probably com-
ing out of Owl Creek.
Bill Williams reported that about

this same time a large, strong con-
vection column was standing over Figure 2—Convection column development near the confluence of Sourdough, Wallace,
the fire. This column was within and Owl Creeks at about 1515 mountain daylight time on August 29. These columns
the main northern dozer line, and originated from spot fires and helitorch operations.
Bill still hoped to use indrafts from
the column to complete the Goat Creek, which was topographi- rescue was overshadowed by the
planned burnout in upper Wallace cally confined.” fire shelter deployment, it was nev-
Creek. Because a very severe crown ertheless an intensive effort accom-
fire started moving to the north up After landing, Gene received plished safely.
Wallace Creek on a western expo- reports that the fire in Sourdough
sure (the east side of Wallace Creek had moved into Wallace Neal Davis, air attack supervisor,
Creek) though extremely heavy Creek and had started firestorm.* flew by helicopter around the fire
fuels, the helitorch was never used Initial reports said it covered about just after 1400 and again at 1515.
in this area as originally planned. 2 miles (3 km) in 15 minutes. (This He provided estimates of the fire
later proved to be an overestima- location in Wallace Creek before
Gene Benedict, the incident com- tion.) Right after the major run, a the fire developed the extreme
mander, was returning to the fire second run started on the west side behavior reported later. On his next
by helicopter between 1500 and near drop point 30, apparently out- flight, at 1550, Neal saw the fire-
1515 and reported that “while view- side the dozer line. Initially, it fighters in the safety zones prepar-
ing this fire I had three other con- spread rapidly to the north, but ing to go into their shelters.
vection columns in view: Goat then veered to the east, probably
Creek on the Salmon National due to indrafts from the larger col- Firefighter Steve Karkanen, work-
Forest, Hand Meadows on the umn in Wallace Creek. This sec- ing between drop point 28 and the
Payette National Forest (a new ondary run threatened firefighters large clearcut at the head of
start), and a fire on the Nezperce along the line on the west side, Wallace Creek, recorded the move-
near Cotter Bar. All fires were who were evacuated by pickup ment of the crown fire as it pro-
extremely active with apparent truck and helicopter. Although this gressed up Wallace Creek. Steve
strong convective activity and sub-
* Although referred to as a firestorm, it should more properly be called a conflagration, which is a severe spreading fire.
stantial rates of spread, except for The term “firestorm” is normally used to describe a severe stationary fire or burnout of an area within a conflagration.

34
Viewed from the air, ahead of the fire, the flames during the run is derived by scaling
were estimated to be two to three times the the distances from the map at each
timeline.
tree height.
It appears that up until about 1530,
took color photographs of the fire, Personnel at the lower shelter area although crowning and developing
recording his location, the direc- reported that the fire reached them strong convection columns, the fire
tion he was shooting, and the esti- at 1610. Jim Steele reports that the behavior was similar to the behav-
mated time and location of the fire firefighters on Tin Cup Hill went ior observed on the two preceding
front. His notes were especially into their shelters approximately 10 days (table 1). The spread rate was
helpful in reconstructing the fire to 12 minutes before those in the low, about 1/3 mile per hour (0.5
movement. His notes at 1600 lower area did. This would have put km/h). After 1530 the fire spread
describe the nature of the fire as it them in their shelters at just about much faster, with an average rate of
passed around the large clearcut: 1600, or a couple of minutes before. about 2 miles per hour (3.2 km/h)
Steele further reports that the fire and a maximum of about 3-1/2
Experiencing intense heat approached them at about 1545 out miles per hour (5.6 km/h). This
and high winds from all of a draw to the southeast. While period was described as a firestorm
directions. At least three Steele was preparing to get into his by observers. The fire had to travel
large whirlwinds passed shelter, he talked by radio to Strike slightly over 1 mile (1.6 km) in half
over that were strong Team Leader Ron Yacomella at the an hour to reach the safety zone. In
enough to knock people off lower shelter area approximately order for the firefighters to reach
balance. The area became 1,000 feet (300 m) away. Ron asked the large clearcut from the lower
too smoky and dusty to if he should start his backfire at this safety zone, they would have had to
take photos. The smoke time, which he did. His crew burned begin the evacuation by 1530.
column completely out approximately 200 feet (60 m) in
enveloped everyone, and it front of the lower shelter zone As with any fire, this one must have
was impossible to see the before the fire hit at 1610. Their moved by surges, with some peri-
fire. Visibility was reduced backfire started easily. At first strong ods of little or no spread. The
to zero several seconds at a indrafts pulled the fire and smoke reconstructed spread rates are too
time, the air was very hot, toward the fire front, but later the coarse to show the surges and
and the area was showered smoke blew back over the crew. appear to be slower than the
with burning embers. impression received by observers
Personnel within the The Nature of the on the ground.
clearcut did not take to Fire
their shelters, a dozer was From observations by Neal Davis, Jim Steele reported that on Tin
used to build fireline Steve Karkanen, Jim Steele, and Cup Hill, firefighters in their shel-
around the vehicles, and Ron Yacomella, we have recon- ters were hit by three waves of fire,
the pumper crew worked structed the probable location and the first one from the southeast.
on small spot fires in flashy time of the fire front as it moved The second one burned up the
fuels. up Wallace Creek and overran the north side and then burned back
crews (fig. 1). The rate of spread towards them at about the same
Table 1—Behavior of Wallace Creek fire run on the afternoon of August 29, 1985.
Time period Elapsed time Distance Rate of spread

1430–1530 60 min 0.32 mi 0.32 mi/h 26 ch/h
1530–1550 20 min 0.48 mi 1.45 mi/h 116 ch/h
1550–1555 5 min 0.29 mi 3.48 mi/h 278 ch/h
1555–1600 5 min 0.14 mi 1.68 mi/h 134 ch/h
1600–1610 10 min 0.15 mi 0.90 mi/h 72 ch/h

35
time as the people in the lower After the run, aerial inspection of upper Wallace
safety zone were going into their Creek revealed a large, intensely burned area in
shelters. The third wave hit from
the southwest. Each time they were which all crown needles and smaller surface fuels
hit by a new wave of fire, the fire- were essentially gone.
fighters moved, crawling along the
ground inside their shelters search-
ing for cooler areas of the safety
zone. At one time they moved away
from the dozer piles of slash that
had been made during the clearing
of the safety zone. After 40 minutes
in their shelters, they came out,
but dense smoke forced them back
in again for another 30 minutes.
The air entering the shelters
around the lower edges was appar-
ently remarkably free of smoke.
The fire that overran the crews was

very large and very intense. Figure
3 shows the nature of the fire as it
passed over the shelters and indi-
Figure 3—A view of the fire as it reached upper Wallace Creek and overran the fire
cates the size of the column in crews. The crews deployed their fire shelters in safety zones similar to those seen in the
comparison to the trees. In the foreground. This photo was taken from a helicopter looking toward the east.
original color slide, the convection
column shows red coloration for er surface fuels were essentially in interviews with the survivors.
hundreds of feet above the trees. gone. There was, however, no evi-
The fire at this time was almost dence from the air, or on the Witnesses, all of them experienced
certainly an independent crown fire ground near the shelter sites, of firefighters, said that this was no
(Van Wagner 1977). firestorm activity such as that seen ordinary crown fire. To some it was
on the Sundance Fire in the Idaho a standing wall of flame that
Viewed from the front, the fire Panhandle in 1967. Trees were not reached 200 feet (61 m) above the
appeared as a wall of flame 200 to laid down in patterns that would treetops. Others described it as a
300 feet (60–90 m) high. Viewed indicate large firewhirl activity. huge, rolling ball of fire with a
from the air, ahead of the fire, the Some firewhirls had been observed bright orange glow. Some witnesses
flames were estimated to be two to during the fire, but trees were not reported large balls of exploding
three times the tree height. The knocked down, uprooted, or broken gasses in the flame front.
fire front was advancing as a typical off as they were in the Pack River
standing flame with the base of the Valley as a result of the Sundance Passage of the flame front was
fire in the trees. The flames in the Fire. accompanied by a roaring sound,
front were not seen to be rotating like that of a jet airplane or a train.
or turbulent. The smoke was rising One firefighter found this the most
sufficiently so that the flame could Inside the Fire frightening part of the ordeal: “The
be seen clearly. The column rose Shelters noise builds up until you can’t hear
nearly vertically, then tilted toward That all the firefighters in the yourself think and then the ground
the north. The rear of the column escape zones survived without seri- begins to shake.” He estimated that
was a turbulent, swirling mass ous injury borders on the miracu- the shaking and roaring lasted 10
impressive in its extreme behavior. lous. Nevertheless, the approach minutes. Over the roar of the fire
After the run, aerial inspection of and passage of the fire was a terrify- he could hear the shouts of nearby
upper Wallace Creek revealed a ing ordeal. Many, in fact, doubted firefighters screaming for reassur-
large, intensely burned area in that they would live though it. The ance, followed by shouts of encour-
which all crown needles and small- trauma of the event was reflected

36
Passage of the flame front was accompanied by a Fire behavior on the afternoon of
roaring sound, like that of a jet airplane. Thursday, August 29, was a repeat,
albeit a much more severe repeat,
of the fire behavior of the preced-
ing two days. Each day took out
more acreage and consequently left
a larger holdover fire for the fol-
lowing day. On the morning of the
29th, the north edge of the fire was
uncontained. Fuels were burned in
patches, leaving large amounts of
scorched fuel and trees within the
fire area. The continuous fuels and
lack of topographic barriers allowed
the fire to move up the slopes of
Wallace Creek with only moderate
winds. The topography contributed
substantially to the fire behavior
and difficulty of control. The slopes
from the valley bottoms were steep,
contributing to rapid upslope runs;
the ridge tops were rounded and
covered with continuous fuels.
Figure 4—Fire characteristics on the Butte Fire. Hence, there were no definite fire
barriers such as steep rocky slopes,
agement from other firefighters. judge when it was safe to come out sharp ridges, or scrubby subalpine
Strong, fire-induced turbulence of their shelters. fuels.
made it difficult to deploy shelters After leaving the shelters, some
and keep them down. One witness firefighters showed symptoms of Examination of weather records
reported a feeling of weightless- carbon monoxide poisoning: vomit- failed to reveal any factors that
ness, of being lifted off the ground. ing, disorientation, difficulty in would have contributed to the
Another reported the shelter being breathing. Emergency medical large-scale convective activity
slammed down against his legs. technicians administered oxygen to observed on August 29. The ex-
Within the safety zones, everyone several individuals; five were evacu- tremely dry spring and summer
moved as far as possible from the ated to a hospital for treatment and probably contributed to the rapid
flame fronts by crawling along observation. All fully recovered. spread of the fire and difficulty in
under the shelter. Among those interviewed, the con- controlling it. As on other fires in
sensus was that without the shel- the northern Rocky Mountains at
Within the shelters, firefighters ters none would have survived. A that time, tree crowns were
experienced extreme heat for as fire fighter with 20 years experi- extremely easy to ignite. Certainly
much as 10 minutes. Shelters were ence summed it up as follows: “The the dry fuels on the ground also
so hot that they could only be han- most frightening, scariest experi- contributed, although the major
dled with gloves. Light entering the ence I’ve ever had. The fire was fire runs at this elevation (6,000 to
shelter though pinholes changed over us, around us, everywhere. I 8,000 feet [1,800–2,400 m]) carried
from dark red at peak intensity, to was in Vietnam for a year, but this predominantly though the crowns.
orange, to white, as the fire passed beats it all.”
over. One survivor said that at one Fire Behavior Analysis
point the ground looked as though Factors Contributing Postfire analysis of the potential
it had been painted a bright orange. to Fire Behavior fire behavior in surface fuels was
Firefighters learned to evaluate the Fire activity in the preceding days made with the BEHAVE fire predic-
color of the light as an indication contributed to the ease with which tion system (Andrews 1986) and
of the fire’s intensity in order to the fire in Wallace Creek began. displayed on the fire characteristics

37
chart (fig. 4). Fuel model 10 was Firefighters learned to evaluate the color of the
used. The values for fuel moistures light as an indication of the fire’s intensity in order
ranged between 3 and 7 percent.
to judge when it was safe to come out of
The light winds of the morning and
early afternoon would have pro- their shelters.
duced fireline intensities of 250 to
500 Btu/ft.sec, making the fire diffi- Table 2a—Data used in BEHAVE to assess fire behavior
cult to control. The stronger in surface fuels on the Butte Fire.
midafternoon winds would have
Element Data
produced fireline intensities in the
surface fuels of 600 to 1,500 Fuel model 10
Btu/ft.sec, virtually assuring an Fuel moisture:
uncontrollable crown fire. The
range of the conditions is shown by 1-hr 3 to 7%
the ellipses on the fire characteris- 10-hr 6%
tics chart (fig. 4). The inputs to 100-hr 9%
BEHAVE and the outputs produced
are shown in table 2. Live woody 75%
Midflame windspeed:
The calculated rate of spread in the Early afternoon (sheltered) 4 to 6 mi/h
surface fuels was 11 to 19 chains
Midafternoon (exposed) 10 to 15 mi/h
per hour (726–1,254 feet per hour
[221–382 m/h]) in the morning and Percent slope 45%
early after noon. The higher wind- Wind direction Directly uphill
speeds in midafternoon would have
pushed the rate up to 28 to 57
chains per hour (1,848–2,762 feet
suggested range mentioned above. fuel moistures in all size classes
per hour [563–842 m/h]). We do
and the speed of the transition
not have methods for calculating
There is a great deal of uncertainty from surface fires to torching, spot-
crown fire rate of spread, but it has
in this type of calculation, indicat- ting, and crowning fires. Because
been found that crown fire spread
ing a strong need for research on large areas were burning un-
can be 2 to 4 times faster than the
crown fire behavior and better checked by either fireline or natu-
rate of spread calculated for fuel
guidelines for predicting the onset ral barriers and a southerly gradi-
model 10 in fuels exposed to the
and spread of crown fires and ent wind had reinforced upslope
wind and as much as 8 times faster
potential blowup situations. and upcanyon afternoon winds in
if the fire is going up steep slopes
Wallace Creek, the direction of fire
(Rothermel 1985). If we compare
the calculated rate of spread in the Conclusions spread and crown fire development
The type of fire run observed in before 1530 were not a surprise.
surface fuels with the crown fire
upper Wallace Creek on August 29 The distance the fire spread, from
values given in table 2, we find that
was not unusual for fires in lodge- 1530 to 1600, and its severity, were,
for the period 1430 to 1530 the
pole pine during the 1985 fire sea- however, unexpected. The large
crown fire was 1.4 to 2.3 times
son throughout the northern area of holdover fire adjacent to
faster than the surface fire. In late
Rocky Mountains. The high-inten- continuous timber with heavy sur-
afternoon, from 1530 to 1610, the
sity fire runs were the result of face fuels proved to be a juxtaposi-
crown fire was 2.6 to 5.3 times
drought-induced, extremely low tion capable of generating an
faster. These values fall within the
Table 2b—BEHAVE outputs.
Time Rate of spread Heat per unit area Fireline intensity Flame length
Early afternoon 11–19 ch/h 1286–1487 Btu/ft2 251–523 Btu/ft.sec 5.7–8 ft
Midafternoon 28–57 ch/h 1286–1487 Btu/ft 2
664–1563 Btu/ft.sec 8.9–13.3 ft

38
That all the firefighters in the escape zones event from recurring in the future?
survived without serious injury borders on If an indirect attack strategy is
selected, then a fail-safe warning
the miraculous.
system must be in place to abso-
lutely clear the line of personnel
incredible amount of energy in a mate now appears to be consider-
well in advance of a high intensity
short time. ably higher than the actual rate of
run. Another approach in conifer
Although crown fires are often spread. Reconstruction of the fire
forests is to select a direct attack
associated with strong winds, in front location at various times indi-
strategy, build a line along the
this case winds of only 10 to 15 cated that the average spread rate
flanks of the fire from a well-
miles per hour (16–26 km/h), with was closer to 2 miles per hour (3.2
secured anchor point, and attack
some stronger gusts, were suffi- km/h) with a maximum of about 3-
the head of the fire only when
ciently strong to channel the flow 1/2 miles per hour (5.6 km/h).
fuels, weather, and topographic
up the canyon and produce the
conditions allow firefighters to
exceptionally intense crown fire The safety zones that were bull-
work safely.
that overran the crews. The ques- dozed into the tractor line at the
tion arose as to whether the head of Wallace Creek made it pos-
Whatever the strategy selected, the
burnout operation with the heli-
fundamental principles of fire
torch on the south side of the fire
behavior and fire suppression
directly accelerated the high-inten- If an indirect attack should always guide decisions that
sity run up Wallace Creek. Inter-
strategy is selected, affect the health and welfare of the
views combined with a careful
then a fail-safe firefighter. Despite the remarkable
inspection of burning patterns on a
progress made in fire management
1/24,000 aerial photo mosaic did warning system
in the past quarter of a century—
not reveal any fire behavior process must be in place to better understanding of fire behav-
whereby the helitorch burnout absolutely clear the line ior, better trained and equipped fire
could have accelerated the run up
Wallace Creek. The photo mosaic of personnel well in crews, more flexibility in attack
advance of a high strategy—conditions like those
showed a patchy pattern of burned
experienced in the northern
and unburned areas between the intensity run. Rockies in the summer of 1985 call
helitorch burning at the confluence
for extreme vigilance in all aspects
of Wallace and Owl Creeks and
of fire suppression. And the safety
upper Wallace Creek. The burnout sible for 73 firefighters to safely
of the individual firefighter is
operation, however, probably con- and effectively use their fire shel-
always the top priority.
tributed to the shelter incident by ters and survive one of the more
preoccupying the attention of some violent fire runs observed in the
key overhead personnel for so northern Rockies in 1985. But, as References
much of the afternoon of August one crew foreman observed after Andrews, P.L. 1986. BEHAVE: Fire behavior
prediction and fuel modeling system—
29. The “eyes in the sky” reconnais- the incident, “the best safety zone BURN subsystem. Part I. Gen. Tech. Rep.
sance that had been routinely avail- is one where a fire shelter is not INT–194. Ogden, UT: USDA Forest
able on previous days was not avail- needed.” This conclusion deserves Service, Intermountain Research Station.
able during the critical time on special emphasis whenever the Jukkala, A.; Putnam, T. 1986. Forest fire
shelters save lives. Fire Management
August 29. Butte Fire is discussed. Notes. 47(2): 3–5.
Rothermel, R.C. 1985. How to predict the
Early reports on the Butte Fire spread and intensity of forest and range
estimated that the fire traveled 2 Preventing Future fires. Gen. Tech. Rep. INT–143. Ogden,
UT: USDA Forest Service, Intermountain
miles (3.2 km) up Wallace Creek in Incidents Forest and Range Experiment Station.
15 minutes, or a spread rate of 8 What measures can be taken to Van Wagner, C.E. 1977. Conditions for the
start and spread of crown fire. Canadian
miles per hour (13 km/h). This esti- prevent such a life-threatening Journal of Forest Research. 7: 23–24. ■

39
NEW JERSEY, APRIL 1963:
CAN IT HAPPEN AGAIN?*
Joseph Hughes
henever New Jersey resi-
W dents discuss large forest

fires, the discussion invari-
ably ends up with what happened
I was fascinated by the horror stories—tales of a
living hell with sheets of fire and houses bursting
into flames from the radiated heat.
in April 1963. As a boy of 14, I
remember seeing the headlines and
later while traveling to the shore
that summer, viewing mile after
mile of blackened woodland and
burnt foundations.
After I came to work for the New

Jersey forest fire service, I was fas-
cinated by the horror stories—tales
of a living hell with sheets of fire
and houses bursting into flames
from the radiated heat. And then
there were the acts of heroism,
such as the removal of a TV anten-
na from the tail of a forest fire drop
plane that flew too low and the acts
of folly, such as the dispatching of
useless hook and ladder trucks
from Philadelphia. Many of those
present during the fires have said Developers in previously wilderness areas of New Jersey often continue to ignore the
that they have never seen anything potential for damage from wildfire.
like it, either before or since. It
must have seemed as if the whole magnitude happened today. The April, and the total since March 20
world was on fire! purpose of this case study is to take at the Lebanon Experimental
a look at what actually happened Forest was only 0.57 inch (1.45
As a firewarden I worry what I during Apri1 20–22, 1963. What cm). The precipitation deficit had
would do and how I would react if were the preconditions leading up been 3.00 inches (7.62 cm) for
ever faced with a similar situation. to the event. What was the damage, March. Precipitation for April was
In the last few years, noticing all and finally what we might expect to already 2.00 inches (5.08 cm) below
the development in the South happen if a similar series of fires normal when April 20 dawned
Jersey area, I wonder what would occurred today. bright, clear, and exceptionally dry.
the loss be in terms of human life The Build-up Index (Cumulative
and damage to improved property if Weather Conditions Drying Factor) was recorded at 115,
a forest fire disaster of a similar New Jersey, along with most of the and the relative humidity was 23
East, had experienced severe percent at 10 a.m.
When this article was originally published, drought conditions prior to April
Joseph Hughes was the Assistant State 20, 1963. The spring had been In addition to the dryness, wind
Firewarden for the New Jersey Fire exceptionally dry and windy, thus conditions played a primary role in
Service, Trenton, NJ. the havoc that followed. At 9 a.m.,
far. Only an average of 0.30 inch
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes (0.76 cm) of rainfall had fallen in wind speeds in a wooded area near
48(1) [Winter 1987]: 3–6. It was adapted from New
Jersey Outdoors.
the ground were clocked at 12

40
It only took three days to devastate New Jersey than the few tankers and hand
with some of the worst fires ever reported in crews could handle.
the East.
By 8 p.m. the head fire hit the
Jersey Central Railroad near
ence of a low level jet wind over the Bullock, covering a distance of 9
Philadelphia and South Jersey area miles (14 km) in 6 hours, or a sus-
on April 20. tained average forward rate-of-
speed of 1.5 miles per hour (2.4
Dry and windy conditions com- km/h). However, ground crews and
bined to make the burning index at personnel at the scene reported
Apple Pie Hill Tower 200, highest short runs that may have
ever recorded in New Jersey; fire approached 4.5 miles per hour (7.2
weather conditions were the worst km/h).
possible.
As the day progressed numerous
Origin of the Fires other fires began to break out
Several of the fires that reached throughout the State. Many of the
major proportions started as early fires burned into the night and
as 9 a.m. (table 1). The cause of the through the next day without con-
largest fire, which burned 76,000 tainment or control. Needless to
acres (31,000 ha), is well docu- say, State, county, and municipal
mented. Three fires started firefighting forces were over-
between Ongs Hat, Pemberton whelmed. Reports of large amounts
Wildfire in wildland/urban interface area
of the New Jersey Pine Barrens. Road, and Lower Mill in Pemberton of structural damage began to
Township, Burlington County, come in, and some deaths were
miles per hour (19 km/h). However, between 9 a.m. and 1 p.m. as the reported.
in openings and above treetops result of local blueberry growers
velocities averaged 30 to 40 miles burning debris. Permits had been Many outside communities, want-
per hour (50–65 km/h) with gusts banned and announcements made ing to help in whatever way possi-
of more than 50 miles per hour (80 in newspapers prohibiting burning. ble, sent all kinds of equipment and
km/hr). Not only were velocities However, fires that had been held volunteers. As mentioned earlier,
high, but the winds were extremely over in dry fields from the previous hook and ladder and street cleaning
turbulent. Many small whirlwinds day rekindled. Strong winds trucks came from Philadelphia.
developed. Sand and dust storms removed a covering of sand and Unfortunately, these just added to
were prevalent throughout the fanned the smoldering embers to the chaos and confusion. One vol-
Delaware Valley wherever plowing life! unteer fireman was killed when his
or land clearing operations had left truck ran into a State truck in the
soil unprotected. The first of these fires broke out at smoke of Route 72, near Coyle
9:50 a.m. A strong suppression Field, on the 76,000-acre (31,000-
Prevailing wind directions during effort by ground crews, water ha) fire.
the day shifted from northwest to tankers, and a drop plane operating
west, back to northwest, then final- out of Coyle Field held the fire in A total of 28 major fires (fires of
ly shifting to almost north that check. However, second and third more than 100 acres [40 ha])
night. Winds shifted as much as 90 fires broke out in the early after- burned on April 20 along with 51
percent within a few minutes. noon from adjacent properties. smaller fires, making a total of 79
These additional fires, combined fires for the day. Damage figures
The turbulent and high velocity with winds of 40 miles per hour (65 were estimated at 183,000 acres
winds were caused by the passage km/h) and the fact that the plane (74,000 ha) burned, the single
of a dry cold front. Later studies of had been pulled off to fight fires in worst day for forest fires in New
weather records at the Philadelphia the Hammonton area, were more Jersey since record keeping began
Weather Bureau indicated the pres- in 1906. Damage to improved prop-

41
Table 1—Major fires in New Jersey on April 20, 1963.
Location Start time Acres burned
Division A—North Jersey
1. Lebanon Township, Hunterdon County 9:00 am 150
2. Warren Township, Somerset County 9:30 am 100
Division B—Central Jersey
1. Jackson Township, Ocean County 9:54 am 1,200
2. Berkeley Township, Ocean County 10:00 am 700
3. Jackson/Frenchhold Township, Monmouth & Ocean Counties 10:28 am 4,480
4. Brick Township, Ocean County 10:45 am 600
5. Old Bridge Township, Middlesex County 12:13 pm 275
6. Stafford Township, Ocean County 12:30 pm 190
7. Jackson Township, Ocean County 12:30 pm 14,000
8. Pemberton Township, Ocean County 12:30 pm 1,900
9. Pemberton, Woodland, Manchester, Lacey, Stafford & Barnegat
Townships, Ocean & Burlington Counties 12:45 pm 74,475
10. Jackson Township, Ocean County 1:08 pm 11,300
11. Marlboro/Old Bridge Townships, Middlesex County 2:15 pm 2,000
12. Howell Township, Monmouth County 2:38 pm 800
13. Evesham/Medford Townships, Burlington County 3:15 pm 575
Division C—South Jersey
1. Clayton Township, Gloucester County 9:00 am 1,900
2. Mullica Township, Atlantic County 9:20 am 11,500
3. Franklin Township, Gloucester County 9:45 am 600
4. Buena Township, Atlantic County 10:50 am 12,600
5. Monroe Township, Gloucester County 11 :00 am 2,700
6. Winslow Township, Camden County 11:15 am 2,215
7. Lindenwold/Gibbsboro Townships, Camden County 12:10 pm 260
8. Monroe Township, Gloucester County 12:30 pm 2,000
9. Alloway Township, Salem County 12:30 pm 1,000
10. Hamilton Township, Atlantic County 1:00 pm 4,160
11. Hamilton Township, Atlantic County 1:15 pm 15,000
12. Hamilton/Egg Harbor Townships, Atlantic County 1:20 pm 14,500
13. Egg Harbor Township, Atlantic County 4:20 pm 1,250

42
Twenty-eight percent of the entire forest acreage Prognosis for the
burned in the Northeastern States in 1963 Future
occurred in New Jersey. It’s now been 24 years since April
1963. What has happened in that
erty was estimated in the millions jumpover from the 13,000-acre span of time? The woods have
of dollars, but it would be months (5,000-ha) fire burning in Buena grown back in places. People have
before the damage was completely Township, Atlantic County, which built new homes where the previ-
assessed. Moreover, the worst fire consumed an additional 5,500 acres ous ones burned down, much as
disaster in the State’s history did (2,200) and threatened the town of people will return and build on a
not end on April 20. Mixpah before being brought under barrier island right after a hurri-
control. cane has leveled everything. In
When April 21 dawned, all of South addition to what was there original-
and Central Jersey was under a On Monday night, rain began to ly, there has been major develop-
thick layer of smoke. Firefighters fall. The worst was over. Only two ment in the Central and South
were tired, having worked through- new fires occurred on April 23. Jersey areas previously burned and
out the night, but most fires were in adjacent, equally hazardous
still burning out of control. The During the 3-day period, there were areas. Many residents have forgot-
problem was compounded by fires a total of 127 forest fires, 31 of ten about 1963 and those new to
continuing to break out. Twenty-six which reached major status. The the area may be unaware that such
new fires occurred on April 21, acreage burned was 190,300 acres a disaster ever occurred.
including two major fires in (77,010 ha). Nearly 4 percent of the
Gloucester County—one in Monroe entire land area of the State was What would happen if a similar fire
Township that began at 11:30 a.m. burned during the 3-day ordeal. occurred in the South and Central
and burned 500 acres (200 ha), and Twenty-eight percent of the entire Jersey area today? Just taking infla-
one in Milville Township that began forest acreage burned in the tion into account would increase
at 2:05 p.m. and burned 160 acres Northeastern States in 1963 the damage to improved property
(65 ha). occurred in New Jersey. It was sev- to $60 million. A new home that
eral months before all the damage sold for $12,000 to $15,000 in 1963
Fires continued to burn through- estimates were in. As the figures costs at least $85,000 today. In
out the second day. However, the came in a grim total emerged. addition, the $5,000 summer cot-
wind finally abated. Crews began to Damage estimates ranged from 1.5 tages of years ago have been
make headway; several fires were to 9.5 million dollars! A total of 404 replaced by year-round $100,000
contained or brought under con- structures had been damaged or estates. None of this takes into
trol. destroyed (table 2). Worst of all, account the increases in develop-
seven persons had been killed ment or population. It was estimat-
On Monday, Apri1 22, there were including a family in Jackson ed by a former section warden, now
22 new fires including a 400-acre Township, and the fireman previ- division firewarden, that if a fire
(160-ha) one in Franklin Township, ously mentioned. similar to the one that burned
Gloucester County, and a large 14,500 acres (5,900 ha) in
Table 2—Damage to improved property caused by fires in New Jersey on April 20, 1963.
186 Houses damaged or destroyed 2 Sawmills 3 Hunting club buildings

191 Outbuildings (sheds, barns,
garages, chicken coops) 1 Bar/restaurant 23 Vehicles
12 House trailers 1 Government office building 2 Blueberry fields
5 Camp buildings destroyed,
1 damaged 1 Laundromat 45 Acres of Cranberries
3 Churches 1 Gas station $70,000 Pulpwood value

43
Hamilton and Egg Harbor People have built new homes where the previous
Townships in 1963 and destroyed ones burned down, much as people will return
12 houses then broke out today, and build on a barrier island right after a
100 homes would be lost. If a simi-
lar multiplier is applied across the
hurricane has leveled everything.
board, the loss would approach
1,500 homes with a total estimated However, I think it can be said with • Highly hazardous wildland fuel,
value of over $112 million. some degree of certainty that if a and
similar disaster occurred today it • Numerous human ignition
It should be emphasized that esti- would be much worse, and damage sources.
mates are just that … estimates! It estimates would be considerably
is impossible to tell what would higher than in 1963. Weather is the third critical vari-
happen with any degree of accuracy able. Conditions need only be simi-
because there are so many variables The stage is set. Two of the three lar to those on April 20, 1963, for a
and so many things have changed. critical factors are already present: major wildland fire to occur. ■
Wildland firefighter at work.

44
HORIZONTAL VORTICES AND THE NEW
MINER FIRE*
Donald A. Haines
f you were not a member of a fire
I suppression crew, the afternoon of

Mother’s Day, May 9, 1976, was a
beautiful time to be in central
The smoke column split into two separate, slowly
revolving vortices, which periodically spilled over
the flanks, dropped to the ground, then reformed
Wisconsin. Skies were mostly clear
with the temperature in the high into a single column.
70’s, relative humidity near 20 per-
cent, and winds, light and vari-
able—just the kind of situation
that can lead to explosive wildland
fires in the jack pine country at
that time of year.
New Miner Fire

Fire towers reported smoke at
1415. At 1430, when the first forces
arrived at the New Miner Fire, they
found 2 acres (0.8 ha) of pine log-
ging slash already burning with
spot fires several hundred yards to
the northeast. A tractor-plow unit
was able to complete a circuit
around the head of the fire, but the
flames jumped the furrow almost
immediately.
Within a few minutes the fire Figure 1—The smoke column on the New Miner Fire after splitting into a horizontal vor-
entered a pine plantation and tex pair. The ambient wind is blowing toward a point to the left of the observer. Photo:
began to crown. The fire grew in Bill Peterson, Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources.
momentum as a light southwester- (4-km) drainage area and begin a into a single column. Horizontal
ly wind pushed it through dense new series of fires on the other vortex activity along the flanks
pine plantations and natural jack side. (fig. 3) threw so many firebrands
pine stands. Fire behavior became into unburned fuels that, in some
the major problem. The pine stands Other interesting behavioral fea- sectors, several lines were plowed
began to burn so intensely that tures quickly developed. As Bill parallel to and 200 feet (60 m) out
flames reached 300 feet (90 m); at Peterson of the Wisconsin Depart- from the (initial) main body before
one point, suppression forces were ment of Natural Resources put it, suppression forces contained the
concerned that spotting would “It appeared that the fire bucket lateral spread.
carry embers across a 2.5-mile was so full that flames began to
When this article was originally published, spill over the sides.” The smoke Cylinders of Fire
Donald Haines was the principal research column split into two separate, A tractor operator plowing along
meteorologist for the USDA Forest Service, slowly revolving vortices
North Central Forest Experimentation the flanks about 20 feet (6 m) from
Station, East Lansing, MI.
(fig. 1). Periodically these vortices the main body of the fire was
spilled over the flanks, dropped to trapped as flames from a horizontal
48(4) [Fall 1987]: 26–28. the ground (fig. 2), then reformed

45
vortex came over the top of his “It appeared that the fire bucket was so full that
unit. His planned escape route was flames began to spill over the sides.”
perpendicular to the flank of the
–Bill Peterson, Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
main body of the fire, but this
would have taken him into a region
of intense fire activity. He escaped,
but his tractor unit was destroyed.
Obviously this type of fire activity

threatened suppression forces.
What was happening? The horizon-
tal vortices that formed in this fire
were like slowly rolling cylinders of
fire and ash, akin to lazy tornadoes
lying on their sides. This type of
vortex is a common feature of flu-
ids. However, unlike vertical vor-
tices, such as tornadoes or most
fire whirls where the spin is rapid,
the angular velocity of this type is
usually quite low. These vortices,
which may spiral out to the sides
while moving downwind, are relat-
ed to other phenomena: the slow
Figure 2—The split smoke column with the counterrotating vortex on the left side of the
swirls of air in the atmosphere that picture “collapsing and spilling” over the flank of the fire. The ambient wind is blowing
cause long parallel lines of clouds toward a point to the left of the observer. Photo: Bill Peterson, Wisconsin Department of
called “cloud streets” as well as the Natural Resources.
helical motions in lakes that cause
the formation of parallel lines of
surface debris.
Wind Tunnel
Simulation
We carried out a series of experi-
ments, attempting to create hori-
zontal vortices in a wind tunnel by
first placing an electronically heat-
ed metal ribbon along the length of
the tunnel floor. The heated ribbon
simulated the flank of a wildland
fire. Smoke generated upstream of
the simulated fire flank made the
airflow visible.
As expected, buoyant forces caused

by the heated ribbon created an
upflow of air passing along and
above the ribbon. A vertical slit cut Figure 3—A vortex with a diameter of about 15 feet (4.6 m) on the flank of the fire.
into the wind tunnel’s side allowed Implied airflow is outlined by the curving arrows. Flames are moving out of the main
body of the fire at 30- to 50-degree angles and making “rolls” back into the fire. The
light into the tunnel. The light out- ambient wind is blowing from right to left in the photograph. Photo: Donald Krohn,
lined a thin cross-section of the Nekoosa Paper Inc., Port Edwards, WI.

46
A tractor operator plowing along the flanks about allow formation? What is the cause
20 feet from the main body of the fire was of vortex collapse? We have gener-
trapped as flames from a horizontal vortex came ated a somewhat similar vortex col-
lapse in a wind tunnel experiment
over the top of his unit. using upstream obstacles that pro-
duced a wake effect, but we don’t
know if this is the same cause and
effect relationship seen in nature.
Unlike vertical vortices,

such as tornadoes or
most fire whirls where
the spin is rapid, the
angular velocity of this
type is usually
quite low.
Have You Seen Them?

We would appreciate information
from firefighters telling of their
experiences with horizontal vor-
tices so that we can compare our
Figure 4—A laser-illuminated, thin cross-section of a vortex pair generated in a wind wind tunnel results to the wildland
tunnel over a heated, longitudinally embedded nichrome wire simulating a fire’s flank.
The photograph was taken with the camera positioned downstream at the tunnel exit
situation. Film, pictures, personal
directly on the axis of flow. anecdotes, and action evidence of
horizontal vortices will be grateful-
smoke-filled air flow showing that a the real thing. ly received and acknowledged. Field
pair of horizontal vortices had We still don’t understand several feedback is essential to our under-
formed, topping the smoke plume facts about these vortices. For standing of this process; and
(fig. 4). The wind tunnel vortices example, they form under relatively understanding the characteristics
are so similar to those seen in wild- low windspeeds; therefore, what are of these vortices is important in
land fires that we believe that the the upper limits of windspeed and fire behavior, in fire control, and in
laboratory simulation is close to turbulence intensity that will still

47
AN OVERVIEW OF THE 1987
WALLACE LAKE FIRE, MANITOBA*
Kelvin G. Hirsch
allace Lake is located in
W eastern Manitoba approxi-

mately 100 miles (160 km)
northeast of Winnipeg. The sur-
The fire produced one of the worst
wildland/urban interface incidents in
Manitoba’s history.
rounding area comprises mainly
mature jack pine and black spruce
stands and is a popular location for days. Total precipitation following Average wind speeds were in excess
summer cottage developments. snow-free cover was minimal. Four of 19 miles per hour (30 km/h) on
Spring fires in this area are not weather stations in the general area each of these days, with gusts up to
uncommon, but the 1987 Wallace reported an average of only 0.13 38 miles per hour (60 km/h) being
Lake Fire was one of the most dev- inches (3.4 mm) of rain. The com- reported. Minimum relative humid-
astating wildfires in modern times. bination of these factors con- ity ranged from the high teens to
tributed significantly to the low low thirties and maximum air tem-
It also has special significance for moisture content of the dead forest perature varied from 73 ºF (23 ºC)
two main reasons. First, it was the fuels and in part to the extreme fire to 90 ºF (32 ºC).
first campaign fire in Manitoba behavior that occurred during the
during which the Canadian Forest first half of May 1987. Valuable Asset
Fire Behavior Prediction (FBP) The FBP System was used to pre-
System (Lawson and others 1985) The majority of the area burned by dict potential fire behavior (e.g.,
was used operationally to forecast the Wallace Lake Fire was the spread rate and type of fire) and
probable fire behavior on a near result of three separate runs, which proved to be a valuable asset to the
real-time basis. Second, the fire took place on May 5, 8, and 12 overhead team assigned to the fire.
produced one of the worst wild- (fig. 1). The primary cause of these The fire spread projections were
land/urban interface incidents in major fire runs was the strong sur- sufficiently accurate and reliable to
the province’s history. face winds associated with the pas- be a major factor in determining
sage of three successive cold fronts. evacuation requirements. For
Dry Conditions
The Wallace Lake Fire started on
Tuesday, May 5, and by May 13
reached its final size of 51,520
acres (20,850 ha). The winter of
1986–87 was unusually warm and
much of the fire area experienced
below-normal precipitation.
Snowmelt occurred rather rapidly
in early April due to a strong and
persistent upper ridge pattern over
the area that produced record max-
imum temperatures on numerous

Kelvin Hirsch was a fire research officer
for the Canadian Forest Service, Manitoba
District Office, Winnipeg, Manitoba.

Figure 1—The Wallace Lake Fire during the initial stages (around 1500 CDT) of its
49(2) [Spring 1988]: 26–27. major run on May 8, 1987. Photo: Manitoba Natural Resources.

48
The Canadian Forest Fire Behavior Prediction System, first used on this fire,
proved to be a valuable asset to the overhead team.
Figure 2—Aftermath of the Wallace Lake Fire at the shoreline cottage subdivision on May 8, 1987 around 1800 CDT. Photo: Manitoba
Natural Resources.
example, on May 8 the fire jumped The extensive property losses at Reference
the established control line and Wallace Lake coupled with the Lawson, B.D.; Stocks, B.J.; Alexander, M.E.;
raced eastward towards the subdivi- $2.26 million fire suppression costs Van Wagner, C.E. 1985. A system for pre-
sion on the west shore of Wallace made the Wallace Lake Fire one of dicting fire behavior in Canadian forests.
In: Donoghue, L.R.; Martin, M.E., eds.
Lake at a rate of 2.4 miles per hour the most expensive wildfires to be Proceedings of the Eighth Conference on
(3.9 km/h). A lodge, campground, fought in Manitoba. This fire did, Fire and Forest Meteorology; 1985 April
and 54 of 69 cottages were either however, illustrate the value and 29–May 2; Detroit, MI. SAF Pub. 85–04.
Bethesda, MD: Society of American
damaged or destroyed by this fire usefulness of the FBP System on a Foresters: 6–16. ■
(fig. 2). However, no lives were lost, going fire and showed the potential
because of the precautions taken by consequences that many of the
the overhead team. other cottage subdivisions in this
general area could possibly face in
the future.

49
DOCUMENTING WILDFIRE
BEHAVIOR: THE 1988 BRERETON
LAKE FIRE, MANITOBA*
Kelvin G. Hirsch
he documented behavior of
T free-burning wildfires can be a

valuable source of information
for both fire researchers and opera-
Fire behavior information can be an effective
training tool for suppression staff since individuals
relate well to recent real-life experiences in which
tional staff. For example, in an
active fire situation, fire behavior they may have been involved.
observations provide a basis for
suppression personnel to take data presently used in the develop- vides a more detailed account of
action and advise personnel. Such ment of the Canadian Forest Fire the information needed (Alexander
information allows them to do the Behavior Prediction (FBP) System. and others 1984).
following: The FBP System database currently
consists of 245 experimental and Forward Rates of Spread. The posi-
• On a timely basis, inform and operational prescribed fires and 45 tion of the head fire at various
update district, regional, and documented wildfires (Lawson and times during a major run needs to
provincial staff of the fire’s status. others 1985). Presently, most of the be recorded. Observations can be
• Provide information that can be information regarding fire behavior made easily if landmarks such as
used to brief both the media and under extreme fire weather condi- roads, creeks, and hydro lines are
the public. Ensure the safety of tions is collected from wildfires used to plot the progression of the
firefighting personnel by direct- since it is difficult to arrange and fire on a topographic map, forest
ing them away from potentially conduct experimental fires success- inventory map, or recent aerial
dangerous situations. fully under such conditions. A photograph.
• Make immediate comparisons detailed example of a documented
between actual and predicted fire wildfire in the Northwest Terri- Position of the Flanks. Mapping or
behavior. tories is provided by Alexander and noting the positions of the fire’s
Lanoville (1987). flanks (along with that of the head
Also, future benefits can be gained fire) permits the length-to-length
from formally recording the influ- This article summarizes the infor- ratio of the fire to be calculated.
ences of weather, fuels, and topog- mation needed to document wild-
raphy on a fire’s behavior. That fire spread rates and illustrates that Other Fire Behavior Observations.
information can then be used as an this is not a complicated process Other observations not directly
effective training tool for suppres- but merely one that requires a few required to document the rate of
sion staff since individuals relate key observations. An example, spread but which can be useful in
well to recent real-life experiences taken from the information record- understanding other aspects of fire
in which they may have been ed by the suppression staff at the behavior are as follows:
involved. 1988 Brereton Lake Fire in south-
eastern Manitoba, has also been • Type of fire (surface fire, torch-
From a fire research perspective, included. ing, crown fire);
observations of extreme fire behav- • Firewhirl development, occur-
ior can supplement or verify the Information rence of spot fires, and associated
Requirements distances;
Kelvin Hirsch was a fire research officer A summary of the information • Flame lengths or flame heights;
for the Canadian Forest Service, Manitoba required to document accurately Smoke column characteristics
District Office, Winnipeg, Manitoba.
wildfire spread rates is given below. such as height of column or
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes The FBP System user guide pro- angle of tilt;
50(1) [Winter 1989]: 45–48.

50
It is worth noting that a photograph can be an tance of 0.9 miles (1.5 km) from
exceptionally useful tool in documenting many the point of ignition.
aspects of a fire’s behavior. • 1706 hours: The fire was on the
last ridge before the swamp, a
distance of 1.5 miles (2.4 km)
• Suppression effectiveness (for tion purposes, details on the topog- from the point of ignition.
example, hand-constructed fire raphy and fuel type mosaic in the • 1753 hours: The head fire
guards are challenged but water fire area can often be described crossed the north tracks near the
bombers are effective); after the fire has occurred. This subdivision, approximately 1.9
• Depth of burn; may consist of information from miles (3.1 km) from the point of
• Mop-up difficulty; and 1:50,000 NTS topographic maps, ignition.
• Postfire evidence such as narrow FBP System fuel type maps pre-
“streets” of unburned trees asso- pared from Landsat imagery, or for- In summary, the fire spread 1.9
ciated with horizontal roll vor- est inventory data. However, obser- miles (3.1 km) in 2 hours and 13
tices. vations of the fire’s behavior in the minutes (133 minutes) for a rate of
various fuel types and on different spread of 76.4 feet per minute (23.3
It is worth noting that a photo- topographic features should be m/min) or 0.88 miles per hour (1.4
graph can be an exceptionally use- noted. km/h).
ful tool in documenting many
aspects of a fire’s behavior. A photo- Brereton Lake Fire Position of the flanks:
graph is especially valuable if the Case Study • 1746 hours: The fire was spread-
time it was taken is also recorded. Observations of the fire behavior at ing at the back.
This may be done manually or a the 1988 Brereton Lake Fire were • 1806 hours: The west side of the
camera with a “dateback” attach- made by a number of Manitoba fire was crowning in black spruce
ment can be used. Natural Resources staff members and spreading rapidly.
Fire Weather Observations and Fire who were coordinating the fire • 1924 hours: A small spot fire was
Danger Indexes. The most signifi- suppression activities and posi- just east of Highway No. 307.
cant fire weather parameter to tioned primarily in helicopters.
measure during a major fire run is This information was recorded ver- Other fire behavior observations:
windspeed and direction. Hourly bally on tape and also onto the dis- • 1734 hours: The head fire was
observations of the wind, along trict radio logs. Given below is a too intense for crews to work in
with temperature and relative summary of the recorded fire front of the fire, so suppression
humidity, if possible, should be behavior at various times during efforts were restricted to the
made at a weather station near the the major run on May 1 (fig. 1) and flanks.
fire. However, if this is not possible, how it relates to the information • 1920 hours: The first cottage was
then estimate these parameters at required for documentation.* lost to the fire.
the fire site by using, for instance,
the Beaufort Scale to estimate Forward rates of spread: It was also noted that the fire was
windspeed. The information could • 1540 hours: The fire was detect- not continuously crowning; that is,
also be obtained from a nearby fire ed and reported to the Manitoba some torching was occurring but
weather station or Atmospheric Natural Resources office in spread was not sustained through
Environment Service (AES) station. Rennie. It was located just west the tree crowns. The fire spread
Inclusion of the daily fire weather of the south railway crossing on primarily on the jack pine ridges
observations that preceded the fire Highway No. 307 and was less and only occasionally burned
is important for calculating the val- than 0.25 acres (0.1 ha) in size. through the black spruce stands.
ues of the Canadian Forest Fire • 1550 hours: The fire crowned Also, some mop-up difficulty was
Weather Index (FWI) System and almost immediately and was experienced in areas with a south-
for possible future analysis. heading northward towards the ern exposure; however, this was not
Brereton Lake subdivision. the case on north-facing sites due
Topography and Fuel Type • 1634 hours: The head fire was to the presence of ground frost at
Characteristics. For documenta- estimated to be approximately or near the surface.
* Time is central daylight time. halfway to Brereton Lake, a dis-

51
By the evening of May 1, crews The most significant fire weather parameter to
were able to secure a fireline com- measure during a major fire run is windspeed
pletely around the fire using both and direction.
natural fuelbreaks and constructed
fireguards. A major suppression
effort on May 2, which included the
use of three CL–215 water
bombers, prevented any further
flare-ups from occurring and effec-
tively brought the fire under con-
trol.
Fire weather observations and fire

danger indexes:
Fire weather information was not
available from the Manitoba
Natural Resources office at Rennie,
but a number of other sources were
used to establish the conditions
that existed before (table 1) and
during the fire run on May 1. This
included the 1300-hour observa-
tions from the fire weather stations
at West Hawk Lake and Nutimik
Lake; the hourly readings on May 1
from the AES stations at Kenora,
Winnipeg, and Sprague, Manitoba;
and estimates of the conditions by
the suppression staff at the fire. At
1700 hours, during the May 1 fire
run, the fire weather and fire dan-
ger condition observations provided
in table 2 were made by fire sup-
pression personnel and substantiat-
ed with data from the AES weather
stations.
Topography and fuel type

characteristics:
The fire area is situated at an eleva-
tion of 1,082 feet (330 m) above
Figure 1—Fire Behavior Prediction System fuel type and fire progress map for the
mean sea level. The terrain is gen- Brereton Lake Fire, May 1, 1988.
tly undulating and had a minimal
effect on the fire’s behavior. information for the area within the Observations by
perimeter of the fire has been Suppression
The fuel types in this area were pri- broadly categorized according to Personnel
marily mature jack pine (FBP the FBP System fuel type classifica-
System Fuel Type C–3) with some During wildfires, suppression per-
tion. A map depicting these fuel
small stands of boreal spruce (C–2) sonnel are often in the best posi-
types is shown in figure 1.
and trembling aspen prior to leaf tion to make fire behavior observa-
flush (D–1). The forest inventory tions. This was true at the Brereton

52
For documentation such as use at postfire boards of
Alexander, M.E.; Lawson, B.D.; Stocks, B.J.;
purposes, details on the review and verification of the FBP Van Wagner, C.E. 1984. User guide to the
System relationships. Operational Canadian Forest Fire Behavior Prediction
topography and fuel staff should be encouraged to make System: Rate of spread relationships.
type mosaic in the fire similar observations in the future. Interim edition. Environment Canada,
Canadian Forest Service Fire Danger
area can often be Group.
described after the fire Reference Lawson, B.D.; Stocks, B.J.; Alexander, M.E.;
Alexander, M.E.; Lanoville, R.A. 1987. Van Wagner, C.E. 1985. A system for pre-
has occurred. Wildfires as a source of fire behavior dicting fire behavior in Canadian forests.
data: A case study from Northwest In: Donoghue, L.R.; Martin, M.E., eds.
Territories, Canada. In: Proceedings of Proceedings of the Eighth Conference on
Lake Fire. The efforts of the sup- Fire and Forest Meteorology; 1985 April
the Ninth Conference on Fire and Forest
pression staff resulted in the collec- Meteorology; 1987 April 21–24; San 29–May 2; Detroit, MI. SAF Pub. 85–04.
tion of useful data. Information of Diego, CA. Postprint volume. Boston, Bethesda, MD: Society of American
MA: American Meteorological Society: Foresters: 6–16. ■
this type serves many purposes
86–93.
Table 1—Fire weather and fire danger conditions that preceded the occurrence of the 1988 Brereton Lake Fire.
1300-hr weather observations a
Relative
Temperature humidity Wind Rain FWI System components b
Date ºF ºC (%) mph km/h in mm FFMC DMC DC ISI BUI FWI
04/21 36 2.0 73 7.8 12.5 0 0 83 30 236 3.1 46 9
04/22 38 3.5 72 0.9 1.5 0 0 83 31 238 1.7 46 5
04/23 43 6.0 49 4.3 7.0 0 0 84 31 240 2.7 47 8
04/24 49 9.5 47 7.8 12.5 0 0 86 33 243 4.3 49 12
04/25 38 3.5 86 8.1 13.0 0.19 4.7 44 22 235 0.1 35 0
04/26 42 5.5 45 5.6 9.0 0.01 0.1 65 23 237 0.8 36 1
04/27 50 10.0 33 9.0 14.5 0 0 81 24 239 2.5 39 6
04/28 64 18.0 19 10.3 16.5 0 0 91 28 244 11.3 44 23
04/29 72 22.0 18 7.8 12.5 0 0 94 33 249 13.6 49 27
04/30 72 22.0 32 9.9 16.0 0 0 93 36 254 14.4 54 30
05/01 73 22.5 40 17.1 27.5 0 0 91 40 260 20.9 58 39
a. Observations from the West Hawk Lake (1,085 feet [331 m] above m.s.l.) and Nutimik Lake (991 feet [302 m] above m.s.l.) fire weather
stations were averaged to obtain the values for the Brereton Lake area. These stations are operated by Manitoba Natural Resources and
located approximately 19 miles (30 km) southeast and north of the fire area, respectively.
b. FFMC = Fire Fuel Moisture Code; DMC = Duff Moisture Code; DC = Drought Code; ISI = Initial Spread Index; BUI = Buildup Index;
and FWI = Fire Weather Index. FWI System calculations began on April 21 with the following moisture code starting values: FFMC = 85;
DMC = 30; and DC = 235.
Table 2—Fire weather and fire danger conditions during a major fire run on the Brereton Lake Fire, May 1, 1988.
1700-hour fire weather observations: a Adjusted FWI System values:
Temperature………………………. 79 ºF (26.0 ºC) Fire Fuel Moisture Code………….. 91
Relative humidity…………………. 21% Initial Spread Index……………….. 22.4
Wind………………………………. SSE 19 mph (30 km/h) Fire Weather Index………………... 42
Days since rain b………………….. 6
a. Estimates were made by fire suppression personnel and substantiated with data from the AES weather stations at Kenora, 47 miles (75
km) east, 1,348 feet (411 m) above m.s.l.; Winnipeg, 75 miles (120 km) west, 784 feet (239 m) above m.s.l.; and Sprague, 56 miles (90
km) south, 1,079 feet (329 m) above m.s.l.
b. Greater than 0.02 inches (0.6 mm).

53
HORIZONTAL ROLL VORTICES IN COMPLEX
TERRAIN*
Donald A. Haines and L. Jack Lyon
bservations of horizontal roll
O vortices (HRVs) are well docu-

mented for intense wildland
fires occurring on flat terrain
Horizontal roll vortices sometimes collapse
outside of the fireline, dropping firebrands on
suppression crews working the flanks of a fire.
(Haines 1984; Haines and Smith
1987). However, there have been no
reported observations of HRVs cause increased turbulence, which,
associated with complex terrain. in turn, causes HRVs to break up.
Haines and Hutchinson (1988) sug- We found that fires with HRVs were
gested that the additional atmos- among the most intense ever
pheric turbulence caused by rough encountered by firefighters.
terrain might dominate the balance
of fluid forces necessary for HRVs Horizontal vortices are common
and quickly destroy formations. features of fluids, including the
However, we conclude that HRVs atmosphere. However, unlike verti-
cal vortices, such as tornadoes or Figure 1—Terrain and progress of the
did form during an intense Mon- Hellgate Fire on the late afternoon of July
tana wildland fire on a mountain most fire whirls that spin rapidly, 15. The arrows on the right indicate the
face that was observed by the jun- the angular velocity of a horizontal direction of the main fire spread along a
ior author. This article describes vortex is quite low. HRVs that form north–south front (A–A’). The fire had
in fires develop vertically but bend reached the ridge line (B–A) above the
the phenomenon. Hellgate north face. Spot fires (S1 and S2)
over easily in light to moderate then began a simultaneous run to the
What Are HRVs? winds. They typically form as coun- ridge, their smoke columns forming hori-
terrotational pairs at or near the zontal roll vortices.
HRVs are bent over, very slowly head of a fire and look like slowly
rotating fire whirls that typically m) flame lengths along with
rolling cylinders of smoke, flame, crowning and spotting. An 8-mile-
form as pairs. HRVs sometimes col- and ash, akin to lazy tornadoes
lapse outside of the fireline, drop- per-hour (13-km/h) southwest wind
lying on their sides (Haines and aided fire spread from the ignition
ping firebrands on suppression Hutchinson 1988). Fire-generated
crews (Haines and Hutchinson point in a valley bottom, up a
HRVs, which may spiral out to the canyon face with a 50-percent
1988). They are, therefore, a threat sides while moving downwind, are
to personnel working the flanks, slope. A temperature of 98 ºF (37
related to other fluid phenomena: ºC) and a relative humidity of 12
especially near the head of the fire. the slow swirls of air in the atmos- percent resulted in rapid fire spread
phere that cause long parallel lines in cured grass. Fuels in the ignition
HRVs form most often during of clouds called “cloud streets” as
extreme burning conditions with area were classed as Fuel Model 1
well as the helical motions in lakes in the Fire Behavior System
unstable air and light winds. that cause the formation of parallel
Higher windspeeds and crossflows (Anderson 1982).
lines of surface debris.
When this article was originally published, The fire was not controlled until
Donald Haines was a research meteorolo- The Hellgate Fire July 18 after 1,568 acres (635 ha) of
gist for the USDA Forest Service, North
Central Forest Experimentation Station, The Hellgate Fire began near forest land had burned. More than
East Lansing, MI; and Jack Lyon was a Missoula, MT, during late afternoon 900 firefighters were involved, as
supervisory research wildlife biologist for on July 12, 1985. When a suppres- well as 23 ground tankers, 8 doz-
the USDA Forest Service, Intermountain
Research Station, Forestry Sciences
sion crew arrived on the scene 17 ers, 4 rotary-wing aircraft, and 2
Laboratory, Missoula, MT. minutes after ignition, the fire had fixed-wing air tankers. In total, the
already increased to 5 acres (2 ha). strong containment effort indicates
51(2) [Spring 1990]: 15–17. Fire behavior included 10-foot (3- the intensity of this fire.

54
Horizontal roll vortices form most often during Implications
extreme burning conditions with unstable air Because of the complex airflow and
and light winds over flat topography. resulting turbulence, HRVs do not
form as easily in rough terrain as
This fire activity took place about they do over flat land. However, the
midslope on a steep hillside with a behavior exhibited by the Hellgate
vertical rise of 2,600 feet (790 m) Fire shows that these fluid struc-
from the canyon floor to the ridge. tures can form in complex topogra-
The two columns, each about 300 phy. In a typical situation, a single
feet (90 m) in diameter, began to smoke column separates into two
slowly rotate (fig. 2). Banding and columnar vortices. In the Hellgate
rotation of smoke showed that air- Fire, HRV formation was aided by
flow in the left column (fig. 2, L) two well-defined spot fires that pro-
turned clockwise, while airflow in duced two columns. The final
the right column (fig. 2, R) rotated results are the same in either situa-
counterclockwise (fig. 3). Flames tion.
were also an integral part of the
columns, although they are not References
apparent in fig. 3. Anderson, H.E. 1982. Aids to determining
fuel models for estimating fire behavior.
Gen. Tech. Rep. INT–122. Ogden, UT:
The space between the two smoke USDA Forest Service, Intermountain
columns was relatively smoke free. Forest and Range Experiment Station.
Figure 2—Suggested airflow into and This suggests that the major source Haines, D.A. 1987. Horizontal vortices and
around the columns on the Hellgate north the New Miner Fire. Fire Management
of oxygen to sustain these fire Notes. 48(4): 26–28.
face. Airflow in the left column (S1)
turned clockwise, while airflow in the columns descended from above Haines, D.A.; Hutchinson, J. 1988. Vortices
right column (S2) rotated counterclock- into the open area (300 feet [90 m] in wildland fire. [A 14-minute videotape.]
wise. Oxygen descended from above into St. Paul, MN: USDA Forest Service, North
wide) between them and spread Central Forest Experiment Station.
the open area between the columns and
spread left and right to feed the columns. both left and right near the surface Haines, D.A.; Smith, M.C. 1987. Three types
to feed the two columns (fig. 2). of horizontal vortices observed in wild-
land mass and crown fires. Journal of
The fire continued this behavior Climate and Applied Meteorology. 26(12):
Description of HRV until the two columns reached the 1624–1637. ■
Activity ridge. At that point, erratic fire
behavior dominated and the two
HRVs formed during late afternoon
columns stopped rotating.
on July 15. Observations were made
from a distance of 3 miles (5 km)
looking south–southeast. The fire
had spread horizontally along a
canyon wall (fig. 1, A–A’) and had
reached the ridge line (fig. 1, B–A).
A firebrand from the ridge caused a
spot fire in unburned timber to the
east of the main fire (fig. 1, S1).
The area of this spot fire increased
rapidly, causing downhill airflow
from the ridge. This activity appar-
ently caused a second spot fire (fig.
1, S2). The two spot fire areas both
crowned in Douglas-fir and lodge-
pole pine, and then began a simul-
taneous run up the Hellgate north Figure 3—The two smoke columns on the Hellgate north face, showing counterrotation-
face to the main ridge (fig. 1, B–A). al banding as well as the clear area between the columns..

55
FIRE BEHAVIOR IN HIGH-ELEVATION [logo: Forest
Service and CDF
TIMBER* (take from FMN

56(3), p. 17)]
Mark Beighley and Jim Bishop
he Fayette Fire was started by
T lightning on August 21, 1988,

near Fayette Lake, on the
Pinedale Ranger District of the
It became evident early in the incident standard
fire prediction methods were not applicable to the
kind of fire behavior we were experiencing on the
Bridger–Teton National Forest. On
August 24, a major fire run over- Fayette Fire.
took Spike Camp 2. Government
and personal gear was lost, but no
personal injuries were reported.
The fire was controlled on
September 14 at a final size of
38,507 acres (15,500 ha).
Unruly Fire Behavior

It became evident early in the inci-
dent that standard fire prediction
methods, based on the procedures
taught us at the Fire Behavior
Analyst course (S–590) at NARTC
(National Advanced Resource
Technology Center, Marana, AZ),
were not applicable to the kind of
fire behavior we were experiencing
on the Fayette Fire. The fire did
not spread continuously in surface
fuelbeds. Torching, crowning, and
spotting were common. In fact
they were not just incidental, they
were absolutely essential to the
movement of the fire. Adjusting
the fire model outputs by the use Office for the firm of Beighley, Bishop, and Berkovitz.
of recommended correction factors mental factors, with quantum steps important factors such as humidity
also provided unsatisfactory up or down in spread rate and and wind.
results. Fire spread rates and intensity from small changes of
intensities were extremely sensitive relative humidity or wind. Matching fire behavior “activity
to small variations in fire environ- levels” with fire history data
When this article was originally published, We began to look carefully at the allowed us to make serviceable
Mark Beighley was a fire management fire behavior, noting details of how spread rate predictions. When
officer for the USDA Forest Service, the fire spread and monitoring the weather predictions held true, our
Deschutes National Forest, Bend Ranger forecasts of fire intensity, forward
District, Bend, OR; and Jim Bishop was a
fire environment. Initially an
State forest ranger, California Department attempt was made to measure spread rates, and fire perimeter
of Forestry and Fire Protection, Butte spread rates that would allow us to increase proved reasonably accu-
Ranger Unit, Oroville, CA. calibrate fire behavior model out- rate. The fire behavior information
puts. Eventually we classified and developed was incorporated into
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes correlated the fire behavior with the tactical decision making
51(2) [Spring 1990]: 23–28.

56
Torching, crowning, and spotting were not just varied greatly from nearly closed
incidental, they were absolutely essential to the canopies to scattered stringers of
movement of the fire. timber on mostly rocky sites.
Ground fuels consisted of a light to
moderate dead-and-down compo-
process and interpreted in the The fire burned mostly within the
nent of windfallen tree boles with
Incident Action Plan for fireline Bridger Wilderness on the south-
many decomposed logs. A large
overhead and firefighters, allowing west flank of the Wind River
portion of the understory area was
them to anticipate large increases Mountains in Wyoming. Elevations
carpeted with grouse whortleberry,
in fire intensity. on the fire ranged from 8,000 to
a 4- to 8-inch (10- to 20-cm) high
over 10,000 feet (2,400–3,000 m).
herbaceous plant, portions of which
Most of our information relates to
were dead. Duff and litter were
elevations between 9,000 and
deep in rocky areas where fallen
10,000 feet (2,700–3,000 m), the
needles concentrated in crevices,
zones of the fire that remained
and shallow, less than one-quarter
most active during our tenure from
inch (0.6 cm), on flatter, less bro-
August 24 through September 16,
ken terrain. The surface fuel com-
1988.
plex tended to be discontinuous
over most of the area.
Description of the Fire
Environment The terrain varied from well-
The environment in which the defined drainages with a 60-percent
Fayette Fire took place provided a slope on the lower elevations (8,000
combination of variables that to 9,500 feet [2,400–2,900 m]) to
resulted in a broad range of fire flatter but more broken terrain,
behavior extremes, from total inac- dotted with small pothole lakes at
tivity to conflagration. higher elevations (9,500 to 10,500
feet [2,400–3,200 m]).
The fuels were predominantly
mature to overmature lodgepole A wide variety of weather condi-
pine and subalpine fir stands with a tions were experienced.
Ignition of tree crowns would occur within
minutes of the initiating spot fire. high standing dead component.
The density of the timber stands
Typical fuelbed of discontinuous ground

fuels and lots of jackstrawed timber,
The Continental Divide became the final fireline stopping the Fayette Fire. Horseshoe
viewed from the air.
Lake is in the foreground.

57
Temperatures approaching 80 °F The environment in which the Fayette Fire took
(27 ºC) and relative humidities in place provided a combination of variables resulting
the 10- to 12-percent range in a broad range of fire behavior extremes, from
occurred on several days, with
winds up to 30 miles per hour (48
total inactivity to conflagration.
km/h). During the period from
September 10 to 12, measurable to burn more intensely in heavy surface fuels at this point is limited
precipitation fell, with high tem- dead fuels, and it spreads into adja- to areas immediately adjacent to
peratures in the 30’s (–1 to 4 °C) cent lighter fuels including dead, flaming, larger dead fuels.
and minimum relative humidities attached branches of trees; low-
in the 50’s and 60’s (10 to 20 °C). growing live evergreens such as Eventually heat builds up under a
Several cold fronts passed through juniper and lower portions of sub- tree canopy, fire climbs the ladder
the fire area, and on one occasion alpine fir; and smaller dead-and- fuels (which are abundant), and the
strong east winds up to 40 miles down material. Any spread into fine tree or compact cluster of trees
per hour (64 km/h) developed
unexpectedly.
Fire Behavior
Observations
Fire behavior in the previously
described fuelbed was observed at
close range on several occasions,
for periods totaling approximately
30 to 40 hours. In addition to visu-
al observation, measurements were
made of spread rates, spotting dis-
tances, and time required for an
initiating spot fire to generate
enough heat to ignite tree crowns
and start new spot fires. Simul-
taneously, observations were made
of relative humidity, temperature,
View of the Fayette Fire from the Pinedale, WY, perspective on August 25, 1988.
wind, and slope. The following
description of fire behavior begins
with conditions at the low end of
the scale of fire activity and pro-
gresses to more severe conditions
and higher levels of activity.
Low-Level Activity. The daily cycle

of fire activity begins with a previ-
ous day’s holdover fire that is burn-
ing in heavy, dead-and-down fuels.
No spread is sustained overnight in
the fine surface fuels, and even
smoldering in the duff is minimal,
much of it having gone out during
the night when it reached thinner
areas. As the day progresses and
increasing temperatures and
decreasing relative humidity lower
fine fuel moisture, the fire begins Heavy down logs loaded drainage bottoms. These drainages formed wicks which propa-
gated loaded fire spread.

58
Ground fire spread alone became such an insignif- the new fire goes out quickly.
icant component that the use of the standard fire The spot fires positioned under aer-
behavior spread model was abandoned. ial fuels begin to increase in inten-
sity until the ladder fuels are ignit-
ed. Common ladder fuels are a low
torches out. This kind of sporadic generally go out. Occasionally a bushy juniper that grows under the
torching commonly begins by mid- small “run” takes place in the lodgepole pine, the lower foliage of
morning, earlier on drier days and whortleberry but it requires a little subalpine fir, and dead branches
later on more humid days. wind and slope to keep it going. attached to the lower portions of
One such run measured 9 chains trees. The time for a spot fire to
When the radiant heat from the (594 feet [181 m]) per hour (of build sufficient intensity to torch
torching trees is available to boost slope 15 percent, midflame wind of out new crowns varies widely and
the fire, it spreads in the fine sur- 3 miles per hour [5 km/h], and a depends a lot on the details of how
face fuels. As the surface fire relative humidity of 17 percent). the fuels receiving the firebrand are
spreads away and the radiant heat Often the flanks of such runs go out positioned relative to the ladder
diminishes, the fine surface fuels and only the head keeps burning. fuels. However, the time to crown
torching is frequently an interval of
Torching tree crowns toss out fire- 20 to 90 minutes.
brands to distances in the 100- to
200-foot (30- to 60-m) range. The We have termed the activity
more potent firebrands are com- described above as “low-level.” The
monly branch tips approximately torching is sporadic and isolated.
one-quarter inch (0.6 cm) in diam- No fire is sustained in surface fuels
eter and fir cones. Firebrands or crowns. Occasionally, where
shower an area downwind, but only continuous fuels are positioned
a small fraction ignite new fires. upslope or downwind of torching
Nearly all the active spot fires are crowns, sluggish crown fire will
in dead material in all stages of move a short distance in the trees.
decay, from sound to decomposed The crowning overall would be
wood. Firebrands landing in sparse classified as “passive.” Perimeter
grass, grouse whortleberry, or advance in areas of continuing
sparse needle litter usually do not activity rarely exceeds 0.3 mile (0.5
light the material but if they do, km) during a burn period.
Typical spot fire scenario. Spotting, up to

1 1/2 miles (2.4 ha) ahead of the front, was
common.
Typical ember landing in grouse whortle-

berry to start spot fires ahead of the main
front. Spot fire beginning to spread into surrounding fuel.

59
Moderate-Level Activity. At a level Fire spread predictions were made using a combi-
we have termed “moderate,” the nation of maximum spotting distances and the
torching of crowns in isolated trees probability that a certain level of fire activity would
or small groups of trees is already
occurring.
occur for that day.
A key process in raising the overall up to an acre or two (0.4 or 0.8 ha) Spotting activity continues, of
level of activity is the maintenance in size before it dies away. The course, and reaches out to approxi-
of fire spread in the surface fuels. activity dies out when surface fuel mately one-quarter mile (0.4 km).
Even in the more severe condi- discontinuity prohibits the contin-
tions, spread in fine surface fuels is ued involvement of new trees in At the upper end of moderate-level
minimal and limited until it is torching. The crowning at this activity, crown fire runs are sus-
aided by the radiant heat provided point is still essentially passive and tained that usually end when they
by torching trees or flaming, heavy, dependent upon spread in the sur- reach the top of the slope. During
dead fuels. Fire in the surface fuels face fuels. This is in contrast to these runs, the fire spread in sur-
then spreads until it reaches new that which occurs in low-level face fuels, driven by radiant heat
trees. Some time is required for the activity, which depends more on
new trees to torch out. However, the preheating of canopies over
more-or-less continuous crown fire individual spot fires and is not
activity can involve patches of trees dependent on surface fire spread.
Dead logs under ladder fuel complex.

Fire behavior analyst takes spread rate measurements and observations on an initiating Ignition under low relative humidity con-
spot fire. ditions caused instant torching of crowns.
Predicting Fire Behavior—The Skillful Art of

Combining the Past With the Present To Determine
the Future
The Fayette Fire demanded something extra from fire behavior analyst—on-the-line fire prediction improvi-
sation. Spotting was not just incidental to the fire, it was an essential element to fire spread. What was the
environment like where this fire burned?—overmature lodgepole pine and subalpine fir where at some points
canopies were nearly closed and at others stringers of timber trailed through rocky sites, terrain ranging
from well-defined drainages to flatter broken terrain, and a wide variety of weather conditions. Combining
maximum spot fire distances with the probable level of fire activity for the day (determined largely by relative
humidity and wind) finally proved the successful method of predicting fire spread.

60
from burning crowns, keeps pace mately 15 miles per hour (24 fuel component. Spread rates using
with the crown fire. Short-range km/h), some independent crowning Northern Forest Fire Laboratory
spotting, within a zone extending takes place. Crown fire moves out Fuel Model No. 10 were well within
approximately 15 feet (5 m) ahead ahead of the surface fire, at least the range of acceptance for such
of the flame front in surface fuels, for awhile. Without higher winds, fire spread. But, overall, ground
aids surface spread. There is an the independent crown runs are fire spread alone became such an
essential, mutually reinforcing usually narrow and not sustained. insignificant component in predict-
interaction between the radiant ing overall perimeter movement
heat from crowns impinging on Long-range spotting reaches out to and fire intensity that the use of
surface fuels and the heating of three-quarters of a mile (1.2 km), the standard fire behavior spread
new crowns by the spreading sur- perhaps more in extreme cases. model was abandoned. The spot fire
face fire. The entire fuel complex is The long-range spots build rapidly program in the BEHAVE System
aflame, including surface fuel enough to initiate new major was very useful in predicting maxi-
already blackened by passage of the crown runs. The fire moves across mum spot fire distances. Fire
surface flaming front, ground to ridges and basins, with an advance spread predictions were made
crowns. This is classified as an of 3 miles (5 km) in a burning peri- using a combination of maximum
“active” crown fire. One such run od being typical. spotting distances and the proba-
on slightly sloping terrain with 8- bility that a certain level of fire
to 12-mile-per-hour (13- to 19- Summary. In summary, the salient activity would occur for that day.
km/h) winds moved at 100 chains features of each activity level are
(6,600 feet [2,012 m]) per hour. described as follows: The level of activity and consequent
spread rate were closely correlated
Spotting reaches out to one-half • Low—Overall spread is main- to two primary factors, relative
mile (0.8 km). New long-range tained by torching and spotting. humidity and wind. To oversimplify
spots do not usually spawn new Surface fire spread does not aid a little, the humidity basically
crown runs of significant propor- crowning. determined the level of activity
tions. They commonly trigger • Moderate—Spread is sustained achieved by the fire, and the wind
torching and crown fire over small by surface fire, active crowning dictated the spread produced by
areas. Fire spread during the burn takes place, but independent that activity. Without low humidi-
period typically amounts to three- crowning is rare and long-range ties to accelerate the torching
quarters of a mile (1.2 km). spotting does not give rise to new process, the fire was confined to
major runs. limited spread in the surface fuels,
High-Level Activity. On days of • High—Active crowning is com- with modest spotting. On several
“high-level” activity, active crown mon, and independent crowning occasions, high winds, 30 to 40
fire is usually occurring by early becomes important. Long-range miles per hour (48–64 km/h), failed
afternoon. Low humidities make spotting can initiate new major to produce significant fire spread in
sustained spread in fine surface crown runs. the presence of humidities over 20
fuels prevalent. Without the low percent. The wind’s major contri-
humidities and attendant, continu- Prediction Procedures bution was twofold:
ously advancing surface fire, con- It is obvious that the mechanism of
tinuous crowning cannot be main- spread on this fire violated most of • Provides the horizontal trajectory
tained. the basic assumptions on which component necessary to trans-
Major runs often develop in zones the fire spread model is built (that port firebrands well ahead of the
“seeded” with spot fires by previous is, no crowning, spotting, or fire crown fire.
days’ activity. Significant areas whirls; uniform, continuous • When the relative humidity con-
(tens or hundreds of acres) become fuelbed; and source of ignition no ditions supported active crown-
involved in active crown fire within longer influencing fire). Occasion- ing, provides the horizontal
a few tens of minutes, and major ally fire spread was limited to sur- thrust necessary to convert an
runs take off, driven by wind or face fuels, specifically in the grouse active crown fire into an inde-
slope. When winds reach approxi- whortleberry and dead-and-down pendent crown fire.

61
The basic activity level was deter- tion, continue with analysis of what report should address the general
mined by the combinations of is seen, and apply what is learned. nature of the fire behavior, verifica-
humidity and wind that are sum- tion, measurements, the adequacy
marized in the matrix illustrated in Clearinghouse for Fire Behavior of the prediction system, and any
table 1. Topography and fuel conti- Analysis. We encourage comment techniques developed to improve
nuity in the active fire areas were and input that relates to the infor- prediction capability. Perhaps a
considered and used to modify our mation in this report. Further- central repository and clearing-
initial judgments, up or down. more, we would like to see the fire house could be created to make
behavior analysis of a given inci- available or distribute the informa-
Not Exactly by the dent routinely summarized and tion. ■
Book shared with other analysts. The
The fire prediction approach out-
lined above, though not refined, Table 1—Fire activity level matrix.
was workable in a situation that
Wind speed
defied the conventional approach. (miles per hour)
We were able to provide useful Relative humidity
guidance to the planners and to the (percent) 0–5 5–10 10–15 15–25 25+
firefighting crews. 10–13 M–H H H H H
Some Useful Advice—Observe, 14–16 M M M–H H H

Analyze, and Apply. We hope that 17–19 L L–M M M M–H
some of what we have reported is
useful to others dealing with fires 20–25 L L L–M L–M M
that have similarities to the Fayette 25–30 L L L L L–M
Fire. At the least, we encourage the
general approach we took on this 30+ L L L L L
fire. Begin with careful observa- Note: L = low-level activity, M = moderate-level activity, and H = high-level activity.

62
THE HAINES INDEX AND IDAHO
WILDFIRE GROWTH*
Paul Werth and Richard Ochoa
he growth of wildfires is related
T to three broad factors: fuel type,

topography, and weather. The
National Fire Danger Rating
The Haines Index is the first attempt to construct
a formal fire-weather index based upon features
of the lower atmosphere. Does it work?
System and the Fire Behavior
Prediction System combine these
factors to predict the probability
and severity of wildland fires.
However, these systems have mixed
results in predicting extreme fire
behavior conditions characterized
by intense crowning and spotting.
Extreme fire behavior is rare, but
when it occurs, fires burn with
intense heat and spread rapidly,
endangering life and property.
An atmospheric index, the Lower

Atmospheric Severity Index (LASI)
developed in 1988 by Donald
Haines, a research meteorologist
with the USDA Forest Service,
addresses the problem of how Figure 1—Map of the United Stales divided into three regional elevations (Haines 1988).
weather promotes extreme fire
behavior conditions. This index Haines Index— loons that measure atmospheric
uses the environmental lapse rate Background temperature, relative humidity,
(temperature difference) within a Information pressure, and wind.) The 0000
layer of air coupled with its mois- Greenwich Mean Time/1800 moun-
Research conducted earlier on fires
ture content to determine a LASI tain daylight time (MDT) tempera-
in the Eastern United States had
number. ture and dewpoint profile for the
identified unstable air and low
evenings on which the fires were
moisture as major contributors to
This paper compares the values of reported were constructed for one
fire severity. Haines contacted wild-
LASI or the Haines Index, as we will of three layers between 950 and
land fire management units
call it, with what occurred on recent 500 millibars (approximately 2,000
throughout the country requesting
large Idaho fires in an attempt to and 18,000 feet [600–5,500 m]
information on their worst fire sit-
determine its predictive capabilities above mean sea level [msl]),
uations over a 20-year period.
with regard to large fire growth. depending upon the elevation of
Information was received from 30
the fire. Due to large differences in
When this article was originally published, States regarding 29 major fires in
Paul Werth and Richard Ochoa were fire elevation across the United States,
the West and 45 fires in the East.
weather meteorologists for the National three combinations of atmospheric
Data from one to three radiosonde
Weather Service, Boise, ID. layers were used to construct the
stations closest to each fire were
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes LASI.
51(4) [Fall 1990]: 9–13. A related article, “Evaluation of examined to determine air-mass
Idaho Wild-Fire Growth Using the Haines Index and
lapse rates and moisture values
Water Vapor Imagery,” appeared in the proceedings of Figure 1 shows a map of the United
the Fifth Conference of Mountain Meteorology; 1990 over the fires. (Radiosonde weather
June 25–29; Boulder, CO, Boston, MA: American States divided into three regional
Meteorological Society: 187–193. stations launch instrumented bal-

63
elevations. Much of the Eastern Extreme fire behavior was exhibited when the
United States, excluding the Haines Index was 5 or 6, but when the index low-
Appalachian Mountains, uses a low-
ered to 4 or less, fire activity significantly
elevation index computed from
950–850 millibar data (approxi- diminished.
mately 2,000 and 5,000 feet
[600–1,500 m] msl). A mid-eleva- Table 1—Stability and moisture limits in the low-, mid-, and high-eleva-
tion index was developed for the tion Haines indexes.
Great Plains and the Appalachian Elevation Stability term Moisture term
Mountains using 850–700 millibar
data (approximately 5,000 and Low 950–850 mb °T 850 mb °T – dewpoint
10,000 feet [1,500–3,000 m] msl). A A = 1 when 3 °C or less B = 1 when 5 °C or less
high-elevation index is used for the
A = 2 when 4–7 °C B = 2 when 6–9 °C
mountainous Western United
States using 700–500 millibar data A = 3 when 8 °C or more B = 3 when 10 °C or more
(approximately 10,000 and 18,000 Mid 850–700 mb °T 850 mb °T – dewpoint
ft [3,000–5,500 m] msl). A = 1 when 5 °C or less B = 1 when 5 °C or less
A = 2 when 6–10 °C B = 2 when 6–12 °C
Comparing large fires and nearby
upper air data, Haines developed A = 3 when 11 °C or more B = 3 when 13 °C or more
his Lower Atmospheric Severity High 700–500 mb °T 700 mb °T – dewpoint
Index, which indicates the potential A = 1 when 17 °C or less B = 1 when 14 °C or less
for large fire growth. Temperature
lapse rate—stability—and moisture A = 2 when 18–21 °C B = 2 when 15–20 °C
values are combined, resulting in A = 3 when 22 °C or more B = 3 when 21 °C or more
the Haines index using:
ture and dewpoint temperature at a low class. Forty-five percent of the
Haines Index lower level. All temperature values fires were associated with the high-
= Stability + Moisture are written in centigrade. class days (Haines Index 6), while
= (Tp1 – Tp2 ) + (Tp1 – Tdp1 ) only 6 percent of the days fell in
=A+B Illustrated in table 1 are the lapse that class.
rate and moisture limits used in
where T is the temperature at two the low-, mid-, and high-elevation Instability and dry air are key
pressure surfaces (p1 ,p2 ); and Tp1 Haines Indexes. parameters that must be present to
and Tdp1 are the dry bulb tempera- result in a high Haines Index num-
The Haines Index equals the sum of
factor A (stability) and factor B
(moisture):
Haines
Index Class of day
(A + B) (potential for large fire)
2 or 3 very low
4 low
5 moderate
6 high
Haines found that only 10 percent

of large fires occurred when the
class of day was very low (Haines
Index 2 or 3) though 62 percent of
Figure 2—Typical synoptic situation that
produces a moderate to high Haines Index the fire-season days fell in the very Figure 3—Map of Idaho with wildfire loca-
value. tion.

64
Between July and September, the Haines Index Idaho Wildfires and
showed a high potential for large fire growth on the Haines Index
only 6 percent of the days—and those accounted The Haines Index is the first
for over 75 percent of the burned acreage. attempt to construct a formal fire-
weather index based upon features
of the lower atmosphere. Does it
ber. Instability can be caused by wraps around the leading edge of
work? To answer that question,
either warming the lower levels of the upper trough resulting in low
wildfires in central Idaho (fig. 3)
the airmass or by cooling the upper relative humidities at the surface.
were investigated in an attempt to
levels. When warming below and
correlate the Haines Index and
cooling aloft occur at the same Figure 2 displays a typical weather
large fire growth. One of these
time, the airmass rapidly destabi- pattern that produces a high
wildfires was the devastating
lizes. In the Western United States, Haines Index in the Western United
Lowman Fire of late July and early
this occurs when cooling, associat- States: a thermal trough at the sur-
August of 1989.
ed with an upper trough of low face, a 500-millibar trough moving
pressure, moves over a surface onto the West Coast, and a
The Lowman Fire. The Lowman
thermal trough or “heat low.” An “tongue” of dry air across the
Fire was one of many fires that
increase in moisture usually Sierra Nevada Range into the Great
started on the Boise National
accompanies the upper trough, but Basin and Northern Rockies. This
Forest during an outbreak of dry
at times a “tongue” of very dry air is the classic pattern associated
lightning on July 26, 1989. The fire
with the
spread only a short distance the fol-
“breakdown of
lowing day, but by July 28, fire
the 500-mil-
activity began to increase. Extreme
libar ridge.”
burning conditions developed the
Nimchuk and
afternoon of July 29 (see fig. 4).
Janz (1984)
Crowning and spotting pushed the
state that the
fire 5.75 miles (9.25 km) to the
breakdown of
northeast. The fire burned through
the 500-mil-
the eastern edge of the small town
libar ridge is
of Lowman destroying 25 buildings
clearly associ-
and a number of vehicles and clos-
ated with
ing State Highway 21. All residents
severe wildfire
of Lowman were evacuated. Fortu-
behavior.
nately there were no injuries or
However, not
Figure 4—Late afternoon satellite picture showing large smoke deaths. The fire continued to
plumes from fires in central Idaho and northeastern Oregon.
every “break-
spread toward the northeast during
down of the
the next 3 days, but at a lower rate.
500-millibar
Cooler temperatures and higher
ridge” will
relative humidities moved over the
produce
fire August 2 with very little
extreme fire
acreage lost after that date. The
weather con-
size of the Lowman Fire (over
ditions—both
46,000 acres [19,000 ha]), its
instability and
extreme fire behavior, and the loss
dry air must
of homes and personal belongings
be present.
will make the Lowman Fire one to
Haines has
remember for many years.
addressed
The rate of spread (ROS) exhibited
these two
by the Lowman Fire is plotted
parameters in
against the Haines Index in figure
Figure 5—Haines Index compared with rate of spread for the developing his
Lowman Fire, July 27 to August 5, 1989. Key: 6 = high, 5 = moder- 5. On the morning of July 29 (from
index.
ate, 4 = low, and 2–3 = very low.

65
the 0600 MDT Boise radiosonde), indrafts into the smoke column. Weather District in 1990 verified
the Haines Index number 6 (fig. 6) For the next 3 days, the Haines the Haines Index.
indicated a high potential for large Index fell to 5, still indicating a
fire growth. At approximately 1400 moderate potential for large Summary
MDT, the fire made a rapid run growth. Although the ROS dropped The Haines Index, which combines
toward the northeast at well over to 25 chains (1,650 feet [500 m]) or values for instability and dry air, is
75 chains (4,950 feet [1,500 m]) less per hour, the fire continued to a valuable indicator of the potential
per hour. Temperature at the time move too quickly to fight effective- for large fire growth. Dry air affects
was between 90 and 95 °F (32–35 ly. The Haines Index (fig. 7) fire behavior by lowering fuel mois-
C°) with the relative humidity as dropped into the low-to-very low ture, which results in more fuel
low as 8 percent. Surface winds range August 2, resulting in a sig- available for the fire and by in-
were measured at 5 to 10 miles per nificant drop in the fire’s ROS (5 creasing the probability of spotting.
hour (8–16 km/h) with occasional chains (330 feet [100 m]) or less Instability affects fire behavior by
gusts to 15 miles per hour (24 per hour). enhancing the vertical size of the
km/h), but were much stronger smoke column, resulting in strong
near the fire front due to strong Extreme fire behavior, with crown- surface winds as air rushes into the
ing and long-range spotting, was fire to replace air evacuated by the
exhibited by the fire when the smoke column. This is the mecha-
Haines Index was 5 or 6, but when nism by which fires create their
the index lowered to 4 or less, fire own wind.
activity significantly diminished.
When the Haines Index number is 5
1990 Results. During the 1990 fire or 6, the probability of extreme fire
season, the Boise Fire Weather behavior (crowning and spotting)
Office included the Haines Index in significantly increases. Fire behav-
the daily fire weather forecasts. A ior is usually low, with only mini-
computer-generated map of Haines mal fire growth, when the index
Index values across the Western number is 4 or less. The Haines
United States was also produced Index is best suited to plume-domi-
twice a day, based upon the 0600 nated fires: that is, fires where the
Figure 6—Haines Index map for 0600 and 1800 MDT upper air data. The power of the fire is greater than the
mountain daylight time, July 29, 1989. Haines Index was then compared power of the wind or the atmos-
Solid contour indicates a value of 5 or with the acreage burned on the
greater; dashed contour, 6. (The Great phere. Wind is not a parameter of
Falls, MT, and Grand Junction, CO, data Boise Fire Weather District (south- the Haines Index. The index has yet
are missing for July 19, 1989.) ern Idaho, western Wyoming, and to be tested on fires driven by
extreme southeastern Oregon) to winds, such as Santa Ana and
see if there was a correlation Sundowner where the power of the
between days in which the index wind is greater than that of the fire.
was in the high category and the
occurrence of large fires. References
Brotak, E.A. 1976. Meteorological condi-
Between July and September, the tions associated with major wildland
Haines Index was 6 (high potential fires. Ph.D. diss. New Haven, CT: Yale
for large fire growth) on only 6 University.
Davis, R.T. 1969. Atmospheric stability
percent of the days. Over 75 per- forecast and fire control. Fire Control
cent of the burned acreage Notes. 30(2): 3–4.
occurred on these days. The Haines Haines, D.A. 1988. A Lower Atmosphere
Severity Index for wildland fire. National
Index was 2, 3, or 4 (very low or Weather Digest. 13(2): 23–27.
Figure 7—Haines Index map for 0600 low potential) on 68 percent of the Nimchuk, N.; Janz, B. 1984. An analysis of
MDT, August 2, 1989. Solid contour indi- days. Only 7 percent of the acreage upper ridge breakdown in historical
cates a value of 5. (The Great Falls, MT, problem fires. Internal report.
burned on those days. Needless to Edmonton, AB: Alberta Energy and
and Grand Junction, CO, data are missing
for August 2, 1989.)
say, fire activity on the Boise Fire Natural Resources Forest Service. ■

66
LOW-LEVEL WEATHER CONDITIONS PRECEDING
MAJOR WILDFIRES*
Edward A. Brotak
nowledge of fire behavior is
K critical for those who control

wildfires. Fire managers must
know spread rates and intensity—
Since fires are three-dimensional phenomena,
managers need to know how the vertical struc-
ture of the lower atmosphere as well as the stan-
not just to eventually contain and
extinguish the fire but also to keep dard surface conditions affect fire behavior.
their fire control personnel safe.
Managers realize that weather is Since the fires in Haines’ study matological data set computed for
paramount in importance when occurred at various elevations, he this study showed that these
determining how a fire will behave. used different pressure levels to extreme fire conditions were indeed
Besides affecting fuel moistures, indicate the low-level lapse rates. abnormal. Approximately 5 percent
meteorological factors also physi- Depending on the actual elevation of all fire season days fell into the
cally change fire. Since fires are of the fire, he used either the 950 high-index category of the LASI,
three-dimensional phenomena, to 850 millibar (mb) temperature but 45 percent of days with large
managers need to know how the difference, the 850 to 700 mb dif- fires or erratic behavior were in
vertical structure of the lower ference, or the 700 to 500 mb dif- this category.
atmosphere as well as the standard ference. As indicators of moisture
surface conditions affect fire behav- content, he used either the 850 or The current study differs from
ior. 700 mb temperature and dewpoint Haines’ work in two ways. First,
difference. The actual LASI that 1200 GMT data were analyzed.
Haines (1988) developed a Lower Haines developed is shown in the These are the morning soundings
Atmosphere Severity Index (LASI) following equation: and would represent typical data
for wildfires. This index combined available to fire weather forecasters
LASI = a(Tp1 – Tp2) + b(Tp1 – Tdp). who are trying to predict fire con-
two factors that could influence fire
behavior: the vertical lapse rate and ditions later in the day. As previ-
the amount of moisture in the air. where T is the temperature at two ously mentioned, the LASI was
The vertical temperature structure pressure surfaces (p1, p2), Tp and developed using 0000 GMT data
of the lower atmosphere would Tdp are the temperature and dew- when extreme fire behavior was
influence the convection over the point at one of the levels (all tem- actually occurring. A goal of this
fire. Steep lapse rates, indicating peratures in °C and a and b are study was to see if the instability
instability, would enhance the con- weighting coefficients given equal and dryness of the lower atmos-
vection over the fire, thus increas- value for this study). phere, common during the occur-
ing the chances of extreme or rence of extreme fire behavior, is
erratic behavior. The amount of Haines calculated LASI values for discernible 12 hours earlier. The
moisture in the lower atmosphere 74 fires using radiosonde measure- second difference from Haines’
is a factor that influences fuel ments at 0000 Greenwich Mean study is the analysis of the vertical
moisture at the surface. Low Time (GMT). In North America, wind profile.
humidity values contribute to these are late afternoon or early
extreme fire behavior. evening soundings and should usu- The effects of the change in wind
ally represent actual conditions speed with height on wildfire behav-
When this article was originally published, when the extreme fire behavior was ior have been discussed in several
Edward Brotak was a Professor in the noted. A vast majority of the fires previous studies. Byram (1954)
Atmospheric Sciences Department, occurred on days with steep lapse
University of North Carolina–Asheville, stressed the importance of a low-
Asheville, NC. rates and low humidities. level jet—stronger winds at low lev-
Comparisons with the Standard els with decreasing winds aloft. An
53–54(3) [Summer 1992–93]: 23–26. Atmosphere and with a simple cli- interpretation of Byram’s work indi-

67
cates that he was not as much con- A goal of this study was to see if the instability
cerned about an actual low-level and dryness of the lower atmosphere, common
wind maximum as he was about during the occurrence of extreme fire behavior, is
minimal amounts of vertical wind
shear. It has been long realized that
discernable 12 hours earlier.
a lack of vertical wind shear allows
convection to develop. Such a wind
profile over a wildfire would allow
the convective column above the fire
to develop more fully. This would
increase the fire’s intensity and its
potential for extreme behavior.
Brotak and Reifsnyder (1977) ana-
lyzed 60 fires in the Eastern United
States. They found that strong
winds throughout the vertical pro-
file were common and in most
cases wind speeds increased with
height. Although a third of the
wind profiles in their study showed
low-level jets, even in these cases,
wind speeds were much stronger
than the Byram model would allow
for. It was their conclusion that Figure 1—Map of the United States climatic divisions showing regional elevation aspects
fires in the Eastern United States, of the LASI.
which were mostly at low eleva- For much of the eastern part of the LASI was computed using the fol-
tions, were primarily driven by country, the 950 to 850 mb tem- lowing:
strong winds and that convection perature difference, the 850 mb
above the fire was usually not as dewpoint depression, and the sur- LASI = A + B
important. The current study face to 700 mb wind profile were
examines fires at various elevations examined. For the Appalachian A=1 if 950–850 T < 4 for low-
and in various terrains to see if any Mountains and much of the Great elevation fires or 850–700 T
correlations exist with the vertical Plains, the 850 to 700 mb tempera- < 6 for mid-elevation fires
wind profile. ture difference, the 850 mb dew- or 700–500 T < 18 for
point depression, and the surface to high-elevation fires.
Data 600 mb wind profile were used. For A=2 if 950–850 T = 4 to 8 for
The fires examined were the same the high elevations of the Western low-elevation fires or
used in Haines’ study. These con- United States, the 700 to 500 mb 850–700 T = 6 to 11 for
sisted of 29 major fires in the West temperature difference, the 700 mb mid-elevation fires or
and 45 fires in the East. Soundings dewpoint depression, and the sur- 700–500 T = 18 to 22 for
from one to three nearby radio- face to 500 mb wind profile were high-elevation fires.
sonde sites were analyzed to deter- analyzed. The lapse rate component A=3 if 950–850 T > 8 for low-
mine both the vertical temperature was broken down into three cate- elevation fires or 850–700 T
and wind profiles. The 1200 GMT gories for each level. For a refer- > 11 for mid-elevation fires
data were used, which represented ence point, the Standard Atmos- or 700–500 T > 22 for
conditions in the morning prior to phere (NOAA and others 1976) high-elevation fires.
the extreme fire behavior. lapse rate was used. The standard B=1 if 850 (T – Td) < 6 for low-
value for the 950 to 850 mb tem- and mid-elevation fires or
To allow for the varying elevations, perature difference is ~6 °C, for 700 (T – Td) < 15 for high-
the country was divided into three 850 to 700 mb it is ~10 °C, and for elevation fires.
broad regions as shown in figure 1. 700 to 500 mb it is ~17 °C. The

68
B=2 if 850 (T – Td) = 6 to 10 for humidity, and LASI categories. The sets; the 1200 GMT soundings
low-elevation fires or 6 to humidity component of the LASI, used in this study indicated less
13 for mid-elevation fires either the 850 or 700 mb dewpoint instability.
or 700 (T – Td) = 15 to 21 depression, was comparably low for
for high-elevation fires. both the 1200 GMT data used in Only 14 percent of the low-eleva-
B=3 if 850 (T – Td) > 8 for low- this study and the 0000 GMT data tion soundings were decidedly
elevation fires or 11 for
used by Haines. Therefore, dry con- unstable at 1200 GMT as compared
mid-elevation fires or 700
(T – Td) > 21 for high-eleva- ditions in the lower atmosphere to 83 percent at 0000 GMT. The
tion fires. certainly seem to be a necessary mid-elevation soundings were only
factor prior to the occurrence of slightly more unstable with 36 per-
Analysis extreme fire behavior. The analysis cent falling into the least stable
of low-level lapse rates did show category in this study in compari-
Table 1 shows the breakdown of the differences between the two data son to 58 percent in the Haines’
fires into the various lapse rate, analysis. The high-elevation sound-
ings showed the least difference
Table 1—Percentage of occurrence of fires by LASI variants for 1200 between 1200 and 0000 GMT. In
GMT soundings, with 0000 GMT data in parentheses for comparison. both studies, nearly 90 percent of
Low-Elevation Fires (21 Fires) the soundings showed lapse rates
greater than the Standard
Lapse rate Humidity Atmosphere rate.
950–850 mb T 850 (T – Td ) LASI
Low-level lapse rates are signifi-
< 4: 24% (4%) < 6: 10% (9%) 2–3: 14% (2%)
cantly affected by the radiation
4–8: 62% (13%) 6–10: 19% (22%) 4: 24% (13%) budget of the underlying surface.
At night, the surface loses heat, and
> 8: 14% (83%) > 10: 71% (69%) 5: 57% (34%)
the lower atmosphere is cooled
6: 5% (51%) from below. This produces stable
lapse rates at low levels. During the
day, the surface gains energy from
Mid-Elevation Fires (28 Fires) solar radiation, and the lower
atmosphere is heated from below.
Lapse rate Humidity This produces steep lapse rates and
850–700 mb T 850 (T – Td ) LASI unstable conditions. The result of
< 6: 7% (7%) < 6: 0% (9%) 2–3: 4% (6%) these processes is a major change
in low-level lapse rates from 1200
6–11: 57% (35%) 6–13: 32% (31%) 4: 25% (16%) to 0000 GMT with the 1200 GMT
> 11: 36% (58%) > 13: 68% (60%) 5: 43% (45%) sounding not being particularly
representative of conditions later in
6: 28% (33%) the day.
The computational problems

High-Elevation Fires (25 Fires) caused by radiational cooling at
Lapse rate Humidity night could be dealt with if these
effects were concentrated within a
700–500 mb T 700 (T – Td ) LASI
nocturnal inversion layer. Lapse
rate calculations could be adjusted
< 18: 12% (13%) < 15: 4% (7%) 2–3: 4% (10%) for some level above the top of the
inversion. The soundings were
18–22: 48% (34%) 15–21: 24% (17%) 4: 24% (21%)
examined specifically for the occur-
>22: 40% (53%) > 21: 72% (76%) 5: 44% (24%) rence of nocturnal inversions. The
lowest levels used to calculate lapse
6: 28% (45%) rates were almost always above the

69
nocturnal inversion. Only in three and is not as affected by radiational convection over the fire is an
cases did the nocturnal inversion effects of the surface as lower tem- important factor. Almost all of the
reach the 950 mb level for low-ele- peratures like the 850 mb would be. mid-elevation fires occurred when
vation soundings. the surface winds were moderate to
The analysis of the 12 GMT low- strong and with substantial vertical
Although nocturnal inversions level wind profiles is shown in table wind shear. Low-level jets were
were not a problem, other types of 2. There are definite regional differ- noted on 33 percent of the sound-
inversions were more prevalent. ences in these data. Nearly three- ings. These fires seemed to fit into
Fourteen of the soundings did dis- fourths of the high-elevation fires Brotak and Reifsnyder’s model of
play low-level inversions which in the West occurred with light wind-driven fires. The majority of
affected the lapse rate calculations. surface winds and little vertical these fires occurred in the spring
Strong surface heating during the wind shear. Again, it must be point- and fall (table 3) when weather sys-
day could have easily destroyed ed out that the radiosonde sites tems are stronger. Surprisingly, the
many of these inversions leading to may not truly represent conditions low-elevation eastern fires showed
more unstable conditions by 0000 at the fire location. Certainly, topo- no distinctive pattern in the wind
GMT. As a result of this, the calcu- graphic and other local effects analysis. It should be remembered
lated LASI values were lower and could produce stronger surface that surface winds usually increase
were not good predictors of winds in the mountains. from 1200 to 0000 GMT due to the
extreme fire behavior. turbulent mixing during the day.
The lack of strong winds aloft is
As previously mentioned, only the probably a function of the time of Summary and
high-elevation soundings showed year. As shown in table 3, most of Recommendations
consistency from 1200 to 0000 the western fires (high-elevation Haines’ LASI for classifying atmos-
GMT. This is due to the location of fires) occurred in the summer pheric conditions during periods of
the radiosonde station. Often the when overall pressure patterns are extreme fire behavior using 0000
radiosonde station is at a much weak. The worst conditions in GMT soundings was not as useful
lower elevation than the fire site. terms of low fuel moistures also in predicting these conditions as
The 700 mb temperature, which is usually occur under an upper-level when 1200 GMT data are used. The
considered a near surface tempera- ridge that favors weak synoptic- destabilization of lapse rates due to
ture for the fire site, is a “free air” scale winds. Fires in the West seem solar heating during the day seems
reading at the radiosonde location to follow Byram’s model where
Table 2—Number and percentage of fire occurrence by low-level wind profile in knots (m/sec).
Wind profile
Fire elevation Light a Moderate b Strong c
Low 12 (6) (48%) 7 (4) (24%) 6 (4) (28%)
Middle 1 (1) (4%) 11 (6) (46%) 12 (6) (50%)
High 13 (7) (72%) 4 (2) (16%) 3 (2) (12%)
a. Surface winds ≤ 5 knots (3 m/sec); upper winds ≤ 25 knots (13 m/sec).
b. Surface winds 5 to 9 knots (3–5 m/sec) and/or upper winds 26 to 34 knots (13–18 m/sec).
c. Surface winds > 9 knots (5 m/sec) and/or upper winds > 34 knots (18 m/sec).
Table 3—Fires by elevation and month.

Elevation Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Low 1 — 6 9 2 1 — 2 1 — — —
Middle — — — 12 2 — 5 — 4 1 — —
High — — — — 1 8 4 9 5 — 1 —

70
to be the main problem. One possi- face winds in conjunction with low References
ble solution would be to use a pre- fuel moistures cause fire-control Brotak, E.A.; Reifsnyder, W.E. 1977.
dicted afternoon surface tempera- problems. Climatologically these Predicting major wildland fire occur-
ture to do the calculations with the conditions are more prevalent in rence. Fire Management Notes. 38(3):
5–8.
1200 GMT soundings. Another pos- the East. In the West, where the Byram, G.M. 1954. Atmospheric conditions
sibility is to compare the 1200 GMT lowest fuel moistures often occur related to blowup fires. Sta. Pap. 35. Dry
values with climatology. This study in the summer, strong winds on Branch, GA: USDA Forest Service,
Southeastern Forest Experiment Station.
could only use as reference points the synoptic scale are rare. These Haines, D.A. 1988. A lower atmospheric
the Standard Atmosphere lapse rate fires seem to be controlled more by severity index for wildland fires. National
and the 0000 GMT results from local or topographically induced Weather Digest. 13(2): 23–27.
NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Haines’ study. For the most accu- winds and by convection over the Administration); National Aeronautics
rate comparisons long-term aver- fire. and Space Administration; U.S. Air Force.
ages for each radiosonde station 1976. U.S. standard atmosphere.
need to be developed. Acknowledgment Washington, DC. ■
This research was funded by
The analysis of low-level wind pro- Cooperative Agreement Number
files also produced mixed results. 23-88-33 of the USDA Forest
In many circumstances strong sur- Service.

71
THOSE REALLY BAD FIRE DAYS: WHAT
MAKES THEM SO DANGEROUS?*
Dan Thorpe
fter some fires, you often hear
A comments like this: “There

was no way to catch that
thing,” or “We couldn’t have
Why were we catching some mid-elevation fires
but losing others under what seemed to be identi-
cal circumstances?
caught that fire even if we’d been
there when it started.” Unfor-
tunately, such comments are all
too often true. In southern
Oregon, we started to ask why that
was so and what we could do about
it. Why do we catch every fire on
some days but lose control of fires
right from the start on others,
even when conditions are appar-
ently the same?
The Problem Fires

The Southwest Oregon District of
the Oregon Department of Forestry
has about 2 million acres (800,000
ha) and a quarter of a million peo-
ple. It ranges in elevation from
about 500 feet (150 m) in the
Rogue River corridor to more than
6,000 feet (1,800 m) in the Cascade Figure 1—The 1981 Tin Pan Peak Fire is an example of a plume-dominated fire burning
in brushy fuels in the mid-elevation zone. Such fires are responsible for 90 percent of the
and Siskiyou Mountain ranges. The total acres burned in the Southwestern Oregon District. Photo: Southwest Oregon
valleys are characterized by annual District, Oregon Department of Forestry, Medford, OR, 1981.
grasses; at middle elevations,
brushy fuels prevail; and second- National forests border the district firefighters how we could have
growth coniferous forest domi- in the west and east. The district stopped each fire. All agreed that
nates above about 2,500 feet (750 handles more than 1,000 alarms some fires had been impossible to
m). Landownership is divided annually, of which about 250 are control during initial attack, no
among rural residents, industrial statistical (bonafide) wildland fires matter how many resources we
forestry operators, small nonindus- and the rest smoke chases, mutual- threw at them; but on others, the
trial landowners, homeowners in aid calls, and no-action responses. right resource at the right time
the wildland–urban interface, and About 25 percent of the fires are would have made the difference
the Bureau of Land Management, caused by lightning and the rest by between quickly controlling the
which contracts with the State of humans. Fire seasons typically run fire and watching it grow into a
Oregon for fire protection. from late May through mid- project fire. We compared the
October and average about 150 days. answers we got to the results of
When this article was originally published, our computer-modeled initial-
Dan Thorpe was the unit forester for the attack analysis through the
Southwest Oregon District, Oregon
On the Southwest Oregon District,
Department of Forestry, Central Point, we began by mapping past fires National Fire Management Analysis
OR. that had escaped initial attack. System. Interestingly, the answers
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes Then we asked our supervisors and and results corroborated each
59(4) [Fall 1999]: 27–29.

72
By integrating the Haines Index with information attack frequently became limited
on the fuel condition, we identified 10 days when due to their use elsewhere in our
high fire intensities were likely. region. In particular, fire retardant
aircraft have often been busy on
fires elsewhere right when we
other—anecdotal evidence from be fully effective; needed them.
our managers agreed with our 3. Because the mid-elevation zone
computer models. was in the thermal belt, average By integrating the daily Haines
temperatures were higher and Index with information on the daily
Next, we tried to isolate the com- the relative humidity was lower; and seasonal condition of our fuels,
mon threads among the escaped and we were able to identify days when
fires. On a planimetric map, we 4. The road system was much less high fire intensities were more
looked for a common geographical developed in the mid-elevation likely. We completed analysis to
feature that contributed to the zone, due to steeper slopes and determine normal curing dates for
escapes. Did a wind corridor, a fewer timber resources. annual grasses and the bottoms of
lightning alley, a roadless area, or the live fuel moisture curves. We
steep slopes contribute to prevent- These four factors contributed to then compared these data with data
ing control? greater contiguous fuel beds, on the thousand-hour fuels to
longer response times, higher fire obtain indices of extreme fire dan-
When we overlaid the large fires intensities, and greater resistance ger. By examining past Haines
with some crude fuel typing, we to control. None of this was news Indices, we determined that the
found that the major fires—the to our fire managers. During their district would have about 10 days
ones responsible for 90 percent of careers, they had controlled hun- per year when the Haines Index
our total acres burned—all started dreds of fires in the mid-elevation was high enough during periods of
in the mid-elevation zone (fig. 1). zone. The real question was this: extreme fire danger to significantly
Further analysis revealed that we Why were we catching some mid- change fire behavior, making a fire
were very successful in controlling elevation fires but losing others much more difficult to control. We
the grass fires in the valley zone. In under what seemed to be similar dubbed the 10 bad fire days “Ira
fact, 96 percent of the valley fires circumstances? days” after Ira Rambo, the principal
were controlled at 10 acres (4 ha) author of our project. Later, we for-
or less. The same was true for the The Atmospheric malized the term by making it into
fires in the upper elevation conifer- Factor the acronym “IRA” (Increased
ous forest. Although the coniferous The answer came from the atmos- Resource Availability).
zone had more lightning ignitions phere by way of the Haines Index.
than the valleys, we succeeded in Historically, our large fires fre- So now we knew what type of days
holding 94 percent of the upper quently occurred during a signifi- were really our worst. The National
elevation fires to 10 acres (4 ha) or cant weather event that can now be Weather Service agreed to give us a
less. So why were we less success- measured in terms of factors other daily prediction of the next day’s
ful in the mid-elevation zone? than just wind or lightning. The Haines Index, providing us with at
Haines Index allows us to deter- least 12 hours’ advance notice
We began to describe what was dif- mine what the atmosphere is doing whenever one of those really bad
ferent about the mid-elevation zone in terms of temperature and lapse fire days might be coming. Now it
so we could later evaluate potential rate (the rate at which temperature was time to put the information to
changes using the computer mod- changes with changing height in practical use. But how?
els. We discovered four major dif- the Earth’s atmosphere). Changes
ferences: in the atmosphere have regional Our Response
effects, and we found it interesting We took the same approach we do
1. The fuel type was brush rather to note that our national forest in dealing with the threat of light-
than timber or grass; neighbors frequently had trouble ning: we increased our available
2. Slopes were steeper in the mid- with large, plume-dominated fires resources. We asked our fire man-
elevation zone—frequently too on the same days that we did. As a agers, “What do you need in the
steep for engines and dozers to result, resources for extended mid-elevation zone to control a fire

73
sooner on days when plume-domi- Our board of directors enthusiastically embraced
nated fires are likely?” Again, the the idea of spending money on those bad fire days
answers were corroborated by our to save money in the long run through
computer models. On those bad
fire days—the IRA days—we found preparedness.
that we needed:
We also made a few other changes tional engines on IRA days and to
• Additional aircraft, and sooner; that cost little or nothing. On IRA have dozers prepared to respond
• Larger engine crews (three peo- days, we now: immediately from logging sites.
ple per type 6 engine rather than The USDA Forest Service, which
two); • Keep resources patrolling in the manages the fire retardant program
• Air attack to improve crew safety mid-elevation zones to minimize in Oregon, agreed to keep an air-
and aircraft efficiency; and response times on potential prob- tanker locally available on IRA
• Additional dozers (more than just lem fires (and to help keep fires days.
two), and sooner, for initial from starting);
attack. • Automatically order retardant; Wildland agencies have known
• Immediately launch our type 2 about and successfully used the
But additional resources would contract helicopter for initial Haines Index for years. The concept
come at a cost—up to $5,000 per attack; of IRA days now allows us to inte-
day on 10 days per year. Was it • Preassign structural task forces grate the Haines Index into our
worth it? and liaisons; and daily preparedness.
• Immediately notify cooperators of
The answer was a resounding yes. A fire starts. Acknowledgments
break-even examination found that
The author wishes to thank Forest
if we stopped just one fire in 100 We discussed our findings with our Officer Ira Rambo for leading the
years from becoming a project fire, cooperators, who embraced our project team that developed the
we would still save the taxpayers proposed response and changed concept of IRA days; Protection
money! Put another way, if we their methods accordingly. Rural Planner Jim Wolf for participating
spent an additional $50,000 per fire districts agreed to increase on the project team; Southwest
year, we had 100 years to be suc- staffing on IRA days to cover the Oregon District protection and
cessful and still make it pay. Our valley zone while our crews patrol management staff for contributing
board of directors enthusiastically the mid-elevation zone. Landown- to the project team’s work; and
embraced the idea of spending ers and our Federal cooperator National Weather Service staff for
money on IRA days to save money agreed to provide staffing for addi- collaborating with the project. ■
in the long run.

74
A RACE THAT COULDN’T BE WON*
Richard C. Rothermel and Hutch Brown
Editor’s note: This article summa-

rizes an incident analysis by
Richard C. Rothermel under the
title, Mann Gulch Fire: A Race That
Couldn’t Be Won (Gen. Tech. Rep.
INT–299; USDA Forest Service,
Intermountain Research Station;
1993). To obtain the full analysis,
contact Publications—Ogden
Service Center, Rocky Mountain
Research Station, USDA Forest
Service, 324 25th Street, Ogden,
UT 84401, 801-625-5437 (tel.),
801-625-5129 (fax),
pubs/rmrs_ogden@fs.fed.us
(e-mail).
t was 4 p.m. on August 5, 1949. A
I USDA Forest Service crew of 15

smokejumpers had just completed
a jump onto a small fire in Mann
View of the Mann Gulch drainage from near its head. In 1949, a wildfire blowup cost the
lives of 13 firefighters not far from this spot. Twenty years later, when this photo was
Gulch, part of a roadless area in taken, signs of severe fire damage were still evident. Photo: Courtesy of National
Agricultural Library, Special Collections, Forest Service Photograph Collection, Beltsville,
western Montana that is now the MD (Philip G. Schlamp, 1969; 519698).
Gates of the Mountains Wilderness.
The fire was burning on the canyon smokejumpers moved down the drafts from local cumulus cells,
crest across Mann Gulch, nearly a gulch. The crew planned to reach firebrands were carried from the
mile (1.6 km) away. Although the the mouth of Mann Gulch on the canyon crest into the mouth of
firefighters were downwind from Missouri River, about 2 miles (3.2 Mann Gulch. By 5:45 p.m., the fire-
the fire, it didn’t look ominous; the km) away, then move around the fighters found that spot fires 150 to
day was ending, and at least one canyon crest to the upwind side of 200 yards (140–180 m) ahead of
smokejumper thought that cooling the fire for initial attack. them were blocking further
temperatures were laying the fire progress down the gulch.
down for the night. By 6 p.m., barely an hour later, 13
of the 16 firefighters lay dead or Terrain. With the way to the
By 5 p.m., the crew had gathered dying. What went wrong? Missouri River cut off, the firefight-
its gear. Joined by a Forest Service ers turned around and headed back
fire guard who had been single- Prevailing Conditions up the gulch. They were in a rock-
handedly fighting the fire, the Weather. The day was hot; temper- strewn canyon with treacherous
atures in Mann Gulch possibly footing. To one side, across the
Dick Rothermel was a retired research exceeded 97 °F (36 °C). Around gulch, was the canyon crest with
physical scientist for the USDA Forest 3:30 p.m., the wind increased and the main fire. To the other side, the
Service, Intermountain Fire Sciences slope steepened to 76 percent and
Laboratory, Missoula, MT; and Hutch shifted direction; by 5:30 p.m., it
Brown was the editor of Fire Management was blowing up Mann Gulch was topped by a perpendicular rim-
Today. toward the crew at speeds of up to rock 6 to 12 feet (1.8–3.6 m) high.
40 miles per hour (64 km/h). Although broken in places by nar-
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Today
60(2) [Spring 2000]: 8–9. Perhaps due to firewhirls or down- row crevices, the rimrock posed a

75
formidable obstacle to anyone try- (815–980 °C). The high flame tem- ahead of the main fire at a slight
ing to cross to safety on the far side peratures proved lethal, primarily uphill angle; all were caught by the
of the ridge. due to respiratory damage. fire within 3 to 4 minutes after the
foreman lit his escape fire. Ten died
Fuels. Vegetation in Mann Gulch Human Factors almost immediately and the 11th
ranged from mature ponderosa Lost Communications. Although on the following day.
pine with a thick Douglas-fir the jump had gone smoothly, heavy
understory at the canyon mouth to turbulence had forced the pilot to In the lee of a convection current
grasses and shrubs farther up the climb before dropping the cargo. caused by the main fire, the escape
canyon. Fuels were tinder dry and The crew’s gear was scattered and fire was unaffected by wind and
highly flammable; dry fuel mois- its only radio was broken, causing therefore spread at an almost 90-
ture values reached as low as 3 to the crew to lose touch with the degree angle to the path of the
3.5 percent. outside world. main fire, directly toward the rim-
rock. Four firefighters followed its
Fire Behavior Tactics and Training. Instead of course, perhaps thinking that it
Under the prevailing conditions, heading straight uphill for the rim- would deflect the main fire. Two of
the fire’s behavior in Mann Gulch rock while the fire was still moving them found a fissure in the rim-
can be calculated with reasonable slowly, the firefighters retreated up rock and climbed through to the
certainty. The spot fires first the gulch while angling uphill safety of a rock slide on the far
encountered by the firefighters toward the rim. At first, their slope. The third firefighter turned
were spreading at the slow rate of retreat showed little urgency—one away from the fissure and perished
about 20 feet per minute (6 firefighter even stopped to take in the main fire below the rimrock.
m/min). However, thick surface photos. However, after 450 yards The fourth, although caught by the
fuels at the mouth of the gulch (410 m), with the fire gaining main fire, made it over the rim
soon sent intense flames into the ground and now only a minute only to die the next day of his
canopy. Within minutes, the wind- behind, the foreman ordered the burns.
driven crown fire was spreading at crew to drop all heavy gear. At this
the much faster rate of 80 to 120 point, the crew probably broke up Lessons Learned
feet per minute (24–36 m/min). as the firefighters began running as Deeply shocked by the Mann Gulch
fast as they could. But the faster tragedy and subsequent firefighter
As the fire chased the firefighters the crew moved up the gulch, the fatalities in California, the Forest
up the gulch, it reached grassier lighter and flashier the fuels Service initiated reforms to prevent
fuels where the trees thinned out, became, the stronger the wind blew future disasters. Thanks to
increasing its rate of spread to 170 at ground level, and the faster the improved training, equipment, and
to 280 feet per minute (52–85 fire spread. safety techniques, another tragedy
m/min). Even farther up the gulch, was averted on August 29, 1985,
where the thinning timber finally Realizing that the crew was in a during the Butte Fire on the
gave way to grassland, midflame race it couldn’t win, the foreman Salmon National Forest, ID.
windspeeds might have reached 20 stopped to ignite an escape fire in Seventy-three firefighters were
miles per hour (32 km/h), pushing the grass, with the main fire only entrapped for up to 2 hours by a
the fire’s rate of spread as high as 30 seconds behind. Although the severe crown fire. By calmly mov-
750 feet per minute (230 m/min)— escape fire saved the foreman’s life, ing to preestablished safety zones
much faster than the firefighters the other firefighters failed to and deploying their fire shelters, all
could run uphill over broken ter- understand his purpose and 73 firefighters escaped serious
rain. In the flashy fuels, flame ignored or couldn’t hear his injury. In part, they owe their lives
lengths might have reached 40 feet entreaties to lie down with him to the lessons learned from the
(12 m), with flame temperatures inside the black. Eleven of the Mann Gulch Fire. ■
ranging from 1,500 to 1,800 °F remaining crew continued racing

76
THE SOUTH CANYON FIRE REVISITED:
LESSONS IN FIRE BEHAVIOR*
Bret W. Butler, Roberta A. Bartlette, Larry S. Bradshaw, Jack D. Cohen,
Patricia L. Andrews, Ted Putnam, Richard J. Mangan, and Hutch Brown
n July 6, 1994, 14 firefighters
O died in a wildfire on Storm

King Mountain in western
Colorado. Their deaths made the
Winds whipping from the west through the
Colorado River Gorge were funneled up the ravine
where the fire was worst, playing a key role in
South Canyon Fire a landmark
event in the annals of wildland fire- the blowup.
fighting, next to such major fire-
fighting tragedies as the Big
Blowup of 1910 and the Mann
Gulch Fire of 1949.**
Within weeks after the fire, the

Report of the South Canyon Fire
Accident Investigation Team
(USDA/USDI/USDC 1994) outlined
many of the circumstances that led
to disaster. Later, John Maclean
(1999) described additional factors,
such as resource use decisions in
the days before the blowup.
This article summarizes a detailed

study by the authors on the fire
behavior associated with the South
Canyon Fire (Butler and others

Bret Butler was a research mechanical
engineer, Roberta Bartlette was a forester, Figure 1—View of the South Canyon Fire site looking northeast across the West
Larry Bradshaw was a meteorologist, and Drainage at the west flank of Main Ridge. Note the west flank fireline, helispots (H–1 and
Jack Cohen and Pat Andrews were H–2), Lunch Spot Ridge, and West Bench. Illustration: USDA Forest Service, Fire
research physical scientists for the USDA Sciences Laboratory, Rocky Mountain Research Station, Missoula, MT, 1998.
Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research
Station, Fire Sciences Laboratory, 1998). What fire-related factors Mountain, at 8,700 feet (2,700 m)
Missoula, MT; Ted Putnam was an equip- contributed to the tragedy? And the highest peak in the area. The
ment specialist (retired) and Dick Mangan
was the Fire and Aviation Program Leader what lessons do they teach? mountain rises about 3,000 feet
for the Forest Service’s Technology and (900 m) above the river’s north
Development Center, Missoula, MT; and Topography bank. Broken spurs and steep
Hutch Brown was the editor of Fire
Management Today. The Colorado River cuts through a ravines reach south from the peak
series of north–south ridges on its to the river.
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Today
61(1) [Winter 2001]: 14–26. way west through the Rocky
** On the Big Blowup, see Stephen J. Pyne, “A Story To Mountains. At Glenwood Springs, Main Ridge (fig. 1), the site of the
Tell,” Fire Management Today 60(4): 6–8; on the Mann
the river bisects a ridge of shale South Canyon Fire, starts in a sad-
Gulch Fire, see Mike Dombeck, “The Mann Gulch Fire:
They Did Not Die in Vain,” and Richard C. Rothermel and sandstone, forming a narrow dle south of the peak and runs
and Hutch Brown, “A Race That Couldn’t Be Won,”
canyon at the base of Storm King southwest for about 3,700 feet
Fire Management Today 60(2): 4–9.

77
Most of the fireline on
the fire’s west flank cut
through Gambel oak,
where visibility was limit-
ed and the fuels were
unusually flammable
under the drought
conditions.
(1,100 m) before ending at a knob

overlooking the Colorado River.
From the knob, the canyon walls
fall steeply about 1,100 feet (330 m)
to the river below.
Though adjacent to an interstate

highway, Main Ridge is difficult to
approach. No roads or trails lead up Figure 2—Approximate distribution of vegetation in the area of the South Canyon Fire
from the highway. The ridge is (not to scale). Gambel oak occupied north- and west-facing slopes, including most of the
flanked on the east and west by terrain traversed by the west flank fireline. Open pinyon–juniper forest predominated
elsewhere, except for an area of ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir south of the Double
deep, twisting ravines running Draws. Illustration: USDA Forest Service, Fire Sciences Laboratory, Rocky Mountain
north and south, called the East Research Station, Missoula, MT, 1998.
A Firefighting Tragedy
In the summer of 1994, Colorado unsure exactly where the smoke cutting fireline along two flanks
suffered its worst drought in originated, so Federal officials of the fire.
decades. Severe fire weather was named the fire after the caller’s
certain to come. On July 2, a location. Suddenly, the fire blew up.
major storm hit the State with Witnesses at the helibase below
dry lightning strikes, igniting At first, the South Canyon Fire Storm King Mountain watched in
thousands of wildland fires. seemed insignificant compared to helpless horror as smoke billowed
much larger fires burning else- across the slopes, enveloping the
One fire started on the flanks of where. For days, fire managers fire shelters they could see
Storm King Mountain near and aerial observers monitored deployed. Within minutes, 14 of
Glenwood Springs, a resort com- the slowly spreading fire from a the 49 people on Storm King
munity in western Colorado. The distance. None thought it wise to Mountain—more than a quarter
mountain overlooks an interstate divert thinly stretched resources of the firefighting force—lay
highway in a canyon carved by from higher priority fires. dead. Others, some badly burned,
the Colorado River. On the morn- escaped over the ridge, while still
ing of July 3, drivers on the high- On July 5, more than 2 days after others survived in their fire shel-
way could see a puff of smoke on the fire’s ignition, a hand crew ters. It took hours for many of
a mountain spur called Main (or finally reached Main Ridge. the traumatized survivors to
Hell’s Gate) Ridge, where a light- Joined by smokejumpers and hot- descend the mountain to safety.
ning fire smoldered in a tree. shots, the firefighters began a Meanwhile, the fire continued to
concerted effort to contain the rage, burning 2,115 acres (856
A caller reported the fire from fire, now dozens of acres in size. ha) before finally coming under
across the river in a gulch known By the afternoon of July 6, they control on July 11.
as South Canyon. The caller was seemed to be making headway,

78
The relative humidity dropped from July 5 to ported heavy live vegetation,
July 6, allowing the fire to continue spreading down- including numerous conifers.
hill overnight toward the bottom of the drainage.
Due to the drought, all fuels were
several weeks ahead of their sum-
The bottom of West Drainage is mer drying trends. Fine dead fuel
especially steep, with a slope of moisture content was about 2 to 5
about 80 percent. The bottom percent. Live foliar moisture was
widens into a half-acre (0.2-ha) probably about 125 percent in
level area called the Bowl about green Gambel oak and about 60
250 feet (80 m) upcanyon from the percent in underburned oak.
base of two long, vertical gullies,
the Double Draws. Upcanyon from
the Bowl, the steep slope flattens
Weather
into an area called the West Bench. Conditions were drier and warmer
than average. Precipitation levels at
The narrow mouth of West Glenwood Springs from October 1,
Drainage, facing southwest, opens 1993, to July 6, 1994, were 58 per-
onto the highway and river. Winds cent of normal. Temperatures were
whipping from the west through higher than usual from May
the river gorge are funneled up the through July.
ravine. They played a key role in
the blowup. On July 5, the air in western
Colorado was hot and dry, with
Fuels light winds from the south. A cold
front building over Idaho reached
Vegetation in the area of the fire
Colorado early on July 6. With the
Figure 3—Firefighters constructing fire- was mixed (fig. 2). Gambel oak
line on the west flank of Main Ridge on approaching cold front, the relative
thickets covered north- and west-
the South Canyon Fire, July 6, 1994. The humidity dropped from a high of
heavy Gambel oak severely limited visibili- facing slopes. Gambel oak reached
40 percent on July 5 to 29 percent
ty and remained combustible despite par- from Main Ridge down to the West
tial underburning. Photo: USDA Forest on July 6, allowing the fire to
Bench just north of Lunch Spot
Service, Fire Sciences Laboratory, Rocky remain active overnight. The cold
Mountain Research Station, Missoula, MT. Ridge, the area traversed by most of
front reached Glenwood Springs at
the fireline on the fire’s west flank.
about 3:20 p.m., bringing strong
and West Drainages. The first fire- More than 50 years old, the oak
winds from the west.
fighters reached the fire by hiking formed a closed canopy 6 to 12 feet
for hours up the East Drainage. (1.8–2.4 m) tall, with leaf litter 3 to
Wind combined with topography to
6 inches (8–16 cm) deep and limit-
create turbulence in the West
The fire burned mostly on the west ed visibility (fig. 3). Elsewhere,
Drainage (fig. 4). The westerly
flank of Main Ridge, so the firefight- except for a pocket of ponderosa
winds speeded up as they pushed
ers built fireline down into the West pine and Douglas-fir south of the
through the narrow Colorado River
Drainage (fig. 1). They traversed Double Draws, open pinyon–
Gorge. Caught by the angle of Main
steep slopes of up to 55 percent, juniper forest prevailed, with a
Ridge, they swept north up the
with treacherous footing in the grassy herbaceous layer.
West Drainage. Rising daytime
crumbling shale. Side spurs and temperatures on the upper moun-
draws angling from Main Ridge The vegetation was generally thick-
tain slopes increased the upcanyon
down into the drainage slowed trav- est toward the top of Main Ridge,
flow by reducing pressure at the
el and blocked the firefighters’ view giving way to shrubs and thick
canyon mouth, as did strong high-
of the fire. The most prominent side cured grasses below. The bottom of
er elevation westerly winds pouring
spur, where many firefighters ate the drainage was generally covered
across Main Ridge. By about 4 p.m.,
lunch on July 6, became known as with grass, with occasional pockets
winds of 30 to 45 miles per hour
Lunch Spot Ridge. of dead brush that had rolled or
(50–70 km/h) were rushing upslope
washed downhill. The Bowl sup-

79
from the mouth of West Drainage, For days, the fire did not seem ominous. It backed
with gusts reaching 50 miles per slowly downhill in surface fuels, making occasional
hour (80 km/h). Cross-cutting upslope fingered runs through unburned canopy
higher elevation winds created a
shear layer and turbulence in the
fuels.
canyon.
Early Fire Behavior

From its point of ignition on Main
Ridge (fig. 5), the fire backed slowly
downhill, burning in cured grasses
under juniper and pinyon pine and
in the leaf litter under Gambel oak.
Sheltered from the low to moderate
winds by canopy cover, the fire
torched only where ladder fuels
carried it into individual trees. The
fire advanced mostly north and
west, making occasional upslope
runs through canopy fuels. From
July 2 to July 6, the fire backed
downhill at a nearly constant rate.
On July 5, firefighters arrived on

Main Ridge and constructed the
first helispot (H–1) but failed to
build effective firelines. The next
morning, the firefighters built
another helispot (H–2), then cut a
fireline along the ridgetop between
the helispots.
Next, the leaders scouted the fire by

helicopter and made the fateful Figure 4—Interaction of the westerly wind flow over the ridgetops burned by the South
Canyon Fire and the northerly wind flow up the West Drainage, forming a shear layer
decision to continue fighting the (dashed line). The shear layer generated turbulence that helped spread fire and burning
fire from Main Ridge instead of embers up the West Drainage and onto the ridgetops. Illustration: USDA Forest Service,
evacuating the ridge and attacking Fire Sciences Laboratory, Rocky Mountain Research Station, Missoula, MT, 1998.
the fire from the highway below.
They decided to improve the Double Draws and was about three- Double Draws. Flame lengths
ridgetop fireline while building fourths of the way down to the bot- exceeded 100 feet (30 m). Photos
fireline down into the West tom of the drainage. Assuming that show smoke rising from well below
Drainage to hook around the west the rate of spread remained con- the crown fire runs, indicating that
flank of the fire. By 3:15 p.m., 49 stant during the day, the fire would fire was reaching the bottom of the
firefighters were on the mountain, have reached the bottom of the drainage.
about evenly divided between the drainage by about 4 p.m.
ridgetop and west flank firelines. By this time, strong westerly winds
The Blowup were flowing across the tops of the
During the night of July 5, low At about 3:55 p.m., the fire, fed by ridges while a strong upcanyon
humidity kept the fire advancing at growing winds, made three upslope (southerly) wind was blowing up
a probable rate of about 32 feet per canopy runs through the patch of the bottom of the West Drainage;
hour (10 m/h) By midmorning on pine and Douglas-fir south of the this combination created severe
July 6, the fire had burned into the turbulence over the West Drainage.

80
On the morning of July 6, the leaders made the Embers from the crown fire runs
fateful decision to continue fighting the fire from and from the flames in the bottom
of the drainage scattered in the tur-
above. bulence, igniting spot fires up and
across the canyon. By 4:02 p.m.,
firefighters reported spot fires
actively burning on the opposite
(east-facing) slope of the West
Drainage.
Pushed by winds, the fire swept up

the east-facing slope and upcanyon
toward the Bowl in a running flame
front 50 yards (45 m) wide. In the
Bowl, relatively dense surface fuels
pushed the fire into the crowns of
the conifers there, increasing the
size and height of the convection
current over the fire and lofting
embers high up both sides of the
drainage. On the ridgetop, spot
fires were multiplying across the
fireline by 4:03 p.m.
By 4:04 p.m., recognizing the dan-

ger, the firefighters on the west
Figure 5—South Canyon Fire perimeters from the time of ignition on July 2 through the flank were all in retreat. Those
morning of July 6, before the blowup (3 acres = 1.2 ha; 11 acres = 4.5 ha; 29 acres = 12
ha; 50 acres = 20 ha; and 120 acres = 50 ha). Illustration: USDA Forest Service, Fire observing the fire south of Lunch
Sciences Laboratory, Rocky Mountain Research Station, Missoula, MT, 1998. Spot Ridge returned to their lunch
spot, while those north of Lunch
Spot Ridge began moving up the
west flank fireline toward Main
Ridge. At about the same time, the
firefighters on the ridgetop aban-
doned efforts to control the spot
fires spreading around them and
headed toward H–1 for helicopter
evacuation.
By 4:07 p.m., the fire front was

rushing upcanyon in a “U” shape
past the Bowl (fig. 6). Two minutes
later, it jumped onto the West
Bench (fig. 1), entering the Gambel
oak directly under the west flank
fireline. The high winds, minimally
impeded by the relatively thin
canopy cover on the bench,
whipped up the flames in the sur-
Figure 6—South Canyon Fire perimeter at 4:07 p.m., minutes after the blowup began. face fuels and sent them into the
The fire had jumped across the West Drainage and was advancing upcanyon in a “U” canopy. The intense heat from the
shape below the west flank fireline. Illustration: USDA Forest Service, Fire Sciences
Laboratory, Rocky Mountain Research Station, Missoula, MT, 1998. burning oak canopy, coupled with

81
relatively low live fuel moisture lev- Cross-cutting winds created a shear layer and tur-
els, led to continuous combustion bulence in the canyon, scattering embers and
of every fuel type as the fire raced igniting spot fires up and across the canyon.
upslope in the Gambel oak north of
Lunch Spot Ridge.
The rest of the west flank firefight- By 4:18 p.m., a finger of the fire cut
Above the West Bench, the fire was ers were north of Lunch Spot Ridge off any possibility of escape into the
more exposed to the westerly winds before the blowup, widely dispersed East Drainage. Angling toward a
sweeping over Main Ridge. The along the fireline. All retreated rock outcropping, the two died
flames spread upcanyon at about 3 back up the fireline toward Main crossing a gully at about 4:23 p.m.,
feet per second (0.9 m/s) while Ridge—a distance of up to 1,880 probably from inhaling lethal hot
making upslope runs before the feet (575 m) for some. Twelve fire- gases funneled up the draw.
winds at 6 to 9 feet per second fighters who had been working on
(1.8–2.7 m/s). One run carried all the lower portion of the fireline Lessons Learned
the way over Main Ridge, forcing were caught by the fire at about The South Canyon Fire tragically
the firefighters who were moving 4:13 p.m. Most were in a group illustrates the deadly fire behavior
toward H–1 to turn around and about 280 feet (85 m) below Main that can occur under certain condi-
head instead for H–2. Ridge. All died within seconds of tions of fuel, weather, and topogra-
each other (see the sidebar). phy. Though extreme, such fire
At 4:10 p.m., a spot fire ignited on behavior is normal under the con-
the West Bench ahead of the main At 4:14 p.m., two helitack person- ditions that prevailed on Storm
fire front and began sweeping ups- nel watched the fire front approach King Mountain on the afternoon of
lope below the fleeing west flank them at H–2. Instead of dropping July 6. Until then, the fire was a
firefighters. Within minutes, it had into the East Drainage with the low-intensity surface burn, with
merged with the main fire and other ridgeline firefighters, they high-intensity fire behavior limited
overrun the entire west flank fire- ran up the ridge toward the moun- to the torching of individual trees
line. By 4:14 p.m., the fire was tain, perhaps trying to reach higher and narrow runs within the fire’s
cresting on Main Ridge and threat- ground for helicopter evacuation. perimeter. But by 4 p.m., changing
ening H–2 (fig. 7). All but two of
the firefighters who were on or had
reached Main Ridge dropped into
the East Drainage and fled down-
canyon to safety.
The Entrapments
Before the blowup, an advance
scout and a group of eight firefight-
ers were observing the fire south of
Lunch Spot Ridge. By 4:06 p.m., all
nine had retreated to Lunch Spot
Ridge. The scout found a safety
zone on the ridge, which remained
largely unburned during the
blowup. The other eight moved
upridge to an area of black several
hundred feet below H–1. At 4:24
p.m., they deployed their fire shel-
ters. Over the next 45 minutes,
they felt the heat from three sepa-
rate fire runs just south of Lunch Figure 7—South Canyon Fire perimeter at 4:14 p.m., just after the entrapment on the
west flank fireline. The fire had completely overrun the west flank fireline and was threat-
Spot Ridge, about 500 feet (150 m) ening H–2. Illustration: USDA Forest Service, Fire Sciences Laboratory, Rocky Mountain
away. All survived unhurt. Research Station, Missoula, MT, 1998.

82
Within minutes after the firefighters began to what was to come; the transition
retreat, the fire had entirely overrun the west to a high-intensity fire was sud-
flank fireline, claiming the first fatalities. den and perhaps unexpected in
the live fuels. Under certain con-
ditions, green vegetation can sup-
wind conditions, combined with cially during frontal passages. port and even promote high-
slope and fire location, dramatically Winds should be constantly mon- intensity burning. A fire’s posi-
altered the fire’s behavior. Within itored all around the fire perime- tion should be constantly moni-
minutes, flames swept through the ter. tored in relation to wind, slope,
live fuel canopy in a continuous • Vegetation, topography, and and fuels; training in fire envi-
blazing front that caught the fire- smoke can prevent firefighters ronment assessment might help
fighters before they could reach from noticing changes in fire firefighters anticipate potential
their safety zone, resulting in 14 behavior. Evidence suggests that fire behavior.
fatalities. the 12 firefighters overrun on the • The longer and farther a fire
west flank fireline were caught by burns, the more likely it is to
Several conclusions can be drawn surprise, perhaps because they change behavior. Given sufficient
from what happened on Storm failed to realize how close the fire time, a low-intensity fire can
King Mountain: was getting. Lookouts positioned often reach a position where fuel,
outside the burn area or overhead weather, and terrain combine to
• Topography can strongly affect can communicate urgency and produce high-intensity fire
local wind patterns. In moun- give escape directions. behavior. The location of the fire
tainous terrain, surface winds can • Extreme fire behavior often perimeter should be constantly
be highly variable and subject to occurs abruptly. The low-intensi- monitored.
sudden dramatic change, espe- ty backing fire gave no hint of
How Were the West Flank Firefighters Overrun?

Before reaching Main Ridge, the • Collapsing Pocket in the Fire over the West Drainage might
last survivor on the west flank Front. Toward the top of Main have pushed the column of
fireline was knocked from his Ridge, northeast of the west smoke and burning gases directly
feet by a blast of hot air from flank fireline, the vegetation onto the firefighters. The embers
the rear. Most of the twelve who changed from Gambel oak to a and hot air would have quickly
died were still in line, many pinyon–juniper mix (fig. 2). The ignited the surrounding vegeta-
with their packs on. They had fire could advance faster in the tion, and the gust of hot gases
neither discarded their tools flashier pinyon–juniper fuels to might have been experienced
nor made any organized the left of the firefighters than in upslope as a blast from the rear.
attempt to deploy their fire the Gambel oak behind them. To • Rapidly Spreading Fire. The fire
shelters. The dense Gambel oak their right, the fire had already spread upslope much faster than
and smoke in the air likely pre- reached Main Ridge. The fire- the firefighters were traveling.
vented them from seeing how fighters were in a pocket, with By 4:13 p.m., as the firefighters
close the fire really was. fire burning around them on stumbled over oak stobs up the
Circumstances suggest that the three sides. The intense energy last and steepest section of fire-
fire overran them with unusual projected from three sides might line below Main Ridge, their rate
rapidity, perhaps catching them have rapidly ignited the vegeta- of travel would have fallen to 1 to
by surprise; the vegetation all tion around the firefighters, col- 3 feet per second (0.3–0.9 m/s).
around them might have lapsing the pocket and sending a They simply couldn’t outrun the
seemed suddenly to explode in blast of hot air upslope. fire, which by this time was trav-
flames. Three scenarios, per- • Descending Smoke Column. eling up to 9 feet per second (2.7
haps in combination, might As the fire gained on the fleeing m/s). The rapid rate of spread
explain such fire behavior: firefighters, a gust from the might have pushed a blast of hot
strong westerly winds sweeping air upslope.

83
• The safety of an escape route is a On Lunch Spot Ridge, a group deployed fire
function of its length and direc- shelters and survived three separate fire
tion. Escape routes should be runs in about 45 minutes.
chosen based on the potential for
extreme fire behavior. Ideally,
they are short and downhill. and most will be readily apparent Literature Cited
• Underburned Gambel oak pro- to firefighters. Perhaps the most Butler, B.W.; Bartlette, R.A.; Bradshaw, L.S.;
vides no safety zone. The blowup important lesson is that the blowup Cohen, J.D.; Andrews, P.L.; Putnam, T.;
began in green Gambel oak but was normal under the circum- Mangan, R.J. 1998. Fire behavior associ-
ated with the 1994 South Canyon Fire on
continued into the underburned stances. A similar alignment of Storm King Mountain, Colorado. Res.
areas above the west flank fire- environmental factors and extreme Pap. RMRS–RP–9. Ogden, UT: USDA
line, which offered no safety. fire behavior is not uncommon and Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research
Station.
Firefighters do not have “one foot will happen again. What was not Maclean, J.N. 1999. Fire on the mountain:
in the black” when working adja- normal is that 14 firefighters were The true story of the South Canyon Fire.
cent to underburned shrub vege- caught in the blowup and could not New York, NY: William Morrow and Co.
USDA/USDI/USDC (U.S. Department of
tation. escape. By learning from their Agriculture/U.S. Department of the
experience, firefighters can help Interior/U.S. Department of Commerce).
None of the lessons from the South prevent a similar tragedy from 1994. Report of the South Canyon Fire
Canyon Fire is particularly new, occurring elsewhere. Accident Investigation Team.
Washington, DC: USDA/USDI/USDC. ■
Websites on Fire*
Lessons Learned Center sis, a growing online library supports knowledge
management, and two online publications encour-
“Train as you work and work as you train”—that’s
age information transfer.
the motto of the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned
Center. Established in March 2002, the Center aims
Lessons Learned is an interagency program spon-
to improve safe work performance and organiza-
sored by the USDA Forest Service and USDI Bureau
tional learning for Federal and State wildland fire-
of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management,
fighting agencies. After-incident reports and infor-
National Park Service, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife
mation teams provide valuable research and analy-
Service. The Center works in cooperation with the
* Occasionally, Fire Management Today briefly describes Websites brought to our
Federal Fire Aviation Safety Team, National Wildfire
attention by the wildland fire community. Readers should not construe the Coordinating Group, and National Association of
description of these sites as in any way exhaustive or as an official endorsement
by the USDA Forest Service. To have a Website described, contact the managing State Foresters.
editor, Hutch Brown, at USDA Forest Service, Office of Communication, Mail
Stop 1111, 1400 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20250-1111,
202-205-1028 (tel.), 202-205-0885 (fax), hutchbrown@fs.fed.us (e-mail). Found at <http:www.wildlandfirelessons.net>

84
FIRE MANAGEMENT TODAY ANNOUNCES
WINNERS OF 2003 PHOTO CONTEST
Madelyn Dillon
urpassing our expectations and If the judges thought that only one that was their purpose). If an
S any previous year’s entries, Fire

Management Today received
more than 400 images from about
or two images in a category
deserved an award, then they made
only one or two awards in that cat-
unsafe practice was evident, the
image was disqualified from com-
petition, and the award went to the
50 people for our 2003 photo con- egory—First, Second, or Third next highest ranked image.
test. Thanks to everyone who con- Place, based on the merit of the
tributed their best fire-related image. Do you have an image that tells a
images to this year’s competition. story about wildland firefighting?
Finally, the winning images were Would you like to see your photo in
We asked people to submit images reviewed by a fire safety expert to print? Turn to the back inside cover
in six categories: ensure that they did not show for information about our 2004
unsafe firefighting practices (unless photo contest. ■
• Wildland fire,
• Prescribed fire,
• Wildland/urban interface fire, Thanks to Fire Photo Experts
• Aerial resources,
• Ground resources, and We assembled an excellent panel Service Center, Fort Collins,
• Miscellaneous (fire effects, fire of judges, people with years of CO. Barb has been an amateur
weather, fire-dependent commu- photography experience: photographer for nearly 15
nities or species, etc.). years. A collection of her pho-
• Joe Champ is a professor of tos was recently showcased at a
After the contest deadline (the first journalism and technical com- local photography lab.
Friday in March), we evaluated the munication at Colorado State
submissions and eliminated all University, Fort Collins, CO. We also made sure that a profes-
technically flawed images, such as Joe is President of Champ sional safety expert evaluated all
Communication Research. winning photos:
those with soft focus or low resolu-
Before his academic career, Joe
tion. Many of these images were
worked for 10 years as an • Ed Hollenshead is the Forest
otherwise outstanding.
award-winning news anchor, Service’s national fire opera-
reporter, and photographer. tions safety officer at the
Next, our judges reviewed, scored,
• Lane Eskew is an editor with National Interagency Fire
and ranked the remaining images the USDA Forest Service, Rocky Center, Boise, ID. Throughout
based on traditional photography Mountain Research Station, his 30-year career, Ed has been
criteria. They asked questions such Fort Collins, CO. As part of his actively involved in wildland
as: job, Lane evaluates photos for fire, serving in nearly every
publication. His own photos capacity, from “ground-
• Is the composition skillful and have been published in outdoor pounder” to incident com-
dynamic? magazines, books, brochures, mander.
• Are the colors and patterns effec- and other media.
tive? • Barbara Menzel is a computer We sincerely appreciate the time
• Does the image tell a story or programmer for the Forest and skill that our panel members
convey a mood? Service, Forest Management gave to this effort!
Madelyn Dillon is the editor of Fire
Management Today, Fort Collins, CO.

85
First Place, Wildland Fire. Trees silhouetted against the advancing First Place, Prescribed Fire. A backfire consumes dry vegetation during
flames on the Hayman Fire between Denver and Colorado Springs, a prescribed burn on the Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge, NV. Photo:
CO. Photo: Steven Smith, Colorado Springs Fire Department, John Wood, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Klamath Basin National
Colorado Springs, CO, 2002. Wildlife Refuge Complex, Tulelake, CA, 2002.
Second Place, Wildland/Urban Interface. Standing in the path of the

Rodeo–Chediski Fire on the Apache–Sitgreaves National Forest, AZ, this
mobile home park in the community of Heber-Overguard was almost
totally consumed by the intense firestorm. Photo: Thomas Iraci, USDA
Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Portland, OR, 2002.
Second Place, Prescribed Fire. A member of the Bandelier Fire Crew Second Place, Wildland Fire. Flames leap into action on the
gathers limbs to toss on burning piles, part of a thinning project to Monument Fire, Malheur National Forest, OR. Photo: Ben Croft, USDA
create a fuel break in the Jemez Mountains, NM. Photo: Kristen Forest Service, Missoula Technology and Development Center,
Honig, National Park Service, Los Alamos, NM, 2003. Missoula, MT, 2002.

86
Third Place, Wildland/Urban Interface. Grazing llamas watch calmly as Third Place, Wildland Fire. The Eightmile Lookout is peacefully out-
a wildfire draws dangerously close to homes on the Deer Creek Ranch lined against distant smoke from the Missionary Ridge Fire, San
near Selma, OR. Photo: Thomas Iraci, USDA Forest Service, Pacific Juan–Rio Grande National Forest, CO. Photo: Mark Roper, USDA
Northwest Region, Portland, OR, 2002. Forest Service, San Juan–Rio Grande National Forest, Pagosa Ranger
District, Pagosa Springs, CO, 2002.
Third Place, Prescribed Fire. Smoke from all directions is drawn into
the heart of a 3,200-acre (1,300-ha) prescribed burn on the Lower
Klamath National Wildlife Refuge, CA. Photo: Troy Portnoff, U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, Klamath Basin National Wildlife Refuge
Complex, Tulelake, CA, 2002.
Second Place, Aerial Resources. A member of the Mesa Verde National First Place, Aerial Resources. Airtanker 22 drops a load of retardant
Park helitack crew guides helicopter 910 in for a safe landing at an on the Missionary Ridge Fire, San Juan–Rio Grande National Forest,
unimproved helispot during the East Canyon #2 Fire in southwestern CO, 2002. Photo: Ben Croft, USDA Forest Service, Missoula Technology
Colorado. Photo: Bill Pool, National Park Service, Phoenix, AZ, 2002. and Development Center, Missoula, MT, 2002.

87
Second Place, Ground Resources. A crew of firefighters snakes up the
line to work on a large burnout operation on the Toolbox Fire,
Fremont National Forest, OR. Photo: Thomas Iraci, USDA Forest
Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Portland, OR, 2002.
Third Place, Ground Resources. A firefighting crew works diligently to

build a line along a burn on the Manti–La Sal National Forest, UT.
Photo: Victor Bradfield, USDA Forest Service, Caribou–Targhee
National Forest, Pocatello, ID, 1989.
First Place, Miscellaneous. Smoke from the Eyerly Fire on the

Deschutes National Forest, OR, creates a stunning sunrise. Photo: Eli
Lehmann, USDA Forest Service, Mount Baker–Snoqualmie National
Forest, Willard, WA, 2002.
2003 oto
Ph inner
nt
Co sest
Third Place, Aerial Resources. Airtanker 23 drops retardant on the

approaching Rodeo–Chediski Fire, Apache–Sitgreaves National Forest,
AZ, as it engulfs Mule Canyon. Photo: Tom Schafer, Show Low, AZ,
2002.

88
Honorable Mention, Ground Resources. Lassen and Plumas Hotshots prepare to set an offroad backfire on the Blue Cut Fire, San Bernardino National
Forest, CA. Photo: Wade Salverson, Susanville, CA, 2002.
Third Place, Miscellaneous. Aftermath of a structure fire on the

West Plains near Spokane, WA. Firefighters must be ready at a
moment’s notice. Photo: Torben Dalstra, Spokane County Forest
District #10, Airway Heights, WA, 2002.
First Place, Ground Resources. Fire from below casts striking shadows
in the smoke during a night burnout by the Baker River Hotshots on the
Tiller Complex Fire, Umpqua National Forest, OR. Photo: Eli Lehmann,
USDA Forest Service, Mount Baker Snoqualmie National Forest,
Willard, WA, 2002.
Second Place, Miscellaneous. The historic Eightmile Lookout on the

San Juan National Forest, CO, was used until the 1970s. Photo: Mark
Roper, USDA Forest Service, San Juan–Rio Grande National Forest,
Pagosa Ranger District, Pagosa Springs, CO, 2002.

89
GUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORS
Editorial Policy Paper Copy. Type or word-process the manu- essential to the understanding of articles.
Fire Management Today (FMT) is an interna- script on white paper (double-spaced) on one Clearly label all photos and illustrations (figure
tional quarterly magazine for the wildland fire side. Include the complete name(s), title(s), affil- 1, 2, 3, etc.; photograph A, B, C, etc.). At the end
community. FMT welcomes unsolicited manu- iation(s), and address(es) of the author(s), as of the manuscript, include clear, thorough fig-
scripts from readers on any subject related to well as telephone and fax numbers and e-mail ure and photo captions labeled in the same way
fire management. Because space is a considera- information. If the same or a similar manuscript as the corresponding material (figure 1, 2, 3;
tion, long manuscripts might be abridged by the is being submitted elsewhere, include that infor- photograph A, B, C; etc.). Captions should make
editor, subject to approval by the author; FMT mation also. Authors who are affiliated should photos and illustrations understandable without
does print short pieces of interest to readers. submit a camera-ready logo for their agency, reading the text. For photos, indicate the name
institution, or organization. and affiliation of the photographer and the year
Submission Guidelines the photo was taken.
Submit manuscripts to either the general man- Style. Authors are responsible for using wild-
ager or the managing editor at: land fire terminology that conforms to the latest Electronic Files. See special mailing instruc-
standards set by the National Wildfire tions above. Please label all disks carefully with
USDA Forest Service Coordinating Group under the National name(s) of file(s) and system(s) used. If the
Attn: April J. Baily, F&AM Staff Interagency Incident Management System. FMT manuscript is word-processed, please submit a
Mail Stop 1107 uses the spelling, capitalization, hyphenation, 3-1/2 inch, IBM-compatible disk together with
1400 Independence Avenue, SW and other styles recommended in the United the paper copy (see above) as an electronic file
Washington, DC 20250-1107 States Government Printing Office Style in one of these formats: WordPerfect 5.1 for
tel. 202-205-0891, fax 202-205-1272 Manual, as required by the U.S. Department of DOS; WordPerfect 7.0 or earlier for Windows 95;
e-mail: abaily@fs.fed.us Agriculture. Authors should use the U.S. system Microsoft Word 6.0 or earlier for Windows 95;
of weight and measure, with equivalent values in Rich Text format; or ASCII. Digital photos may
USDA Forest Service the metric system. Try to keep titles concise and be submitted but must be at least 300 dpi and
Attn: Hutch Brown, Office of Communication descriptive; subheadings and bulleted material accompanied by a high-resolution (preferably
Mail Stop 1111 are useful and help readability. As a general rule laser) printout for editorial review and quality
1400 Independence Avenue, SW of clear writing, use the active voice (e.g., write, control during the printing process. Do not
Washington, DC 20250-1111 “Fire managers know…” and not, “It is embed illustrations (such as maps, charts, and
tel. 202-205-1028, fax 202-205-0885 known…”). Provide spellouts for all abbrevia- graphs) in the electronic file for the manuscript.
e-mail: hutchbrown@fs.fed.us tions. Consult recent issues (on the World Wide Instead, submit each illustration at 1,200 dpi in
Web at a separate file using a standard interchange for-
Mailing Disks. Do not mail disks with electronic <http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/planning/firenote.htm mat such as EPS, TIFF, or JPEG, accompanied
files to the above addresses, because mail will be >) for placement of the author’s name, title, by a high-resolution (preferably laser) printout.
irradiated and the disks could be rendered inop- agency affiliation, and location, as well as for For charts and graphs, include the data needed
erable. Send electronic files by e-mail or by style of paragraph headings and references. to reconstruct them.
courier service to:
Tables. Tables should be logical and under- Release Authorization. Non-Federal
USDA Forest Service standable without reading the text. Include Government authors must sign a release to
Attn: Hutch Brown, 2CEN Yates tables at the end of the manuscript. allow their work to be in the public domain and
201 14th Street, SW on the World Wide Web. In addition, all photos
Washington, DC 20024 Photos and Illustrations. Figures, illustrations, and illustrations require a written release by the
overhead transparencies (originals are prefer- photographer or illustrator. The author, photo,
If you have questions about a submission, please able), and clear photographs (color slides or and illustration release forms are available from
contact the managing editor, Hutch Brown. glossy color prints are preferable) are often General Manager April Baily.
Contributors Wanted
We need your fire-related articles and photographs for Fire Management Today! Feature articles should be up to about 2,000
words in length. We also need short items of up to 200 words. Subjects of articles published in Fire Management Today include:
Aviation Firefighting experiences
Communication Incident management
Cooperation Information management (including systems)
Ecosystem management Personnel
Equipment/Technology Planning (including budgeting)
Fire behavior Preparedness
Fire ecology Prevention/Education
Fire effects Safety
Fire history Suppression
Fire science Training
Fire use (including prescribed fire) Weather
Fuels management Wildland–urban interface
To help prepare your submission, see “Guidelines for Contributors” in this issue.

90
PHOTO CONTEST ANNOUNCEMENT
Fire Management Today invites Rules For example:
you to submit your best fire-related • The contest is open to everyone. A Sikorsky S–64 Skycrane deliv-
images to be judged in our annual You may submit an unlimited ers retardant on the 1996 Clark
competition. Judging begins after number of entries from any place Peak Fire, Coronado National
the first Friday in March of each or time; but for each image, you Forest, AZ.
year. must indicate only one competi- • You must complete and sign a
tion category. To ensure fair eval- statement granting rights to use
Awards uation, we reserve the right to your image(s) to the USDA Forest
All contestants will receive a CD change the competition category Service (see sample statement
with the images and captions (as for your image. below). Include your full name,
submitted) remaining after techni- • An original color slide is pre- agency or institutional affiliation
cal review. The CD will identify the ferred; however, we will accept (if any), home or business
winners by category. Winning pho- high-quality color prints with address, telephone number, and
tos will appear in a future issue of negatives. e-mail address, if any.
Fire Management Today. In addi- • Digitally shot slides (preferred) or • Images are eliminated from com-
tion, winners in each category will prints will be accepted if they are petition if they have date stamps;
receive: scanned at 300 lines per inch or show unsafe firefighting practices
equivalent. Digital images will be (unless that is their express pur-
1st place—Camera equipment accepted if you used a camera pose); or are of low technical
worth $300 and a 16- by 20-inch with at least 2.5 megapixels and quality (for example, have soft
framed copy of your photo. the image is shot at the highest focus or show camera move-
2nd place—An 11- by 14-inch resolution or in a TIFF format. ment).
framed copy of your photo. To ensure fair evaluation, digital- • The contest judges have signifi-
3rd place—An 8- by 10-inch ly manipulated images will be cant photography experience, and
framed copy of your photo. accepted only if the manipulation their decision is final.
corrected technical flaws (such as
Categories exposure and focus) that could Postmark Deadline
• Wildland fire also be corrected in a convention- First Friday in March
• Prescribed fire al darkroom.
• Wildland-urban interface fire • You must have the right to grant Send submissions to:
• Aerial resources the Forest Service unlimited use USDA Forest Service
of the image, and you must agree Fire Management Today Photo
• Ground resources
that the image will become pub- Contest
• Miscellaneous (fire effects; fire lic domain. Madelyn Dillon
weather; fire-dependent commu- • The image must not have been 2150 Centre Avenue
nities or species; etc.) previously published. Building A, Suite 361
• For every image you submit, you Fort Collins, CO 80526
must give a detailed caption.
Example Release Statement and Contact Information

Enclosed is/are _________(number) slide(s)/print(s)/digital image(s) for publication by the USDA Forest Service. For each image
submitted, the contest category is indicated and a detailed caption is enclosed. I have the authority to give permission to the Forest
Service to publish the enclosed image(s) and am aware that, if used, it/they will be in the public domain and appear on the World
Wide Web.
Contact information:
Name __________________________________________Institution affiliation, if any ______________________________________
Home or business address ________________________________________________________________________________________
Telephone number ________________________________ E-mail address ________________________________________________

91

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Fire

United States Department of Agriculture

Fire Management Today is available on the World Wide Web at <http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/fmt/>.

Ann M. Veneman, Secretary April J. Baily

Dale Bosworth, Chief Robert H. “Hutch” Brown, Ph.D.

Jerry Williams, Director Madelyn Dillon

Martin E. Alexander, Ph.D., and David A. Thomas

On the Cover: CONTENTS

Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003

ase studies done in one country

C can be applied to another, if

Fire Management Today

Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003

Distractions From Making Fire Behavior

Fire Management Today

Suggested Outline for Preparing a Wildland Fire

Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003

Why Write a Case Study?

Fire Management Today

Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003

Fire Management Today

Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003

Fire Management Today

pril 1, 1966, was not a day for

A April Fool jokes in the coastal

Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003

Fire Management Today

uring the more critical fire

D seasons there always seems to

Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003

Fire Management Today

n June 13–17, 1956, the

O Dudley Lake Fire burned

Following the Dudley Lake Fire,

As we began to put together the

Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003

One obvious difference between the

Fire Management Today

Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003

uring a drought period when

D the build-up index is very

Using Weather Maps

Fire Management Today

determined by the radius of curva-

The likelihood of precipitation is

Fortunately, the development of

Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003

mined which could be used as pre-

Strong surface winds are a prereq-

Fire Management Today

The 950–850 millibar (~2,000 feet

The 850–700 millibar (∆T) depicts

The 850–500 millibar (∆T) depicts

Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003

Figure 7—850–500 millibar temperature difference for all fire runs.

Fire Management Today

lthough wildland fires are fair-

A ly common in New Jersey,

Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003