Nuclear Escalation Ladders in South Asia

By:

Rodney Jones
Policy Architects International
April 2011

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 Nuclear Escalation Ladders in South Asia

By

Rodney W. Jones
Policy Architects International

Introduction:

This report consists of a preliminary analysis of the military and nuclear escalation
ladders of India and Pakistan on one hand, and of India vis-à-vis China on the other – the
three geographically contiguous nuclear armed states in Asia. It seeks to assess these
ladders as virtual realities, albeit evolving, of relations among the three nuclear-armed
powers. It attempts to portray how they are perceived in terms of their deterrence
properties, stability dynamics, and related risks of initiating armed conflict or escalating
conflict to higher levels by the national actors concerned.

Since China’s military intrusion into northeastern India in October 1962, India’s
conventional defense policies have included preparatory requirements for war
simultaneously on two fronts – with Pakistan and China. Pakistan in contrast has viewed
India historically as its main threat and prepares for war primarily with India. Today,
however, the Taliban insurgency conditions in Afghanistan and the spread of similar
conditions over recent years within western Pakistan itself poses for the first time the
likelihood that Pakistan must also reckon with two front war contingencies if not
requirements, albeit on a different scale.

Multiple opponents may add rungs to a country’s escalation ladders and influence how
national decision-makers expect to move up or down them, particularly when facing
nuclear-armed opponents. Armed non-state actors and insurgents can impinge on state-to-
state escalation ladders and demand refinements or precipitate ladders of their own. In
major crises, geographical contiguity means the military escalation ladders of Asia’s
nuclear three could be linked in some forms of triangulation.

The underlying concerns of the analysis are that the persistent intensity of competition
and recurrent military crises – especially in the India-Pakistan dyad – defy past
understandings of what nuclear deterrence ordinarily can accomplish and elevate the risks
of outbreak of war and potential for nuclear escalation. The crises also retard political and
diplomatic measures of restraint and normalization of security relations, drive undue
military and technological competition, or ‘arms racing,’ with its toll not only on ordinary
economic and social development but also its technical enlargement and deepening of the
catastrophic damage potential from wars that may erupt. The same competitive intensity
arguably also enlivens clandestine exploitation of extremist organizations and the
opponent’s sub-national divides as available means of sub-conventional warfare,
circumventing or subverting the conventional military defense mechanisms, applying
 4

unpredictable pressures on decision-makers and their public constituencies, and

rekindling or perpetuating deeply-embedded hostilities.

While tensions in the India-China relationship of recent years entail fewer emergencies,
and China does not provoke in India the same volatile public emotions as Pakistan, and
while positive trade and exchange activities also mitigate tension in India’s relationship
with China, the pattern could change for the worse. The deepening military and nuclear
intimacy of China with Pakistan, Chinese sensitivities and growing military presence in
Tibet, the unresolved Himalayan border disputes, the intrinsic maritime competition of
the two “rising” big Asian powers for natural resources, and India’s incremental, longer-
range, nuclear ballistic missile development intended to cover China suggests that the
bilateral military and nuclear relationship eventually may tighten – both on land, and at
sea. This could crystallize recognition of reciprocal nuclear escalation ladders between
the two Asian giants that have not been so apparent or active heretofore.

I. Classical Nuclear Escalation Ladder Constructs:

During the Cold War confrontation between the Superpowers, Herman Kahn gained
some notoriety in American strategic circles by pushing the military envelope in On
Thermonuclear War on “thinking about the unthinkable” (waging nuclear war) 1 and also
– of immediate relevance here -- as the author of On Escalation: Metaphors and
Scenarios set forth a 44-rung, “nuclear escalation ladder” construct (see, below, in
Appendix A). 2

Kahn’s 44-rung nuclear escalation ladder construct proceeds upward from diplomatic
actions and what he calls “subcrisis maneuvering” (rungs 1 to 3), at the bottom of the
ladder, to demonstrations of force, signaling, acts of partial military mobilization, and
legal as well as violent harassment actions under the rubric of “traditional crises” (rungs 4
to 9) – all still under the “nuclear war is unthinkable” threshold. The ladder rises through
ten more rungs under the “intense crises” rubric, yet all still under the “no-nuclear use
threshold”. No-nuclear use rungs 10 to 20 of “intense crises” begin with breaking off
diplomatic relations and rise through acts and declarations of limited conventional war,
nuclear ultimatums, initial population evacuation measures, spectacular demonstration of
force, “justifiable” counterforce attack, and embargo or blockade – all short of firing
nuclear weapons, though presumably putting nuclear forces on alert (a rung not specified,
but implicit in nuclear ultimatums) would have been done.

The remaining twenty-four rungs span the conduct of nuclear warfare from limited war to
all-out nuclear war. The ladder moves in rungs 21 through 25 through demonstrative
1
On Thermonuclear War, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960. Kahn was not an advocate of
initiating nuclear war, of course, but rather of generating preparedness for response and other means of
strengthening deterrence to preclude such a war. His graphic analyses forced strategists to think through
hard choices about nuclear posture, doctrine and capabilities, and offered useful constructs aimed at crisis
control over escalatory processes.
2
On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, N.Y.: Praeger, 1965. (Republished by Transaction Publishers,
New Brunswick, N.J., 2010.
 5

nuclear use and acts of limited nuclear war outside the main opponent’s territory (in this
Cold War context, nuclear actions by the US or NATO in Warsaw Pact Europe, North
Korea, or other areas on the periphery of the USSR, but leaving the USSR itself
“sanctuary”). The ladder continues on to breach the “central sanctuary” in rungs 26 to 31
with “exemplary central attacks” on specific targets in the main opponent’s territory
(demonstrative but still limited attacks on elements of the military, property, population),
to include reprisals, but still short of “central war.” Beyond that, the ladder breaches the
“central war” threshold and rungs 32 to 38 consist primarily of “military central wars,”
i.e., counter-military and counter-force attacks of increasing scope, albeit still beneath a
final “city targeting threshold” so that cities as such are not yet targets. Finally, the ladder
goes through the “city targeting threshold” in rungs 39 through 44, continuing disarming
attacks but with rising levels of counter-city and counter-value salvos through the final
category of “spasm or insensate” war.

It should be noted that Kahn’s treatise On Escalation and its ladder construct was
formulated in the early 1960s when the “massive retaliation” strategic nuclear declaratory
policy of the Eisenhower-Dulles years had gone out of fashion and NATO had risen and
been strengthened to become a more formidable conventional blocking force – even
though still outmatched numerically on the ground by its counterparts on the other side of
the Iron Curtain. This was deemed compensated for by tactical nuclear weapons (TNW)
or theater nuclear forces (TNF), and declaratory policies that allowed for the first use of
TNW in response to surprise ground and air attack from the east. This was the period in
which American strategic nuclear thought and policy were refocused on flexible response
options and counter-force and counter-value distinctions were elaborated in war plans.
Note also that Kahn’s ladder construct does not itself distinguish resort to tactical and
strategic nuclear weapons, or fission and thermonuclear weapons, as different rungs on
the escalation ladder, although operational plans (the evolving SIOP and targeting
databases) and other bodies of strategic military analysis of the time certainly took such
distinctions into account, and they may be present in or emerging as factors in Asian
nuclear war planning and escalation ladders.

Kahn’s nuclear escalation ladder was focused on the bipolar strategic confrontation of the
superpowers and their alliances during the Cold War, and not on third power nuclear
relationships or escalation structures that might intersect, as is now prospectively possible
in Asia. His escalation ladder construct was a heuristic concept for strategic thought and
analysis -- a pedagogical tool to force clarification of potential issues of strategy and
operations, but not a replica in any way of actual operational plans. By positing break
points between rising and increasingly consequential levels of offensive military action,
the escalation ladder offered tools to think through the contemporaneous political and
military contexts of action and, by implication, to define where escalatory action could be
arrested or controlled. Many American decision makers in high office – civilian and
military -- were skeptical that controlling strategic nuclear escalation after the initial
stages of nuclear war was really feasible but few could object to employing disciplined
thought processes that offered to examine or war-game such possibilities, however
theoretically. The nature of such analysis also contributed to understanding of the
operational potential for damage limitation and offered insights into how nuclear
 6

deterrence is made credible or more robust. The analytical use of escalation ladders was
in no way inconsistent with pursuing first order deterrence objectives of forestalling the
outbreak of “hot” military conflict, conventional as well as nuclear. While not invented
specifically as a tool for arms control negotiations, the ladder analysis of escalatory
potentials coupled with detailed knowledge of deployed strategic systems undoubtedly
sharpened the de-escalatory and deep offensive force reduction objectives of such
negotiations, especially in the final decade of the Cold War.

The more immediate purpose the nuclear escalation ladder construct serves here is to
adapt its conceptual framework to decipher constructs that one may infer are being
visualized by the decision makers and military planners in the political and military
relationships of Pakistan with India, and India with China.

II. Basic Elements of Nuclear Escalation Ladders: the South Asian Theaters

For India and Pakistan, geography and demography, conventional military and nuclear
force structures, and operational defense postures are key factors that would determine
the basic rungs and thresholds on their nuclear escalation ladders. These factors are
equally relevant to understanding India’s and China’s potential land-warfare ladders in
the Himalayas.

A. Territorial Boundaries

India and Pakistan face each other across a common international border that loops along
some 1,350 miles, as well as across the Line of Control (LOC) in disputed Jammu &
Kashmir, a modified “cease-fire line,” that snakes north along another 460 miles. The
militaries of the two countries thus deal with boundaries stretching between them for
some 1,800 miles. India’s disputed boundaries with Pakistan in the north intersect with
India’s disputed boundaries with China in Ladakh.

The boundary directly between India and China defined largely by the British-era
McMahon Line (now referred to as the Line of Actual Control or LAC) runs through the
Himalayas from Ladakh in Kashmir south and east for 2,100 miles, interrupted by Nepal
and Bhutan, which have their own northern borders with China of 768 and 292 miles
respectively. India considers the security of Nepal and Bhutan to be part of its sphere of
interest and integral to its own defense against China. As a result, the virtual Himalayan
boundary between India and China, from India’s point of view, actually spans a distance
of some 3,160 miles. China disputes the legality of the McMahon line and occupied
Aksai Chin in Ladakh (adjoining Kashmir and Tibet) while India holds, just east of
Bhutan, the culturally Tibetan valley of Tawang and a large, non-Sinic, tribally-populated
expanse further east that the British had designated as the Northeast Frontier Agency
(NEFA) and which India has subsequently integrated as the state of Arunachal Pradesh.
The brief Chinese military incursion into India in October-November 1962 was in this
northeastern region.

B. The Mountains
 7

India’s and Pakistan’s opposing defense structures and escalation ladders each involve
potential warfare in the mountains (mainly in Kashmir), on the plains, and at sea. Each of
these sectors deserves its own discussion. For instance, the escalatory rungs each has
available would not likely all be the same in the mountains as on the plains or at sea.
Somewhat different ladders may be applicable in each environment, though they likely
would be linked if conflict begins in one and spreads to another (horizontal escalation, at
least, but possibly vertical as well).

One key escalation ladder difference for conflict localized in the Himalayan mountain
sector, for instance, at least for India and Pakistan, is that nuclear threats or resort to
nuclear use specifically in the mountains against each other’s forces seems highly
improbable, for at least two reasons. First, the valleys of the areas in dispute are inhabited
(it would alienate and probably displace peoples whose political support is needed).
Second, targets of high military value that are also susceptible to nuclear attack would be
scarce or non-existent. Offensive ground operations in the mountains are logistically
cumbersome and slow-going, motorized equipment is channeled by terrain, and
accessibility for heavy equipment is severely constrained. Defensive operations, if the
infrastructure has been prepared, hold special advantages in the mountains. In short, use
of nuclear weapons would seem to have no military utility for either India or Pakistan in
the Kashmir context. (Note that in the India-China case and insofar as their land warfare
could begin in the mountains, the same non-nuclear logic may apply today but not
necessarily hold as tightly in the future, a point we will return to later.)

C. Sub-conventional Rungs

With respect to another issue, however, the reciprocal escalation ladders may have a
common feature in each geographical environment. Both India and Pakistan have
practiced sub-conventional warfare against each other in the past, a fact that should not
be brushed aside, even if Pakistan’s operations against India have been more prominent
and become better known. Hence, beneath the conventional threshold, each may be
considered to have sub-conventional rungs available, if not always active, that are
applicable in the mountains, on the plains, and even at sea. India’s conventional
superiority in each of the three geographical environments means that it has far less
incentive to activate or employ sub-conventional means – and in some scenarios could
skip these rungs on their ladder, but the means exist. Arguably, it is the sub-conventional
realm today that most drives nuclear risks in the India-Pakistan dyad.

India and China, however, do not appear to be engaged directly in sub-conventional

warfare against each other. China fears potential Indian support for the Tibetan diaspora
or people of Tibet itself in resisting the heavy weight of Han China, but evidently does
not ascribe clandestine operations of this kind to India today. China may once have fished
in troubled waters in tribal northeastern India, but has not been active in that way for
decades. Nevertheless, if military tension heats up between them, such means are
technically available. Should they be exercised in conflict, they could form lower runs on
nuclear escalation ladders.
 8

D. The Plains

Of the three geographical environments between India and Pakistan, an escalating

conflict that tests nuclear deterrence is most likely to take hold in the plains, even if it
starts elsewhere as in the mountains. The geography and demography of the plains along
the borders between India and Pakistan have important features that differentiate the
Punjab sector from areas further south. The 1948 and 1965 armored battles in the plains
were concentrated in Punjab. It held special strategic significance back then because the
border runs near India’s narrow landline access to Kashmir and also because the Punjab
region around Lahore is considered Pakistan’s cultural and political heartland. The
Punjab sector is densely inhabited and relatively compact – stretching hardly 200 miles
from the foot of the hills below Kashmir to the Punjab state border with Rajasthan on
India’s side, and just below where the Sutlej River bends more sharply west towards the
city of Bahawalpur and the Indus beyond, inside Pakistan.

Punjab has been heavily defended since the early years. But today it is even more so.
Named for five rivers that pass through, the region is also heavily irrigated; rivers and
large canals are natural obstacles to rapid movement of armor and heavy equipment,
especially in the face of air attack. Other obstacles have been built with time. Bunkers
with anti-tank equipment abound. The boundaries in central Punjab can be and at times
are profusely mined. Today, collateral damage is much harder to avoid than in 1965
because urban settlements have proliferated and expanded. Lahore city is only 20 miles
from the border at Wagah and its urban sprawl has narrowed that distance. Amritsar,
Jullundur and other urban areas are also prolific and close on the Indian side of the
border. Former areas available for mechanized maneuver have greatly shrunk.

The rest of the plains stretching south along some 1,100 miles of border contain three
other geographical segments. First, just beyond Punjab, is some 250 miles of arid and
sparcely inhabited but relatively hard terrain in Rajasthan, suitable for rapid armor and
mechanized or maneuver warfare, opposite Pakistan’s narrowed lines of communication
between its own provinces of Punjab to the north and Sindh to the south. This region was
flagged as a logical invasion corridor for India to cut Pakistan in two, by India’s then
Chief of Army Staff, General K. Sundarji in the large area Army exercises known as
“Brass Tacks” in 1985.

Second, further south, the Thar Desert crops up for some 400 miles, extending well into
both countries. Most of it is almost uninhabited except for scattered nomads and their
camels. Much of this area is less attractive (but not impossible) for mechanized ground
warfare due to long logistic lines, intense heat, sandstorms and shifting sand dunes in
which heavy equipment can get bogged down.

Finally, the third segment runs another 250 odd miles to the Arabian Sea coast, about 120
miles south of Karachi, Pakistan’s main commercial port. On Pakistan’s side, part of that
segment is a continuation of the Thar Desert, and part marshy areas close to the coast.
Just south of the border on India’s side is the low-lying Rann of Kutch, swampy from
 9

inundation by brackish water from the coast, and further south the rest of the state of
Gujarat. This third segment is relevant, potentially, to combined ground, air and naval
operations designed to blockade Pakistan from the sea.

E. Strategic Depth

A crucial geographic element of how conventional and nuclear escalation ladders would
operate that needs separate discussion is strategic depth. In the India-China Himalayan
land warfare case, since both countries are territorially large, it is safe to say that both
also enjoy considerable strategic depth. Their estimates of what this means would differ
in certain respects, however, particularly when the nuclear rungs of their escalation
ladders are taken into account. While Indian territory stretches well to the south, India’s
densely populated heartland (Gangetic River basin), the capital at Delhi, and a
considerable fraction of its industrial base is not very far south of the Himalayas.
Moreover, the Arunachal area of India that China lays some claim to, and Assam, are
connected to India territorially, north of Bangladesh, by the narrow, 25-kilometer wide
Siliguri corridor, while the larger northeastern area of India has been fraught for decades
with tribal insurgencies. From China’s vantage point, its military infrastructure in Tibet
lies in relatively sparcely populated regions while the more strategically sensitive
Chinese heartland – particularly its larger cities and most of its industrial base -- are
concentrated at considerable distances from India to the east.

For Pakistan the issue of strategic depth is much more severe, perhaps even agonizing for
its military planners – especially today, with uncertainty about Afghanistan and as Indian
conventional military modernization and international stature advances. This concern
about strategic depth pervades Pakistan’s contemporary military relationship with the
United States on how to deal with the Pashtun insurgencies in Afghanistan and within
Pakistan’s own tribal areas, neutralizing which is regarded as a key to “stabilizing”
Afghanistan. Pakistan’s security establishment has its own strategy which in certain key
respects is at odds with that of the United States and coalition operations in Afghanistan.
Most of Pakistan’s northern population in Punjab lives along or to the east of the Indus
river, which flows south hardly 200 miles west, as the crow flies, from the Indian border
near Amritsar, and the Khyber Pass entry to Afghanistan is just 100 miles further on a
northwesterly angle. To the south, Pakistan’s “green belt” narrows and its trunk lines of
communication opposite Kishangarh in Rajasthan run as close as 40 miles from the
border.

With this problem of narrow strategic depth in mind, Pakistani strategists believe not only
do they require a “friendly” and “stable” state in Afghanistan on their western border, but
that this can only be assured if Indian influence in Afghanistan is minimal. Pakistan’s
India-centric focus has led Pakistan to welcome China’s security support since the 1960s,
and that “all-weather” relationship has deepened over the years with major Chinese
assistance in arms procurement and production, energy technology, telecommunications,
and road and port infrastructure. Insurgency-related instability in western Pakistan
increases Pakistan’s dependency on China. This in turn tends to constrain Pakistan’s
capacity and readiness to seriously explore normalization of relations with India. While
 10

only one of several factors, it seems likely that this current Pakistani preoccupation with
insecurity to the rear (perceived as Indian encirclement) weighs on where Pakistan’s
nuclear threshold is placed on its escalation ladder with India.

F. The Maritime Environment

Conventional wars between India and Pakistan in the past have been limited in space and
time and have caused relatively little collateral damage (with the partial exception of the
1971 war, in which there was a large population displacement into India and India’s
military action was strategically consequential in facilitating the separation of Pakistan’s
eastern province and creation of an independent Bangladesh). Most Indian and Pakistani
planning for conventional war still assume that high-intensity warfare could not be
sustained for more than a few weeks, due to likely shortages of petroleum, oil, and
lubricants (POL). Both countries depend heavily on imports of these items, although
stockpiling and storage are more advanced than in the past. Both are sensitive, however,
to possible interruptions of energy flows from the Persian Gulf. Eruption of war between
them could affect exports due to escalated insurance costs even without either side
moving to blockade the other’s ports, but blockades would likely deter or delay shipping.
These then are areas of action that will also be found on their respective escalation
ladders, but could these come close to the nuclear threshold? We will return to this
question later.

India and China are embarked on building blue water naval capabilities and distant port
facilities that could put them into maritime collision at some point. Their respective needs
for imported energy and raw materials are growing, and lead to commercial activities far
from their borders, but with passage through the Indian Ocean increasingly vital. The
possibility of hot India-China conflict in the maritime domain raises longer term issues
than those in the land warfare environment. The same is true of China’s possible use of
Gwadar port in Pakistan as a naval base. We will return to these questions later.

III. Force Structures and Operational Nuclear Postures – Rungs and Escalation
Ladders

A. The India-Pakistan Dyad

In the Cold War experience with strategic and theater nuclear deterrence, the risks of
nuclear exchange led to considerable superpower caution. American (or NATO) and
Soviet (or Warsaw Pact) soldiers never came to blows. Direct conventional warfare
between them was deliberately avoided on both sides. While there were occasional
harassment episodes (including ‘chest-bumping’) between naval vessels of both sides on
the high seas, ships of either side never fired on the other’s ships. Combat fire against the
other side’s military aircraft was also scrupulously avoided, with the exception of Soviet
surface to air missiles that brought down Gary Power’s U-2 surveillance aircraft in 1960.
Moreover, there were no armed clandestine operations launched by either side that
attacked the other sides’ military facilities or uniformed personnel. It became part of the
shared understandings that open warfare between the two sides was too likely to escalate
 11

to nuclear levels and should be avoided if at all possible. This contributed immeasurably,
most believe, to the stability of mutual nuclear deterrence between the superpowers in
that era. Nuclear deterrence seemed to be effective against offensive conventional attack
at any level by either side in the central European theater and at sea or in the air
anywhere. This did not, needless to say, curb superpower political-military competition
and rivalry of other forms in other parts of the world – recruiting or arming allies, or in
Moscow’s case, supporting armed revolutionary movements. But by fencing off direct
conventional warfare in the central theater, it did reduce the immanent risk of either side
starting up an escalation ladder of direct armed conflict.

This kind of understanding and practice does not seem to have taken hold fully in South
Asia between India and Pakistan since both openly became nuclear-armed states in 1998,
even though they are contiguous and each have among the world’s largest conventional
armed forces facing each other across their shared borders. Their newly unveiled strategic
nuclear deterrents did not preclude the outbreak or prosecution of the Kargil mini-war in
Kashmir in the summer of 1999, nor preclude India from mobilizing for conventional war
and sustaining the confrontation as a threat of such war against Pakistan in late 2001
through August 2002. The terrorist attack on Mumbai in November 2008 – known to
have been planned and organized in Pakistani territory -- led to force alerts on both sides,
but not the same level of brink-of-war confrontation.

In the meantime, however, India’s frustration with the Kargil war and the December 13,
2001 terrorist attack on India’s Parliament that precipitated the 2001-02 confrontation led
senior officers of the Indian Army to articulate and advocate a Pakistan-centric theory of
limited conventional war to develop options to punish Pakistan for what they believed
was officially instigated sub-conventional warfare campaigns against India, both in
Kashmir and in the heart of India. Those theories of limited conventional war have been
converted into an Army “Cold Start” doctrine (now being talked about as “proactive
defense” strategies) and field exercises to strike Pakistan quickly across the border to a
limited depth, in reprisals that, theoretically, will be recognized by the Pakistani military
as falling short of Pakistan’s “red lines” and thus below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold, not
warranting a nuclear response.

While the Army’s Cold Start and proactive defense strategy options have not been given
official blessing as policy by the elected government of India – the civilian leadership is
not on the same page as the Army on this issue -- and have not been adopted as common
doctrine by the Indian Air Force and Navy either, the Army’s efforts to advance these
ideas in procurement and acquisitions, training and exercises as well as in joint doctrine
with the other services continues. Thus, what persists between India and Pakistan is a
dynamic that threatens the stability of nuclear deterrence as a means of deterring war. In
effect, at least part of the military establishment in India seeks to make Pakistan aware
that it is not deterred by Pakistan’s strategic nuclear deterrent from offensively waging
limited conventional war and punitive strikes as a response to sub-conventional attacks.
In so doing, the Indian Army, some believe, intends to call Pakistan’s nuclear resolve as a
bluff. For advocates of Cold Start operations, the objective is to deter sub-conventional
attacks by threat of conventional retaliation, and if that deterrence fails, to use available
 12

opportunities to exact some attrition on Pakistani military forces and other exemplary
targets of military or economic value. The ground force rungs on India’s escalation ladder
are not all solely defensive; some represent offensive, albeit presumably shallow strike,
options.

The common elite and public belief in Pakistan is that the unveiling of its nuclear
weapons in 1998 provided a reassuring deterrent against India’s conventional military
superiority and freedom to apply it aggressively against Pakistan. (Some circles in India
share this understanding that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons had an equalizing and
stalemating effect.) Despite India’s limited war debate, nuclear weapons are still thought
to have made Pakistan much safer from the conventional Indian threat over the last 12
years. Leaders in the Pakistani strategic community point out that India threatened but did
not resort to horizontal escalation in the Kargil War, threatened conventional war in the
2001-02 confrontation at two points (in January and May) but ultimately fell back from
that course, and went on alert after the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008 but
did not mount a major new confrontation similar to 2001-02.

There is virtually no public discussion in Pakistan of other factors that may have
contributed to Indian self-restraint (and that might lead one to question Pakistan’s
interpretation of the efficacy of its nuclear deterrence as the overriding factor). These
would include the possibly indirect deterrent effects on Indian risk-taking of the limited
US presence in Pakistan (established in 2001-02 to support the logistics of the coalition’s
overthrow of the Taliban and continuing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan),
Musharraf’s partial clamp-down on extremist organizations in Pakistan in 2002, the
slowdown in the last decade of militant cross-border operations in Kashmir, and, finally,
India’s huge public relations gains in the international community from its restraint in
and beyond Kargil.

Pakistan’s security establishment has responded to India’s Cold Start development in

several ways. It knows that the Indian Army’s practical efforts to reequip, reorganize,
train, and prepare forward infrastructure for such operations has progressed relatively
slowly, and that the concept was not been enthusiastically endorsed by the Air Force nor
blessed as policy in New Delhi by the civilian powers that be. It is not uncommon to hear
the view that India was bluffing in this sphere in 2001-02 and Pakistan stood up
unflinchingly to its coercive diplomacy. At the same time, Pakistan’s senior military do
not completely write off these Indian concepts and demonstrative Army exercises but
rather consider them an evolving, long term threat. They study them closely, use them for
war gaming, and employ the worst case threats for public support and international
sympathy for their typically India-centric views of Pakistan’s military requirements.
Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Ashfaq Kayani, sponsored a three-phased conventional
military exercise in April-May, 2010 under the rubric Azm-e-Nau (New Resolve) to
generate a response to India’s Cold Start doctrine. 3 These exercises are also said,
3
Arif Jamal, “Pakistan’s Ongoing Azm-e-Nau-3 Military Exercises Define Strategic Priorities,” Terrorism
Monitor, Vol. 8, Issue 18, May 7, 2010. Available at:
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36355
 13

however, to have convinced the senior Pakistani leadership that Cold Start is a flawed
concept and reassured them that the Army possesses effective counter-measures in anti-
tank and air defense equipment using what might be described as swarm techniques to
thwart shallow penetrations and pick apart integrated battle groups, should they actually
materialize.

Pakistan may also be developing other measures to raise India’s risks for starting any
limited war action. These measures could signify a lowering its nuclear threshold, in one
or more of three ways. First, there is a quiet internal debate and there have been informal
indications for some time that Pakistan is developing tactical nuclear weapons (TNW)
and could decide to pre-position them upon warning of a crisis at selected locations not
far from the borders. If Pakistan does move down that path, we may judge for technical
reasons – miniaturization for artillery and other battlefield type weapons is a challenge,
and the fissile material inventory is growing but limited – that Pakistan would most likely
rely on short-range ballistic missile and aircraft delivery of nuclear weapons configured
for use in a tactical mode. This would, of course, add nuclear battlefield rungs to the
escalation ladder and might lower the nuclear threshold to correspond. Second, Pakistan
could alter its long-declared practice of keeping separate the nuclear and trigger
components of warheads as well as the delivery systems on which they would be loaded
or mated, in favor of enhanced readiness, albeit with other risks or tradeoffs. Pakistan
could possibly also shorten the timelines between nuclear alert, weapons assembly,
dispersal and a state of combat readiness for certain systems.

B. India’s Escalation Ladder vs. Pakistan – the Rungs Assembled

Figure 1, below, depicts the “Indian Escalation Ladder – Facing Pakistan,” as a synthesis
of the observations thus far, together with what is known or can be inferred from public
data about India’s operational postures, conventional and nuclear. With 19 rungs, it is a
simpler escalation ladder than Herman Kahn’s 44-rung Cold War superpower construct,
but is thematically similar in construction, with pre-war, conventional, pre-nuclear, and
nuclear war thresholds. The four columns in Figure 1 under the “context and probability
estimate” heading – representing ‘peacetime’, ‘military crisis’, ‘terrorist attack’, and ‘war
outbreak’ scenarios, are not in Kahn’s model and are offered as one way of elaborating
on how the state’s escalation options (India, in this Figure 1 case) can be visualized in the
actual theater, given the pattern of bilateral crises and conflicts India and Pakistan have
experienced in the past along with contextual circumstances at the time. The probability
estimates (rough orders of magnitude) are the author’s intuitive views of the likelihood of
a state (India in this case) being forced at the rung it is on to examine and decide whether
to climb to the next rung on the escalation ladder, or not. 4 Note: These probability
estimates are not estimates of the probability that a state (India in this case) will
necessarily execute the next higher rung on the escalation ladder. Developing probability
estimates of the likelihood of a state moving up from one rung to the next is an exercise

4
The probability estimates given are based on this author’s knowledge of developments in the region,
enhanced by recent field interviews in both countries with military practitioners and security experts.
 14

that requires interactive analysis of opposing escalation ladders, and that exceeded the
time and resources available for this project.
Fig. 1. Indian Escalation Ladder - Facing Pakistan

Response or Initiative Context and Probability Estimate

Rung Military Terrorist War in

Order Thresholds and Rungs Peace Crisis Attack Progress

19 All out counter-value strike (response) ongoing >20

18 Strategic counter-military strike (response) lost >30
17 Proportional retaliation (response) vs. TNW in >95
16 Demonstrative nuclear weapon use (response) the <50
noise
No Nuclear Use Threshold

15 Conventional air campaign vs bases and airfields <30 >50

14 Initiate major war to cripple Pakistani forces <15 <40
13 Full nuclear alert (wpns assembly and transfer) 10 >80
12 Complete full mobilization, all services <30 100

No Major Conventional War Threshold

ongoing
11 Initiate full range of 'shallow' Cold Start options <5 >25 >75
10 Implement limited subset of Cold Start options <10 >50 >90
9 Precautionary nuclear alert (no transfer) >40 >10 >90
8 Ultimatum for Cold Start operations 30 >50 >60
7 Initiate ground and air force mobilization >95 >30 100

No Conventional War Threshold

6 Subconventional (covert) offensive campaign in <10 0 >30

heart of Pakistan
5 Subconventional (covert) offensive campaign in >30 <5 >60
Kashmir
4 Subconventional (covert) retaliation <20 <5 >50

No "Hot" Warfare Threshold

3 Selective areas of military mobilization <5 >60 <5

2 Military signalling (tests, exercises) <20 >35 0
1 Pre-crisis maneuvering, gestures, diplomacy 12 >75 >25

Disagreement - Pol-Mil Rivalry

 15

The depiction in Figure 1 of the Indian escalation ladder differs from Herman Kahn’s
model by explicitly incorporating rungs of sub-conventional action. It also reflects the
possibility that Indian escalation from one rung to another may be either a measured
response (reaction) to an action by Pakistan or a consciously escalatory initiative
(proactive measure), e.g., intended to gain escalation dominance, although in a real two-
way escalatory process the motivations underlying such a distinction may be difficult to
track empirically. It is relevant heuristically, however, to imagining whether and at what
point a state’s decision-makers could settle on a stopping point in the escalatory process.
Their freedom to do so, of course, will be contingent on many variables, not least the
reaction of the opponent and its effects on the contest in progress.

Not surprisingly, the numerical estimates here on certain rungs of the Indian escalation
ladder suggest significant probabilities of being faced with decisions whether to resort to
Cold Start types of operations – moving up the ladder past the “no conventional war”
threshold to rungs of “limited conventional war” – during military crises. The
probabilities that decisions will be made to escalate to higher rungs of Cold Start-type
operations could be expected to become very high in the wake of high-casualty terrorist
attacks or amidst the outbreak of any level of conventional war. They may also be
influenced by what external powers, regional allies, or other regional opponents are doing
in that same context – although third party actions are deemed too complex to map in this
ladder construct.

The estimates in Figure 1 suggest that terrorist attacks by themselves would not have a
pronounced impact in forcing review or decision on Indian nuclear alert levels; the
probability is low that such attacks would cause India to assemble nuclear weapons and
put them in military hands for a high state of nuclear combat readiness. On the other
hand, the numbers suggest a very high probability of India considering a decision to go to
full nuclear alert levels and assembly and transfer of nuclear weapons to military custody
after the outbreak of conventional war, even limited conventional war initiated by India,
but particularly in the event of a major conventional war. This judgment tends to run
counter to a common view of India’s supposedly recessed nuclear deterrent as a relaxed
posture that would not need to be activated save in the event of a prior nuclear (or other
WMD) attack on India or on its military forces. 5

The rungs depicted on India’s escalation ladder here reflect skepticism of the credibility
of India’s actually executing its 2003 amended declaratory policy (so-called doctrine) on
nuclear weapons, which calls for “massive retaliation” against the perpetrator of any
nuclear (or WMD) attack on India or its military forces, including such attacks on those
deployed or operating outside India’s borders. The intermediate rungs depicted here are
meant to suggest that India would be much more likely to consider and respond to limited
Pakistani nuclear attack in a proportional (and thus initially limited) way rather than to
escalate immediately to the top of the ladder with large strategic counterforce strikes let
alone massive city and countervalue strikes. At the same time, the figures presented still
admit a significant chance of India considering the option of massive nuclear retaliation,

5
Note that there is ample wiggle room in this posture. Arguably, India’s NFU declaratory posture would
evaporate instantly with any nuclear use by the opponent, even as limited as a demonstration shot.
 16

ultimately, in the event of a major conventional war compounded by any escalation to

strategic nuclear exchange warfare.

Bear in mind that this Indian escalation ladder as well as those of Pakistan, and of India
versus China presented below, are heuristic constructs imagined to clarify the potential
nature of the escalatory process under, and up through, nuclear warfare conditions. Their
approximation of reality can be improved by discussion and further study and analysis.
They obviously do not represent the skeletal structure of actual war plans nor can they
begin to capture the variety of operational alternatives. Their value is in prodding a
clearer, policy-oriented understanding of the conditions of escalation and factors that
might be used as controls and as escalatory preventative mechanisms. They can also be
useful for generating constructs for negotiated threat reduction and arms control.

C. Pakistan’s Escalation Ladder vs. India

Pakistan’s escalation ladder depicted below in Figure 2 is not a mirror image of India’s
but closely follows it in certain respects since the bulk of Pakistani war planning centers
on its assessment of Indian capabilities and what it learns over time about Indian military
doctrine and planning. Pakistan’s operational nuclear posture currently emphasizes
holding hostage value targets deep in Indian territory by the potential launch of nuclear-
equipped, mobile ballistic missiles, along with the selective use of nuclear-equipped
strike aircraft and land-attack cruise missiles that are still in development. This clearly is
a deterrent against Indian nuclear surprise attack on Pakistan out of the blue, though few
believe India would actually contemplate that scenario in foreseeable conditions. While
unequal to India’s, Pakistan also possesses formidable conventional ground forces and a
respectable air force that are intended to provide “conventional deterrence” against India
planning a major conventional war against Pakistan. The conventional deterrent value of
those forces is surely is significant in its own right in today’s circumstances, even with
the diversion of effort to contain the current insurgency in the Pashtun borderland to
Pakistan’s rear.

The primary dilemma seen in Pakistan’s strategic nuclear posture is whether it can make
nuclear deterrence effective against (i.e., essentially neutralize) India’s unilateral threat to
initiate conventional ground, air force and naval capabilities in offensive modes against
Pakistan, in limited, punitive warfare in response to high casualty terrorist attacks in its
interior, as postured in India’s Cold Start and proactive defense strategies planning. If it
can not, and the Indian Army at least signals that it is not itself necessarily so deterred by
Pakistan’s strategic nuclear deterrent, then Pakistani strategists may fear India would take
advantage of further conventional escalation during hostilities to pursue more
fundamental goals, incrementally, such as to ravage Pakistan’s conventional warfighting
capabilities, threaten its strategic assets by conventional air attack, or, ultimately, even
attempt to break the country into pieces. These are worst case scenarios, of course, and so
understood by Pakistani planners, but their image of the rolling snowball gathering size
and momentum cannot be totally dismissed. It is their views, not those of outsiders, that
will matter in a showdown.
 17

Fig. 2. Pakistani Escalation Ladder - Facing India

Response or Initiative Context and Probability Estimate

Rung Military Terrorist War in
Order Thresholds and Rungs Peace Crisis Attack Progress

18 All out counter-value strike ongoing >20

17 Strategic counter-military strike >30
16 TNW employment vs. Indian ground forces >95
15 Nuclear limited action vs. naval blockade lost >30
14 Covert nuclear employment at sea in >50
13 Demonstrative nuclear weapon use >75

No Nuclear Use Threshold the

noise
12 Selective counter-military air strikes >50
11 Full nuclear alert (wpns assembly and transfer) >80
10 Complete full mobilization, all services 100

No Major Conventional War Threshold

ongoing
9 Blocking, limited escalation vs. Cold Start >50 >90
8 Precautionary nuclear alert (no transfer) >40 >10 >90
7 Prepositioning to counter Cold Start options >60 >50 100
6 Initiate ground and air force mobilization >95 >30 100

No Conventional War Threshold

5 Subconventional (covert) offensive campaign in <10 0 >30

heart of India
4 Resumption of (covert) offensive campaign in >10 >50 >60
Kashmir

No "Hot" Warfare Threshold

3 Selective areas of military mobilization 15 >60 >35

2 Military signalling (tests, exercises) 25 >50 0
1 Pre-crisis maneuvering, gestures, diplomacy >50 >75 15

Disagreement - Pol-Mil Rivalry

Until a year or two ago, Pakistani military leaders (as well as their Indian counterparts)
sensibly dismissed any need for, and therefore serious consideration of, reinforcing
conventional forces with tactical nuclear assets and operations. The results of Pakistan’s
Azm-e-Nau exercises even now suggest that Pakistan’s conventional response to actual
Indian Cold Start intrusions would block or neutralize them. But this still means Pakistan
could be forced into intense conventional warfighting, and it reveals the perceived
weakness of its conventional (and nuclear) defense posture in effectively deterring
actions that would precipitate that fight. In this light, informal indications that Pakistan is
 18

considering not only a tightening up of nuclear preparatory procedures but adoption of

some TNW capability may have to be taken seriously as a possible augmentation of
battlefield operations in the war in the plains environment, and possibly also in a
maritime setting. This is considered here, therefore, as a likely differentiating feature of
Pakistan’s escalation ladder from India’s in the near term.

Figure 2 suggests that Pakistan would be somewhat cautious during military crises in
pursuing (or allowing) major sub-conventional actions against the heart of India, but
probably would be inclined to consider stepping up such efforts in Kashmir and the
Indian interior if attacked in a similarly sub-conventional manner by India, particularly
when there are signs conventional war is expected to break out. At the bottom of the
ladder (pre-war threshold), the numbers suggest Pakistan might be more energetic in its
diplomatic efforts than India – although the focus might well be more on enlisting
international attention than reaching a political solution directly with India.

Between the lower threshold of “no conventional war” and that above it of “no major
conventional war,” the ladder’s rungs reflect engagement in limited conventional warfare.
The specific rungs and their associated probability figures for Pakistan are intended to
indicate that its options of military action at this level could involve intense but limited
responses well below its own nuclear threshold. These options include escalatory reprisal
designed to nullify the military effects of India’s initiatives. If limited conventional war
escalates in reciprocal actions to major conventional war, however, while Pakistan has a
very strong defensive capability and short lines of logistical support in Punjab, the ladder
suggests Pakistan has fewer non-nuclear response rungs (less space, shorter time) to
counter the opponent’s forces, or be able to sustain its own blocking effort, if major
conventional warfare continues, and especially if it goes all-out (e.g., a “fight to the
finish”).

Above the nuclear use threshold, the ladder suggests Pakistan is likely to visualize,
conceive and perhaps operationalize a few more rungs of “flexible response” than India,
moving in degrees from nuclear warnings (demonstration shots) to limited nuclear action,
with some options at sea, and the main one on land being the exercise of tactical nuclear
weapons against ground forces, either on the battlefield or to the rear to interdict Indian
logistics and support facilities. Reaching this level presumes conventional warfare has
begun, is continuing, and being intensified. Flexible nuclear response rungs would reflect
judgments that Pakistani leaders, pressed hard, may believe they would have space to
maneuver with TNW operations between India’s offensive conventional operations and
India’s resort to massive retaliation as a strategic measure. Indian recognition of this kind
of Pakistani planning ahead of time could enhance Pakistan’s overall deterrence of India
executing its limited conventional war strategies. When push comes to shove, this may be
a plausible analytical judgment, but the underlying TNW trend surely poses heavy risks
to both Pakistan and India. There is no way to be sure once nuclear weapons are actually
being fired on forces in the field that the nuclear escalatory process will be stopped. It
would almost require that one side stand down peremptorily.
 19

Separate excursions to determine whether the Chinese military relationship with Pakistan
influences Pakistan’s escalation ladder with India or Indian views of its own deterrence
and escalatory options opposite Pakistan are warranted, but are not likely to offer very
definitive results from reviewing past experience. The main effect of the China
relationship on Pakistan’s ladder today probably is a higher level of Pakistani confidence
and resilience in face of India’s military modernization and experimentation with limited
war concepts and future advanced technology solutions in surveillance and missile
defense against Indian progress in those fields.

China’s military relationship with Pakistan has been extensive and multi-dimensional in
the category of arms supply, which does much to enable Pakistan’s robust ground forces,
sustain modernization of air force combat and air defense capabilities. Missile supply and
transferred missile production capabilities clearly helped underwrite Pakistan’s nuclear
delivery capabilities and thus its strategic deterrent against India. China also provides
positive political, technical and financial support of Pakistan’s political and economic
development priorities – and is forgiving of domestic political instability in Pakistan as
long as it is not linked with Uighur dissident groups in Xinjiang province in western
China or threatening to Chinese workers in Pakistan. China also has a stake in its bilateral
resolution with Pakistan of formerly disputed territorial boundaries between the Northern
Territories of former Jammu & Kashmir.

Although increasingly close and described as an “all weather relationship”, China thus far
has not signed anything resembling a classical mutual defense treaty with Pakistan, 6 nor
ever offered direct military support to Pakistan in the recurring conflicts with India, not
even in the 1971 War just south of its Himalayan borders with India (not far from where
China invaded Indian territory in 1962). During the brief Kargil War, all evidence
suggests that China advised Pakistan to withdraw from the conflict rather than attempt to
pursue any advantageous military outcome. China put no specific diplomatic pressure on
India as a favor to Pakistan during the ten months-long 2001-02 confrontation. China has
also kept its relationship with Pakistan hands off and deferential with respect to the linked
insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Pakistan’s emerging two-front war problem is insurgency-related and unlikely to exceed

the dimensions of a low-intensity conflict in the foreseeable future. Afghanistan is also
very unlikely itself to present a state-to-state, modern, mechanized warfare threat to
Pakistan in any foreseeable future. A formal depiction of a separate escalation ladder for

6
In April 2005, Pakistan and China signed a “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-Neighborly
Relations” that went into effect on January 4, 2006. The main defense-related obligation in this treaty is for
each side to refrain from “joining any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the sovereignty, security and
territorial integrity of the other side”. The treaty’s terms link Pakistan formally to China’s “one China”
policy vis-à-vis Taiwan. The parties also undertake to “cooperate on both bilateral and multilateral basis to
crack down on terrorism, separatism and extremism, as well as … organized crimes, illegal immigration
and illegal trafficking in drugs and weapons.” China has referred to it as “an important legal foundation for
the Strategic Partnership.” The text of the treaty has not officially been made public in Pakistan, although
some newspaper reports have quoted excerpts from it taken from the Chinese press. For Chinese
publication of the treaty text, see People’s Daily Online, at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200504/06/eng20050406_179629.html
 20

Pakistan on these issues probably would not uncover any startling new ideas. In general,
the insurgencies tend to deprive Pakistan of what former COAS General Mirza Aslam
Beg first sponsored as a vision of a friendly (or subordinate) Afghanistan in Pakistan’s
back yard that would part of Pakistan’s “sphere of influence” and a reservoir of strategic
depth. For the near term, the “Pakistani” Taliban insurgency also strains Pakistan by
diverting roughly 100,000 regular military personnel (added to the 30,000 Frontier Corps,
a paramilitary) from their normal stations close to the eastern border with India. There is
also some diversion of Army helicopters and, for brief intervals, even Air Force F-16s to
cover targets with precision weapons or provide close air support in battles against
insurgents. This definitely adds stress to Pakistan’s India-centered escalation ladder by
reducing the margins for error of conventional ground operations. It certainly is one of
the factors that has made US-Pakistan security cooperation particularly brittle over the
last three or four years.

Beyond that, what has attracted some attention and is worthy of mention is the
geographical fact that the domestic instability that radiates outward from the insurgency
in Pakistan’s northwest constrains the security and utility of the natural concealment
available in the rising terrain of that hilly region to the west of the Indus River, for the
deployment of fixed and dispersal of mobile strategic assets, since they could be (at least
theoretically) penetrated or overrun by insurgent and extremist organizations. Al Qaeda
or Taliban seizure of nuclear weapons from Pakistan’s tightly organized command and
control system may be a remote scenario, but not one that the Pakistani military or its
friends can leave to chance. Nor is this overlooked as a shared regional concern in India,
and as an unstated additional cause for its own restraint vis-à-vis Pakistan -- at least at the
top level of elected political leadership.

D. The China-India Dyad

The Indian strategic community has since 1962 viewed India’s relationship with China in
geopolitical and competitive terms. China’s advent as a nuclear weapons state after 1964
added a nuclear dimension that the Indian elite foresaw and responded to in stages,
developing its own nuclear weapons capability and delivery systems, seen in retrospect as
a relatively gradual pace over nearly five decades. As China first around 1975, and India
later about 1991 (coinciding with the end of the Cold War) began their economic “rise”
as big powers in Asia, the sense of competition has sharpened. On a bilateral and
strategic level, India feels this more intensely than China, which has had to contend
geopolitically and strategically with the former Soviet Union (now Russia), Japan, and
the United States.

Until relatively recently, China appears to have regarded India strategically as a third
order concern, rather than a high priority. China has given a more strategic importance to
India only since the turn of the century, roughly correlated with its growing commercial
maritime dependence on distant sources of petroleum and minerals, especially in the
Middle East and Africa, but also more recently in Latin America. India’s nuclear break
out in 1998 may have been an added factor, but probably not a driving one. The growing
U.S. interest in India over three administrations also played a part. China’s reach for oil,
 21

gas, and minerals has not been exclusively maritime but has also gone over land, and
resulted in successful oil and gas pipelines connecting Central Asia to western China in
the last three years. Nevertheless, the bulk carriage on maritime routes remains crucial.
India’s geographical position which can influence the security of these routes from
China’s littoral on the Pacific Ocean past Singapore and the Malacca Straits, and onward
through the Indian Ocean to Africa and the Persian Gulf, gives India potential naval
leverage that China would be foolish to ignore. China has also encouraged a rapidly
growing and mutually beneficial trade relationship with India, with a total value reaching
about $60 Billion in 2010, so their relationship has important cooperative dimensions,
and is not overwhelmingly zero-sum. Both have worked to tamp down bilateral issues of
potential confrontation.

That said, both India and China are pursuing blue-water naval expansion, including
aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submarines. At least in some cases, their long-
distance submarines are, or are expected to be, nuclear weapon-equipped. Modern naval
development is so costly, however, that the R&D and production schedules on both sides
stretch over many years. India has expanded the naval share of its defense budget, but
China has more money to spend, and is already exercising its military access to the
Arabian Sea with rotating, conventionally-armed naval flotillas (primarily destroyers and
frigates, but also some landing-support ships). In the longer term, maritime nuclear
escalation ladders for India and China will come into play and should be mapped. They
probably will not be exclusively dyadic, however, because many other national navies,
including the U.S. Navy, operate in the same waters.

For the time being, Indian and Chinese maritime escalation ladders do not reflect the
operational deployment of strategic nuclear platforms within the Indian Ocean and their
operational conventional naval assets would not impinge much on their land border
confrontations in the Himalayas. Some day this picture is likely to change. But the
bilateral escalation ladders that matter operationally between them today have a land
warfare focus.

Note: The current report depicts an Indian Escalation Ladder facing China (in Figure 3,
below), but stops short of depicting the Chinese counterpart ladder facing India.
Depicting a counterpart Chinese ladder would be feasible with more time and resources,
but would need to overcome the fact that publicly available data on Chinese military
deployment and infrastructure in Tibet and the Tibetan Autonomous Republic (TAR) is
scarcer as well as currently in flux and describing rungs on the ladder might be somewhat
sketchier and less reliable.

E. India’s Escalation Ladder vs. China

India has spent nearly five decades and great effort since the Chinese PLA incursion in
1962 to fortify its conventional defenses along the over 3,100 adjusted miles of the Line
of Actual Control (LAC) facing China in the Himalayas. Much progress has been made
in physical infrastructure and force development that makes a repeat of that humiliation
quite unlikely. The terrain, however, gives significant combat advantage to Chinese
 22

forces based on the Tibetan plateau (“roof of the world”) since access to India is downhill
through mountain corridors, while Indian forces generally would have to fight and
resupply through similar corridors uphill. The inhabited areas of Tibet range from 3,500
to 4,500 meters (the average altitude of 4,000 meters is 16,000 feet). The drawbacks for
Chinese forces include water scarcity in the summer, generally low temperatures with
snow or frost for 6 months of the year, the thin air (low oxygen) for those not properly
acclimatized, and the load limitations on aircraft and transport helicopters landing or
taking off at those altitudes. These factors also affect Indian forces prepositioned at or
near those altitudes, and their aerial resupply.

India has built access roads into the mountains, border outposts, support bases, and
numerous airfields below or in the foothills. India built and has maintained 10 mountain
divisions each with nested artillery brigade components for many years, and reportedly
has raised, trained, and equipped two more mountain divisions of 36,000 troops each
since 2008. It has incrementally built and reinforced logistical support depots, truck
transport fleets, and light transport aircraft for mountain operations, and has also beefed
up sub-regional paramilitary forces. As concerns about what Indian officials have
described as a “new assertiveness among the Chinese” in Tibet have risen in 2009 and
2010, India has made new commitments to strategic road-building and airstrips near the
LAC (not only along the northeast but also in Ladakh near Aksai Chin), has mooted
raising a new mountain “strike corps”, is redeploying four squadrons of Su-30MKI
advanced strike aircraft (two squadrons each to Tezpur and Chabua air bases in Assam),
reportedly has bolstered air defense with a network of transportable low-altitude radars in
the east, and also expects to use AWACs and drone aircraft for surveillance in those
sectors. 7 From India’s point of view, the coupling of the land warfare relationship with
China in the Himalayas is tightening.

What India is reacting to is China’s push over the last several years to build up
commercial as well as military infrastructure in Tibet, including roads, rail lines,
commercial airports and military airfields. 8 Some of the transport routes are linked by
road to the Karakorum highway and corridor in Pakistan. The vast and still sparcely
populated Tibetan buffer area is beginning to be integrated commercially as well as
fortified by China and connected with overland road and rapid transit rail links to its
much denser military infrastructure to the northeast (Qinghai) and directly east to
Chengdu (Sichuan basin). The high-altitude Qinghai-Lhasa rail line running southwest to
Lhasa from Xining in Qinghai province was completed in 2006 and connects to the east
and south through interior rail lines to many of the major cities and provinces of China.
China has also started building an extension of the Qinghai-Lhasa railway to connect
Lhasa to its southwest with Xigaze (Shigatsey), with plans to extend the rail line further
on south to the border of Nepal by 2014. A new airport at Xigaze also began operating in
2010. Another spur from the Qinghai-Lhasa railway is soon to be built to connect Lhasa
with Nyingchi, which is less than 50 kilometers from the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh.

7
See IISS, The Military Balance 2011, p. 212.
8
Ibid., pp. 211-212.
 23

Fig. 3. Indian Escalation Ladder - Facing China in the Himalayas

Response or Initiative Context and Probability Estimate

Rung Military Terrorist War in
Order Thresholds and Rungs Peace Crisis Attack Progress

20 All out counter-value strike ongoing <20

19 Strategic counter-military strike <10
18 Proportional retaliation vs. TNW >95
17 Demonstrative nuclear weapon use <30
not
No Nuclear Use Threshold
in
16 Reciprocate, if China installs SRBMs >75
15 Conventional air campaign vs bases and airfields the >50
14 If no choice, wage local conventional campaign 100
13 Full nuclear alert (wpns assembly and transfer) current >80
12 Complete full mobilization, all services 100
deck
No Major Conventional War Threshold ongoing
of
11 Reinforce forward positions >60 >90
10 Precautionary nuclear alert (no transfer) >40 cards >90
9 Reinforce mountain divisions, stockpiles >60 >60
8 Alert ground and air forces all sectors >95 on 100

No Conventional War Threshold either

7 Roll back infringements on forward access >50 >90 side

6 Local patrol skirmishes over border lookouts >50 >90
5 Expanded naval ops perimeter, showing the flag >30 >75

No "Hot" Warfare Threshold

4 Upgrading roads and defense infrastructure >60 100

3 Military signalling (Agni missile tests, exercises) 20 >60
2 Pre-crisis maneuvering, gestures, diplomacy 30 >75
1 Accelerating strategic asset acquisition 15 >75

Disagreement - Geopolitical Rivalry

Nyingchi also has a new airport. The Government of India has recently acknowledged in
Parliament that this infrastructure shortens the time for China to surge regular troops into
Tibet near the LAC. 9

9
See report on Indian Defence minister’s answers to questions in Parliament on China’s activity in Tibet,
by Rajat Pandit, “China has five airbases, extensive rail-road networks in Tibet: Antony,” Times of India,
March 11, 2011, reference on line at: http://articles.timesofindia.indatimes.com/2011-03-
08/india/28668105_1_airbases-sukhoi-squadrons-tar
 24

It is worth emphasizing as context for India’s escalation ladder vs. China that there has
never been any credible evidence of China deploying nuclear missiles or other nuclear
weapons in Tibet proper – and certainly not close to the LAC, though this has been
claimed by Indian analysts in think tanks and reported in the media frequently over at
least three decades. China is also not known to have TNW in the classical battlefield or
naval forms, although it tested some low-yield weapons and probably considered TNW
development at certain points of time. The paucity and unreliable quality of information
about China on this subject, including contradictory findings released by US intelligence
sources since the 1980s, is reviewed in considerable detail as of 2006 by the Nuclear
Information Project. 10 The closest Chinese nuclear missile bases to the Tibet
Autonomous Republic (TAR) would appear historically to be more than 1,000 kilometers
from the LAC to the north, east, and south, for example, in Qinghai province (Delingha)
and Yunnan province (Jianshui). China could, as could India or Pakistan, use strike or
transport aircraft to deliver gravity nuclear bombs (tactical use) in a battlefield context.

As the land-based relationship with India tightens up, China could also deploy dual-
capable SRBMs and MRBMs in Tibet facing India, but there have been no signs so far of
it doing so. This kind of response may be conceivable in the future, however, as India
develops, tests, and is expected eventually to deploy nuclear-tipped, land-based ballistic
missiles (Agni III, Agni V) with ranges capable of reaching cities in China’s interior.

India’s Escalation Ladder Facing China in the Himalayas in Figure 3 suggests that there
are many rungs of escalation prior to conventional warfare and in conventional warfare to
exercise below the nuclear threshold and that there probably would be reluctance to
escalate at the higher rungs to a strategic nuclear exchange. This does not rule out
potential instability but it suggests that the conventional level of deterrence has more
efficacy for both sides than can be counted on in the India-Pakistan dyad. This would
seem to be consistent with several factors. While NFU as a declaratory policy is no
guarantee of nuclear “no first use”, China was the first strategic weapons state to adopt
this formulation. Hence, for China it not only has historical resonance but may have some
practical credibility. After all, China also faces the largest nuclear powers, Russia and the
United States. It would be problematic for China to be caught up in an intense nuclear
confrontation with India that could cause it to let its guard down in the other
relationships, and natural for it to steer away from this possibility. China may regard the
Indian NFU statements as usefully reciprocal, at least in the political sense.

While China has shown no interest to date in extending its nuclear deterrence of India to
Pakistan, it is remotely conceivable that changing circumstances in South Asia could
draw it toward Pakistan in that fashion. Such a linkage between the Pakistani and Chinese
nuclear escalation ladders facing India, were it to develop, almost certainly would add a
quantum level change in tension between India and China. The judgment here is that
China is most likely to shy away from extended deterrence of this kind under foreseeable

10
See the report, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning, November 2006, chp. 2
(“Estimates of Chinese Nuclear Forces”), pages 64ff, accessed at http://www.nukestrat.com/china/Book-
35-125.pdf .
 25

circumstances. The one factor that might persuade reexamination of this issue would be
Pakistan’s potential grant to China of freedom to use Gwadar port as a naval base, with
military storage and resupply facilities on Pakistan’s territory. A Chinese naval presence
of this kind would not necessarily compel China to formally extend nuclear deterrence
over Pakistan, but if it were to have a substantial naval presence in Gwadar, it would
complicate any offensive Indian military action against Pakistan.

III. Threat Reduction and Arms Control

Bilateral American and Soviet success with negotiated nuclear arms reduction
agreements ultimately contributed to the winding down of the Cold War, and set the stage
for multilateral agreements that greatly reduced conventional arms levels in Europe and
spread new forms of transparency. Above all, these measures dispersed the clouds of
unlimited nuclear war. They also helped advance international treaties and a wide range
of other threat reduction and dismantlement measures related to stored nuclear warheads
and fissile materials and large former arsenals of chemical and biological weapons. The
various types of arms control and threat reduction measures, and especially those related
to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were seen as contributors to stability and
security. They received strong military support from the participant countries in part for
their additional contribution to predictability, a value in defense planning and confidence
in national security.

In light of these East-West developments, many of which were unprecedented and

extraordinary at the time, it is natural for westerners to wonder why arms control is
resisted so strongly in Southern Asia, a region where conventional war has been recurrent
and nuclear arms have taken hold in two new nuclear states since the Cold War. The
nuclear escalation ladders highlight the added risks of nuclear weapons to security and
national development and make the case implicitly for arms control, but they do not
specifically explain why arms control has so little appeal or traction.

Some tentative explanations of the low appeal of arms control may still be useful, and
may even help to turn up new ideas on how to enhance the appeal of threat reduction and
arms control measures as circumstances change.

One factor clearly is that the relationships among India, Pakistan and China contain
significant asymmetries of military capability and relative security. The Cold War
experience suggests that negotiated arms control is more likely to advance when
opponents have approximate parity as starting points and can visualize gains to their
security from reducing their defense burdens and uncertainties about deterrence on a
reciprocal basis. Redressing fundamental asymmetries related to major differences in
size, resource endowments or geography is not necessarily practical, but improving
relative security may be. In dyadic relationships, opponents can, at least in principle,
work to reduce mutual dangers from uncertainty about the efficacy of deterrence. The
objective of deterrence is to dissuade the exercise of great threat. Threat reduction tools
can be employed to reduce both the likelihood and the perception that an available great
threat will be exercised and the opponent’s deterrence thereby necessarily fail. Outside
 26

partners may be able to offer constructive assistance to regional opponents in the same
vein.

A second factor lies in ingrained perceptions that arms control is a tool that frequently
undercuts international status. This has been particularly evident in India’s stance on the
NPT, whose obligations India labeled as unequal and politically discriminatory. India sets
a high bar on standards for its participation in international agreements. It is also reluctant
to participate in bilateral agreements that could diminish its international status. China
has had similar reservations. Pakistan is somewhat more receptive to bilateral arms
control than India but often sees it as a mechanism for equalizing its position vis-à-vis
India.

A third factor has been aversion to processes that may hobble freedom of national
development. Both China and India, but also Pakistan, started in the post-World War
Two environment from positions lower on the scale of science and technology than
Europe, the USSR, and the West. As “rising” powers now making significant progress in
redressing their perceived technology deficiencies, they are loath to engage in
negotiations that they fear may subtly hamper that progress.

A fourth factor may well be a perspective that nuclear risks can be managed successfully
and that they have been lowered over time by observation, learning, and vicarious
historical experience. This perspective may be held more distinctly by India and China
than Pakistan, but arises from watching the strategic arms race compulsions of the USSR
and the U.S., and deeming them excessive, a model to avoid. While this viewpoint may
seem complacent and even unrealistic to those who were caught up in the Cold War, it
may have some virtue if it does lead India and China to avoid their own excesses.

Finding ways to advance threat reduction and arms control will still exist, with
opportunities emerging through changing circumstances, or even suddenly from a
catastrophic development. The burdens of maintaining deterrence stability to contain
threats by posing threats and refinement or expansion of military capabilities ultimately
turn a spotlight on other less herculean approaches to enhancing security.

It is worth keeping in mind that even though the relationship between India and Pakistan
has been highly competitive and crisis prone militarily, a few incremental advances have
been made in nuclear stability, some unilateral, and some bilateral. Pakistan has worked
hard and successfully to develop a tight nuclear command and control system and India
evidently believes it has done the same. Three specific and meaningful areas of
agreement, albeit narrow, have arisen from bilateral initiatives. One is the agreement to
give nuclear installations sanctuary from attack, with relevant, periodic data exchange. A
second is the agreement to notify the other of impending missile tests. A third is the
regulation of military aircraft with a no-fly zone close to the borders. The hotline
agreements are also attractive in principle but are not really used for the intended purpose
and are left with little more than public relations value.
 27

A substantive measure developed in track two dialogues is to agree on eliminating or

restricting the use of nuclear-capable short-range missiles. This could be a useful step
towards enhancing nuclear deterrent stability, but it remains to be seen whether it can be
suitably defined and actually come to fruition. If it did it would also add some weight to
the utility of track two dialogues, which in any case have been useful for encouragement
of understanding and restraint in the official arena. Even more valuable would be military
to military talks, India with Pakistan, and India with China. China and the U.S. have their
own cautious bilateral history of such talks. The impediments to such talks between
China and India should not be insuperable.

Conclusions

This exercise in mapping dyadic nuclear escalation ladders is one approach to clarifying
escalation dynamics and a stimulus to practical thought about how to control and
appropriately stop military escalation so that it does not culminate in nuclear war and
catastrophe. The ladders depicted help to highlight the risks of employing limited
conventional war offensively and suddenly in an attempt to deter subconventional
actions, and serve to encourage policy thinking about alternative means to accomplish
that end. Under the nuclear overhang, the most obvious answer is to give up or repress
subconventional means, a positive course of action that may be called for on both sides.

The Indian and Pakistani ladders also highlight the special characteristics of asymmetry
in geography and unequal conventional military capability, and the impact on the weaker
of the conventional imbalance becoming worse over time, while insurgency compels a
shift of some resources to the rear. Pakistan relies on its strategic force to deter the
possibility of India launching an all out conventional war. But Pakistan would prefer to
rely on its compact conventional forces to deter conventional aggression, rather than have
to fight defensively against sharp, shallow incursions. The ladder depicts its conventional
escalation options and suggests how much closer the nuclear rungs are if those measures
fail.

The Indian ladder versus China helps characterize the likely dynamics of escalation in
land warfare where the engagement is slowly tightening, while looking further ahead to a
time when maritime conflict and escalation may also be a part of the India-China picture.
If there is asymmetry in this relationship on land, it is one that favors China over India
today, particularly at the nuclear level. But the conventional balance is arguably more
equal, even though the geography from the Tibetan plateau through the mountains
challenges the Indian side more as it organizes its campaigns from the foothills and
plains. This escalation ladder thus sheds light on mountain warfare. It reflects a much
higher nuclear threshold for both sides in the Himalayas than Pakistan would have versus
India in the plains. But it also brings in the potential complexity of bringing short-range
nuclear missiles into play.

While these nuclear escalation ladders are designed to serve heuristic purposes in policy
and military analysis, they could be useful tools for simulation exercises in which
participants are chosen both for relevant experience and openness to learning. The
 28

escalation ladders would be part of the scenario constructs for role playing games or
simulations. The simulation feedback would serve to improve the ladder constructs and
scenarios and perhaps make them more realistic. The game or simulation outcomes could
offer significant insights into how escalation scenarios play out, and lessons on how
unproductive or catastrophic escalation could be reigned in at lower levels.
 29

Select Bibliography
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Pvt. Ltd., 2010.

Cohen, Stephen P., and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming: India’s Military
Modernization, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010.

Cheema, Zafar Iqbal, Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development and
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Gurung, Gopal, “Countering Pakistan’s Asymmetric Warfare,” New Delhi: Centre for
Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), Manekshaw Paper, No. 25, 2011, pp. 1-40.

Hussain, Jamal, (Air Commodore PAF, retd.), Air Power in South Asia (2nd ed.); and
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International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2011, London:

Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2011 (and earlier editions).

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by Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, N.J., 2010, with a new foreword by Thomas
C. Schelling).

Karnad, Bharat, India’s Nuclear Policy, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2008.

Kugelman, Michael, ed., India’s Contemporary Security Challenges, Washington, DC:

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011.

Ladwig, Walter C., “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War
Doctrine” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3, Winter 2007-08, pp. 158-190.

Narang, Vipin, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian
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Nawaz, Shuja, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, Karachi:
Oxford University Press, 2008.
 30

Rashid, Ahmed, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation
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 31

Appendix A

Herman Kahn’s Nuclear Escalation Ladder

From his On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, N.Y.: Praeger, 1965, Figure 13.4, p.
39. (Republished by Transaction Publishers (New Brunswick, N.J.), 2010.)

_____________________________Aftermaths________________________________

44. Spasm or Insensate War

Civilian 43. Some Other Kinds of Controlled Central War
Central 42. Civilian Devastation Attack
Wars 41. Augmented Disarming Attack
40. Countervalue Salvo
39. Slow-Motion Countercity War

(City Targeting Threshold)

38. Unmodified Counterforce Attack

37. Counterforce-with-Avoidance Attack
Military 36. Constrained Disarming Attack
Central 35. Constrained Force-Reduction Salvo
Wars 34. Slow-Motion Counterforce War
33. Slow-Motion Counter-“Property” War
32. Formal Declaration of “General” War

(Central War Threshold)

31. Reciprocal Reprisals

Exemplary 30. Complete Evacuation (Approximately 95%)
Central 29. Exemplary Attacks on Population
Attacks 28. Exemplary Attacks Against Property
27. Exemplary Attack on Military
26. Demonstration Attack on Zone of Interior

(Central Sanctuary Threshold)

25. Evacuation (Approximately 70 per cent)

Bizarre 24. Unusual, Provocative, and Significant Countermeasures
Crises 23. Local Nuclear War – Military
22. Declaration of Limited Nuclear War
21. Local Nuclear War – Exemplary

(No Nuclear Use Threshold)

 32

20. “Peaceful” World-Wide Embargo or Blockade

19. “Justifiable” Counterforce Attack
18. Spectacular Show or Demonstration of Force
Intense 17. Limited Evacuation (Approximately 20 per cent)
Crises 16. Nuclear “Ultimatums”
15. Barely Nuclear War
14. Declaration of Limited Conventional War
13. Large Compound Escalation
12. Large Conventional War (or Actions)
11. Super-Ready Status
10. Provocative Breaking Off of Diplomatic Relations

(Nuclear War is Unthinkable Threshold)

9. Dramatic Military Confrontations

8. Harassing Acts of Violence
Traditional 7. “Legal” Harassment – Retortions
Crises 6. Significant Mobilization
5. Show of Force
4. Hardening of Positions – Confrontation of Wills

(Don’t Rock the Boat Threshold)

Subcrisis 3. Solemn and Formal Declarations

Maneuvering 2. Political, Economic, and Diplomatic Gestures
1. Ostensible Crisis

___________________________Disagreement – Cold War _______________________

Bottom of ladder ….