Anderson-DeterringCounteringDefeating-2021

Deterring, Countering, and Defeating Conventional-Nuclear Integration
Author(s): Justin Anderson and James R. McCue

Source: Strategic Studies Quarterly , SPRING 2021, Vol. 15, No. 1 (SPRING 2021), pp. 28-60
Published by: Air University Press
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PERSPECTIVE
Deterring, Countering, and

Defeating Conventional-Nuclear
Integration
Justin Anderson
Lt Col James R. McCue, USAF
Abstract
Potential US adversaries have integrated nuclear weapons into their
concepts for fighting and winning a future regional conflict. To this end,
they have organized, trained, and equipped nuclear-capable forces for thea
ter war fighting. The United States, and its allies, must prepare for adversar-
ies who integrate conventional and nuclear arms to shape the regional
battlespace, counter theater defenses, and combat coalition forces. The
challenge posed by this conventional- nuclear integration (CNI) cuts
across strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. While CNI is
not a new phenomenon, its growth and evolution in recent years is placing
increasing pressure on US regional deterrence and defense strategies. To
effectively deter this threat requires an integrated, but not mirror-imaged,
approach. The goal of US CNI is to convince potential adversaries that
integrating conventional and nuclear-capable forces grants insufficient
advantages within a future regional conflict to overcome either the latter’s
potential vulnerabilities or the risks attendant with attempting to leverage
nuclear escalation. Potential adversaries are likely to retain some of these
platforms and their associated nuclear weapons as a hedge against uncer-
tainty. However, it is important for the Department of Defense to bolster
US and allied deterrence postures in Europe and the Asia-Pacific by tak-
ing steps—prior to any regional crisis—to influence their cost-benefit
calculus in contemplating the deployment or employment of nuclear
weapons in theater. This article proposes a three-part framework using the
Department of Defense’s Deterrence Operations – Joint Operating Concept
(deny benefits, impose costs, and encourage restraint) to plan and posture
for accomplishing this goal.
*****
R
ussia, China, and North Korea are fundamentally opposed to re-
gional security arrangements currently underpinned by US de-
fense commitments.1 They are determined to undermine these
28 STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY  SPRING 2021

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alliances and partnerships and are preparing for potential future regional
conflicts with the United States and its allies. They recognize, however,
that US and allied militaries represent a formidable challenge when fight-
ing together with full national support. To counter these forces, potential
adversaries seek to fully integrate all elements of their military power, sow
political division between Washington and allied capitals, and exploit po-
tential seams and gaps within US and allied theater defense postures.
An important component of their approach is integrating conventional
and nuclear-capable forces into their political-military strategies. For ad-
vanced militaries, nuclear-capable forces include delivery systems that are
solely devoted to a nuclear role and dual-capable platforms that can carry
either conventional or nuclear weapons (and whose status and armaments
may be unclear to a potential opponent). All three states have developed
and deployed both long- range “strategic” nuclear- armed missiles and
theater-range (i.e., short-, medium-, or intermediate- range) nuclear-
capable delivery systems, with the latter serving alongside, or intermixed
with, their conventional forces.2 These integrated forces provide these ac-
tors with the ability to develop combined arms theater campaign plans
bringing conventional and nuclear capabilities to bear against US and al-
lied forces within a future potential regional conflict.3 As stated by Brad
Roberts, former deputy assistant secretary of defense (DASD) for nuclear
and missile defense policy, the “United States must expect that nuclear
weapons would play a role in regional wars against Russia or China,” as
both Moscow and Beijing have incorporated nuclear coercion, and poten-
tial employment, into their “theories of victory” for these types of conflicts.4
Roberts further assesses that North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile
development programs may have granted it “operationally attractive” op-
tions for a “credible anti-access area-denial strategy” against the United
States and South Korea within a future conflict on the Korean Peninsula.5
Keith Payne, who also previously served in this DASD role, shares many of
these same concerns. In 2018 he noted, “We must understand how to deter
Great Powers and nuclear-armed Rogues from exploiting limited nuclear
threats and/or escalation for coercive purposes in support of their respec-
tive goals to change established orders and borders in Europe [and] Asia.”6
For US policy makers, it is important to recognize that present efforts
to address the challenge posed by conventional-nuclear integration (CNI)
can be informed by the Cold War, when the Soviet Union attempted to
utilize a combination of conventional forces and theater-range nuclear
delivery systems to threaten and attempt to fracture the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO).7 The United States met this challenge with
STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY  SPRING 2021 29

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Justin Anderson and James R. McCue
its own integrated conventional-nuclear force, with the allied regional

defense posture relying on the US arsenal of “non-strategic” nuclear weap-
ons to counter the Warsaw Pact’s significant advantage in conventional
forces.8 Critically, however, the present CNI threat from adversaries com-
bines both of these concepts. Russia, China, and North Korea field inte-
grated forces to challenge US regional defense alliances and deterrence
postures while also viewing CNI as necessary to offset what they assess as
contemporary US advantages in conventional forces.
As a result, while aspects of the present situation echo the Cold War,
today’s CNI environment is more complex than in the past era. The
United States must address the challenge of three potential adversaries
fielding integrated conventional and nuclear forces, to include new
theater-range, nuclear-capable mobile missiles recently fielded by each
state. Our proposed counter-CNI strategy seeks to adapt to today’s multi
polar context, a half century of technological achievement, and the im-
portant fact that the United States is less reliant on nuclear weapons to
impose costs on an opponent’s military forces within future regional
conflicts than its potential adversaries. US policies and strategies for
countering the evolving and cross-cutting CNI threat thus requires an
integrated, but not mirror-imaged, response. It should leverage US con-
ventional and nuclear-capable forces to enhance regional deterrence and
defeat options, without mimicking potential adversaries by overly and
dangerously relying on the threat or use of nuclear weapons in theater to
prevail in a potential future regional conflict.
This article begins by defining the broader phenomenon of CNI and the
present CNI threat posed by Russia, China, and North Korea. Next, it as-
sesses why these potential adversaries seek to integrate their conventional
and nuclear-capable forces and how these states may seek to use them in
regional crises and conflicts. It then uses the concepts within the DOD
three-part framework from Deterrence Operations – Joint Operating Concept
(deny benefits, impose costs, and encourage restraint) to propose potential
courses of action for countering this evolving threat.9 The US military must
prepare for adversaries to readily accept and leverage nuclear risk to realize
an advantage in a future regional conflict. With adversary CNI posing a
number of pressing challenges to US and allied defense policies and pos-
tures, we focus our assessments and recommendations on steps US policy
makers and combatant commanders can take to bolster regional deterrence
and assurance strategies. These include preparing US war fighters to com-
bat and defeat an opponent’s integrated conventional and nuclear forces
while signaling preparedness and resiliency to potential adversaries.

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Defining the CNI Phenomenon and Present Threat

CNI is a subset of the broader phenomena of nuclear-conventional
“entanglement,” a term referring to the ways and means by which con-
ventional and nuclear forces may intersect, interconnect, and/or overlap.10
Importantly, entanglement does not necessarily attribute intentionality
to this interrelationship. Research on this subject often focuses on areas
of entanglement that may be unintentional and, therefore, are either
reversible or can be otherwise addressed to reduce the risk that overlap
could lead to nuclear crisis or conflict.11
We define CNI as the deliberate, calculated decision by a state actor to
combine conventional and nuclear-capable forces for the purpose of real-
izing strategic, theater, and/or tactical military objectives that it assesses
cannot be achieved through the use of conventional forces alone. This
intentionality extends across a spectrum of activities associated with
fielding military forces. These include researching and developing deliv-
ery systems and weapons that can fit into an integrated force (such as
dual-capable missiles that can carry conventional or nuclear warheads);
organizing, training, and equipping both conventional and nuclear-
capable military forces; preparing, planning, and training these forces to
operate together; and openly conducting tests or exercises for combined
operations, demonstrating how one type can support or enable the other
and/or making clear to outside audiences that nuclear-capable forces are
integral to theater war-fighting concepts. The focus here is on the inte-
gration of conventional and nuclear-capable forces by Russia, China, and
North Korea as actors that represent potential adversaries of the United
States. It is important to note, however, that CNI is a broader phenome
non that also extends to states such as Pakistan, which has integrated
short- and medium-range nuclear-capable forces into strategies and plans
for defending its territory against a potential cross-border offensive by
large numbers of Indian conventional forces.12
Understanding the Evolving CNI Threat

While the integration of nuclear and conventional forces never fully
disappeared after the end of the Cold War (to include for the purposes of
preparing for potential regional contingencies), CNI has substantively
evolved in the past five years in a manner posing additional threats and
challenges to the United States and its allies.13
Russia, China, and North Korea have devoted significant resources to
developing and fielding new theater-range, nuclear-capable delivery sys-

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tems. Their goal is to supplement their conventional forces and to provide

their national leaders with options for threatening regional states and
holding US and allied targets at risk below the threshold of strategic nu-
clear forces. Russia deliberately violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty that reflected US-Russian mutual agreement to fully elimi-
nate an entire class of missiles and reduce the risk of regional nuclear cri-
ses. It did so by developing and fielding the SSC-8/9M729, a dual-capable,
ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile—the exact type of
delivery system expressly banned by the treaty. As stated in November
2018 by then-director of national intelligence Dan Coats, Russia now
fields “multiple battalions of 9M729 missiles, which pose a direct conven-
tional and nuclear threat against most of Europe and parts of Asia.”14 The
missile joins a range of other Russian short- and medium-range nuclear-
capable delivery systems (ground, naval, and air) that can be equipped
with munitions from the country’s “active stockpile” of approximately
2,000 “non-strategic nuclear weapons.”15 China currently fields the world’s
largest arsenal of medium- and intermediate- range conventional and
nuclear-capable missiles.16 While Beijing long restricted its nuclear forces
to a relatively small number of silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles
kept at a low level of readiness, it now deploys multiple mobile nuclear-
capable delivery systems.17 These include the DF-26, an intermediate-
range ballistic missile (IRBM) that the Chinese media describes as having
an “aircraft carrier killer” role and the DOD states is “capable of rapidly
swapping conventional and nuclear warheads” and ranging US bases across
the Indo-Pacific region as far as Guam.18 In addition, North Korea has
pursued a breakneck effort to develop a range of conventional and nuclear-
capable missiles, to include theater-range, nuclear-capable systems such as
the KN-15 MRBM and Hwasong-12 IRBM. Pyongyang has successfully
test-launched both missiles from transporter erector launchers (TEL),
leading a number of analysts to conclude these systems are either opera-
tional or will be in the near future.19 Moreover, Russia and China, per
unclassified US government assessments, maintain open production lines
for nuclear weapons (with China potentially doubling its nuclear arsenal
in the next decade), while North Korea has stated it maintains the ability
to produce fissile material for new weapons.20 The implications of such
developments are that Russia, China, and North Korea have intermingled
their conventional and nuclear-capable forces.
Russia, for example, currently deploys several SSC-8/9M729 IRBMs
together with its conventional forces (to include conventionally armed
ballistic missiles) stationed in the Kaliningrad Oblast bordering Poland

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and Lithuania, where these missiles can range a number of key NATO
military facilities across several states.21 China’s People’s Liberation Army
Rocket Force (PLARF), responsible for the country’s ground-based mis-
sile fleet, assigns brigades of conventional and dual-capable delivery sys-
tems to shared bases, appears to deploy and/or exercise these brigades in
overlapping areas, and is increasingly training its personnel in how to use
both.22 This situation led at least one PLARF officer to publicly note the
increased burden in training, stating in 2017 that “our missile weapon
systems are both nuclear- and conventional-capable. . . . Nuclear must be
learned, and conventional also must be learned. This is equivalent to one
person doing two jobs.”23 China’s command-and-control systems and
processes for conventional and nuclear-capable missiles also appear to be
either shared or substantively overlap.24 In addition, North Korea’s con-
ventional, dual-capable, and nuclear missile programs are closely inte-
grated, both in terms of “systems integration” and in some cases, co-
location at certain bases.25
Russia, China, and North Korea have also conducted exercises and/or
tests where nuclear-capable forces carry out strikes demonstrating their
ability to support a broader, integrated force in its achievement of regional
war-fighting objectives. From 2013 to the present, several Russian mili-
tary exercises have combined conventional and nuclear-capable forces in
operations practicing for an armed conflict against an unnamed adversary
that appears closely modeled on NATO. These exercises have included
“simulated” nuclear attacks against NATO members and partners and
tests of various types of nuclear-capable systems in providing fire support
to conventional forces.26 In August 2020, China made public a recently
concluded “cross regional confrontational exercise,” allegedly held in re-
sponse to the “US provocatively [sending] two aircraft carriers to the
South China Sea for exercises [with] India, Japan and Australia” that
practiced striking mobile targets at sea, such as aircraft carriers.27 This ex-
ercise followed a number of other PLARF exercises highlighted by Chi-
nese government-controlled media outlets in the last four years that have
featured theater-range, nuclear-capable missile units rapidly deploying
and carrying out simulated strike operations against an advanced military
opponent equipped with fighter jets and “electronic warfare” capabilities
(which in at least one case was directly referred to as the “blue team” squar-
ing off against the PLA’s “red team”).28 North Korea has stated that past
tests of its nuclear-capable missiles represent practice for potential future
strikes against US military bases in Japan.29 These tests (and statements)
are consistent with both South Korean and US assessments of North

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Korea’s strategy for a future conflict on the peninsula, which would first
rely on “coercive nuclear preemptive threats” with ballistic missiles to try
to prevent unified US and allied action against its forces.30 If these threats
failed to have the desired effect, Pyongyang would then lean on artillery
and missile strikes, to possibly include with nuclear weapons, against Seoul
and US bases in South Korea and Japan to support a surprise attack by its
conventional forces to attempt to win a quick victory prior to the arrival of
US reinforcements.31
In short, these above developments reflect the DIA’s 2018 assessment
that Russia, China, and North Korea are developing and fielding nuclear
capabilities “for military or coercive use on the battlefield.” All three states
view integrated forces—and the credible threat of nuclear employment on
regional battlefields by theater-range platforms—as important to their
“theories of victory” for future potential regional conflicts.32
Why Pursue CNI?

Development of capability alone, however, does not fully explain the
intent of potential adversaries or the potential risks CNI poses to the
United States and its allies. Why have Russia, China, and North Korea
pursued CNI, and why should their integration of conventional and
nuclear-capable forces concern the United States?
Russia, China, and North Korea’s perspective on regional affairs repre-
sents a jaundiced form of realism; while they strongly believe they are
engaged in a “zero sum game” with the United States and its allies (with
regional prestige and influence the prize), they categorically reject ever
accepting a regional balance of power.33 Russian and Chinese leaders are
determined to be seen both at home and abroad as the preeminent power
within their respective regions (with North Korea’s primary concern that
it be recognized as the strongest state on the Korean Peninsula and a
power center independent from the United States and China).34 All three
thus strongly oppose and continually seek to undermine US-led regional
security arrangements, which Russia and China view as obstacles to as-
suming their “rightful” place as first among equals in the region. Mean-
while, North Korea fears that US allies such as Japan will wholeheartedly
support Washington’s efforts to topple its ruling regime.
This competitive animosity leads these states to contemplate and pre-
pare for potential armed conflict with the United States and its allies ei-
ther on or near their borders or within what they view as their traditional
sphere of influence. All three likely assess that they face a significant chal-
lenge in defeating the United States and its regional allies within a conflict

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that solely features conventional forces. They worry that US conventional

forces will best their own in a future fight and fear facing the same type of
ignominious defeats meted out to autocrats such as Slobodan Milosevic
and Saddam Hussein in past conflicts.35 Moreover, they are deeply wary of
launching any kinetic strike against the US homeland, likely calculating
this type of attack would bring the full force of the United States to bear
on a conflict they would prefer remain regional.
Russia, China, and North Korea thus conclude they face a significant
security dilemma in their pursuit, within their respective regions, of what
they consider critical national objectives. They believe it imperative to field
and wield military power that can coerce and compel other regional states
to accept their leadership. At the same time, however, they seek to limit
US involvement, and prevent US intervention, in regional affairs, to in-
clude within any military crises or conflicts. Moreover, they are committed
to preparing for a possible future fight with the United States or its allies
and resolve to find a potential pathway to victory either on the battlefield
or at the negotiating table.36
We assess that Russia, China, and North Korea conclude that integrat-
ing conventional and nuclear forces, with the latter specifically featuring
theater-range options, can play a key role in achieving these imperatives.
CNI does so, in their view, by allowing their military forces to realize some
or all the following objectives within a potential regional conflict with the
United States and its allies.
To Guarantee at Least a Draw (and Thus Preserve the Regime)

Russia, China, and North Korea all view military power as a critical tool
of statecraft and seek to use it to coerce and compel other states. All three
are wary, however, of the risks of military aggression against the United
States and its allies. They do not have full confidence of victory in a re-
gional conventional military conflict. Moreover, their leaders may fear that
suffering a serious military reversal in the field could pave the way for
US-imposed regime change or even catalyze an internal coup d’état.37
In the face of these grim (but in their view, entirely plausible) outcomes,
Russia, China, and North Korea likely view theater-range, nuclear-capable
forces as critical to preventing potential setbacks within a future regional
military conflict from turning into routs. They may conclude that the only
means to force the conclusion of an armed conflict not going their way is
to threaten US and allied forces with a theater nuclear strike unless both
sides agree to a cease-fire and/or a negotiated settlement.38 Should this
fail to end hostilities (and if their conventional forces continue to suffer

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reverses in the field), they may seriously contemplate employing a theater

nuclear strike against US and allied forces, perhaps even on or within the
boundaries of their own borders to cover a military retreat. They may
gamble that nuclear employment in the midst of ongoing combat—perhaps
with a small number of weapons configured for low yield and low fallout—
would fall below the threshold of the US stated policy to impose “intoler-
able costs” in response to an adversary’s nuclear attack.39
Their leaders very likely understand that a nuclear strike causing signifi-
cant US or allied civilian casualties would result in devastating counter
strike. But in the heat of a battle with potentially existential stakes, they
may bet that a “limited” nuclear attack on US or allied military forces—
particularly if these forces were either afloat or away from major civilian
population centers—might be assessed differently by US leaders. All three
states may share the assessment of Bernard Brodie, who in his 1965 clas-
sic, Escalation and the Nuclear Option, concluded that “the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons in tactical operations seems at least as likely to
check as to promote the expansion of hostilities.”40 Like the venerable
Cold War strategist, they may conclude that theater nuclear employment
will not necessarily result in a broader nuclear war, as the attacked party
may hesitate to order a significant nuclear counterattack for fear of initiat-
ing a mutually destructive nuclear conflagration. If so, this form of nuclear
employment may be viewed as an acceptable risk and the best, or perhaps
the only, way to halt the advance of coalition forces and compel the United
States and its allies to accept a negotiated settlement.41
To Discourage Allied Participation and/or US Intervention

Any future regional crisis or conflict involving Russia, China, or North
Korea will occur near their borders and under a nuclear shadow cast by
their growing nuclear arsenals. Potential adversaries may view CNI’s
ability to put pressure on US alliances as one of its prime benefits, forcing
foreign leaders to contemplate the possibility that their populations and
military forces can be targeted with nuclear-capable platforms from the
outset of hostilities. CNI allows Russia, China, and North Korea to exer-
cise or deploy large integrated conventional-nuclear forces—prominently
featuring theater-range, nuclear-capable delivery systems—adjacent to
allied territory.
Russia and North Korea, for example, have already made open, credible
nuclear threats against allied targets in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, re-
spectively. In addition to the simulated nuclear attacks against NATO
noted above, Russian officials and legislators have made public nuclear

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threats against NATO allies and partners for their support of activities
such as theater missile defense exercises and hosting US forces.42 North
Korea regularly makes bellicose nuclear threats against US regional allies,
to include stating that Japan’s main islands can be “sunken into the sea”
with nuclear weapons and that South Korea faces “pre-emptive” and “in-
discriminate” nuclear attacks due to its ongoing military cooperation with
Washington.43 These statements aim to dissuade key allied and partner
capitals from operating or exercising with the US military and to convince
their publics to oppose hosting or otherwise supporting US forces. These
shots across the bow may also represent attempts by potential adversaries
to influence regional states to consider denying the US military access to
airports and seaports in a future conflict, slowing the flow of US forces
intended to relieve beleaguered allies into the theater (and possibly tip-
ping the balance of a contested fight).
Adversaries may also view CNI as useful for raising questions in Wash-
ington regarding whether overseas allies are worth the potential cost in
US blood and treasure necessary to defend them against nuclear threats
from delivery systems that cannot range the United States. They may also
seek to raise doubts in allied capitals regarding whether a US president
would answer these questions in the affirmative. These issues are not new.
During the Cold War, Western European leaders perennially asked
whether a US president would really “trade New York or Detroit to save
Hamburg or Bonn.”44 They are made acute, however, by the evolution and
expansion of theater-range, nuclear-capable options and the fact that
these capabilities are fielded by multiple actors. Dissuading the United
States from military intervention on behalf of allies, and persuading these
actors they may be better off negotiating their own forms of bilateral dé-
tente, will be top priorities for Russia, China, or North Korea in a future
regional military crisis or conflict. All three may view CNI as a way to
achieve both objectives.
To Provide Fidelity for (Theater) Brinkmanship

Potential adversaries may also believe that integration grants them a
more expansive military tool kit for managing and exploiting future re-
gional crises. They may view CNI as granting ways and means for manipu-
lating nuclear risk in a regional crisis or conflict in a manner that enhances
the reach or weight of their conventional forces. Russian military writings,
for example, argue that “the threat of nuclear escalation, particularly with
nonstrategic nuclear weapons, helps amplify the coercive effect of strategic
conventional weapons.”45 The mobility of theater-range, nuclear-capable

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platforms that can transit to and from border areas, for example, can pro-
vide leaders with a form of local pressure that can be readily dialed up or
down against neighboring or nearby states as needed.46
Introducing theater-range, nuclear-capable forces into a region and/or
spotlighting their presence may also be viewed—by potential adversaries
and allies—as a way to ratchet up tensions during a crisis by providing the
former with a more plausible battlefield weapon than “strategic” nuclear
forces capable of reaching the United States. Saber rattling with the latter
would likely prompt the United States to quickly respond with strong
deterrence and assurance measures. Potential adversaries may calculate
that the ambiguous status of integrated forces in theater permits them to
communicate threats with these capabilities that will effectively play on
the fears of regional actors without directly antagonizing Washington.47
To Complicate the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Targeting

A potential adversary might also hope that deliberately intermixing
conventional and nuclear-capable forces at certain locations, or as part of
a specific combined arms operation, will shield the latter and transfer this
protection to nearby assets. Its intent is for the United States to either
hesitate before launching an attack against an intermixed force or other-
wise truncate target lists in a way that limits the effectiveness of strikes.48
For Russia, China, and North Korea, this ability to buy time, and perhaps
a form of protection, for their integrated forces in theater may be consid-
ered an important way to achieve a military balance against the United
States and its allies. It may also provide a means of safeguarding certain
key homeland targets, such as rear-area military headquarters or political
leadership sites, from US conventional attacks through stationing nuclear-
capable forces at these locations or signaling (or tacitly allowing the US to
conclude) that these facilities are integral to the command and control to
some or all of their nuclear forces.
This approach relies on potential adversaries making two broad as-
sumptions. The first is that the United States is unable to readily discern
the difference between intermixed conventional and nuclear-armed forces
in theater. US forces will thus prove wary of engaging the combined forces
of an opponent out of concern the possible inadvertent or incidental de-
struction of nuclear platforms (or their means of command and control)
could escalate a conventional fight into a nuclear conflict. The second as-
sumption is that even in those cases where the United States is confident
it has correctly identified an opponent’s theater-range, nuclear-capable
platform, it will hesitate to attack these forces. Recognizing that these

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forces represent high-value assets (due to their limited numbers, their

value to leadership, or other factors), the United States may fear attacks on
these platforms will quickly place an opponent into a “use or lose” situa-
tion with its remaining delivery systems.49
If these assumptions proved correct, CNI could pose a unique obstacle
to US freedom of action regarding attacking key adversary forces, bases,
and supporting elements. Potential adversaries are deeply concerned by
the speed, accuracy, and effectiveness of US strike capabilities and are ea-
ger to find ways and means to counter this advantage. They may view
comingling conventional and nuclear-capable forces as useful for slowing
or even paralyzing US military activities in the field, complicating US
ROEs, forcing US war fighters to gather onerous amounts of information
before acting, and/or pushing targeting decisions up the command chain.
To Enhance the Lethality of Standoff Strike Options

Nuclear weapons are uniquely powerful; the effects of detonation in-
clude blast, heat, radiation, and an electromagnetic pulse.50 A nuclear war-
head’s explosion is orders of magnitude more destructive than a
comparably-sized conventional one. By arming theater-range platforms
with nuclear weapons, aggressors significantly increase the destructive
capacity of their standoff strike options.
This enhanced lethality can boost broad efforts to restrict US and allied
freedom of movement in theater that are sometimes collectively referred
to as anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies. Adversaries may believe
that the threat of a possible nuclear strike in theater will cause US political
leaders and military commanders to hesitate before flowing additional
forces into a particular region or lead to less efficient, more dispersed force
flow. They may also hope the presence and posture of theater-range,
nuclear-capable systems on or near their land or maritime borders can
force US ground forces to avoid using or transiting through certain areas
or US naval forces to keep their distance from coastlines.
Potential adversaries who fear they are overmatched in theater (whether
due to US and allied strike systems in particular or some “correlation” of
offensive and defensive forces in general) may view the destructive poten-
tial of theater-range, nuclear-capable forces as providing a more favorable
balance of forces, particularly if they only have limited numbers of stand-
off strike systems available.51 In the event of an actual conflict, equipping
platforms such as theater-range mobile ballistic missiles with nuclear
warheads may also provide an option for delivering a stinging blow against
massed coalition forces or other critical targets that are either outside the

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reach, or resilient to the effects, of their conventional platforms. At a basic

level, nuclear weapons may be the most lethal munitions available to an
opposing force, and their use in combat could simply reflect a potential
adversary’s assessment that military necessity demands their employment.
The above list is not intended to be comprehensive or all inclusive, nor
do all these reasons apply to every potential adversary that integrates its
conventional and nuclear-capable forces. Several of the above factors,
however, likely figure into the decision-making calculus of potential ad-
versaries. Understanding the nuances of why potential adversaries are
pursuing CNI is essential for the United States to prepare efficiently and
effectively to deter, counter, and defeat these types of capabilities.
Countering the CNI Threat

Adversary CNI poses two interrelated challenges for US policy makers
and US combatant commanders. First, Russian, Chinese, and North Ko-
rean CNI represents a cross-cutting challenge for US defense policy and
military strategy. Their integration of conventional and nuclear-capable
forces can affect a range of US and allied cost-benefit calculations before
and during hostilities. By placing pressure on US alliances and extended
deterrence guarantees, the CNI threat requires US policy makers to devote
time and attention to assuring allies they are protected against an oppo-
nent’s conventional and nuclear forces, to include during any regional con-
tingency or conflict. It also necessitates US policy makers making resource
decisions on capability investments, the placement of forces, and other
matters relevant to countering potential adversaries in contested regions.
Furthermore, it presents a range of operational and tactical issues for US
combatant commands that must plan against the challenges posed by an
opponent’s integrated force, to include the possible threat of nuclear em-
ployment in a regional conflict. Moreover, these various challenges cannot
be separated from each other. Adversaries and allies must believe the United
States has both the political will and military capacity to directly counter,
deter, and if necessary, defeat an integrated force fielding conventional and
nuclear-capable assets in a regional fight far from US shores.
The second challenge is convincing potential adversaries that theater-
range, nuclear capable delivery systems operating as part of an integrated
force do not represent a critical offset to, or a competitive advantage
against, US and allied forces in a regional conflict. Russia, China, and
North Korea likely assess that the stakes of a possible regional armed con-
flict are higher for them than for the United States. Potential adversaries
may view CNI as a useful cost imposition strategy vis-à-vis the United

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States, prompting US commanders to expend significant time and re-

sources to either defend against or attempt to avoid platforms they are
forced to treat as highly lethal war-fighting assets. As described by Ken-
neth Ekman, “Cost imposition strategies focus on eliciting an adversary
response that creates a hardship differential favoring the initiating nation.
. . . Necessary preconditions include the requirement and will to compete,
the impetus to do so efficiently, and the potential to do so from a position
of capability advantage with ability and intent to elicit a disadvantageous
response from an adversary.”52 To counter this strategy, the United States
must attempt to convince potential adversaries that integrating conven-
tional and nuclear-capable forces will incur rather than impose costs, par-
ticularly if they are used to commit regional aggression.
Addressing these two challenges in an era of military competition with
Great Powers and ongoing contention with rogue regimes requires renewed
policy attention and military focus. Following the approach to deterrence
stated in the Department of Defense Deterrence Operations – Joint Operat-
ing Concept, US policy makers and combatant commanders must work to-
gether to affect the “adversary’s decision calculus elements in three ‘ways’:
Deny Benefits, Impose Costs, and Encourage Adversary Restraint.”53
Importantly, due to the unique challenges posed by nuclear weapons,
deterrence (and parallel efforts to assure allies) cannot rely on conven-
tional forces alone. The United States needs its own integrated response
addressing adversary CNI as a strategic, operational, and tactical threat.
Combatant commanders, for example, need to develop plans and activities
designed specifically to deter potential adversaries from either integrating
their forces or attempting to leverage CNI for the purposes of intimida-
tion, coercion, or armed aggression within a contested region. The Depart-
ment of Defense recognized this issue in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) and now requires “the integration of [US] nuclear and non-nuclear
military planning. Combatant Commands and Service components will
be organized and resourced for this mission, and will plan, train, and exer-
cise to integrate US nuclear and non-nuclear forces to operate in the face
of adversary nuclear threats and employment.” The NPR further notes
that “the United States will coordinate integration activities with allies
facing nuclear threats and examine opportunities for additional allied bur-
den sharing of the nuclear deterrence mission.”54
Critically, however, this integration should counter, but not mirror-
image, the CNI strategy of potential adversaries. The latter’s approach
incorporates CNI as part of broader political and military strategies that
ultimately rely on coercion and threats of aggression to reorder regional

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security arrangements. In addition, all three states have rejected US offers

over the past decade to engage in substantive talks on arms control, stra-
tegic stability, or regional confidence-building measures for nuclear or
conventional forces.55 They assert that their increased commitment to
nuclear forces (to include theater-range, nuclear capable delivery systems)
is necessary to address a dangerous and unstable regional security environ-
ment, but for the most part refuse to engage in diplomacy that could ad-
dress a range of risks associated with military competition, whether with
nuclear, conventional, or both types of forces.
In contrast, the US approach to CNI should be carefully calibrated and
clearly communicated as a commitment to regional stability that directly
denies the benefits, and increases the costs, of nuclear threats and aggres-
sion. US CNI can be further differentiated from potential adversaries’ ap-
proach to integration by emphasizing that, as an important part of the US
approach to extended deterrence, it is collaborative in nature, reflecting
Washington’s readiness to accept risks to defend its allies against all threats.
In addition, the United States should continue to press all three capitals to
participate in diplomatic talks and military- to-
military engagements
aimed at verifiably reducing nuclear risks, to include those associated with
entanglement, while simultaneously ensuring its force capabilities and
posture provide US negotiators with a strong hand in future negotiations.
By making these distinctions in the development of a US approach to
CNI, policy makers and combatant commanders can ensure the US re-
sponse to integrated nuclear and conventional threats both assures ner-
vous allies and imposes costs on those choosing to rely on delivery systems
such as theater-range, nuclear-capable platforms.
Deny CNI Benefits (Intermingling)

Potential adversaries may believe they can realize a number of benefits
from intermingling their conventional and nuclear forces, to include com-
plicating US efforts to understand their order of battle, obscuring the na-
ture and purpose of key strike systems, and even attempting to protect
certain locations or units from attack. To deny them from realizing any
advantages from either attempting to cloak their intent or shield key as-
sets, the United States should seek to equip military commanders with
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities that can
help disentangle these integrated forces by identifying the presence of
nuclear weapons on the battlefield.
The development and fielding of tools for providing commanders with
this information represents a significant, but not insurmountable, techni-

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cal and tactical challenge. Past experiments have demonstrated the ability
to use standoff platforms equipped with radiation detectors to find radio-
active signatures at a distance, to include those associated with nuclear
weapons. In 1989 US and Russian scientists, as part of a joint effort to
develop verification tools for future nuclear arms control agreements, suc-
cessfully demonstrated that a helicopter equipped with a neutron detector
could find a nuclear weapon stored inside a surface ship from a range of
100–150 meters.56 Later experiments using detectors carried by piloted
and remotely piloted platforms have shown improvement in the ability to
detect different types of radiation sources at these and greater distances, to
include in radioactively contaminated environments.57 Although not de-
signed for battlefield conditions, these platforms and their sensors could
possibly be modified for military purposes. In addition to providing means
for detecting nuclear weapons on a battlefield and depriving potential ad-
versaries the ability to hide or mask the status of delivery systems (or the
larger force elements within which they are integrated), these types of
platforms could also prove invaluable for finding and securing stored, un-
used, or even lost nuclear weapons and help support future diplomatic
efforts to develop a new generation of arms control agreements.
Deny CNI Benefits (Lethality)

Within potential future regional conflicts, the United States and its al-
lies may face adversaries willing to take significant risks to achieve their
goals or to avoid ignominious defeat. A combatant commander facing an
adversary with an integrated nuclear and conventional force must prepare
for the possibility that it may seriously contemplate a theater nuclear strike
even if it is well aware that the United States can impose considerable
costs in response.
In addition, potential adversaries may integrate their standoff strike
capabilities (such as air and missile platforms) to boost the profile of their
overall forces within a regional conflict. In doing so, they may hope to
force their opponents to treat some or all of these forces as if they are
equipped with nuclear munitions, expending finite time and resources at-
tempting to deal with this amplified risk.
This scenario highlights the importance of the United States develop-
ing deterrence strategies to deny a potential adversary from realizing any
benefits from launching a standoff nuclear strike in theater against US and
allied forces and imposing significant costs should such a strike be at-
tempted during a regional conflict. Such strategies can play a critical role
in assuring allies that the United States wields both a sword and a shield

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on their behalf against CNI opponents. Deterrence by denial efforts aimed

at achieving this goal can include mounting both “active” and “passive”
defenses against an adversary’s theater-range, nuclear-capable platforms.
Active defenses. The primary US approach to protecting forces from
theater air and missile threats is integrated air and missile defense
(IAMD).58 IAMD posits a layered, dynamically active approach to incor-
porating “sensors and shooters” that brings together radars and theater
missile defenses (such as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense [THAAD]
and Patriot Advanced Capability [PAC]-3 batteries). This approach is
“agnostic” with regard to the characteristics of the armaments of the air
and missile platforms it defends against, and US military doctrine on
IAMD does not generally focus on or otherwise highlight theater-range,
nuclear-capable threats for prioritization, especially during a mass strike.59
This approach is both logical and practical in terms of broad application
to the wide range of air and missile threats faced by US and allied forces
worldwide. Within a region where an adversary has integrated its conven-
tional and nuclear-capable forces, however, US policy makers and com-
batant commanders can send signals (e.g., via IAMD exercises) commu-
nicating to an adversary that it cannot trust that a limited theater nuclear
strike will prove successful.60 In addition, intelligence-based tipping and
cueing can help focus “sensors and shooters” on nuclear threats hidden
within a larger salvo, focusing interceptors on the most lethal part of an
adversary’s attempted strike. The realization that even a limited defensive
system can plausibly destroy an inbound nuclear-armed missile or aircraft
can serve as an important deterrent to potential adversaries launching
such an attack. US and allied active defenses can tilt their cost-benefit
assessments against attempting a standoff strike whose prospects are un-
certain but whose initiation invites major retaliation.
No defense, however, can provide a perfect shield against all incoming
attacks. An unfavorable ratio of interceptors against the number of both
conventional and nuclear missiles an adversary can fire (and/or air defenses
against adversary dual-capable strike aircraft) requires a theater IAMD ap-
proach that integrates offensive and defensive operations.61 During a con-
flict, for example, ISR systems tracking an adversary’s theater- range,
nuclear-capable systems could send information about an imminent launch
to both missile defense interceptors and piloted and remotely piloted assets
already in the air.62 These latter forces could then undertake actions (both
kinetic and nonkinetic) to destroy, disable, or otherwise disrupt adversary
air and missile forces before they can fully launch an attack or fire a second
salvo, helping to prevent US and allied defenses from being overwhelmed—

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even as these latter forces are already alerted to, tracking, and preparing to
intercept any missiles that make it into the air.
With this mixed offense-defense approach, the United States and its
allies can place and posture forces that can rapidly impose costs on an
opponent’s launchers and their support elements at the same time as part-
nering defensive capabilities are denying the benefits of the attempted
strike. This can further bolster the United States’ deterrence posture against
an integrated opponent contemplating a theater nuclear strike, as it may
have a limited number of high-end assets such as TELs and strike air-
craft—only some of which may be armed with nuclear weapons. If a po-
tential adversary has to worry that any attempt at launching such a strike
faces poor odds of success and may well result in some or many of its most
prized forces and weapons being knocked out of the fight (perhaps with-
out any prospect of replacing them in time to affect the remainder of the
conflict), it may conclude that this type of attack is not worth attempting.
Passive defenses. Another key tenet of a robust regional deterrence
posture against a CNI opponent is to convince the potential adversary
that US and allied forces can survive—and operate in, around, and
through—a potential theater nuclear attack. While less high-profile than
active defenses, passive defenses play an important deterrent role against
theater nuclear use, particularly if the latter’s combined arms operations
rely on a handful of standoff strikes against key US and allied nodes either
on the battlefield or at operational depth.63
If the hardening of key facilities in theater, for example, means that an
adversary attack featuring a limited number of low-yield nuclear muni-
tions causes damage at ports and/or bases within the region but does not
necessarily suspend all US operations, then the construction of protective
structures such as “third generation” hardened aircraft shelters at these
locations is a worthwhile investment.64 Importantly, not all facilities nec-
essarily require hardening, which would prove prohibitively expensive.
Selective hardening may be sufficient to protect critical facilities and im-
pact an adversary’s cost-benefit calculus, as the latter must factor in the
possibility that a nuclear attack may hit but neither fully nor effectively
destroy its target.65 The attack will have thus broken the nuclear taboo,
with costly implications, to realize little or no military gain.
In addition, dispersion and redundancy are two means of defeating geo-
graphically and numerically limited nuclear threats that may prove more
affordable than widespread nuclear hardening. The essential assumption
underpinning this counter-tactic is that dispersion and duplication create
more targets than the attacker’s means of destruction. In the past, force

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dispersal posed a challenge to regional combatant commands because this

complicated the ability to concentrate combat power. Advances in com-
munications technology and networked approaches to warfare, however,
have drastically reduced this negative effect.66 Integrated command, con-
trol, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) is a baseline re-
quirement for contemporary theater combat operations. Many core capa-
bilities such as intelligence gathering and munitions delivery are now also
naturally disaggregated and dispersed across the fighting force. In addi-
tion, precision strike effects can be provided from many ground, air, or sea
platforms deployed to the theater. In short, smaller numbers of platforms,
operating from a range of locations (to include locations outside of the
theater), can now provide the same effects that once required massing
forces at a few regional bases.
This message is bolstered by the United States demonstrating the ability
to combine assets in and outside of a specific theater to practice complex
operations, such as a July 2020 maritime exercise where a B-52 from a US-
based bomber task force flew 28 hours to support a US carrier strike group
in the Pacific.67 Publicizing these types of exercises clearly demonstrates to
both US allies and potential adversaries that geographic distance is no ob-
stacle to US efforts to rapidly and decisively respond to potential regional
aggression. Moreover, this approach may realize a range of efficiencies for
the global force, and it would be worthwhile for the Defense Science Board
or some other US government-funded research effort to study how disper-
sion and duplication can help the United States address regional defense
and deterrence challenges in an era of Great Power competition.
Exercises simulating nuclear environments against nuclear-armed
opponents. Deterrence can be further strengthened by demonstrating
competency fighting on simulated radiologically contaminated battle-
fields. US and allied forces should conduct combined exercises preparing
participants to encounter both conventional and nuclear-capable forces
on regional battlefields. Moreover, these exercises, whether conducted in
theater or on tabletops, should continue unabated through a simulated
battlefield nuclear attack. This act should not be treated as a terminal part
of the exercise or as an activity separated from other “conventional” ac-
tions. Demonstrating preparedness to continue operations despite a no-
tional opponent’s theater nuclear strike assures both internal and external
actors of the US-led coalition’s ability to remain cohesive and effective
after any conventional or combined attack.
These types of exercises are critical for both physically and psychologi-
cally preparing personnel for a situation without precedent—continuing

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to fight following adversary employment of a nuclear weapon. A study of

the potential psychological effects of a nuclear attack notes that following
the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, survivors of the attacks
reported, in addition to physical injuries, “psychic numbing, severe anxiety,
and disorganized behavior, and there were later chronic effects such as
survivor guilt and psychosomatic reactions.” The study’s author concludes
that the psychological impact on military personnel surviving a nuclear
strike would likely be the same.68 While nothing can fully mitigate the
shock of experiencing a nuclear attack, preparing forces for the possibility
that one could occur on a battlefield where they are engaged in combat
can help manage fears of the unknown. Doing so can ensure that, should
a nuclear detonation occur, troops are mentally and physically prepared to
maintain good order while treating casualties, mitigating radiological con-
tamination, and preparing to execute response orders.69
Within a future regional conflict a potential adversary, if sufficiently
pressured, may gamble that the “shock value” of a nuclear detonation in
theater will provide time, space, and other forms of military advantage. By
devoting attention and resources to openly preparing US and allied forces
to withstand the physical and psychological impact of a nuclear attack, US
policy makers and combatant commanders can clearly signal to an adver-
sary that the United States and its allies will be neither intimidated by nor
unprepared for possible nuclear strikes in theater.
Impose Costs
The ability to impose unacceptable costs via defeat in actual tactical
combat is also foundational to deterrence theory. As described in the
DOD’s Deterrence Operations – Joint Operating Concept,
Deterrence by cost imposition involves convincing adversary decision-
makers that the costs incurred in response to or as a result of their attack
will be both severe and highly likely to occur. Cost imposition includes
the full array of offensive operations including kinetic and non-kinetic
options. . . . The key challenge to improving the effectiveness of deterrence
by cost imposition is to overcome adversar[ies’] perceptions that they can
successfully deter US attack, or that the US will be self-deterred.70
In addition to making it clear to potential adversaries that their inte-
gration of conventional and nuclear forces cannot effectively hide or pro-
tect the latter, it is important for the United States to show that it can
rapidly target and destroy high-value, low-density, nuclear-capable assets
such as mobile missiles. While strike lists within a campaign strategy will

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undoubtedly target many other types of assets, these expensive and rare
nuclear-capable platforms are an easily justified pressure point for impos-
ing costs in response to the threat or employment of nuclear weapons in
theater. Increasing the vulnerability of an adversary’s theater- range,
nuclear-capable forces will decrease the utility of both CNI in force plan-
ning and the use of these forces in theater war fighting.
Calibrate the kill chain. The ROEs and “kill chain” for fighting a CNI
adversary will differ in several ways from fighting an opponent that fields
a solely conventional force. It is important for policy makers setting guid-
ance (and for combatant commanders in planning and execution) to bal-
ance several key considerations. If there are policy and operational con-
cerns regarding attacking nuclear-capable platforms that may or may not
be armed with nuclear weapons, US forces in theater should be equipped
with precision weapon options that can disable or destroy these threats
with low collateral damage risk. Hellfire missiles equipped with blades
instead of explosives, for example, are already in the US arsenal; these or
other nonexplosive weapons could potentially be used against the crew or
tires of a wheeled TEL carrying a missile in order to prevent it from reach-
ing a launch site.71 In addition, directed-energy weapons (DEW), several
of which are in later stages of development, may provide other nonexplo-
sive options for disabling theater-range, nuclear-capable platforms by
providing means for disabling or otherwise interfering with their guid-
ance, communications, or other key internal systems.72
Another challenge is that US platforms will likely be operating within
a contested, high-risk environment and may be searching for a moving
target accompanied by conventional forces. These cases may require locally
generated, high-penetration, precise engagement options that are highly
discriminate and capable of striking both priority platforms and their de-
fenses (such as theater-range, nuclear-capable delivery systems protected
by air-defense batteries). Moreover, policy makers and combatant com-
manders will likely seek to minimize the risk to US personnel; if available,
they will either employ unmanned systems or manned-unmanned combi-
nations that reduce human exposure to hazardous environments. Emerg-
ing strike delivery options such as the Golden Horde and CLEAVER
programs provide expendable, semiautonomous weapons that can signifi-
cantly increase standoff strike capacity across a theater, granting US com-
manders numerous options for attacking an adversary’s forces while keep-
ing US forces out of harm’s way.73
These and other examples of “smart” weapons currently fielded or under
development could be important cost imposition tools for dealing with

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CNI opponents. An additional benefit of these conventional systems is

their complementary traits of rapid incorporation expandable across a coa
lition and slew of delivery platforms as well as, in relative terms, their low
costs per unit or weapon.74 By providing US forces with large numbers of
inexpensive weapons that are dispersed across multiple bases and plat-
forms and able to operate in a wide range of nonpermissive environments,
these strike options can obviate some of the perceived benefits of inter-
mingling forces and seriously complicate the planning of a CNI adversary.
Even when its strike systems (conventional and nuclear-capable) are pro-
tected by active defenses or appear to be operating away from American
strike platforms, these types of smart weapons will be able to hold all these
forces—offensive and defensive—at risk of a sudden, accurate, lethal con-
ventional attack.
Tailor communications. A threat that is not effectively communicated
or fully understood is not credible, regardless of the military capabilities
behind it. US policy makers should develop tailored strategic communica-
tions plans aimed at influencing the cost-benefit calculus of potential CNI
opponents. Through public speeches and statements at events or engage-
ments (particularly with allies and partners), policy makers should empha-
size the risks potential adversaries face if they fail to disentangle their
nuclear forces or choose to engage in theater nuclear brinkmanship. At
the same time, however, they should also tout the potential benefits these
states can realize through joining arms control talks, agreeing to imple-
ment confidence-building measures, and engaging in Track 1 and Track 2
dialogues. In turn, US combatant commanders, whose public statements
are also closely watched by the capitals of both allies and potential adver-
saries, can broadcast these same messages to their defense counterparts
across the region.
US policy makers should draw a clear distinction within their public
messaging between a potential adversary’s approach to CNI and the re-
gional defense strategy and deterrence posture of the United States and its
allies. Opening talking points could focus on potential adversaries’ over-
reliance on destabilizing (and vulnerable) theater-range, nuclear-capable
forces to attempt to hold US and allied forces within the region at risk. In
contrast, the United States and its allies have a wide range of conventional
ways and means for locating and either disabling or destroying an adver-
sary’s key theater-range strike systems (however armed) and, more broadly,
for halting any combined conventional-nuclear theater offensive. Further-
more, the effectiveness of these conventional operations is enhanced by
the enduring US commitment to extended deterrence. This provision of a

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US “nuclear umbrella” is neither static nor applicable only in dire crises. It

is an integral part of a broader US regional defense posture that includes
conventional and nuclear-capable forces and is calibrated to meet con-
temporary security challenges, to include neutralizing adversary efforts to
use nuclear threats to shape the battlespace or otherwise alter US and al-
lied conventional operations. Neither the United States nor its allies rely
on nuclear saber rattling to communicate resolve, nor do they require nu-
clear strikes to realize US and allied theater campaign objectives. Indeed,
the potential employment of US nuclear forces, which will never target
civilians, remains solely reserved for “extreme circumstances.”75
A second important message for US policy makers to emphasize is that
these actors stand alone, and their efforts to use nuclear weapons to in-
timidate regional states betray their isolation and comparative military
weakness. In contrast, the US approach to regional deterrence and assur-
ance, including extended deterrence, is part of a common, coordinated
theater defense posture based on consultation and cooperation rather than
bullying. Indeed, the unique challenges posed by a potential adversary’s
integrated forces and nuclear weapons ultimately bind the United States
and its allies more closely together. As a result, coalition forces are well
prepared for a full range of adversary threats, can maintain combat effec-
tiveness in even the most challenging operating environments, and are fully
equipped to counter conventional and nuclear-capable platforms in theater.
Finally, US policy makers can state that US alliance networks—and the
extended deterrence guarantees undergirding these relationships—func-
tion to impose significant costs on adversaries in times of both competi-
tion and conflict. With coalition forces able to hold an opponent’s inte-
grated forces at risk regardless of when, where, and how they seek to
leverage nuclear threats, theater-range, nuclear-capable forces are not
credible tools of coercion or war fighting. As such, the substantial resources
potential adversaries devote to developing, fielding, and maintaining
theater-range, nuclear-capable forces and their accompanying nuclear
weapons entail significant resource costs without offering any real benefits.
Encourage Restraint
The third pillar of US deterrence strategies is encouraging restraint. As
stated in Deterrence Operations, “Encouraging adversary restraint is the way
in which US actions can influence adversary decision-makers’ perceptions
of the benefits and costs of not taking an action we seek to deter. Thus,
encouraging adversary restraint involves convincing adversary decision-

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makers that not undertaking the action we seek to deter will result in an
outcome acceptable to them (though not necessarily desired by them).”76
Regarding the challenges posed by CNI, the United States should en-
courage adversaries to either halt or roll back their integration of conven-
tional and nuclear-capable forces. A closely related objective is attempt-
ing to convince a potential adversary to convert its theater- range,
nuclear-capable systems so that they can only deliver conventional muni-
tions and making this nonnuclear status permanent and readily observ-
able.77 Overall, the United States seeks to convince potential adversaries
that casting a nuclear shadow over a region is a costly, counterproductive
endeavor not worth pursuing.
Deterrence Operations also indicates that encouraging restraint requires
convincing a potential adversary there are viable alternatives to pathways
the United States does not wish them to pursue (and that accepting this
alternative will result in an outcome amenable to both). On some issues,
this may entail finding a “minimax” solution whereby the United States
and the other party reach a mutually advantageous agreement (and avoid
a mutually costly outcome) despite their broader competition.78
Persuading a potential adversary to either roll back its integration of
conventional and nuclear forces or give up some of the latter may require
a combined diplomatic-military approach akin to the “dual track” em-
ployed by the United States and NATO prior to the negotiation of the
1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. To counter the
threat posed by new Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces in the form
of the SS-20 Pioneer missile, the United States developed its own highly
capable intermediate- range, nuclear- capable platforms (which several
NATO states then agreed to host). The United States, however, also of-
fered a diplomatic “track” to Moscow, proposing arms control talks to
potentially limit these types of forces. The Soviet Union, which viewed the
United States’ ground-launched intermediate-range missiles as particu-
larly dangerous (due in part to fears they could spearhead a “decapitation”
strike on its leadership) and increasingly concerned about the costs of a
prolonged arms race, eventually agreed to a treaty eliminating both sides’
arsenals of these types of theater-range delivery systems.79
A contemporary dual-track approach could focus the military track
on the United States fielding its own type(s) of ground- launched,
intermediate-range missiles previously banned by the INF Treaty; con-
tinuing to develop several types of locally generated, high-penetration,
precise-engagement “smart” weapons such as those discussed above; in-
creasing troop rotations, force levels, or pre-positioned equipment to areas

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or allies subject to specific regional nuclear threats; or perhaps employing

some combination of the above. At the same time as it took these steps
boosting its ability to hold a potential adversary’s theater-range, nuclear-
capable platforms at risk, the United States could also offer diplomatic
negotiations to limit these types of capabilities and their associated nuclear
weapons. One possible approach could be the pursuit of an agreement
representing a hybrid of nuclear and conventional arms control treaties,
such as combining elements of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty, INF Treaty, and New START. The agreement would provide for
numerical limitations of certain types of weapon systems and inspections
within a specific theater and verification measures confirming the nuclear
or nonnuclear status of dual-capable platforms.
The success of these or other types of talks seeking to address CNI-
related challenges will ultimately depend on a broad range of factors.
Whether via arms control negotiations or the use of other ways and means
to encourage restraint (such as sanctions designed to penalize the devel-
opment of certain types of weapons), US policy makers can negotiate or
operate from a position of strength when backed by flexible, effective
military capabilities and strong support from allies. This position can pave
the way for potential adversaries to accept restraint regarding nuclear in-
tegration or the deployment of theater-range, nuclear-capable forces.
Conclusion
Potential adversaries such as Russia, China, and North Korea are con-
tinuing to invest in theater-range, nuclear-capable delivery systems and
the production of new nuclear warheads. Their integration of nuclear and
conventional forces, to include for the purpose of theater campaign plan-
ning, is a present and future challenge for US policy makers and combat-
ant commanders.
Deterring and countering CNI threats from potential adversaries re-
quires an integrated, but not mirror-imaged, US response. Policy makers
should clearly communicate that the US approach to CNI allows its forces
to hold opposing high-value theater assets, such as theater-range, nuclear-
capable forces, at risk throughout a conflict. Such a message credibly
threatens defeat of their integrated forces with US conventional capabili-
ties—all without ever resorting to bellicose threats of nuclear use. More-
over, when properly equipped, US combatant commanders will possess an
uninterrupted alliance all-domain kill chain that can effectively isolate an
adversary’s nuclear assets and eliminate theater employment options.

79.173.92.110 on Mon, 02 Dec 2024 10:15:36 UTC
By coupling cost imposition and deterrence by denial strategies, the

United States can make clear to both adversaries and allies that attempt-
ing to introduce nuclear weapons into a regional military conflict will not
provide the former with a pathway to victory. In addition, developing ef-
fective US strategies for negating the perceived benefits of CNI will
strengthen the ability of policy makers to encourage potential adversaries
to refrain from their dangerous reliance on theater-range, nuclear-capable
forces and regional nuclear coercion. In the long term, these strategies may
also contribute to broader efforts to encourage these actors to retire or
negotiate away nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable platforms either de-
signed or assigned for regional conflict.
Justin Anderson
Dr. Anderson is a senior policy fellow at the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at
National Defense University. He earned an MA and a PhD in war studies at King’s College London and
a BA in diplomacy and world affairs at Occidental College.
Lt Col James R. McCue, USAF

Colonel McCue serves as a nuclear strategist at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. He is an Air Force
helicopter pilot with over 2,500 hours in various missions, including combat rescue and nuclear security.
He is a graduate of the Air Force Institute of Technology’s Nuclear Weapons Effects, Policy, and Plan-
ning course; Missouri State University’s Defense and Strategic Studies program; and the National De-
fense University Counter-WMD Fellowship Program.
Notes
1. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the
United States of America (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2018), 2, https://dod.defense.gov/.
2. The authors use the term “theater-range, nuclear-capable delivery systems” to refer
to any platform (short-, medium-, or intermediate-range) that can affect the battlefield
or operational depth of a given regional conflict.
3. As stated by a 2020 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, “Recent missile
tests suggest that North Korea is striving to build a credible nuclear warfighting capa
bility designed to evade regional ballistic missile defenses.” Mary Beth D. Nikitin and
Samuel D. Ryder, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs,” CRS In
Focus report (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 2020), 1, https://
fas.org/. See also Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Global Nuclear Landscape 2018
(Washington, D.C.: DIA, 2018), 19–21, https://dod.defense.gov/; and Department of
Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea 2017: Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2018), 1, 4. For Russia’s inte-
gration of “non-strategic” nuclear forces across the “full spectrum of conflict,” to include
regional or “limited” war-fighting strategies, see Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia
Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations (Washington,
D.C.: DIA, 2017), 22, 25, 32, https://www.dia.mil/. See also Dave Johnson, Russia’s Con-
ventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds, Livermore

79.173.92.110 on Mon, 02 Dec 2024 10:15:36 UTC
Papers on Global Security No. 3 (Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Labo-
ratory Center for Global Security Research, 2018), 66–72, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/.
4. Brad Roberts, On Theories of Victory, Red and Blue, Livermore Papers on Global
Security No. 7 (Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Center for
Global Security Research, 2018), 23, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/.
5. Brad Roberts, Living with a Nuclear-Arming North Korea: Deterrence Decisions in a
Deteriorating Threat Environment (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, November 2020),
7, https://www.stimson.org/.
6. Keith B. Payne, “Nuclear Deterrence in a New Age,” Comparative Strategy 37, no. 1
(2018): 4, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2018.1419708.
7. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (Fredericksburg, VA: Bookcrafter’s, 1966),
114; Sean Maloney, “Remembering Soviet Nuclear Risks,” Survival 57 no. 4 (August/
September 2015): 78–80, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1068558; and Wil-
liam Drozdiak, “Kohl Defends Missiles,” Washington Post, 22 November 1983, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/.
8. Paul Schulte, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO and Beyond: A Historical and
Thematic Examination,” 16–25, in Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO, eds. Tom Nichols,
Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies
Institute, 2012), 13–74, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/.
9. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review made it imperative that the United States de-
velop, in close coordination with its allies, an approach to counter the CNI threat. See
Department of Defense, 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2018),
VIII, https://media.defense.gov/.
10. James M. Acton, “Why Is Entanglement So Dangerous?” Carnegie Q&A, 23
January 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/.
11. James Acton, “Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of
Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War,” In-
ternational Security 43, no. 1 (Summer 2018): 56–99, https://www.mitpressjournals.org/;
Thomas G. Mahnken and Gillian Evans, “Ambiguity, Risk, and Great Power Conflict,”
Strategic Studies Quarterly 13, no. 4 (Winter 2019): 57–77, https://www.airuniversity.af
.edu/; Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear?: Assessing the Risk of Chinese
Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” International Security
41, no. 4 (Spring 2017): 50–92, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00274; and Rebecca
Hersman, “Wormhole Escalation in the New Nuclear Age,” Texas National Security Re-
view 3, no. 3 (Autumn 2020): 91–109, http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/10220.
12. Mansoor Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on
Stability,” Carnegie Regional Insight, 30 June 2016, https://carnegieendowment.org/.
13. Alexei Arbatov, “A Russian Perspective on the Challenge of U.S., NATO, and
Russian Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons,” 152–162, in Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe,
eds. Steve Andreason and Isabelle Williams (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initia-
tive, 2011), 152–71, https://media.nti.org/.
14. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Director of Intelligence Daniel
Coats on Russia’s Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Violation,” press
statement, 30 November 2018, https://www.dni.gov/.
15. DIA, Global Nuclear Landscape, 8.

79.173.92.110 on Mon, 02 Dec 2024 10:15:36 UTC
16. Statement by Admiral Harry B. Harris, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command, House Armed Services Committee Meeting on U.S. Pacific Command Pos-
ture, 26 April 2017, https://docs.house.gov/.
17. David C. Logan, “Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces,” 401–8, in Chairman
Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, eds. Phillip Saunders et al.
(Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2019), 393–435, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/.
18. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2020 (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2020), viii, https://media.defense.gov/;
and Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Rocket Force Launches DF-26 ‘Aircraft Carrier Killer’ Missile in
Fast Reaction Drills,” Global Times (China), 6 August 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/.
19. Ankit Panda, “North Korea Shows Increased Operational Confidence in
Hwasong-12 IRBM,” The Diplomat, 17 September 2017, https://thediplomat.com/; and
Michael Elleman, “North Korea’s Hwasong-12 Launch: A Disturbing Development,”
38 North, 30 August 2017, https://www.38north.org/.
20. DIA, Global Nuclear Landscape, 11, 22; and Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, “The Arms
Control Landscape ft. DIA Lt. Gen. Robert P. Ashley, Jr.,” event transcript, Hudson In-
stitute, 31 May 2019, https://www.hudson.org/.
21. Henry Foy, “Russia Makes Missile Offer in Effort to Restart Talks on Arms Con-
trol,” Financial Times, 26 October 2020, https://www.ft.com/.
22. David Logan, “Are They Reading Schelling in Beijing?: The Dimensions, Drivers,
and Risks of Nuclear-Conventional Entanglement in China,” Journal of Strategic Studies
(2020): 19–24, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1844671.
23. Logan, 23.
24. Acton, Escalation through Entanglement, 59.
25. United Nations, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution
1874 (2009), 31 July 2019, S/2019/691, 135, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/.
26. NATO, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2015 (Brussels: NATO, 2015), 21;
and Dave Johnson, “ZAPAD 2017 and Euro-Atlantic Security,” NATO Review, 14 De-
cember 2017, https://www.nato.int/.
27. Xuanzun, “PLA Rocket Force Launches DF-26.”
28. CGTN, “China’s Rocket Force Launches New Missiles in Northwest China’s
Desert,” YouTube video, 1:13, 29 January 2019, https://www.youtube.com/; CGTN,
“PLA Rocket Force Brigade Holds Night Combat Drill,” YouTube video, 1:00, 18 April
2018, https://www.youtube.com/; and CGTN, “China’s ‘Rocket Force’ Conducts First
Drill of New Year,” YouTube video, 1:28, 3 January 2016, https://www.youtube.com/. See
also CCTV, “Chinese Rocket Force Conducts Missile Launch Drills,” YouTube video,
0:48, 11 June 2017, https://www.youtube.com/.
29. Anna Fifield, “North Korea Says It Was Practicing to Hit U.S. Military Bases in
Japan with Missiles,” Washington Post, 6 March 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/.
30. Kim Min-Seok, “The State of the North Korean Military,” 21–23, in Korea Net
Assessment, Chung Min Lee and Kathryn Botto, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, 2020), 19–30; and Department of Defense, 2019 Mis-
sile Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2019), v, https://www.defense.gov/.
31. Min-Seok, 21–23; DOD, v; and Vince Manzo and John Warden, “Want to Avoid
Nuclear War? Reject Mutual Vulnerability with North Korea,” War on the Rocks, 29 Au-
gust 2017, https://warontherocks.com/.

79.173.92.110 on Mon, 02 Dec 2024 10:15:36 UTC
32. Brad Roberts, “Strategic Competition in the 21st Century: Theories of Victory,
Red and Blue,” presentation, Lawrence Livermore Center for Global Security Research,
YouTube video, 50:08, 21 May 2015, https://www.youtube.com/.
33. George F. Kennan’s “Long Telegram” assessment of the Soviet Union provides
observations that can also apply to contemporary autocratic states, to include that they
cannot accept a lasting peace or conclusion of competition with the United States and its
democratic allies; any “peace” or acceptance of a stable relationship is tactical and tempo-
rary. Wilson Center Digital Archive, “George Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram,’ ” 22 February
1946, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/.
34. National Intelligence Council (NIC), “Russia and Eurasia,” in Global Trends:
Paradox of Progress (Washington, D.C.: NIC, 2017), 125, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/;
Michael Mazarr, “The Essence of Strategic Competition with China,” PRISM 9, no. 1
(2020): 3–22, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/; and Richard Javad Heydarian, “China’s Prema-
ture Bid for Hegemony in Southeast Asia,” Order from Chaos (blog), Brookings, 28 No-
vember 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/.
35. Stephan Evans, “The Saddam Factor in North Korea’s Nuclear Strategy,” BBC
News, 9 September 2016, https://www.bbc.com/; and James C. Mulvenon et al., Chinese
Responses to U.S Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense
(Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2006), 10.
36. Vince Manzo and John Warden note that “an adversary of the United States and its
allies may believe it can conduct limited nuclear strikes and, rather than precipitate its own
destruction, win the war—not in the sense of defeating the United States military, but by
convincing Washington to refrain from bringing its full strategic-military power to bear on
the conflict.” See Vince Manzo and John Warden, “After Nuclear First Use, What?” Sur-
vival 60, no. 3 (February 1980): 133–60, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2020.1702341.
37. Jung Pak, “What Kim Wants: The Hopes and Fears of North Korea’s Dictator,”
Foreign Affairs, May/June 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/.
38. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review recognized this challenge, stating that the
United States (and its nuclear forces) will ensure “potential nuclear-armed adversaries
that they cannot escalate their way out of failed conventional aggression.” Department of
Defense, 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: DOD, March 2014),
13, http://archive.defense.gov/.
39. DOD, 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, 14.
40. Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 1965), vi, https://www.rand.org/.
41. Kevin Ryan, “Is ‘Escalate to De-escalate’ Part of Russia’s Nuclear Tool Box?,”
Russia Matters, Harvard Belfer Center, 8 January 2020, https://www.russiamatters.org/.
42. “Russia Threatens to Aim Nuclear Missiles at Denmark Ships if it Joins NATO
Shield,” Reuters, 22 March 2015, https://www.reuters.com/; and “ ‘Norway Will Suffer’:
Russia Makes Nuclear Threat over US Marines,” The Local, 31 October 2016, https://
www.thelocal.no/.
43. Jack Kim and Kiyoshi Takenaka, “North Korea Threatens to ‘Sink’ Japan, Reduce
US to ‘Ashes and Darkness,’ ” Reuters, 14 September 2017, https://www.reuters.com/;
and “North Korea Threatens US and S. Korea with Nuclear Strikes,” BBC News, 7 March
2016, https://www.bbc.com/.
44. The quote is attributed to French president Charles De Gaulle, whose answer
was a definitive “non,” leading France to develop its nuclear force de frappe. Drew

79.173.92.110 on Mon, 02 Dec 2024 10:15:36 UTC
Middleton, “The De Gaulle Nuclear Doctrine Is Alive in Paris,” New York Times, 6 May
1981, A16, https://www.nytimes.com/. See also Jamie Shea, “1979: The Soviet Union
Deploys Its SS20 Missiles and NATO Responds,” NATO video lecture, 4 March 2009,
https://www.nato.int/.
45. Michael Kofman, Anya Fink, and Jeffrey Edmonds, Russian Strategy for Escala-
tion Management: Evolution of Key Concepts (Washington, D.C.: Center for Naval Analy
ses, April 2020), 12, https://www.cna.org/.
46. Christian Lowe, “Russia Defends Right to Deploy Missiles after Kaliningrad
Rebuke,” Reuters, 6 February 2018, https://www.reuters.com/.
47. This allied fear of “decoupling,” which was also present during the Cold War, has
returned but now applies to the potential threat posed by more than one actor. See Yochi
Dreazan, “Here’s What War with North Korea Would Look Like,” Vox, 8 February 2018,
https://www.vox.com/; and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Decoupling Is Back in Asia: A 1960s
Playbook Won’t Solve These Problems,” War on the Rocks, 7 September 2017, https://
warontherocks.com/.
48. This is a “deterrence by doubt” defense. “Interview: Lt. Gen. Raad Al-Hamdani,”
Frontline, PBS, 26 February 2004, http://www.pbs.org/.
49. James Acton, “Inadvertent Escalation and the Entanglement of Nuclear
Command-and-Control Capabilities,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, 29 October 2018,
https://www.belfercenter.org/.
50. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear
Matters Handbook 2020 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2020), 224,
https://fas.org/.
51. Alexei Arbatov, “A Russian Perspective on the Challenge of US, NATO, and
Russian Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons,” 152–71, in Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe:
A Framework for Action, eds. Steve Andreasen and Isabelle Williams (Washington, D.C.:
Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011): 162–63, https://media.nti.org/.
52. Col Kenneth P. Ekmen, “Applying Cost Imposition Strategies against China,”
Strategic Studies Quarterly 9, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 26, 30, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/.
53. Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations – Joint Operating Concept, ver. 2.0
(Washington, D.C.: DOD, December 2006), 5, https://www.jcs.mil/.
54. Department of Defense, 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, VIII.
55. David Santoro and Robert Gromoll, On the Value of Nuclear Dialogue with China
(Honolulu, HI: Pacific Forum, 2020): 8–9, https://pacforum.org/; Brad Roberts, “Stra-
tegic Stability Under Obama and Trump,” Survival 59, no. 4 (2017): 57, https://doi.org
/10.1080/00396338.2017.1349780; Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), “Russia Rejects
Immediate Talks on Tactical Nuke Cuts,” 8 February 2011, https://www.nti.org/; Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Russia Sees ‘No Prospects’ for Extending Nuclear Pact
with U.S.,” 14 October 2020, https://www.rferl.org/; “Russia Suspends Joint Consulta-
tions on Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” TASS, 10 March 2015,
https://tass.com/russia/781973; Julia Masterson and Kelsey Davenport, “North Korea
Rejects U.S. Proposal,” Arms Control Now (blog), Arms Control Association, 10 October
2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/; and Duyeon Kim, “N. Korea Launches Rocket,
Kills U.S. Deal,” Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association, 8 May 2012, https://
www.armscontrol.org/.

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56. S. T. Belyaev et al., “The Black Sea Experiment: The Use of Helicopter-Borne Neu-
tron Detectors to Detect Nuclear Warheads in the USSR-US Black Sea Experiment,”
Science and Global Security 17, nos. 2-3 (2009): 186–93, http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/.
57. Richard Maurer et al., “Aerial Neutron Detection: Neutron Sensors for Nonpro-
liferation and Emergency Response Applications,” National Security Technologies, Re-
port DOE/NV/25946-1634, October 2012, 48, https://doi.org/10.2172/1136549. In
more recent years, experiments conducted around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Plant destroyed by the tsunami that struck Japan in 2011 have demonstrated that un-
manned drones can detect localized radiation sources and hotspots from 150 to 300
meters. Jiang et al., “A Prototype of Aerial Radiation Monitoring System Using an Un-
manned Helicopter Mounting a GAGG Scintillator Compton Camera,” Journal of Nu-
clear Science and Technology 53, no. 7 (2016): 1067–75, published online 5 October 2015,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00223131.2015.1089796.
58. Gabriel Almodovar et al., “Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Simplifying
an Increasingly Complex Problem,” Joint Force Quarterly 88 (1st Qtr 2018): 78–84,
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/.
59. Joint Publication 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, 21 April 2017 (vali-
dated 2 May 2018), https://www.jcs.mil/.
60. For example, the United States developed plans for a theater missile defense ex-
ercise with Japan and South Korea shortly after North Korea conducted its November
2017 test of the Hwasong-15 missile. Ankit Panda, “US, Japan, South Korea to Hold
Missile Tracking Exercise,” The Diplomat, 11 December 2017, https://thediplomat.com/.
61. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review (Washington,
D.C.: Department of Defense, 2019), https://www.defense.gov/; US Army, Army Air
and Missile Defense Vision 2028 (Huntsville, AL: USASMDC/ARSTRAT, March
2019), https://www.smdc.army.mil/; and Kenneth R. Dorner, William B. Hartman, and
Jason M. Teague, “Back to the Future: Integrated Air and Missile Defense in the Pa-
cific,” Air and Space Power Journal 29, no. 1 ( January-February 2015): 61–78, https://
www.airuniversity.af.edu/.
62. Joseph Trevithick, “F-35 Cueing Artillery to Take Out Air Defense Site Is a
Glimpse of the Future,” The Drive, 13 December 2019, https://www.thedrive.com/.
63. “Passive defenses” broadly refer to static defenses and techniques such as dispersal
of forces, inasmuch as the latter involves movement before or during conflict.
64. US Army News Service, “US Army Corps of Engineers, Far East District, Com-
pletes Construction of Third Generation of Hardened Aircraft Shelters at Kunsan Air
Base,” 27 May 2020, https://www.army.mil/.
65. Jaganath Sankaran, “ ‘Big, Fat, Juicy Targets’—The Problem with Existing Early-
Warning Satellites. And a Solution,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 30 September 2019,
https://thebulletin.org/.
66. George I. Seffers, “Air Force Seeks Disaggregated Command and Control,” Sig-
nal, 1 February 2019, https://www.afcea.org/.
67. Hailey Haux, “A B-52 Exercises Dynamic Force Employment with Joint Part-
ners in Indo-Pacific,” Pacific Air Forces Public Affairs press release, 7 July 2020, https://
www.pacom.mil/.
68. Charles A. Salter, “Psychological Effects of Nuclear and Radiological Warfare,”
Military Medicine 166, Suppl. 2 (2001): 17–18.

79.173.92.110 on Mon, 02 Dec 2024 10:15:36 UTC
69. Following a series of exercises in which most personnel wore personal protective
equipment for most of the activity, a November 2019 US Army 1st Armored Division
report noted, “Much of what will be asked of a Soldier against a near-peer threat in a
contaminated battlefield will require fighting ‘dirty’ for extended periods of time. Ma-
neuver formations at the brigade level and lower will need to conduct hasty decontami-
nation as far forward as possible to continue to sustain operational tempo.” Kurt Ebaugh,
“News from the CTC: Unit CBRN Readiness Training – A Way,” Center for Army
Lessons Learned, November 2019, https://usacac.army.mil/.
70. DOD, Deterrence Operations – Joint Operating Concept, 26–27.
71. Nonexplosive Hellfire missiles have a proven combat record eliminating high-
value targets on the move with exceptionally low collateral risk. See Gordan Lubold and
Warren P. Strobel, “Secret Missile Targets Terrorist Leaders,” Wall Street Journal, 10 May
2019, A4.
72. One example of such a system would be Boeing’s Counter-electronics High
Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP), a “non-kinetic, non-lethal”
weapon first tested in 2012 that uses “bursts of high-powered energy” to destroy elec-
tronics systems and microchips, “effectively knocking out a specific target’s data and
electronic subsystems” and rendering it inoperable. “CHAMP – Lights Out,” Boeing
press release, 22 October 2012, https://www.boeing.com/; and George I. Seffers,
“CHAMP Prepares for Future Flights,” SIGNAL, 1 February 2016, https://www.afcea
.org/. Similarly, other electronic attack systems may be able to directly disable delivery
systems by interfering with internal or external systems or networks that enable them to
conduct attacks. Brendan I. Koerner, “Inside the New Arms Race to Control Bandwidth
on the Battlefield,” Wired, 18 February 2014, https://www.wired.com/; and Joseph Trevi
thick, “Navy to Add Laser Weapons to at Least Seven More Ships in the Next Three
Years,” The Drive, 8 July 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/.
73. The “Golden Horde” is a US Air Force “Vanguard program” that, via an innovative
combination of hardware and software, can provide aircraft with “munitions [that] can be
networked together and operate autonomously after launch according to a set of pre
determined rules.” Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force Gears Up for First Flight Test of
Golden Horde Munition Swarms,” Defense News, 13 July 2020, https://www.defense
news.com/. Golden Horde, after being fired by a pilot, can split up to strike both the
intended target (e.g., air defense systems) and other, higher-priority targets (e.g., mobile
missiles leaving hide sites) that are not identified until after the weapons are inbound.
The Cargo Launch Expendable Air Vehicle with Extended Range (CLEAVER) system
is designed to allow cargo planes to drop multiple “palletized munitions” that contain
“long-range, high precision weapons [that can] destroy moving and non-moving targets.”
Whitney Wetsig, “AFRL, AFSOC Launch Palletized Weapons from Cargo Plane,” Air
Force News, 28 May 2020, https://www.af.mil/.
74. Weapons such as the CLEAVER, dropped from standard cargo planes, can provide
strike options that are significantly less expensive than medium- or long-range bombers.
This is especially true for offering such technology to partners and allies in an attempt to
cheaply attain dispersion and redundancy of long-range precision-strike capabilities.
75. DOD, 2019 Nuclear Posture Review, II.
76. DOD, Deterrence Operations – Joint Operating Concept, 27.
77. Under the terms of START, for example, the United States agreed to convert its
dual-capable B-1B bombers to conventional-only platforms. A “metal cylindrical sleeve

79.173.92.110 on Mon, 02 Dec 2024 10:15:36 UTC
was welded into the aft attachment points,” making it impossible for the aircraft to carry
nuclear-armed cruise missiles from its wings, and cable connectors required to arm nu-
clear weapons were also removed. US Air Force, “B-1 Bomber,” fact sheet, 16 December
2015, https://www.af.mil/.
78. Thomas C. Schelling, “The Strategy of Conflict: Prospectus for a Reorientation of
Game Theory,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 2, no. 3 (September 1958): 209–19, https://
doi.org/10.1177/002200275800200301.
79. Louis Sell, From Washington to Moscow: US-Soviet Relations and the Collapse of the
USSR (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 204.

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Deterring, Countering, and Defeating Conventional-Nuclear Integration

Author(s): Justin Anderson and James R. McCue

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26984767

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Deterring, Countering, and

28 STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY  SPRING 2021

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its own integrated conventional-­nuclear force, with the allied regional

30 STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY  SPRING 2021

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Defining the CNI Phenomenon and Present Threat

Understanding the Evolving CNI Threat

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tems. Their goal is to supplement their conventional forces and to provide

32 STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY  SPRING 2021

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STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY  SPRING 2021 33

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Why Pursue CNI?

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that solely features conventional forces. They worry that US conventional

To Guarantee at Least a Draw (and Thus Preserve the Regime)

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reverses in the field), they may seriously contemplate employing a theater

To Discourage Allied Participation and/or US Intervention

36 STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY  SPRING 2021

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To Provide Fidelity for (Theater) Brinkmanship

STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY  SPRING 2021 37

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To Complicate the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Targeting

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forces represent high-­value assets (due to their limited numbers, their

To Enhance the Lethality of Standoff Strike Options

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reach, or resilient to the effects, of their conventional platforms. At a basic

Countering the CNI Threat

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States, prompting US commanders to expend significant time and re-

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security arrangements. In addition, all three states have rejected US offers

Deny CNI Benefits (Intermingling)

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Deny CNI Benefits (Lethality)

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on their behalf against CNI opponents. Deterrence by denial efforts aimed

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its own integrated conventional-nuclear force, with the allied regional

forces represent high-value assets (due to their limited numbers, their