WALTER M.

DRZEWIENIECKI

THE POLISH ARMY ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II

Background of theModern Polish Army

Although Poland had ceased to exist as an independent nation by the end

of the eighteenth century, the tradition of the Polish armed forces as a
sovereign arm of the nation could not be buried with the state. It had lived
throughout theNapoleonic period inGeneral Dabrowski's Legions, in the
small but splendid armies of the Duchy of Warsaw and the Congress
Kingdom of Poland, but itwas almost destroyed by the defeat of the
unsuccessful insurrection against Russia in 1863-64.
The man who reintroduced, almost forced upon Polish society, the idea
of a military organization as the only force which could regain indepen
dence for Poland was Jozef Pilsudski. Prior toWorld War I, he created
some paramilitary organizations and, subsequently, a small,
in Galicia
quasi-independent military legion, the First Brigade, which fought along
side the Austrian armies for the independence of Poland against themost
oppressive of the occupants, Russia. The Austrians in time increased Polish
participation in the war to three brigades. These legions constituted per
haps themost important, but by far not themost numerous, element from
which a new army of the independent Polish state was created in 1918.1
They, together with the secret POW organization, contributed some 2,500
officers.2
Service in the legions was voluntary, but Polish youth were also subject
to draft into the armies of all three occupation powers. Hundreds of
thousands of young men fromGalicia had to serve in theAustro-Hungarian
army, and thousands obtained commissions either in the regular army or in
the reserves. After the Empire's disintegration, between 12,000 and 15,000
officers joined the new Polish army.3
Since the lion's share of partitioned Poland was under Russian occupa
tion, the majority of Polish conscripts wore Russian uniforms and later

1See Marian "Wskrzeszenie Wojska Reestablishment of the Polish

Kukiel, Polskiego"(The
Army), Bellona, 1959, 1:3-17; 11:127-138; 111:225-235; and IV:319-325. See also Waclaw

Lipiriski, Walka zbrojna o niepodlegtosc Polski, 1905-1918(Armed Struggle for Poland's

Independence, 1905-1918), 2nd ed. (Warsaw, 1935) and Wtadyslaw Pobog-Malinowski,
Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski, 1864-1945 (Most Recent Polish Political History,
1864-1945) (Paris: n.p., 1953), vol. I.
2Marian Romeyko, Przed ipo maju (Before and after May) (Warsaw, 1976), I, 93.
3Ibid.

54
The Polish Army 55

served in the Polish units created by the Russian high command. It is

estimated that between 40,000 and 50,000 officers (including 10,000 profes
sionals) were mobilized by the tsarist army in the years 1914-17, and out of
this number about 25,000 joined the independent Polish army in 1918.4
The one army in which most Poles declined to serve as professional
soldiers was that of Imperial Germany. They were, of course, subject to
draft, but only a small percentage were commissioned. Hence, only about
1,000 officers with German training were later available for the Polish
army.5

Finally, between 1,500 and 1,750 officers, Polish and non-Polish, arrived
in Poland in 1919-20 from France, where they had served with the French
army. Some of these were volunteers from the United States and other
Western hemisphere countries.6
All these officers had one common failing. They had never been able to
acquire high-level military experience beyond that of the infantrydivision,
as none of the foreign powers would tolerate Polish nationals serving above
that level. The only exception involved two Poles in theRussian army, and
these had gained their advancement only because, unlike most Poles, they
were non-Catholic. Quite possibly this lack of upper-level experience
influenced the situation within thePolish army between the twoworld wars
and handicapped its preparation for war with Germany.
Thus composed, the Polish army in 1918 had no uniform training,
tradition, background, or military doctrine. Many officers did not even
speak good Polish. Yet this army, equipped with weapons of every type,
under the inspiring leadership ofMarshal Pitsudski, managed not only to
secure frontiers for the new state, but also to win the war with the new
Communist Russian state in 1920.

Polish Armed Forces after the Russo-Polish War

For a few years after theRusso-Polish War the composition of theArmy

remained unchanged, apart from the fact that a new element had begun to
appear on the lowest level in the persons of young officers who had not
served in any foreign army and whose only loyalty was to independent
Poland. The systematic training of new officers had already been initiated
under theGerman occupation inNovember, 1917 and this continued after
the independence of Poland was proclaimed on November 11,1918. Other
wise, the balance among the various groups was at first preserved since all
were needed to fight wars against the Russians, theGermans, theUkrain

*Ibid
*lbid., p. 94.
6//>/</.
56 The Polish Review

ians, and even the Czechs and the Lithuanians. For example, the Com
mander-in-Chief was the former commander of the First Brigade of the
Polish Legion, Jozef Pilsudski, and his Chief of Staff was the former
Austrian Feldmarschalleutnant (lieutenant general) Tadeusz Rozwadow
ski; the overall command in fighting against theGermans was in the hands
of General Jozef Dowbor-Musnicki from the Russian army. Itwas, how
ever, only a matter of time before one group (former legionnaires from the
First Brigade) would take over (after Pilsudski's coup d'etat in 1926), and
come from foreign
rapidly retiremost of the senior army officers who had
armies. The result was that by 1939 the following important posts were in
the hands of Pilsudski's legionnaires:

?The Inspector General (Commander-in-Chief)

?The Chief of General Staff and his associates
?The Minister of Military Affairs and his deputies
?About 80 percent of the generals in the Inspectorate General (army
commanders)
?About 80 percent of army corps commanders
?About 70 percent of divisional commanders
?About 50 percent of cavalry brigade commanders.7

Meanwhile, in 1923,Marshal Pilsudski retired from both his army and

political posts. In the same year the Polish armed forces began a plan of
reorganization which had been approved by Pilsudski prior to his retire
ment.

The Russo-Polish War, as has been pointed out, was won with weapons
and equipment of every type captured for themost part from disintegrating
foreign armies. Not until the final stages of the war was a substantial
shipment of French hardware received and used effectively.After thewar,
the Poles bought from France a huge amount ofWorld War I equipment
and arms no longer needed by theFrench. Thus, the peacetime Polish army
possessed a grand mosaic of weapons and equipment already obsolescent
and of little value for the future defense of the country.
According to the 1923 plan prepared by the Polish General Staff, the
peacetime army was to consist of thirty infantrydivisions, eleven cavalry
brigades, ten tank battalions, ten air-force regiments, and a proportional
number of other services. The total strength of theArmed Forces was to
amount to 17,000 officers, 30,000 NCOs, and about 230,000 men. In case of
war the overall strengthwas to be doubled to sixty infantrydivisions and
about 1,500,000 officers and men. The plan was to be completed by 1935,8

7Stanisiaw Kopariski, Moja stuzba w Wojsku Polskim, 1917-1939 (My Service in the
Polish Army, 1917-1939) (London: Veritas, 1965), pp. 302-303.
8Jozef Zajac, "Nasze przygotowania do wojny"(Our War Preparations), Kultura, No. 1-2
(1961), pp. 161-162.
The Polish Army 57

but itnever was. Nevertheless, substantial progress was made in the field of
weaponry. For example, all troops received the same rifle, theMauser 98,
and the same kind of light and medium machine guns; also most of the
artillery units were uniformly equipped with French guns.
Unfortunately, the decision of theMinister ofMilitary Affairs, General
Wladyslaw Sikorski, to create a special army corps to guard the Polish
eastern frontier (the Frontier Defense Corps?K.O.P.) made itpractically
impossible to secure enough military equipment for the sixty infantry
divisions ifwar broke out. For many years the army had to train, equip,
and feed hundreds of thousands of additional soldiers who could not be
called to arms in 1939. Furthermore, as a result of General Sikorski's
decision and of subsequent reforms introduced byMarshal Pilsudski after
1926,when he resumed his former army posts, the budgetary allotment for
the upkeep of troops under arms was so high that relatively littlewas leftfor
new equipment and modernization of the nation's armed forces.9
Pilsudski also decided to divide the responsibility for military affairs
between two separate units: theMinistry forMilitary Affairs for peacetime
command of the armed forces and the Inspectorate General for prepara
tion for future wars. As a result, therewas great confusion regarding the
respective responsibilities of the two authorities, and future high command
ers were separated from their troops and staffs.10Other negative con
sequences of this division of power included lack of organized training for
future higher commanders.
Another factor that adversely affected the state of Polish readiness for
war with Germany was Marshal Pilsudski's conviction that the Soviet
Union was Poland's principal enemy, and that all efforts should, therefore,
be directed towards preparing the defense of the eastern frontier.We shall
return to this question a little later.
One final shortcoming of the army was the relatively low percentage of
officers with higher military education. After Pilsudski's reforms,most of
the generals occupying positions of responsibility, including the Inspector
General himself, had no formal higher military education and out of the
entire officers' corps of 18,668, only 903 (or 4.84%) were graduates of staff
colleges.11

Polish Armed Forces in 1935

The German-Polish non-aggression pact of 1934 was supposed to guar

9Ibid., p. 169.

10Eugeniusz Kozlowski, Wojsko Polskie, 1936-1939. Proby modernizacji i rozbudowy

(The Polish Army, 1936-1939. Attempts at Modernization and Development) (Warsaw,

1964), pp. 14, 15, and 45-79.
"Ibid., p. 77.
 58 The Polish Review

antee the security of Poland's western frontier. However, since the Ger
mans, in spite of their frequent assurances of good intentions towards
Poland, were rapidly proceeding with themilitarization of their country,
the new Inspector General, Marshal Edward
Rydz-Smigly (Pilsudski died
inMay, 1935), decided to initiate a study of the overall
military situation in
case of German attack. At the same time, the General Staff was still

continuing itswork on the defenses of Poland's eastern frontier.

The firstconsequence of the emphasis on the
possible need to defend the
western frontierwas the creation of a new mobilization
plan "W,"12 which
could be used in the event of war, not only with the Soviet Union but also
with Germany. The plan was probably one of the best ever
prepared by any
army. At the same time,Marshal Rydz-Smigly, ingreat secrecy, instructed
a number of generals from the
Inspectorate General and certain staff
officers from theGeneral Staff to start
preliminary studies of the defense of
Poland's western border. On the basis of these studies, the
Inspector
General later formulated his own plan for a defensive war with
Germany.13
Needless to say, Rydz-Smigly's generals did not find Poland's defensive
ability in the west adequate, even after taking into consideration that the
security of the western frontier depended heavily on the alliance with
France and, later, with Great Britain. The
study also revealed that the
Polish Army was still at the level of 1914, and that, because of its
military
poor organization and outdated equipment, itwas no match for the new
German forces. Under these the Poles had no alternative
circumstances,
other than to undertake immediate modernization of theirmilitary ma
chine.14 The study also showed that about 10.5% of the Polish
Army
consisted of antiquated cavalry units while the
percentages of such units in
Germany and the Soviet Union amounted to only 2.1% and 6.2% respec
tively.15 Similar disparities, to the disadvantage of Poland, existed in
artillery, air force, armored forces, and other services.
One can say that, in general, Poland's 1935 war machine had an un
usually high percentage of infantry and cavalry and a relatively low per
centage of air, artillery, tank, and other services. Moreover, Polish infantry
and cavalry divisions were
poorly equipped with field guns: four lightguns
for an infantry battalion, as
against the Germans' eight or more; and no

12From the name of its author, Colonel Jozef Wiatr. See Polskie Sify
Zbrojne w Drugiej
wojnie swiatowej (The Polish Armed Forces inWorld War 11) (London: Instytut Historyczny
im. Gen.
Sikorskiego, 1951), Vol. I: Kampaniawrzesniowa (The September Campaign)pt. 1,
292-298. Subsequently PSZbr.
"Ibid, pp. 114-128.
14
Previous plans of modernization (Generals Konarzewski, and Piskor) did not
Fabrycy,
gain Marshal Pilsudski's approval. See Kozlowski, op. cit., p. 15.
isIbid.
The Polish Army 59

antitank guns at all. Polish infantrydivisions had neither organic, medium,

nor antiaircraft artillery, nor any tank units. They had some 57 mmgs and
34 lmgs, far fewer, however, than similar German divisions could count.
While in most European armies supply and maintenance units were
mechanized, Polish divisions had only horse-drawn supply columns which
slowed down themovement of divisions and made them vulnerable to air
attacks. Polish cavalry brigades were similarly antiquated. Already poorly
equipped with machine guns and artillery, theywere altogether lacking in
tanks and mechanized supply columns.
Polish armored units were small, organized as independent battalions
and even companies! Emphasis was on small reconnaissance tanks,where
as Poland's neighbors, the Soviet Union and Germany, were concentrating
on the production of attack tanks. Within most European armies, tanks
were gradually becoming one of themain services, ifnot themost impor
tant, but in Poland they still remained a support service.
The prospects of mechanization of the Polish Army once war broke out
were bleak since, for example, in 1936 therewere only 140 cars and trucks
in the entire nation for each infantrydivision to be mobilized. At the same
time, the Soviet Union had 2,300 vehicles, Germany 4,700 and France
12,900 per division.16
The equipment of Polish engineer units was rather primitive. There were
a few bridge- and road-building units without proper mechanical equip
ment. Similar German and Soviet units, on the other hand, were totally
mechanized.

Polish signal units were relatively well equipped with telephones. Radio
units, however, had to rely on equipment purchased from France after
World War I which, by themid-1930s, was obsolete. Thus, the Polish Air
Force, tank units, and higher headquarters were without a reliable com
munications network.
The Polish Air Force was in a particularly painful and dangerous situa
tion. Under Marshal Pilsudski the role of the Air Force was reduced to
reconnaissance and liaison between larger army units. As a result of this
lack of understanding of the importance of the air force in futurewars, the
Ministry ofMilitary Affairs reduced itsbudget almost every year. By 1936
the Air Force budget amounted to only 50% of that of 1926. According to
estimates by the Polish General Staff, the Soviet Union, which in the 1920s
had fewer aircraft than Poland, had by 1935 expanded itsair force to 5,000
planes or ten times as many of Poland. The superiority of theGerman Luft
waffe was of similar proportions.17

"Ibid, pp. 16-17.

"Ibid, pp. 17-19. See also PSZbr., I, pt. 1, 148-166.
60 The Polish Review

Reorganization and Modernization, 1936-1939

The findings of Rydz-Smigly's task force were shocking and prompted

his 1936 decision to prepare a plan for the expansion and modernization of
Poland's armed forces. As the new Polish constitution of 1935 greatly
improved the position of the Inspector General and endowed him with
substantial additional powers,18 he was in an advantageous position to
carry out his plans.
To start with, Rydz-Smigty retiredmost of the top echelon of the army
and replaced themwith men of significantly higher qualifications, although
most of these were drawn from Pilsudski's legionnaires. He also greatly
improved the position of the General Staff, nevertheless, choosing as its
chief one of the youngest generals who, naturally, had some difficulty
exercising his authority with older generals. Rydz-Smigly also created a
new coordinating "Committee for theDefense of the Republic" (Komitet
Obrony Rzeczypospolitej). The President of the Republic was the com
mittee's chairman, with the Inspector General as deputy chairman, and the
deputy chief of the General Staff, as secretary.
Simultaneously with the personnel and organizational changes just de
scribed a special committee was set up on theGeneral Staff level to prepare
the actual plans for expanding and modernizing the Polish armed forces.19
Itwould seem, unfortunately, that the entire Project was initiated without
first developing an overall picture of the future army.20 Such a vision
emerged only gradually, as the plan was being implemented.
Basically, the new plan called for the increase of fire power of infantry
divisions up to the general European level through the allocation of addi
tional machine guns, small caliber mortars, antitank guns, and field artil
lery. However, as a result of financial and industrial limitations, Polish
divisions would have actually remained 50% below the European level in
antitank and antiaircraft artillery, medium and heavy mortars, and radio
equipment. The plan also called for a substantial increase of mechanized
transport in divisional headquarters and supply units.
General Stachiewicz claims that the plan also called for the creation of
ten new reserve divisions. The equipment which was manufactured and
allocated to the army allowed for the formation of only seven reserve

^Dziennik Ustaw R.P. (Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland), No. 38, pt. 286.
Quoted after Kozlowski, pp. 22-23.
19Waclaw Stachiewicz, Pisma (Works), Vol. I: Przygotowania wojenne w Polsce, 1935
1939 (War Preparations in Poland), (Paris, 1977), passim. See also PSZbr., I, pt. 1, 167-228
and Kozlowski, passim.
20
Kozlowski, p. 24.
The Polish Army 61

divisions, but at the lastmoment, during the summer of 1939, two addi
tional divisions were formed with personnel and equipment from the
Frontier Defense Corps (KOP).21 The reserve divisions, however, were
short on artillery, and some of their equipment was inferior.Nevertheless,
in the years 1938-39, all infantry divisions received very good 37 mm
"Bofors" antitank guns (nine for regular divisions, six for the reserves), and,
also at the lastmoment, 7.9 mm antitank rifles of Polish production (one
per platoon in regular division, fewer in the reserve). In addition, most of
the regular divisions were provided with one mechanized battery of 40 mm
"Bofors" antiaircraft guns and some medium artillery (one battery for
regular divisions; the original plan had called for one battery of 155mm
howitzers and one of 155mm guns). Further improvement in artillery and
heavy mortars was planned for 1940 and 1941.
The plan did not call for an increase in the number of regular cavalry
brigades, but some regiments were gradually to be mechanized to form four
mechanized brigades (only one was fully, and another partially, organized
in the summer of 1939). Horse brigades were to receive one mechanized
infantry battalion each (none were received, and most got only regular
infantrybattalions), some tanks, antitank, and antiaircraft artillery, as well
as modern signal and engineer units. The cavalry plan was only partially
realized in 1939.22
Prior to the start of themodernization program, the Poles had begun to
introduce into the army a number of light tanks (7.51.) and some extremely
light reconnaissance vehicles (TK and TKS). The Ministry of Military
Affairs had purchased a fewVickers light tanks, which, after some changes,
were subsequently manufactured in Poland and introduced into the army
under the name of "light tanks 7 TP" (7 t. Polish tank). In addition, a
number of armored trains and motor-car units were organized.
After 1935 the problem of the armored forcewas frequently discussed by
theCommittee forArmament and Equipment (KSUS?Komitet do spraw
uzbrojenia i sprzqtu) and an extensive study was underway. Unfortunately,
the generally poor economic condition of the country and its lack of a
sufficient industrial base precluded not only the formation of armored
divisions, but even of a larger number of mechanized brigades. The only
practical solution, the committee concluded, was to manufacture tanks
which be used to support the existing infantry divisions. These
could
support tanks would have to have heavy armor and be of relatively limited
speed. An attempt to purchase a tank of this type (French Renault 35
and/or Somua) failed, and, as a result, the Poles had to limit themselves to

21Stachiewicz, p. 98.
22Ibid, pp. 98-101.
62 The Polish Review

what theywere able tomanufacture at home: TKS and 7 TP. Shortly before
the war, France, under pressure of the deteriorating political situation,
agreed to supply Poland with some modern tanks. A sufficient number to
form one battalion arrived in Poland in July, 1939,23?too late to be used
effectively during thewar. In themeantime, home production of tanks did
not develop satisfactorily, and during the last three years before thewar,
only 149 units were manufactured. As a consequence, the Polish army
remained weak in armored units.24

The Polish Air Force

Poland entered the period of peace at the close of the Russo-Polish War
of 1919-21 with a somewhat large and impressive air force, mainly pur
chased from France. Most of these aircraft, however, were obsolete when
received. Worse, there was neither an adequate network of airfields and
other facilities nor a sufficient industrial base to maintain them. The
industrial base came into existence only after Poland had built her own
aircraft factories and developed new models in the late 1930s. In 1936, after
useless aircraft had been withdrawn, the overall strength of the Polish Air
Force was reduced by 50% to 417 aircraft, including the slow R-XIII (93),
the obsolete Potez XXV and Breguet 19 (c. 170), P-7 and P-l 1 (130), and
Fokker (18).
The air force plan of 1936-37 called for new equipment for the existing
airforce regiments (six) and a special force of light bombers, as well as
substantial reserves of weapons, ammunition, and equipment. Since liter
ally all existing Polish aircraft were unfit formodern warfare, they had to
be replaced as soon as possible. Thus, Poland's youthful aircraft
industry
had to prepare new models. This enterprise needed, of course, substantial
time and an enormous financial commitment. The
help of Poland's ally,
France, was requested but was not obtained in time. For example, a new
observation plane could not be issued because France had failed to
supply
aircraft engines!
Plans for new types of fighter planes and bombers were
prepared by
Polish engineers, but their production could not be started until 1940?too
late for the September war. The hard-pressed Polish General Staff ordered
from France 160 modern fighters?"Morane 406"?but none arrived in
1939.
The prototype of a very good modern light bomber "Los" had been

23Ibid., pp. 110-114.

24 to Kozlowski,
According p. 164, in 1939 the Polish army had 887 light tanks as follows:
Renault R. 35 (50), Vickers and 7 TP (161); TKandTKS
(574)and World War IRenault R17
(102).
The Polish Army 63

designed a little earlier, in 1938, and by 1939 the Poles had managed to
supply their airforce regiments with 36 aircraft of this type.25
The Poles had put forth a tremendous effort to modernize their Air
Force, and their accomplishments were indeed noteworthy. However, due
to conditions existing in 1939, the entire Air Force could count no more
than 511 aircraft, and only a small percentage of those were modern.26 And
this was the aviation that alone had to face the thoroughly up-to-date
Luftwaffe of at least 3,000 aircraft!

Conclusion

To conclude this discussion, some additional comments must be made

regarding the field organization of the army. The highest operational unit
in the peacetime army was the infantry division. Although there were
corps commands (ten), their commanders had only administrative respon
sibility.During war, the Polish armed forces were to be organized into 6-7
armies and several ad hoc organized "operational groups." All armies and
some operational groups were to be commanded directly by theComman
der-in-Chief.27 Apparently the Polish Commander-in-Chief overestimated
his and his staffs ability to command, for this system simply did not work
and could not work under Polish conditions.
The backbone of the Polish army in peace as well as in war was the
infantry regiment (equivalent to theAmerican and British brigades). There
were 90 such regiments in the regular Polish army, and itwas up to them,
according to the field manuals, to achieve victory in the field. The com
manders of these extremely important units, however, were not supplied in
peace or war with staffsof adequate numbers and training. Unfortunately,
themodernization plan of 1936 paid little, ifany, attention to the command
structure of the infantry regiment. Subsequent war experience proved that
thiswas perhaps themost serious shortcoming of the army, and one which
could have been corrected with a relatively small expenditure of time and
money. This deficiency is even more difficult to understand when one takes
into consideration that a cavalry brigade, which was substantially weaker
and less important than an infantry regiment, was supplied with a well
trained, similar-to-divisional staff.28

25Stachiewicz, pp. 114-123. See also Kozlowski, pp. 220-270.

26Stachiewicz, p. 122. Other authors give different numbers.
E.g., author, Boje polskie,
1939-1941 (Polish Fighting, 1939-1941), (London, 1941), pp. 36-38 estimates the total
number of Polish aircraft at 388 and Tadeusz Cyprian in Komisja stwierdzita (Warsaw,

1960), pp. 379-477, and PSZbr., 1, pt. 1, 191-400 aircraft in fighting units.
27Stachiewicz, pp. 95-98.
28
Wlodzimierz M. Drzewieniecki, Wrzesniowewspomnieniapodporucznika (The Septem
ber Reminiscences of a Second Lieutenant), (Warsaw, 1978), pp. 173-179.
64 The Polish Review

All in all, a student ofmilitary historymust conclude that during the years
immediately preceding the outbreak of theWar, thePoles made an impres
sive effort to improve the fighting ability of their armed forces. The trouble
was, they simply did not have enough time and resources to fulfill their
plans. However, even had all plans been realized, Poland's ability to survive
the last war would still have been dependent upon the attitude and actions
of her allies, France and England, and her eastern neighbor, the Soviet
Union. All three proved to be totally unreliable.

AMERICAN POLONIA: THE CULTURAL ISSUES

An appraisal of Dean Dr. James S. Pula

contemporary American Professor Dr. Thaddeus V. Gromada

Polonia and a guide for Attorney Leonard Walentynowicz
the future Attorney David Franasiak
Archivist Mary Cygan
Educator Rev. Dr. L. F. Chrobot
Eleven Polish American Professor Dr. Eugene Kusielewicz
leaders speak out on Judge Honorable Ann T. Mikoll
eight issues confronting Attorney Marion N. Baruch
thePolish American Judge Honorable T. L. Kowalski

community Engineer Alfred F. Bochenek

Published by theAmerican Council of Polish Cultural Clubs. Price: $3.75
including postage and handling fromACPCC, c/o A. F. Bochenek, 8726 Brook
Road, McLean, Va. 22102. Also available at thePolish Institute.