India International Centre India International Centre Quarterly

Muslim Intellectuals, Institutions and the Post-Colonial Predicament
Author(s): MUSHIRUL HASAN

Source: India International Centre Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1, SECULARISM IN CRISIS
(SPRING 1995), pp. 100-122
Published by: India International Centre
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23003714
Accessed: 06-05-2020 05:46 UTC
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MUSHIRUL HASAN
Muslim Intellectuals, Institutions

Post-Colonial Predicament*
is still conducted within the framework be

queathed by the British and some nationalist
Much researchbeen
on the Muslimsbut
since
notIndependence
writers. The categories used to define them have
questioned changed. There is still
talk of a 'Muslim mind', a 'Muslim outlook', and an inclination to
construct a 'Muslim identity' around Islam. A sense of Othern
is conveyed in such images. Muslims are made to appear differen
in the print media, in some literary works, and in the world
cinema. In this respect, there is often a striking convergence
tween the secular and the communal perspectives.
It is also assumed that orthodoxy represents true Islam an
the interests of its adherents; and that liberal and modernist cur
rents are secondary or peripheral to the more dominant separati
communal and neo-fundamentalist paradigms. It is time to under
line, along with the dominant orthodox paradigms, the heterodo
trends which contest the definition of Muslim identity in purel
religious terms; and to refute the popular notion that Islamic valu
and symbols provide a key to the understanding of the 'Musli
world view'
Much is made of the fact that Muslims, more than any other
religious entity, attached greater importance and value to their
religio-cultural habits and institutions; hence they were more
prone to being swayed by the religious/Islamic rhetoric. There is
irrefutable evidence to substantiate this view. But if the inferences
drawn are specific to a community, what does one make of
nineteenth-century religio-revival movements in Bengal,
Maharashtra and Punjab, and their deepening anxieties over the
future of the Hindu identity.
* An abridged version of the original paper submitted to the IIC.
MUSHIRUL HASAN / 101
At the heart of the Arya Samaj's brand of reconstruction and

reform was the restoration of the pristine purity of the Vedic culture
and civilisation. The 'Tilak school' in Maharashtra and the leadin
architects of the swadeshi movement in Bengal, including
Aurobindo Ghose and B.C. Pal, were constructively rethinking
their Hindu heritage and meeting the challenges of modern
thought by assimilative-creative processess. The cow question was
nothing but an evocative symbol of Hindu resurgence in northern
and western India. The crusade for Hindi in opposition to Urdu
was as much linked with government employment as with a
widely perceived symbol of a Hinduised identity.1 Finally, th
emergent national consciousness appropriated the Orientalist con
struction of Hinduism, as well as what it regarded as the heritage
of Hindu culture. The need for formulating a Hindu community
also became a requirement for political mobilisation, when repr
sentation by the religious community gave access to political
power and economic resources.2
It must be borne in mind that a Muslim, like his counterpart
in any other community, has many diverse roles to play. He is not
cast in the role of a religious crusader or a relentless defender of
the faith. Besides being a follower of Islam by birth and training, a
Muslim, and for that matter a Hindu or a Sikh, is a peasant or
landlord, an agricultural worker or a landless labourer, a worke
or an industrialist, a student or a teacher, a litigant or a lawyer, a
Shia or a Sunni, a Deobandi or a Barelwi. Should we then harp on
his Muslim/Islamic identity at the exclusion of everything else
including the secular terms in which he relates to the more imme
diate socio-economic needs and his wide-ranging interactions with
his class and not just his Muslim brethren? The depth and nature
of this interaction is a matter of dispute; but does that justify a
discussion in terms of an absolute Muslim/Islamic consciousness?
If centuries of shared experiences could not create composite
solidarities, how could a specifically Muslim self-consciousness
emerge out of their diverse experiences?
Mohammad Ali Jinnah believed he had all the answers. So did
the Jamaat-i Islami. But there were other explanations as well,
boldly constructed around secular and pluralist conceptions, and
counterposed to an essentialist view of Indian Islam. Scholars,
artists and creative writers, in particular, continued to contest the
two-nation theory, unfolded the past to discover elements of unity,
102 / India International Centre Quarterly
cohesion and integration, and to provide historical legitimation for

multi-culturalism and religious plurality. Prominent amongst
them were people with pronounced socialist and Marxist leanings.
Muslim intellectuals, both independently and as part of
liberal-left formations, were doing much the same. Acting not as
Muslim intellectuals per se, they nevertheless saw themselves as
transmitters of a certain historical tradition. They carried forward
the inconclusive debates of the post-1857 decades, when the ulama
and the liberal intelligentsia were constrained to sketch out a role
for themselves—within a religious tradition that had strong
revivalist precedences as well as liberal and reformist tendencies.
They did so because certain key aspects in those debates bore
contemporary relevance, and related to how Muslims situated
themselves in a world that was brutally shattered by the partition.
The nature of this engagement in post-independence India is
the central theme of this discussion, though it is mainly confined
to the realm of ideas mirrored through the Jamia Millia Islamia and
the Aligarh Muslim University.
Azad, "marked a spirit of renaissance for the Indian spirit

The nineteenth
and Aligarh was onecentury,
of the centrescommented
of such renaissance".3Maulana Abul Kalam
Zakir Husain, author of the Wardha scheme of education and
Aligarh's Vice-Chancellor, told Nehru on his visit to the campus in
November 1955 that "the way Aligarh works, the way Aligarh
thinks, the contribution Aligarh makes to Indian life ... will largely
determine the place Mussalmans will occupy in the pattern of
Indian life".4 Such magisterial generalisations do not stand the test
of historical scrutiny; but they certainly offer a clue to the role
assigned to this university in the Muslim intellectual resurgence.
It is appropriate to concentrate on the main reformist strands in the
last quarter of the nineteenth century, a phase dominated by the
ideas of Syed Ahmad Khan and the 'Aligarh movement'.
The post-mutiny era witnessed two kinds of reactions: a
traditionalist backlash which was sometimes militant but more
often muted, and a modernist response typified in the Delhi school
and the Aligarh movement. There were first and foremost those
who, in the footsteps of Shah Waliullah, attributed the political,
social and moral decline of the faithful to Hindu and Shia
accretions, to their straying from the straight path of Islam. Th

future of Muslims and of Islam was in jeopardy, because the
Western concept of life, with its excessive individualism and
materialism, constituted the very antithesis of the basic values of
life as formulated by the Quran. That was the message from th
Mujahidin in the north-west frontier region and the Faraizis in rur
Bengal. They argued, just as their counterparts did in Egypt, Suda
and Turkey, that a programme of religious purification, together
with religious education and of 'Islamic conscientisation' in th
form of publications,5 was an alternative to the degenerating
Western ideologies which had placed the umma into its graves
crisis.6
Some of their ideas, though fairly worn-out, went down well
in north India and Bengal, where British rule had disturbed the
status quo most of all. Their protagonists secured a following in
rural Punjab and Bengal through established networks of mosques,
dargahs and madarsas. Yet neither the Mujahidin nor the Faraizis
could generate a countrywide movement comparable to, say, the
Khilafat campaign in the nineteen-twenties. The social equilibrium
was disturbed in some areas, but not everywhere. Islamic revival
became an obsession with some, but not all. The message from
Deoband's Dar al-ulum reached far and wide; yet not many, so
lamented the high priests at this major site of Islamic revival, lived
their lives in accordance with their fatawa. The colonial govern
ment, especially after 1857, thwarted the orthodox challenge
through conciliation and compromise and a policy of balance and
rule between what they conceived as the two great communities,
the Hindu and the Muslim.
The upsurge in 1857 offered a rallying point to the disgruntled
elements in the ruling and service classes; but the banner of revolt
was not raised everywhere.7 In most areas, Muslims seemed in
clined from the days of Company rule to arrive at a workable modus
vivendi with their new rulers, and carve out new channels of
aspiration and of spiritual creativity. Having read the writing on
the wall, they accepted British rule much more gladly than others.
There were no doubt a few hard nuts to crack; but most were not
repelled by but attracted towards the West. Because they found, as
did Mirza Abu Talib and Lutfullah during their stay in England, a
stable political system, an affluent industrialised economy, and a
civilisation with a strong material and cultural foundation.8
In Delhi College, subsidised by the British since 1827 and

always headed by a British principal, there was much creative
thinking and many systematic endeavours to demonstrate Islam's
compatibility with Western thought and values.9 In the presidency
towns, Abdul Latif and Ameer Ali in Calcutta, and the Tyabji family
in Bombay, set the tone. Tyab Ali, head of the Tyabji family, was the
first Muslim to send his sons abroad for education, and the first
ladies of the Tyabji-Fyzee family left purdah in 1894. His son,
Badruddin Tyabji, was the first Indian barrister in Bombay, the first
Indian judge on the Original side of the Bombay High Court, and
the first Indian to act as Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court.10
The rapprochement with the British, the guiding principle of
most Muslim reformers, went along with much soul-searching and
self-introspection. Newly-founded organisations like the Anju
man-i Himayat-i Islam in Punjab, the All-India Muslim Education
al Conference, and the Anjuman-i Islam in Bombay began to
wonder why the Muslims were not able to integrate their system
of education, family structures, economic enterprises and even
political aspirations into the 'national mainstream'. Why the resis
tance to change and innovation? What were the deeper causes of
the social malaise? What was the remedy? Thus Hali devoted his
Majlis un-Nisa to the plight of Muslim women.11 Syed Mumtaz Ali
commented on polygamy, the age of marriage, purdah and the
empowerment of Muslim women.12 Nazir Ahmad, a civil servant,
set a model for writers in the Mirat al-urus (The Bride's Mirror),
detailing the evils of polygamy and the virtues of women educa
tion and widow remarriage.13
Justice Shah Din in Punjab advocated specialised training for
Muslim girls, if not in scholarly pursuits, then at least in the basic
skills of reading, writing, arithmetic, hygiene and home economics.
He was the first president of the Muhammadan Educational Con
ference in 1894, and he and Mohammad Shafi were the first Mus
lims to send their daughters to study at the Queen's Mary College
in Lahore.14 In Bombay, Badruddin Tyabji helped found and then
ran for many years an educational foundation. The major focus of
his career was the education of Muslim boys, along with other
social reform measures like the removal of purdah and getting the
Age of Consent Bill passed in the teeth of both Hindu and Muslim
opposition. At the Muhammadan Educational Conference in 1903,
he pleaded for the abandonment of the purdah system and for

liberal education for Muslim women.15
During most of his adult life, Hakim Ajmal Khan, a senior and
venerable citizen of Delhi, wore the sherwani and Turkish fez, the
former an adaptation of the Western coat and the latter a symbo
of admiration for Ottoman social change.16 His life-long friend an
comrade, M.A. Ansari, witnessed the impact of the Young Tur
Revolution, led by the Committee of Union and Progress, and wa
vastly impressed by the strength and vitality of the modernising
forces in Turkey.17 Others were equally impressed that Turkey wa
on the move, competing with the West for an equal status in the
comity of modern nations. This led Iqbal, who was among the few
Muslim intelletuals in India to welcome the abolition of the
Khilafat, to comment: "If the renaissance of Islam is a fact, and
believe it is a fact, we too one day, like the Turks, will have
re-evaluate our intellectual inheritance."18
Syed Ahmad was of course the trailblazer. He alone possessed
the intellectual resources to reconcile matters of faith with the more
immediate task of rescuing Muslims from their downward spiral.
He set high value on the social morality of Islam and justified the
adoption of Western ideas and institutions in Islamic terms. It was
not necessary to imitate the West, but only to accept some of its
values as, at least, a second-best substitute for the vanished Muslim
glories.19
With his sharp, analytical mind and his acute sense of the
working of historical forces in the shaping of contemporary
societies, the Aligarh reformer was able to recognise change, flux
and movement in history. He knew his Islamic history well. He
knew his Islam better. He could thus comprehend the scale and
depth of reformist ideas and currents, identify elements of change
and innovations, and discover a sound theoretical basis for a
constructive dialogue and interaction with the West. The con
clusions drawn by him and the message communicated were
directed against the ill-founded assumptions about the West and
the ill-informed criticism of his own project by the theologian. He
describes in his letter to Nawab Mohsinul Mulk, his esteemed
colleague at Aligarh, how he became concerned after the Mutiny
for the reform of his community, which he saw to be impossible
apart from their education in the modern sciences and in the
English language.
Despairing of existing commentaries with their preoccupation

with trivia, he "deliberated on the Quran itself and tried to under
stand from the Quran itself the principles on which its composition
is based".20 He found that if the Quranic principles were adopted
there would remain no incompatibility between the modern scien
ces and Islam. He tried to resolve the difficulties inherent in the
four traditional sources of Muslim law, by a dialectical rationalist
exegesis of the Quran; by scrutinising the classical data of the
Hadith; by an almost unlimited emphasis on ijtehad as the in
alienable right of every individual Muslim; and finally by rejecting
the principle of ijma (consensus) in the classical sense which con
fined it to the ulama.21
There was strong resistance to and criticism of Syed Ahmad
from identifiable quarters. But in the long run, his modernist
agenda was acclaimed and endorsed by a new generation of Mus
lims, many of whom were alienated by the formalism of the
traditional theologians. They were, moreover, convinced that the
pursuit of modern education and the raising of intellectual stand
ards would not undermine but only vindicate the message of Islam.
His reformulation of doctrine in modern instead of medieval terms,
as also his eclectic world-view, became part of the furnishing of
mind of educated Muslims. He inspired some to set up educational
centres modelled on the Aligarh College. Thus a Madrasatul-Islam
in Sind and the Dacca College were set up, the latter gaining, like
Aligarh, university status after World War I.22 Following the
Muhammadam Educational Conference held at Madras in 1901,
the Muslim Educational Association of South India was founded.
In his 'Preparatory Years', Syed Ahmad unveiled to the young

Azad the true spirit of the Quran and the genuine teachings of
Islam.23 The Maulana compared him with Raja Rammohun Roy,
both of whom left the stamp of their personality in all spheres of
intellectual activity, and emphasised that the Syed, who used the
metaphor that Hindus and Muslims were the two eyes in Mothe
India's face, was a believer in inter-community harmony. He, the
presiding spirit of the university, represented the forces of change
by challenging traditional values and outmoded beliefs. "The battle
was fought here in Aligarh and Aligarh is the visible embodiment
of the victory of the forces of progress".24 Iqbal, too, described Sye
Ahmad as "the first modern Muslim to catch a glimpse of the
positive character of the age that was coming" and "the first Indian
Muslim who felt the need for a fresh orientation of Islam and
worked for it".25
a change, in response to major national and transnational

In the earlyA closing-up
developments. twentieth century
of the ideological the thepolitical landscape underwent
split between
ulama and the liberal intelligentsia, and a gradual reassimilation of
the traditional and western values, were the immediate consequen
ces. Deoband's Dar al-ulum and the Aligarh College were no longer
arrayed against each other; in fact, vocal sections at both places
dialogued to bridge the gulf and narrow their differences. This was
not on account of any basic ideological compatibility or the sudden
meeting of minds on matters of faith and dogma.26 It was because
more and more Muslim divines, especially from Deoband and
Nadwa, and the men of 'New Light' discovered, as in the case of
the Mussalman Waqf Validating Act of 1913, new areas of coopera
tion.27 Yet what engaged them most and spurred the efforts at unity
were not just legal, educational or religious matters, but their place
in the political arrangements that were being hammered out in
Delhi and Whitehall. Their main preoccupation, if not the sole
concern, was to define the community afresh in order to suit their
godly as well as the more attractive temporal interests. Their
spirited endeavour, for which they revitalised an otherwise
defunct Muslim League, was to locate the wider communitarian
concerns outside the framework of Congress nationalism.
Once the ulama and their erstwhile bete noire, the western
trained professional politicians, put their heads together, they came
up with a definition which was developed in the context of colonial
institutions and their own scripturalist rhetoric. This definition
sought to create a corporate identity and set Muslims apart from
their own class, region and linguistic unit. An Islamicate identity
was thrust on Muslims, many of whom were not accustomed to
living in accordance with the Shariat or the diktat of the
theologians. In the end, the coming together of the men of religion
and the modern-day publicists backfired—in so far as it aided the
cause of 'Muslim nationalism' and stifled liberal, reformist and
secularising trends. This was a cause of celebration in some
quarters; but not everyone had reasons to rejoice over this ominous
development in Indo-Muslim history. The worrying thought was
that the contours of a community were being delineated in complete

disregard of and with no reference to its local, regional, class, caste
or linguistic specificities.
What did the enumerators find when the first all-India census
was tabulated and analysed in 1881? They found that Muslims
numbered but 19.7 per cent of the population. They uncovered a
geographically-dispersed aggregate of Muslims, forming neither a
collectivity nor a distinct society for any purpose, political,
economic and social. They found Muslims whose religious rituals
had a very strong tinge of Hinduism, and who retained caste and
observed Hindu festivals and ceremonies.28 In the Bengal
countryside, in particular, pre-Islamic ceremonies relating to birth,
marriage and death continued to be observed.29 In fact, the entry
of Muslims in South Asia by so many and separated doorways,
their spread over the subcontinent by so many different routes,
over a period of centuries, and the diffusion of Islam in different
forms from one area to the another, ensured that this religion would
present itself in many different epiphanies seen from different
angles. Neither to its own adherents nor to non-Muslims did Islam
seem monochromatic, monolithic or indeed mono-anything.30 Yet
by the close of the nineteenth century, the community, separate and
distinct from the Others, had arrived with its accompanying bag
gage of concepts which bore no relationship with the ground
realities.
This is where the Simla deputation of 1 October 1906 and the

Viceroy's response to the command performance appears to be a
significant landmark.31 From now on the Muslim elites and their
spokesmen knew where their priorities lay, and to whom who to
turn for political legitimation. They had a three-fold project: to trace
the historical evolution of an imaginary community, as an antithesis
to the Congress theory of Unity in Diversity; to emphasise the
distinct identity and separateness of this community in order to
bargain and extract concessions from the government; and to
invoke Islamic symbols of unity to mount a movement that would,
in its essential thrust, delink specific Muslim aspirations from the
broader concerns of the countrywide nationalist struggle. This is
how Muslim nationalism gained legitimacy in government eyes.
This is why it appealed to the landed and the urban-based profes
sional classes, who were apprehensive of their position in the
newly-created power structures. So that every single step towards
the devolution of authority to Indian hands was accompanied wi

initiatives to cement bonds of religious solidarity, on the one han
and exacerbate inter-community differences, on the other.
The British had no reason to challenge sectarian nationalis
so long as it could be pressed into service to counter nationa
aspirations. Having already created a Muslim identity in Indi
politics, they could draw comfort from Jinnah repeating, at th
height of the Muslim League movement, much the same ar
ments that had prompted Morley, Minto, Montagu an
Chelmsford to concede to the Muslims separate electorat
weightages and reservation in the councils and public servic
During World War II, Jinnah could play any tune he liked. Offici
in Delhi were prepared to give him a patient and sympathet
hearing and support his Pakistan project. He emerged strong
once the guns were silent on all fronts and the Allies had extract
their pound of flesh from Germany. The British government fe
obliged to reward him for dutifully supporting the war-efforts.
While these games were being played out on the Indian turf
with utmost cynicism and insensitivity, a fair number of Musli
dominated organisations and institutions sensed the dreadful con
sequences of political solidarity being built on religious ties. The
questioned the conviction, or myth in certain Muslim circles tha
the future of Islam in South Asia was endangered by Hin
nationalism, they disputed the notion of a monolith and homo
nised community, and they challenged the constitutional arrang
ments that lay the seeds of discord and disunity. Many peo
wrote and spoke from these perspectives, about composite livi
and plural nationhood. Many were moved by a high sense
idealism and worked for inter-community unity and harmon
Their banners and flags did not flutter on housetops. Their audi
ces or readership did not run into thousands but this did not de
them from making their point of view known. They were men
conviction and envisaged, even when Pakistan's creation w
imminent, a future that held out hopes for the beleaguered M
lims in India. Their optimism was summed up in the narrative as
well as the title of Tufail Ahmad Manglori's book Mussalmanon k
Raushan Mustaqbil (A Bright Future for the Muslims), and in th
reflections of others who, after independence and partition
renewed their intellectual quest and commented on their history
and destiny with poise, dignity and self-confidence.32
he Jamia Millia Islamia (National Muslim University) in

Delhi was, in the words of Nehru, "a lusty child of the
JL non-cooperation movement",30 and a living symbol of a
modest but significant endeavour to experiment with the under
pinnings of multi-culturalism. It encapsulated two dominant
trends, each finding several points of covergence in the post
Khilafat era: the reformist inclination of some ulama who, like
Maulana Mahmud Hasan of Deoband, were also profoundly anti
British, and the political radicalism of Aligarh-based students who
rejected their institution's pro-British proclivities and gravitated
towards Gandhi and Nehru for political leadership. The Turkish
author, Halide Edib, found the Jamia to be much nearer to the
Gandhian movement than any other Muslim institution. It seemed,
in its political aspect, "like an attempt to understand the inalienable
democracy of Islam as it was in the earlier Islamic society".34 Sturdy
Congressmen could thus mingle with ardent socialists and fiery
communists, and individually and collectively fashion a composite
and secular ethos. Hence, the League's criticism of Jamia's nation
alist complexion.
Whether others agreed or not, the Jamia biradari at Okhla in
South Delhi was convinced of its quintessential role as a nationalist
institution, devoted to the service of the nation and destined to
contribute to the shaping of modern India. Though founded by
Muslims, it was Muslim only in name. The atmosphere was mixed
and cosmopolitan, thanks to the presence of several Hindu and
Christian teachers, including a few from Germany, a country where
some of Jamia's founders learnt their first lessons to develop their
antipathy towards British colonialsm. The theological disputations
between the Barelwis and the Deobandis, and the doctrinal dif
ferences between the Shia and Sunnis, which marrred campus life
in Aligarh, were alien to Jamia's culture where no one wished to
serve as a proper example of religiosity.
Jamia's social and intellectual manifesto was the outcome of
enlightened political and intellectual currents sweeping across the
country. Its educational programmes, embodied in the Wardha
scheme of education, bore the imprint of Gandhi's ideas on pri
mary education and incorporated some of Tagore's innovations at
Vishwa-Bharati in Shantiniketan. Its liberal orientation owed much
to Syed Ahmad who, according to Mohammad Mujeeb, "had a
larger view of life than any of the purely religious leaders, and one
must be grateful to him for having given commonsense its rightf

place in religious thought".35 Its own reconstruction of the Islam
ideal of an active political life was inspired by Azad, whose n
intellectual modernism, religious universalism and commitme
to composite Indian nationalism, represented the essence of what
the Jamia stood for. Zakir Husain, Vice-Chancellor from 1926
1948, recalled:
When I was a boy I was anxious to light the dusty lamp of my life, and
like other people, I too had prepared the cotton wicks and had put
them in the oil of my soul, and was roaming about to find out from
where I could ignite them. The first wick of that soul, the first wick of
the lamp, I lit from the lamp of the Maulana. As a student I used to
read Al-Hilal, and when I read it in the company of my friends, it was
at that time that this wick got the fire. Although I have ignited myself
from other sources as well, but I do confess today that the first ignition
had taken place only from him. 36
The Jamia fraternity was dumbfounded by the rhetoric of th

Muslim League. Iqbal's plea for a Muslim state in north-weste
India was against their cherished ideal that Muslims must live an
work with non-Muslims, for realising common ideals of citiz
ship and culture. Mujeeb, the Vice-Chancellor, said so to the poet
when he visited the campus early in 1935 to preside over Halid
Edib's lecture.37 The two-nation theory was anathema to an insti
tion whose sole raison detre was to promote cultural integration,
foster composite and syncretic values, and cement bonds of inter
community friendship and understanding. As the first Amir-i Jam
(chancellor), Hakim Ajmal Khan expected the students to know
each other's culture: "the firm foundation of a united Indian nation
hood depends on this mutual understanding".38 M. A. Ansari, who
nursed Jamia when it was threatened with closure, did not believe
in a politically separate Muslim community. He often said that
future India must be a field of cooperation between men of different
faiths. Writing to Halide Edib, who was Ansari's guest in Jamia,
the chancellor observed: "I consider the brotherhood of man as the
only real tie, and patriotism based on race and colour are, to my
mind, artificial and arbitrary, leading to division and factious
fights".39
Jinnah's political agenda in the nineteen-forties ran contrary
to the Ajmal-Ansari project. There were other huge differences as
well. The Jamia biradari lionised Gandhi, their chief benefactor, and
admired Nehru's intellect, broad vision and progressivism.40 They
were regarded as models of impeccable political conduct. The more
devoted, Shafiqur Rahman Kidwai being one of them, took to
wearing khaddar and the Gandhi topi and participated in civil
disobedience campaigns.41 Jinnah and his colleagues were, on the
other hand, highly critical of Gandhi, Nehru and the Congress
brand of nationalism. Not surprisingly, they fired their salvo
against Ansari and Zakir Husain, chided them for turning the
institution into a Hindu stronghold and criticised the syllabi which
cultivated patriotism at the exclusion of Islamic worship. Jamia's
ethos and orientation, stated in a well-publicised letter, was
prejudicial to Islam.42
An institution with a secular and nationalist record, testified
to by a Muslim, could not escape the fury of the angry mobs that
struck terror in Delhi during the communal holocaust in August
September 1947. Jamia's property at Karol Bagh in old Delhi, where
the institution was first headquartered after its brief and lazy
existence in Aligarh from 1920 to 1925, was looted and destroyed.
The Vice-Chancellor, Zakir Husain, ran for his life and escaped
miraculously. The husband of Anis Kidwai, a friend of Jamia, was
killed. There were other tragedies as well, but Jamia lived through
such harrowing experiences to provide the healing touch. Amidst
incredible savagery, dedicated teachers and students were, in the
words of Gandhi, "like an oasis in the Sahara".43 Nehru commented:
Few institutions succeed in retaining for long the impress of the ideal
that gave them birth. They tend to become humdrum affairs, perhaps
a little more efficient, but without the enthusiasm that gives life. The
Jamia,. more I think than any other institution that I can think of,
retained some of the old inspiration and enthusiasm.44
The university, in its search for moral and political support

after independence, could have turned into a quasi-religious or
quasi-communal institution. But this did not happen. It remained,
and rightly projected itself as secular and nationalist to the core.
Wedded to the values of liberal humanism, it allowed no space to
religious intolerance and communal allegiances. "I look on this",
claimed Mujeeb proudly, "as a secular school".45 Such traditions
were exemplified in the writings of Mohammad Mujeeb and Syed

Abid Husain, both connected with Jamia since 1925-6.
In his magnum opus published in 1966, Mohammad Mujeeb
the Oxford-educated Jamia Vice-Chancellor, identified variou
constituent elements of Indian Muslim religious, political and
social life, revealed some of its essential qualities, and que
tioned
the fallacies and illusions that arise out of an identification of the whole
... community with some element of its belief or practice, with some
political figures or military or political achievements, with particular
social forms and patterns of behaviour, with some historical tenden
cy.
He brought to light, a fact that is now adequately known

through perceptive historical and sociological studies: the diversity
of beliefs, the variety of social forms and the multiplicity of ideas
and movements among Muslims. The only common factor, he
argued, was common allegiance to Islam; though it was easy to
confuse the Islamic identity of the Muslims as a distinct body
politic, as a nation, which they never were and never wanted to be.
He questioned the ways in which educated Muslims saw them
selves, arguing that their judgements were either inspired by self
praise or self-pity, and by an idealisation of themselves as the
embodiment of religious truth.
Mujeeb underlined, in the spirit of liberal-left historians like
Tara Chand, Beni Prasad, R.P. Tripathi, Mohammad Habib and
K.M. Ashraf, the weight of composite and syncretic forces in Indian
history. "If the Indian Muslim State is divested of its pseudo
religious guise", he observed, "the spirit of the political system will
appear to be in accordance with what is recognised as the national
interest today".47 He diligently traced the evolution of those ideas
and movements that reinforced bonds of inter-religious unity and
understanding. He concluded that there were far more convincing
reasons for Hindus and Muslims to stay together than to be divided
on the basis of religion. He was attracted, for these reasons, to the
enlightened world view of Abul Talib, Ghalib, Syed Ahmad, Hali,
Ajmal Khan and Azad, and his sympathies therefore lay with the
protagonists of composite nationalism, chiefly the Congress Mus
lims.
The message for his generation was:
Indian Muslims can serve Islam and themselves best by associating

themselves with persons and parties who aim at making democracy
as real as possible and at achieving the maximum of social justice and
social welfare through the legislative and administrative action of the
State.48
Abid Husain, a Shia married to Swaliha Abid Husain, a front

rank Urdu writer and a descendant of Hali, studied at Allahabad,
Oxford and Berlin. He taught philosophy and literature at the
Jamia from 1926 to 1956, authored a number of books, and trans
lated German, English and French works into Urdu.49 His forte lay
in analysing and evaluating movements outside the conventional
category of religion. He held the view that "the work of integrating
the various communities into a nation ... cannot be and should not
be done on the religious but on the secular plane".50 To combat
divisive tendencies, it was necessary to impart practical training in
schools and colleges "in citizenship based on the high ideals of
nationalism, secularism and democracy".51
The Destiny of Indian Muslims, along with Abid Husain's other
works, helps to comprehend how educated Muslims saw their own
role and their community's place within secular paradigms.52 The
journals Islam and the Modern Age and Islam and the Modern Age
Society reflected his larger intellectual concerns.
The Destiny of Indian Muslims, published in 1965, was a well
conceived statement of a Muslim steeped in the nationalist values
and traditions of Ajmal, Ansari and Azad. He dwelt on a common
national culture, based on the secularism of the Indian State, and
on religious awakening and a spiritual renaissance among Mus
lims.53 His concern was to prevent Muslims from "drifting away
from the mainstream of national life",54 though the agenda he set
for himself and the secular and religious leadership was simple
enough: drastic changes in the curriculum of maktab and madarsas,
reforms in other Muslim institutions, and the exercise of ijtehad to
cope with the demands of the new age. He observed: "For the last
hundred years things have changed and the modern ulama must
give a fatwa giving a new ijtehad to the provisions of the Muslim
law"55
Scholars at the Aligarh Muslim University, especially in th

departments of history, geography, Islamic studies and Urdu, w
also engaged in constructing the past in secular terms. This was
task undertaken by Professor Mohammad Habib, brother
Mujeeb, and some of his fellow-historians.56 The tone was set by
Zakir Husain, who departed from the Jamia Millia in 1948 to joi
the Aligarh Muslim University as its vice-chancellor. When
joined Aligarh an atmosphere of gloom and uncertainty prevailed
because of the university's close identification with the Musl
Leage and the Pakistan movement. But he changed it all. Imbu
with a mission "of great national significance", his task was
build a united nation in a democratic secular State and the role and
status of its forty million Muslim citizens within it", weld together
diverse cultures into a harmonious whole and promote its growth
"in such a manner that each culture shines and lends beauty and
strength to the entire whole". 57
Scholars debated the highly emotive and contentious issue

Thereof were
reformingother visible
Muslim family signs
laws. What is thereof change
to reform in on the horizon.
the Muslim Personal Law? Is reform possible in Islam? Is the
Islamic law a product of human intelligence and adaptation to
social needs and therefore amenabale to modifications and chan
ges? Or, is it of divine inspiration and hence immutable? If so, what
lessons should be drawn from the history of reforms in Muslim
countries? Or, what weight should one attach to the views of
Muslim thinkers in India such as Iqbal, who believed that the
Muslim liberals were perfectly justified in reinterpreting the fun
damental legal principles "in the light of their own experience and
the altered conditions of modern life"? 58
There were no simple or straightforward answers. The key
issues that figured, for example, at the International Congress of
Orientalists in 1964 and at a seminar held also in Delhi five years
later, related to the Shariat's divine and sacrosanct character, the
preservation of Muslim identity and the fear of their social system
being 'Hinduised'.59 Traditional or conservative opinion, articu
lated by the Jamaat-i Islami and the Jamiyat al-ulama, was
profoundly indignant at the prospect of a change or modification
in the personal law. Changing laws based on specific injunctions
of the Quran or the Hadith was unimaginable. Attempts to per

suade Muslims to substitute man-made laws for "the universal and
faultless laws given by God is a waste of time".60 The Quranic
regulations were authoritative and final for all occasions, and for
all epochs between the time of revelation and doomsday. Those
wanting to tamper with them were enemies of Islam and its fol
lowers. Thus the Jamiyat al-ulama leader, Maulana Asad Madani,
viewed the plea for reforms as "a mask for the Jana Sangh's sinister
designs to exterminate the Muslim community from India".61
A section of the reformist ulama were not swayed by the
rhetoric of their more diehard colleagues. Maulana Said Ahmad
Akbarabadi, editor of Burhan was one of them. He was educated
at Deoband, served as principal of the Madarsa-i Aliya in Calcutta,
and retired as professor of theology at the Aligarh Muslim Univer
sity. He was one of those who made a distinction between those
Quranic injunctions which are specific to Arab customary law of
the time, and those applicable to Muslim and human societies in
other times.62 He insisted, moreover, that the ulama take note of the
changes taking place around them, to formulate their ideas in the
light of modern thought. The fact that they did not do so was
largely because they did not pay heed to the admonition of
Deoband's illustrious co-founder, Maulana Qasim Nanotawi's,
that traditional education should always be combined with
modern knowledge.63 And he rigorously argued that the concept
of tauhid (Unity of God) implies the Unity of all people and all
nations. So also was Divine revelation or the Divine guidance
(Al-Huda).64 "It was not only Universal but one and the same also".
He quoted Azad approvingly who had pointed out in the Tarjuman
al-Quran that "the great emphasis that the Quran lays on this truth,
the stronger has been the inclination on the part of the world to
relegate it to the background".65
A. A. A. Fyzee, a well-known scholar of jurisprudence, held the
view that Islam had ceased to be dynamic, religious practices had
become "soulless rituals", the spirit of the Prophet's message was
throttled by fanaticism, its theology was gagged by history and its
vitality was sapped by totalitarianism. He made a strong case for
releasing the "spirit of joy, compassion, fraternity, tolerance and
reasonableness".66 More importantly, he positioned himself again

the traditional view that in Islam law and religion are coterminou
because law is a product of social evolution and must change with
time and circumstances. He was convinced that
gradually all individual and personal laws, based upon ancient prin
ciples governing the social life of the community, will either be
abolished or so modified as to bring them within a general scheme of
laws applicable to all persons, regardless of religious differences.
Such a development, he pointed out, will not destroy "the

essential truth of the faith of Islam".67 To an independent Muslim
observer, himself a Muslim, "it would seem that no one can change
the fate of the Muslims of India, except the Muslims themselves".68
Some of these ideas were inspired by Azad's Tarjuman al
Quran and his emphasis therein on the rudiments of religious
pluralism, which constituted the basis of the Maulana's moder
nism. Fyzee regarded this as the only pragmatic solution to the
Indian Muslims, and for the preservation and progress of Islam in
a composite society.69 M.H. Beg, a distinguished jurist, boldly
suggested that Muslim jurisprudence could contribute valuable
ideas on formulating a uniform civil code of personal laws. Muslim
jurisprudence "has acted and could still act as a part of that com
mon stock of juristic ideas which have acted and reacted upon each
other to produce a composite culture in this country which sustains
the secular state".70
There was, predictably, criticism of and strong opposition to
the liberal and secular credo. In fact, some analysts pointed out that
the Muslims after 1947 could neither come to terms with the
'newness' of the situation nor did they feel at home with the new
creative upsurge of Indian construction: "Indian freedom they saw
rather as the unchecked opportunities for their enemies to hold
them down or indeed to crush them". He concluded that 'only in
very limited numbers did Muslims evaluate with true appreciation
the ideals and announced objectives of the nation to which they
belonged". 71
conclusions. There can be no doubt that individual Muslims

Evidence marshalled
felt weak, fearful, insecure; orin
that this paper
some sections leads to slightly different
were deeply
concerned with their identity and the preservation of their religious

and cultural heritage. Yet Islam in India was a living and vital
religion, appealing to the hearts, minds and conscience of million,
setting them a standard by which to live honest, sober and god
fearing lives. There was no concerted attempt, despite the stridency
of Hindu nationalist forces, to undermine their self-perceived in
terests as a community, though Muslim organisations were in
clined to make much of the persecution to which that their
followers were subjected.
Nehru's government, on the contrary, created a climate that
was conducive to the political and economic integration of large
numbers of Muslims. It could not have been any better. As a result,
"the realization is growing that they (Muslims) must sink or swim,
and the number of those who find swimming is not too difficult if
one decides upon it is gradually increasing".72 The mood was
summed up in 1960 by Maulana Ali Mian, the head of Lucknow's
Nadwat al-ulama:
The clouds will disperse, as they are bound to be, and there will be
sunshine again. The Muslims will regain the position in the country
which is justly theirs. All the schemes for national reconstruction will
remain incomplete if they are left to rot and decay.73
With this frame of mind, large numbers of Muslims could look

ahead with a degree of hope and optimism. "We must not despair
of the future", admonished M.C. Chagla. "With more education,
with more industrialisation of India, with more social reform, the
barriers between the two communities must inevitably break
down".74 If such hopes were somewhat belied, the explanations
would principally lie in the breakdown of the secular consensus in
the post-Nehruvian era.
preoccupation with communitarian identities, chauvinistic

Contemporary politicsthatindivide
ideologies and movements India is com
religious characterised by a
munities and exacerbate differences. Attention needs to be paid to
ideologies and movements that have historically and contem
poraneously tried to unite Hindus and Muslims and furthered the
post-colonial agenda of social transformation.
A big question remains over the tenability of the approaches

and interpretations of liberal and secular-minded Muslims. Doubts
have been expressed over their reading of Indian Islam and the
thesis on the nature of Hindu-Muslim interaction in the subcon
tinent.75 These doubts will stay as long as scholarship on Indian
Islam, as also on its adherents, is confined to the realm of specula
tion, and tied to a conventional but stereotyped framework.
What we need today, more than ever before, is to discover new
schools of thought and interpretations among Muslims that placed
Indian Islam more firmly in its specific Indian environment. I
believe the creative intellectual energy, released in the first two
decades after independence, was the outcome of a unique Indian
Muslim experience of living in a world that was neither Muslim,
Hindu or specifically Western. These experiences and their conse
quences merit serious consideration, and not whether India was a
dar al-Islam (Land of Islam) or a dar al-Harb (Enemy territory) or
whether pan-Islamism was an ideal or still a living force.
Notes
1. Susobhan Sarkar, Presidential address to the Indian History Congress, Decem

ber 1971; Kenneth W. Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movement in British India,
Cambridge, 1993; Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement,in Bengal 1903-1908,
Delhi, 1973; J.R. McLane, Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress, Princeton
University Press, 1987.
2. Romila Thapar, "Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient History and the
Modern Search for a Hindu Society", Modem Asian Studies, 23,1989, pp. 209-32;
and Arjun Appadoari, "Number in the Colonial Imagination", in Carol A.
Breckenridge and Peter Van der Veer (ed.), Orientalism and the Postcolonial
Predicament, Delhi, 1994, pp. 314^41.
3. Convocation Address at the Aligarh Muslim University, 20 February 1949,
Speeches ofMaulana Azad, Delhi, 1950, p.78.
4. Quoted in Mohammad Mujeeb, Dr. Zakir Husain, Delhi, reprint 1991, p. 160; see
also Saiyid Hamid, Aligarh Tehrik [Aligarh Movement] in Urdu, Patna, Khuda
Bakhsh Library, 1989.
5. Francis Robinson, "Technology and Social Change: Islam and the Impact of
Print", Modern Asian Studies, 27,1, February 1993, pp. 231-45.
6. S.A. A. Rizvi, Shah Abdul Aziz: Puritanism, Sectarian Polemics, and jehad, Canberra,
1982, and his Shah Wali-Allah and His Times, Canberra, 1980; For Faraizis, see
Moinuddin Ahmad Khan, History of the Faraidi Movement in Bengal 1818-1906,
Karachi, 1965, and Mohiuddin Ahmad, Saiyid Ahmad Shahid, Lucknow, 1975;
Qeyamuddin Alimad, The Wahhabi Movement, Delhi, 1993, revised edn.; Barbara
India International Centre Quarterly
Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900, Princeton University

Press, 1982; Ahmed, Bengal Muslims 1871-1906: A Quest for Identity, Delhi, 1981;
Asim Roy, The Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal, Princeton University Press,
1983; S.F. Dale, Islamic Society on the South Asian Frontier: The Mapillas of Malabar
1498-1922, Delhi, 1980.
7. See E.T. Stokes, Peasants and the Raj: Studies in Agrarian Society and Peasant
Rebellion in Colonial India, Cambridge, 1978.
8. Mushirul Hasan, "Resistance and Acquiescence in North India: Muslim
Responses to the West", in Mushirul Hasan and Narayani Gupta (eds.), India's
Colonial Encounter: Essays in Memory of E.T. Stokes, Delhi, 1993, pp. 39-64.
9. Gail Minault, "Sayyid Ahmad Dehlavi and the Delhi Renaissance", in R.E.
Frykenberg (ed.), Delhi Through the Ages: Essays in Urban History, Culture and
Society, Delhi, 1986, pp. 289-98; C.F. Andrews, Zakaullah of Delhi, Lahore, 1976
reprint.
10. Theodore P. Wright, Jr., "Muslim Kinship and Modernization: The Tyabji Clan
of Bombay", in Imtiaz Ahmad (ed.), Family, Kinship and Marriage in Indian Islam,
Delhi, 1976, pp. 217-38.
11. Gail Minault, "Hali's Majalis un-Nisa: Purdah and Women Power in Nineteenth
Century India", in Milton Isreal and N.K. Wagle (eds.), Islamic Society and
Culture: Essays in Honour of Professor Aziz Ahmad, Delhi, 1983, pp. 39-50., and
Khwaja Altaf Husain Hali, Voices of Silence. English translation of Majalis un
Nisa by Gail Minault, Delhi, 1986 edn.
12. Barbara Metcalf, "Reading and Writing about Muslim Women in British India",
in Zoya Hasan (ed.), Forging Identities: Gender, Communities and the State, Delhi,
1994, pp. 10-11.
13. Mohammad Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims, London, 1967, pp. 531-3.
14. Eminent Mussalmans, p. 381, and for Shafi's educational activities, see pp.
229-30.
15. Ibid., pp. 107, 111.

16. Barbara Metcalf, "Nationalist Muslims in British India: The Case of Hakim
Ajmal Khan", Modern Asian Studies, 19, 1, 1985, p. 15, and her "Hakim Ajmal
Khan: Rais of Delhi and Muslim Leader", in Frykenberg (ed.), op. cit., pp.
299-315.
17. Mushirul Hasan, A Nationalist Conscience: M.A. Ansari, the Congress and the Raj,
Delhi, 1987, pp. 45-7,131-3.
18. See Annemarie Schimmel, Gabriel's Wing: A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir
Mohamed Iqbal, Leiden, 1963, pp. 47-8.
19. Hodgson, op. cit., p.335; C.W. Troll, Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A Reinterpretation of
Muslim Theology, Delhi, 1978.
20. Ahmad and Grunebaum (eds.), Muslim Self-statement, p. 40.
21. Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1946, London, 1967,
p. 54.
22. Schimmel, Islam in the Indian Subcontinent, p. 201.
23. Quoted in Douglas, op. cit., p. 52.
24. Speeches ofMaulana Azad, pp. 78-9.
25. Quoted in Schimmel, Islam in the Indian Subcontinent, p. 198.
MUSHIRUL HASAN
26. Rizvi, History of the Dar al-Ulum, vol. 1, pp. 234-5.

27. Gregory C. Kozlowski, Muslim Endowments and Society in British India,
Cambridge, 1985, p. 182.
28. Census of India, 1921, vol. 1, p. 115.
29. Ahmad, Bengal Muslims, p. 134.
30. Peter Hardy, "Islam and Muslims in South Asia", in Raphael Israeli (ed.), The
Crescent in the East: Islam in Asia Minor, London, 1988, pp. 39-40.
31. Matiur Rahman, From Consultation to Confrontation: A Study of the Muslim League
in British Indian Politics 1906-1912, London, 1970.
32. The book was first published in 1937. Its fifth edition appeared in 1945 (Kutub
Khana-i Aziziya) with an added section "Raushan Mustaqbil Kyon hai?" [Why a
bright future?]. The book was commended by, among others, Azad, Husain
Ahmad Madani and Khwaja Hasan Nizami.
33. Message on the Silver Jubilee of Jamia Millia, 10 September 1946, S. Gopal (ed.),
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, second series, vol. 2, p. 386.
34. Halide Edib, Inside India, p. 322; and "A Note on the JamiahMilliyah Islamiyah",
in W.C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, Lahore, 1947, pp. 147-54.
35. Mujeeb, Indian Muslims, pp. 447-52.
36. Quoted in Sheik Ali, Zakir Husain: Life and Time, Delhi, 1991, p. 49; and Abid
Husain, "Modern Trends in Islam", in Islam, Patiala, 1969, p. 98.
37. C.H. Philips and D. E. Wainwright (eds.), The Partition of India, p. 406.
38. Barbara Metcalf, "Nationalist Muslims in British India", p. 25.
39. Edib, Inside India, p. 323.
40. See, for example, Abid Husain, The Way of Gandhi and Nehru, Bombay, 1959, and
his Gandhiji and Communal Unity, Bombay, 1969. He also translated Gandhi's
The Story of My Experiments with Truth and Nehru's Autobiography, The Discovery
of India and Glimpses of World History; K.G. Saiyidain, Andhi me Chiragh, Delhi,
1982 edn., for his essays on Gandhi and Nehru.
41. Abid Husain dedicated one of his books to Shafiqur Rahman Kidwai, "who
lived and died following The Way of Gandhi and Nehru".
42. Millat-i Islamia aur Jamia Millia Islamia, Delhi, Calcutta, 1941.
43. Speech at prayer meeting, 6 April 1947, The Collected Works ofMahatma Gandhi,
vol. Ixxxvii, p. 218.
44. Nehru to Zakir Husain, 16 February 1948, SWJN, second series, vol. 5, p. 561,
and his message on the Silver Jubilee of Jamia Millia Islamia, 10 September 1946,
SWJN, second series, vol. 1, pp. 385-6.
45. Quoted in Greighton Lacy, Indian Insights, Delhi, 1972, p. 288.
46. Mujeeb, Indian Muslims, p.555
47. Mujeeb, Indian Muslims, p. 557.
48. Mujeeb, Islamic Influence on Indian Society, p. 176.
49. See Abid Husain Felicitation Volume, Delhi, 1974, and Sheila McDonough, "The
Spirit of Jamia Millia Islamia as Exemplified in the Writings of Syed Abid
Husain", in Robert D. Baird (ed.), Religion in Modern India, Delhi, 1981, pp.
287-93. Commenting on The Destiny of Indian Muslims (Hindustani Mussulman
aina-i ayyam men, in Urdu) and The Indian Muslims, A.A.A. Fyzee wrote: "The
former is a fresh spring of water: lucid, sane and deep; the latter is an encyclopedia
India International Centre Quarterly
of facts—social, cultural, historical and religious". A.A.A. Fyzee, "The Muslim

Minority in India", Quest, Bombay, 1967, p. 4.
50. Husain, Destiny of Indian Muslims, p. 12.
51. Ibid., p. 8.
52. For example, The Way of Gandhi and Nehru, 1959; and National Culture, i965;
Gandhiji and Communal Unity 1969; Mussulman aur Asr-i Masail, Delhi, 1972.
53. Ibid., p. 7.
54. Husain, National Culture, pp. 63-4; see also Ahmad, Islamic Modernism, pp.
257-8.
55. Interview, National Herald, Delhi, 2 June 1970.

56. For his presidential address to the Indian History Congress in 1948, see K.A.
Nizami (ed.), Collected Works of Professor Mohammad Habib: Politics and Society
During Early Medieval India Delhi, 1974.
57. Quoted in A.G. Noorani, President Zakir Husain: A Quest for Excellence, Bombay,
1967.
58. Mohammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Lahore, 1934,
pp. 150-60.
59. J. Duncan M. Derret, Religion, Law and the State in India, London, 1968, p. 532;
Robert T. Baird (ed.), "Uniform Civil Code and the Secularization of Law", in
Baird (ed.), Religion in Modern India, op. cit. pp. 414-46.
60. A.A.K. Soze, "Emancipation: The Two Extremes", National Herald, 3 June 1970.
61. Ibid., 1 June 1970.
62. Ahmad, Islamic Modernism, pp. 254-5.
63. Saeed Ahmad Akbarabadi, "Zamane ke ilmi taqase aur afkar-i-jadida", in
Naseem Qureshi (ed.), Aligarh Tehrik: Aghaaz se Anjaam tak, Lucknow, 1960, p.
238.
64. Said Ahmad Akbarabadi, "Islam and other religions", in Islam, op. cit., pp. 103-4.
65. Tarjuman al-Quran, quoted in ibid., p. 105.
66. A.A.A. Fyzee, A Modern Approach to Islam, Bombay, 1963, p. 112.
67. Ibid.
68. Fyzee, "The Muslim Minority in India", op. cit., p. 7.

69. Ahmad, Islamic Modernism, p. 265; see also Gopal Krishna, "Piety and Politics
in Indian Islam", in T.N. Madan (ed.), Muslim Communities of South Asia: Culture
and Society, Delhi, 1976, pp. 165-6.
70. M.H. Beg, "Islamic Jurisprudence and Secularism", in G.S. Sharma (ed.),
Secularism: Its Implications for Law and Life in India, Delhi, 1966, p. 152.
71. W.C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, pp. 260. 265, 266.
72. Mujeeb, Indian Muslims, p. 561; see also, Abid Husain, Destiny of Indian Muslims
p. 166, and Rafiq Zakaria, "What have the Muslim done for India and
Secularism", in Malik Ram (ed.), Hakeem Abdul Hameed Felicitation Volume, Delhi,
Hakeem Abdul Hameed Felicitation Committee, 1981, pp. 87-101.
73. A.H.A. Nadwi, Muslims in India Lucknow, 1980, p. 139.
74. Typescript, 6 January 1962, M.C. Chagla papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and
Library.
75. Francis Robinson, "Islam and Muslim Society in South Asia", Contributions to
Indian Sociology, 17 February 1983.

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Muslim Intellectuals, Institutions and the Post-Colonial Predicament

Author(s): MUSHIRUL HASAN

Muslim Intellectuals, Institutions

is still conducted within the framework be

* An abridged version of the original paper submitted to the IIC.

At the heart of the Arya Samaj's brand of reconstruction and

cohesion and integration, and to provide historical legitimation for

Azad, "marked a spirit of renaissance for the Indian spirit

accretions, to their straying from the straight path of Islam. Th

In Delhi College, subsidised by the British since 1827 and

he pleaded for the abandonment of the purdah system and for

Despairing of existing commentaries with their preoccupation

In his 'Preparatory Years', Syed Ahmad unveiled to the young

a change, in response to major national and transnational

that the contours of a community were being delineated in complete

This is where the Simla deputation of 1 October 1906 and the

the devolution of authority to Indian hands was accompanied wi

he Jamia Millia Islamia (National Muslim University) in

must be grateful to him for having given commonsense its rightf

The Jamia fraternity was dumbfounded by the rhetoric of th

The university, in its search for moral and political support

were exemplified in the writings of Mohammad Mujeeb and Syed

He brought to light, a fact that is now adequately known

The message for his generation was:

Indian Muslims can serve Islam and themselves best by associating

Abid Husain, a Shia married to Swaliha Abid Husain, a front

Scholars at the Aligarh Muslim University, especially in th

Scholars debated the highly emotive and contentious issue

of the Quran or the Hadith was unimaginable. Attempts to per

reasonableness".66 More importantly, he positioned himself again

Such a development, he pointed out, will not destroy "the

conclusions. There can be no doubt that individual Muslims

concerned with their identity and the preservation of their religious

With this frame of mind, large numbers of Muslims could look

preoccupation with communitarian identities, chauvinistic

A big question remains over the tenability of the approaches

1. Susobhan Sarkar, Presidential address to the Indian History Congress, Decem

Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900, Princeton University

15. Ibid., pp. 107, 111.

26. Rizvi, History of the Dar al-Ulum, vol. 1, pp. 234-5.

of facts—social, cultural, historical and religious". A.A.A. Fyzee, "The Muslim

55. Interview, National Herald, Delhi, 2 June 1970.

68. Fyzee, "The Muslim Minority in India", op. cit., p. 7.

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