Unit 2- AIDS TO INTERPRETATION

An Aid is considered as a tool or device which helps in interpreting a statute, the court
can take help from internal aids to interpretation (i.e. within statutes) or external aids to
interpretation (i.e. outside the statutes).

I- INTERNAL AIDS

Internal aids mean those aids which are available in the statute itself, court can interpret
the statute by employing such aids to find the object or policy behind the statute. However,
these internal aids are ought to be used only when there is ambiguity in the words of the
statue after an attempt has been made to expound the meaning of the same by reading statute
as a whole in the context.

Traditionally, all the writers on interpretation of statutes consider the preamble, title,
heading, marginal notes, punctuation, illustrations, definitions, proviso, explanation etc. as
internal aids.

A. LONG TITLE

Statutes usually have two titles: the short title and the long title. Former is merely a short
form of the full statute used for the sake of brevity. The latter along with preamble states out
the objective and purposes of the statute. A statute, when referred to, is always known by its
short title. A short title has no interpretive value.

It is now settled that Long Title of an Act is a part of the Act and is admissible as an aid
to its construction. The long title which often precedes the preamble must be distinguished
with the short title; the former taken along with the preamble or even in its absence is a good
guide regarding the object, scope or purpose of the Act, whereas the latter being only an
abbreviation for purposes of reference is not a useful aid to construction.

While dealing with the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act,
1951, which bears a full title thus ‘An Act to authorise Advocates of the Supreme Court to
practise as of right in any High Court, S. R. DAS, J., observed: “One cannot but be impressed
at once with the wording of the full title of the Act. Although there are observations in earlier
English cases that the title is not a part of the statute and is, therefore, to be excluded from
consideration in construing the statutes, it is now settled law that the title of a statute is an
important part of the Act and may be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining its general
scope and of throwing light on its construction, although it cannot override the clear meaning
of the enactment.1

The title of the Madras General Sales Tax, 1939, was utilised to indicate that the
object of the Act is to impose taxes on sales that take place within the province. 2 The title
although part of the Act is in itself not an enacting provision and though useful in case of
ambiguity of the enacting provisions, is ineffective to control their clear meaning.

The long title of the Act – on which reliance is placed by advocates and judges as a
guide for the determination of the scope of the Act and the policy underlying the legislation,
no doubt, indicates the main purposes of the enactment but cannot, obviously, control the
express operative provisions of the Act.

In the case of Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra & Ors. v. State of Orissa & Ors., 3 the
Supreme Court has held that:

“The title of a statute is no doubt an important part of an enactment and can be

referred to for determining the general scope of the legislation. But the true nature of any
such enactment has always to be determined not on the basis of the given to it but on the
basis of its substance.”

In M.P.V. Sundararamier & Co. v. State of A.P., 4 the Supreme Court was considering
whether the impugned enactment was a Validation Act in the true sense. This Court held that
although the short title as also the marginal note described the Act to be a Validation Act, the
substance of the legislation did not answer that description. The Supreme Court observed:

“31. ... It is argued that to validate is to confirm or ratify, and that can be only in
respect of acts which one could have himself performed, and that if Parliament cannot enact a
law relating to sales tax, it cannot validate such a law either, and that such a law is
accordingly unauthorised and void. They only basis for this contention in the Act is its
1
Aswinikumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC pp.369, 388
2
Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 SC 274
3
(2014) 4 SCC 583
4
AIR 1958 SC 468
description in the short title as the ‘Sales Tax Laws Validation Act’ and the marginal note to
Section 2, which is similarly worded. But the true nature of a law has to be determined not on
the label given to it in the statute but on its substance. Section 2 of the impugned Act which is
the only substantive enactment therein makes no mention of any validation. It only provides
that no law of a State imposing tax on sales shall be deemed to be invalid merely because
such sales are in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. The effect of this provision is
merely to liberate the State laws from the fetter placed on then by Article 286(2) and to
enable such laws to operate on their own terms.”

Lord Moulton in Vacher and Sons Ltd. v. London Society of Compositors,5 described
the short title of an Act as follows:

“A title given to the Act is solely for the purpose of facility of reference. If I may use
the phrase, it is a statutory nickname to obviate the necessity of always referring to the Act
under its full and descriptive title ..... Its object is identification and not description.”

B. PREAMBLE

A preamble of a statute is a prefatory statement following the title and preceding the
enacting clause. It expresses the scope, object and purpose of the Act more elaborately than
the long title.

The preamble of a statute like the long title is a part of the Act and is an admissible aid to
construction. Although not an enacting part, the preamble is expected to express the scope,
object and purpose of the Act more comprehensively than the long title. It may recite the
ground and cause of making the statute, the evils sought to be remedied or the doubts which
may be intended to be settled. In the words of SIR JOHN NICHOLL : “It is to the preamble
more specifically that we are to look for the reason or spirit of every statute, rehearsing this,
as it ordinarily does, the evils sought to be remedied, or the doubts purported to be removed
by the statute, and so evidencing, in the best and most satisfactory manner, the object or
intention of the Legislature in making or passing the statute itself.6

The principle has also been enunciated by the Supreme Court, where MUDHOLKAR, J.,
speaking for the court observed: “It is one of the cardinal principles of construction that

5
1913 AC 107
6
Brett v. Brett, (1826) 162 ER 456, pp. 458, 459
where the language of an Act is clear, the preamble may be resorted to explain it. Again,
where very general language is used in an enactment which, it is clear must be intended to
have a limited application, the preamble may be used to indicate to what particular instances,
the enactment is intended to apply. We cannot, therefore, start with the preamble for
construing the provisions of an Act, though we could be justified in resorting to it, nay, we
will be required to do so, if we find that the language used by Parliament is ambiguous or is
too general though in point of fact parliament intended that it should have a limited
application.7

The preamble may, no doubt, be used to solve any ambiguity or to fix the meaning of
words which may have more than one meaning, but it can, however, not be used to eliminate
as redundant or unintended, the operative provision of a statute. A preamble retrospectively
inserted into an earlier Act is not of much assistance for gathering the intention of the original
Act. Similarly, it seems the repeal of a preamble simpliciter will not affect the construction of
the Statute.

The apex court in Arnit Das V. State of Bihar8 observed:

“The preamble suggests what the Act was intended to deal with. If the language used by
parliament is ambiguous the court is permitted to look into the preamble for construing the
provisions of an Act. The Preamble is a key to unlock the legislative intent. If the words
employed in an enactment may spell a doubt as to their meaning it would be useful to so
interpret the enactment as to harmonise it with the object which the legislature had in its
view.”

Preamble to the Constitution

The Preamble of the Constitution like the Preamble of any statute furnishes the key to
open the mind of the makers of the Constitution more so because the Constituent Assembly
took great pains in formulating it so that it may reflect the essential features and basic
objectives of the Constitution. The Preamble is a part of the Constitution.

The Preamble embodies the fundamentals underlining the structure of the

Constitution. It was adopted by the Constituent Assembly after the entire Constitution has
been adopted. The true functions of the Preamble is to expound the nature and extend and

7
Burakar Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC pp.954, 956, 957
8
(2000) 5 SCC 488
application of the powers actually confirmed by the Constitution and not substantially to
create them.

The Constitution, including the Preamble, must be read as a whole and in case of
doubt interpreted consistent with its basic structure to promote the great objectives stated in
the preamble. But the Preamble can neither be regarded as the source of any substantive
power nor as a source of any prohibition or limitation. The Preamble of a Constitution
Amendment Act can be used to understand the object of the amendment.

The majority judgments in Keshavananda Bharati9 and Minerva Mills10 strongly relied
upon the Preamble in reaching the conclusion that the power of amendment conferred by
Article 368 was limited and did not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or
framework of the Constitution.

C. HEADINGS

The view is now settled that the Headings or Titles prefixed to sections or group of
sections can be referred to in construing an Act of the Legislature. But conflicting opinions
have been expressed on the question as to what weight should be attached to the headings. “A
Heading”, according to one view, “is to be regarded as giving the key to the interpretation of
the clauses ranged under it, unless the wording is inconsistent with such interpretation; and so
the headings might be treated “as preambles to the provisions following them.”11

The Supreme Court expressed itself as follows: “It is well settled that the headings
prefixed to sections or entries (of a Tariff Schedule) cannot control the plain words of the
provisions; they cannot also be referred to for the purpose of construing the provision when
the words used in the provision are clear and unambiguous; nor can they be used for cutting
down the plain meaning of the words in the provision. Only in the case of ambiguity or doubt
the heading or sub-heading may be referred to as an aid in construing the provision but even
in such a case it could not be used for cutting down the wide application of the clear words
used in the provision.”12

The Supreme Court in Bhinka v. Charan Singh,13 observed : “The heading prefixed to
sections or sets or sections in some modern statutes are regarded as preambles to those
9
Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 : (1973) 4 SCC 225
10
Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC pp.1789, 1798, 1806
11
Toronto Corporation v. Toronto Ry, (1907) AC (PC) pp.315, 324
12
M/s. Frick India Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC pp.689, 693
13
AIR 1959 SC pp.960, 966
sections. They cannot control the plain words of the statute but they may explain ambiguous
words.”

The Supreme Court in Union of India V. Raman Iron Foundary14 observed as follows:

“heading cannot control the interpretation of a clause if its meaning is otherwise plain
and unambiguous, but it can certainly be referred to as indicating the general drift of the
clause and affording a key to a better understanding of its meaning.”

D. MARGINAL NOTES

In the older statutes marginal notes were not inserted by the legislature and hence
were not part of the statute and could not be referred to for the purpose of construing the
statute. If they are also enacted by the legislature they can be referred to for the purpose of
interpretation. In the case of the Indian Constitution, the marginal notes have been enacted by
the Constituent Assembly and hence they may be referred to for interpreting the Articles of
the Constitution. If the words used in the enactment are clear and unambiguous, the marginal
note cannot control the meaning, but in case of ambiguity or doubt, the marginal note may be
referred to.

In the case of Thakurain Balraj Kunwar v. Rao Jagpatpal Singh, 15 it was observed that
“it is well settled that marginal notes to the sections of an Act of Parliament cannot be
referred to for the purpose of construing the Act… They are not part of the act. A marginal
note is merely an abstract of the clause intended to catch the eye.”

There can be no justification for restricting the contents of the section by the marginal
note. The marginal note cannot affect the construction of the language used in the body of the
section if it is otherwise clear and ambiguous. The marginal heading cannot control the
interpretation of the words of the section particularly when the language of the section is
clear and unambiguous.

Where the language is clear and can admit of no other meaning, the marginal note
cannot be read to control the provisions of the statute. “Marginal notes in an Indian statute, as
in an Act of Parliament cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the statute.”

14
AIR 1974 SC
15
(1904) ILR 26 All 393 (PC) as
Although a marginal note may not be determinative of the content of the provision, it may act
as an intrinsic aid to construction.

In the State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society 16 it was contended that Art-
29(2) did not confer any fundamental right on all citizens generally but guaranteed the rights
of citizens of minority groups. Reference was made to the marginal note to Art.29 which
states : ‘Protection of interests of minorities’. This contention was rejected by the Supreme
Court and it was held that Article 29(2) applies to all citizens.

E. PUNCTUATIONS

‘Punctuation’ means to mark with points and to make points with usual stops. It is the art
of dividing sentences by point or mark. Is the Court entitled to use punctuation also while
interpreting the statutes? Punctuation is considered as a minor element in the construction of
statutes. Text book writers comment that English Court pay little or no attention to
punctuation while interpreting while interpreting the statutes. The same is not the cases in
Indian Courts. If a statute in question is found to be carefully punctuated, punctuation may be
resorted for the purpose of construction.

Comma is the most commonly used punctuation mark. Generally, the mark comma is
understood to provide a pause between two phrases in the sentences. The mark comma is
used for various purposes –

a. sentence which provides list of things / activities (comma in such a context is known
as serial comma);

For Example: Business includes any trade, commerce, manufacture, profession, vocation,
adventure, wager or any other similar activity, whether or not it is for a pecuniary benefit.

b. a sentence which incorporates two clauses could be separated by a comma (known

as comma splice). In this scenario, generally, the same interpretation or meaning could be
retained by replacing comma with full-stop;

For example: Continuous supply of services means a supply of services which is

provided, or agreed to be provided, continuously or on recurrent basis, under a contract, for a
period exceeding three months with periodic payment obligations and includes supply of such

16
AIR 1954 SC 561
services as the Government may, subject to such conditions, as it may, by notification,
specify.

c. used to separate an introductory part in a sentence;

For example: Capital goods means goods, the value of which is capitalised in the books of
account of the person claiming the input tax credit and which are used or intended to be used
in the course or furtherance of business.

d. used to separate phrases which interrupts the sentence flow (nevertheless,

nonetheless, moreover, further, accordingly, as such etc.,)

An Oxford comma is generally used in a sentence which incorporates the list of things /
activities. In such a sentence, the last comma which is used before and or or in a series is
known as oxford comma. Generally, oxford comma is used to prevent ambiguity. In other
words, the oxford comma is used between the penultimate item in a list and ‘and / or’ to
prevent the confusion and to supply the plain meaning.

The use and purpose of using a "semi-colon" in a statute is explained by Vepa P. Sarathi
in his book interpretation of statutes. It is said "semicolon" is an important and interesting
mark to use. It is stronger than a comma, which is used more for a pause; but the semi-colon
does not imply a complete break like the full stop. It only makes a partial break and is at the
same time a link between sentences appearing on the subject. It often implies that what
follows at least partially explains and amplifies the sentence that comes before it. It is often
used instead of a comma when it is followed by "and" or "or" or "but".

In Mohd. Shabbir v. State of Maharashtra, 17 while interpreting Section 27 of the Drugs

and Cosmetics Act, 1940, which provided whoever ‘manufactures for sale, sells, stocks or
exhibits for sale or distributes’ a drug without a licence, is liable for punishment. the Supreme
Court pointed out that the presence of ‘comma’ after ‘manufactures for sale’ and ‘sells’, and
absence of any ‘comma’ after ‘stocks’ would indicate that only stocking for sale could
amount to offence and that mere stocking cannot be treated as an offence for the purpose of
the Drugs and Cosmetics Act.

B. K. MUKHERJEE, J., in Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, 18 expressed himself

as follows: “Punctuation is after all a minor element in the construction of a statute, and very

17
AIR 1979 SC 564
18
AIR 1952 SC pp.369, 383
little attention is paid to it by English Courts-. It seems, however, that in the vellum copies
printed since 1850, there are some cases of punctuation, and when they occur they can be
looked upon as a sort of contemporanea expositio-. When a statute is carefully punctuated
and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be given some cases, but it
cannot certainly be regarded as a controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the
plain meaning of a text.”

KANIA, C.J., in construing Art. 22(7)(a) of the Constitution, referred to the punctuation
and derived assistance from it in reaching his conclusion that Parliament was not obliged to
prescribe both the circumstances under which, the class or classes of cases, in which a person
may be detained for a period longer than three months, without obtaining the opinion of the
Advisory Board and that Parliament.19

In the case Dr. M. K. Salpekar v. Sunil KumarShamsunder Chaudhari 20 the court

construed clause 13 (3) v of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order.
This provision permits ejectment of a tenant on the ground that “the tenant has secured
alternative accommodation, or has left the area for a continuous period of four months and
does not reasonably need the house.” In holding that the requirement that the tenant ‘does not
reasonably need the house’ has no application when he ‘has secured alternative
accommodation’ the court referred and relied upon the punctuation comma after the words
‘alternative accommodation.’

However, if a statute is revised and re-enacted but the section under construction in the
revised statute is brought in identical terms as in the old statute except as to variation of some
punctuation, that in itself will not be indicative of any intention on the part of the Legislature
to change the law as understood under the old section.

F. ILLUSTRATIONS

Illustrations appended to a section form part of the statute and although forming no part of
the section, are of relevance and value in the construction of the text of the section and they
should not be readily rejected as repugnant to the section.

19
A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC pp.27, 45
20
AIR 1979 SC
 It would be the very last resort of construction to make this assumption. The great
usefulness of the Illustrations which have, although not part of the sections, been expressly
furnished by the Legislature as helpful in the working and application of the statute, should
not be thus impaired.

In interpreting section 113 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and in deciding that
'later' bequest to be valid must comprise of all the testator's remaining interest, if the legatee
to the later bequest is not in existence at the time of testator's death, and that a conferment of
a life estate under such a bequest is not valid, the Privy Council took the aid of Illustrations
appended to that section. VISCOUNT MAUGHAM in Sopher v. Administrator General of
Bengal,21 pointed out:

“Illustrations 2 and 3 would seem to show - What is not clear from the language of the
section - that however complete may the disposition of the will, gift after the prior bequest
may not be a life interest to an unborn person for that would be a bequest to a person not in
existence at the time of testator's death of something less than the remaining interest of the
testator.”

The Supreme Court, in Jumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra Deviah, 22 took the aid of
Illustration appended to section 43, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 for the conclusion that the
said provision applies to transfers of spes successionis and enables the transferee to claim the
property, provided other conditions of the section are satisfied. VENKATARAMA AIYAR,
J., quoted the judgment in Ariffins’ case,23 and observed: “It is not to be readily assumed that
an Illustration to a section is repugnant to it and rejected.”

Mention must also be made of Illustration (b) to section 114, Indian Evidence Act,
which reads: 'The court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is
corroborated in material particulars.' The impact of this Illustation on the construction of
section 133 of the Evidence Act - 'An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an
accused person; and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the
uncorrobotated testimony of an accomplice' - is too well known. The rule evolved on the
basis of the Illustration is that "it is almost always unsafe", to convict an accused on the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, and that the corroboration required to sustain a
conviction must be independent and must relate to the participation of the accused in the
21
AIR 1944 PC pp.67, 69
22
AIR 1962 SC pp.847, 851
23
43 IA pp.256, 263
offence. The Supreme Court has never felt any difficulty in setting aside a conviction based
on uncorroborated or insufficiently corroborated testimony of an accomplice. Thus the rule of
law enacted in the later part of section 133 has, from practical point of view, been reduced to
a dead letter on the basis of a rule of practice developed under a mere illustration and that too
appended to a different section. Such a result, which is exceptional from the point of view of
principles of construction, is the outcome of the anxiety of Courts to safeguard the liberty of
the subject and to make sure that a conviction is not obtained merely on tainted evidence.

In Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer, 24 which involved the interpretation of

section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Court held that the said provision was not
intended to relieve the prosecution of the burden of proof and was designed to meet certain
exceptional cases and had no application to those cases where the information was as much
within the knowledge of the prosecution as of accused. Referring to the Illustration to section
106, BOSE J., observed: “We recognize that an Illustration does not exhaust the full content
of the section which it illustrates but it can neither curtail nor expand its ambit.”

G. DEFINITION SECTION

It is also known as interpretation clause. It provides an important aid to gather intention of

the legislature. Legislature often gives definitions of certain words to remove ambiguity and
extend the ordinary meaning of the words or phrases in question.

Definition is a statement that explains the meaning, nature and content of something one
is defining in a precise and articulate manner.

These do not, generally, take away the ordinary and natural meaning of the words, but as
used:

(i) to extend the meaning of a word to include or cover something, which would not
normally be covered or included; and
(ii) to interpret ambiguous words and words which are not plain or clear.

The definition must ordinarily determine the application of the word or phrase defined;
but the definition itself must first be interpreted before it is applied. When the definition of a
word gives it an extended meaning, the word is not to be interpreted by its extended meaning

24
AIR 1956 SC pp.,404, 406
every time it is used, for the meaning ultimately depends on the context; and a definition
clause does not, ordinarily enlarge the scope of the Act.

A court should not lay down a rigid definition and crystallize the law, when the
legislature, in its wisdom has not done so. It is ordinarily unsafe to seek the meaning of words
used in an Act, in the definition clause of other statutes even when enacted by the same
legislature; but where a word or phrase used in an Act, is used in another Act which is in pari
materia and the word is not defined in that other Act, then the word may be given the
meaning given in the first Act.

Definitions in an Act are to be applied only when there is nothing repugnant in the subject
or context, and this is so even if such a qualifying provision is not expressly stated by the
legislature.

If a special definition of a word or phrase is set out in an Act, the meaning of this word or
phrase as given in such definition should normally be adopted in the interpretation of the
statute. In the absence of such a definition, the General Clauses Act of the particular
legislature which enacted the statute should be referred to. If the word is not defined there
also, the rules of interpretation would come into play.

Khanna J., in Indira Nehru Gandhi V. Raj Narain25 :

“A definition clause in a statute is a legislative device with a view to avoid making

different provisions of the statute cumbersome. Where the effect is that where ever the word
defined is used in a provision to which that definition is applicable, the definition of the word
gets substituted. Where, however, the definition is preceded by the words "unless the context
otherwise requires", the connotation is that normally it is the definition given in the section
which should be applied and given effect to. This normal rule may, however, be departed
from, if there be something in the context to show that the definition should not be applied.”

Restrictive and Extensive Definitions

The words ‘that is to say’ are not words of restriction. They are words of illustration,
and the instances that follow operate as a guide for interpretation. An interpretation clause
may used the very ‘includes’ or ‘means’ or ‘means and includes’, or ‘denotes’ or ‘deemed to
be’.

25
AIR 1975 SC
 The words ‘includes’ is generally used in the interpretation clause to enlarge the
meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used,
those words and phrases must be considered as comprehending, not only such things as they
signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause
declares that they shall include. If the words ‘means’ or ‘means and includes’ are used it
affords a exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must
inevitably be attached to those words or expressions. If the word ‘denotes’ is used it has the
same significance as ‘includes’. If the word ‘deemed to be’ is used it creates a fiction and a
thing is treated to be that which in fact it is not.

In Vanguard Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Fraser & Ross, 26 one of the
questions that fell for determination before the Supreme Court was whether the definition of
the word “insurer” included a person intending to carry on a business or a person who has
ceased to carry on a business. It was contended that the definition started with the words
“insurer means” and, therefore, is exhaustive. The Supreme Court, repelling that contention
held, that statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject to the qualification
variously expressed in the definition clauses which created them and it may be that even
where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain
thing, it is possible for the word to have somewhat different meaning in different sections of
the Act depending upon the subject or the context. That is why all definitions in statutes
generally begin with the qualifying words “unless there is anything repugnant in the subject
or context.”

The expression “include” is used as a word of extension and expansion to the meaning
and import of the preceding words or expressions. The following observations of Lord
Watson in Dilworth v. Stamps Commissioners,27 in the context of use of “include” as a word
of extension has guided this Court in numerous cases:

“... But the word ‘include’ is susceptible of another construction, which may become
imperative, if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for
the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the words or expressions defined. It may
be equivalent to ‘mean and include’, and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation
of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words
or expressions.”
26
AIR 1960 SC 971
27
1899 AC 99
 The meaning of the said expression has been considered by a three Judge Bench of
this Court in South Gujarat Tiles Manufacturers Assn. V. State of Gujarat, 28 wherein this
Court has observed:

“Now it is true that ‘includes’ is generally used as a word of extension, but the
meaning of a word or phrase is extended when it is said to include things that would not
properly fall within its ordinary connotation.”

The word ‘include’ is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge
the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used
those words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things, as they
signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause
declares that they shall include.

It goes without saying that interpretation of a word or expression must depend on the
text and the context. The resort to the word ‘includes’ by the legislature often shows the
intention of the legislature that it wanted to give extensive and enlarged meaning to such
expression. Sometimes, however, the context may suggest that word ‘includes’ may have
been designed to mean ‘means’. The setting, context and object of an enactment may provide
sufficient guidance for interpretation of the word ‘includes’ for the purposes of such
enactment.

The word “include” is generally used to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases
occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used those words or phrases must be
construed as comprehending, not only such things, as they signify according to their natural
import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include.
That is to say that when the word “includes” is used in the definition, the legislature does not
intend to restrict the definition: it makes the definition enumerative but not exhaustive. That
is to say, the term defined will retain its ordinary meaning but its scope would be extended to
bring within it matters, which in its ordinary meaning may or may not comprise.

In construing a provision of law as to its mandatory nature, the intention of the

legislature and the consequences that would flow from the construction thereof one way or
the other have to be kept in view. In Mohan Singh v. International Airport Authority of
India,29 the Supreme Court was considering the question whether the use of the word ‘shall’

28
(1976) 4 SCC 601
29
(1997) 9 SCC 132
is not decisive in construing whether a provision is mandatory or directory. It was observed
as under:

“.......... The word ‘shall’, though prima facie gives impression of being of mandatory
character, it requires to be considered in the light of the intention of the legislature by
carefully attending to the scope of the statute, its nature and design and the consequences that
would flow from the construction thereof one way or the other. In that behalf, the court is
required to keep in view the impact on the profession, necessity of its compliance; whether
the statute, if it is avoided, provides for any contingency for non-compliance; if the word
‘shall’ is construed as having mandatory character, the mischief that would ensure by such
construction; whether the public convenience would be subserved or public inconvenience or
the general inconvenience that may ensue if it is held mandatory and all other relevant
circumstances are required to be taken into consideration in construing whether the provision
would be mandatory or directory. If an object of the enactment is defeated by holding the
same directory, it should be construed as mandatory whereas if by holding it mandatory
serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons of general public without
much furthering the object of enactment, the same should be construed as directory but all the
same, it would not mean that the language used would be ignored altogether. Effect must be
given to all the provisions harmoniously to suppress public mischief and to promote public
justice.”

H. PROVISO

The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case which would
otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment and its effect is confined to
that case. It is a qualification of the preceding enactment which is expressed in terms too
general to be quite accurate.

As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to

what is in the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule.
Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. It carves
out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no
other. When one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the
proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter of the
proviso. A proviso must be construed with reference to the preceding parts of the clause to
which it is appended.

Where the proviso is directly repugnant to a section, the proviso shall stand and be held a
repeal of the section as the proviso speaks the later intention of the makers. When a proviso is
repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso will not prevail over the absolute terms of a later
Act directed to be read as supplemental to the earlier one. However, where the section is
doubtful, a proviso may be used as a guide to its interpretation; but when it is clear, a proviso
cannot imply the existence of words of which there is no trace in the section.

The proviso is subordinate to the main section. A proviso does not enlarge an enactment
except for compelling reasons. Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is inserted by way of
abundant caution.

A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provision. A construction placed upon a

proviso which brings it into general harmony with the terms of section should prevail. The
normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify
something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the
enactment.

As was stated in Mullins v. Treasury of Survey 30, when one finds a proviso to a section
the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would
have included the subject-matter of the proviso.

The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case which would
otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment and its effect is confined to
that case. It is a qualification of the preceding enactment which is expressed in terms too
general to be quite accurate. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify
or create an exception to what is in the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted
as stating a general rule. If the language of the enacting part of the statute does not contain
the provisions which are said to occur in it you cannot derive these provisions by implication
from a proviso.

Reference can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Sundaram Pillai v.
V.R. Pattabiraman.31 After exhaustively referring to the earlier case law on scope and

30
1885 (5) QBD 170
31
AIR 1985 SC 582
interpretation of a proviso as well as explanation to a section, the Supreme Court laid down
as under:

“A proviso may serve four different purposes: (1) qualifying or excepting certain
provisions from the main enactment; (2) it may entirely change the very concept of the
intendment of the enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in
order to make the enactment workable; (3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to
become an integral part of the enactment and thus acquire the tenor and colour of the
substantive enactment itself; and (4) it may be used merely to act as an options addenda to the
enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision.

I. EXPLANATION

An explanation is a part of the enactment and it explains the meanings of the words in the
enacting clauses. It does not ordinarily enlarge the scope of the original section which it
explains, but only makes the meaning clear beyond dispute. An Explanation cannot in any
way interfere with or change the enactment or any part thereof.

The object of explanation is -

a. to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself;

b. where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the same so as
to make it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to subserve;

c. to provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it
meaningful and purposeful.32

J. NON OBSTANTE CLAUSE

A section sometimes begins with the phrase ‘notwithstanding anything contained etc.’
Such a clause is called a non obstante clause and its general purpose is to give the provision
contained in the non obstante clause an overriding effect in the event of a conflict between it
and the rest of the section. Thus, there is generally a close relation between the non obstante
clause and the main section and in case of ambiguity the non obstante clause may throw light

32
Ibid.
on the scope and ambit of the rest of the section. If, however, the enacting part is clear and
unambiguous, its scope cannot be whittled down by the use of the non obstante clause. This
phrase i.e. ‘notwithstanding anything in’ is in contradiction to the phrase ‘subject to’.

In Aswini Kumar v. Arabinda Bose,33 the petitioner was an Advocate of the Calcutta High
Court and also of the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in
High Courts) Act, 1951 is an Act to atuthorise Advocates of Supreme Court to practice as of
right in any High Court. When he filed in the Registry on the original side of the Calcutta
High Court a warrant of authority executed in his favour to appear for a client, it was
returned, because under the High Court Rules and Orders, Original side, an Advocate could
only plead and not act. The Advocate contended that as an Advocate of the Supreme Court he
had a right to practice which right included the right to act as well as to appear and plead
without being instructed by an attorney. The contention was accepted by the majority. The
Supreme Court observed that:

“the non obstante clause can reasonably be read as overriding ‘anything contained’ in any
relevant existing law which is inconsistent with the new enactment, although the draftsman
had primarily in his mind a particular type of law as conflicting with the new Act. The
enacting part of a statue must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non obstante clause
where both cannot be read harmoniously; for, even apart from such a clause, a later law
abrogates earlier laws clearly inconsistent with it. While it may be true that the non obstante
clause need not necessarily be co-extensive with the operative part, there can be no doubt that
ordinarily there should be a close approximation between the two.”

It was further observed that:

“It should first be ascertained what the enacting part of the section provides on a fair
construction of the words used according to their natural and ordinary meaning, and the non
obstante clause is to be understood as operating to set aside as no longer valid anything
contained in relevant existing laws which is inconsistent with the new enactment.”

In Kanwar Raj v. Pramod,34 the Custodian of Evacuee Property cancelled a lease granted
by him, under Section 12 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. Section 12
enacts : Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force the
Custodian may terminate any lease, etc. It was contended that the power of the Custodian to

33
AIR 1952 SC 369
34
AIR 1956 SC 105
cancel leases could be exercised only so as to override a bar imposed by any law but not the
contract under which the lease is held, because, the non obstante clause is limited to
‘anything contained in any other law for the time being in force’. It was held: The operative
portion of the section which confers power on the Custodian to cancel a lease or vary the
terms thereof is unqualified and absolute, and that power cannot be abridged by reference to
the provision that it could be exercised ‘notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
for the time being in force.’ This provision is obviously intended to repel statutes conferring
rights or leases, and cannot prevail as against them and has been inserted ‘ex abundant
cautela’. It cannot be construed as cutting down the plain meaning of the operative portion of
the section.

In Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi lal,35 the question arises that when two or more laws operate
in the same field and each contains a non obstante clause stating that its provisions will
override those of any other law, stimulating and incisive problems of interpretation arise. The
court observed that:

“Since statutory interpretation has no conventional protocol, cases of such conflict have
to be decided in reference to the object and purpose of the laws under consideration. A
piquant situation, like the one rose in Shri Ram Narain v. Simla Banking & Industrial Co.
Ltd.,36 the competing statutes being the Banking Companies Act, 1949, as amended by Act 52
of 1953 and the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951. Section 45-A of the
Banking Companies Act, which was introduced by the amending Act of 1953, and Section 3
of the Displaced Persons Act, 1951 contained each a non obstante clause, providing that
certain provisions would have effect ‘notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
contained in any other law for the time being in force….’ This court resolved the conflict by
considering the object and purpose of the two laws and giving precedence to the Banking
Companies Act by observing: “It is, therefore, desirable to determine the overriding effect of
one or the other of the relevant provisions in these two Acts, in a given case, on much broader
considerations of the purpose and policy underlying the two Acts and the clear intendment
conveyed by the language of the relevant provisions therein.” For resolving such inter se
conflicts, one other test may also be applied though the persuasive force of such a test is but
one of the factors which combine to give a fair meaning to the language of the law. That test
is that the later enactment must prevail over the earlier one.”

35
(1977) 1 SCC 750
36
AIR 1956 SC 614
 The enacting part of a statute must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non obstante
clause where both cannot be read harmoniously; for even apart from such clause, a later law
abrogates earlier laws clearly inconsistent with it.

K. SCHEDULE

Schedules attached to an Act generally deals with as to how claims or rights under the Act
are to be asserted or as to how powers conferred under the Act are to be exercised. The
Schedules are appended towards the end of the enactment. Schedules are parts of the Statute
itself and may be looked into by the courts for the purpose of interpreting the main body of
the statute.

Sometimes, a schedule may contain some subjects in the form of a list as is the case with
the Constitution of India to enable the Union and the states to legislate in their respective
fields.

Similarly, while interpreting the schedules help may always be taken from the main body
of the Act to find out the true spirit of the Act.

Sometimes, a schedule may contain transitory provisions also to enable an Act to remain
in existence till the main provisions of the Act begin to operate, such as the Ninth Schedule of
the Government of India Act, 1935.

In Ellerman Lines Ltd. v.Murray,37 it was laid down that a schedule can’t be referred to on
the construction of an enacting part of the statute unless the language of the enacting part is
ambiguous.

In the case of Kallu v.Munna38 it was held that in case of an ambiguous enactment,
schedule is a legitimate aid to construction.

The court held in Aphali Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 39 that, in case of a
conflict between the body of the Act and the schedule, the former prevails.

II- EXTERNAL AIDS

37
1931 AC
38
1970
39
AIR 1989 SC 2227
 When internal aids are not adequate, court has to take recourse to external aids. These are
the things or documents found outside of the statute relevant to expound the ambiguous
statutes. It may be parliamentary material, historical background, reports of a committee or a
commission, official statement, dictionary meanings, foreign decisions, etc.

The Supreme Court has accepted the necessity of external aids in interpretation of
statutory provision. O.Chennappa Reddy J. in B. Prabhakar Rao and others v State of A.P. 40
and others , has observed :

“Where internal aids are not forthcoming, we can always have recourse to external aids to
discover the object of the legislation. External aids are not ruled out. This is now a well
settled principle of modern statutory construction.”

In District Mining Officer and others v Tata Iron & Steel Co. and another, 41 Supreme
Court has observed: “It is also a cardinal principle of construction that external aids are
brought in by widening the concept of context as including not only other enacting provisions
of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of law, other statutes in pari materia
and the mischief which the statute was intended to remedy.”

So far as admissibility and utility of these external aids are concerned, law is almost
settled in our country now. The Supreme Court in K.P. Varghese v Income Tax Officer
Ernakulam,42 has stated that interpretation of statute being an exercise in the ascertainment of
meaning, everything which is logically relevant should be admissible.

A. PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY

The ingredients of Parliamentary History are the bill in its original form or the
amendments considered during its progress in the Legislature, Speech of the minister who
introduced the bill in the Parliament which is also referred to as Statements of Objects and
Reasons, Reports of Parliamentary debates and resolutions passed by either House of the
Parliament and the Reports submitted different Parliamentary Committees.

According to the traditional English view the Parliamentary History of a statute was
not considered as an aid to construction. The Supreme Court of India in the beginning

40
AIR 1986 SC 120
41
(2001) 7 SCC 358
42
AIR 1981 SC 1922
enunciated the rule of exclusion of Parliamentary History in the way it was traditionally
enunciated by the English Courts but on many an occasion, the court used this aid in
resolving questions of construction.

In Indira Sawhney v. Union of India, 43 while interpreting Article 16(4) of the

Constitution the Supreme Court referred to Dr. Ambedkar‟s speech in the Constituent
Assembly as the expression backward class of citizens’ is not defined. The court held that
reference to Parliamentary debate is permissible to ascertain the context, background and
objective of the legislatures but at the same time such references could not be taken as
conclusive or binding on the courts.

In the Ashwini Kumar’s Case,44 the then Chief Justice of India Patanjali Shastri
quoted that the Statement of Objects and Reasons should not be used as an aid to
interpretation because in his opinion the Statement of Objects and Reasons is presented in the
Parliament when a bill is being introduced. During the course of the processing of the bill, it
undergoes radical changes. But in the Subodh Gopal’s Case, 45 Justice S.R. Das although he
fully supported Chief Justice Patanjali Shastri’s views in the Ashwini Kumar’s Case but he
wanted to use the Statement of Objects and Reasons to protect the sharecroppers against
eviction by the new buyers of land since zamindari system was still not abolished and land
was still not the property of the farmers. So Justice S.R. Das took the help of Statements of
Objects and Reasons to analyse the social, legal, economic and political condition in which
the bill was introduced.

In Harsharan Verma v. Tribhuvan Narain Singh46, the appointment of Tribhuvan

Narayan Singh as the chief minister of Uttar Pradesh was challenged as at the time of his
appointment he was neither a member of Vidhan Sabha nor a member of Vidhan Parishad.
While interpreting Article 164(4) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court held that it did not
require that a Minister should be a Member of the Legislature at the time of his being chosen
as such, the Supreme Court referred to an amendment which was rejected by the Constituent
Assembly requiring that a Minister at the time of his being chosen should be a member of the
Legislature.

43
AIR 1993 SC 477.
44
Ashwini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369.
45
State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, AIR 1954 SC 92.
46
AIR 1971 SC 1331.
 Reports of Commissions including Law Commission or Committees including
Parliamentary Committees preceding the introduction of a Bill can also be referred to in the
Court as evidence of historical facts or of surrounding circumstances or of mischief or evil
intended to be remedied. Obviously, courts can take recourse to these materials as an external
aid for interpretation of the Act. Though, the Supreme Court refused to take recourse to the
Report of the special Committee which had been appointed by the Government of India to
examine the provision of the Partnership Bill for construing the provisions of the Partnership
Act, 1932 in CIT, A.P. v Jaylakshmi Rice and Oil Mills Contractor Co.,47 yet in another case
Haldiram Bhujiawala and another v Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar and another, 48 the Supreme
Court took recourse to the very same report of the Special Committee (1930-31) for
construing the provisions of section 69 of the Partnership Act, 1932. The Supreme Court in
the above case held that decision in CIT v. Jaylakshmi Rice & Oil Mills (supra) in this
respect is no longer good law.

B. HISTORICAL FACTS AND SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES

Courts while interpreting a statutory provision, can take into account relevant historical
facts or history of enactment in order to understand the subject matter of statute. Court can
also have regard to the surrounding circumstances which existed at the time of passing of the
statute. But, like any other external aid, the inference from historical facts and surrounding
circumstances must give way to the clear language employed in the enactment itself. In this
regard, Supreme Court in Mohanlal Tripathi v. Distt. Magistrate Rail Bareilly and others, 49
has observed:
“Value of ‘historical evolution’ of a provision or ‘reference’ to what preceded the
enactment is an external aid to understand and appreciate the meaning of a provision, its
ambit or expanse has been judicially recognized and textually recommended. But this aid to
construe any provision which is ‘extremely hazardous’ should be resorted to, only, if any
doubt arises about the scope of the section or it is found to be ‘sufficiently difficult and
ambiguous to justify the construction of its evaluation in the statute book as a proper and
logical course and secondly, the object of the instant enquiry’ should be ‘to ascertain the true

47
AIR 1971 SC 1015
48
(2000) 3 SCC 250
49
(1992) 4 SCC 80
meaning of that part of the section which remains as it was and which there is no ground for
thinking of the substitution of a new proviso was intended to alter’.”
This rule of admissibility permits recourse to historical works, pictures, engraving and
documents where it is important to ascertain ancient facts of a public nature.
The Supreme Court while dealing with the Dental Act, 1948 in Dental Council of India v
Hariprakash,50 has observed:
“The Act is a pre constitutional enactment but it has application in the post constitutional
era also. When interpreting such an enactment, we have not only to bear in mind the
historical background leading to the legislation and the amendments effected therein, but also
various aspects covered by it”.

C. DEVELOPMENTS—SOCIAL ,POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC

According to Waisman, “ Judges are not robots. They have to evolve various methods and
techniques to tackle a problem which confronts them.
It is often possible that after the enactment of a statute, political and economic
developments in the society may take place. New scientific inventions may also come out.
The legislature might not have been aware of all these developments and inventions, when
the law was made. Therefore, courts take into account all these development while construing
statutory provisions. In this regard, Bhagwati J. in S.P. Gupta v Union of India,51 has stated:
“The interpretation of every statutory provision must keep pace with changing concepts
and values and it must, to the extent to which its language permits or rather does not prohibit,
suffer adjustments through judicial interpretation so as to accord with the requirement of the
fast changing society which is undergoing rapid social and economic transformation … It is
elementary that law does not operate in a vacuum. It is, therefore, intended to serve a social
purpose and it cannot be interpreted without taking into account the social, economic and
political setting in which it is intended to operate. It is here that the Judge is called upon to
perform a creative function. He has to inject flesh and blood in the dry skeleton provided by
the legislature and by a process of dynamic interpretation, invest it with a meaning which will
harmonise the law with the prevailing concepts and values and make it an effective
instrument for delivery of justice.”

50
(2001) 8 SCC 61
51
AIR 1982 SC 149
 Again, in S.P. Jain v Krishan Mohan Gupta and others,52 the Supreme Court has held:
“We are of the opinion that law should take pragmatic view of the matter and respond to
the purpose for which it was made and also take cognizance of the current capabilities of
technology and life style of community”.
With the change of times, Article 21 of the Constitution which was at one time interpreted
in a very narrow way, has now been interpreted in such a way, that the right to life includes
everything which makes a man’s life meaningful, complete and worth living. The Supreme
Court in J.K. Cotton Spinning & Wvg Mills Ltd. v Union of India, 53 observed that in a
modern progressive society it would be unreasonable to confine the intention of the
legislature to the meaning attributed to the word used at the time the law was made and
unless a contrary intention appears, an interpretation should be given to the words used to
take in new facts and situations, if the words are capable of comprehending them.

D. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

Reference to decisions of the English Courts was a common practice in the administration
of justice in pre independent India. However, courts have also referred to American
decisions, especially when matter is connected with Fundamental Rights. These judgments
have persuasive value, when there is no law on point.
Speaking about Indian Codes, M.C.Setalvad has stated: “Where the language of the code
was clear and applicable, no question of relying on English Authority would arise. But very
often the general rule in the Indian Code was based on an English Principle and in such cases
the Indian Courts frequently sought the assistance of English Decisions to support the
conclusions they reached. They could not otherwise for not only the general rules contained
in the codes but some of the illustrations given to clarify the general rules were based on
English decisions.”
In the case General Electric Company v. Renusagar Power Company, 54 the Supreme
Court of India held that when guidance is available from Indian decisions, reference to
foreign decisions may become unnecessary. Different circumstances may also result in non
acceptance of English precedents by the Indian Courts. In the case M.V.Elisabeth v. Harwan
Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd.,55 the Supreme Court differed from English decisions and
52
AIR 1987 SC 222
53
AIR 1988 SC 191
54
(1987)4 SCC 137
55
AIR 1993 SC 1014.
interpreted the words „damage caused by a ship‟ in Section 443 of the Merchant Shipping
Act, 1958 as not limited to a physical damage caused by a ship by reason of its coming into
contact with something; it intended to include damage to the cargo carried in a ship. The
Supreme Court in this case differed in its opinion because in India there is no other Act
covering claim of damages for damage to the cargo carried in a ship but in England this
subject is covered expressly by a different Act.

E. REFERENCE TO OTHER STATUTES

It is a settled principle that for the purpose of interpretation or construction of a statutory

provision, courts can refer to or can take help of other statutes. It is also known as statutory
aids. The General Clauses Act, 1897 is an example of statutory aid. Apart from this, Court
can take recourse to other statutes which are in pari mataria i.e. statute dealing with the same
subject matter or forming part of the same system. Supreme Court in Common Cause, A
Registered Society v Union of India, 56 took recourse to section 13A and 139 (4B) of the
Income Tax Act 1961 for the purpose of interpretation of Explanation I to section 77 (1) of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
In the case, State of Punjab v. Okara Grain Buyers syndicate Ltd., Okara 57 , the Supreme
Court held that when two pieces of legislation are of differing scopes, it cannot be said that
they are in pari materia. However, it is not necessary that the entire subject matter in the
statutes should be identical before any provision in one may be held to be in pari materia with
58
some provision in the other. In the case State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanath Aiyer, the
respondent, an income tax officer was accused of accepting bribe. The Trial Court convicted
him and awarded a rigorous imprisonment of six months. When an appeal was made in the
High Court, the High Court set him free on the ground of a possibility that he might have
borrowed the money and not accepted it as bribe. The Supreme Court held the accused guilty
and made an observation that the judgement of the High Court was extremely perverse. In the
instant case, the Supreme Court held that Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,1947,
which directs that on proof that the accused has accepted any gratification other than legal
remuneration, it shall be presumed unless the contrary is established by the accused that the
gratification was accepted as bribe, has been held to be in pari materia with subject-matter

56
AIR 1996 SC 3081
57
AIR 1964 SC 669
58
AIR 1958 SC 61
dealt with by the Indian Evidence Act,1872; and the definition „shall presume‟ in the Indian
Evidence Act has been utilized to construe the words „it shall be presumed‟ in section 4 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act,1947.
The application of this rule of construction has the merit of avoiding any contradiction
between a series of statutes dealing with the same subject, it allows the use of an earlier
statute to throw light on the meaning of a phrase used in a later statute in the same context.
On the same logic when words in an earlier statute have received an authoritative exposition
by a superior court, use of same words in similar context in a later statute will give rise to a
presumption that the legislature intends that the same interpretation should be followed for
construction of those words in the later statute. However, a later statute is normally not used
as an aid to construction of an earlier statute, but when an earlier statue is truly ambiguous, a
later statute may in certain circumstances serve as a parliamentary exposition of the former.

F. DICTIONARIES

When a word is not defined in the statute itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to
find out the general sense in which that word is understood in common parlance. However, in
the selection of one out of the various meanings of a word, regard must always be had to the
scheme, context and legislative history.
The meaning of particular words in an Indian statute is to be found not so much in a strict
etymological propriety of language nor even in popular sense, as in the subject or occasion on
which they used. But it is well known that words are generally used in their ordinary sense
and therefore, though dictionaries are not to be taken as authoritative in regard to the
meanings of the words used in statutes, they may be consulted. In Voltas Ltd. v. Rolta India
Ltd.,59 the Supreme Court has held that: “Dictionaries can hardly be taken as authoritative
exponents of the meanings of the words used in legislative enactments for the plainest words
may be controlled by a reference to the context.
Similarly, Lexicons would only define an expression in terms of a decision given by a
Court of Law, and unless this decision was given under the Act in which the expression is
used “it involves” in the words of Ram Lal,J. in Frim Karam Narain Daulat Ram v. Colkart
Bros.,60 “a dangerous method of interpretation.”

59
(2014) 4 SCC 516
60
A.I.R. 1946 Lah (F.B) pp.116, 128
 G. INTERNATIONAL LAW

India being a dualist country does not allow the courts to apply International law in
adjudication without enactment. However, since International law requires non-violation of
objectives of the treaty, it may be considered by the courts. The constitution also ordains to
fulfil international commitments. Reference to international law can only be made when there
is absence of domestic jurisprudence on the impugned matter.
The Supreme Court in Visakha v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011 took recourse to
International Convention for the purpose of construction of domestic law. The Court
observed:
“In the absence of domestic law occupying the field to formulate effective measures to
check the evil of sexual harassment of working women at all work places, the contents of
International Conventions and norms are significant for the purpose of interpretation of the
guarantee of gender equality, right to work with human dignity in Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g)
and 21 of the Constitution and the safeguards against sexual harassment implicit therein. Any
international convention not inconsistent with the fundamental rights and in harmony with its
spirit must be read into those provisions to enlarge the meaning and content thereof, to
promote the object of the Constitutional guarantee.”
In Pratab Singh v. State of Jharkhand61 Court held that the International treaties,
covenants and conventions although may not be a part of our Municipal Law can be referred
to and followed by the courts having regard to the fact that India is a party to the said treaties.
In Research Foundation For Science v Union Of India 62 the Court referred to Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their
Disposal.

H. USAGES AND PRACTICE (CONTEMPORANEA EXPOSITIO)

Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissmo in Lege, meaning The best way to
construe a document is to read it as it would be read when it was made. Usages and practice
developed under a statute is indicative of the meaning ascribed to its words by contemporary

61
AIR 2005 SC
62
AIR 2005 SC
opinion and in case of an ancient statute, such reference to usage and practice is an
admissible external aid to its construction.
But this principle is not applicable to a modern statute and it is confined to the
construction of ambiguous language used in old statute. This principle of ‘contemporanea
exposito’ was applied by the Supreme Court in National and Grindlays Bank v Municipal
Corporation for Greater Bombay,63 while construing Bombay Municipal Corporation Act,
1888. The apex court also referred to the actual practice in the matter of appointment of
judges of Supreme Court and High Court in the context of interpreting Articles 74 and 124 of
the Constitution and observed that the practice being in conformity with the constitutional
scheme should be accorded legal sanction by permissible constitutional interpretation.

63
AIR 1969 SC 1048