93

CHAPTER - III

CONTINUINQ GUARANTEE — ITS NATURE ,REVOCATION ETC,

The question whether a guarantee Is a

continuing guarantee or not may be considered under
1

two heads. The first class o£ cases consists of

ordinary mercantile guarantees for a current account;
either for goods sold, or for money advanced or some
consideration of the like nature. The second class
of cases arises where guarantees have been given for
the good behaviour of a person in some office or
1
employment. Sections 129 to 131, of the Indian Contract
Act, deal with the nature and revocation of a continuing
guarantee.

All guarantees must be either specific or

continuing. If restricted by their terms to a single
transaction or within a fixed limit of time they are
temporary. If not so restricted they continue in force
until revoked. The latter class are called continuing
guarantees, A continuing guarantee must refer to a
series of transactions of which, when the guarantee
is given, some are unknown, indefinite or uncertain.
Where the guarantee is given in respect of a single
existiny transaction, namely the payment of a specific
 9x

2
sum, the guarantee is a simple guarantee. To determine
the difference bet.%feen a simple guarantee and a conti-
nuing guarantee one has to examine the nature of the
consideration. If it is fragmentary and divisible,
supporting for example a running or floating balance,
the guarantee is continuing and revocable. If it is
entire, supporting , say the grant of a lease or the
3
fidility of an employee, it is non-revofcable.

The question often mooted is what is the

effect of presence or absence of clauses expressly
limiting liability on the nature of guarantee, /Mother
moot question worth examining is whether a general
authority, without any words of limitation as to time or
amount, to make advances to another on the credit of
the promisor, will bind the surety for any amount at
any time until revoked, or whether he is bound merely
for any amount the principal asks for and receives at
the time he presents his letter of credit.

To restrict such obligations to a single

transaction and construe it as a limited guarantee is
to adopt the view that instruments of guarantee should
be construed most strangly in favour of the surety,
and to construe the instrument as a continuing guarantee
is to adopt the other extreme view that the construction
 95

4
Should be most strongly against the surety,

Chitty while dealing with continuing guarantee

5
expressed the opinion*

"It is often a difficult question

whether a guarantee, for example,
of the price of goods to be supplied,
or may be lent up to a specified
amount is tendered , to extent to a
single or definite number of transac-
tions, or whether it is intended to
be a continuing. In the former event,
payment of the principal debtor for the
goods sold, or repayment of money lent,
brings the surety's liability to an end,
in the latter event, the surety remains
liable if further goods are supplied or
money lent up to the limit of the
guarantee".

Whether the guarantee is continuing in any

case is a question of construction, no hard and fast
rule can be laid down, and the contents of one document
affords little or no guidance to the constructions of
an-other. Each case depends entirely on the language
used and the document must be looked at with reference
to the circiMnstances Kunder which it was given. The
expression from time to time" or until further notice
will usually, if not always be ^^^eclusive of an inten-
tion to make a continuing guarantee.
 9

Continuing guarantee In accordance with

section 129 of the Contract Act, would only mean a
guarantee which extends to a aeries of transactions
Therefore continuing guarantee speaks of continuing
transactions, not the period of such transactions.
Therefore, it is q[ulce possible that a guarantee can
be confined to a series of transactions and can be
restricted or limited to one year. Hence there can be
7
a continuing guarantee for a fixed period. The
illustrations ai.pended to section 129 has created con-
fusion among various High Courts in order to determine
the nature of the guarantee. It has been pointed out
8
by Rangoon High Court that the illustrantion to the
Contract Act are to be used as guides only and not as
authoritative and binding declarations of the law. It
is to be noted firstly that illustration (a) is appa-
rantly not based upon any specific English case, such
as the two subsequent illustrations are. Again in S.N.
9
Sen V. The Bank of Bengal, it has been observed that
there is hardly any modern case in which guarantee has
been held to be continuing one, which depends upon a
main contract of employment between a master and a servant
in the nature of a surety for the servant's fidelity.
 9?

The only surviving cases of continuing guarantee

are those In which a third party stands surety for
the due discharge of a mercantile account or a floating
balance between businessmen. The court held that
Illustration - (a) of section 129 Is wrong as a state-
ment of law.

Where a guarantee is meant to cover a series

of transaction or no time limit has been fixed, but
containing limitation as to the amount for which the su-
rety will be demanded, it will , in general, be construed
to be a continuing guarantee. The time limit mentioned
in such a guarantee ordinarily is deemed to have reference
to the amount of the surety's liability, and not to
the sunount of dealings between the principal debtor and
the creditor, and the surety will be held liable to
the extend of his guarantee. The principal debtor may
have during the contract contracted debts to an amount
equal to or greater than that agreed to. Thus I agree
to be responsible for the price of goods purchased of
you either by note or account, by H, at any time
hereafter, to the amount of 0 1000 , was held conti-
nuing . So that though H. bought ^ iOOO/- worth of
goods from the creditor and paid for them and then
bought other goods of him in excess of that amount, the
 93

guarantor was held liable for ^ 1000 of the balance

10
due to the creditor.

Where a guarantee contains no express limitation

as to either time or amount, and there is nothing in
the instrument itself to give rise to the conclusion
that it was the intention of the sureties to leave it
open as to both, the guarantee may generally be under-
stood as refering to a single transaction. Thus if you
will let the bearer have what leather he wants and charge
the same himself, I will see that y->u have your pay in
a reasonable length of time. It was held to confine to
a single transaction. The court said; "^,e think it Is
limited to a single transaction or purchase. We must
hold this or that it is unlimited both as to time and
amount. Every man is supposed to have some regard for
his own interest and it is not reasonable to presume any
man of ordinary prudence would become surety for another
without limitation as to time or amount unless he has
11
done so in express terms or by clear implication.

The document should be interpreted as a whole

and is not to be confined to the operative part. If
there is any ambiguity or uncertainty it is pei^rilssible
to press into consideration the nature and character of
 93

business« the relative position of the parties and

12
surrounding circumstances. In Sankaranaeayna v.
13
Paramasivan, it has been held that there is no analogy
between a security executed by a surety under section
55(4) C.P.C, and a continuing guarantee as defined in
section 129 of the Contract Act, In the former case,
there is no series of transactions giving rise to a
distinct liability which the guarantee is intended to
cover Dut tnere is only a single transaction under
which the surety takes the responsibility for certain
things to be done in future though on different occa-
sions. But where a person becomes a surety, and
executes a security bond stipulating "I, the executant,
agree to become a surety for the judgment-debtor and
covenant that I shall produce the Judgment debtor in
court on each and every occasion when his attendance is
called for by the order of the court", the Contract is
14
of continuing guarantee.

Where a bond or other guarantee has been given

for the good behaviour ( fidelity ) of third persons
in office or employment, very nice question often arise
as to whether the liability of surety continues after
some change has taken place as to the circumstances of
the appointment. These situations may arise as:
 10.

(1) The liability of the surety after the third

party's appointment to the same office.

(2) The surety's liability after the third

party's appointment to another, though similar office
ar employment.

(3) The suretys liability after a change has

taken place in the duties or the length of the term
of the third person's office.

In the celebrated case of Lora Arlingtan v,

15
MERRICK, the guarantee was conditioned for the per-
formance of the duties of deputy postmaster, by A.B,
for and during all the time he shall continue deputy
postmaster. It appeared, however, from the recital in
the bond, that the plaintiff had appointed A.B. to act
as Deputy Postmaster for the term of his six months. It
was accordingly held, that the general words of the
condition was restricted by the recital, and that the
liability of the defendant under the bond or surety for
A.B. ended only during the six months and did not extend
to subsequent re-appointment to the same office. In
16
Peppin V. Cooper, a bond was given which after reciting
the appointment of Henry Warren to be a Collector, under
an Act of parliament which made the office an annual
office. The due collection of rates and dues at all
 in;

tiroes hereafter" was guaranteed, Abb6tt, C.J. said,

" I am of the opinion that the condition of the bond
is satisfied by the faithful collection of rates and
dues for the period of one year. It is true, that
the words at all tiroes hereafter, in the condition
of the bond, would taken by theroselves, extend the
liability of the surety beyond that period. But these
words must be construed with reference to the recital,
and to the nature of the appointment there mentioned.
Now the nature and duration of that office must be
learnt from the Act of Farliaroent itself, for if the
Statute make it an annual office, it is unnecessary to
state that fact either in the bond or in the pleading.
Of course, by the use of the proper words, a surety may
provide for a continuance of his liability on subsequent
re-appointment to same office, of the person, whose
17
default or miscarriage is guaranteed against.

Where a person is surety for another's good be-

haviour in a particular office, and subsequently such other
person is appointed to a perfectly distinct office,
which is incompatible and inconsistent with the first
appointment the surety is discharged even though the
duties under the two appointments be substantially inden-
tical. But where a person, for whose good behaviour an-
 IOJ

other is surety* Is subsequently , appointed to

an additional office or employment^ the liability

of the surety does not in consequence necessarily

18
cease. Of course, however, in such a case the

liability of the surety would not extend to any-

thing done or omitted by the plaintiff in respect

of such additional office or employment.

Cases where, after the execution of the

surety bond, a change has taken in the duties or

length of the term of the third person's office

or employment, or in the mode of remuneration

of such third person for his services. It is

well established that when the change made

materially alters the duties of the office and

this effects the peril of the sureties, they are

released.
 HIS'

The liability of the surety may also be destroyed

by an alteration in the mode of payment, as well as by
an alteration in the duties of an office. For where a
bond given by a person as surety for the good behaviour
of a third person in an office or employment states
that such third person is to be renununerated for his
services in a particular way, the surety is discharged
from all liability if subsequently to the execution of
the bond any change be effected in the made of remunera-
tion. Thus as decided in The London and North Western
19
Railway Co. v. Whimsay. In 1851 the defendant executed
a bond in favour of a railway co.The company had agreed
to appoint L. as their clerk or agent for the purpose
of selling coal. The salary was £100 per year. A
gurantee was given for the due accounting by L. Of all
moneys received by him for the use of the company.
Subsequently it was agreed between L and Company to
substitute for salary. It was held that th?? surety was
liable for the faithful conduct of L. Whilst ne conti-
nued clerk at such fixed salary, and consequently the
defendant was not liable after the change in the mode
of remuneration .

Whether a guarantee is continuing or non-continuing

cannot be determined by fixed rules of construction, nor
by reference to decide cases. They simply illustrate
 H]->

what the courts have done under the peculiar facts

and circumstances of particular cases. Disputes fre-
quently arise in England as to whether an instrument
falls within the description of a continuing guarantee
or not. There is considerable difficulty in reconciling
all the cases on this suoject, and the difficulty
arises chiefly from their being not at one as to the
principle of decision, Scxne cases lay down that the
guarantee sho\kld be construed liberally; in favour of
the person giving it, and the others, that it ought
to be construed^gtrictly. LorJ Ellenborough observed
in Merle v. Well , "d)f a party means to confine his
liability to a single dealing, he should take care to
say so. Such a recital would restrain the generality
of the engagement and explain whether it has reference
to past or future transactions or continuing with
reference to future transaction depends always on the
circumstances under which it is given",

"Revocation of a continuing guarantee"

k continuing guarantee may either be revoked by

notice as by death as to the future transactions under
certain circumstances. If it 'appears that the guarantee
was intended to be a continuir>g and the contract contains
 103

no express limitation as to the duration of the

guarantor's liability, liability thereunder will be
deemed to have continued, in the absence of anything
to indicate a different intention,ubtil notice of re-
vocation of the contract was given by the guarahtor.
Speaking generally, a continuing guarantee may be
revoked by the guarantor unless the terms of the con-
tract preclude revocation. More precisely, an offer to
guarantee an obligation which is to be incurred at a
future time may be revoked by the offree, with the
result that he may not be held liable by the creditor
oft account of the latcers extension of credit to the
debtor subsequent to the receipt of notice of revoca-
tion. Of course, the guarantor cannot revoke the
guarantee so as to escape liability for credit already
extended.

where the guarantee can be revoked, the revo-

cation cannot affect advances which have been made, or
responsibilities wnich have been incurred on the strength
of the guarantee before notice of the revocation is
given.

\ continuing guarantee for future advances as

supplies, in consideration of granting of such advances or
 lOJ

supplies does not become binding until the creditor

has acted upon it. It may, therefore, be revoked^i,

before it is acted upon, and as to future transactions,

even if it has been acted upon, if there is no stipu-

20)
lation between the parties.

The reason is that each advance or supply,

or each transaction is a separate transaction, and

the guarantee is divisible as to each advance or

supply. It ripens into a irrevocable promise or

guarantee as to each advance, supply and transaction

22
only when the same is made. If the surety finds the

principal debtor untrustworthy, he is entitled, on

the payment of what has been advanced to the principal

debtor upto date, to get the guarantee back. In

23
Lloyd's V. Harper, James L.J, said:

"It may be considered equitable

and right tnat where a man is
not under any obligation to aska
make further advances or to sell
further goods, a person who has
guaranteed repayment of such
advances, or payment of the price
of the giods, may say, I d o not
sell any further goods or make any
further advances. I give you a
warning that you are not to rely
on my guarantee for any further
advances which he make; or any other
goods you sell'. That might be in
many cases an equitable view, it
might perhaps be hardly equitable
for a banker or merchant to go on
 lu;

making advances after receiving

notice from the guarantor that
he would not be further liable*.

Where the guarantee is a continuing one, the

surety can at any time revoke the guarantee by notice
to the creditor. So where a guarantee relates to a
qmnnber of payments of rent, extending to a series of
transactions, it is a continuing guarantee. The
surety can revoke the guarantee after a notice to
the creditor. The surety is not responsible for the
payment of the rent which accu^ted after the surety
has revoked the contract and guarantee by notice.

A distinction is to be made between entire and

individual consideration on the one hand and fragmentary
and divisible consideration on the other hand. In
the former case, all guarantees which relate to the
conduct of a person admitted to an office of trust; or
to the possession of property. In such cases, the
consideration is a single act done once for all and
25
is not divisiDle. In Abdul v. Belayat All. it has
been held that under section 130 a continuing guarantee
may be revoked at any time as regards future transac-
tions. It is a well known class of cases and there
 10.

have been many cases in English courts in which a

surity has been allowed to withdraw, where the
guarantee has been found to be a continuing. But
no case has ever established where a surety has
given a guarantee to cover a definite case, he can
simply by notice to the creditor withdraw the gua-
rantee to nullify altogether the effect of the
security. The consideration is entire, supporting,
as the grant of lease or the fidelity of an employee.
But there is one authority to show, however, that in
the case of a fidelity guarantee once exact information
has reached the surety that the principal debtor has
been guilty of misconduct or the position has com-
pletely changed, the surety is entitled to recall the
guarantee as against the creditor. For example in the
26
case of PHILLIPS V. FOXALL, it has been observed:

" But if there is misconduct on the

part of the person whose fidelity
is guaranteed, for instance, if a
man guarantees that a collecting
clerk shall only account for all
money received by him and that collec-
ting clerk is found to have embezzled
his employer's money, reason requires
that the man who entered into the
guarantee because he believes the
person to be of good character, when
he finds he is not so, and not to be
trusted, should have the power of
saying. I now withdraw the guarantee.
I gave you. I give you full notice
not to trust him any more. Notwith-
standing all that what has been said.
 10

I am clearly of the opinion that a

person who entered into such a gua-
rantee and is therefore responsible
for the person whose fidelity he has
guaranteed has a right to withdraw
that guarantee when that person has
been proved guilty of dishonesty".

In the absence of agreement to the contrary, a

continuing guarantee is revoked, as to future transac-
tions, thereunder, by any change in the constitution of
27
a firm to or far whom guarantee was given.

There is, however, conflict of opinion between

various High Courts aregarding the revocation of bonds
given in court proceedings. The Madras High Court has
28
held in Sankaranarayan v, Paramasivan, that there is no
anology between a security bond executed by a surety
under section 55(4) C.P.C. and a continuing guarantee as
defined in section 129 of the Contract Act. A surety in
the former case cannot claim to be released from the
obligation at his pleasure and the principle of section
130, Contract Act, does not apply. On the other hand
29
Allahabad High Court, has held that where a person becomes
a surety, and executes a surety bond stipulating, "I,
the executant, agree to become a surety for the judgment
debtor and covenant that I shall produce the judgment-
debtor in the court on each and every occasion when his
 11.J

attendance is called for by the order of the Court",

The contract being a continuing guarantee cannot be
revoked by the guarantor as to future transactions,
by the notice to the creditor.

The Lahore High Court has taken a view that a

security bond furnished under section 55 of C P . C , is
in the nature of a continuing guarantee, and when the
surety produces a judgmentdebtor before the court
and requests to be absolved from further liability
30
under the bond, the court should not refuse the prayer.
It is submitted that the view taken by Lahore High Court
is reasonable that when a surety executes a sacarity
bond he cannot put an end to his guarantee at his will.
But the Court has a power to exonerate such surety from
all future liability, that is liaoility arising from
future transactions or future events,
31
The law commission | The Thirteenth Report(1958)|
suggests:
"To section 130 of the principal Act, the
following exception be added namely;

A continuing gurantee given to a court cannot be

revoked by the surety as to future transactions without
the permission of the Court",
 n

In cases where the continuii^g guarantee

relates* for instance, to a current account in a bank*
or a current account relating to goods sold in a
business, the guarantee may be withdrawn at any time ,
as to future transactions by notice to the creditor.

The right of revocation may be limited by

express stipulation. In case, it is intended that
the surety should, in default of an agreed notice,
continue liable indefinetely, the intention should be
clearly expressed. The law is clear that a conti-
nuing guarantee may be revoked by the surety by notice
to the creditor. But to have the effect of revoca-
tion , the notice must be such as can be regarded as
a notice putting an end to the contract of guarantee
under this section. The mere fact, that the surety
denied his liability as surety in a previous suit cannot
be regarded as a notice putting an end to the contract
of guarantee when the denial was made for the purpose
of pleading and could not have any other effect given
to it than was given in the suit itself. A mere denial
of liability by a party in a previous suit cannot operate
as notice, nor can the denial of existence of a legal
contract have that effect. Such denial cannot be given
the effect of a notice to the creditor that surety is
 1]

32
putting an end to a legal contract of guarantee,
33
In Dhamoomal Farsasen v. Kuppuraj, it has been
held that the Indian Contract Act has left it open
to the parties to provide as to the manner in which
notice to the creditor under section 130 has to be
given, then such a contract is binding contract.

When guarantee Is given by more than ane person,

34
notice must be given by or on behalf of them. \
notice revoking a continuing guarantee Just a day
35
before the performance of the contract is valid. But
it is sutxnitted that the revocation should be within
a reasonable time so that alternative arrangements
could be made. So far as the revocation of security
bonds required by the courts aire concerned, the revo-
cation should always came into effect only for subse-
quent appearances when the prit^cipal debtor first has
been produced before the court.

Revocation of a Continuing Guarantee by surety's death

Where the guarantee is one which can be ended

at the will of the surety while living, it is terminated
as to future transactions by his death. But such
termination does not affect transactions which were
executed prior to his death. Where the contract of the
 11 u

surety is to be responsible for goods to be sold or

money to be advanced in the future, it is held to be
lnv>tih« nature of an offer or authority t<b sell goods
or any other authority not coupled with an interest is
revocable by notice by the surety to the creditor
36
during life and is ipso facto revoked by his death.

But not all the cases held that death ipso facto
revokes the guarantee of future advances even when it
might have been revoked by notice during life and there
is much authority and reason for the rule that notice
or knowledge of guarantees' death must reach the creditor
before the credit is given for which the guarantor's
estate is sought to be held liable.To the same result
37
is Bradbury v, Margan, " if the guarantee has been in
these words," i request you to deliver to A tomorrow
morning goods to the value of £ 50, and in consideration
of your doing so 1 will repay you", and before the
morning the guarantor died, but the goods were duly
delivered, I can see no reason, said Bramwell B, the
personal representatice of the guarantor should be
liable. In that case the guarantee had been acted upon
and the question was only as to the effect of the death
of the guarantor as to the future advances made subse-
quently. In such circumstances, at any rate, it is now
 1 ] •:

settled that the death of the guarantor does not put

an end to the continuance of the security, unless it
38
comes to the knowledge of the creditor.

The guarantee is revoked by the guarantor's

death if the guarantor might have revoked it during
his life time. Guarantees have been divided into two
classes, ojne., where it passes wholly in one time- the
c'her, where it passes at different times, and is
therefore, separable or divisible. The former are
not revocable by the guarantor, and are not terminated
by the death of the guarantor and notice of that fact.
The latter, on the contrary, may be revoked as to the
subsequent transactions by the guarantor, upon notice
to that effect and are determined by his death and
notice of that event. A leading case on the subject
39
is Lloyd's V. Harper, in this case the principal
applied for an admission as an underwriting member of
"Lloyd's and pursuant to a rule of that association
regarding a guarantee on this behalf. The surety
held himself responsible for all his engagements in
that capacity. It was held that the guarantee was
not terminated by the death of the surety and that
the representative of the surety were bound for de-
faults occurlng after his death. Here the consideration
 n
la given once for all, just as in the case of granting

of a lease in which a third party guarantees the

payment of the rent and performance of the conditions.

If the surety was at liberty to say, " I withdraw

the guarantee", than the guarantee would have been

utterly futile and idle.

A similar question was before privy council in

40
S,N. Sen V. Bank Qf Bengal, in this case the principal

was appointed to a office of trust and a contract of

guarantee was entered xnto for securing an appointment

of principal in a bank. It was held that there being

no series of transactions. It was one transaction,

the appointment af the employee to a place of trust in

the bank. So long as he continued in that place the

guarantee remained and would not be revoked by the

death of the guarantor. Any other view would have

consequences very injurious to business. It would put

the bank in the position of having either to get rid

of an official forthwith upon death of his guarantor,

which might be most inconvenient, or to keep him

without security for his good behaviour. Even where

the employee is entitled to three months notice the

bank has to take a risk for three months of the gua-

ranty • -
Or'8 death.
 ] 1 J

41
In Kaparthala Estate v, Sheo Shankar/ under
a security bond, the surety made himself liable to
thp extent of one year's rent on default by the
principal debtor during the period of the lease. The
principal died in the course of the lease. The surety
did not give notice to the landlord revoking his
guarantee. It was held that the sarety was liable on
the bond for the whole period of the lease.

The general rule is subject to a contrary con-

tract between the parties. The effect of a contract
to the contrary is that the death of the surety does
not operate as a revocation of a continuing guarantee
so far as regards future transactions. In each case,
the contract between the parties must be looked into in
order to determine whether the contract of surety has
been revoked by the death of the surety. If from the
contract it can be gathered, either from the express
provision or by necessary implication, that there was a
contract that the death of the surety would not operate
as a revocation, the contract af guarantee will be held
to continue even after the death of the surety. In
42
Durga Priya v. Durgapada, towards the end of the bond,
it was further stated:
 I'J?

"Oyr heirs and legal represenatatlves

shall be bound by the terms of this
security bond in the same way may in
which we are i>o\ma by them".

From these terms it seems to be clear that the surety

bound himself as well as his heirs and legal represen-
tatives by the terms oficthe contract entered into between
him and the plaintiff for standing as a surety. There is
in this contract as contemplates under section 131 the
stipulation that the representatives of the surety would
be bound for any act done by the principal debtor during
the continuance of his service even after the death of
the surety.

There may be two cases where the surety has a

contractual right to terminate the guarantee. One is
where the contract of guarantee contains a provision
enabling the surety to terminate the contract after a
certain notice. The other where the surety binds himself
and his representatives, after the death of the surety,
and also contains a provision that the surety might ter-
minate his liability after giving a certain notice.

In the first, the continuing guarantee is revoked

by the death of the surety. In the second case, the death
of the surety does not free his representatives from
liability for default of the principal debtor subsequent
 n

to the death of the surety. In this case the question

for consideration is whether there is any contract to
the contrary in the surety bond which takes it out of
the provisions of this section. If the surety bond
shows that it will continue to operate even after the
death of the surety or that the operation of the surety
bond will continue so long as the original contract
between the creditor and the principal debtor continues,
the case is taken out of this section and the clause
in the surety bond that the surety in the surety bond
that the surety can terminate his liability by giving
previous notice does not show that the surety can ter-
minate at any time, and, therefore, would ipso facto
terminate with the death of the surety.43

So far as banks are concerned, the question of

notice of determination of the guarantee by the bank is
simple no period is required, for the guarantor under-
takes to pay the amount due under the guarantee on demand
in writing being made by the bank. In protection of
its own interest, the creditor should not allow termi-
nation on the part of the guarantee, who will be required
to give to the creditor a notice in writing of his
intention to terminate the guarantee at the expiration
 11

of the period stated in the guarantee« which may

be, say, one month. This period allows the creditor,
on the receipt of the notice, an opportunity of
ascertaining the position vis-a-vis the principal
debtor and for the guarantor before the expiry, date
arrives. In acknowledging the receipt of the notice
to the guarantor the creditor will state that the
amount of his liability under the guarantee will be
advised to him on the expiration of the notice.

In practice, a tri-partite meeting may be

sought by the creditor, so that the question of what
arrangements the guarantor and/or customer intend to
make or repayment or whether the customer can provide
alternative security may be discussed among the three
interested parties.
 L, J
REFERENCES

1. Appendix I
2. Wall Mdl. V. Ganpat, A.I.R. 1931 All, 243;
Hasan All v. Wallullah, A.I.R. 1930 All. 730
3. Mylngyan Municipal Conunittee v. Mg. PONYUN,
A.I.R. 1930 Rang. 173; S.N. Sen v. Bank of
Bengal, A.I.R. 1920 P.C. 35
4. ARTHUR ADELBERT STEARNS, The Law of Suretyship,
4th Ed. 1934 P. 70; Hagedorm v. Zenurray 28 Ga.
APP 807 ( cited. :ln the above book )
5. Chltty on Contract, 24th Ed. vol. 2 para, 4828;
Edward W. SPENCER, The General Law of Suretyship,
2nd Impression 1913 0. 130
6. Indian a Bicycle Co. Tuttle, 51 Atto Rep. 538;
Eastern Bank Ltd. Parts services of India Ltd.,
A.I.R. 1986 Cal. 61; Rowhatt on the Law of
Principal and surety , 4th Ed. 1982 P. 51 where
it has been observed:
A guarantee for a future debt may either be
restricted to a debt of that amount to be
Incurred once and Cor all, or it may be
continuing. The construction will turn upon
the wording of the Individual contract, the
principle being that the guarantee is continuing,
unless it eithes appears that only dealings to
the extent of the limit, which are them to
cease , are contemplated, or the guarantor dis-
tinctly limits his undertaking to a definite
transaction or to the first items of the credit
amounting of the total named.
7. Ibid.
8. Supra note 3
9. A.I.R. 1920 P.C. 35
 21

10. Bent V. Hartshorn, 1 Met ( Mars) 24;

Seewalal 1« Fazle Husaln, A.I.R. 1939
Nag. 31; Nedeengadi Bank Ltd. v. Dorakiannu
Amual, A.I.R. 1941 Mad. 382
11. Guard v. Stevens, 12 Mich, 292, cited supra note 5
The remarks of the court in this case would
seem to apply also to the guarantee, " please
let my daughter have what goods she wants, and
I will stand good for the money to settle the
bill. You will find the pay part all right with
her, I think". Yet the Court construed this
to be a continuing guarantee in Wright v. Griffith,
121 Ind. 478.
12. Mitchell V. Philles, A.I.R. 1931 P.O. 224
13. A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 101
14. Supra note 2
15. 2 Wms Sawrd 813. Refered by Decylor;
Benford v. lies, 2 B & Aid, 43
16. 2 B & Aid. 43
17. Aagero v. Keen, 1 M & W 390
18. S Killelt V. Plet cher, L.R. 2 C.P. 469
19. 10 Exch. 77
20. 2 Camp. 413
21. Rowlatt on The Law of Principal and Surety
4th ed. 1982; Supra note 5 P. 59
22. Offard v. Davis 12 C.B. (N.S.) 748
23. (1880) 16 Ch. D. 290
24. Sherumal v. Greenfield, A.I.R. 1930 Sind. 316
 12-

25. A.I.R. 1917 Cal. 699; Budh Singh v. Bhan Singh

A.I.R. 1934 Lah. 962; Radha Kanta v. United Bank
of India, 1955 Cal. 217
26. (1881) 7 Q.B. | Blackburn J., as he hen was,
said, qfuoting the case of Burgess, v , Eue,
(1872) 13 Eg. 450 from the judgment of Malins,
V.C. i

27. Section 38 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1931;

Eastern Bank Ltd. v. Parts Service of India
Ltd, A,I.R. 1986 Cal. 161.

28. A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 101

29. Supra Note 2
30. Aishan v. Mahabir Parshad, A.I.R. 1929
Lah. 262; SiraJ-ud-din v. Gusanditta Mai,
A.I.R. 1934 Lah. 692
31. Appendix I ii*j.
32. Bhik^bhai v. Bai Bhuri I.L.R. 27 Bom. 418
33. A.I.R. 1977 Mad. 274
34, Egbert v. National Crown Bank, A.I.R. 1918 P.C.210
35, Supra Note 2
36, Jardon v. Aobbins, 122 Madf 1683
Offard V. Davis (1862) 12 C.B, (N S ) 748
37, (1862) 1 H&C 249; Dodd v. Whelar 1 er. Rep.595
38, Coulthart v, Clemenlson, (1879) 5 Q.B. 42
39. ( 1881 ) 16 Ch. Div. 290

40. A.I.R. 1920 P.C. 35; MD. Ubedullaha v,

MD. Inshaullah, A.I.R. 1921 All. 287

41. A.I.R. 1942 Oudh 325

42. A.I.R, 1928 Cal. 204

43. Supra Note 27