08 Chapter 03
08 Chapter 03
08 Chapter 03
CHAPTER-3
THE SCOPE OF
THESTA: E
DE~INITION OF
The main concern of Political Scien e is the State, the greatest of all
human associations. The word has often een erroneously employed as a
synonym for "nation", "country", "society' and "the government." There is
so great a diversity of the uses of the word "State" that it creates confusion.
There are diverse notions about the word 'State" in Political Science. The
word has often been used indiscriminately t express a general tendency or an
1
It is very much impmtant to know about the ideas given by the Political
thinkers about the word State. The term "State" has been defmed by a number
of political thinkers who tried their best to let us know what they meant by the
term "State". A few popular defmitions are given below:
101
According to Bluntschli,:
6
"The State is politically organised people of a definite territory."
Phillimore goes to the extent of saying that a State for all purposes of
international laws is :
"a people prominently occupying a fixed territory, bound
Modem Conception of the State, Views of Gabriel Almond and Robert Dahl:
Gabriel Almond used the term "Political System" instead of the State.
According to him Political System is the system of interactions to be found in
all independent societies which perform the functions of integration and
10
adaptation (both internally and vis-a-vis other societies) by means of the
employment, or threat of employment of more or less legitimate physical
compulsion". "The political System", he explains "is the legitimate, order
maintaining or transforming system in the society". 11
10. Gabriel, A. Almond and James S. Coleman: "The Politics of Developing Areas", at7.
11. Ibid., at 7
12. J. Donald Pennock and David G. Smith : "Political Science", at 126.
13. Robert A. Dahl: ''Modern Political Analysis", at 12.
104
of the state i.e territmy and sovereignty. It refers to the government and
population only. Holland's definition refers to the territory and population but
it does not include the other two essential elements of the modem State, i.e the
government and sovereignty. The definition given by Burgess deals in detail
with population and the political organisation and does not make any reference
to territmy and sovereignty. Therefore, this definition also remains incomplete
and fails to give us the idea of the modem state. Likewise the definition given
by Bluntschli is also incomplete and unsatisfactory as it does not refer to
sovereignty. It deals only with territmy and politically organised people.
Of these four constituent elements of the modem state, the frrst two are
physical elements, the third is political and the fourth is spiritual.
There is no denying the fact that the state is a human institution and is
the highest of all human associations. Obviously, there can be no state without
human beings. A population of some kind is necessary for the existence of the
State. No state can exist in an uninhabited land nor can a definite piece of
land without human habitations be called a state. The State, being a human
institution, can never exist without human beings. Nor can living beings other
than human constitute the State.
Indeed, there cannot be a lower or upper limit for the number of citizens
of a state, nor can a dozen of people or so living in defmite place form a state.
Their number should neither be too small to be self- sufficient nor too large to
be well-governed. What should be the desirable number of the people and
what should be the suitable size of population for an ideal state are the problems
with which a number of political thinkers attempted to deal. For example,
Plato, the famous Greek Philosopher fixed the number at 5,050 citizens,
whereas his disciple - Aristotle - was not willing to be bound by any set figur.
He was clearly of the opinion that there ought to be a limit and he laid down
the general principle that "the number should be neither too small nor too
large; it should be large enough to be self-sufficient and small enough to be
well -governed. " 14 He believed that ten persons would be too small a figure
but a hundred thousand would be too large a figure to be well-governed. Both
were the extremes. He stuck a via media between too small a figure and too
large a number. While giving his opinion in this regard Aristotle h~d in his
view the city-states of Greece which according to him, were self-sufficient
14. Aristotle: "Politics". Bk. VII 4 (Jowett's ed., at. 267), "Laws" V 737.
106
On the other hand, there are small states like San Marino. The population
of San Marino was twentythree thousand only in 1985. It does not go beyond
five figures. This it is quite clear that the states of today va1.y greatly in respect
of population.
The modern state gives preference to the big size of population because
bigger the size of population, greater will be its manpower. They can fight for
a big longer period of time dming the war period.
All the modem thinkers and writers are of the opinion that territmy
15. Jellink: "Richt des Modernen States", (1905), Bk III Ch. III, at 19
107
forms an essential element of the State. Bluntschi believes that "as the state
has its personal basis in the people, so it has its material basis in theland. The
people do not become state until they have acquired a teni.tmy." 16 Owing to
this reason, the State is different from other human Institutions.
differentiated the State from the government. They did so in order to justify
their absolute authority. King Louis XIV used to say," I am the State". Some.
political thinkers have also gone to the extent of using these two terms inter-
changeably. Hobbes employed the tetms the State and the govetnment as if
they meant the same thing. It was John Locke who ftrst of all attempted to
differentiate the State from the government in nineteenth centmy.
Political thinkers like Harold J. K Laski and G.D.H Cole also fmd little
or no difference between the two. According to Cole, the State "is nothing
more or less than the political machinery of government in a community" _17
Laski also observes, "for the state is for the purposes of practical administration,
the government". This indentiftcation of the State and government misses an
important fact. "While the government is a body of some citizens, the State
consists of all the citizens, however, inactive and inarticulate their will may be
in the governance of the country." 18 In this connection Professor W.w.
Willoughby Organisation of the State -the machinery through which its purpose
are formulated and executed" .19
The term sodety and State have often been inter-changeably used. For
example, Aristotle saw no difference between the State and society. That is
why the Greek City-states were said to be co-existensive with society. These
two terms-society and State are usually employed as synonyms but they differ
from each other in several respects. Society is a social organisation whereas
the State is a political organisation. "By society", says Laski, "I mean a group
of human beings living together for the satisfaction of their mutual wants". 20
Society deals with the social order whereas the State deals with the political
order. In this connection Maciver has very aptly remarked. "To identify the
social with the political is to be guilty of the grossest of all confusions which
completely bars any understanding of either society or State". 21 "Social relations
17. G.D.H. Cole: "Self Government and Industry", revised ed. Londo 1919, at 119.
18. C.C. Field: "Guild Socialism -A critical Examination", at 106.
19. W.W. Willoughby: "The Nature of the State", at 8.
20. Laski: "The State in Theory and Practice", (1967), at 20.
21. Maciver: "The Modern State".
109
an threads of life" and social institutions "fmm the loom on which the threads
are woven into a cloth or garment". Leacock has pointed out that the term
"Society" suggests "not only the political relations by which men are bound
together but the whole range of human relations and collective activities G.D.H.
Cole has defmed Society as "the complex organised association and institutions
within the community". 22 Maciver believes that, "Society exists for a number
of purpose", some great and some small but all in their aggregate deep as well
as broad, "The State is not a social organisation". Maclver has pointed out that
"the ends for which the state stands are not all the ends which humanity seeks
and quite obviously the ways in which the state pursues its objects are only
some of the ways in which within society, men strive for the objects of their
desires". 23 Thus, it is quite clear that society and States are different
organisations. They are different in their modes and structure.
Ancient political thinkers like Atistotle and Plato, did not see any
disctinction between the State and society. The reason is that when they dealt
with the te1m "State" they had the idea of city-states in mind. But now the
city-states do not exist. Like Plato and Aristotle, Hegel, Hitler and Mussolini
also saw no difference between the State and society. They considered the
State all powerful with its sovereignty over its population living in a fixed
territory. But gone are the days of Hegel, Hitler and Mussolini. Maclver, an
eminent American political thinker, fails to accept the opinion ofHegal, Hitler
and Mussolini. He says "In this first place we must distinguish the State fi:om
Society. To identify the social with the political is to be guilty of the grossest
of all confusions which completely bars any understanding of either society
or the State". 24
22. G.D.H. Cole: "Social Theory", III ed. London, 1923, at 29.
23. Maciver: "The Modern State".
24. Maciver : "Modern State", at 5-6.
110
as "A group of persons or members who are associated and organised into
unity of will or a common end".Z 5 Cole defmes it like this, any group of person
pursuing a common purpose or system or aggregation of purposes by a course
or cooperative action extended beyond a single act and for the purpose agreeing
together upon certain methods of procedure and laying down in, however
rudimentary a form, rules for common action". 26 State is also a group of human
beings. Like other groups it also exists to satisfy human needs through the
concerted action of the government. Despite this close affinity between the
State and other associations, there are marked differences between the State
and other associations.
In this part, unless the context otherwise requires " the state" includes
i) The Government and Parliament of India and
ii) The Government and the Legislature of each of the States and
iii) All local authorities or
iv) Other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of
the Government of India.
Article 12 gives an extended meaning to the words ' the state' wherever
they occur in Part III of the constitution. Unless the context otherwise requires,
"the state" will include not only the Executive and Legislative27 organs of the
Union and the States, but also local bodies 28 (such as municipal authorities) as
well as 'other authorities ' 29 , which include the 'instrumentalities' or agencies'
25. Ibid., at 6
26. Cole: "Social Theory", at 37.
27. Kochunni K.Kv. state ofMadras, AIR 1959 SC 725.
28. Railway Boards v. observer Publications, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1792.
29. Basheshar Nath v. I.T Commr., AIR 1959 SC 149 (158).
111
The term 'State' has been vety widely defmed with a view to seeming
the guarantee of fundamental rights in respect of all possible institutions. The
scope of this wide de~inition has been further expanded by judicial
interpretation of the tetm 'other authorities' occuring in Art. 12. This expansive
interpretation promotes the expansion of administrative law as more bodies
are covered under its scope. It helps in the expansion of judicial review as
many more bodies become subject to the writ jurisdiction, and it also makes
bodies amenable to the resttictions of fundamental rights.
30. Ramana Dayaram Shettyv. !.A.A.!., AIR 1979 SC 1628 (1638); State ofPunjab v.
Raja Ram, AIR 1981 SC 1694.
31. Rama Rao Gazula Dasarathav. State ofA.P., AIR 1961 SC 564 (570).
32. Kartik Chandra Nandi v. W.B.S.I. corpn., AIR 1967 Cal, 231 (234).
33. GulamAbbas v. State ofU.P, AIR 1981 SC 2198.
34. Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. !.A.A.!., AIR 1979 SC 1628 (1638); State ofPunjab v.
Raja Ram, AIR 1981 SC 1694.
35. Sam Prakash Rekhi v. Union ofIndia, AIR 1981 SC 212.
112
used in Article 12. The Supreme comt has shown the vital role for widening
the scope of this Article 50 that the Fundamental Rights of the citizen can be
better protected against the arbitrmy practices of the Govemment Departments,
legislature as well as administrative actions.
36. Ajit Singh v. State ofPubjab, AIR 1967 SC 856 (866): Bhagat Ram v. State ofPunjab,
AIR 1967 SC 927.
37. Madras Pinjrapole Management v. Labour Court, AIR 1961 Mad, 234 (23 9).
38. Madras Pinjrapole Management v.labour Court, AIR 1961 Mad, 234 (239);
Dinesh (Dr.) Kumar v. MNM College AIR 1986 SC 1877 (a Municipal Corpn. and
educational institution run by it )
39. Housing Board ofHaryana v. Haryana Housing Board Employees Union, AIR 1996
sc 434.
40. Calcutta State Transport Corporation v. Commissioner ofIncome Tax, W.B. (1996) 8
sse 758.
41. Commissioner ofIncome Tax, Lucknow v. UP Forest Corportation, AIR 1998 SC
1125.
113
Broadly, there are three different concepts which exist for determining
the question which fall within the expression 'other authorities":
(i) The Corporations and the Societies created by the State for carry-
ing on its trading activities in tetms of Article 298 of the Consti-
tution wherefor the capital infrastucture, initial investment and
fmancial aid etc. are provided by the State and it also exercises
regulation and control thereover.
(ii) Bodies created for reseat·ch and other developmental works which
is otherwise a governmental function but may or may not be a
part of the sovereign function.
(iii) An authority set up under a statute 61 for the purpose of adninstering a law
enacted by the Legislature, including those vested with the duty to make
decisions in order toimplement them. 62 U.P State Cooperative Land
Development Bank Ltd. is an authority63 .
A non-statutory body, exercising no statutory powers 64 is not 'State', e.g.,
65
(i) A company.
(ii) Private bodies, having no statutory power, 66not being supported by a State
act. 67
54. Rajasthan State Electricity Bd. v. Mohan La/, AIR 1967 SC 1857 (1861-63); Railway
Board v. Observer Publications Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 1792.
55. Umesh v. Singh, AIR 1967 Pat. 3 (9) F.B.
56. Paramatma Sharan v. ChiefJustice Rajasthan High Court, AIR 1964 Raj 13.
57. Rajasthan State Electricity Bd. v. Mohan La!, AIR 1967 SC 1857 (1861-63); Railway
Board. v. Observer Publications Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 1792.
58. Paramatma Sharan v. ChiefJustice Rajasthan High Court, AIR 1964 Raj. 13.
59. State ofBiharv. Ba/Mukund Sah, (2000) 4 SCC 640.
60. D.T.C. v.MazdoorCongress, D.T.C., AIR 1991 SC 101.
61. Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, AIR 1975 SC 1331 (1342);
Sabhajit Tewary v. Union ofIndia, AIR 1975 SC 1329; Premji Bhai Parmar v. D.D.A.,
AIR 1980 SC 738.
62. Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P, AIR 1962 SC 1621; Masthan Sahib v. Chief Commr.
Pondicheny, AIR 1963 SC 533; Ramamurthy Reddiar KS. v. ChiefCommr. Pondichery,
AIR 1963 SC 1464.
63. U.P State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Chandra Bhan Dubey, AIR
1999 sc 753.
64. Devdas v. KE. College, AIR 1964 Raj. 6 (11).
65. S.K Mukherjee v. Chemicals Allied Products, AIR 1962 Cal. 10 (12);MC. Mehtav.
U.O.l, AIR 1987 SC 1086.
66. Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State ofMaharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 (11); Parbhani
T.C.S. v. R.T.., AIR 1960 (3) SCR 177; Tekraj Vasandi v. Union oflndia, AIR 1988 SC
469.
67. Kochunni KK v. State ofMadras, AIR 1959 SC 725 (730).
116
68. Tiwari J (Smt) v. Jwala Devi (Smt), AIR 1981 SC 122; Dhanoa S.S. v. Municipal
Corpn., AIR 1981 SC 1395; Sheela Barse v. Children's Aid Society, AIR 1987 SC 656.
69. Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union ofIndia, AIR 1981 SC 212; Sabhajit Tewmy v. Union of
India, AIR 1975 SC 1329; Minhas B.S. v. Indian Statistical Inst. AIR 1984 SC 363;
Ramchand Iyer, P.K v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 541; Sheela Barse v. Secy.,
Children's Aid Society, AIR 1987 SC 656.
70. Ramana Dayaram Shetty. v.lA.A.I, AIR 1979 SC 1628 (1638); State of Pubjab v.
Raja Ram, AIR 1981 SC 1694.
71. Chander Mohan Khannav. NC.E.R.T, AIR 1992 SC 76.
72. Central Inland water Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, AIR 1986, SC 1571; Bhandari
O.P. v.lTD.C., AIR 1987 SC 111;AjayHasiav. KhalidMujib Sehravardi, AIR 1981
SC 487 (496); LIC v. Escorts, AIR 1986 SC 1370; Gujarat State Financial Coprn.v.
Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd, AIR 1983 SC 848; Kalra A.L. V. P & E Corpn.,AIR 1984 SC
13 61; Food Corpn. ofIndia Worker's Union v. Food corporation ofIndia, AIR 1996
sc 2412.
73. Monmohan Singh v. Conum: UT Chandigarh, AIR 1985 SC 364; Workmen Food
Corpn. v. Food Corpn.oflndia, AIR 1985 SC 670.
74. SukhdevSingh v. Bhagatram SardarSingh, AIR 1975 SC 1331 (1335, 1359-60) ;A.I.
Sainik Schools Employees v., Sainik Schools Sociel)J, AIR 1989 SC 88; Star Enterprises
v. C.! D.C. Maharashtra Ltd (1990) 3 SCC 280; Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil,
AIR 1990 SC 1031.
75. Central Inland Water C01pn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, AIR 1986 SC 1571, 24, 69;
Bhandari O.Pv.lTD.C.,AIR 1987 SC 111.
117
76. Central Inland Water Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, AIR 1986 SC 1571; Bhandari
O.P v. J.TD.C., AIR 1987 SC 111; AjayHasia v. KhalidMujib Sehravardi, AIR 1981
SC 487 (496); LIC v, Escorts, AIR 1986 SC 1370; Gujarat State Financial Cmpn. v.
Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1983 SC 848; Kalra A.L.v. P & E Corpn, AIR 1984 SC
1361.
77. ManmohanSinghv. Commr. U.T Chandigarh,AIR 1985 SC 364workmenFoodCorpn.
v. Food Corpn. ofIndia, AIR 1985 SC 670 Ganapathi National Middle School v. M
Durai Kannan, AIR 1996 SC 2803.
79. Ajay Hasia v. Kalid Mujib Sehravardi, AIR 1981 SC 487 (496); LIC v. Escorts, AIR
1986 SC 1370; Gujarat State Financial Cmpn. v. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd; AIR 1983 SC
848; Kalra A.L. v. P & E. Corpn. AIR 1984 SC 1361.
80. Mehta MC. v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086; L.J.C. v. Escorts, AIR 1986 SC
1370.
In Zee Tele Films Ltd v. Union oflndia85 • The question for consideration
in this petition is whether the Board falls within the definition of 'the State' as
contemplated under Article 12 of the Constitution.
It was the argument· of the Board that it did not come under the term
"other authorities", hence was not a State for the purpose of Article 12. While
the petitioner contended to the contrary on the ground that the va.tious activities
of the Board were in the nature of public duties. A literal reading of the
definition of State under Article 12 would not bring the Board under the Term
"other authorities '' for the purpose of Article 12. However, the process of
judicial interpretation has expanded the scope of the term "other authorities"
in its various judgments. It is on this basis that the petitioners contended that
the Boa.t·d would come under the expanded meaning of the term "other
authorities" in Atticle 12 because of its activities which was that of a public
body discharging public function.
... .... there are two ways of doing it. One way is to use a
composite phrase such as 'the State', as we have done in
Article 7; or, to keep on repeating every time, the Central
Government, the Provincial ·Government, the State
Government, the Municipality, the Local Board, the Port Trust,
or any other authority. It seems to me not only most
cumbersome but stupid to keep on repeating this phraseology
every time we have to make a referecne to some authority.
The wisest course is to have this comprehensive phrase and
to economise in words. " 86
86. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII 1948 at 610, Quoted in Zee Tele Films Ltd. v.
Union ofIndia, AIR 2005 SC 2677 at 2685.
120
Till about the year 1967 the courts in India had taken the view that
even statutmy bodies like Universities, Selection Committee for admission to
Government Colleges were not "other authorities" for the purpose of Article
12 87 . In the year 1967 the case of Rajasthan State Electricity Board V. Mohan
Lal & Ors. 88, the Court held that the expression "other authorities" is wide
enough to include within it every authority created by a Statute on which
powers are conferred to carry out governmental or quasi-governmental
functions and functioning within the territoy of India or under the control of
the Government of India. Even while holding so Shah, J. in a separate but
concuningjudgement observed that every constitutional or statutory authmity
on whome powers are conferred by law was not "other authority" within the
meaning of Artcle 12. He also observed further that it is only those authorities
which are invested with sovereign powers, that is power to make rules or
regulations and to administer or enforce them to the detriment of citizens and
others that fall within the definition of 'State' in Article 12: if constitutional
or statutmy bodies invested with power but not sharing the sovereign power
of the State are not "State" within the meaning of the Article.
87. See The University of Madras V Shantha Bai & Am: (AIR 1954 Madras 67) :
B. W.Devadas V The Selection Committee for Admission ofStudents to the Karnataka
Enginneering College and Ors. AIR 1964 Mysore 6.
In Sabhajit Tewary v. U 0.1 & Ors. 91 the judgment was delivered by the
very same Constitution Bench which delivered the judgment in Sukhdev Singh
case. In this judgment the court noticing its judgment in Sukhdev Singh &
Ors. 92 , rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that Council for Scientific
and Industrial Research the respondent body in the said writ petition which
was only registered under the Societies Registration Act would come under
the term "other authorities" in Article 12.
90. Sukhdev Sing v. Bhagatram, AIR 1975 SC 1331, Quoted in Zee Tele Films Ltd., v
Union ofIndia, AIR 2005 SC 2677 at 2686.
91. AIR 1975 SC 1329.
92. AIR 1975 SC 1331.
93. AIR 1975 SC 1329.
122
the former the Court held that bodies which were creatures of the statutes
having important State functions and where State had pervasive control of
activities of those bodies would be State for the purpose of Article 12. While
in Sabhajit Tewary scase the Court held, a body which was registered under a
statute and not performing impottant State functions and not functioning under
the pervasive control of the Government would not be a State for the purpose
of Article 12.
The law has not been slow to recognize the impmtance of this new
kind of wealth and the need to protect individual interest in it and with that
end in view, it has developed new forms of protection. Some interest in
Government larges, formerly regarded as privileges, have been recognized as
rights while others have been given legal protection not only by forging
procedural safeguards but also by confining or structuring and checking
Government discretion in the matter of grant of such larges. The discretion of
the government has been held to be not unlimited in that the Government
cannot give or withhold largess in its arbitary discretion or its sweet will.
It is in the above context that the Bench in Ramana Dayaram She tty s97
case laid down the parameters or the guidelines for identifying a body as coming
within the definition of "other authorities" in Article 12, they are as follows:
1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held
by Goverment it would go a long way towards indicating that the
corporation is an instrumentality of Goverment98 •
(2) Where the fmancial assistance of the State is so much as to meet.. almost
entire expenditure of the corporation. It would afford some indication of
the corporation being impregnated with governmental character99 •
96. Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority ofIndia & Ors., AIR
1979 SC 1628, quoted in Zee Tele Films Ltd v. Union ofIndia, AIR 2005 SC 2677 at
2687.
97. AIR 1979 SC 1628.
98. Ramana Dayaram She tty v. The International Airport Authority ofIndia & Ors., AIR
1979 SC 1628, quoted in Zee Tele Films Ltd v. Union ofIndia, AIR 2005 SC 2677 at
2688.
99. Ibid
lOO.lbid
124
(4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication
that the corporation is a state agency or instrumentality101 •
(5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely
related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor classifying
the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government102 .
The above conflict in the judgments of Sabhajit Tewary 108 and Ajay
H asid 09 of two co-ordinate Benches was noticed by this Court in the case of
· 101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. AIR 1981 SC 487.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. AIR 1975 SC 1329.
108. Ibid
109. AIR 1981 SC 487
125
Pradeep Kumar Biswas and hence the said case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas 110
came to be referred to a larger Bench of seven Judges and the said Bench,
speaker through Ruma Pal, J. held that the judgment in Sabhajit Tewarym
was delivered on the facts of that case, hence could not be considered as having
laid down any principle in Law. The said larger Bench while accepting the
ratio laid down in Ajay Hasia s112 case though cautiously had to say the
following in regard to the said judgment of this Court inAjay Hasia:
Thereafter the larger Bench of this Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas 121
after discussing the various case laws laid down the following parameters for
gauging whether a particular body could be termed as State for the purpose of
Artcle 12:
1) Principles laid down inAjay Hasial 25 are not a rigid set of principles so
that if a body falls within any one of them it must ex hypothesi, be
considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12.
2) The question in each case will have to be considered on the bases of facts
available as to whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established,
the body is fmancially, functionally, administratively dominated, by or
under the control of the Government.
4) The Board does enjoy a monopoly status in the field of Cricket but such
Status is not State conferred or State protected.
Criticism of too broad a view taken of the scope of the State under
Article 12 in Ramana case 126 invited some criticism which was noticed in
Som Prakash Rekhi case 127 . It was pointed out that the observations in Ramana
case 128 spill over beyond the requirments of the case and must be dismissed as
obiter; that International Airport Authority is a corporation created by a statute
and there was no occasion to go beyond the narrow needs of the situation and
expand the theme of the State in Article12 vis-a-vis government companies,
registered society, and what not; and that there was contradiction between
Sukhdev Singh case 120 and Ramana case 130 •
126. Ramana Dayaram ShetfJ' v. International Airport AuthorifJ' of India, AIR 1979 SC
1628.
127. SomPrakash Rekhi v. Union ofIndia, AIR 1981 SC 212.
128. Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Ai1port Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC
1628.
129. Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, AIR 1975 SC 1331.
130. Ramana Dayaram Shetf)' v. International Ai1port AuthorifJ' of India, AIR 1979 SC
1628.
130
The Supreme Court132 has, however, given to the above words a meaning
different from that given in the Constituent Assembly. According to the
Supreme Court the words under the control of the Government oflndia control
the word authorities and not the word territory, so that the expression would
read thus:
(a) Authorities situate within the territory of India; these need not be un
der the control of India in order to be deemed 'State' under Art. 12.
(b) Authorities situate outside the territmy of India (e. g., territories ad
ministered by India under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947); these
will come within the purview of Art. 12 only if they are under the
control of India.
Proceeding from the view, it has been held133 that since a judicial or
quasi-judicial authority cannot be said to be under the control of the
Government, in respect of its function, the superior Courts in India will have
no power of judicial review over the decisions of a judicial or quasi -judicial
authority if it is situated in a tenitmy outside India, even though such territory
is under the control of the Government of India.
It is conceded by the Supreme Comt in both the cases 134 that where the
control of the Government of India extends over a territory which is outside
India, the superior courts in India can exercise their constitutional jurisdiction
over the acts of the administrative authorities situated in such territory by
'passing suitable orders' against the Government of India. Does it make any
difference if such administrative authority is endowed with quasi-judicial
authority by the law? So far as quasi-judicial bodies located in India are
concerned, there is no doubt that their decisions may, in proper circumstances,
be quashed by certiorari. In such cases, it is the decision which is struck down
arid the Supreme Court does not compel the inferior tribunal to exercise its
functions in any pruticular manner. Where the quas-judicial authority violates
the-decision of the Court, the Supreme Court cannot directly enforce its decision
against such authority and will be obliged to take the aid of the Government
of India; but then the Government of India shall be competent to see that the
quasi-judicial body complies with the orders of the Supreme Court in the same
manner as it can do in the case of a pm·ely administrative body. In so doing,
the Government would not be compelling the quasi-judicial tribunal to decide
a question in a pruticular manner, but only enforcing the decision of the highest
Comt of India against the inferior tribunal.
134. Ramamurthyv. ChiefCommr., AIR. 1963 S.C. 1464 (1467-8);Masthan Sahib v. Chief
Comm1:, AIR. 1963 S.C. 533 (537).
135. Ramamurthy v. ChiefCommr., AIR. 1963 S.C. 1464 (1467-8).
132
(vi) Judiciary
(vii) Industry
(a) A judicial decision or order which violates a fundamental right is void, 146
even though it will be binding on the patties so long as it is not set aside
in appropriate proceedings. 147
(b) Though the remedy under Art. 32 is not available where teh offending
Court is the Supreme Court itself, the court in the exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction (para 105)1 48 would review and set aside a previous direction
given by the court which offended against a fundamental right, e.g. the
natural justice, an ingredient of Art. 14 or 21 (paras 60-61, 77, 80-82). 149
The literatures available on the definition of the State are not sufficient.
The subject has been discussed in the constitutional law commentaries and
ru.ticles published in the law journals. Over and above one has to depend mainly
on the judicial decisions.
Seervai has pointed out that "our constitution should exist on the exercise
of power by the State; but the essential problem of liberty and equality was
freedom from ru.ibutary restrictions. The constitution should be so interpreted
that the governing power, wherever located, must be subjected to fundamental
constitutional limitations". He raises a question "when can a corporation be
looked upon as an agency of the State for subjecting it to constitutional
limitation? No easy answer is possible". 150
was adopted by Bhagwati J. The problem to be solved in that case was thus
stated by Bhagwati J.:
(a) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the
corporation is held by Govt., it would go a long way towards
indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency
ofGovt;
153. Ibid.
154. Shukla, V.N. The Constitution ofIndia (2001)
136
The 'judiciary', though an organ of the State like the executive and
legislature, is not specifically mentioned in Article 12. Does it mean that the
'judiciary' is notmeantto be included in the concept of'the state'? The answer
depends on the distinction between the judicial and non-judicial functions of ·
the courts. In the exercise of non-judicial functions the courts fall within the
definition of 'the State'.
Article 12, while defining the word 'State' used in the Constitution,.
points to fact that the word 'State' includes the Government and Parliament of
India, the Government and legislature of each of the State and all·local and
other authmities within the teiTitmy of India or under the Control of the
Govemment of India. With regard to scope of this article. Dr. Ambedkar said
that it encompasses within its ambit "every authority which has been created
by law and which has got certain powers to make laws, to make tules and to
make by laws" 155
cases of International Airport Authority158 and Ajay Hasia159, it has now become
well-established that a body is an 'authority' under Article 12 if it can be
characterised as an 'instrumentality' of the Government . To be so, the
concerned body has to fulfil two basic tests, viz. : funding and control. Does
the Government foot a substantial part of the bill for the operations of the
body in questions? Does the Government exercise effective and pervasive
control over the body concerned? It does not matter what is the structure of
the body in question : it may be statutory or non-statutory : it may be set up by
or under an Act of the Legislature or even administratively; it may be a
registered society, a co-operative society, or a Government company. It does
not also matter whether the body in question has been set up initially by the
Government or private enterprise. It does not matter what functions does the
body discharge : governmental, semi-governmental, non-governmental,
educational, commercial, banking, social service. So long as a body is
characterised as an 'instrumentality' of the Government, if falls within the
purview of Article 12 as an 'authority'.
161. C.K. Takwani, "other authorities" within the meaning ofArticle 12 ofthe Constitution,
(1986) 4 sec (J).
162. G.B Reddy, Fifty years oflndian Constitution -A Constitutional imperative to Review
its working, IBR 2000.
163. Y.R. Haragopal Reddy, Article 12 of the Constitution and the new Horizons offonda
mental rights, IBR 1984.
139
statutory organisations, and are in form plivate clubs, are to be within this
category. So also are labour unions on which statutes confer the light of
collective bargaining. It is hoped that in the years to come the courts will go a
step forward and interpret the expression 'other autholities' in Article 12 in
such a way that it will include within its fold bodies plivate in character but
dealing with public rights to make them accountable to patt III of the
Constitution as is being done in the United States of Amelica. The Courts can
fully utilise the new trend set by Airports Authority164 to expand the constituency
of fundamental tights to a greater extent so as to prohibit arbitrariness and
disclimination and to extent so as to prohibit arbitrariness and disclimination
and to extend the blessings ofliberty and equality proclaimed in the preamble
to the constitution and transformed into the body of the Constitution in terms
of Fundamental lights and directive plinciples to one and all.
to the fundamental rights to the same extent and in the same manner as the
government. 166
A good number of decisions have come up since the last quarter of the
20th Century. The issue of interpretation of the expression "other authorities
specifically started from its interpretation by the Supreme Court in Sukhdev
Singh s 167 case. This interpretation was further developed and institutionalized
168
in Ajay Hasia s case by evolvirig the test for determining the agency or
instrumentality of the State. The issue however, has been subjected to further
scrutiny by the Apex Court as to the evolution of the parameters of the agency
166. Udai Raj Rai, Reach ofFundamental Rights, Vol. 36 JILl (1994) at 292.
167. AIR 1975 SC 1331.
168. AIR 1981 SC 487.
141
169
or instrumentality test. A significant question arose in the MC Mehta case
as to the inclusion of the private corporation into the expression other authorities
within the definition of the State under Article 12. This question although not
finally decided by the Supreme Court and left for future occasion to be
determined, gave ample scope for academicians to infer a positive assertion.
Another significant question in this respect is whether it is necessary to include
any authority within the expression "other authorities" so as to make it amenable
to the limitation of the Fundamental Rights. This was subject to further
elaboration by the Supreme Court in Unni Krishnan s 17° Case. Further in the
matter of public interest litigation the Supreme Court has extensively interpreted
the definition of the State for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.