King V Whitmer Sanction Decision 08-25-21

Case 2:20-cv-13134-LVP-RSW ECF No. 172, PageID.
6890 Filed 08/25/21 Page 1 of 110
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TIMOTHY KING, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GRETCHEN WHITMER, et al., Civil Case No. 20-13134

Honorable Linda V. Parker
Defendants.,
and
CITY OF DETROIT,
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE,
MICHIGAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY,
and ROBERT DAVIS,
Intervenor-Defendants.
_____________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
This lawsuit represents a historic and profound abuse of the judicial process.
It is one thing to take on the charge of vindicating rights associated with an
allegedly fraudulent election. It is another to take on the charge of deceiving a
federal court and the American people into believing that rights were infringed,
without regard to whether any laws or rights were in fact violated. This is what
happened here.
Case 2:20-cv-13134-LVP-RSW ECF No. 172, PageID.6891 Filed 08/25/21 Page 2 of 110
Individuals may have a right (within certain bounds) to disseminate
allegations of fraud unsupported by law or fact in the public sphere. But attorneys
cannot exploit their privilege and access to the judicial process to do the same.
And when an attorney has done so, sanctions are in order.
Here’s why. America’s civil litigation system affords individuals the
privilege to file a lawsuit to allege a violation of law. Individuals, however, must
litigate within the established parameters for filing a claim. Such parameters are
set forth in statutes, rules of civil procedure, local court rules, and professional
rules of responsibility and ethics. Every attorney who files a claim on behalf of a
client is charged with the obligation to know these statutes and rules, as well as the
law allegedly violated.
Specifically, attorneys have an obligation to the judiciary, their profession,
and the public (i) to conduct some degree of due diligence before presenting
allegations as truth; (ii) to advance only tenable claims; and (iii) to proceed with a
lawsuit in good faith and based on a proper purpose. Attorneys also have an
obligation to dismiss a lawsuit when it becomes clear that the requested relief is
unavailable.
This matter comes before the Court upon allegations that Plaintiffs’ counsel
did none of these things. To be clear, for the purpose of the pending sanctions
motions, the Court is neither being asked to decide nor has it decided whether there
2
was fraud in the 2020 presidential election in the State of Michigan.1 Rather, the
question before the Court is whether Plaintiffs’ attorneys engaged in litigation
practices that are abusive and, in turn, sanctionable. The short answer is yes.
The attorneys who filed the instant lawsuit abused the well-established rules
applicable to the litigation process by proffering claims not backed by law;
proffering claims not backed by evidence (but instead, speculation, conjecture, and
unwarranted suspicion); proffering factual allegations and claims without engaging
in the required prefiling inquiry; and dragging out these proceedings even after
they acknowledged that it was too late to attain the relief sought.
And this case was never about fraud—it was about undermining the
People’s faith in our democracy and debasing the judicial process to do so.
While there are many arenas—including print, television, and social
media—where protestations, conjecture, and speculation may be advanced, such
expressions are neither permitted nor welcomed in a court of law. And while we
as a country pride ourselves on the freedoms embodied within the First
1
In fact, resolution of that issue was never appropriately before the Court for the
reasons stated in the Court’s December 7, 2020 ruling. (See ECF No. 62.)
3
Amendment, it is well-established that an attorney’s freedom of speech is
circumscribed upon “entering” the courtroom.2
Indeed, attorneys take an oath to uphold and honor our legal system. The
sanctity of both the courtroom and the litigation process are preserved only when
attorneys adhere to this oath and follow the rules, and only when courts impose
sanctions when attorneys do not. And despite the haze of confusion, commotion,
and chaos counsel intentionally attempted to create by filing this lawsuit, one thing
is perfectly clear: Plaintiffs’ attorneys have scorned their oath, flouted the rules,
and attempted to undermine the integrity of the judiciary along the way.3 As such,
2
See Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 717, 720-21 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gentile
v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991)) (“[The Supreme Court] has
noted . . . that ‘[i]t is unquestionable that in the courtroom itself . . . whatever right
to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely circumscribed. . . . [I]n filing motions
and advocating for his client in court, [an attorney is] not engaged in free
expression; he [is] simply doing his job. In that narrow capacity, he voluntarily
accept[s] almost unconditional restraints on his personal speech rights . . . . For
these reasons, . . . in the context of the courtroom proceedings, an attorney retains
no personal First Amendment rights . . . .”).
3
Plaintiffs’ counsel and their counsel have suggested that this Court’s handling of
these proceedings and any resultant decision can be expected based on the
President who appointed the undersigned. This is part of a continuing narrative
fostered by Plaintiffs’ counsel to undermine the institutions that uphold our
democracy. It represents the same bad faith that is at the base of this litigation. To
be clear, all federal judges, regardless of which President appoints them, take oaths
affirming that they will “faithfully and impartially discharge” their duties, 28
U.S.C. § 453, and uphold and protect the Constitution of the United States, 5
U.S.C. § 3331.
4
the Court is duty-bound to grant the motions for sanctions filed by Defendants and
Intervenor-Defendants and is imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and its own inherent authority.
I. Procedural History
On November 3, 2020, a record 5.5 million Michigan residents voted in the
presidential election, resulting in then-Former Vice-President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
securing over 150,000 more votes than then-President Donald J. Trump.4 By the
following evening, President Biden had been declared the winner in the State.5
Even though Michigan law establishes an extensive procedure for challenging
elections, see Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 168.831-.832, .879, Plaintiffs did not avail
themselves of those procedures, as they conceded at the July 12, 2021 motion
hearing before this Court (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5332-33).
Instead, at 11:48 p.m. on November 25, 2020—the eve of the Thanksgiving
holiday—Plaintiffs (registered Michigan voters and nominees of the Republican
Party to be presidential electors on behalf of the State) filed the current lawsuit
against Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer, Michigan Secretary of State
4
Moving forward, the Court refers to the current and former presidents as
President Biden and Former President Trump, respectively.
5
See Sam Gringlas, Biden Wins Michigan, Per The AP, Putting Him 6 Electoral
Votes From Presidency, NPR (Nov. 4, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://perma.cc/S5NL-
F9UB; Todd Spangler, Joe Biden Wins Michigan in Critical Battleground Election
Victory, Detroit Free Press (Nov. 4, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://perma.cc/3N9J-A5KL.
5
Jocelyn Benson, and the Michigan Board of State Canvassers. The following
lawyers electronically signed the pleading: Sidney Powell, Scott Hagerstrom, and
Gregory J. Rohl. (ECF No. 1 at Pg ID 75.) The Complaint listed the following
attorneys as “Of Counsel”: Emily P. Newman, Julia Z. Haller, L. Lin Wood, and
Howard Kleinhendler. (Id.)
On November 29, a Sunday, Plaintiffs filed, inter alia, an Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 6) and an “Emergency Motion for Declaratory, Emergency,
and Permanent Injunctive Relief and Memorandum in Support Thereof” (“Motion
for Injunctive Relief”) (ECF No. 7). The same attorneys who electronically signed
or were listed as “Of Counsel” on the initial complaint signed or were listed on the
amended pleading. (ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 957.) The amended pleading also listed
Brandon Johnson as additional “Of Counsel.” (Id.)
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged three claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983: violations of (Count I) the Elections and Electors Clauses; (Count
II) the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause; and (Count III) the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. (ECF No. 6.) Under Count IV,
Plaintiffs asserted violations of the Michigan Election Code. (Id.) Underlying
Plaintiffs’ claims were their contentions that Defendants (i) “failed to administer
the November 3, 2020 election in compliance with the manner prescribed by the
Michigan Legislature in the Michigan Election Code, [Mich. Comp. Laws]
6
§§ 168.730-738” and (ii) “committed a scheme and artifice to fraudulently and
illegally manipulate the vote count to make certain the election of Joe Biden as
President of the United States.” (See ECF No. 7 at Pg ID 1840 (citing “Compl.,
Section 1”).) Plaintiffs asserted that their claims were supported by “the affidavits
of dozens of eyewitnesses and the statistical anomalies and mathematical
impossibilities detailed in the affidavits of expert witnesses.” (ECF No. 6 at Pg ID
873.) Plaintiffs attached hundreds of pages as exhibits to their pleadings, some of
which included affidavits from individuals and reports from purported experts.
(See ECF Nos. 6-1 to 6-30.) Most of these affidavits had been submitted by
different lawyers in prior Michigan lawsuits challenging the 2020 presidential
election. These other lawsuits include Costantino v. City of Detroit, No. 20-
014780-AW (Wayne Cnty. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 8, 2020) and Donald J. Trump for
President, Inc. v. Benson, No. 1:20-cv-01083 (W.D. Mich. filed Nov. 11, 2020).
Plaintiffs cited to these materials in support of the factual allegations in their
Amended Complaint and Motion for Injunctive Relief.
Plaintiffs asked the Court to, inter alia, decertify the election results and
order Defendants “to transmit certified election results that state that President
Donald Trump is the winner of the election . . . .” (ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 955; ECF
No. 7 at Pg ID 1847.) Plaintiffs maintained that this Court had to issue this relief
by December 8, 2020, because, on that date, the results of the election would be
7
considered conclusive. (See ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 890; ECF No. 7 at Pg ID 1846-
47.)
By December 1, motions to intervene had been filed by the City of Detroit
(“City”) (ECF No. 5), Detroit resident and Michigan voter Robert Davis (ECF No.
12), and the Democratic National Committee and Michigan Democratic Party
(“DNC/MDP”) (ECF No. 14). As of that date, however, Plaintiffs had not yet
served Defendants with the pleadings or the Motion for Injunctive Relief. Thus, on
December 1, the Court entered a text-only order to hasten Plaintiffs’ actions to
bring Defendants into the case and enable the Court to address Plaintiffs’ pending
motions. Plaintiffs served Defendants on December 1 (ECF No. 21), and the Court
thereafter granted the motions to intervene (ECF No. 28) and entered an expedited
briefing schedule with respect to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Injunctive Relief (ECF No.
24).
On December 7, the Court issued an opinion and order denying Plaintiffs’
motion and thereby declining to grant Plaintiffs the relief they wanted, which the
Court noted was “stunning in its scope and breathtaking in its reach” as it sought to
“disenfranchise the votes of the more than 5.5 million Michigan citizens who . . .
participat[ed] in the 2020 General Election.” (ECF No. 62 at Pg ID 3296.) The
Court concluded that Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was subject to dismissal based on any one
of several legal theories: (i) their claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment
8
immunity; (ii) their claims were barred under the doctrine of laches; (iii) they
lacked standing; (iv) their claims were moot; and (v) abstention was appropriate
under the doctrine set forth in Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). (Id. at Pg ID 3301-24.) But the Court also
concluded that Plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their claims.
(Id. at Pg ID 3324-28.)
As to Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants violated the Elections and Electors
Clauses by deviating from the requirements of the Michigan Election Code, the
Court pointed out that Plaintiffs failed to “explain how or why such violations of
state election procedures automatically amount to violations of the clauses” (id. at
Pg ID 3324), and case law did not support Plaintiffs’ attempt to expand the
Constitution that far (id. at Pg ID 3325). Thus, the Court found, Plaintiffs’
Elections and Electors Clauses claim was “in fact [a] state law claim[] disguised as
[a] federal claim.” (Id. at Pg. ID 3324.) With respect to Plaintiffs’ attempt to
establish an equal protection claim based on the theory that Defendants engaged in
tactics to, among other things, switch votes for Former President Trump to votes
for President Biden, the Court found the allegations to be based on nothing more
than belief, conjecture, and speculation rather than fact. (Id. at Pg ID 3326-28.)
As to the due process claim, the Court noted that Plaintiffs abandoned it. (Id. at Pg
ID 3317 n.5.)
9
The day after the Court issued its decision, attorney Stefanie Lynn Junttila
entered her appearance in this matter (ECF No. 63) and filed a Notice of Appeal to
the “Federal Circuit” on behalf of Plaintiffs (ECF No. 64). The notice was updated
on December 10 to reflect the proper appellate court (namely, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals). On December 11, 2020, Sidney Powell, Stefanie Lynn Junttila,
and Howard Kleinhendler filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court. (See ECF No. 68.) In the petition, when urging immediate
Supreme Court review, Plaintiffs wrote: “Once the electoral votes are cast [on
December 14, 2020] subsequent relief would be pointless.” (ECF No. 105-2 at Pg
ID 4401.)
On December 15, 2020, the City served a letter (“Safe Harbor Letter”) and
motion (“Safe Harbor Motion”) on Plaintiffs’ attorneys, threatening sanctions
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 161-3; see
also ECF No. 95 at Pg ID 4118-19 (acknowledging service of the motion).)
Specifically, counsel for the City sent the Safe Harbor Letter and Safe Harbor
Motion via electronic mail and first-class mail to Sidney Powell, Gregory Rohl,
Stefanie Lynn Junttila, Scott Hagerstrom, L. Lin Wood, and Howard Kleinhendler.
(ECF No. 161-3 at Pg ID 6058-67.)
10
In the meantime, the Supreme Court did not rule on Plaintiffs’ petition for
writ of certiorari by December 14.6 On December 22, Davis filed a motion seeking
sanctions against Plaintiffs and their counsel pursuant to the Court’s inherent
authority and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. (ECF No. 69.) On the same day, motions to
dismiss were filed by Defendants (ECF No. 70), the DNC/MDP (ECF No. 72), and
the City (ECF No. 73). The City’s motion to dismiss included four paragraphs
discussing why Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel should be sanctioned pursuant to
§ 1927.7 (Id. at Pg ID 3576-78.) And all three motions to dismiss reflected that
concurrence had been sought, but not obtained, from Plaintiffs’ counsel. (See ECF
No. 70 at Pg ID 69; ECF No. 72 at Pg ID 3434; ECF No. 73 at Pg ID 3545.)
Plaintiffs’ response to Davis’ sanctions motion was due on January 5, 2021, and
their responses to the motions to dismiss were due on January 12. See E.D. Mich.
LR 7.1(e).
On January 3, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking an extension of time (until
January 19) to respond to Davis’ sanctions motion, citing counsel’s current
assignments and the need for more time to prepare a response. (ECF No. 74 at Pg
ID 3598.) The Court granted Plaintiffs’ request. (ECF No. 76.) On January 12,
6
The Supreme Court eventually denied the petition on February 22, 2021. (See
ECF No. 114 and accompanying docket entry text.)
7
The City further explained in this motion that it “intends to file a Motion for Rule
11 sanctions (after the safe harbor expires).” (ECF No. 73 at Pg ID 3558 n.17.)
11
Plaintiffs sought an extension of time (also until January 19) to respond to the
pending motions to dismiss, again citing the need for more time to research the
claims advanced in the motions. (ECF No. 82.) The Court granted this request, as
well.
On January 14, Plaintiffs filed what was docketed as a response to all three
pending motions to dismiss, but the single response brief addressed only the
§ 1927 sanctions requested in the City’s motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 85.) On the
same day, Plaintiffs filed notices voluntarily dismissing this case as to Defendants
(ECF Nos. 86, 88, 90), the City (ECF No. 87), and the DNC/MDP (ECF Nos. 89,
91). Plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss Davis a few days later. (ECF No. 92.)
On January 26, 2021, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the matter on appeal.
(See ECF No. 101.)
In the meantime, on January 5, the City filed a Rule 11 “Motion for
Sanctions, for Disciplinary Action, for Disbarment Referral and for Referral to
State Bar Disciplinary Bodies.” (ECF No. 78.) On January 28, Governor Whitmer
and Secretary of State Benson (hereafter “the State Defendants”) filed a “Motion
for Sanctions Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.” (ECF No. 105.) All sanctions motions—
including Davis’—were fully briefed thereafter.
On June 8, the Court scheduled a motions hearing for July 6 and, on June 17
ordered “[e]ach attorney whose name appears on any of Plaintiffs’ pleadings or
12
briefs” to “be present.” (ECF No. 123.) On June 28, Plaintiffs sought to adjourn
the hearing due to Junttila’s planned vacation (ECF No. 126), a request the
opposing parties (except Davis) did not contest (ECF No. 126 at Pg ID 5201). The
Court granted the request and eventually the hearing was scheduled for July 12.
(ECF No. 147.) Prior to the hearing, Plaintiffs’ attorneys (except Junttila) retained
counsel to represent them.8 (ECF Nos. 127-140, 148.)
The Court conducted an almost six-hour virtual hearing on July 12. At the
beginning of the hearing, the Court explained that each question was directed to all
attorneys and, if no other attorney commented or added to the initial response to a
question, the Court would find that all other attorneys agreed with the answer
placed on the record. (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5314.) At the end of the hearing, the
Court indicated that the attorneys could file supplemental briefs and supporting
affidavits (id. at Pg ID 5424, 5506-07, 5513, 5515, 5517), and thereafter entered an
order setting deadlines for those briefs (see ECF No. 150). Supplemental briefs
were subsequently filed (ECF Nos. 161-62, 164-65), as were responses thereto
(ECF Nos. 166-171). No attorney filed an affidavit.
8
During the July 12 hearing, Donald D. Campbell and Patrick McGlinn
represented Hagerstrom, Haller, Johnson, Rohl, Wood, Kleinhendler, and Powell,
while Thomas M. Buchanan represented Newman. By the time post-hearing
supplemental briefs were filed, Wood and Newman had obtained new counsel.
(See ECF No. 154, 158.)
13
II. Sanctions Motions
The State Defendants and Intervenor-Defendants rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1927,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and the Court’s inherent authority as the
sources for sanctioning Plaintiffs and/or their counsel. In this section, the Court
summarizes the arguments made in each sanctions motion. In the next section, the
Court discusses the law that applies to each source of authority.
A. Governor Whitmer & Secretary of State Benson
The State Defendants seek sanctions against Plaintiffs’ counsel under § 1927
or, alternatively, the Court’s inherent authority.
The State Defendants contend that sanctions are appropriate pursuant to
§ 1927 for two reasons. “First, Plaintiffs’ counsel unreasonably and vexatiously
multiplied the proceedings in this litigation by failing to dismiss the case when
their claims became moot, which plainly occurred upon the vote of Michigan’s
electors on December 14, if not earlier.” (ECF No. 105 at Pg ID 4337.)
“[S]econd, Plaintiffs’ counsel knew or should have known that their legal claims
were frivolous, but counsel pursued them nonetheless, even after the Court’s
opinion concluding that Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their
claims for multiple reasons,” which included “the weakness of their legal claims
and the lack of factual support.” (Id. at Pg ID 4367.) And, the State Defendants
argue, sanctions pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority are appropriate because
14
“Plaintiffs’ claims were meritless, their counsel should have known this, and their
real motive in filing suit was for an improper purpose.” (Id. at Pg ID 4369-74.)
In a supplemental brief filed in support of their motion for sanctions on April
6, 2021, the State Defendants also identify three specific allegations that they
contend were not well-grounded in fact:
1. “‘[T]he absentee voting counts in some counties in

Michigan have likely been manipulated by a computer
algorithm,’ and [] at some time after the 2016
election, software was installed that programmed
tabulating machines to ‘shift a percentage of absentee
ballot votes from Trump to Biden.’”
2. “Smartmatic and Dominion were founded by foreign

oligarchs and dictators to ensure computerized ballot-
stuffing and vote manipulation to whatever level was
needed to make certain Venezuelan dictator Hugo
Chavez never lost another election.”
3. “The several spikes cast solely for Biden could easily

be produced in the Dominion system by preloading
batches of blank ballots in files such as Write-Ins,
then casting them all for Biden using the Override
Procedure (to cast Write-In ballots) that is available to
the operator of the system.”
(ECF No. 118-2 at Pg ID 4804-05 (citing ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 874 ¶ 5, 916-17
¶ 124, 922 ¶ 143).)
15
B. City of Detroit
The City seeks sanctions against Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel for
violating Rule 11.
The City first argues that the Complaint was filed for an improper purpose,
in contravention of Rule 11(b)(1). The City supports this assertion by pointing to
(i) the hurdles that previously barred Plaintiffs’ success, including Eleventh
Amendment immunity, mootness, laches, standing, and the lack of merit as to the
claims under the Constitution and state statutory law; (ii) the lack of seriousness
and awareness of deficiency evinced by Plaintiffs’ failure to serve Defendants
before this Court hastened them via its December 1, 2020 text-only order; and (iii)
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s attempt “to use this Court’s process to validate their
conspiracy theories,” “undermin[e] our democracy,” and “overturn[] the will of the
people” as evinced by statements made by some of Plaintiffs’ attorneys. (ECF No.
78 at Pg ID 3636-43.)
The City also contends that Plaintiffs’ claims were not well-grounded in law,
in contravention of Rule 11(b)(2). This is so, the City argues, not only because of
Eleventh Amendment immunity, mootness, laches, and standing, but also because
the factual allegations could not support Plaintiffs’ claims or the relief they
requested. (Id. at Pg ID 3658-62.)
16
The City further contends that Plaintiffs’ allegations were not well-grounded
in fact, in contravention of Rule 11(b)(3):
1. Plaintiffs alleged that “Republican challengers were

not given ‘meaningful’ access to the ballot
processing and tabulation at the Absent Voter
Counting Board located in Hall E of the TCF
Center,” knowing that the assertion lacked
evidentiary support because it was rejected in
Costantino, the state court case decided before
Plaintiffs filed the Complaint (id. at Pg ID 3644
(citing Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 13, 42, 47, 57, 59-61));
2. Plaintiffs alleged that “Republican challengers were

exclusively barred from entering the TCF Center,”
knowing that the assertion was rejected in
Costantino (id. at Pg ID 3645 (citing Am. Compl. at
¶¶ 62-63));
3. Plaintiffs alleged that some absentee ballots were

“pre-dated,” knowing that the assertion was rejected
in Costantino (id. at Pg ID 3645-46 (citing Am.
Compl. at ¶¶ 88, 90));
4. Plaintiffs alleged that ballots were “counted more

than once,” knowing that the assertion was both
rejected in Costantino and “conclusively disproven
by the Wayne County canvass” (id. at Pg ID 3646-
47 (citing Am. Compl. at ¶ 94));
5. Plaintiffs alleged that a “software weakness” in

Dominion machines “upended Michigan’s election
results,” knowing that the “two instances of errors
[to which Plaintiffs cite]—one in Antrim County
and one in Oakland County (Rochester Hills)”—did
not constitute evidentiary support for the allegation
(id. at Pg ID 3647-49);
17
6. Plaintiffs “intentional[ly] lie[d]” by filing the

partially redacted declaration of “Spider”—who
Plaintiffs identified as “a former US Military
Intelligence expert” and “former electronic
intelligence analyst with the 305th Military
Intelligence”—which was signed by Joshua Merritt,
who never completed the entry-level training course
at the 305th Military Intelligence Battalion and is
not an intelligence analyst (id. at Pg ID 3651-52
(citing Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 17, 161));

declaration of Russell James Ramsland, Jr., who
claimed (i) that there were “reports of 6,000 votes in
Antrim County that were switched from Donald
Trump to Joe Biden and were only discoverable
through a hand counted manual recount,” when
“there were no hand recounts in Michigan as of that
date”; (ii) “statistically improbable” voter turnouts,
including a turnout of 781.91% in North Muskegon,
where the publicly-available official results were
known, as of election night, to be approximately
78%, and a turnout of 460.51% (or, elsewhere on
the same chart, 90.59%) in Zeeland Charter
Township, where it was already known to be 80%”;
and (iii) that “‘ballots can be run through again
effectively duplicating them,’” when there were
“safeguards in place to prevent double counting of
ballots in this way” (id. at Pg ID 3652-54 (emphasis
in original)); and

“analysis” of William M. Briggs, who relied on
“survey” results posted in a tweet by Matt Braynard
and the “survey” “misrepresents Michigan election
laws”; “disregards standard analytical procedures”;
contains “a baffling array of inconsistent numbers”;
and includes “conclusions [that are] without merit”
(id. at Pg ID 3654-58).
18
The City maintains that monetary sanctions sufficient to deter future
misconduct by counsel must include the amount counsel collected in their
fundraising campaign to challenge the 2020 election, as well as the attorneys’ fees
Defendants incurred to defend against Plaintiffs’ claims. (Id. at Pg ID 3662-63.)
The City also seeks an injunction barring Plaintiffs and their counsel from filing
future actions in this District without obtaining approval from a judicial officer and
asks the Court to refer counsel for discipline and disbarment.9 (Id. at Pg ID 3664,
3666-69.)
C. Davis
Davis seeks sanctions against Plaintiffs and their counsel pursuant to the
Court’s inherent authority and § 1927, based on many of the same legal and factual
9
The City also argues that “this is the rare case where the Plaintiffs themselves
deserve severe sanctions.” (ECF No. 78 at Pg ID 3664.) “Rule 11 expressly
provides the district court with discretion to impose sanctions on a party that is
responsible for the rule’s violation, provided that the violation is not one for
unwarranted legal contentions under Rule 11(b)(2).” Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel
Indus., Inc., 556 F.3d 389, 398 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1),
(c)(5)(A)). Nevertheless, courts generally decline to do so, and the Sixth Circuit
has reserved such sanctions for occasions where the party can be said to have
caused the violation. Id. The Court is unable to reach that conclusion here,
particularly given that it is Plaintiffs’ counsel, not Plaintiffs, who have filed similar
legally frivolous lawsuits in other battleground states.
19
deficiencies set forth by the State Defendants, the City, and this Court in its
December 7 decision. (ECF No. 69.)
III. Applicable Law
A. Sanctions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927
“Section 1927 provides that any attorney ‘who so multiplies the proceedings
in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally the excess of costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct.’” Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 298 (6th
Cir. 1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1927). The purpose of a sanctions award under
this provision is to “deter dilatory litigation practices and to punish aggressive
tactics that far exceed zealous advocacy.” Red Carpet Studios Div. of Source
Advantage, Ltd. v. Sater, 465 F.3d 642, 646 (6th Cir. 2006).
Section 1927 imposes an objective standard of conduct on attorneys, and
courts need not make a finding of subjective bad faith before assessing monetary
sanctions. Id. (citing Jones v. Cont’l Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1230 (6th Cir. 1986)).
A court need only determine that “an attorney reasonably should know that a claim
pursued is frivolous.” Id. (quoting Jones, 789 F.2d at 1230). “Simple inadvertence
or negligence, however, will not support sanctions under § 1927.” Salkil v. Mount
Sterling Twp. Police Dep’t, 458 F.3d 520, 532 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Ridder, 109
F.3d at 298); see also Red Carpet Studios, 465 F.3d at 646 (holding that “§ 1927
20
sanctions require a showing of something less than subjective bad faith, but
something more than negligence or incompetence”). Ultimately, “[t]here must be
some conduct on the part of the subject attorney that trial judges, applying
collective wisdom of their experience on the bench, could agree falls short of the
obligations owed by a member of the bar to the court . . . .” Ridder, 109 F.3d at
298 (quoting In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 984 (6th Cir. 1987)).
B. Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 11(b) and (c)10
Rule 11(b) reads, in part:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other

paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating it—an attorney . . . certifies to the best of the
person’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose,

such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are

warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument
for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law; [and]
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if

specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary
10
Although the Court mentioned the availability of imposing Rule 11 sanctions on
its own initiative during the July 12 hearing, it recognizes such sanctions must be
preceded by a show cause order, which was not issued here. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(3). Moreover, for the reasons discussed infra, the Court need not rely on that
authority to sanction Plaintiffs’ counsel.
21
support after a reasonable opportunity for further

investigation or discovery . . . .11
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (emphasis added). Much of the italicized language was
added to Rule 11 in 1993. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes
(1993 Amendment). Also added in 1993 was the provision in subsection (c)
allowing for the sanctioning of attorneys other than presenters who are
“responsible” for a violation of the rule. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). As the
Advisory Committee Notes explain: “The revision permits the court to consider
whether other attorneys in the firm, co-counsel, other law firms, or the party itself
should be held accountable for their part in causing a violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
Advisory Committee Notes (1993 Amendment).
Any sanction imposed pursuant to Rule 11 “must be limited to what suffices
to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
11
None of the allegations in the Amended Complaint contain “specific[ ]”
reference to the need for additional factual support from investigation or discovery.
And Plaintiffs plead on “information and belief” in only three of the Amended
Complaint’s 233-paragraphs. One of those paragraphs does not contain a fact
asserted upon information and belief but seems to be concluding that facts asserted
elsewhere reflect, upon information and belief, Defendants’ failure to follow
proper election protocol; another of those paragraphs relate to when a co-inventor
of certain Dominion-related patents joined Dominion’s predecessor; and the other
relates to Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendants failed to post certain absentee ballot
information before certain times on Election Day. (See ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 934
¶ 166, 952 ¶¶ 221, 224.) Plaintiffs have not availed themselves of Rule 11’s
allowance for claims that “will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery,” except for arguably in the latter
two instances.
22
situated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). This is because “the central purpose of Rule 11
is to deter baseless filings in district court.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496
U.S. 384, 393 (1990). Thus, “[e]ven if the careless litigant quickly dismisses the
action, the harm triggering Rule 11’s concerns has already occurred[,]” and “the
imposition of such sanctions on abusive litigants is useful to deter such
misconduct.” Id. at 399.
Rule 11 “de-emphasizes monetary sanctions and discourages direct payouts
to the opposing party.” Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel Indus., Inc., 556 F.3d 389, 395
(6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ridder, 109 F.3d at 294 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
Advisory Committee Notes (1993 Amendment))). “The amended rule recognizes,
however, that ‘under unusual circumstances deterrence may be ineffective unless
the sanction not only requires the person violating the rule to make a monetary
payment, but also directs that some or all of this payment be made to those injured
by the violation.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes
(1993 Amendment)). In addition, a variety of possible sanctions are available
under Rule 11, including, but not limited to, “requiring participation in seminars or
other education programs; ordering a fine payable to the court; [and] referring the
23
matter to disciplinary authorities.”12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes
(1993 Amendment).
In the Sixth Circuit, the test for imposing Rule 11 sanctions is “whether the
individual’s conduct was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” Nieves
v. City of Cleveland, 153 F. App’x 349, 352 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Jackson v. Law
Firm of O’Hara, Ruberg, Osborne & Taylor, 875 F.2d 1224, 1229 (6th Cir. 1989)).
To determine objective reasonableness, the court must ask “whether the position
advanced by a party was supported by a reasonable inquiry into the applicable law
and relevant facts.” Advo Sys., Inc. v. Walters, 110 F.R.D. 426, 430 (E.D. Mich.
1986) (citations omitted). Whether a “reasonable inquiry” was conducted “is
judged by objective norms of what reasonable attorneys would have done.” In re
Big Rapids Mall Assoc., 98 F.3d 926, 930 (6th Cir. 1996). “Courts must not ‘use
the wisdom of hindsight,’ but must instead test what was reasonable to believe at
12
Plaintiffs maintain that the City’s Rule 11 motion is procedurally defective
because it seeks “both Rule 11 sanctions and . . . disbarment of attorneys and their
referral to state bar associations for disciplinary action.” (ECF No. 95 at Pg ID
4114-45.) Plaintiffs note that Rule 11 motions “must be made separately from any
other motion[.]” (Id. at Pg ID 4145 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (emphasis
added by Plaintiffs)).) Plaintiffs’ argument is frivolous. The separate-motion
requirement is designed only “to prevent [the sanctions request] from being tacked
onto or buried in motions on the merits, such as motions to dismiss or for summary
judgment.” Ridder, 109 F.3d at 294 n.7. The City’s request for referral and
disbarment are merely the sanctions sought for Plaintiffs’ alleged Rule 11
violations. As indicated above, a “variety of possible sanctions” may be imposed
for a Rule 11 violation, including those requested by the City.
24
the time the pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted.” Gibson v. Solideal
USA, Inc., 489 F. App’x 24, 29-30 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Merritt v. Int’l Ass’n of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 613 F.3d 609, 626 (6th Cir. 2020)).
This objective standard is “intended to eliminate any ‘empty-head pure-
heart’ justification for patently frivolous arguments.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory
Committee Notes (1993 Amendment); Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 594 (6th
Cir. 2003) (“A good faith belief in the merits of a case is insufficient to avoid
sanctions.”).
1. Signatures
Plaintiffs’ lawyers argue that no attorney can be sanctioned whose name
appeared only in typewritten form; that no attorney besides Plaintiffs’ local counsel
has appeared or signed a document filed in this matter; and that the Court lacks
jurisdiction to sanction any attorney who did not personally appear or sign a
document filed in this matter. (ECF No. 95 at Pg ID 4116-18.) Yet, the local
attorneys assert that, although they signed the filings, they did not prepare them
and thus should not be responsible for them. (See ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5322-24,
5359, 5523; ECF No. 111-1 at Pg ID 4597 ⁋⁋ 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 15.) As such, no
25
attorney wants to take responsibility now that sanctions are sought for filing this
lawsuit.
In this age of electronic filing, it is frivolous to argue that an electronic
signature on a pleading or motion is insufficient to subject the attorney to the
court’s jurisdiction if the attorney violates the jurisdiction’s rules of professional
conduct or a federal rule or statute establishing the standards of practice. As set
forth earlier, Sidney Powell, Scott Hagerstrom, and Gregory Rohl electronically
signed—at least—the Complaint, Amended Complaint, and Motion for Injunctive
Relief. The remaining attorneys, except Junttila, were listed as “Of Counsel” on
one or more of the pleadings.13 The cases Plaintiffs cite to support their argument
that non-signing attorneys cannot be sanctioned were decided before the 1993
amendments to Rule 11. (See ECF No. 95 at Pg ID 4116-17.)
For purposes of Rule 11, an attorney who is knowingly listed as counsel on a
pleading, written motion, or other paper “expressly authorize[d] the signing, filing,
submitting or later advocating of the offending paper” and “shares responsibility
13
Junttila, however, did sign and docket subsequently filed motions, briefs, or
other papers in which she and Plaintiffs’ remaining attorneys advocated the claims
asserted in their pleadings. (See, e.g., ECF No. 85 at Pg ID 3896-3906); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (indicating that counsel “present[s] to the court a pleading,
written motion, or other paper” by, inter alia, “signing,” “filing,” or “later
advocating it”) (emphasis added).
26
with the signer, filer, submitter, or advocate.”14 Morris v. Wachovia Sec., Inc., No.
3:02cv797, 2007 WL 2126344, at *9 (E.D. Va. 2007) (emphasis removed)
(quoting Gregory P. Joseph, Sanctions the Fed. Law of Litig. Abuse, § 5(E)(1) at
110 (3d ed. 2000)). “The Court need not go through ‘mental gymnastics,’ as pre-
1993 courts sometimes felt compelled to do, see Sanctions, § 5(E)(1) at 109, in
order [to] hold [the attorney] to account under Rule 11.” Id.
Notably, because Rule 11 only requires a signature by “at least one
attorney,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a), documents are frequently presented to federal
courts which list several attorneys as counsel but contain the signature of only one.
Regardless, as amended in 1993, Rule 11 allows for sanctions “on any attorney . . .
that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)
(emphasis added). Moreover, Michigan Rule of Professional Conduct 8.5(a) reads:
“A lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary
authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal
services in this jurisdiction.” (emphasis added).
14
At the July 12 hearing, Wood asserted for the first time that he was oblivious to
his inclusion as counsel for Plaintiffs in this case. The Court will address this
assertion separately.
27
By agreeing to place their names on pleadings and/or motions, counsel are
responsible for those submissions and will be held accountable.15
2. L. Lin Wood
At the July 12 hearing, Wood maintained that the Court lacks jurisdiction to
sanction him because he played no role in drafting the Complaint, did not read any
of the documents with respect to the Complaint, was not aware of the affidavits
attached to it, and did not give permission for his name to be specifically included
in this action. When the Court asked Wood if he gave permission to have his name
included on the pleadings or briefs, Wood answered:
I do not specifically recall being asked about the

Michigan complaint, but I had generally indicated to
Sidney Powell that if she needed a, quote/unquote, trial
lawyer that I would certainly be willing and available to
help her.[16]
In this case obviously my name was included. My

experience or my skills apparently were never needed so
I didn’t have any involvement with it.
Would I have objected to be included by name? I don’t

believe so . . . .
15
Although the issue of whether non-signing attorneys can be sanctioned is
discussed in this Rule 11 section, the Court concludes for the same reasons that
they can be sanctioned under § 1927 and the Court’s inherent authority, as well.
The same is true for Wood, Newman, and Rohl, who are discussed in the next
subsections.
16
Wood, therefore, admittedly “offer[ed] to provide . . . legal services in this
jurisdiction.” MRPC 8.5(a) (emphasis added).
28
(ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5360.) The Court then asked Wood if he gave Powell
permission to include his name on the filings in this matter, to which he responded:
I didn’t object to it, but I did not know – I actually did not know
at the time that my name was going to be included, but I
certainly told Ms. Powell in discussions that I would help her if
she needed me in any of these cases, and in this particular
matter apparently I was never needed so I didn’t have anything
to do with it.
(Id. at Pg ID 5360-61.)
Wood then denied being served with the motion for sanctions and stated that
he was present only at the hearing because the Court required him to be there. (Id.)
According to Wood, he only discovered that he had been included as counsel for
Plaintiffs in this matter when he saw a newspaper article about the sanctions
motion: “I didn’t receive any notice about this until I saw something in the
newspaper about being sanctioned.” (Id. at Pg ID 5362, 5366 (emphasis added).)
When the Court turned to Powell and asked whether she told Wood his name
was being placed on the pleading, Powell first answered:
My view, your honor, is that I did specifically ask Mr.

Wood for his permission. I can’t imagine that I would
have put his name on any pleading without understanding
that he had given me permission to do that.
29
(Id. at Pg ID 5371.) Powell then suggested that perhaps there was “a
misunderstanding” between her and Wood.17 (Id.) And Kleinhendler did not recall
whether he spoke to Wood before Wood’s name was included on the pleading.
(Id.) The Court does not believe that Wood was unaware of his inclusion as
counsel in this case until a newspaper article alerted him to the sanctions motion
filed against him and this is why.
First, the City’s motion for sanctions was filed on January 5, 2021. (ECF
No. 78.) At no time between that date and the July 12 hearing did Wood ever
notify the Court that he had been impermissibly included as counsel for Plaintiffs
in this action. Almost a month before the motion hearing, the Court entered an
order requiring “[e]ach attorney whose name appears on any of Plaintiffs’
pleadings or briefs” to be present at the hearing. (ECF No. 123.) Wood still did
not submit anything to the Court claiming that his name was placed on those
17
The existence of a misunderstanding seems improbable given that several similar
lawsuits seeking to overturn the presidential election results were filed in Georgia,
Wisconsin, and Arizona, each bearing the same “Of Counsel” listing for Wood as
appears here. See Compl., Pearson v. Kemp, No. 1:20-cv-04809 (N.D. Ga. filed
Nov. 25, 2020), ECF No. 1 at Pg 103; Compl., Feehand v. Wisconsin Elections
Commission, No. 2:20-cv-01771 (E.D. Wis. filed Dec. 1, 2020), ECF No. 1 at Pg
51; Compl., Bowyer v. Ducey, No. 2:20-cv-02321 (D. Ariz. filed Dec. 2, 2020),
ECF No. 1 at Pg 53. Wood moved for pro hac vice admission in the Arizona
proceedings. See Remark, Bowyer, No. 2:20-cv-02321 (D. Ariz. Dec. 4, 2020).
He did not do so in Wisconsin but, like Michigan, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin does not permit pro hac vice motions. E.D. Wis. LR
83(c)(2)(E).
30
filings without his permission. No reasonable attorney would sit back silently if
his or her name were listed as counsel in a case if permission to do so had not been
given.
Second, Wood is not credible. 18 He claims that he was never served with
the City’s motion for sanctions; however, counsel for the City represents that the
motion was sent to Wood via e-mail and regular mail. (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID
5363-64.) Kimberly Hunt, the office manager for the City’s attorneys, affirms in
an affidavit that she mailed via First Class U.S. Mail a copy of the Safe Harbor
Letter and the Safe Harbor Motion to Wood, among others, on December 15, 2020,
and that no copies were returned as undeliverable. (ECF No. 164-3 at Pg ID 6393
¶¶ 5, 8.) And despite being told that he had the opportunity to attach an affidavit to
18
Notably, while Wood stated at the July 12 hearing that he only learned about the
motions seeking sanctions against him when he read about it in a newspaper
article, Wood suggests in his supplemental brief that he in fact learned of his
purported involvement in the lawsuit when he received a call from one of the
attorneys in this matter in mid- to late-June 2021, alerting him to the Court’s order
requiring him to appear at the hearing on the sanctions motions. (ECF No. 162 at
Pg ID 6102.)
31
his supplemental brief in order to put his oath behind his factual assertions (see
ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5517), Wood surprisingly chose not to do so.19, 20
More importantly, Wood’s social media postings undermine his current
assertions, as do his statements in other court proceedings. As discussed during the
July 12 hearing, on the day the City e-mailed copies of the Safe Harbor Letter and
Safe Harbor Motion to Plaintiffs’ counsel, Wood tweeted a link to an article
containing a copy of the motion, stating “[w]hen you get falsely accused by the
likes of David Fink and Mark Elias . . . in a propaganda rag like Law & Crime, you
smile because you know you are over the target and the enemy is runningscared
19
Wood asserts in his supplemental brief that he “and his legal assistant have
performed a diligent search of all email correspondence as well as U.S. mail at Mr.
Wood’s Atlanta office and elsewhere. They have turned up no evidence to indicate
they were provided with any Rule 11 notice prior to the filing of the motion.”
(ECF No. 162 at Pg ID 6122.) Yet no affidavit is offered from Wood or his legal
assistant to attest to these assertions. And notably, the address listed for Wood on
the filings in this matter (and thus where the City’s attorneys mailed items to him)
is a post office box, not his firm’s address.
20
Wood contends that he is entitled to a “full evidentiary hearing”—“should the
Court determine that material factual questions do exist”—so that he “may present
to the Court with the evidence of record, sufficient to establish the factual
representations” made in his supplemental brief regarding why this Court does not
have “jurisdiction” to sanction him. (ECF No. 162 at Pg ID 6124.) He is entitled
to no such thing. See In re Big Rapids Mall Assoc., 98 F.3d at 929 (recognizing
that an evidentiary hearing is “not necessarily required where the court has full
knowledge of the facts and is familiar with the conduct of the attorneys”). The
July 12 hearing provided Wood the opportunity to present his evidence and, as
noted supra, he had the further opportunity to attach an affidavit as evidence to his
supplemental brief.
32
[sic]!” (ECF No. 164-6 at Pg ID 6424; ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5369-70.) On
January 5, 2021, the day the City filed the motion, Wood tweeted a link to an
article with the motion, stating that it was “unfair” for the City to seek sanctions
against him. (ECF No. 164-7 at Pg ID 6426.) In a federal courtroom in the
Eastern District of New York on January 11, Wood acknowledged that the City
was “trying to get [him] disbarred.” (ECF No. 164-12 at Pg ID 6506.)
Even more importantly, prior to the July 12 hearing, Wood took credit for
filing this lawsuit.21 In a brief submitted in the Delaware Supreme Court, Wood
claimed, through his counsel:
[Wood] represented plaintiffs challenging the results of

the 2020 Presidential election in Michigan and
Wisconsin. . . . In the days and weeks following the
[General Election of 2020], Wood became involved in
litigation contesting the election’s results or the manner
votes were taken or counted in critical “swing states.”
Among those cases in which Wood became involved were
lawsuits in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Wood’s own suit
in the State of Georgia.
21
Notably, Rohl stated under oath that Wood, along with Powell, “spearheaded”
this lawsuit. (ECF No. 111-1 at Pg ID 4597.) Though the Court hesitates to rely
too much on the assertions of any of Plaintiffs’ attorneys because their positions—
as counsel for the City aptly describes—have been like “[s]hifting [s]ands[,]” the
Court notes that Rohl’s sworn affidavit was attached to a supplemental brief filed
by Plaintiffs’ counsel in response to the City’s motion for sanctions. (See ECF No.
111 at Pg ID 4556, 4559, 4561-62.) No member of Plaintiffs’ legal team objected
to any part of Rohl’s affidavit.
33
(ECF No. 164-13 at Pg ID 6525-26 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).)
These statements are binding on Wood. See K.V.G. Props., Inc. v. Westfield Ins.
Co., 900 F.3d 818, 822 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)) (noting that
pleadings, which are judicial admissions, “are binding legal documents that can be
admitted as evidence against that party in subsequent proceedings”).22
For these reasons, while Wood now seeks to distance himself from this
litigation to avoid sanctions, the Court concludes that he was aware of this lawsuit
when it was filed, was aware that he was identified as co-counsel for Plaintiffs, and
as a result, shares the responsibility with the other lawyers for any sanctionable
conduct.
3. Emily Newman & Gregory Rohl
Newman contends that she had a limited role in this lawsuit, having “not
play[ed] a role in drafting the complaint” and spending “maybe five hours on [the
matter]” “from home.” (ECF No. 157 at Pg. ID 5317-18, 5324.) Therefore,
Newman argues, she should not be subject to sanctions.
22
See also United States v. Burns, 109 F. App’x 52, 58 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that
courts have “discretion to consider statements made in a brief to be a judicial
admission” and binding on the party who made them); Beasley v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. for Certificate Holders of Park Place Sec., Inc., 744 F. App’x 906, 914
(6th Cir. 2018) (same).
34
By placing her name on the initial and amended complaints, Newman
presented pleadings to the Court asserting that Defendants committed
constitutional and state law violations. Newman does not suggest that her name
was included without her permission. In addition, Newman does not cite case law
suggesting that an attorney may not be sanctioned under Rule 11 or any other
source of sanctions authority if the time spent on the relevant lawsuit does not
surpass an unidentified threshold. (See generally ECF No. 168.) And Newman’s
responsibility for any Rule 11 violation is not diminished based on where those
working hours were spent (particularly during a global pandemic when many
individuals were working remotely from home). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory
Committee Notes (1993 Amendment) (“[S]anction[s] should be imposed on the
persons—whether attorneys, law firms, or parties—who have violated the rule or
who may be determined to be responsible for the violation. . . . The revision
permits the court to consider whether other attorneys in [a] firm, co-counsel, other
law firms, or the party itself should be held accountable for their part in causing a
violation,” even if they were not “the person actually making the presentation to
the court.”); see Morris, 2007 WL 2126344, at *9. So long as the attorney bears
some responsibility, the attorney may be sanctioned. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1).
In an affidavit filed in this case, Rohl stated that at “approximately 6:30 PM”
on the day this lawsuit was filed, he “was contacted by an associate who asked
35
Rohl if he would assist in litigation involving alleged election fraud in Michigan.”
(ECF No. 111-1 at Pg ID 4597.) He thereafter received a copy of “the already
prepared” 830-page initial complaint and Rohl “took well over an hour” to review
it. (Id.) “[M]aking no additions, deletions or corrections” to the Complaint (id. at
Pg ID 4598), Rohl had his secretary file it at 11:48 p.m. (Id. at Pg ID 4597; ECF
No. 1.)
To the extent Rohl asserts he should not be sanctioned because he read the
pleading only on the day of its filing, the argument does not fly. Rule 11(b)
“obviously require[s] that a pleading, written motion, or other paper be read before
it is filed or submitted to the court,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes
(1993 Amendment), and the Court finds it exceedingly difficult to believe that
Rohl read an 830-page complaint in just “well over an hour” on the day he filed it.
So, Rohl’s argument in and of itself reveals sanctionable conduct. Rule 11(b) also
explains that, by presenting a pleading to the court, an attorney certifies that “to the
best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after a reasonable
inquiry under the circumstances,” the complaint is not being filed for an improper
purpose and is well-grounded in law and fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (emphasis
added). The Court finds it even more difficult to believe that any inquiry Rohl
may have conducted between the time he finished reading the Complaint and 11:48
p.m. could be described as a “reasonable” one. But also, Rohl cannot hide behind
36
his co-counsel. As a signer of the complaints, Rohl certified to the Court that the
claims asserted were not frivolous. Moreover, because his co-counsel were not
admitted to practice in the Eastern District of Michigan, the complaints could not
have been filed without Rohl’s signature. See E.D. Mich. LR 83.20(f)(1),
(i)(1)(D)(i). Therefore, to the extent Rohl contends that he was only helping co-
counsel, he still failed to fulfill his obligations as an officer of the court.
4. Safe Harbor Requirement
At least 21 days before submitting a Rule 11 motion to a court, the movant
must serve “[t]he motion” on the party against whom sanctions are sought and the
motion “must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). As indicated above, the City served a copy of its Rule 11
motion on Plaintiffs’ counsel at least 21 days before it was filed.23 Plaintiffs argue
23
With each new brief filed and opportunity to argue before the Court, Plaintiffs’
attorneys raise a new argument for why they were not adequately served with the
City’s Safe Harbor Letter and Safe Harbor Motion. First, in their original response
to the motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel argued only that the notice served upon them was
deficient because it was not accompanied by the City’s more detailed brief. (See
ECF No. 95 at Pg ID 4119.) Then, at the July 12 motion hearing, Wood and
Newman suddenly claimed that they had not been served at all with the City’s safe
harbor materials. (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5317, 5362.) In the supplemental brief
filed by Campbell on behalf of Plaintiffs’ counsel Hagerstrom, Haller, Johnson,
Kleinhendler, Powell, and Rohl, counsel insinuates that the Rule 11 motion was
not properly served pursuant to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as
required under Rule 11(c)(2). (See ECF No. 161 at Pg ID 5805 n.6.) No specific
argument is made, however, as to how service did not comply with Rule 5. (Id.);
see McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th Cir. 1997) (“It is not
37
that the City failed to comply with this “safe harbor” provision because the brief in
support of the motion, which was filed later, was not included. (See ECF No. 95 at
Pg ID 4118-19; ECF No. 161 at Pg ID 5805-06.) According to Plaintiffs, the
City’s motion “makes only conclusory statements and blanket assertions regarding
the alleged violations of Rule 11 and fails altogether to ‘describe the specific
conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).’” (ECF No. 95 at Pg ID 4119 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)).)
Rule 11, however, requires service of only “[t]he motion” to trigger the
commencement of the 21-day safe harbor period. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)
(“The motion must be served . . . .”); see also Star Mark Mgmt. v. Koon Chun Hing
sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way,
leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.”) In his next filing on behalf of
Hagerstrom, Haller, Johnson, Kleinhendler, Powell, and Rohl, Campbell raises two
new arguments: (i) the City did not mail a copy of the safe harbor materials to the
correct address for Johnson, and (ii) in a footnote of the safe harbor motion,
concurrence was only sought from Powell. (ECF No. 167 at Pg ID 6679 n.1
(citing ECF No. 164-4 at Pg ID 6409 n.1).) Newman picked up the same refrain
about her address in her supplemental brief. (See ECF No. 168 at Pg ID 7608-09.)
Wood said nothing in his supplemental brief to challenge the address where he was
served; however, in his response to the City’s supplemental brief, he claimed for
the first time that the zip code used by the City when mailing the safe harbor
materials to him was incorrect. (See ECF No. 170 at Pg ID 6801.) However, the
addresses used by the City for each of these attorneys, including Wood’s zip code
(see ECF No. 161-3 at Pg ID 6058), were the exact addresses provided by
Plaintiffs in their filings (see, e.g., ECF No. 1 at Pg ID 75; ECF No. 6 at Pg ID
957). The belated argument regarding footnote 1 of the City’s Safe Harbor Motion
is frivolous as the Safe Harbor Letter was addressed to all counsel. (ECF No. 161-
3 at Pg ID 6058.)
38
Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd., 682 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Ideal
Instruments, Inc. v. Rivard Instruments, Inc., 243 F.R.D. 322, 339 (N.D. Iowa
2007)) (finding that the defendant’s delivery of its sanctions motion met the
procedural requirements of the safe harbor provision of Rule 11(c)(2) despite not
serving at that time supporting affidavits or a memorandum of law); Burbidge
Mitchell & Gross v. Peters, 622 F. App’x 749, 757 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Star
Mark, 682 F.3d at 176 and “join[ing] the Second Circuit in declining ‘to read into
the rule a requirement that a motion served for purposes of the safe harbor period
must include supporting papers such as a memorandum of law and exhibits’”). As
Plaintiffs’ attorneys correctly point out (see ECF No. 161 at Pg ID 5805-06), the
Local Rules for the Eastern District of Michigan require a motion to be
accompanied by a brief, see E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(d)(1)(A), and judges in this District
strike motions not complying with this requirement, see, e.g., Williams Huron
Gardens 397 Trust v. Waterford Twp., No. 18-12319, 2019 WL 659009, at *1
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 26, 2019). But this speaks to when a motion is filed. Moreover,
the issue here is not whether the City complied with the District’s local rules;
rather, it is whether the City satisfied Rule 11’s safe harbor requirements.
The Safe Harbor Motion the City served on Plaintiffs’ counsel on December
15, 2020, “describe[s] the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).”
39
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Specifically, the City asserted violations of subdivisions
(b)(1)-(3) of the rule:
1. “Initiat[ing] the instant suit for improper purposes,

including harassing the City and frivolously
undermining ‘People’s faith in the democratic process
and their trust in our government.’ . . .
[U]nderst[anding] that the mere filing of a suit (no
matter how frivolous) could, without any evidence,
raise doubts in the minds of millions of Americans
about the legitimacy of the 2020 presidential
election.” (ECF No. 161-3 at Pg ID 6060 (quoting
ECF No. 62 at Pg ID 3329-30).)
2. Asserting “causes of action . . . in the Complaints

(ECF Nos. 1 and 6), Emergency Motion for
Declaratory, Emergency, and Permanent Injunctive
Relief and Memorandum in Support Thereof (ECF
No. 7), and Emergency Motion to Seal (ECF No. 8)
[that] were frivolous and legally deficient under
existing law and because Plaintiffs failed to present
any non-frivolous arguments to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law.” (ECF No. 161-3 at Pg ID
6061.) The City then went on to detail the legal
deficiencies as to Plaintiffs’ Elections and Electors
Clauses, Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process
Clause claims, and further argued that Plaintiffs
lacked standing and their claims were moot and
barred by laches. (Id. at Pg ID 6061-63.)
3. Raising “factual contentions . . . in the complaints and

motions [which were] false.” (Id. at 6063.) The City
wrote further: “The key ‘factual’ allegations from the
supposed fact witnesses, some of whom attempt to
cloak their identities while attacking democracy, have
been debunked. The allegations about supposed fraud
in the processing and tabulation of absentee ballots by
the City at the TCF Center have been rejected by
40
every court which has considered them.” (Id. at Pg ID

6064.)
Plaintiffs’ attorneys maintain that the City’s motion was deficient because it
“did not cite a single case or fact supporting [its] arguments” (ECF No. 161 at Pg
ID 5806) and “fail[ed] to identify any specific factual allegation or witness that
lacks evidentiary support” (ECF No. 95 at Pg ID 4119). Plaintiffs’ attorneys do
not identify any authority requiring case citations in a Rule 11 motion to satisfy the
safe harbor requirements.24 Moreover, the failure to identify specific facts or
witnesses has no bearing on the adequacy of the motion as to the claimed
violations of Rule 11(b)(1) or (2).
And as to the claimed violations of Rule 11(b)(3), the motion was specific as
to the violative conduct: All of the allegations discussed in the Rule 11(b)(3)
analysis below (with the exception of one) concern supposed fraud in the
processing and tabulation of absentee ballots by the City at the TCF Center (see
infra 68-78)—just as the City specifically identified. And the one exception
concerns a key factual allegation that was debunked in Costantino. (See ECF No.
31-15 at 2440-41.) Moreover, in the Safe Harbor Motion, the City expressly refers
to its response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Injunctive Relief “for a detailed debunking
24
As discussed earlier, Rule 11(c)(2) does not require a memorandum of law or
exhibits to satisfy the safe harbor requirements. Star Mark Mgmt., 682 F.3d at
176; Ideal Instruments, Inc., 243 F.R.D. at 339; Burbidge Mitchell & Gross, 622 F.
App’x at 757.
41
of Plaintiffs’ baseless factual contentions.”25 (ECF No. 161-3 at Pg ID 6064
(citing ECF No. 39 at Pg ID 2808-2[8]33).)
C. Sanctions Pursuant to the Court’s Inherent Authority
“Even if there are sanctions available under statutes or specific federal rules
of procedure, . . . the ‘inherent authority’ of the court is an independent basis for
sanctioning bad faith conduct in litigation.” Dell, Inc. v. Elles, No. 07-2082, 2008
WL 4613978, at *2 (6th Cir. June 10, 2008) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501
U.S. 32, 49-50 (1991)); see also Runfola & Assocs. v. Spectrum Reporting II, Inc.,
88 F.3d 368, 375 (6th Cir. 1996) (“In addition to Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, a
district court may award sanctions pursuant to its inherent powers when bad faith
occurs.”). To award attorneys’ fees under this “bad faith exception,” a district
court must find that (i) “the claims advanced were meritless”; (ii) “counsel knew or
should have known this”; and (iii) “the motive for filing the suit was for an
improper purpose such as harassment.” Big Yank Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 125 F.3d 308, 313 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted) (“The district court has
the inherent authority to award fees when a party litigates in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
25
Even if the City did not specify every allegation in Plaintiffs’ pleading
lacking evidentiary support, the same conduct could be sanctioned (and, as found
infra, is sanctionable) under the Court’s inherent authority.
42
The Sixth Circuit has further explained:
For a court to impose sanctions under its inherent

powers, it is not necessary that the court find that an
action was meritless as of filing, or even shortly
thereafter. It can become apparent part-way through a
suit that an action that initially appeared to have merit is
in fact meritless; parties and attorneys have a
responsibility to halt litigation whenever they realize that
they are pursuing a meritless suit. . . . [M]oreover, a party
or firm might enter an action long after the filing of the
initial complaint, but may still be sanctionable under a
court’s inherent powers if it acts in bad faith. The
“something more” that a court must find to meet the third
prong of the Big Yank test may similarly occur at any
stage of the proceedings. A court imposing sanctions
under its inherent powers may consider the nature and
timing of the actions that led to a finding of bad faith in
determining whether to impose sanctions on conduct
from that point forward, or instead to infer that the
party’s bad faith extended back in time, perhaps even
prior to the filing of the action.
BDT Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 753 n.6 (6th Cir. 2010)
(emphasis in original). The Supreme Court has held that “a federal court’s
inherent authority to sanction a litigant for bad-faith conduct by ordering it to pay
the other side’s legal fees . . . is limited to the fees the innocent party incurred
solely because of the misconduct.” In re Bavelis, 743 F. App’x 670, 675 (6th Cir.
2018) (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1183-84
(2017)). In other words, “[t]he complaining party . . . may recover ‘only the
portion of his fees that he would not have paid but for’ the misconduct” but courts
43
have “considerable room” to “exercise discretion and judgment” when making this
“but for” determination. Id. at 676 (quoting Goodyear Tire, 137 S. Ct. at 1187).
Plaintiffs’ attorneys contend that the Court cannot rely on its inherent
authority because “[t]he comments accompanying Rule 11 indicate that its
procedures are controlling when the Court exercises its inherent authority.” (ECF
No. 161 at Pg ID 5804.) This argument is misleading. Plaintiffs’ counsel first
quote the Advisory Committee’s 1993 comment to Rule 11: “The power of the
court to act on its own initiative is retained, but with the condition that this be done
through a show cause order.” (Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee
Notes (1993 Amendment)).) But this comment simply explains that the
amendment retained the authority for courts to issue sua sponte sanctions pursuant
to Rule 11 but with the added requirement of a show cause order.
To maintain that the show cause requirement applies to sanctions under a
court’s inherent authority, Plaintiffs’ attorneys quote a second statement in the
comments but strategically omit the following key italicized language: “[T]he
procedures specified in Rule 11—notice, opportunity to respond, and findings—
should ordinarily be employed when imposing a sanction under the court’s
inherent authority.” (Id. (omitted language added).) Nothing in the comments
suggests that the additional procedures in Rule 11 apply when a court sanctions
44
pursuant to its inherent authority or that Rule 11 supplants this authority. In fact,
the Advisory Committee’s 1993 comment specifically states the opposite:
Rule 11 is not the exclusive source for control of

improper presentations of claims, defenses, or
contentions. It does not supplant statutes permitting
awards of attorney’s fees . . . . It does not inhibit the
court in punishing for contempt, in exercising its inherent
powers, or in imposing sanctions, awarding expenses, or
directing remedial action authorized under other rules or
under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes (1993 Amendment) (emphasis
added).
When invoking its inherent authority to sanction, “[a] court must, of course,
. . . comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite
bad faith exists and in assessing fees.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50 (citing Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980)). The Sixth Circuit has further
explained:
The district court must [] afford the parties concerned . . .

at least minimal procedural protections, including notice
and the opportunity to respond or to be heard. Miranda,
710 F.2d at 522. We do not, in so holding for due
process purposes, indicate that there must be a formal
‘complaint’ lodged with specifications in the event of a
proposed sanction, or that a ‘full fledged’ hearing is
mandated, but notice and a reasonable opportunity to be
heard is a minimum protection to be afforded.
Ray A. Scharer & Co. v. Plabell Rubber Prod., Inc., 858 F.2d 317, 321 (6th Cir.
1988) (additional internal citations omitted) (discussing due process in context of

45
court’s inherent authority); see also Banner v. City of Flint, 99 F. App’x 29, 37
(6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that, when exercising its inherent authority, a court
must “give . . . minimal procedural protections, but no[] formal notice detailing the
penalties or a full evidentiary hearing” is required “when the court has sufficient
relevant information, including pleadings or materials filed in the record, to
decide”); In re Big Rapids Mall Assoc., 98 F.3d at 929 (recognizing that an
evidentiary hearing is “not necessarily required where the court has full knowledge
of the facts and is familiar with the conduct of the attorneys”). Ultimately, when a
court intends to invoke its inherent authority, “[a]t the very least, responsive
briefing . . . [can] provide[] the procedural safeguards necessary.” KCI USA, Inc.
v. Healthcare Essentials, Inc., 797 F. App’x 1002, 1007 (6th Cir. 2020); see also
Red Carpet Studios, 465 F.3d at 647 (finding that the court provided due process
when sanctioning via its inherent authority where sanctioned party “argued his case
in writing and at a hearing, and [] makes no argument why the notice and the
hearing he received were inadequate”).
Plaintiffs’ lawyers have been afforded due process here. Through the
multiple motions for sanctions and related briefs and during the July 12 motion
hearing, they received notice of: (i) who sanctions were being sought against; (ii)
the reasons why; (iii) the authority pursuant to which sanctions were requested;
and (iv) the types of sanctions requested. Counsel were provided the opportunity
46
to answer the sanctions allegations in responsive briefs, orally at the six-hour
hearing, and in supplemental briefing. To the extent the Court questioned
Plaintiffs’ counsel about materials attached to their pleadings which had not been
specifically addressed in the movants’ briefs, counsel had an opportunity to
respond to those concerns in their supplemental briefs—and counsel took
advantage of that opportunity. (See, e.g., ECF No. 161 at Pg ID 5815-19; ECF No.
165 at Pg ID 6578-80; ECF No. 167 at Pg ID 6682-84, 6684 n.3).
IV. Discussion26
A. Whether Plaintiffs’ Counsel Violated 28 U.S.C. § 1927
The Court first considers whether Plaintiffs’ counsel unreasonably and
vexatiously multiplied proceedings by failing to dismiss this case when even they
acknowledged it became moot. Ridder, 109 F.3d at 298 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927).
Plaintiffs expressly acknowledged in their petition for writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court that “[o]nce the electoral votes are cast, subsequent relief would
be pointless,” and “the petition would be moot.” (ECF No. 105 at Pg ID 4362
(citing ECF No. 105-2 at Pg ID 4401, 4409).) Michigan’s electors cast their votes
26
At last, this opinion arrives at the issue of whether Plaintiffs’ attorneys should be
sanctioned. The Court is aware of how long it took to get here. But addressing
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s arguments concerning the Court’s ability to impose sanctions
was first required, and—as noted previously—those arguments shifted and
multiplied with each new brief they filed.
47
on December 14. “Yet, that date came and went with no acknowledgement by
Plaintiffs and their counsel to Defendants or this Court,” the State Defendants
argue, forcing the State Defendants and Intervenor-Defendants to file motions to
dismiss on December 22. (Id. (citing ECF No. 70); see also ECF Nos. 72, 73.)
During the July 12 motion hearing, Campbell contended that—over the
course of the litigation—“things change[d].” (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5345.) He
explained, when this case was filed on November 25, counsel “thought honestly
and truly that the drop-dead date was December 8th, and that’s what [they] said to
this Court.” (Id. at Pg ID 5346.) Later, “a judge in Wisconsin said,” according to
Campbell, “Well, why are you guys all hurrying for December 8th. It should be
December 14th.” (Id.) Campbell continued, because “[s]omebody else came along
and said, ‘Why not December 14th?’ . . . [counsel] didn’t argue with that” and gave
the United States Supreme Court that date as the one upon which the case becomes
moot. (Id.) And on December 14, “three [] [] Plaintiffs were, in their opinion,
properly elected as electors” and, Campbell further explained, “[t]hat changed
things, and [then] the Supreme Court’s determination did have life.” (Id.)
In other words, Plaintiffs’ attorneys maintain that this lawsuit was no longer
moot after December 14 because three Plaintiffs subjectively believed that they
had become electors. The attorneys cite no authority supporting the notion that an
individual’s “[personal] opinion” that he or she is an elector is sufficient to support
48
the legal position that the individual is in fact an elector. Of course, such a belief is
contrary to how electors are appointed in Michigan. See Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 168.42. In any event, Plaintiffs’ attorneys fail to provide a rational explanation
for why this event breathed life into this action. Moreover, prior to the July 12
hearing, Plaintiffs never told anyone about this newly-formed subjective belief.
They did not tell this Court that the case would no longer be moot after December
8, despite telling this Court the exact opposite when filing this lawsuit on
November 25. And they did not tell the Supreme Court that the case would no
longer be moot after December 14, despite telling that Court the exact opposite on
December 11. The fact that it was never shared suggests that counsel’s argument
as to why the case had to be pursued after December 14 is contrived.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys proffer several additional unpersuasive arguments.
First, citing Beverly v. Shermetta Legal Grp., No. 2:19-CV-11473, 2020 WL
2556674 (E.D. Mich. May 20, 2020), they argue that the act of filing the initial
complaint is not enough to warrant sanctions under § 1927. (ECF No. 85 at Pg ID
3887, 3890, 3894; ECF No. 93 at Pg ID 4071; ECF No. 112 at Pg. ID 4609, 4625-
26; ECF No. 161 at Pg ID 5808-09; ECF No. 165 at Pg ID 6572.) This argument
misses the crux of opposing counsel’s argument for § 1927 sanctions, which is that
Plaintiffs’ counsel multiplied proceedings by failing to dismiss the case when their
claims became moot on December 14 (if not earlier) and by pursuing their legal
49
claims even after the Court issued its opinion clearly informing Plaintiffs and their
counsel that their legal claims were weak and lacked factual support.
Second, Plaintiffs’ counsel contend that they “moved as expeditiously as
possible from the outset through the termination of this proceeding” and “had not
injected new legal claims or evidence after this Court’s December 7, 2020[] Order
denying the TRO Motion.” (ECF No. 85 at Pg ID 3893-94; ECF No. 112 at Pg ID
4625.) Even if true, it misses the point as to why counsel unreasonably and
vexatiously multiplied the proceedings. “[I]f events that occur subsequent to the
filing of a lawsuit . . . deprive the court of the ability to give meaningful relief, then
the case is moot and must be dismissed.” Sullivan v. Benningfield, 920 F.3d 401,
410 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ailor v. City of Maynardville, 368 F.3d 587, 596 (6th
Cir. 2004)). Here, Plaintiffs conceded that their claims were moot after December
14. Yet, in the month that followed, Plaintiffs refused to voluntarily dismiss their
claims, forcing Defendants to file their motions to dismiss and the Court to decide
Plaintiffs’ motion for additional time to respond to the motions to dismiss, which
Plaintiffs ultimately did not do.27 In the end, Plaintiffs’ attorneys prolonged the
27
Notably when the State Defendants sought concurrence in their Motion to
Dismiss on December 22 (ECF No. 105-3 at Pg ID 4432), Plaintiffs’ counsel
responded that they were “not in a position to respond to [the State Defendants’]
request until [the] appeals [before the Sixth Circuit and United States Supreme
Court] are decided,” and noted that “[they] do not believe the district court has
jurisdiction to consider [the State Defendants’] motion while the case is on
50
inevitable and “caused both [the State Defendants and Intervenor-Defendants] and
the [C]ourt to waste resources” in the meantime. Morris v. City of Detroit Water &
Sewage Dep’t, 20 F. App’x 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Andretti v. Borla
Performance Indus., Inc., 426 F.3d 824, 835 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming impositions
of sanctions where attorney “refus[ed] to voluntarily dismiss the count and forc[ed]
[opposing counsel] to pursue a dispositive motion in order to have the claim
dismissed”); Davis v. Detroit Downtown Dev. Auth., 782 F. App’x 455, 458 (6th
Cir. 2019).
Finally, Plaintiffs’ attorneys contend that the facts and outcome of several
cases cited by the State Defendants in support of § 1927 sanctions are
distinguishable. (ECF No. 112 at Pg ID 4627-32.) Plaintiffs’ attorneys distinguish
Ridder because there, unlike here, “an attorney pursued . . . a claim for five years
without offering any evidence.” (Id. at Pg ID 4629.) But this does not matter:
Forcing Defendants and Intervenor-Defendants to file any pleading or brief at any
appeal.” (Id.) Of course, because neither this Court, the Sixth Circuit, nor the
United States Supreme Court had entered a stay—and Plaintiff had not moved for
one in any court—this Court retained its jurisdiction to consider the Motion to
Dismiss. See Zundel v. Holder, 687 F.3d 271, 282 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[A]n appeal
from an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction does not divest the
district court of jurisdiction to proceed with the action on the merits.”) And for
some reason, Plaintiffs eventually voluntarily dismissed this lawsuit while it
remained on appeal in the Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court, even though they
previously refused to concur as to Defendants’ motions to dismiss because it was
on appeal in those courts.
51
point after Plaintiffs’ claims became moot required them to file one pleading or
brief too many. Andretti, 426 F.3d at 835. Plaintiffs’ attorneys also take issue with
the State Defendants’ use of Big Yank, pointing out that the court stated—
according to Plaintiffs’ counsel—that “the bad faith exception requires that the
district court make actual findings of fact that demonstrate that the claims were . . .
pursued for an improper purpose.” (ECF No. 112 at Pg ID 4630 (citing Big Yank,
125 F.3d at 314).) But the portion of the Big Yank opinion cited discusses a court’s
inherent authority to sanction, not sanctions under § 1927 as pursued by the State
Defendants. Plaintiffs’ counsel’s contention as to the three remaining cases—
Salkil, 458 F.3d 520, Jones, 789 F.2d 1225, and In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 1225—are
plainly meritless and worthy of no further discussion. (See ECF No. 112 at Pg ID
4627-29.)
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ counsel unreasonably and vexatiously
multiplied the proceedings in this case and their arguments to the contrary are
unavailing.
52
B. Whether Plaintiffs’ Counsel Violated Rule 11
1. Whether Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted claims, defenses, or

other legal contentions not warranted by existing law or by
a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law in
violation of Rule 11(b)(2)
a) Counsel’s presentment of claims not warranted by

existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law
The Court said it before and will say it again: At the inception of this
lawsuit, all of Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrines of mootness, laches,
and standing, as well as Eleventh Amendment immunity. (See ECF No. 62 at Pg
ID 3302-24.) Further, Plaintiffs’ attorneys did not provide a nonfrivolous
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing
new law to render their claims ripe or timely, to grant them standing, or to avoid
Eleventh Amendment immunity. The same can be said for Plaintiffs’ claims under
the Elections and Electors, Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses, and the
alleged violations of the Michigan Election Code.28 Finally, the attorneys have not
28
There is no reason to repeat what the Court already has stated regarding the legal
merit of Plaintiffs’ claims under the Elections, Electors, and Equal Protection
Clauses. (See ECF No. 62 at Pg ID 3324-28.) The briefs filed by the State
Defendants and Intervenor-Defendants provide further detail as to why those
claims, as well as Plaintiffs’ Due Process and Michigan Election Code claims, are
legally flawed and why Plaintiffs and their counsel knew or should have known
this to be the case.
53
identified any authority that would enable a federal court to grant the relief sought
in this lawsuit.
Plaintiffs asked this Court to enjoin the State Defendants from sending
Michigan’s certified results to the Electoral College (ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 84-86);
but as reported publicly, Governor Whitmer had already done so before Plaintiffs
filed this lawsuit.29 Plaintiffs sought the impoundment of all voting machines in
Michigan (id. at Pg ID 86); however, those machines are owned and maintained by
Michigan’s local governments, which are not parties to this lawsuit. Mich. Comp.
Laws §§ 168.37, .37a, .794a. Plaintiffs demanded the recount of absentee ballots
(ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 85), but granting such relief would have been contrary to
Michigan law as the deadline for requesting and completing a recount already had
passed by the time Plaintiffs filed suit. Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.879. Further, a
recount may be requested only by a candidate. Id. And while Plaintiffs requested
the above relief, their ultimate goal was the decertification of Michigan’s
presidential election results and the certification of the losing candidate as the
winner—relief not “warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for
29
See Governor Gretchen E. Whitmer, State of Michigan: Office of the Governor,
Certificate of Ascertainment of the Electors of the President and Vice President of
the United States of America (Nov. 23, 2020, 5:30 PM), https://perma.cc/NWS4-
9FAB; Governor Gretchen Whitmer (@GovWhitmer), Twitter (Nov. 24 2020,
12:04 PM), https://perma.cc/22DF-XJRY.
54
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).
While courts do have the authority to grant injunctive relief affecting
conduct related to elections, no case suggests that courts possess the authority to
issue an injunction of the scope sought here. Plaintiffs’ attorneys maintain that the
strongest case is Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). There, however, the Supreme
Court was asked neither to order a recount nor to decertify Florida’s presidential
election results. Instead, the Court was asked to stop a recount ordered by the
Florida Supreme Court, which infringed the State’s legislatively enacted scheme.
Bush, 531 U.S. at 532-33. Ultimately, the Court halted the Florida recount of the
presidential election to allow the previously certified vote results to stand, id.,
which had declared President Bush the winner in the State.30
At the July 12 hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel pointed for the first time to the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878), as
supporting this Court’s authority to take—it seems the attorneys are suggesting—
any equitable action in connection with the 2020 presidential election. (ECF No.
157 at Pg ID 5335.) Apparently Throckmorton’s quotation of the maxim “fraud
vitiates everything” is a refrain that has been oft-repeated on social media by those
30
Notably, this was a recount sought by a candidate in accordance with Florida’s
contest provisions. Bush, 531 U.S. at 528.
55
who question the results of the 2020 presidential election and believe Former
President Trump should be declared the winner.31, 32 (ECF No. 164-8.) The City is
correct that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s citation to Throckmorton is puzzling, both because
the case relates to a nineteenth-century land grant and has nothing to do with
election law and because the Supreme Court held that the grant could not be
collaterally attacked on the basis that the judgment was procured by fraud. 98 U.S.
at 68. Simply put, the case does not support Plaintiffs’ legal contentions directly or
even by extension. Yet counsel’s citation to Throckmorton is enlightening in that
it reflects, as the City puts it, “that this suit has been driven by partisan political
posturing, entirely disconnected from the law” and “is the dangerous product of an
online feedback loop, with these attorneys citing ‘legal precedent’ derived not from
31
(See ECF No. 164-8 at Pg ID 2 (listing Twitter posts that state, among other
things, that (i) “[A]ny fraud located . . . constitutes nullification of the presidential
contest. This means, Trump wins by default because of the vote switching by
Dominion Machines. Look up Throckmorton 1878.”; (ii) “[F]raud will
DISQUALIFY Biden completely and mean that Trump will be the winner of all 50
states . . . . There can be no other outcome. ‘Fraud vitiates everything’ US v.
Throckmorton . . . .”; (iii) “[F]raud vitities everything. Meaning one state commits
voter fraud they all go down! So DJTrump wins the 2020 election.”; and (iv)
“Fraud vitiates everything it touches. [THROCKMORTON] . . . . Thus the
Biden/Harris ‘swearing in’ is negated, quashed annulled, invalidated, revoked and
abrogated.”).)
32
Of course, the Supreme Court did not hold in Throckmorton that “fraud vitiates
everything”; rather, it merely quoted this phrase from a treatise and then held that,
in fact, fraud did not justify overturning a federal district court’s 20-year-old
decree. 98 U.S. at 65, 68.
56
a serious analysis of case law, but from the rantings of conspiracy theorists sharing
amateur analysis and legal fantasy in their social media echo chambers.” (ECF No.
164 at Pg ID 6143.)
It is not lost upon the Court that the same claims and requested relief that
Plaintiffs’ attorneys presented here were disposed of, for many of the same
reasons, in Michigan courts33 and by judges in several other “battleground”
jurisdictions where Plaintiffs’ counsel sought to overturn the election results 34.
The fact that no federal district court considering the issues at bar has found them
worthy of moving forward supports the conclusion that Plaintiffs’ claims are
frivolous.
33
Op. & Order, Costantino, No. 20-014780-AW (Wayne Cnty. Cir. Ct. filed Nov.
13, 2020); Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Sec’y of State, Nos. 355378,
355397, 2020 Mich. LEXIS 2131 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2020), appeal denied
951 N.W.2d 353 (Mich. 2020).
34
See 12/7/20 Tr., Pearson v. Kemp, No. 1:20-cv-04809 (N.D. Ga. filed Dec. 8,
2020), ECF No. 79 at Pg 41-44; Wood v. Raffensperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310
(N.D. Ga. 2020), aff’d 981 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2020); Feehan v. Wis. Elections
Comm’n, 506 F. Supp. 3d 596 (E.D. Wis. 2020); Bowyer v. Ducey, 506 F. Supp. 3d
699 (D. Ariz. 2020).
57
b) Counsel’s contention that acts or events violated

Michigan election law (when the acts and events, even
if they occurred, did not)
Plaintiffs alleged that certain acts or events violated the Michigan Election
Code when, in fact, they did not.
To support the allegation that Defendants violated Michigan election laws
by accepting “unsecured ballots . . . without any chain of custody,”35 the Amended
Complaint states that Whitney Meyers “observed passengers in cars dropping off
more ballots than there were people in the car.”36 But when the Court asked
Plaintiffs’ counsel whether individuals other than the voter can drop off a ballot in
Michigan, Campbell answered in the affirmative. (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5486.)
And of course, anyone easily could have learned this by consulting Michigan law.
See Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.764a (explaining at Step 5(c) that a household
member or family member (as defined by Michigan law) may return a voter’s
absentee ballot). It seems to the Court, then, that Plaintiffs’ counsel knew or
should have known that this conduct did not violate existing state law.
35
(ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 879 ⁋ 15(A), 943 ⁋ 190(k) (citing IIC).)
36
(See IIC - “Additional Violations of Michigan Election Code That Caused
Ineligible, Illegal or Duplicate Ballots to Be Counted,” Subsection 7 - “Election
Workers Accepted Unsecured Ballots, without Chain of Custody, after 8:00 PM
Election Day Deadline,” ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 906 ⁋ 101 (referencing Meyers Aff.,
ECF No. 6-3 at PDF Pg 130-31).)
58
The Amended Complaint further claims that Michigan election laws were
violated because ballots that lacked postmarks were counted.37, 38 But when the
Court asked Plaintiffs’ attorneys whether Michigan absentee ballots must be
received through U.S. mail—and therefore postmarked—to be counted, counsel
went on about not being able to “rely on the Secretary of State’s guidance.” (ECF
No. 157 at Pg ID 5468.) Noticeably absent from that response, however, was an
answer to the Court’s question. Tellingly, when the City’s counsel stated that
ballots are not required to be mailed or postmarked in Michigan—as they “are
often handed in by hand”; “[via] boxes in front of clerk’s offices by hand”; and
sometimes “right across the desk in the clerk’s office” (id. at Pg ID 5470)—
Plaintiffs’ counsel did not object to or refute this recitation of the law. See Mich.
Comp. Laws § 168.764a (explaining that absentee ballots may be delivered
37
(ECF No. 6 at Pg. ID 879 ⁋ 15(C), 942 ⁋ 190(h) (citing IIC); see IIC -
“Additional Violations of Michigan Election Code That Caused Ineligible, Illegal
or Duplicate Ballots to Be Counted,” Subsection 4 - “Election Officials Counted
Ineligible Ballots with No Signatures or No Dates or with No Postmark on Ballot
Envelope,” ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 904 ⁋ 96 (referencing Brunell Aff., ECF No. 6-3 at
PDF Pg 35-36; Spalding Aff., ECF No. 6-3 at PDF Pg 61-62; and Sherer Aff., ECF
No. 6-3 at PDF Pg 126-28).)
38
When one searches through the unindexed affidavits attached as Exhibit 3 to
Plaintiffs’ pleading and eventually locates these affidavits, however, one finds that
none of the affiants state that ballots without postmarks were counted. (See ECF
No. 6-3 at PDF Pg 35-36, 61-62, 126-28.)
59
“[p]ersonally to the office of the clerk, to the clerk, or to an authorized assistant of
the clerk, or to a secure drop box”).
To support the allegation that Defendants “count[ed] ineligible ballots—and
in many cases—multiple times,” in violation of Michigan election law,39 the
Amended Complaint cites to several affidavits in which the affiants state that
batches of ballots were repeatedly run through the vote tabulation machines40.
When the Court asked whether Plaintiffs’ counsel inquired as to why a stack of
ballots might be run through tabulation machines more than once, Plaintiffs’
counsel did not answer the Court’s question and instead proclaimed that “ballots
are not supposed to be put through more than once. Absolutely not. That would
violate Michigan law.” (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5462.) But bafflingly, Plaintiffs’
counsel did not offer a cite to the law violated, and counsel did not identify such a
law in the Amended Complaint either. However, the affidavit of Christopher
Thomas, Senior Advisor to the Detroit City Clerk, filed in Costantino (“Thomas
Affidavit”), explained that “ballots are often fed through the high-speed reader
39
(ECF No. 6 at Pg. ID 879 ⁋ 15(B), 942 ⁋ 190(g) (citing IIC).)
40
(See IIC - “Additional Violations of Michigan Election Code That Caused
Ineligible, Illegal or Duplicate Ballots to Be Counted,” Subsection 2 - “Ineligible
Ballots Were Counted—Some Multiple Times,” ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 903 ⁋ 94
(referencing Helminen Aff., Waskilewski Aff., Mandelbuam Aff., Rose Aff., Sitek
Aff., Posch Aff., Champagne Aff., and Bomer Aff.).)
60
more than once” “as a routine part of the tabulation process.” (ECF No. 78-14 at
Pg ID 3772 ¶ 20.) And he detailed a myriad of reasons why this may be necessary,
including “if there is a jam in the reader” or “if there is a problem ballot (e.g.,
stains, tears, stray markings, . . . etc.) in a stack.” 41 (Id.)
At the July 12 hearing, Kleinhendler told the Court that it was “completely
irrelevant” whether the conduct Plaintiffs claimed was violative of Michigan law
was actually unlawful. This is because, counsel argued, the conduct “raise[d] a
suspicion” and what was significant was the mere chance for misfeasance to
occur.42 (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5484.) But litigants and attorneys cannot come to
federal court asserting that certain acts violate the law based only upon an
opportunity for—or counsel and the litigant’s suspicions of—a violation.
41
Thomas goes on to explain: “To an untrained observer[,] it may appear that the
ballot is being counted twice, however, the election worker will have cancelled the
appropriate count on the computer screen. Any human error in the process would
be identified during the canvass. If not, the number of voters at the absent voter
counting board would be dramatically different than the number of counted votes.”
(ECF No. 78-14 at Pg ID 3772 ¶ 20.)
42
To make his point, Kleinhendler used the analogy of handing someone an open
can of Coke and assuring the recipient that a drink had not been taken from it.
(ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5484.) But it is just as plausible that the can had been
sipped before delivery, as it is plausible that it had not been. A “pleading must
contain something more than a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion of
a legally cognizable right of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
556 (2007) (citation, internal quotation marks, brackets and ellipsis omitted).
61
c) Counsel’s failure to inquire into the requirements of

Michigan election law
Plaintiffs alleged that certain acts or events constituted violations of the
Michigan Election Code when, in fact, Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to make any
inquiry into whether such acts or events were in fact unlawful.
In light of Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendants violated the Michigan
Election Code by permitting ballots to arrive at the TCF Center “not in sealed
ballot boxes,” “without any chain of custody,” and “without envelopes”43 and
because the Amended Complaint does not identify a provision in the Michigan
Election Code prohibiting the actions about which Plaintiffs complain44, the Court
asked Plaintiffs’ attorneys at the July 12 hearing about their understanding
regarding Michigan’s ballot-bin requirements. (Id. at Pg ID 5478-79.) Counsel’s
response: “[W]e do not purport to be experts in Michigan’s process,” (id. at Pg ID
5479-80), and, they argued, the affidavit that supported this allegation—that of
Daniel Gustafson (“Gustafson Affidavit”)—was copied and pasted from
43
(ECF No. 6 at Pg. ID 879 ⁋ 15(F), 943 ⁋ 190(k) (citing IIC); see IIC -
“Additional Violations of Michigan Election Code That Caused Ineligible, Illegal
or Duplicate Ballots to Be Counted,” Subsection 7 - “Election Workers Accepted
Unsecured Ballots, without Chain of Custody, after 8:00 PM Election Day
Deadline,” ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 905-06 ⁋ 100 (quoting Gustafson Aff., ECF No. 6-
4 at PDF Pg 48-49).)
44
(See ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 878 ⁋ 14(C) (advancing this specific allegation but
citing no Michigan Election Code provision violated); id. at Pg ID 879 ⁋ 15(F)
(same); id. at Pg ID 905-06 ⁋ 100 (same); id. at Pg ID 943 ⁋ 190(k) (same).)
62
Costantino (id.). These evasive and non-responsive answers to the Court’s direct
questions amount to an admission that Plaintiffs’ counsel did not bother to find out
what the Michigan Election Code requires, and whether the acts alleged to
constitute violations of the Michigan Election Code were actually prohibited.
In Costantino—which was decided approximately two weeks before
Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit—Wayne County Circuit Court Judge Timothy
M. Kenny credited the Thomas Affidavit (ECF No. 78-11 at Pg ID 3738-39, 3742,
3745)—thereby informing Plaintiffs’ counsel that what Gustafson observed did not
in fact violate Michigan Election Code, or at a minimum putting counsel on notice
that there was a duty to inquire further. And even if Plaintiffs’ counsel lacked
expertise as to the Michigan Election Code, they undoubtedly were required to be
familiar enough with its provisions to confirm that the conduct they asserted
violated that code in fact did.
The Court finds Plaintiffs’ counsel’s arguments to the contrary unavailing.
First, the attorneys assert that neither opposing counsel nor the Thomas Affidavit
took issue with the facts as outlined in the Gustafson Affidavit (ECF No. 157 at Pg
ID 5481-82) and, therefore, the Gustafson Affidavit does not suggest that
Plaintiffs’ counsel engaged in any conduct worthy of sanctions. This misses the
point. The sanctionable conduct is not based on whether the facts described in the
Gustafson Affidavit are true or false. What is sanctionable is counsel’s allegation
63
that violations of the Michigan Election Code occurred based on those facts,
without bothering to figure out if Michigan law actually prohibited the acts
described.
Second, Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that permitting ballots to be handled and
transported in the manner described in the Gustafson Affidavit “raises a suspicion”
and “[w]hether [such acts are] required under Michigan law or not[] [is]
completely irrelevant.” (Id. at Pg ID 5484.) But the Amended Complaint
repeatedly asserts that Defendants violated the Michigan Election Code and
Plaintiffs’ state law, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Electors and Elections
Clauses claims are based on these alleged violations. (See, e.g., ECF No. 6 at Pg
ID 877, 879, 892, 903, 937-48, 953, 955.) And, again, a mere “suspicion” is not
enough—this is especially so when neither the litigant nor his or her counsel has
bothered to figure out exactly what the law is or what it permits.
For the reasons discussed in the three subsections above, the Court
concludes that Plaintiffs’ attorneys presented claims not warranted by existing law
or a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law.
2. Whether Plaintiffs’ counsel presented pleadings for which

the factual contentions lacked evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, would likely have evidentiary
support in violation of Rule 11(b)(3)
Before analyzing whether Plaintiffs’ counsel violated Rule 11(b)(3), the
Court pauses to answer two questions.

64
The sanctionable conduct under Rule 11(b)(3)
Plaintiffs’ attorneys argue that they genuinely believed the factual
allegations in this lawsuit, and otherwise filed this suit and the accompanying
documents in good faith. (See ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5415, 5418, 5419, 5492-93,
5501.) They also argue that the affiants genuinely believed the same and
submitted their affidavits also in good faith. (Id. at Pg ID 5403.) Because all of
this was done in good faith, counsel contends, they should not be sanctioned.
Of course, an “empty-head” but “pure-heart” does not justify lodging
patently unsupported factual assertions.45 And the good or bad faith nature of
actions or submissions is not what determines whether sanctions are warranted
under Rule 11(b)(3). What the City claims and the Court agrees is sanctionable as
a violation of the rule is the filing of pleadings claiming violations of the Michigan
Election Code, Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, and Electors and
Elections Clauses where the factual contentions asserted to support those claims
lack evidentiary support. The Court spent significant time during the July 12
hearing inquiring about the various reports and affidavits Plaintiffs attached to their
pleadings not necessarily because Plaintiffs’ counsel may have filed this lawsuit in
45
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes (1993 Amendment) (noting
that Rule 11’s objective standard is “intended to eliminate any ‘empty-head pure-
heart’ justification for patently frivolous arguments”); Tahfs, 316 F.3d at 594 (“A
good faith belief in the merits of a case is insufficient to avoid sanctions.”).
65
bad faith, and not necessarily because the affiants may have submitted their
affidavits in bad faith. Rather, the Court did so because—as discussed below—no
reasonable attorney would accept the assertions in those reports and affidavits as
fact or as support for factual allegations in a pleading when based on such
speculation and conjecture. And no reasonable attorney would repeat them as fact
or as support for a factual allegation without conducting the due diligence inquiry
required under Rule 11(b).
To be clear, as to Rule 11(b)(3), the Court is not concerned with whether
counsel’s conduct was done in bad faith.46 The Court is concerned only with what
the reports and affidavits say and reveal on their face, and what Plaintiffs’ counsel
should (or should not) have done before presenting them in light of what is
revealed on their face.47
46
This does not mean, however, that violating Rule 11(b)(3) by presenting
pleadings for which the factual contentions lacked evidentiary support cannot be
done in bad faith or for an improper purpose. If it is, this would of course
constitute a violation of Rule 11(b)(1). See infra, Section IV, Subsection B, Part
3—“Whether Plaintiffs’ counsel acted with an improper purpose in violation of
Rule 11(b)(1).”
47
Plaintiffs’ attorneys further contend that they did more than was required by
attaching this “evidence” to their pleadings. (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5534.) True,
Plaintiffs were not required to attach evidence to support their factual allegations;
but, they did. Therefore, they had an obligation to scrutinize the contents and
doing so would have revealed that key factual assertions made in their pleading
lacked evidentiary support.
66
No evidentiary hearing is needed
Plaintiffs’ attorneys contend that “[t]he proper method for evaluating
affidavits is an evidentiary hearing” during which a court tests the veracity of the
affiants and, without one, the Court cannot sanction counsel. (See, e.g., ECF No.
161 at Pg ID 5815, 5816 n.10; ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5491-93.) However, the
affiants’ credibility and the truth or falsity of their affidavits have no bearing on
what the Court finds sanctionable under Rule 11(b)(2) and (3).
Instead, what is sanctionable under Rule 11(b)(2) as discussed above is,
among other things, (i) asserting that acts or events violated Michigan election law,
when the acts and events (even if they occurred) did not and (ii) failing to inquire
into the requirements of Michigan election law. What is sanctionable under Rule
11(b)(3) as discussed below is (i) presenting factual assertions lacking evidentiary
support; (ii) presenting facts taken from affidavits containing speculation and
conjecture because, at no stage during the litigation process, would such
“evidence” count as evidentiary support for a factual allegation; (iii) failing to ask
questions of affiants who submitted affidavits that were central to the factual
allegations that the affidavits supported; (iv) failing to inquire (sufficiently, if at
all) into recycled affidavits first used by different attorneys in earlier election-
challenge lawsuits; and (v) failing to inquire into information readily discernible as
false.
67
Because ascertaining whether Plaintiffs’ counsel committed any Rule 11(b)
(2) or (3) infraction does not turn on the veracity of the affiants and the Court
obtained the information it needed during the hearing and via the sanctions
briefing, an evidentiary hearing is of no use.48
a) Counsel’s failure to present any evidentiary support

for factual assertions
Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to present any evidence to support their allegation
of “illegal double voting.” (See ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 903 ¶ 93.) To support this
factual assertion, Plaintiffs pointed to a single piece of “evidence”: the affidavit of
Jessy Jacob (“Jacob Affidavit”).49 That affidavit states in part: “I observed a large
number of people who came to the satellite location to vote in-person, but they had
48
Plaintiffs’ attorneys complain that the Court focused on only a limited number of
affidavits at the July 12 motion hearing, when more were laced throughout their
960-page Amended Complaint. (ECF 157 at Pg ID 5450-51.) However, as the
Court noted at the motion hearing, the affidavits focused on were often the only
evidence cited to support key factual assertions in Plaintiffs’ pleadings. (Id. at Pg
ID 5358, 5410, 5420, 5428, 5435, 5448, 5452.) And, as discussed below, all of the
affidavits the Court references in this Opinion & Order’s Rule 11(b)(3) analysis
were in fact the only pieces of evidence offered to support the relevant factual
allegation.
49
(ECF No. 6 at Pg. ID 942 ⁋ 190(f) (citing IIC); see IIC - “Additional Violations
of Michigan Election Code That Caused Ineligible, Illegal or Duplicate Ballots to
Be Counted,” Subsection 1 - “Illegal Double Voting,” ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 903 ⁋ 93
(referencing Jacob Aff., ECF No. 6-4 at PDF Pg 36-38).)
68
already applied for an absentee ballot.”50 (ECF No. 6-4 at PDF Pg 37 (emphasis
added).) 51 Of course, applying for an absentee ballot is not evidence that someone
voted via an absentee ballot, and when the Court highlighted this lack of evidence
as to “double voting” during the hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel responded: “I think
there’s inferences that can be drawn, and it should not shock this Court that
somebody could show up, after having asked for an absentee ballot … and then
show up and vote again.” (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5454-55 (emphasis added).)
It does not shock the Court that a Michigan resident can request an absentee
ballot and thereafter decide to vote in person. Indeed, Michigan law says that
voters can. Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.769(1) (“An absent voter may vote in person
within his or her precinct at an election, notwithstanding that he or she applies for
an absent voter ballot and the ballot is mailed or otherwise delivered to the absent
voter by the clerk” if, “[b]efore voting in person,” “the absent voter [] return[s] the
50
Jacob does claim that people came to vote in person at the satellite location
where she worked who had already applied for an absentee ballot, and that those
individuals voted without returning the mailed absentee ballot or signing an
affidavit that the ballot had been lost. (ECF No. 6-4 at PDF Pg 37 ¶ 10.) Michigan
law makes it a felony to vote both in person and absentee. See Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 168.769(4). Of course, Jacob does not state that these individuals voted in
person and absentee. As such, her affidavit in fact does not plausibly support
“illegal double voting.” (ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 903.)
51
Some of the documents filed by the parties contain illegible docket headers. In
such instances, the Court references the “PDF” page numbers instead of the “Page
IDs.”
69
absent voter ballot.”). But the Court is concerned that Plaintiffs’ attorneys believe
that a Michigan resident’s choice to do so serves as circumstantial evidence that
the Michigan resident “double voted.” It does not. Inferences must be reasonable
and come from facts proven, not speculation or conjecture. United States v.
Catching, 786 F. App’x 535, 539 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted) (explaining
that “reasonable inferences from the evidence” are allowed but not “mere
speculative inferences”); see also id. (quoting Cold Metal Process Co. v. McLouth
Steel Corp., 126 F.2d 185, 188 (6th Cir. 1942) (“An inference is but a reasonable
deduction and conclusion from proven facts.”)).
b) Counsel’s presentment of conjecture and speculation

as evidentiary support for factual assertions
Plaintiffs’ counsel presented affidavits that were based on conjecture,
speculation, and guesswork.
To support the allegation that “unsecured ballots arrived at the TCF Center
loading garage, not in sealed ballot boxes, without any chain of custody, and
without envelopes, after the 8:00 PM Election Day deadline,” Plaintiffs quote the
70
affidavit of Matt Ciantar (“Ciantar Affidavit”),52, 53 which is a masterclass on
making conjectural leaps and bounds:
The afternoon following the election[,] as I was taking

my normal dog walk (mid-afternoon), I witnessed a dark
van pull into the small post office located in downtown
Plymouth, MI. I witnessed a young couple . . . pull into
the parking lot . . . and proceed to exit their van (no
markings) . . . and open[] up the back hatch and
proceed[] to take 3-4 very large clear plastic bags out . . .
and walk them over to a running USPS Vehicle that
appeared as if it was “waiting” for them. . . .
There was no interaction between the couple and any

USPS employee which I felt was very odd. . . . They did
not walk inside the post office like a normal customer to
drop of[f] mail. It was as if the postal worker was told to
meet and standby until these large bags arrived. . . .
[T]he bags were clear plastic with markings in black on

the bag and on the inside of these clear bags was another
plastic bag that was not clear (could not see what was
inside) . . . . [There were] what looked like a black
security zip tie on each back [sic] as if it were “tamper
evident” type of device to secure the bag. . . . [B]y the
time I realized I should take pictures of the bags once I
noticed this looked “odd[,]” they had taken off.
52
(ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 943 ⁋ 190(k) (citing IIC); see IIC - “Additional Violations
of Michigan Election Code That Caused Ineligible, Illegal or Duplicate Ballots to
Be Counted,” Subsection 7 - “Election Workers Accepted Unsecured Ballots,
without Chain of Custody, after 8:00 PM Election Day Deadline,” ECF No. 6 at Pg
ID 906 ⁋ 103 (quoting Ciantar Affidavit, ECF No. 6-7 at Pg ID 1312-14).)
53
Plaintiffs also reference the Gustafson and Meyers Affidavits to support this
allegation. (ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 905-06 ⁋⁋ 100-03.) For the reasons discussed
above (see supra 58, 63-64), these two affidavits are of little to no evidentiary
value.
71
The other oddity was that [sic] the appearance of the

couple. After the drop, they were smiling, laughing at
one another.
What I witnessed and considered that what could be in

those bags could be ballots going to the TCF center or
coming from the TCF center . . . .
(ECF No. 6-7 at Pg ID 1312-14 (emphasis added).)
When the Court asked Plaintiffs’ attorneys how any of them, as officers of
the court, could present this affidavit as factual support of anything alleged in their
pleadings and Motion for Injunctive Relief, counsel emphatically argued that “[t]he
witness is setting forth exactly what he observed and [the] information that he
bases it on. . . . He saw these plastic bags . . . . It is a true affidavit.” (ECF No. 157
at Pg ID 5488-89.) The Court accepts that the affidavit is true in that Ciantar
memorialized what he saw at the time. But the Court cannot find it reasonable to
assert, as Plaintiffs’ attorneys do, that this “shows fraud.” (Id. at Pg ID 5489.)
Absolutely nothing about this affidavit supports the allegation that ballots were
delivered to the TCF Center after the Election Day deadline. And even if the Court
entertained the assertion of Plaintiffs’ counsel that this affidavit “is one piece of a
pattern” reflecting fraud or Defendants’ violations of Michigan election laws (id.),
this would be a picture with many holes. This is because a document containing
the lengthy musings of one dog-walker after encountering a “smiling, laughing”
72
couple delivering bags of unidentified items in no way serves as evidence that state
laws were violated or that fraud occurred.
During the hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel further asserted that “we don’t
typically rewrite what an affiant says.” (Id. at Pg ID 5490.) That is good. But,
pursuant to their duties as officers of the court, attorneys typically do not offer
factual allegations that have no hope of passing as evidentiary support at any stage
of the litigation.
To support the allegation that Defendants “fraudulently add[ed] tens of
thousands of new ballots . . . to the [Qualified Voter File] . . . on November 4,
2020, all or nearly all of which were votes for Joe Biden,”54 Plaintiffs quote the
affidavit of Melissa Carone (“Carone Affidavit”),55 which describes “facts” that
demonstrate no misconduct or malfeasance, and amount to no more than strained
and disjointed innuendo of something sinister:
54
(ECF No. 6 at Pg. ID 942 ⁋ 190(a) (citing IIB).)
55
Plaintiffs also reference the affidavit of Andrew Sitto (“Sitto Affidavit”) and
Robert Cushman (“Cushman Affidavit”) to support this allegation. (ECF No. 6 at
Pg ID 905-06 ⁋⁋ 100-03.) But as Judge Kenny concluded in Costantino, Sitto’s
affidavit is “rife with speculation and guess-work about sinister motives” and he
“knew little about the process of the absentee voter counting board activity.” (ECF
No. 31-15 at Pg ID 2443.) Indeed, the evidentiary value of the Sitto Affidavit is
questionable at best. And while the Court does not discuss the Cushman Affidavit
in this Opinion and Order, the Court notes that Plaintiffs describe the Carone
Affidavit as “the most probative evidence” of the factual allegation at bar. (ECF
No. 6 at Pg ID 899 ¶ 84.)
73
There was [sic] two vans that pulled into the garage of
the counting room, one on day shift and one on night
shift. These vans were apparently bringing food into the
building . . . . I never saw any food coming out of these
vans, coincidently it was announced on the news that
Michigan had discovered over 100,000 more ballots—not
even two hours after the last van left.56
The Amended Complaint calls this an “illegal vote dump.” (ECF No. 6 at Pg ID
900 ⁋ 84.)
But nothing described by Carone connects the vans to any ballots; nothing
connects the illusory ballots to President Biden; and nothing connects the illusory
votes for President Biden to the 100,000 ballots “coincidently” announced on the
news as “discovered” in Michigan.57 Yet not a single member of Plaintiffs’ legal
team spoke with Carone to fill in these speculation-filled gaps before using her
56
(See IIB – “Election Workers Fraudulently Forged, Added, Removed or
Otherwise Altered Information on Ballots, Qualified Voter List and Other Voting
Records,” Subsection 1 – “Election Workers Fraudulently Added ‘Tens of
Thousands’ of New Ballots and New Voters in the Early Morning and Evening of
November 4,” ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 899-900 ⁋ 84 (quoting Carone Affidavit, ECF
No. 6-5 at Pg ID 1306 ⁋ 8).)
57
And nothing in the affidavit enlightens its reader as to what is meant by
“discovered.”
74
affidavit to support the allegation that tens of thousands of votes for President
Biden were fraudulently added.58, 59 (See ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5426-28.)
It is also notable that, when the Court asked Plaintiffs’ counsel whether an
affiant’s observation of a self-described “coincidence” serves as evidentiary
support for the allegation that an “illegal vote dump” occurred, Plaintiffs’ counsel
appeared to say that it was okay in this case because Ramsland “relied on [the
Carone Affidavit] for . . . his statistical analysis” and “an expert can rely on
hearsay.” (Id. at Pg ID 5429.) But the problem with the Carone Affidavit does not
concern hearsay—it concerns conjecture. And surely Plaintiffs’ attorneys cannot
fail to reasonably inquire into an affiant’s speculative statements and thereafter
escape their duty to “stop-and-think” before making factual allegations based on
the statements, simply because their expert did the same. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
Advisory Committee Notes (1993 Amendment) (“The rule continues to require
litigants to ‘stop-and-think’ before initially making legal or factual contentions.”).
58
Without engaging in such an inquiry—much less a reasonable one—counsel’s
affirmative decision to label the 100,000 ballots discussed on the news—or the
illusory ballots theoretically removed from two vans—an “illegal vote dump”
serves as a quintessential example of guesswork laced with bad faith.
59
Kleinhendler emphasized during the hearing that Carone “publicly testified . . .
in Michigan about her findings.” (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5427.) It is
nonsensensical to suggest that supporting a key factual allegation with nothing
more than speculation is justified because that speculation was repeated publicly.
75
Plaintiffs’ counsel further emphasized that if Carone “[said] things that don’t
turn out to be entirely accurate, that can be discovered through the processes that
this Court is very familiar with.” (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5429.) The Court
assumes the attorneys were referring to the discovery process. But here’s the snag:
Plaintiffs are not entitled to rely on the discovery process to mine for evidence that
never existed in the first instance. See Goldman v. Barrett, 825 F. App’x 35, 38
(2d Cir. 2020) (explaining that a plaintiff “may not rely on discovery to
manufacture a claim that lacks factual support in the first instance” but “may use
discovery to bolster evidence”).
And speculation, coincidence, and innuendo could never amount to evidence
of an “illegal vote dump”—much less, anything else.60
60
The Supreme Court has made clear that where there are perfectly plausible
alternative explanations for an event—here, for example, legally cast ballots
simply being delivered and counted—a plaintiff’s allegations are not to be
accepted as true. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (explaining the “need at the
pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)”
liability). And of course, the mere fact that the affiant and/or Plaintiffs’ counsel
opted to use seemingly sinister language to describe an event does not make that
event sinister, wrongful, unlawful, or fraudulent.
76
c) Counsel’s failure to inquire into the evidentiary

support for factual assertions
Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to ask questions of the individuals who submitted
affidavits that were central to the factual allegations in the pleadings.
To support the allegation that Defendants permitted “election workers [to]
change votes for Trump and other Republican candidates,”61 Plaintiffs point to one
thing—namely, Articia Bomer’s affidavit (“Bomer Affidavit”):
I observed a station where election workers were

working on scanned ballots that had issues that needed to
be manually corrected. I believe some of these workers
were changing votes that had been cast for Donald
Trump and other Republican candidates.62
Per the Amended Complaint, this is the only evidence and only “eyewitness
testimony of election workers manually changing votes for Trump to votes for
Biden.” (ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 902 ⁋ 91.)
When the Court asked whether an affiant’s belief that something occurred
constitutes evidentiary support for that occurrence, Plaintiffs’ counsel stated: “[I]f
you see it, that would certainly help you to form a belief.” (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID
61
(ECF No. 6 at Pg. ID 942 ⁋ 190(d) (citing IIB).)
62
Records,” Subsection 4 - “Election Workers Changed Votes for Trump and Other
Republican Candidate,” ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 902 ⁋ 91 (quoting Bomer Aff., ECF
No. 6-3 at Pg ID 1008-10) (emphasis added).)
77
5450.) The Court then asked: “[D]id anyone inquire as to whether or not [] Bomer
actually saw someone change a vote?” (Id. at Pg ID 5452.) The Court was met
with silence. (Id.)
As an initial matter, an affiant’s subjective belief that an event occurred does
not constitute evidence that the event in fact occurred. But more importantly,
during the hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded that the Bomer Affidavit had
evidentiary value only if Bomer saw election workers manually changing votes for
Former President Trump to votes for President Biden. Yet, without asking Bomer
if she saw such manual changes, Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted her affidavit as
evidentiary support that such manual changes in fact occurred. This alone fell
short of counsel’s obligation to conduct a reasonable inquiry and is the very laxity
that the sanctions schemes are designed to penalize.
And Plaintiffs’ counsel’s failure to ask this material question—when paired
with their affirmative decision to label Bomer’s testimony as “eyewitness testimony
of election workers manually changing votes”—evinces bad faith. Plaintiffs’
counsel may not bury their heads in the sand and thereafter make affirmative
proclamations about what occurred above ground. In such cases, ignorance is not
bliss—it is sanctionable.
78
d) Counsel’s failure to inquire into evidentiary support

taken from other lawsuits
As evidentiary support in this case, Plaintiffs’ counsel attached affidavits to
their pleadings that were submitted in two previously filed election-challenge
lawsuits without engaging in a reasonable inquiry as to their contents.
For example, to support the allegation that Defendants “fraudulently add[ed]
tens of thousands of new ballots and/or new voters to the [Qualified Voter File] . . .
on November 4, 2020,”63 Plaintiffs quote the Sitto Affidavit64. When the Court
inquired about factual assertions in the Sitto Affidavit (Id. at Pg ID 5412),
Kleinhendler responded that “[t]hese were affidavits that were submitted by
counsel in [Costantino]” (id. at Pg ID 5414-15). Plaintiffs’ attorneys admit to
similarly lifting the Carone Affidavit from Costantino and filing it in this case as
evidentiary support without engaging in an independent inquiry as to its merits.65
63
(ECF No. 6 at Pg. ID 942 ⁋ 190(a) (citing IIB).)
64
Records,” Subsection 1 – “Election Workers Fraudulently Added ‘Tens of
Thousands’ of New Ballots and New Voters in the Early Morning and Evening of
November 4,” ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 899 ⁋ 82 (quoting Sitto Aff., ECF No. 6-4 at
PDF Pg 40-42).)
65
(ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5433 (Ms. Haller: “I would just point out that the
[Carone Affidavit] . . . [is] documented as a document from the [Costantino] court
. . . . It is not represented to be a document that was created by us. It is not
represented to be anything other than what it was, which is a document from a
79
The attorneys admit the same as to the Bomer Affidavit. (Id. at Pg ID 5448-49.)
And suggest the same as to the Jacob Affidavit. (Id. at Pg ID 5440-45.) In fact,
almost every (if not every) non-expert affidavit attached to Plaintiffs’ pleadings
here (see ECF Nos. 6-3 to 6-6, 6-13, 6-14) was filed by other attorneys in prior
lawsuits. See Complaint Exs. 1-4, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., No. 1:20-
cv-01083 (W.D. Mich. filed Nov. 11, 2020), ECF Nos. 1-2 to 1-4; Complaint Exs.
A-F, Costantino, No. 20-014780 (Wayne Cnty. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 8, 2020).
When the Court asked whether Plaintiffs’ counsel inquired as to the
affidavits copied and pasted from the other cases, Plaintiffs’ counsel dipped and
dodged the question and did not disclaim the City’s counsel’s assertions that they
did not. (See, e.g., ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5440-47, 5452-55.) “[O]ther lawyers
saw it” and “[t]hey believed it to be appropriate for submission to the Court in that
circumstance,” Plaintiffs’ attorneys argued. (Id. at Pg ID 5445.) “[Y]ou’ve got to
be able to trust when something has been submitted by counsel because of the oath
that we take” knowing that “everybody else within the profession” therefore
believes that the attorney’s submission “should have tremendous value.” (Id. at Pg
ID 5419.) Clearly, Plaintiffs’ counsel relied on the assessment of counsel for the
different court. . . . It is a document that is not hearsay. It is a simple document

that is a sworn statement from another court that is cited to by our expert, and we
rely upon it to the extent that it’s cited in the complaint.”).)
80
plaintiffs in other cases as to the affidavits from those cases that Plaintiffs’ counsel
recycled here.
This is not okay. The Court remains baffled after trying to ascertain what
convinced Plaintiffs’ counsel otherwise. “Substituting another lawyer’s judgment
for one’s own does not constitute reasonable inquiry.” Schottenstein v.
Schottenstein, 230 F.R.D. 355, 361-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Pravic v. U.S.
Indus.-Clearing, 109 F.R.D. 620, 622 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (holding that counsel’s
reliance on a memorandum prepared by a separate law firm was not reasonable
because, among other things, counsel “did no independent research”). In short,
Plaintiffs’ counsel cannot hide behind the attorneys who filed Costantino or any
other case to establish that Plaintiffs’ counsel fulfilled their duty to ensure that the
affidavits they pointed to as evidentiary support for the pleadings here, in fact had
any chance of ever amounting to evidence.66
In their supplemental brief in support of their motion for sanctions, the State
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to engage in the requisite pre-
filing inquiry, pointing to several statements Powell made in an election-related
66
Plaintiffs’ attorneys argue that “[t]he court never held an evidentiary hearing in
Costantino and, as a result, did not properly assess the merits of the action” and
“[t]his was one of the reasons why the[y] presented affidavits from that action in
this case.” (ECF No. 161 at Pg ID 5816 n.10.) The point, however, is that
presenting those affidavits required counsel to first conduct a reasonable inquiry
into the factual allegations contained therein.
81
defamation case, which is based in part on allegations made in the instant lawsuit.
(See ECF No. 118-2 at Pg ID 4806.) In a motion to dismiss filed in that case,
Powell argued that, even if the plaintiffs “attempt[] to impugn the various
declarations as unreliable[] [or] attack the veracity or reliability of the various
declarants,” “[l]awyers involved in fast-moving litigation concerning matters of
transcendent public importance, who rely on sworn declarations, are entitled to no
less protection” than “[j]ournalists [who] usually repeat statements from sources
(usually unsworn, often anonymous) on whom they rely for their stories, and
sometimes those statements turn out not to be true.” (Id. at PDF Pg 66-67.)
“Journalists”—like attorneys, Powell argued—“must be free to rely on sources
they deem to be credible, without being second-guessed by irate public figures who
believe that the journalists should have been more skeptical.” (Id. at PDF Pg 67.)
In response to the State Defendants’ supplemental brief, instead of
explaining what efforts they undertook to investigate the veracity of the affidavits,
Plaintiffs’ attorneys argue that they “never stated that lawyers cannot be held to
account.” (ECF No. 120 at Pg ID 5004.) “Instead,” they argue, the motion to
dismiss “justifies lawyers being afforded the same type of Constitutional
protections as journalists,” “who . . . would lose the protection afforded to them by
the Supreme Court . . . if they were ‘drawn into long court battles designed to
82
deconstruct the accuracy of sources on which they rely.’” (Id. at Pg 5004-05
(quoting ECF 118-2 at PDF Pg 66-67).)
Attorneys are not journalists. It therefore comes as no surprise that
Plaintiffs’ attorneys fail to cite a single case suggesting that the two professions
share comparable duties and responsibilities. Perhaps this confused understanding
as to the job of an attorney, and what the law says about the attendant duties and
obligations, is what led Plaintiffs’ counsel to simply copy and paste affidavits from
prior lawsuits. Perhaps not. But what is certain is that Plaintiffs’ counsel will not
escape accountability for their failure to conduct due diligence before recycling
affidavits from other cases to support their pleadings here.
e) Counsel’s failure to inquire into Ramsland’s

outlandish and easily debunked numbers
Plaintiffs’ counsel attached Ramsland’s affidavit to their pleadings to
support the assertion that hundreds of thousands of illegal votes were injected into
Michigan’s election for President. (See ECF No. 6-24.) In his affidavit, Ramsland
refers to several statistical “red flag[s],” including: (i) reports of 6,000 votes in
Antrim County being switched from Former President Trump to President Biden
and (ii) 643 precincts in Michigan with voter turn-out exceeding 80% (e.g.,
460.51% in Zeeland Charter Township, 215.21% in Grout Township, Gladwin
County, and 139.29% in Detroit). (Id. at Pg ID 1573-74 ¶¶ 10, 11.)
83
However, the State issued a bulletin well before this lawsuit was filed
explaining the user error that led to the miscount in Antrim County’s unofficial
results, which had been “quickly identified and corrected.” (ECF No. 39-12.) And
official election results for Michigan—reporting voter turnout rates vastly lower
than the numbers in Ramsland’s affidavit—were published and readily available
shortly after the election and well-before his report was filed here.67 A reasonable
attorney, seeing Ramsland’s striking original figures, would inquire into their
accuracy or at least question their source.
Even the most basic internet inquiry would have alerted Plaintiffs’ counsel
to the wildly inaccurate assertions in Ramsland’s affidavit. For example, in
comparison to the voter turnout of 139.29% in the City of Detroit claimed by
Ramsland, the official turnout was recorded on or before November 19, 2020 as
67
Ramsland fails to identify the source of his figures in the initial affidavit
presented in this case, indicating only that he and his colleagues “have studied the
information that is publicly available concerning the November 3, 2020 election
results.” (See ECF No. 6-24 at Pg ID 1573 ¶ 9.) He astoundingly claims, however,
that “[s]ome larger precincts in Wayne Co[unty] and others are no longer publicly
reporting their data[.]” (Id. at Pg ID 1574 ¶ 11.) And after it was widely reported
that Ramsland’s figures were grossly inaccurate, Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted new
numbers from Ramsland in an “expert report” filed December 3, 2020, where
Ramsland claims that “[t]he source of that original data was State level data that no
longer exists [f]or some unexplained reason” and, for the first time, identifies those
purported sources. (ECF No. 49-3 at Pg ID 3123 ¶ 6.)
84
being 50.88%.68 Ramsland reported that voter turnout in Zeeland Charter
Township was a whopping 460.51%, when an official report ran on November 11
showed that the average turnout for the four precincts within the township was
80.11%.69 And unlike Ramsland’s assertion of an eye-popping 781.9% turnout in
the City of North Muskegon, the two precincts in the city had a turnout of 73.53%
and 82.21%, averaging 77.78%, as indicated as of November 13, 2020.70
And before Plaintiffs’ counsel presented Ramsland’s affidavit here, there
was more to alert them as to the unreliability of Ramsland’s figures and to put
them on notice that further inquiry was warranted. Specifically, attorneys used an
affidavit from Ramsland in Wood’s challenge to the presidential election results in
Georgia. See Aff., Wood v. Raffensperger, No. 20-04651 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 18,
2020), ECF No. 7-1. But there, Ramsland represented data as being from
Michigan when, in fact, the townships listed were in Minnesota. See id. at Pgs. 3,
6. Moreover, it was widely publicized before Plaintiffs’ counsel offered
68
Official Results for November 3, 2020 General Election, City of Detroit (Nov.
19, 2020, 2:11 PM), https://perma.cc/A8MY-FZEJ.
69
Official Results for Ottawa County Precinct, Ottawa County (Nov. 11, 2020,
4:20 PM), at PDF Pg 918-54, https://perma.cc/3W57-D33G.
70
Official Results for Muskegon County Precinct, Muskegon County (Nov. 13,
2020, 5:55 PM), at PDF Pg 466-67, https://perma.cc/9MAA-J6RU.
85
Ramsland’s affidavit here that even for the Minnesota locations, Ramsland’s
conclusions about over-votes was not supported by official data from the State.71
It is true, as Plaintiffs’ attorneys assert to defend their use of Ramsland’s
affidavit, that Ramsland adjusted his voter turnout figures in a subsequently filed
report. (See ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5396; ECF No. 49-3 at Pg ID 3124.) However,
counsel never drew attention to this modification in the reply brief to which
Ramsland’s updated report was attached, or anywhere else. (See ECF No. 49.)
But more importantly, this does not change the fact that a reasonable inquiry was
not done before Ramsland’s initial affidavit was presented.72
For the reasons discussed in subsections a-e above, the Court concludes that
Plaintiffs’ counsel presented pleadings for which the factual contentions lacked
evidentiary support.
71
See, e.g., Aaron Blake, The Trump Campaign’s Much-Hyped Affidavit Features
a Big, Glaring Error, Washington Post (Nov. 21, 2020, 7:39 AM),
https://perma.cc/E6LY-AL44.
72
It is unclear from counsel’s answers to the Court’s questions at the July 12
hearing whether Plaintiffs’ attorneys questioned Ramsland about the startling
numbers in his affidavit before it was filed or after. (See ECF No. 157 at Pg ID
5395-96 (Kleinhendler explaining that he asked Ramsland about “these numbers”
and “[Ramsland] said, ‘Yes, yes, I did question them. Yes, I did review, and yes,
it was an error’ that he corrected on his reply affidavit.”).) However, even if
Kleinhendler questioned Ramsland about the numbers before the affidavit was
filed, such inquiry clearly was insufficient considering the readily available data
contradicting them.
86
3. Whether Plaintiffs’ counsel acted with an improper purpose

in violation of Rule 11(b)(1)
The Court already concluded that Plaintiffs’ counsel acted with an improper
purpose when affirmatively labeling as an “illegal vote dump” the 100,000 ballots
discussed on the news, despite failing to inquire as to the gaps that established the
relevant affidavit as nothing more than conjecture. Evidence of improper purpose
can also be found in their decision to label as “eyewitness testimony” an affidavit
that does not state that the affiant saw election workers manually changing votes,
especially when opting not to even ask the affiant if she saw such a thing. And
still, evidence of bad faith abounds.
First, Campbell filed an emergency motion within hours of the July 12
hearing’s conclusion, asking the Court to publicly release the recording of the
proceeding. (ECF No. 152.) In that motion, some of the attorneys representing
Plaintiffs argued:
[O]n June 17, 2021, the Court issued an order that

“[e]ach attorney whose name appears on any of
Plaintiffs’ pleadings or briefs shall be present at the
motion hearing.” [ECF No. 123.] Media around the
country picked up this story, including large internet
news sites such as Yahoo, The Hill, and MSN. . . .
Indicative of the public’s interest, the Sanctions Hearing,

at its peak, “attracted more than 13,000 people watching
the live video” on YouTube as broadcasted by the Court.
The national media, from the Associated Press to CNN to
the New York Times, ran stories on the hearing. Most
outlets presented a narrative that counsel for plaintiffs
87
believe to be incorrect. Those characterizations may

change if the Court republishes the video and allows
others to view it. . . . [T]he recording is no longer
available on the Court’s website. Consequently, counsel
is unable to refute what they believe to be public
mischaracterizations. . . .
There was a lot of “spirit” in the hearing in this court,

which the public should be able to experience in its
entirety—enabling citizens to draw their own inferences
from the presentations instead of depending on media
presentations.
(Id. at Pg ID 5284-89 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).)73
Notwithstanding the apparent belief of Plaintiffs’ counsel, this case is being
tried in a court of law, not the court of public opinion. As noted throughout this
decision, statutes, rules, and standards of professional responsibility apply.
Considering Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ obligation to act within these parameters, this
Court is curious as to what narrative Plaintiffs’ attorneys wished to present through
the video’s release. The Telegram message Wood posted within hours of the
hearing’s conclusion gives some insight,74 as do the introductory remarks in
73
Plaintiffs’ attorneys also asserted that the video would assist them with the
drafting of their supplemental briefs; however, this justification for releasing the
video was not made until late in their brief and was addressed in only two
paragraphs of the 15-paragraph submission. (ECF No. 152 at Pg ID 5289-90.)
74
In the post, Wood expressed in part that he “thought [he] was attending a hearing
in Venezuela or Communist China.” (ECF No. 151-1 at Pg ID 5278.) He further
expressed that “[t]he rule of law and due process does [sic] not exist at this time in
our country except in a very, very few courtrooms.” (Id.)
88
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s supplemental brief75. What is most important, however, and
what very clearly reflects bad faith is that Plaintiffs’ attorneys are trying to use the
judicial process to frame a public “narrative.” Absent evidentiary or legal support
for their claims, this seems to be one of the primary purposes of this lawsuit.
Second, there is a basis to conclude that Plaintiffs’ legal team asserted the
allegations in their pleadings as opinion rather than fact, with the purpose of
furthering counsel’s political positions rather than pursuing any attainable legal
relief.
As an initial matter, several of the allegations asserted in this and similar
lawsuits filed by Plaintiffs’ attorneys are the subject of a lawsuit that the
companies responsible for the Dominion election machines and software filed
against Powell and her company, Defending the Republic, Inc.: U.S. Dominion,
Inc. v. Powell, No. 1:21-cv-00040 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 8, 2021) (“Dominion
Action”). 76 The State Defendants assert this in their supplemental brief. (ECF No.
118-2 at Pg ID 4797, 4803-05.) And Powell admits this in response to the State
75
(Supp. Br. Filed by Campbell, ECF No. 167 at Pg ID 6679 (“Bias is hard for
attorneys to avoid and it is undoubtedly no less difficult for judges. The difference
is that there can be no tolerance for the influence of [] bias on a judicial decision.
The issue of sanctions cannot be a partisan political exercise.” (internal citations
omitted)).)
76
Other statements by Powell are at issue in the Dominion Action but the Court’s
focus here is on those that are made in the instant lawsuit.
89
Defendants’ brief (ECF No. 120 at Pg ID 4998, 5003), as well as in her motion to
dismiss the Dominion Action (ECF No. 118-2 at PDF Pg 46 (conceding that “[t]he
lawsuits containing the underlying allegations” in the Dominion Action, including
“the exhibits and evidence on which the alleged defamatory statements are based,”
“were filed in . . . Michigan”)).
In response to the Dominion plaintiffs’ claim that Powell’s assertions here
were defamatory, Powell has maintained that the statements were “opinions”
which “reasonable people would not accept . . . as fact.” (Id. at PDF Pg 63.)
Powell makes clear that at least some of the allegations in the current lawsuit were
made to support her chosen political candidate. Specifically, Powell’s brief in
support of her motion to dismiss in the Dominion Action states: “Given the highly
charged and political context of the statements, it is clear that Powell’s statements
were made as an attorney-advocate for her preferred candidate and in support of
her legal and political positions.” (Id. at PDF Pg 62.) “The highly charged and
political nature of the statements,” Powell continues in her brief, “underscores their
political and hence partisan nature.” (Id. at PDF Pg 61.) Powell characterizes her
statements and allegations as “vituperative, abusive and inexact” “political
speech,” as well as “inherently prone to exaggeration and hyperbole.” (Id. at PDF
Pg 62-63.) Powell latched onto the Dominion plaintiffs’ assertion that her
allegations amounted to “wild accusations” and “outlandish claims” and therefore,
90
she argued, “reasonable people would not accept” these alleged statements and
allegations “as fact but view them only as claims that await testing by courts
through the adversary process.” (Id. at PDF Pg 62.)
It is not acceptable to support a lawsuit with opinions, which counsel herself
claims no reasonable person would accept as fact and which were “inexact,”
“exaggerate[ed],” and “hyperbole.” Nor is it acceptable to use the federal judiciary
as a political forum to satisfy one’s political agenda. Such behavior by an attorney
in a court of law has consequences. Although the First Amendment may allow
Plaintiffs’ counsel to say what they desire on social media, in press conferences, or
on television, federal courts are reserved for hearing genuine legal disputes which
are well-grounded in fact and law. See Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438, 440 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (explaining that the circuit court does “not conceive it a proper function
of a federal court to serve as a forum for ‘protests,’ to the detriment of parties with
serious disputes waiting to be heard” and suggesting the same for use as a
“political [] forum”); see also Knipe v. Skinner, 19 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1994)
(affirming the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions where, as the district court found,
the filing of the action was “[a]nother creative avenue to beat a dead horse” and the
“pursui[t of] a personal agenda against [a government entity]” without a good faith
basis).
91
The Court pauses to briefly discuss Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ attempt to cloak
their conduct in this litigation under First Amendment protection. The attorneys
have argued:
Setting a precedent to sanction an attorney whose case is

denied at the district court level on procedural grounds is
a grave abuse of the disciplinary process and potentially
constitutes intimidation for filing a grievance against the
government, which is a core protection of the First
Amendment.
(ECF No. 112 at Pg ID 4615.) The attorneys have further argued that a sanctions
order “would implicate Plaintiffs’ and their counsel’s First Amendment right of
access to the courts.” (ECF No. 93 at Pg ID 4078.) The attorneys are incorrect.
An attorney’s right to free speech while litigating an action “is extremely
circumscribed.” Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 717, 720-21 (6th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991)). As the Sixth
Circuit explained in Mezibov:
It is not surprising that courts have thus far been reluctant

to allow the First Amendment to intrude into the
courtroom. At first blush, the courtroom seems like the
quintessential arena for public debate, but upon closer
analysis, it is clear this is not, and never has been, an
arena for free debate. . . . An attorney’s speech in court
and in motion papers has always been tightly cabined by
various procedural and evidentiary rules, along with the
heavy hand of judicial discretion. . . . [and in] [t]he
courtroom[,] . . . the First Amendment rights of everyone
(attorneys included) are at their constitutional nadir.
92
Id. at 717 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Attorneys
“voluntarily agree[] to relinquish [their] rights to free expression in [] judicial
proceeding[s]” and “voluntarily accept[] almost unconditional restraints on [their]
personal speech rights” when before a court. Id. at 719-20. For that reason, the
Sixth Circuit has “see[n] no basis for concluding that free speech rights are
violated by a restriction on that expression.”77 Id. at 719.
Third, the Court finds an improper purpose because Plaintiffs’ counsel failed
to conduct the pre-filing reasonable inquiry required of them as officers of the
court, despite most of the attorneys acknowledging that “no one is immune to
confirmation bias” and, therefore, “attorneys should look beyond their prejudices
and political beliefs, and view evidence with a level of professional skepticism.”
(Supp. Br. Filed by Campbell, ECF No. 161 at Pg ID 5818.) Plaintiffs’ attorneys
attempt to excuse their failure to objectively evaluate their “evidence” because
“[they] are not the only individuals who viewed the[] affidavits [attached to their
pleadings] as evidence of serious fraud.” (Id. at Pg ID 5817.) They say Former
President Trump “susp[ected]” it too (id. at Pg ID 5817-18), and “millions of []
77
The Court drew Plaintiffs’ counsel’s attention to Mezibov at the motion hearing
in response to their repeated refrain that the First Amendment protects them from
any sanctions for their conduct in this litigation. Despite doing so and urging
counsel to review the Sixth Circuit’s decision (see ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5497),
Junttila continued to argue First Amendment protection in her supplemental
brief—albeit in a more illogical and incoherent fashion. (ECF No. 165 at Pg ID
6563-64).
93
Americans . . . believed that their president would not intentionally mislead them”
(id. at Pg ID 5817). As officers of the court, Plaintiffs’ counsel had an obligation
to do more than repeat opinions and beliefs, even if shared by millions. Something
does not become plausible simply because it is repeated many times by many
people.78
Counsel’s failure to “look beyond their prejudices and political beliefs”
during this litigation and before filing this lawsuit strongly suggests improper
motive. The evidence of bad faith and improper motive becomes undeniably clear
when paired with the fact that Plaintiffs’ counsel violated Rule 11 in a multitude of
ways. See supra. In other words, by failing to take the basic pre-filing steps that
any reasonable attorney would have taken and by flouting well-established
pleading standards—all while knowing the risk associated with failing to remain
professionally skeptical, Plaintiffs’ counsel did everything in their power to ensure
that their bias—that the election was fraudulent, as proclaimed by Former
President Trump—was confirmed. Confirmation bias notwithstanding, Plaintiffs’
counsel advanced this lawsuit for an improper purpose and will be held to account
for their actions.
Fourth, circumstances suggest that this lawsuit was not about vindicating
rights in the wake of alleged election fraud. Instead, it was about ensuring that a
78
This is a lesson that some of the darkest periods of history have taught us.
94
preferred political candidate remained in the presidential seat despite the decision
of the nation’s voters to unseat him.
Before the 2020 general election, Powell appears to have been certain that
those who did not support Former President Trump already engaged in fraudulent
illegal activity. On Election Day, Powell gave an interview during which she
described “the many multifaceted efforts the democrats are making to steal the
vote,” including “develop[ing] a computer system to alter votes electronically,”
spreading the “COVID . . . apocalypse hoax,” and ensuring that “people . . . have
not gotten their absentee ballots” even though “they’ve . . . request[ed] them three
different times[] and been told they were cancelled.” (See, e.g., Interview Tr., U.S.
Dominion, Inc. v. Powell, No. 21-cv-00040 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1-
20 at Pg 2:13-24.) Why would someone, who believes that election fraud is
already happening and will likely reach peak levels on Election Day, not raise the
alarm with the entity the individual claims can fix things—specifically, the
judiciary? It is because Plaintiffs’ counsel was equally certain—even before the
polls closed—that Former President Trump was going to win the 2020 election.
(Id. at Pg 3:23-4:9 (claiming that the results of the 2020 election would be “the
Trump victory,” and stating that “[Democrats] [have] effectively conceded that
Trump is going to win at the voting booth”).)
95
Indeed, Plaintiffs’ attorneys waited until after votes were tallied to file this
lawsuit, even though the record suggests that—well in advance of Election Day—
they knew or should have known about the things of which they complained. (See,
e.g., ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 927-933 (supporting allegation about “[D]ominion
vulnerabilities to hacking” with an expert report dated August 24, 2020; a law
review article dated December 27, 2019; letters dated October 6, 2006 and
December 6, 2019; news articles dated May 4, 2010, August 10, 2017, and August
8, 2019; a public policy report published in 2016; and a cybersecurity advisory
dated October 30, 2020).)
This game of wait-and-see shows that counsel planned to challenge the
legitimacy of the election if and only if Former President Trump lost. And if that
happened, they would help foster a predetermined narrative making election fraud
the culprit. These things—separately, but especially collectively—evince bad faith
and improper purpose in bringing this suit.
Fifth, Joshua Merritt is someone whose identity counsel redacted, referring
to him only as “Spyder” or “Spider,” and who counsel identified in their pleadings
and briefs as “a former electronic intelligence analyst with 305th Military
Intelligence” and a “US Military Intelligence expert.” (Id. at Pg ID 880 ¶ 17, 932
⁋ 161; ECF No. 7 at Pg ID 1835.) Yet, even after learning that Merritt never
96
completed any intelligence analyst training program with the 305 th Military
Intelligence Battalion, Plaintiffs’ counsel remained silent as to this fact.
In its motion for sanctions, the City emphasizes Merritt’s statement that the
“original paperwork [he] sent in [to Plaintiffs’ counsel] didn’t say that” he was an
electronic intelligence analyst under 305th Military Intelligence. (ECF No. 78 at
Pg ID 3657.) According to the City, a spokeswoman for the U.S. Army
Intelligence Center of Excellence, which includes the battalion, stated that
“[Merritt] kept washing out of courses . . . [h]e’s not an intelligence analyst.” (Id.)
Plaintiffs’ counsel did not dispute these assertions in their response brief. (ECF
No. 95 at Pg ID 4144.) Nor did Plaintiffs’ counsel dispute these assertions during
the hearing.
Instead, Kleinhendler argued during the hearing that Merritt’s “expertise” is
based on “his years and years of experience in cyber security as a confidential
informant working for the United States Government” (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID
5375)—not Merritt’s purported military intelligence training. Clearly this is
dishonest. This was not the experience on which Plaintiffs’ attorneys premised
Merritt’s expertise in their pleadings and Motion for Injunctive Relief, and Merritt
never claims in his declaration that he has “years and years of experience in cyber
97
security as a confidential informant working for the United States Government.”79
(See ECF No. 6-25.) Instead, it was precisely Merritt’s experience as “an
electronic intelligence analyst under 305th Military Intelligence” that Plaintiffs’
attorneys presented to convince the Court and the world that he is a reliable expert.
Kleinhendler argued during the hearing, however, that he first learned about
this inconsistency after the case was dismissed on January 14. (ECF No. 157 at Pg
ID 5375.) “I had no reason to doubt,” Kleinhendler explained. (Id.) This also is
dishonest.
First, the City attached an article from the Washington Post to its January 5
motion for sanctions,80 which at least put Plaintiffs’ counsel on notice that Merritt
lacked the expertise they claimed. Yet curiously, during the hearing, when the
Court asked if “anyone ask[ed] [Plaintiffs’ counsel] if, or suggest[ed] to [them]
that, [Merritt] was not a military intelligence expert,” Kleinhendler, Haller, and
79
To the extent that Plaintiffs’ attorneys claim that an “affidavit” attached to their
reply to the motion to seal includes this assertion (see ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5385
(citing ECF Nos. 50, 50-1)), it does not. That “affidavit” is not signed by or
associated with anyone, much less someone named Spyder, Spider, or Joshua
Merritt. (ECF No. 50-1.)
80
(ECF No. 78-18); Emma Brown, Aaron C. Davis, and Alice Crites, Sidney
Powell’s Secret ‘Military Intelligence Expert,’ Key to Fraud Claims in Election
Lawsuits, Never Worked in Military Intelligence, Washington Post (Dec. 11, 2020,
6:29 PM), https://perma.cc/2LR2-YTBG.
98
Powell said “no” and all other counsel agreed by remaining silent. (Id. at Pg ID
5386-87.)
Second, the Court finds it implausible (for several conspicuous reasons) that
absolutely no member of Plaintiffs’ legal team learned of the Washington Post
article (and thus the questions it raised) shortly after it was published on December
11, 2020. This is especially so considering that, according to the Washington Post
article, when “[a]sked about Merritt’s limited experience in military intelligence,”
Powell stated “in a text to The [Washington] Post: ‘I cannot confirm that Joshua
Merritt is even Spider. Strongly encourage you not to print.’”81
Kleinhendler further argued that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s assertion that Merritt
was a U.S. military intelligence expert was “not technically false” or “technically
[] wrong” because “[h]e did spend, from [Kleinhendler’s] understanding, seven
months training with the 305th.” (Id. at Pg ID 5375, 5384-85.) The Court is
unconvinced by this effort to mischaracterize. Kleinhendler himself admitted that
labeling Merritt as a U.S. military intelligence expert is “not [] the full story.” (Id.
at Pg ID 5384.) Surely, any reasonable attorney would find it prudent to be
forthcoming after learning that one of his experts never actually completed the
training upon which the expert’s purported expertise is based.
81
(ECF No. 78-18 at Pg ID 3799.)
99
And Kleinhendler appears to concede that this argument is a poor one
because he nonetheless admits that “[h]ad [he] known in advance [of the January
14 dismissal] that [Merritt] had transferred out, [he] would have made [it] clear.”
(Id. at Pg ID 5375, 5384-85, 5387.) But this is yet another misrepresentation. As
detailed above, by January 5, Kleinhendler knew Merritt never completed the
training that formed the basis of his purported expertise. Yet, Kleinhendler did not
“make it clear.” Co-counsel for Plaintiffs also had reason to question Merritt’s
expertise by no later than January 5. Yet, they remained silent too.
Ultimately, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s decision to not make clear “the full story”
about Merritt not completing military intelligence training was for the improper
purpose of bolstering their star witness’ expertise and misleading the Court,
opposing counsel, and the world into believing that Merritt was something that he
was not.
Finally, despite what this Court said in its December 7, 2020 decision and
what several other state and federal courts have ruled in similar election-challenge
lawsuits, Plaintiffs’ lawyers brazenly assert that they “would file the same
complaints again.” (Id. at Pg ID 5534.) They make this assertion even after
witnessing the events of January 6 and the dangers posed by narratives like the one
counsel crafted here. An attorney who willingly continues to assert claims doomed
100
to fail, and which have incited violence before, must be deemed to be acting with
an improper motive.
In sum, each of the six matters discussed above individually evince bad faith
and improper purpose. But when viewed collectively, they reveal an even more
powerful truth: Once it appeared that their preferred political candidate’s grasp on
the presidency was slipping away, Plaintiffs’ counsel helped mold the
predetermined narrative about election fraud by lodging this federal lawsuit based
on evidence that they actively refused to investigate or question with the requisite
level of professional skepticism—and this refusal was to ensure that the evidence
conformed with the predetermined narrative (a narrative that has had dangerous
and violent consequences). Plaintiffs’ counsel’s politically motivated accusations,
allegations, and gamesmanship may be protected by the First Amendment when
posted on Twitter, shared on Telegram, or repeated on television. The nation’s
courts, however, are reserved for hearing legitimate causes of action.
C. Whether the Court May Sanction Plaintiffs’ Counsel Pursuant to

Its Inherent Authority
To award attorneys’ fees pursuant to its inherent authority, a district court
must find that (i) “the claims advanced were meritless,” (ii) “counsel knew or
should have known this,” and (iii) “the motive for filing the suit was for an
improper purpose such as harassment.” Big Yank, 125 F.3d at 313.
101
As discussed in the preceding subsections, Plaintiffs’ counsel advanced
claims that were not well-grounded in the law, as demonstrated by their (i)
presentment of claims not warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument
for extending, modifying, or reversing the law; (ii) assertion that acts or events
violated Michigan election law, when the acts and events (even if they occurred)
did not; and (iii) failure to inquire into the requirements of Michigan election law.
Plaintiffs’ counsel advanced claims that were also not well-grounded in fact, as
demonstrated by their (i) failure to present any evidentiary support for factual
assertions; (ii) presentment of conjecture and speculation as evidentiary support for
factual assertions; (iii) failure to inquire into the evidentiary support for factual
assertions; (iv) failure to inquire into evidentiary support taken from other lawsuits;
and (v) failure to inquire into Ramsland’s outlandish and easily debunked numbers.
And, for the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ counsel knew or should
have known that these claims and legal contentions were not well-grounded in law
or fact. Moreover, for the reasons also discussed above, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs and their counsel filed this lawsuit for improper purposes.
Accordingly, sanctions also are warranted pursuant to the Court’s inherent
authority.
102
V. Conclusion
In summary, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ counsel filed this lawsuit in
bad faith and for an improper purpose. Further, they presented pleadings that (i)
were not “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or establishing new law” and (ii) contained
factual contentions lacking evidentiary support or likely to have evidentiary
support. 82 Finally, by failing to voluntarily dismiss this lawsuit on the date
Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged it would be moot and thereby necessitating the
filing of motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs’ attorneys unreasonably and vexatiously
multiplied the proceedings.
For these reasons (and not for any conduct that occurred on appeal), the
Court holds that sanctions against Plaintiffs’ counsel are warranted under Rule 11,
§ 1927, and the Court’s inherent authority. Sanctions are required to deter the
filing of future frivolous lawsuits designed primarily to spread the narrative that
82
And for these reasons, this lawsuit is not akin to Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), as Plaintiffs’ counsel, Powell, baselessly suggested during
the July 12 hearing. (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5534.) Yes, attorneys may and should
raise difficult and even unpopular issues to urge change in the law where change is
needed. But unlike Plaintiffs’ attorneys here, then-attorney Thurgood Marshall
had the requisite legal footing on which his clients’ claims were grounded in
Brown, and the facts were not based on speculation and conjecture. Brown arose
from an undeniable history during which Black Americans were treated as second-
class citizens through legalized segregation in the schools of our country. In stark
comparison, the present matter is built on fantastical claims and conspiracy
theories.
103
our election processes are rigged and our democratic institutions cannot be trusted.
Notably, many people have latched on to this narrative, citing as proof counsel’s
submissions in this case. The narrative may have originated or been repeated by
Former President Trump and it may be one that “many Americans” share (see ECF
No. 161 at Pg ID 5817); however, that neither renders it true nor justifies counsel’s
exploitation of the courts to further spread it.
A. Whether Sanctions Should be Awarded to Intervenor-Defendants
Plaintiffs do not challenge the Court’s power to award sanctions to
Intervenor-Defendants. However, Plaintiffs maintain that, under § 1927, “a party
seeking sanctions . . . has a duty to mitigate their damages.” (Id. at Pg ID 5809
(citing Carter v. Hickory Healthcare, Inc., 905 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2018)); see
also ECF No. 165 at Pg ID 6573 (same).) According to Plaintiffs, the City and
Davis did just the opposite by intervening in this lawsuit where they were not
being sued and, Plaintiffs assert, had no necessary interest to protect.
The Court already concluded, however, that Davis and the City possess a
substantial legal interest in this matter warranting their intervention either as a
matter of right or permissibly. (See ECF No. 28.) Of course, every intervenor
could mitigate its damages by staying out of a lawsuit; however, choosing to step
in does not on its own mean parties cannot seek an award of sanctions when they
prevail in protecting their interests.
104
Despite this, the Court declines to award sanctions to Davis because he did
not substantially contribute to the resolution of the issues in this case. As the Court
noted in its opinion denying Davis’ request to intervene as of right, the State
Defendants, the DNC/MDP, and the City aimed to protect the interests of all
Wayne County voters, including Davis. (Id. at Pg ID 2143-44.) Although the
Court granted Davis’ request for permissive intervention, the Court noted that its
decision was a “close call” and that it granted Davis’ request only because “[his]
intervention [would] not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original
Defendants’ rights.” (Id. at Pg ID 2146, 2145 n.2 (citations omitted).)
In fact, Davis’ involvement did more to interfere with than assist the
advancement of this litigation. Davis’ briefs added little to the discussion,83 and he
often clogged the Court’s docket with inconsequential requests and wasted the
83
Davis’ Response to Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
contained two brief arguments and a note that “[he] hereby incorporates by
reference all of the legal arguments asserted by Defendants and Intervening
Defendants in their respective responses to Plaintiffs’ motion for TRO” “[i]n order
to alleviate redundancy.” (ECF No. 37 at Pg ID 2749.) And Davis’ Motion for
Sanctions summarized and quoted—for nearly the entire length of the brief—a
Detroit Free Press article, the Court’s December 7, 2020 Opinion & Order Denying
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Injunctive Relief, and case law regarding § 1927 and a
court’s inherent authority, as well as proffered a disjointed argument about why the
alleged falsity of Ramsland’s affidavit resulted in the unreasonable and vexatious
multiplication of proceedings in violation of § 1927. (ECF No. 69.)
105
Court’s limited time with the same84. Moreover, despite speaking only twice
during the almost six-hour long sanctions hearing (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5340,
84
For example, (i) Davis’ Emergency Motion to Strike Amended Complaint (ECF
Nos. 41, 42), filed on December 3, 2020, was denied in a text-only order on the
same day;
(ii) Davis’ Emergency Motion to Strike Emergency Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order (ECF No. 45), also filed on December 3, 2020, was withdrawn
on December 4 (ECF No. 51);
(iii) the Emergency Motion to Expedite Briefing, Scheduling and Adjudication of

Intervenor Defendant Robert Davis’ Emergency Motions to Strike (ECF No. 46),
also filed on December 3, 2020, was withdrawn on December 4 (ECF No. 51);
(iv) Davis’ Emergency Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice of Newspaper
Articles Published in Detroit Free Press and Associated Press (ECF No. 59), filed
on December 5, 2020, was denied on December 6 via a text-only order, which
stated that “[t]he Court [found] the newspaper articles unnecessary to resolve the
pending [Motion for Injunctive Relief]”;
(v) Davis’ Emergency Motion to Strike Motion for Extension of Time to File
Response/Reply as to Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 75), filed on January 4, 2021
because Plaintiffs’ counsel “mistakenly selected and identified [] Davis as the
‘filer’” of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s motion for extension of time (id. at Pg ID 3603),
was denied as moot on January 5, after the Court ordered “the Clerk’s Office [to]
correct the docket entry text associated with Plaintiffs’ motion [] so that the filing
party is noted as ‘All Plaintiffs’—not ‘Robert Davis’” (ECF No. 76 at Pg ID 3611);
(vi) Davis’ Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice of Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel Filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
against Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. (ECF No. 79), filed on January 8,
2021, was denied on July 19, 2021 in an order, which stated that “the Court [did
not] find it necessary to consider the motion to withdraw filed in another federal
district court . . . to decide the pending sanctions motions” (ECF No. 149 at Pg ID
5267);
106
5519), Davis’ counsel (unlike counsel to every other party to this case) opted not to
file any supplemental briefing—presumably because, again, Davis had nothing to
contribute.
Ultimately, the Court refuses to reward Davis for taking the Court’s time and
giving nothing back.
B. Sanctions Imposed
This lawsuit should never have been filed. The State Defendants and the
Intervenor-Defendants should never have had to defend it. If Plaintiffs’ attorneys
are not ordered to reimburse the State Defendants and the City for the reasonable
fees and costs incurred to defend this action, counsel will not be deterred from
continuing to abuse the judicial system to publicize their narrative. Moreover, this
Court has found that Plaintiffs’ counsel initiated this litigation for an improper
(vii) Davis’ Emergency Motion to Strike Voluntary Dismissal (ECF No. 97), filed
on January 20, 2021 after Plaintiffs’ counsel misidentified a document on January
14 by selecting the wrong activity on the Court’s electronic filing system, asked
the Court to “sanction Plaintiffs’ counsel for refusing to correct the error that was
promptly brought to her attention by [] Davis’ counsel” on January 18—the Court
denied the motion via a 3-page order on January 25 (ECF No. 99); and
(viii) Davis’ Emergency Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice of Michigan
Senate Oversight Committee’s June 23, 2021 Report on November 2020
presidential election (ECF No. 124), filed on June 23, 2021, was denied on July 19,
2021 in an order, which stated that “the Court [did not] find it necessary to
consider . . . the Michigan Senate Oversight Committee’s June 21, 2021 report . . .
to decide the pending sanctions motions” (ECF No. 149 at Pg ID 5267).
107
purpose, rendering this the “unusual circumstance” in which awarding attorneys’
fees is warranted.
Further, given the deficiencies in the pleadings, which claim violations of
Michigan election law without a thorough understanding of what the law requires,
and the number of failed election-challenge lawsuits that Plaintiffs’ attorneys have
filed, the Court concludes that the sanctions imposed should include mandatory
continuing legal education in the subjects of pleading standards and election law.
Lastly, the conduct of Plaintiffs’ counsel, which also constituted violations
of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct, see, e.g., MRPC 3.1 and 3.3, calls
into question their fitness to practice law. This warrants a referral for investigation
and possible suspension or disbarment to the appropriate disciplinary authority for
every state bar and federal court in which each attorney is admitted, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes (1993 Amendment) (explaining that such
referrals are available as a sanction for violating the rule); E.D. Mich. LR
83.22(c)(2). 85
85
The Court is troubled that Powell is profiting from the filing of this and other
frivolous election-challenge lawsuits. See https://defendingtherepublic.org
(website of company run by Powell on which donations are solicited to support the
“additional cases [being prepared] every day”). Other attorneys for Plaintiffs may
be as well, given that their address (according to the filings here) is the same
address listed on this website. What is concerning is that the sanctions imposed
here will not deter counsel from pursuing future baseless lawsuits because those
sanctions will be paid with donor funds rather than counsel’s. In this Court’s view,
108
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the motions for sanctions filed by the State
Defendants (ECF No. 105) and City of Detroit (ECF No. 78) are GRANTED. The
Court is granting in part and denying in part Davis’ motion for sanctions (ECF No.
69) in that the Court finds sanctions warranted but not an award of Davis’
reasonable attorneys’ fees or costs.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ attorneys shall jointly and
severally pay the fees and costs incurred by the State Defendants and the City of
Detroit to defend this action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within fourteen (14) days of this
Opinion and Order, the State Defendants and City of Detroit shall submit time and
expense records, specifying for each attorney who performed work on the matter,
the date, the hours expended, the nature of the work performed, and, where
applicable, the attorney’s hourly rate. Plaintiffs’ counsel may submit objections to
the requested amount within fourteen (14) days of each movants’ filing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ attorneys shall each complete
at least twelve (12) hours of continuing legal education in the subjects of pleading
standards (at least six hours total) and election law (at least six hours total) within
this should be considered by any disciplinary authority reviewing counsel’s

behavior.
109
six months of this decision. Any courses must be offered by a non-partisan
organization and must be paid for at counsel’s expense. Within six months of this
decision, each attorney representing Plaintiffs shall file an affidavit in this case
describing the content and length of the courses attended to satisfy this
requirement.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall send a copy
of this decision to the Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission and the
appropriate disciplinary authority for the jurisdiction(s) where each attorney is
admitted, referring the matter for investigation and possible suspension or
disbarment: (i) Sidney Powell - Texas; (ii) L. Lin Wood - Georgia; (iii) Emily
Newman - Virginia; (iv) Julia Z. Haller - the District of Columbia, Maryland, New
York and New Jersey; (v) Brandon Johnson - the District of Columbia, New York,
and Nevada; (vi) Scott Hagerstrom - Michigan; (vii) Howard Kleinhendler - New
York and New Jersey; (viii) Gregory Rohl - Michigan; and (iv) Stefanie Lynn
Junttila - Michigan.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: August 25, 2021
110

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Case 2:20-cv-13134-LVP-RSW ECF No. 172, PageID.

6890 Filed 08/25/21 Page 1 of 110

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

TIMOTHY KING, et al.,

GRETCHEN WHITMER, et al., Civil Case No. 20-13134

OPINION AND ORDER

It is one thing to take on the charge of vindicating rights associated with an

allegedly fraudulent election. It is another to take on the charge of deceiving a

Individuals may have a right (within certain bounds) to disseminate

And when an attorney has done so, sanctions are in order.

Here’s why. America’s civil litigation system affords individuals the

privilege to file a lawsuit to allege a violation of law. Individuals, however, must

law allegedly violated.

Specifically, attorneys have an obligation to the judiciary, their profession,

question before the Court is whether Plaintiffs’ attorneys engaged in litigation

applicable to the litigation process by proffering claims not backed by law;

unwarranted suspicion); proffering factual allegations and claims without engaging

While there are many arenas—including print, television, and social

media—where protestations, conjecture, and speculation may be advanced, such

as a country pride ourselves on the freedoms embodied within the First

Amendment, it is well-established that an attorney’s freedom of speech is

circumscribed upon “entering” the courtroom.2

Intervenor-Defendants and is imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the

On November 3, 2020, a record 5.5 million Michigan residents voted in the

presidential election, resulting in then-Former Vice-President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

Even though Michigan law establishes an extensive procedure for challenging

hearing before this Court (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5332-33).

Instead, at 11:48 p.m. on November 25, 2020—the eve of the Thanksgiving

holiday—Plaintiffs (registered Michigan voters and nominees of the Republican

against Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer, Michigan Secretary of State

Howard Kleinhendler. (Id.)

On November 29, a Sunday, Plaintiffs filed, inter alia, an Amended

Complaint (ECF No. 6) and an “Emergency Motion for Declaratory, Emergency,

and Permanent Injunctive Relief and Memorandum in Support Thereof” (“Motion

Brandon Johnson as additional “Of Counsel.” (Id.)

In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged three claims pursuant to 42

Plaintiffs asserted violations of the Michigan Election Code. (Id.) Underlying

Michigan Legislature in the Michigan Election Code, [Mich. Comp. Laws]

§§ 168.730-738” and (ii) “committed a scheme and artifice to fraudulently and

of dozens of eyewitnesses and the statistical anomalies and mathematical

impossibilities detailed in the affidavits of expert witnesses.” (ECF No. 6 at Pg ID

873.) Plaintiffs attached hundreds of pages as exhibits to their pleadings, some of

different lawyers in prior Michigan lawsuits challenging the 2020 presidential

Plaintiffs cited to these materials in support of the factual allegations in their

Amended Complaint and Motion for Injunctive Relief.

considered conclusive. (See ECF No. 6 at Pg ID 890; ECF No. 7 at Pg ID 1846-

By December 1, motions to intervene had been filed by the City of Detroit

December 1, the Court entered a text-only order to hasten Plaintiffs’ actions to

On December 7, the Court issued an opinion and order denying Plaintiffs’

participat[ed] in the 2020 General Election.” (ECF No. 62 at Pg ID 3296.) The

As to Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants violated the Elections and Electors

state election procedures automatically amount to violations of the clauses” (id. at

motion (“Safe Harbor Motion”) on Plaintiffs’ attorneys, threatening sanctions

also ECF No. 95 at Pg ID 4118-19 (acknowledging service of the motion).)

(ECF No. 161-3 at Pg ID 6058-67.)