Bolivarian Army
Bolivarian Army
Bolivarian Army
1. Summary
1.1.1. STRENGTH
1.1.2. INFANTRY
Brigade × 4
1.1.3. ARMOUR
Armoured Brigade × 2
1.1.4. AIRBORNE
Parachute Brigade × 1
1.1.5. ARTILLERY
Group × 8
1.1.6. SUPPORT
Communications Brigade x 1
1
This is the total number of conscripts recruited in 2009 for 2009-10 national military servicem tehre
are no disagregated figures and a large proportion of conscripts are in the army or otherwise enrusted
to (none-air or embarked) land-related functions (security guards, perimeter patrol, etc).
Logistics Brigade x 1
Engineer regiment x 3
2. Assessment
Venezuela has not fought a foreign war since its independence. Since 1999, the army has been
subjected to a modernisation and re-organisation process with changes made to the officer
structure as well as the overall army role. The operational structure of the core army remains
unchanged, although politics have seen a large number of senior officers to retire (some by force)
and be replaced by more politically-oriented, recently promoted officers. In July 2007, the Chávez
administration increased salaries by 30 per cent to boost morale.
The army’s reform has stretched beyond the procurement of new assault and sniper rifles and now
comprises of a modernised doctrine too. New concepts include asymmetric warfare and reliance
on the country’s communication and supply infrastructure as well as popular support to resist a
large scale US invasion.
Most of the armyʼs equipment dates from the late 1980’s or early 1990s and is still fairly efficient,
although there is little standardisation causing maintenance problems. Short term requirements
include tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and air defence systems, at least some of which will be
supplied by Russia following a September 2009 arms agreement.
The recent US embargo has been followed by Sweden’s refusal to supply spares or support of any
kind. This will have a direct impact on the MANPADS and infantry anti-tank capabilities. Russian
equipment is expected to become standard with an indigenous maintenance and support
infrastructure slowly developing to support this.
2.1. Adaptability
The army is undertaking a large and expensive modernization and re-organization programme that
seeks to improve its conventional and non-conventional fighting capabilities. At the same time, it
has been undergoing a doctrinal transformation that has the goal of creating a politically
conditioned military.
2.2. Sustainment
The Army has a Centre for Refresher training which is part of the 5 th Division and has three
battalions dedicated to the refresher training role, they are denominated “replacements”. There is
a fourth battalion of replacements assigned to the Second Division. There is also a Military olice
Replacements battalion assigned to the 3 rd Division. There is an Army reserve Command to
coordinate sustainability, although it is unclear at this point weather it has been integrated into the
National Bolivarian Militia, which took over control of the 48 reserve battalions.
2.3. Readiness
The 42nd Para Brigade’s rapid reaction and Para-commando units are the main rapid reaction units
in the Venezuelan army. Special Forces battalions are also assigned a rapid reaction role.
3. Deployments, tasks and operations
3.1. Role and Deployment
The army is tasked with ensuring land defence, contributing to the development of democratic
institutions and respect for the laws of the republic, contributing to the development and national
integration and to be prepared to participate in joint and international peacekeeping operations.
Furthermore, President Chavez is promulgating an additional role, which is to support the
development of the 21st Century Socialist State. Each soldier must now say the words 'Country,
Socialism or Death!' before referring to a superior.
Venezuela has, in the past, contributed to the peacekeeping operations of both the Organisation of
American States and the UN. It maintained a small observer group with UNPROFOR, in Croatia;
and also in ONUSAL, in El Salvador; UNIKOM, in Iraq/Kuwait and MINURSO, in the Western
Sahara. In late 2004, the Venezuelan military also contributed to hurricane emergency relief
operations in several countries in the Caribbean.
Chief of Staff, Army Division General Jesus del valle Morao Gardona
Under both the Constitution and the Organic Law of the armed forces, the President is the
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. In this position he exercises control on a daily basis
through the Minister of Popular Powers for Defence.
The Commandant General of the army, whose tenure of office is a maximum of two years, reports
to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Minister of Defence. The Inspector
General of the Army forms part of the chain of command and ranks second only to the
Commandant General. Following in line is the Chief of Staff (Army), to whom the commanders of
all units and formations report.
A unified command - CUFAN - was created to control all operations, particularly in Military Areas 1
and 2 on the border with Colombia. This evolved during 2007 into the Strategic Operational
Command (Comando Estratégico Operacional: CEO) and under the command of General Jesus
González González. The CEO formed the planning, co-ordination, direction and implementation
command for Venezuela’s joint forces. The country has now been divided into five regions under
the CEO, with each regional commander (either a General or Admiral) responsible for all of the
forces in its territory.
In March 2009, further restructuring granted actual control of the armed forces completely to the
CEO and General Carlos Mata Figueroa was appointed the new CEO commander. The Defence
Ministry will now be transformed into a purely administrative organisation in charge of overseeing
the development of the armed forces and directing the country's defence policy. Previously,
through the combined General Staff, the Ministry of Popular Powers for Defence had directly
controlled a number of multi-service command, security and logistic support units, which will likely
now aggregate to the CEO. These include the Caracas Armed Forces HQ Security Battalion, the
General Lino de Clemente Security and Service Battalion, the General Jose Trinidad Moran
Production, Supply and Service Battalion and a Mixed Military Police Battalion embodying
elements of the four armed forces, all at Caracas. Both the Clemente and Moran battalions are
scheduled for transfer to the Army Command, at some unspecified future date.
Similarly, the tri-service (army, marines and air force) Air Defence Command was previously
directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defence, and will likely now become the responsibility of the
CEO. It comprises the air forceʼs 1st Air Defence Artillery Group (Base Aereo El Libertador, Palo
Negro), the navyʼs 2nd Air Defence Artillery Group (Base Naval Mariscal Juan C. Falcon, Punto
Fijo) and the armyʼs 3rd General de Division Ascension Barreras Air Defence Artillery Group
(Fuerte Guraguao, El Gury).
Also directly subordinate to the Defence Ministry were: the multiservice Regimiento Guardia de
Honor (which consists of the General Manuel Manrique Security Battalion equipped with V-150
Commando armoured fighting vehicles); the General Tomas Montilla Custodial Battalion; the
General Jose de la Cruz Paredes Support Battalion; and a Commando Company.
5. Organisation
Venezuelan Army units are constantly being formed, stood down or re-deployed, changing their
numerical designations in accordance with their parent formations - the only constant is the name,
which all units of battalion size and above historically bear.
In accordance with Venezuelaʼs new Organic Law, published 31 July 2008, the country is divided
into five strategic defence regions:
% Central: Vargas, Caracas, Miranda, Aragua, Carabobo and Yaracuy - Commanded by (Army)
Major General Juan Vicente Paredes Torrealba;
% Western: Falcón Lara, Trujillo, Mérida, Táchira and Zulia - Commanded by (National Guard)
Major General Luis Motta Dominguez;
% Los Llanos: Apure, Portuguesa, Barinas, Cojedes and Guárico - Commanded by (Air Force)
Major General Jorge Arevalo Oropeza Pernalete;
% Eastern: Delta Amacuro, Monagas, Sucre and Nueva Esparta - Commanded by (Navy) Admiral
Pedro José González Díaz; and
% Guyana: Bolívar and Amazonas - Commanded by (Army) Major General Félix Antonio
Velásquez.
Directly subordinate to Army HQ Command are the General Daniel Florencio O'Leary Army HQ
Battalion (Caracas DF); the General Andrés Ibarra Intelligence Battalion;; the Army Aviation
Command; the Army Logistic Command; and the Army Reserve Command.
Unit Base
Unit Base
2
In the process of formation; all “Cazador” (Ranger) units have changed denomination to Caribes as
parto f the New Military Thinking doctrine.
Unit Base
Unit Base
Unit Base
Unit Base
Unit Base
Unit Base
Table 10.
5.5. Bases
Table 11.
Base Location
5.6. Garrisons
A military presence is maintained in most major population centres and at frontier crossing posts.
6. Personnel
6.1. Demographics
The force is composed of 8% of officers, 5% of NCO’s and 87% of troops. In 2009 the Venezuelan
government announced that 17,100 conscripts would form the 2009-2010 national military service.
Conscription is voluntary.
6.2. Recruitment
The National Bolivarian army has stepped up recruitment in recent years with its fore expanding
from an estimated 63-65,000 in 2000 to over 100,000 by 2010. This has been made possible by
more attractive salary and living conditions, as well as by a generational change in the officer
corps, as force retirement of large numbers of them have opened the door to fast career
advancement by politically oriented principals.
6.3. Morale
Extensive financing has translated into pay increases throughout the ranks, but morale is
considerably low. Crack units are being formed with politically-oriented appointments and
leadership positions are being filled in the same way, which has had a negative impact on morale.
6.4. Professionalism
Despite extensive financing, professionalism in the Venezuelan army has descended considerably
due to the retirement of a large number of officers, the elimination of a large cadre of NCO’s,
calling them “Technical Officers” and assigning them “People’s” roles. New officer training has
been cut from 5 to 4 years. Preference of political loyalty over professional talent has produced
the biggest impact.
7. Training
Since 1988, all officer cadets of the army, navy, air force and National Guard have attended a two-
year course at the Armed Forces Basic Training School at Maracay. The Military Academy, at El
Valle, offers an additional four-year course for army officer cadets who may pursue a degree
course at one of the civilian universities or at the Universidad Politecnica de las Fuerzas Armadas,
after commissioning in the rank of second lieutenant. The Escuela Superior de Guerra Libertador
Simon Bolívar is at Chorrillos and aspirants to promotion beyond the rank of lieutenant colonel
must successfully complete either its command and staff course or a course at a recognised
foreign military establishment of equivalent category. Most officers also pursue post-graduate
studies abroad, usually in the US. The General Jose Felix Ribas NCO School and the General
Rafael Urdaneta Infantry School, the General Rojas Special Forces School, the General Irribarren
Armoured Forces School, the Colonel Diego Jalon Artillery School, the General Jacot Engineering
School and the Transport School are all located at Maracay, which is the principal military centre in
the country. The Signals School, the Negro Primero Equitation School and the General Flores
Physical Education School are all located at Caracas. Conscripts receive their non-specialist
training in the units to which they are assigned on induction.
In 2005, the Venezuelan military carried out two main exercises in relation to the government’s
preparation for ʼasymmetric warʼ:
% The first – called Operacion Armada Soberana 01-2005 (Operation ʼSovereign Navyʼ) – was
carried out between June 2-5 2005 and took place near the towns of Caimancito and Guayacan
in the state of Sucre, on Venezuela’s eastern coast near the island of Margarita. The aim was to
test the capability of reservists that had already been trained. Some 4,500 personnel took part in
the exercise as well as 16 vessels and 14 aircraft, and it was commanded by Rear-Admiral
Douglas Clemente. During the main amphibious landing, the armament used was: 10 coast
guard vessels; six gun-boats; one logistics vessel; three frigates; three ducks; two riverine
amphibious craft; eight helicopters, and four F-16 fighter jet aircraft. A battalion of army infantry
and two battalions of marine infantry were included, as well as an unspecified number of
National Guard combatants.
% A second exercise was carried out about one week later, near military Fort Los Caribes, in the
state of Cojedes, west of Caracas. It was called Operacion Huracan 01-2005 (Operation
ʼHurricaneʼ), but far less detail is available. One report stated that 1,273 army infantry were
involved, as well as an unspecified number of reservists, 75 paratroopers, 6 helicopters, and an
unspecified number of tanks. The personnel were divided into two armies, labelled ʼredʼ and
ʼblueʼ, and the aim was for one army to fend off an invasion by the other army.
8. Army procurement
8.1. Armour
The Venezuelan Ministry of Defence confirmed in October 2008 that it was looking to acquire a
new main battle tank to replace its ageing AMX-30V and the AMX-13C-90 and Scorpion light tank
fleets, looking to acquire T-72M/T-90 tanks from Russia as well as reconnaissance light tanks .
During the September 2009 visit of President Hugo Chavez to Moscow, Russian defence officials
confirmed that a contract worth USD500 million for the delivery of 92 T-72M and T-90 MBTs plus
up to 200 other armoured vehicles was signed. Deliveries are slatted to commence by early 2010.
In May 2004, the Defence Ministry issued a tender for the acquisition of approximately 200 new
armoured personnel carriers and tactical vehicles in a contract estimated to be worth about USD80
million. Four European companies had pre-qualified by June 2004; Steyr-Daimler-Puch (Austria);
Sabiex International (Belgium); Mowag (Switzerland), and Alvis-Vickers (UK). This requirement
was then expanded to 600 armoured vehicles in 2007, with the BMP-3 becoming the most likely
option, although this may only form part of the 600-vehicle requirement. In October 2008 a
Rosoboronexport spokesman indicated that Venezuela would sign a contract for a large number of
BMP-3 vehicles from Russia within the next month. Delivery of up to 200 BMP-3 and BTR APC’s
were said to be imminent during a November 2009 speech by President Chavez.
The Venezuelan Army has developed its own model of all-terrain multi-use vehicle, the
CENARECA UR-53AR50 Tiuna, locally referred to as the Tiuna. It is 4.92 m long and 2 m wide,
weighs 3.2 tonnes and has the capacity to carry nine fully-armed soldiers. It has a 5.3 litre, V-8
engine, with automatic transmission. There are six different versions of the Tiuna in service: The
basic armed reconnaissance model has a mounted M-2 12.7 mm machine gun, two side-mounted
MAG 7.62 mm machine guns and can be fitted with two AT-4 84 mm rocket-launchers; an
ambulance version; one with a M-40A1 106 mm recoilless rifle; a utility transport; an anti-riot; and,
an air defence versions with either a mounted RBS-70 launcher or twin Mistral missile launcher.
In mid 2005 the army signed a contract with CENARECA for 310 Tiunas in several versions. The
first batch of 97 vehicles was delivered by early 2006, the next 100 by mid 2006 and 113 by early
2007.
It was announced in November 2008 that LOMO in St. Petersburg, through Rosoboroneksport,
had sold the Igla-S system to Venezuela. No figures were provided, although deliveries reportedly
commenced in April 2009 and are scheduled through to 2011.
The Igla-S weapons will likely replace the RBS 70, which was previously the army’s main short
range air defence missile but will be increasingly difficult to maintain after Sweden, prompted by
the US-imposed arms embargo, announced it would not provide Venezuela with any equipment,
spares or replacements for any type of weapons.
There are plans for up to three self-propelled medium-range air defence batteries, with the Tor-M1
as the selected platform. A contract with Russia was finalised in mid-2007 while Belarus has been
contracted to provide technical assistance. However, these will be operated by the Air Defence
Command and the army is apparently in negotiations to acquire its own batch of Tor-M1’s.
8.3. Infantry
A contract was signed in October 2004 to buy 100,000 semi-automatic assault rifles from the
Russian Federation. The USD54 million contract involves the delivery of AK-103 rifles, an updated
version of the AK-47. The Russian rifles will eventually replace the Belgian-made FAL 7.62 rifle,
which is standard issue in the Venezuelan military. The first 30,000 AK-103s were delivered to
Venezuela in June 2006. It is not clear whether the Russian rifle will also be used to equip the
army’s reserves (or territorial guard) which could number in excess of 100,000. The plan to acquire
Russian Kalashnikovs would appear to partially supersede that of Army Plan 2000, which entailed
the re-equipment of the infantry with the FN FNC assault rifle.
At the time of the delivery of the first batch of AK-103s, the Chávez government said that it will
receive a licence from Russia to build the first Kalashnikov factory in Latin America. US defence
officials have expressed concern that some of the Kalashnikovs, and decommissioned FALs, may
fall into the hands of Colombian insurgent groups and other militant groups. The Kalashnikov plant
is scheduled to begin production in late 2009.
The army also took delivery of a batch of 5,000 Dragunov SVD sniper rifles during 2008
Under Project Pemon the army acquired a fleet of 33 new combat and transport helicopters during
2005 in three phases. Phase 1 was valued at USD120 million and included six Mi-17V-5 Panaera,
a single Mi-26T2 Pemon heavy lift and three Mi-35M2 Caribe gunships. Phase two comprised five
Mi-35M2 attack helicopters and was valued at USD81 million. The final phase comprised up to 14
Mi-17V-5, two Mi-26T2 and two Mi-35M2 is a USD200 million deal. All deliveries were completed
by late 2007.
In December 2009, the Russian ambassador to Venezuela announced that it was at an advanced
stage of negotiations to supply a further 53 helciopters to the Venezuelan armed forces. The
details of the specific number or type of helicopters involved has not been revelade, but is thought
to include a further 33 transport Mi-17 and Mi-26 and up to 20 combat helicopters with a mix of Mi-
35M and Mi-28N.
8.5. Modernisation
A large number of off the shelf acquisitions in recent years has left little room for modernisation
efforts.
The AMX-13/C-90 fleet was modernised before delivery with new 90-mm guns and engines. Up to
six of the earlier AMX-13 fleet were modified with an M42 40-mm turret and known as AMX-13
Ráfaga. The AMX-30V fleet also received new night vision systems.
Four UH-1H Iroquois were subjected to the Huey 2 upgrade programme but by the time the US
embargo was announced these were still in the US.The four machines have been impounded and
are being offered for sale. The funds allocated by Venezuela were used to procure three Bell
206B, a Beech 200 and a number of Cessna lights on the US civil commercial market. Something
similar seems to happen with the Agusta A-109 fleet and these machines appear to have been
subjected to the embargo also. There is no available information on this.
9. Equipment in service
9.1. Armour
Table 12.
Table 13.
Table 14.
Type Manufacturer Role Original In Service First
Total Delivery
Table 15.
L/70(1) (Twin)
Table 16.
Type Role
Table 17.