01 People v. Bayabos MALLARI
01 People v. Bayabos MALLARI
01 People v. Bayabos MALLARI
2nd:, Nonetheless, the SC affirmed the quashal of the Information based on grounds different from those raised by the Special
PROSEC. As a manifestation of this constitutional right, the Rules of Court requires that the information charging persons with
an offense be “sufficient.” One of the key components of a “sufficient information” is the statement of the acts or omissions
constituting the offense charged, subject of the complaint.
At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the information filed with the court based on the grounds
enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, one of which is the claim that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. In assessing whether an information must be quashed on that ground, the basic test is to determine if the facts
averred would establish the presence of the essential elements of the crime as defined in the law. The information is
examined without consideration of the truth or veracity of the claims therein, as these are more properly proven or
controverted during the trial. In the appraisal of the information, matters aliunde are not taken into account.
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established:
1. a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or psychological
suffering or injury; and
2. these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s admission or entry into an organization.
In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against persons defined under the RPC is the
infliction by a person of physical or psychological suffering on another in furtherance of the latter’s admission or entry into an
organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act, they may nonetheless
be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are
school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite
actual knowledge thereof.
SC disagrees with the Sandiganbayan ruling that the quashal of the Information was warranted for failure to allege that the
purported acts were not covered by the exemption relating to the duly recommended and approved “testing and training
procedure and practices” for prospective regular members of the AFP and the PNP. This exemption is an affirmative defense
in, not an essential element of, the crime of accomplice to hazing. It is an assertion that must be properly claimed by the
accused, not by the prosecution.
Nevertheless, we find – albeit for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash must be granted, as the Information does not
include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing. There is no allegation that the purported acts
were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would
prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the
crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term– in this case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a
characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law.
Finally, we reject the Special Prosecutor’s claim that the Sandiganbayan should just have ordered the filing of another
information or the correction of the defect by amendment, instead of dismissing the case outright. Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117
of the Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, the court shall give the prosecution a chance to correct the defect by amendment. However, the provision also states
that if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, the motion shall be granted. Here, we point out that the Special
Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion to Quash that there was no defect in the Information. Neither has he filed a
new information after the motion was sustained, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in
ordering the quashal of the Information and the eventual dismissal of the case.This does not mean, however, that the Special
Prosecutor is now precluded from filing another information. Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a
motion to quash would not bar another prosecution. That is, of course, unless respondents are able to prove that the criminal
action or liability has been extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already attached.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 171222 is hereby DENIED and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 174786,
DISMISSED. The dismissal of the case in Sandiganbayan Resolutions are thus AFFIRMED.
NOTES
2S 2016-17 (MALLARI)