A Note On Gödelian Inexhaustibility and Computationalism

A NOTE ON GÖDELIAN INEXHAUSTIBILITY AND COMPUTATIONALISM
The inexhaustibility phenomenon is a Gödelian phenomenon affecting at least all

consistent formal systems that include recursive arithmetic. I will call such systems
arithmetical theories. An arithmetical theory S can always been extended by adding an
arithmetical sentence ConS equivalent under the standard interpretation to a proposition
asserting S’s consistency. In fact, whoever can come to recognize the soundness of such
a theory, can in principle deduce its consistency, construct ConS, interpret it and
acknowledge its truth, and so go beyond the theory.
Now it happens that if human reason could be represented by an arithmetical theory

(call it H), it seems that humans could in principle examine it, recognize its soundness,
construct and assert ConH, and go beyond H, which is absurd. This is in essence the
Lucas-Penrose argument against computationalism, based on the mathematical
equivalence of formal systems and computational devices. Note that it is not necessary
for the argument humans to know that H mirrors human reason.
Opponents argue that human mathematical intelligence could be represented by an

arithmetical theory H such that humans could not examine it, recognize its soundness,
construct and assert ConH. The standard argument is that H could be too complex a
theory for humans to be able of examining it, recognizing its soundness, constructing
and asserting ConH.
I’ll try to show why this counterargument is not satisfactory.
Any formal system is finitely expressed and can, in principle, be exhaustively examined
and evaluated; there is no logical impossibility for this. If H really represents human
reason, humans could in principle examine it and find its axioms and inference rules
correct so as to infer its consistency. It could happen that no human could achieve this
or get from there to the construction of ConH because of technical (I mean: mental,
physical, environmental) limitations, but humans would certainly possess the amount of
logico-mathematical resources to deduce H’s soundness and consistency, construct and
assert ConH. Human reason is indeed incarnate in human mind and human brain, and
this can impose technical restrictions on its implementation: any hindrance humans
could face in producing ConH would not originate in logico-mathematical facts for the
passage from T to T + ConT is unproblematic enough but only in technical
circumstances. Humans could confront a technical impossibility to know ConH with
certainty and they would no doubt eventually meet that kind of impossibility at some
stage of iteration but they could suffer from no logical impossibility, that is, no lack
of logico-mathematical resources to conclude ConH.
So what reflection upon the inexhaustibility phenomenon makes evident is the necessity
to draw a distinction between the factual aspects of human mind and the logico-
mathematical legality it embodies under the name of human reason. Consider a
particular summation of a trillion numbers each of them of a trillion digits. We may
very well be unable to perform the operation successfully: our minds, our brains, time,
paper supply, etc. may fail; still no one will doubt that our reason comprises the logico-
mathematical resources to accomplish the task. In fact, the equation expressing the
correct result is a theorem of first order Peano arithmetic whose axioms, axiom scheme
and inference rules most of us can check in a few minutes and find correct with as much
certainty as, say, the Pythagorean theorem. Provided with better technical resources
such as an improved memory or more suitable notation devices, we would produce the
equation with no need of additional logico-mathematical information.
So, if H existed, we would perhaps fail in constructing and asserting ConH but while H
would lack the logico-mathematical information that is, the axioms or the inference
rules required to prove it, we would only lack some technical resources. So there is
no formal system equivalent to human reason.
In fact, it is the unproblematical rule permitting to pass from T to T+ConT that cannot be
formalized and included in a formal theory or computational device. So simple a rule
(when enunciated in ordinary language) as ‘assert the consistency of whatever
proposition you are prepared to assert’ cannot be coded and included in a formal
system. Similarly, the rule ‘assert the truth of whatever proposition you are prepared to
state’ cannot be embodied by a formal system; the famous Tarski theorem stays in the
way.
However, this conclusion rests on two implicit assumptions. One: there is a consistent
logico-mathematical legality (human reason) that humans can potentially use to
produce arithmetical knowledge. Two: human reason includes recursive arithmetic. The
latter is hardly controversial because recursive arithmetic is recursive, that is, each of its
truths can in principle be obtained by an effective step-by-step procedure. The former is
quite another thing. But what legality could we rely on to argue for the inconsistency or
nonexistence of human reason? On human reason?
So what the inexhaustibility phenomenon suggests is that computationalism is either

false or impossible to defend by rational means.

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A NOTE ON GÖDELIAN INEXHAUSTIBILITY AND COMPUTATIONALISM

The inexhaustibility phenomenon is a Gödelian phenomenon affecting at least all

Now it happens that if human reason could be represented by an arithmetical theory

Opponents argue that human mathematical intelligence could be represented by an

I’ll try to show why this counterargument is not satisfactory.

So what the inexhaustibility phenomenon suggests is that computationalism is either

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