Surveillance & Society

5(1): 33-50
http://www.surveillance-and-society.org

CCTV Identity Management and Implications for

Criminal Justice: some considerations∗

Moira Carroll-Mayer, Ben Fairweather and Bernd Carsten Stahl1

Abstract

The UK Presidency of the European Union called for an expansive, mandatory policy of surveillance
technologies aimed at the reduction of crime and the protection of citizens. Research indicates that the
efficacy for this task of the technology, epitomised by CCTV, cannot be taken for granted. This paper asks
whether the effects of the technological surveillance environment may be more problematic than currently
posited in the literature to the extent that they render more vulnerable and undermine the identities of those
they are pledged to safeguard. Much of the literature in surveillance studies debates whether surveillance
technology, particularly CCTV, has the effects of crime reduction and prevention attributed to it by
proponents. This paper goes one step further and through a process of critical analysis explores the import
for individuals subjected to the process of surveillance technologies epitomized by CCTV. In particular the
paper addresses the question as it is perceived through the postmodernist agenda. Accordingly in the
process of critical analysis the paper considers the effects of transcarceration, the phenetic fix and the
technological imperative.

Background Issues

McCahill and Norris (2002) estimated that in the UK there are over 4.2 million CCTV
cameras, one for every 14 citizens. A UK citizen may be captured on CCTV up to 300
times each day (Murakami Wood et al., 2006: 7). The figures indicate a higher
camera/citizen ratio in the UK than in any other state on earth. It is against this backdrop
that on the 7th September 2005 the UK Presidency of the European Union released a first
formal report on security enhancement entitled Liberty and Security: Striking the Right
Balance2. The main intention of the report was to further promote surveillance
technologies in order to safeguard freedom and security. Some of the policies suggested
in the report are domestic UK policies that had failed in the UK for a variety of reasons

∗ In the context of this paper identity management describes the process whereby the individual’s identity
is recast through the medium of CCTV surveillance technologies.
1 All: Centre for Computing and Social Responsibility, Faculty of Computing Sciences and Engineering,
De Montfort University, UK. mailto:moiracaroll2000@yahoo.co.uk
2 The report may be accessed at
http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/terrorism/library/ukpresidencypaperonstrikingtherightbalance.p
df. It is also accessible at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/LibertySecurity.pdf [Last accessed Jan 18th,
2008].

© 2008 Surveillance Studies Network. All rights reserved. ISSN: 1477-7487

 Carroll-Mayer et al.: CCTV Identity Management

(Riley, 2003:16; FIPR, 2003). What is nevertheless interesting about the report is that it
suggests that surveillance technologies are generally justified in the fight against crime
and terrorism. It is based on strong assumptions about the nature of crime, of law
enforcement and of the role of technology as a facilitating factor for providing security.
But it must be emphasised that there is no agreement as to the effectiveness of CCTV
technology as a panacea to misbehaviour. This will come as no surprise to scholars in the
field of surveillance studies. Research on the effectiveness and efficiency of surveillance
technologies in the UK has shown that their efficacy is dubious. A leading study
conducted for the Home Office concludes that CCTV does not lead to crime reduction
(Gill and Spriggs, 2005: 60). Gerrard et al. (2007:11) are careful to stress the ongoing
debate as to CCTV efficacy in crime reduction and prevention. Any analysis of the value
to society of increased technologically enabled surveillance must, in the face of its
promotion by the authorities as a general panacea, take account of the doubtful status of
CCTV as a crime reduction tool.

This paper aims to counter balance the blanket approval of CCTV surveillance
technologies by policy makers. Overall, the paper asks readers to go beyond the standard
issue of usefulness of CCTV surveillance technology and develop a broader account that
allows an appreciation of unexpected and counter-intuitive effects of the technology.

The paper critically analyses the events surrounding the deaths of Rigoberto Alpizar and
Jean Charles De Menezes in the CCTV rich environments of an airport and underground
rail station respectively. Of airports Adey (2004:1477) has this to say ‘they are symbols of
mobility, emblematic of the postmodern world… well and truly a space under
surveillance’. Since mobility is often viewed as a risk to the social order (Adey, 2004:
1478), it is no surprise that surveillance in the form of CCTV should be concentrated and
implicated there in societal conflict. Their role in surveillance has gone largely unnoticed
by surveillance studies, reflecting the invisibility of these transient ‘non-places’ within the
social sciences (Adey, 2004:1). Cwerner (2006) concurs and explains, ‘the social sciences
and humanities have had relatively little to say about these systems and processes
(comprising airports) partly because such time-systems are gated and off-limits’. (The
position is exacerbated since as Gerrard et al. (2007:28) note there is refusal to reveal ‘the
needs’ of state agencies regarding viewing, analysis and recovery of CCTV footage due to
national security considerations.) The role of surveillance at airports, largely ignored,
reflects that invisibility. Despite invisibility and obfuscation, what happens there [and
surely now at rail stations] is a microcosm of events to come as through surveillance
technologies a range of political agendas and aspirations strive to effect wider society
(Lyon, 2003: 410). We may learn useful lessons from what happens within them for other
places and spaces.

The thrust of the paper is all the more pertinent in light of recent research for the Home
Office and other major stakeholders in CCTV (Camerwatch Launch Report, 2007)
revealing that over 90% of the CCTV cameras from which police evidence is obtained fail
to meet the Information Commissioner’s Code of Practice and are operated illegally
(Ferrie, 2007). Ferrie states too,

I’m not surprised there is confusion [about CCTV evidence]. It’s a

complex area…the Data Protection Act covers images of people and
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requires they be held securely if the data is to be used as legal and

admissible evidence. Storing images of people is also impacted by the EU
Human Rights Act. As things stand today clever legal counsel could drive
a horse and cart through most CCTV evidence and that is not in anybody’s
best interests.

Courts are also taxed by questions of image quality. Cunningham (2007) representing the
Home Office and ACPO states ‘The use of CCTV as an evidential tool has grown
significantly but 89% of CCTV images that reach the police is far from ideal.’ The theme
is repeated in the National CCTV Strategy 2007,

Anecdotal evidence suggests that over 8o% of the CCTV footage supplied
to the police is far from ideal, especially if it is being used for primary
identification or identities are unknown and identification is being sought,
for instance by media release.
(National CCTV Strategy, 2007: 2.2.2)

Underscoring these problems are the informing instructions issued by the Fifth Report of
the House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee3 whereby it is left to the
discretion of the courts whether to admit CCTV evidence. Current practice is to admit
such evidence even where there are weaknesses arising for example from image quality or
authenticity. Such issues go instead to the weight afforded to the CCTV evidence within
the judicial process. The Committee having looked at issues effecting the admissibility of
digital imaging for evidential purposes for example loss of quality attendant upon
compression, image manipulation and authentication concluded, ‘Evidence should not
necessarily be inadmissible because it does not conform with some specific technological
requirement.’4. The laissez faire approach is perhaps understandable if it understood, for
example, that though it is possible to go through CCTV operating code line by line it is
not possible to see it in operation; CCTV software algorithms are operationally obscure
(Introna and Wood, 2004:183). This difficulty is equalled by there being a mere handful
of experts worldwide with the ability to understand and interpret the algorithmic trial left
by smart CCTV (Philips et al., 2003).

Methodology
The paper addresses the issue of CCTV and its implications for identity management
within the criminal justice system through the lens of critical theory, it proceeds upon the
basis that there is inherent structural conflict at the nexus of the technology and the
interests of societal stakeholders. Since the presence of structural conflict provides the
ideal milieu for critical research (Fay, 1987: 27) this was a major factor in the decision to
proceed from that theoretical standpoint. Taking into account the blanket and pervasive
nature of the hegemonic discourse, characterised by the call of the UK Presidency of the
EU to intensify CCTV surveillance technologies, a theoretical approach was required that
would effectively probe the attendant incomplete, ambiguous and contradictory discourse.
Critical analysis finds what lurks behind and what is really being said (Bondarauk and

3 The full report is available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-

office.co.uk/pa/ld1999798/ldselect/ldctech/064v/st0501.htm
4 House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology Report of 1998, para 3.18 of note 8.

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 Carroll-Mayer et al.: CCTV Identity Management

Hubb, 2003: 2). Overarching all of this is the consideration that of all the main stream
methodologies only critical analysis permits the identification, investigation and
judgement of the effects of phenomenon outside the boundaries of origin. It answers the
question ‘how’ invites prescription and does not preclude dismay (Potter, 1996:3).

Manipulation and Misuse of CCTV Evidence

Gerrard et al. (2007: 24) opine, ‘there appears little doubt the police service utilizes
CCTV images in the investigative process and has considerable success in doing so. High
profile cases have reinforced the investigative benefits of CCTV, which not only assist
police officers in the identification of offenders but also help establish the nature, location
and time of the crime...’ Their remark is immediately preceded by an acknowledgement
that there is a lack of formal research evidence for the conclusion5.

It is instructive to look at formal research evidence that does exist. There is near
consensus that the presence of CCTV in the working environment of police officers can
produce negative effects on their behaviour (Werrett, 2003: 192). These effects may
manifest in mistakes or in the commission of criminal offences. Goold (2003) found that
though officers positively modify their behaviour in the presence of CCTV that they
exhibit a tendency to manipulate CCTV deployment to their advantage. Goold (2003:
199) cites Norris and Armstrong (1999: 190) who identified police practices such as
signalling operators to pan away from questionable police activities and ignoring or
suppressing CCTV footage in order to create evidential biases. Goold’s findings,

gave reason to believe that police officers at some of the [CCTV] schemes
had attempted to remove tapes that they feared might contain footage of
police misconduct. At police led schemes operators claimed that on a
number of occasions officers had come up to the CCTV control room
following incidents in which they had been required to use force and had
asked to ‘check the tape.’
(Goold, 2003: 199)

According to one CCTV operator interviewed by Goold many officers did not view
themselves bound by the Code of Practice rules on CCTV evidence handling and access.
Goold reports that officers at police led schemes viewed the evidence as existing
primarily for their benefit and displayed signs of regarding themselves as the rightful
owners of all evidence generated by CCTV. At times they were emboldened to remove
tapes without authorisation.

The proprietary stance of the police towards CCTV evidence must be viewed against the

5 Gerrard et al. (2007:26) report that the Police Standards Unit does not publish performance data for
CCTV evidence and that there is therefore no quantifiable data regarding the success of CCTV evidence
an investigative tool. The explanation rendered is the absence of all activities relating to CCTV evidence
from the police National Competency Framework and that therefore the retrieval and compilation of
CCTV evidence is still not a recognised practice or a recognised police officer’s role.

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‘broad concern’ regarding the problem of police perjury6 and police involvement in
perverting the course of justice7 in the UK referred to by Edwards (2002: 1).

Of course the manipulation of CCTV evidence is not peculiar to the police. The Rodney
King case is the most compelling extant illustration of CCTV manipulation by both sides
in criminal proceedings. In 1992 Mr Rodney King, an Afro-American, was stopped for
speeding and subsequently assaulted by the four arresting white police officers. The event
was video recorded by a man from a nearby building which recording became subject to
various forms of distortion by the opposing sides in the prosecution of Mr King’s
attackers. Goodwin (1994: 2) states,

Opposing sides in the case used murky pixels of the same television image to display to
the jury incommensurate events: a brutal savage beating of a man lying helpless on the
ground versus careful police response to a dangerous ‘PCP- crazed giant’ who was argued
to be in control of the situation. By deploying an array of discursive practices including
talk, ethnography, category systems articulated by expert witnesses, and various ways of
highlighting images provided by the video tape, lawyers for both sides were able to
structure [the depicted actions ergo the characters of the actors] in ways that suited their
own distinctive agendas…

Though a full consideration of Goodwin’s findings is precluded here it is instructive to

present from each side an adapted illustration of the many techniques of CCTV evidence
manipulation that his research discovered. During the first trial the prosecution presented
the recording as self explicating, objective record in these terms, ‘What more could you
ask for? You have the video tape that shows objectively, without bias, impartially what
happened that night. It can’t be rebutted’ (Goodwin, 1994: 15). Using the same images an
expert witness for the defence filtered the taped events through a police coding scheme,
instructing the jury to view the victim’s body movement in terms of that scheme. A
coding scheme for the use of violence was applied to the taped images:

• If a suspect is aggressive the proper police response is force escalation in order

to subdue.
• When the suspect cooperates then the force is de-escalated.

Following the application of the code to the images what is in fact a brutal assault is
deconstructed into a new set of events as follows:

6 The Perjury Act 1911, section 1 provides for the offence of lying on oath. Lying on oath includes false
declarations per the Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.89 and the Magistrates Court Act 1980, s.106 covering
statements tendered in committal proceedings and representations punishable under any statute in judicial
proceedings. The offence is triable on indictment only and attracts a seven year maximum sentence.
7 Perverting the course of justice is a common law offence; triable on indictment only it may attract a life
sentence though in practice is unlikely to result in a sentence exceeding ten years imprisonment. The
offence includes fabrication or disposal of evidence or inducing others to do so. Edwards (2002) indicates
that police officers found guilty of perverting the course of justice are likely to attract sentences of
between four and seven years for perjury relating to the most serious charges of murder, violence and
drugs. Perjury and perverting the course of justice strike at the basis of the rule of law and have been said
to ‘poison the well of justice’ Crabtree J. in R v. Archer, unreported 2002, Para 63.

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Defense: There were ten distinct uses of force rather than one single use of
force. In each of those, uses of force there was an escalation and a de
escalation an assessment period, and then an escalation and a deescalation
again. And another assessment period.

Actions the prosecution describe in the second trial as ‘beating the suspect into
submission’ is then transformed into a display that the ‘period of de escalation has
ceased’:

Defense: Four oh five, oh one [blows] We see a blow being delivered. Is

that correct?
Expert: That’s correct. The force has been again escalated to the level it
had been previously, and deescalation has ceased.
Defense: And at - at this point which is… We see a blow being struck and
thus the end of the period of deescalation? Is that correct Captain?
Expert: That’s correct. Force has now been elevated to the previous level,
after this period of de escalation.
(Goodwin, 1994: 17)

Goodwin anticipates objections that the expert’s point is tautology; that if one is being
struck repeatedly then by definition the moments in between are de-escalations. Goodwin
responds ‘However much more than tautology is involved. By deploying the escalation-de
escalation framework the expert has provided a coding scheme that transforms the actions
being coded into displays of careful, systematic police craftwork’. At another stage the
defence expert codifies images of Mr King’s buttocks rising slightly in a manner that
unleashes a cascade of perceptual inferences that have the effect of exonerating the
officers and of recasting the identity of the victim as the controller of the action
(Goodwin, 1994: 22).

The Process of Transcarceration in the CCTV Environment

There are other more insidious forces at work in the CCTV environment. Towards an
explanation of the origins and effects of CCTV identity management exemplified at its
most extreme by the cases of De Menezes and Alpizar, this paper draws attention to
similarities between the characterisation of ‘suspects’ on CCTV and the characterisation
of the mentally ill on televised media through a process of transcarceration. The concept
of transcarceration originally described confinement of the mental patient within and
between environments wherein the individual’s identity and autonomy might be expunged
or modified. The concept has been extended by Arrigo et al. (2005), Lowman et al.
(1987) and Haggerty (2004) to cover those targeted by the criminal justice system.
Haggerty (2004: 218) describes how environments conducive to transcarceration evolve
from the replacement of ‘criminological experts who targeted policy intervention at the
level of the individual or the social by new experts in the situational’ [italics added].
Their focus is upon crime control through transformation of the immediate physical
environment. Situational criminology stresses crime reduction through loss prevention,
target hardening and enhanced visibility; each of these is realised through CCTV as in the

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process of transcarceration it reaches out to and is entered by ‘suspect’ yet silenced

individuals. In such a setting the sense making speech is located in the unconsciousness of
the viewer ‘awaiting mobilization and valorization’ (Arrigo et al., 2005).

There are two intersecting axes that pass through the speaking subject (Chong et al.,
2006), the plane of meaning and being and the plane of the existential and the symbolic.
The former is identifiable in the linguistic struggle of the psychiatric patient as he seeks to
assert his legitimacy through the limiting, established clinico-legal system of
communication. The latter is identifiable in the articulation of self referential, thematic,
circulated meanings and values of the clinico-legal professions. Clinico-legal speech, the
medium for discussion of mental illness, is ‘steeped in and governed by a grammar that
privileges disciplinary systems’ (Foucault, 1977). In the taken-for-granted clinico-legal
communication setting the mentally ill are over time denied the individuality and validity
they would otherwise posses.

Consider now the societal response to one whose likeness appears on CCTV footage that
has been sequestered or otherwise obtained for the identification of a criminal actor. Not
for him a luxurious world where disempowered voices may nonetheless be heard from
‘the plane of meaning and being’ (Chong et al., 2005). In the silent movie world of CCTV
evidence, in a process of ‘transcarceration’ (Arrigo et al., 2005), suspects are moved
between nowhere and the scene of crime. Worse, they are left hovering, loitering at the
scene, assuming guilt by association. Separated from reality, isolated in virtual reality,
deconstructed within hours, minutes or seconds, according to the temporal constraints of
pressurised police activity, they have no voice. This is, as Chong et al. (2006) would have
it, the ‘manifestation of punishment assuming a discursive linguistic form’. The
superimposition of the suspect’s silence by the voice of authority has consequences that
will be considered.

Personal appearances upon publicly located CCTV screens are unaccompanied by the
voice of the actor. They acquire, in the hands of the police however, a ‘voice over’. The
absence of voice is important in the process of transcarceration. The superimposition of
the voice of authority is critical. From this side, through the lens of critical
postmodernism, it is possible to explain how the superimposition of the voice can lead to
the virtual criminalisation of those depicted on CCTV. It partially explains the horrifying
consequences, for Jean Charles De Menezes, attendant upon the appearance of his look-
alike, a suspected July 7th bomber, on CCTV (IPCC, 2007). For Rigoberto Alpizar it may
explain in part why he was gunned down at Miami airport.

The power of CCTV ‘voice-overs’ in identity management is of course demonstrated in

the US case of Rodney King in the context of CCTV manipulation and misuse considered
above. The extent and the dangers of police voice-overs of CCTV evidence in the UK
were highlighted in June 2005. During a criminal case defence lawyers discovered the
unqualified status and unreliability of an expert in lip reading who had regularly been
employed by the police. The ‘expert’ has been used to analyse silent CCTV footage in
over 700 prosecutions (many of which resulted in convictions). At the time of the
discovery the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) announced that in future where lip
reading of CCTV footage is admitted in evidence judges would warn of its limitations and
of the risk of error. Nonetheless three subsequent appeals against conviction secured on
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the evidence of the discredited ‘expert’ have failed. Despite defence argument based on
the CPS guidelines judges are determined to give weight to the reliability of lip reading
evidence of CCTV images. In R v Lutterel8 the court opined,

lip reading from a video like facial mapping, is in our view a species of
real evidence…We are entirely satisfied that lip reading evidence as to the
contents of a videoed conversation is capable of passing the ordinary test
of relevance and reliability and therefore being potentially admissible in
evidence.

With respect the wisdom of the finding is questionable. The Association of Teachers of
Lip Reading for Adults has recommended members do not carry out forensic lip reading
for the police since reliability cannot be guaranteed. Professor Quentin Summerfield an
expert in linguistics tested the discredited expert’s deciphering skills with CCTV footage
before her employ by the police. In one test from 297 words she cited 43 that were
unuttered and in another 87 (Johnson, 2005). Johnson quotes Jane Hickman of the
Criminal Appeal Lawyers Association,

No one asks, ‘How far should we go with forensic evidence?’ And its
increasingly becoming the whole story in a trial. The trend as science
advances is for the Crown to adduce evidence that is not sufficiently
developed. Juries are being asked to draw conclusions that the evidence
can’t bear.

CCTV and the Phenetic Fix

Adey (2004: 502) and Lyon (2002b) talk about the ‘phenetic fix’ achieved by surveillance
technologies that capture in a snapshot the [apparent] essence of movements, bodies and
identities9 10. Information obtained from the snapshot is used to determine who might be a
threat and should therefore be subjected to more intense security analysis. Before the
shooting of De Menezes a grainy CCTV image of a suspected London bomber Hussein
Osman was used by the police to determine that De Menezes merited ‘another look’
(IPCC, 2007: 12.9). This loose determination triggered a train of events that culminated in
officers shooting their suspect dead, allegations of police criminality and ultimately to

8 EWCA Crim 1344, CA (Criminal Division), 28th May, 2004.

9 Phenetic has the literal meaning of a classification based upon overall similarities.
10 Walby (2003) conceptualises CCTV as an ‘initiating text’ which is ‘active, activated and contributing to
the organisation of sociality and work processes within a ruling framework’. He argues that though
prevalent discourses are present in for example the compilation of policemen’s’ notebooks that the
discourse of CCTV permits the more rapid reproduction of and circulation of initiating texts in multiple
sights as operators participate in and reproduce discourses through meticulous monitoring of citizens.
Through these discourses citizens who exhibit certain types of behaviour or characteristics become ‘flawed’
or ‘dangerous’, to be dealt with as ‘risks to be policed’. Walby notes the pace and immediacy of the
labelling of those subject to CCTV surveillance relative to the objects of synoptic media. Conceptualising
CCTV as rolling text he found that it immediately transformed social relations setting in motion events that
immediately affected the objects of surveillance.

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findings of endangering public safety. Ominously the Stockwell One Report invites the
Crown Prosecution Service to consider charges of murder against two officers (IPCC,
2007).

Due process has long been the quarry of a pressurised police force (Williams, 2000;
Kaufman, 1998; Anderson and Anderson, 1998). In the wake of the September 11th
attacks in America and of the July 7th London bombings due process finds itself closer
than ever to becoming the victim of that force. At the forefront of the ‘war on terror’ it is
apparent that CCTV footage increasingly precedes arrest and interrogation as the first
point of contact between the police and terrorist suspects. It is arguable that an appearance
upon CCTV vies with interrogation, attracting the accolade attributed to the latter by
Williams (2000: 209), ‘a critical forum in which initial information and impressions are
exchanged’. Through the phenomenon of the phenetic fix it may become for the police
much more than prima facie evidence, as to it they attach a presumption of guilt.

Following the shooting of Rigoberto Alpizar by an air marshal at Miami airport in

Florida, statements from fellow passengers indicated that the man had been behaving
erratically from an early stage. In fact he was a sufferer of Bi Polar disorder, the
symptoms of which include restlessness. Standing in the queue to board he was stated to
have been waving his arms about, moving between lines at the Customs check and to
have made agitated body movements11. There are two distinct types of CCTV, one that
records stasis and motion in an environment for the concurrent or subsequent assessment
by human and another that records stasis and motion for the concurrent or subsequent
assessment by an algorithm (Carroll-Mayer et al., 2006: 3). At many US airports
including Miami the ‘phenetic fix’ is enabled by algorithmic surveillance technologies
that analyse CCTV footage in real time. At one level these identify actions such as
entering the wrong corridor and on another they pick up on individual body movements.
Body movements are ‘inscribed with meanings of what is an allowed movement and what
is considered suspicious and deviant’ (Adey, 2004: 508). Security is alerted to investigate
those whose movements are judged by the algorithm to be suspicious or deviant. There is
circumstantial evidence to suggest that Mr Alpizar may have been the victim of the
‘phenetic fix’. The Marconi Corporation provides Miami Airport with a high speed
behavioural recognition surveillance system with integrated access control, video
transport, full duplex voice and digital recognition features (Gager, 2005). At the time of
installation the system was hailed as a cost saving exercise. It is possible that the price
may also be counted in human life. So far the US authorities have refused to
acknowledge the involvement of the system in the chain of events leading to the killing of
Mr Alpizar. Statements issued by the authorities describe the chain of events as having
begun on board when the deceased got up from his seat and ran from the aircraft. If the
Marconi system was in operation at the time that Mr Alpizar was passing through Miami
airport then it is reasonable to assume that it would have ‘noticed’ Mr Alpizar much
earlier and that security measures against him would have begun from that moment. If this
is the case then it is possible that the authorities are attempting to focus attention away

11 See the final report of Miami-Dad State Attorney’s Office

http://www.miamisao.com/publications/press/2006/airmarshalshooting.pdf (Last accessed 11th Nov 2007).
There are also numerous newspaper reports of witness statements.

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from the involvement of CCTV in the debacle1213. Worryingly such an effort would
deflect discussion away from the ethical and legal implications of deploying, in the civil
setting, autonomous decision systems that identify potential human targets. Ethicists and
lawyers pay scant attention to the implications of these devices in the military realm
where they are the cause celebre of western military planners (Carroll-Mayer and Stahl,
2005). As they encroach upon the civil setting that apathy becomes more dangerous than
ever.

CCTV and the Technological Imperative

In Speed and Politics Virilio (1986: 6) proposes ‘dromomatics’, the influence of speed
upon all aspects of urban life, for example transportation, communication and warfare.
As computers accelerate and set the pace of human transactions, humans in turn are
enthralled to what Virilio terms ‘the technological imperative’. There is evidence to
suggest that the police and others closely involved with CCTV are subject to the
technological imperative; the trite saying ‘because the machine says so’ takes on sinister
meaning as we become what the machine says we are. Manning (1988: 155) posits that
technology enslaves officers, ‘…although the public pays them, they work for the
machines that lurk behind them, glow in front of them, click and buzz in their ears and fill
the air with electronic sounds’.

This type of response exemplified by, for example, a tendency to respond more to
technological ‘chat’ than to human command in the control based situation, that is well
documented (Cummings, 2004: 6). Worryingly it is only very recently, for the first time,
and entirely by accident, that the influence of the technological imperative has been noted
in the targeting situation. The unexpected results arose from tests undertaken by the US
Navy to measure the situational awareness of human controllers of Tomahawk missiles
(Cummings, 2004: 5). The tardiness of this discovery was unmodified by situational
awareness being as Klein (2000) states ‘of utmost importance’ to military planners or by
previous research by (Ruff at al., 2002) indicating reduced situational awareness arising
from poorly designed human/computer interfaces. It is not suggested that the complexity
of the military systems is on par with systems such as might be provided by Marconi at
Miami airport. It is suggested that human responses to the embedded instant messaging
interface in systems such as that provided by Marconi have the propensity to embody the
shortcomings identified in the Tomahawk research. Accordingly the potential for
catastrophic consequences in air and rail termini and in other surveillance intense
environments exists.

12 Discussion of the Marconi system is clouded by obfuscation. Gager (2005) reports Jack Waskowicz
head of the program at Miami airport saying of the system that its details ‘cannot be revealed’. It is
interesting to note also that the system does not appear to have a name though it is however part of the
Marconi Simple Multiservice Architecture for Reliable Transport (SMART) programme. Probably the
most informative document is one released by Marconi in 2003. Described by the company as a White
Paper on Security and Surveillance it was entitled ‘Mission Critical Security Network for Critical
Infrastructure Protection’
13 Editor’s Note: Marconi was largely absorbed by Ericson late in 2005 (Goring, 2005) and most of their
reports and documentation are no longer available online or have been rebadged.

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Cummings (2004) explains that situational awareness is defined on three levels,

1.Perception of elements in the environment, 2. Comprehension of the current situation, 3.
The projection of future status. In the Tomahawk tests controllers were sent routine
queries from supervisors in conditions designed to emulate high and low work load
periods. Initial analyses revealed nothing out of the ordinary-there were no significant
differences in situational awareness despite varying workload levels. However,

…an unexpected behavioural trend was noted in regards to the use of the
instant message interface…Many subjects fixated on the instant messaging
and ignored primary tasking of retargeting missiles in urgent situations.
This occurred despite the fact that all subjects were repeatedly instructed
that retargeting instructions were their primary priority tasking and that
answering queries through the chat box was the least important of all
tasks…Many subjects would answer all queries before attending to the
more pressing retargeting problems…This could be costly from an
operational perspective…
(Cummings, 2004: 6).

The chatter from the ‘chat box’ overrode other more vital tasking information. Cummings
emphasises that though these findings were unexpected and did not result from
experiments directed at eliciting such information they highlight the need for more
research into the effects of instant messaging upon task performance. Manufacturer’s
literature about digital surveillance systems typically state that the systems analyse,

images from video surveillance feeds and alert security personnel to

behaviours that are suspicious or out of the ordinary, such as a fallen
person, lingering individuals or vehicles… predefined behaviours…14

The alerts disseminated by systems such as those provided by Marconi equate with ‘chat’.
It is not known whether the Marconi system did issue ‘alerts’ at Miami Airport in the
incident in question, but if the Marconi system did issue alerts in response to its
observation of Mr Alpizar these may have been blindly reacted to by the human agents to
the exclusion of other equally valid and important information.

There is evidence tending to suggest that this may have happened. Much has been
reported in the press and in the report of Miami-Dade State Attorney’s office about Mrs
Alpizar having told just about anyone within earshot that her husband’s behaviour was
being driven by illness. Strangely however this vital information did not impinge upon
that collated by Airport security. The unfruitful efforts of Mrs Alpizar are eerily
reminiscent of those of the human agents on the ground in Kosovo just prior to the
bombing of the Chinese Embassy. On that occasion the systems used to guide bombers
mistakenly identified the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade as a legitimate target. Human
agents, on the ground, aware of the mistake frantically attempted to intercept the Secure
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPERNET). They failed because SIPERNET is a
closed system, incapable of being infiltrated by outside information (Ignatieff, 2000: 64).

14Editor’s Note: Cerenium Intelligent Video Analytics site used to be at http://www.cerenium.com

However the company no longer exists.

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 Carroll-Mayer et al.: CCTV Identity Management

In light of the findings cited by Cummings it is debateable, had it not been a closed
system, whether the human voices would in fact have resulted in a countermand to the
strike order.

There is another indication that those in charge of the surveillance systems at Miami are,
probably unconsciously, acquiescing to the technological imperative. This lies in the
unequivocal response of officials when questioned as to how killings like that of Mr
Alpizar could be avoided in the future (Cohen, 2005). The officials advocate,

1. Enhanced computer profiling to include more personal information.

2. Increased use of behaviour pattern recognition systems.
3. More explosives detection equipment.
4. People like Mrs Alpizar ‘could take on more responsibility to alert the airline of
the potential for erratic behaviour that could be mistaken for a threat’.

Now points 1-3 are disquietingly self explanatory. Point 4 however is disturbingly
curious. Every day thousands of travellers for myriad reasons are fidgety, irritable or
downright obstreperous, they may rush and they may struggle. Many of us, for example,
know someone whose fear of flying is physically manifested. The possibilities are
infinite. Security experts are effectively saying that as long as humans have the
propensity for physical behaviour that is not recognised by algorithms as ‘normal’ they
face execution. Further, execution might be considered legitimate if friends and relatives,
having predicted the behaviour in advance or having noticed it, fail to communicate their
knowledge to precisely the right people15.

In 2003 in anticipation of upgrading their surveillance systems in place at US airports,

including Miami, Marconi issued a ‘White Paper’16. The paper described the enhanced
capability of the new SMART system,

In legacy systems integration is achieved via a combination of manual

integration and workflow processes. With Marconi SMART solutions the
data from all these systems can be fully integrated on the network and
monitored via a rule –based approach. The Marconi architecture can take
data and events from any and all systems the security manager wants to
activate and the systems can designate the rules that govern how the
systems operators react (italics added).

This approach ignores the cognitive nature of computers. Unlike humans who grow into
the position of being moral agents by socialisation, enculturation and learning (Stahl:
2004: 70) computers have no social history from which to form a sense of meaning.
Algorithms cannot decide which data is relevant to the construction of morally informed
action (Carroll-Mayer and Stahl, 2005: 6).

15 If otherwise suspicious behaviour is to be discounted on the basis of such reports, and they became
common, it is hard to see what would stop potential terrorists similarly phoning to advise that their fear of
flying may mean that they behave erratically before the flight as a way of deflecting suspicion.
16 See Note 14.

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 Carroll-Mayer et al.: CCTV Identity Management

It is with dismay one notes the complete absence of references to CCTV in the 41 page
report issued by the Miami Dade State Attorney’s Office exonerating two Air Marshals
from guilt in the Alpizar killing. There are hundreds of smart CCTV cameras at Miami
Airport yet images from none were referred to in the evidential process. Several still
photographs were included in the report but were taken and provided by Miami-Dade
police department after the events. The remark made by Gerrard et al. (2007: 28) as to
state agencies’ refusal to discuss publicly their CCTV ‘needs’ is recalled and takes on
refreshed significance in the light of that report. The last paragraph on the last page states:

It is factually and legally irrelevant whether FAMs 1 and 2 complied with

their department’s policies and procedures. Whether the Air Marshals’
actions are justified or not in the State of Florida is independent of whether
they abided by the rules set by a Federal Agency. For this reason, the
department’s policies and procedures, if any, were not evaluated.

In the face of such obfuscation it is unlikely we will ever know the extent of the
involvement of a CCTV system in the death of Rigoberto Alpizar.

The Future and CCTV

If suspects are ‘transcarcerated’ wider society is transfixed, awaiting mobilization and

valorization (Arrigo et al.: 2005) from the only voice in the scene, that of the authorities.
Hence society waited, believed, and acquiesced as it was told of the execution at
Stockwell Tube station of a July 21st ‘terrorist’ who had been clearly ‘identified’ from
CCTV footage (Cusick, 2005). But now we know the true identity of the man killed as a
result of his ‘look alike’ Hussein Osman having appeared on CCTV; the reliability and
the effect of that form of evidence is more roundly understood.

As Dick (2004: 52) reminds, policing is socially constructed. Why then, despite the
Menezes and Alpizar killings, evidence suggesting that the police interfere with CCTV
evidence, and authoritative findings that CCTV does not reduce crime or increase
detection, does the public demand more? In part this is explained by a sense of comfort
gained from CCTV, the feeling that an area is safer. Post September 11th and July 7th
Lacan’s voice of ‘desire’ is siren. In the ‘war on terror’ the social capital of the voice ‘on’
the CCTV video tape is maximised; offering security, it delivers danger.

At a meeting of the International Association of Public Transport, the then UK Transport

Secretary Alistair Darling spoke enthusiastically about the installation of behaviour
recognition systems at UK airports and train stations. This was in stark contrast to the
opinions of other transport chiefs. Alain Claire, director of the Paris region transport
authority, rejected Darling’s objective. Claire cites the greater accuracy of human
security agents. Attention was drawn to recent unsuccessful trials of behaviour
recognition technology in one London station. Results indicate the vast majority of alerts
triggered by the system were mistakes (Mathews, 2005). Just such a ‘mistake’ may have
led to the death of Alpizar. Consensus among conference delegates is that the systems are
immature and unreliable. This has not however dampened the zeal of the authorities.

Surveillance & Society 5(1) 45

 Carroll-Mayer et al.: CCTV Identity Management

Speaking contemporaneously Ian Johnston, Head of British Transport Police, was

adamant that the systems are needed now (Davenport, 2005). Marconi continued to have
involvement with security systems at a European level including the Paris Metro,
Eurotunnel and London Underground (Gerbig, 2003). In 2005 Marconi Transportation
was awarded a £150 million contract to install and operate surveillance on three London
Underground lines; Northern, Piccadilly and Jubilee (Datamonitor, 2005)17. If the UK
surveillance policy continues upon its current trajectory it is likely that society will
become increasingly dominated and eventually framed within what might be termed the
‘double glazing’ of advanced surveillance technology. CCTV images of human beings as
they traverse the boundaries of social order, through the centres of mobility will be
routinely processed, characterised and sorted, by algorithm into one of two categories-
potential or confirmed targets of lethal force.

Conclusion

This paper is a critical analysis of the implications of CCTV identity management

technologies for the criminal justice process. The consideration was undertaken in
response to the call by the UK Presidency of the EU to expand the deployment of CCTV
surveillance technologies. The paper counter poses and supplements assumptions
pertaining to CCTV technologies that emanate from the policy making cadre; it looks
beyond the standard utilitarian stance. Fear of the manipulation and misuse of CCTV
technologies in the criminal justice process has haunted the technology since its inception
as an instrument of the law. In the section devoted to this issue the paper examined
opportunities for manipulation and misuse and demonstrated the realisation of the fears as
they manifested in the remarkable case of Rodney King. The paper examines concepts
that loom on the postmodernist agenda; transcarceration, the phenetic fix and the
technological imperative and through their lens exposed the characteristics of CCTV
technology to critical analysis.

The paper looked at the effects of CCTV surveillance in extremis as they intermingled to
a greater or lesser extent with the other causal factors affecting the deaths of Rigoberto
Alpizar and Jean Charles De Menezes in the CCTV rich environments of airports and
train stations. It considered the nature of these environments, reconstructed through
technologies of surveillance by ‘the new experts in the situational’, as they displace
experts whose remit was the individual and the social. Casting the reconstructed CCTV
rich environments of the airport and the station as prescient microcosms of other/wider
spaces the paper illuminated the societal pitfalls. In sum the paper draws attention to
research findings tending to suggest that inadequately considered reliance upon CCTV
evidence promises the worst of all possible worlds, a world where crime is not in fact
reduced, where the legitimate forces of law may themselves be compromised and the
identity of the individual ultimately lost. It is time to interrogate the strengths and
weaknesses of CCTV technology, its power to mislead and openness to abuse so that its
capabilities can be better harnessed to draw in tandem the interests of the criminal justice
system and of the individuals affected by it.

17 See Note 14.

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 Carroll-Mayer et al.: CCTV Identity Management

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