Sensors: A Comprehensive Survey On Signcryption Security Mechanisms in Wireless Body Area Networks

sensors
Review
A Comprehensive Survey on Signcryption Security
Mechanisms in Wireless Body Area Networks
Saddam Hussain 1 , Syed Sajid Ullah 2, *, Mueen Uddin 1 , Jawaid Iqbal 3 and Chin-Ling Chen 4,5,6, *
1 School of Digital Science, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Jalan Tungku Link, Gadong BE1410, Brunei;
saddamicup1993@gmail.com (S.H.); mueenmalik9516@gmail.com (M.U.)
2 Department of Information and Communication Technology, University of Agder (UiA),
N-4898 Grimstad, Norway
3 Department of Computer Science, Capital University of Science and Technology, Islamabad 44000, Pakistan;
jawaid5825@gmail.com
4 School of Information Engineering, Changchun Sci-Tech University, Changchun 130600, China
5 Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, Chaoyang University of Technology,
Taichung 41349, Taiwan
6 School of Computer and Information Engineering, Xiamen University of Technology, Xiamen 361024, China
* Correspondence: syed.s.ullah@uia.no (S.S.U.); clc@mail.cyut.edu.tw (C.-L.C.)
Abstract: WBANs (Wireless Body Area Networks) are frequently depicted as a paradigm shift in
healthcare from traditional to modern E-Healthcare. The vitals of the patient signs by the sensors
are highly sensitive, secret, and vulnerable to numerous adversarial attacks. Since WBANs is a
real-world application of the healthcare system, it’s vital to ensure that the data acquired by the
WBANs sensors is secure and not accessible to unauthorized parties or security hazards. As a result,
effective signcryption security solutions are required for the WBANs’ success and widespread use.
Over the last two decades, researchers have proposed a slew of signcryption security solutions to

achieve this goal. The lack of a clear and unified study in terms of signcryption solutions can offer a
Citation: Hussain, S.; Ullah, S.S.; bird’s eye view of WBANs. Based on the most recent signcryption papers, we analyzed WBAN’s
Uddin, M.; Iqbal, J.; Chen, C.-L. A
communication architecture, security requirements, and the primary problems in WBANs to meet
Comprehensive Survey on
the aforementioned objectives. This survey also includes the most up to date signcryption security
Signcryption Security Mechanisms in
techniques in WBANs environments. By identifying and comparing all available signcryption
Wireless Body Area Networks.
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072. https://
techniques in the WBANs sector, the study will aid the academic community in understanding
doi.org/10.3390/s22031072 security problems and causes. The goal of this survey is to provide a comparative review of the
existing signcryption security solutions and to analyze the previously indicated solution given for
Academic Editors: Shah Nazir and
WBANs. A multi-criteria decision-making approach is used for a comparative examination of the
Iván García-Magariño
existing signcryption solutions. Furthermore, the survey also highlights some of the public research
Received: 20 November 2021 issues that researchers must face to develop the security features of WBANs.
Accepted: 22 December 2021
Published: 29 January 2022 Keywords: wireless body area networks; signcryption; healthcare
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral
with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affil-
iations. 1. Introduction
Wireless communications, distributed processing, micro-electro-mechanical systems,
wireless sensor applications, and embedded systems have all contributed to a significant
revolution in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). A WSN is a collection of distributed
Copyright: © 2022 by the authors.
sensors that monitor and record the physical conditions of the environment, then organize
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
and transmit the data to a base station [1]. WSNs have been employed in a variety of
This article is an open access article
applications, including medical surveillance and monitoring. Medical monitoring has
distributed under the terms and
grown in importance as a control system that provides real-time data and communication.
conditions of the Creative Commons
The term “WBANs” refers to the use of WSN in medical applications. A WBAN is a special
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
type of sensor network that uses the internet to connect patients with medical service
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
providers to communicate vital health information [2]. WBANs is a critical wearable and
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072. https://doi.org/10.3390/s22031072 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/sensors

Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 2 of 37
implant network for health diagnostics, monitoring, and regulating actuators by sensing
various important data from various wireless sensors (deployed in/over the body). It
has several advantages, including location-independent monitoring, no effect on patients’
mobility, early disease identification and prevention, and remote patient help, among
others. As a result, it’s ideal for continuous monitoring, providing for precise diagnosis
and real-time feedback to medical experts [3].
WBANs are an Internet of Things (IoT) application that aims to improve the quality
of patient services [4]. The IoT market is estimated to exceed 19 trillion USD in the next
several years [5]. By 2025, it is estimated that about 100 billion IoT devices will be in use
around the world, with an estimated economic worth of more than USD 11 trillion [6].
WBANs are one of the most capable wireless sensor technologies for health care, allowing
users of healthcare systems to communicate real-time data for essential applications such
as remote health monitoring, sports, home/patient care, emergency response, and early
intrusion detection [7–10]. However, the lack of adequate data sharing protection in such
a networking paradigm allows rogue users to execute illicit acts on sensitive medical
data. As a result, there is a significant loss of sensitive data and user privacy, which has
a significant impact on patients. For example, if a patient has a heart attack, a wearable
gadget, or wireless sensors (deployed over or in his/her body) can detect it. Thus, in a
public network, user and data protection is essential, allowing a doctor to begin therapy
immediately [11,12].
An effective security framework is necessary to secure the security of the WBANs
system. Authentication and confidentiality are two of the most important security concerns
in WBANs that must be addressed. Security and authentication are generally addressed
through the use of encryption and digital signatures [13]. It is common to use the sign-
then-encrypt method when both encryption and signing are required at the same time.
Complicated cryptographic procedures, on the other hand, are not possible due to the strict
limitations associated with low-end WBANs sensing devices, including limited onboard
energy and CPU capabilities. Due to the use of an amalgamated approach known as
‘signcryption’, it is possible to overcome such a stumbling block [14]. Moreover, because of
its lower cost, it is far more appropriate for resource-constrained scenarios such as WBANs
than the alternative of using signatures followed by encryption.
1.1. Communication Architecture of WBANs

Data communication could be separated into multiple layers of communication when
considering the entire WBANs ecosystem. It should be emphasized that when a person in
this scenario moves, his or her body may also be moving. As a result, the placement of the
sensors involved in this scenario may fluctuate, implying that WBANs are not considered
static. In general, the WBANs standard [15–17] recognizes three levels of communication:
1.1.1. Tier-1: Intra-BAN Communications

The communication at this tier can be wired/wireless. Zimmerman [18] suggests this
method of communication. Only the sensors and the sink are connected in intra-BAN
communication [19]. This tier’s communication range is about 2 m in and around the
human body. As the sensors are essentially positioned within this connection range, this
tier is vital. This is why the manner of communication is limited in range. In this layer,
ZigBee [20] and Bluetooth [21] are employed as communication technologies. Sensors
monitor physiological attributes and send the data to a sink, which is positioned within
this tier’s borders. The sink’s function is to process and transfer the data to Tier 2 [17,22,23].
1.1.2. Tier-2: Inter-BAN Communications

In this layer, communication occurs between the sink and one or more Access Points.
In another possibility, there could be infrastructure that installs Access Points, or the
Access Points could be purposefully placed in a dynamic environment to properly manage
emergency occurrences. The purpose of this tier is to provide interconnection between
1.1.2. Tier-2: Inter-BAN Communications
In this layer, communication occurs between the sink and one or more Access Points.
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 In another possibility, there could be infrastructure that installs Access Points, or the3 of
Ac-37
cess Points could be purposefully placed in a dynamic environment to properly manage
emergency occurrences. The purpose of this tier is to provide interconnection between
various forms of easily available networks, such as cell phone networks (or the Internet)
various forms of easily available networks, such as cell phone networks (or the Internet)
and WBANs. This tier can leverage wireless technologies such as 3G/4G, cellular, ZigBee,
and WBANs. This tier can leverage wireless technologies such as 3G/4G, cellular, ZigBee,
Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs), and Bluetooth [17,22,23].
Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs), and Bluetooth [17,22,23].
1.1.3.
1.1.3. Tier-3:
Tier-3: Beyond-BASN
Beyond-BASN Communications
Communications
Metropolitan
Metropolitan Area Area Networks
Networks (MANs)
(MANs) werewere thethe inspiration
inspiration forfor this
this layer.
layer. The
The medical
medical
sensor is linked to the Internet or any other network that transports data
sensor is linked to the Internet or any other network that transports data to the recipients, to the recipients,
allowing
allowing medical
medical andand health
health professionals
professionals to to view
view the data. The
the data. The individual
individual who who receives
receives
the gift could be a doctor or a nurse [23]. The information
the gift could be a doctor or a nurse [23]. The information could potentiallycould potentially be be
saved in
saved
the patient’s
in the patient’s database.
database.As aAsresult, the the
a result, database
databaseplays a crucial
plays rolerole
a crucial in Tier-3. The The
in Tier-3. pa-
tient’s/profile,
patient’s/profile, users as as
users well
wellasashis/her
his/her medical
medical history,
history,isismaintained
maintainedininthe the database.
database.
When this happens, the doctor will receive a notice indicating that the patient’s patient's condition
is deteriorating, and the needed action can be taken using the database record before the
patient arrives at the hospital [17,22].
The most essential
essential components
components of of Tier-3’s
Tier-3’s are
are the
the medical
medical environment
environment and and database,
database,
which contain
contain the the user’s
user’smedical
medicalhistory
historyandandprofile.
profile.AsAsa result,
a result,doctors/patients
doctors/patients cancan
be
be notified
notified of of a medical
a medical emergency
emergency viathe
via theInternet
Internetorortext
textmessaging.
messaging. Tier-3
Tier-3 additionally
that any
ensures that anyimportant
importantpatient
patientdatadata that
that cancanbe be
usedused
for for therapy
therapy is restored
is restored [23]. [23].
De-
Depending
pending on on
thethe application,
application, thethe sink-inininTier-1
sink-in Tier-1can
cancommunicate
communicatewith withanan AP
AP through
3G/4G/GPRSinstead.
3G/4G/GPRS instead.
necessaryWBANs
The necessary WBANscommunication
communication layers
layers areare depicted
depicted in Figure
in Figure 1. In1. In Tier-1
Tier-1 com-
communication,
munication, two two
BANs BANs are illustrated
are illustrated in illustration,
in the the illustration,
withwith on-body
on-body nodes nodes
and and
im-
implanted
planted nodesnodes spread
spread throughout
throughout thethe
body.body.
All All nodes
nodes are are either
either directly
directly connected
connected to
to the
the hub
hub or through
or through a relay
a relay node.node.
Figure
Figure 1.
1. Communication
Communication Layers
Layers in
in the
the WBANs.
WBANs.
1.2. WBANs Applications

WBANs are being used in a variety of fields, including medical, entertainment, military,
and sports [23]. WBANs have an important role in the medical industry, both in terms of
saving lives and transferring patient information in an emergency [24]. WBANs entail the
implantation of sensors on the human body that will monitor the patient’s health state in
real-time. Any abnormal changes in the patient’s health, such as high fever, a low heart
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 4 of 37
rate, or other symptoms, will be communicated to the doctor via the internet for prompt
action [25]. An implantable sensor and a wearable sensor are the two types of WBANs
applications that have been classified [26]. A sensor that is implanted into the human body
with the use of surgery and is not meant to be removed from the patient’s body is known
as an implantable sensor. When patients need to be monitored, a wearable sensor is used,
which is worn by the patient and provides the necessary information. The Wearable Sensor
node, on the other hand, assists in the identification of patient movement and abnormal
positions. It is possible to remove wearable sensors from a patient’s body at any time. As
an example, a wearable personal digital assistant can assist in the monitoring of blood
glucose, body temperature, SpO2, the functioning of the heart, and blood pressure [27].
Sensors 2022, 22, x FOR PEER REVIEW 5 of 39
WBANs are being used to develop a wide range of applications, including remote
healthcare, ambient assisted living, and even user-centric applications like gaming and
smart homes, as illustrated in Figure 2. In recent years, there has been a great deal of interest
in
bethe field ofwhich
revealed, humancould
activity
poserecognition
a threat to[28].
theirBut there
social is a rapid Even
well-being. expansion of the use
the slightest bit of
of
WBANs in healthcare
information applications,
or misinformation aboutwhere, amongfitness
a player’s other things,
has the remote medical
potential to harmsupervision
their rep-
could be Consequently,
utation. advantageous for eldercare,
WBANs early detection,
applications shouldand treatment
be made moreofsecure
conditions including
overtime to as-
chronic
sure thediseases.
precision The
and elderly
long-termmight feel more
durability independent
of the monitoringin their daily for
applications routines
whichwith
they
the
are designed. It is becoming increasingly vital to set rigorous security requirementsthe
support of ambient assisted living applications. Similarly, WBANs is useful in as
entertainment
more and moreindustry because involved
parties become it aids in the
withtransfer of data streaming operations.
such applications.
Figure 2.
Figure 2. Application
Application of
of WBANs.
WBANs.
In addition,
1.3. Authors WBANs
Motivation and are used to monitor a player’s practice as well as his or her
Contributions
physical fitness in sports such as
Recently, there has been a lot hammer throwing,
of interest swimming, water
in authentication volleyball,
research cricket,
in the WBAN’s
football, and other similar activities. By analyzing sensing data, it is possible
security field. To improve the security of WBANs, plenty of comprehensive survey and to develop
specialized
analysis of measures to improve
the existing their performance
state-of-the-art whileapproaches
authentication also maintaining theirproposed
has been health [29].
in
Wearable sensors respond to body movement during water sports like swimming
the literature. However, authentication, as well as confidentiality, are important aspects and water
volleyball
of WBANsby switching
security. communication
Unfortunately, nonemedia
of thefrom air to
existing water cover
surveys or vicesigncryption
versa. For such
(au-
applications, a water-resistant sensor enclosure is required, as well as clever
thentication, confidentiality) solutions. Table 1 presents a summary of qualitative MAC protocols
com-
parisons between previous surveys and the proposed survey. Following are some of the
major contributions.
• A quick overview of WBANs technology, applications security requirements, and
architecture that provides readers with a basic understanding of the research do-
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 5 of 37
that can switch communication media on demand. In addition, WBANs are extremely
important in the military since they allow medical personnel to monitor a soldier’s health
and locate him in the event of an emergency.
Disaster relief and emergency response scenarios such as fire and flood rescue are
expected to utilize WBANs in the future [30]. When body sensors are used in disaster relief,
distress signals are sent that can be picked up by rescue equipment or relayed or supplied
by neighbouring BANs [31]. As a result, WBANs applications now have an important new
dimension that requires not only intra-BAN but also inter-BAN communication capabilities
in a cross-medium environment. Different types of sensors, such as temperature sensors,
multimedia sensors, and so on, are used in conjunction with GPS in these applications.
As a result, the data size varies depending on the type of sensor used. The fact that flood
rescue sensors can transmit data across water and air necessitates the adoption of smart
MAC protocols.
Sensors are used in, on, or around the human body in all of these applications, and
they also collect information about the user’s behaviour. Therefore, humans are inextri-
cably linked to the system, raising concerns about its overall security and reliability. For
example, data integrity is a critical requirement for WBANs applications because incor-
rect information about a person’s body vitals could result in incorrect treatment and, as
a result, fatal consequences. It is also critical for these applications to protect user data
confidentiality because sensitive information about user behaviour and their daily lives
could be revealed, which could pose a threat to their social well-being. Even the slightest
bit of information or misinformation about a player’s fitness has the potential to harm their
reputation. Consequently, WBANs applications should be made more secure overtime to
assure the precision and long-term durability of the monitoring applications for which they
are designed. It is becoming increasingly vital to set rigorous security requirements as more
and more parties become involved with such applications.
1.3. Authors Motivation and Contributions

Recently, there has been a lot of interest in authentication research in the WBAN’s
security field. To improve the security of WBANs, plenty of comprehensive survey and
analysis of the existing state-of-the-art authentication approaches has been proposed in
the literature. However, authentication, as well as confidentiality, are important aspects of
WBANs security. Unfortunately, none of the existing surveys cover signcryption (authenti-
cation, confidentiality) solutions. Table 1 presents a summary of qualitative comparisons
between previous surveys and the proposed survey. Following are some of the major
contributions.
• A quick overview of WBANs technology, applications security requirements, and
architecture that provides readers with a basic understanding of the research domain.
• To the best of our knowledge, the current study surveys all signcryption approaches
proposed for securing WBANs infrastructure. Additionally, the schemes have been
thoroughly examined, analyzed, and compared.
• Based on the methods utilized, this survey classifies existing signcryption schemes
into six categories: Attribute-based signcryption schemes, Identity-based signcryp-
tion schemes, PKI-based signcryption schemes, Certificateless signcryption schemes,
Certificate-based signcryption schemes Heterogeneous signcryption schemes. Addi-
tionally, each scheme’s strengths and flaws are assessed and compared to the others.
• This survey not only gives a thorough examination of the existing signcryption
schemes for WBANs security and privacy criteria but also detailed explanations
of the attacks that target these schemes.
• Qualitative analysis of related surveys is carried out to show the novelty of the pro-
posed survey.
• Future research directions, opportunities, and open issues have been offered.
schemes for WBANs security and privacy criteria but also detailed explanations of
the attacks that target these schemes.
• Qualitative analysis of related surveys is carried out to show the novelty of the pro-
posed survey.
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072
• 6 of 37
Future research directions, opportunities, and open issues have been offered.
1.4. Paper Organization

1.4. Paper Organization
The rest of this survey is divided into seven sections, which are listed below. Section
The rest of this survey is divided into seven sections, which are listed below. Section 2
2 provides the summary of WBANs security surveys. In Section 3, security requirements
provides the summary of WBANs security surveys. In Section 3, security requirements
andand
taxonomy of WBANs signcryption schemes based on the type of cryptography were
taxonomy of WBANs signcryption schemes based on the type of cryptography were
discussed.
discussed. InInSection
Section4,4,the
the efficiency ofthe
efficiency of thesigncryption
signcryption schemes
schemes is compared
is compared basedbased
on on
computation
computationtime,time,communication overhead,security
communication overhead, security hardness,
hardness, andand security
security strength.
strength.
Section
Section5 outlines
5 outlinesWBAN’s futureresearch
WBAN’s future research possibilities
possibilities and and directions
directions with a with a conclusion
conclusion as
as shown in Figure 3.
shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Survey
Figure 3. SurveyOrganization.
Organization.
Table
Table 1. 1. Summaryofofthe
Summary the Related
Related Surveys.
Surveys.
Authors
Authors and Ref.
and Ref. No.No.Publication
Publication
YearYear Findings
Findings
Saleem et al. [32] 2009 • •Highlight

Highlightmain
main security
security requirements
requirements and DDoS concerns
and DDoS concerns
• Provide a thorough assessment of existing security protocols for WBANs
Saleem et al. [32] 2009 • •Provide a thorough
Investigate probable assessment of existing
resource-constrained WBANs security
attacks protocols for
•WBANs
Present state-of-the-art communication protocols, cryptographic
Zhang et al. [33] 2011 • algorithms,probable
Investigate and key management strategies
resource-constrained WBANs attacks
• Examine existing solutions’ flaws and probable future research areas in
• Present
WBANs state-of-the-art communication protocols, cryptographic al-
Zhang et al. [33] 2011 •gorithms, and key
Offer a critical management
analysis strategies
of potential WBANs authentication techniques in
Aqeel et al. [34] 2013 the light of IEEE 802.15.6 standard
• Examine existing solutions’ flaws and probable future research ar-
• Examine major security and privacy issues as well as potential threats
Javadi and Razzaque [35] 2013 •easDiscuss
in WBANsan unsolved Quality of Service (QoS) problem in WBANs
• • Offer a critical analysis
Outline future directions of potential WBANs authentication tech-
Aqeel et al. [34] 2013 • Present a state-of-the-art of existing WBANs security aspects.
Saha and Anvekar [36] 2014 niques in the light of IEEE 802.15.6 standard
• Highlights several significant security challenges
• Examine major security and privacy issues as well as potential
Javadi and Razzaque
2013 threats
[35]
• Discuss an unsolved Quality of Service (QoS) problem in WBANs
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 7 of 37
Table 1. Cont.
Authors and Ref. No. Publication Year Findings

• Outline of WBANs and related challenges from a security perspective
Pathania and Bilandi [37] 2014 • Discuss security attacks and security necessities in WBANs
• Investigate the security features of application and communication
protocols
Kang and Adibi [38] 2015 • Discuss the architecture, vulnerabilities, and attacks, as well as future
opportunities of WBANs
• Summarise the benefits and drawbacks of different security and privacy
Mainanwal et al. [39] 2015 solutions used in WBANs
• Outline future directions
• Address various types of attacks, prevention strategies, and simulation
Usha and Priya [40] 2015 tools for WBANs
• Conduct a comprehensive review and analysis of the numerous
Masdari and Ahmadzadeh authentication schemes presented in WBANs
2016 • Discuss the benefits and drawbacks of various authentication techniques
[41]
• Present an overview of WBANs and WSNs
Naik and Samundiswary • Discuss WBANs security protocols with their advantages and
2016
[42]
disadvantages
• Examine the communication architecture of WBANs, as well as their
Al-Janabi et al. [43] 2017 security and privacy needs, security threats, and important issues.
• Focuses on building and implementing WBANs in healthcare systems
Sawaneh et al. [44] 2017 • Provide a brief overview of WBAN security and privacy requirements
• Examine a wide range of secure communication solutions within WBANs
and between external entities
Zou et al. [45] 2017 • Emphasizes the importance of primary security requirements for secure
transmission at both levels
• Conduct a thorough review of significant studies on mobile, ubiquitous,
Aman and Shah [46] 2017
and WBANs, focusing on routing and security challenges
• Provide a comprehensive analysis of several authentication approaches
Narwal and Mohapatra • Add a complete analysis of the schemes based on security attacks,
2018
[47] security features, and a variety of other factors
• Investigate Security issues at all WBANs layers
Usman et al. [48] 2018 • Underline future directions
• Present a broad overview of major security requirements and potential
Malik et al. [49] 2018 attacks in WBANs at various layers of the OSI model
• A comprehensive overview of existing key agreement methods is
Kompara and Holbl [50] 2018
presented, with each method being divided into four categories
Morales et al. [51] 2019 • Aims to provide a holistic security picture of the entire WBANs system
Bharathi and • Present an overview of WBANs, their applications, and security concerns
2019
Venkateswari [52]
• Review the security and privacy issues of electronic healthcare record
Nidhya and Karthk [53] 2019 systems in WBANs
Joshi and Mahopatra [54]. 2019 • Analyze Authentication protocols design issues in WBANs
• Explore the security and privacy difficulties with WBANs
Chaudhary et al. [55] 2019 • Describe the type of authentication technique that can be employed at a
particular stage.
• Provide an overview of WBANs and their properties
• Compares various authentication techniques, highlighting their
Hussain et al. [56] 2019 advantages, disadvantages, performance evaluation, and robustness
against various security attacks
• Present a thorough assessment of the issues in WBANs from the
Asam et al. [57] 2019 perspectives of communication and security
Karchowdhury and Sen • Discuss security requirements and Denial of Service concerns
2019
[58]
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 8 of 37
Table 1. Cont.
Authors and Ref. No. Publication Year Findings

• Present a comprehensive analysis on WSNs and WBANs security and
privacy challenges
Roy et al. [59] 2020 • Examine the characteristics, architecture, performance measures, and
applications of both in-depth, and then conduct a comparison analysis
• Outline future research direction
• Examine and evaluate WBANs routing, security, energy, and cost-cutting
Sharma and Kang [60] 2020
problems
• Overview WBANs technology with a special focus on security and
Hajar et al. [61] 2021 privacy concerns and countermeasures
• Outline future research directions
Vignesh and Sivakumar • Discuss security and routing issues that WBANs face with a preventative
2021 mechanism that is in place.
[62]
• Review different security approaches of WBANs
Jabeen et al. [63] 2021 • Investigate the feasibility of multiple attacks while keeping memory
restrictions in mind
• Discuss various security and authentication schemes and solutions
Narwal and Mahopatra
2021 • Discuss WBANs applications, open research issues, recommendations,
[64]
and future trends
• Surveys all the WBANs signcryption schemes and compared based on
EDAS technique to show the efficiency of each. Furthermore, the study
Proposed 2021 emphasized the security issues that the previously suggested schemes
face, as well as future work for WBANs.
2. Related Security Survey Presented for WBANs

The primary goal of this review study is to provide an overview of the most recent
signcryption security research papers as well as upcoming trends in WBANs security.
Through Figure 4, the authors’ process for selecting appropriate research papers relevant to
the survey is depicted in diagrammatic form. The research keywords that were used in the
search selection: “WBANs security, WBANs security survey, WBANs security requirements,
and WBANs application”. The relevant information about our research is dispersed across
the various conferences, chapters, and journals that have been published in the9past.
Sensors 2022, 22, x FOR PEER REVIEW of 39 To
extract relevant materials, the most widely used online repositories, such as IEEE Explore,
Springer, Science Direct, etc. A manual search in the relevant area was also carried out as a
second
carriedstep. Besides,
out as westep.
a second reviewed allwe
Besides, thereviewed
security all
surveys (to thesurveys
the security best of (to
ourthe
knowledge)
best of
inour
theknowledge)
domain of WBANs as shown
in the domain in Figure
of WBANs 5.
as shown in Figure 5.
120
102
100
80 74
64
59
60
44 45
40 40 41
40 31
24
16
20
8
1 2 2 3 2 4 3 2 4
0 0
0
-20
Security Survey in WBANs Number of Security Schemes for WBANs
Figure4.4.WBANs
Figure WBANsSecurity
Security Survey
Survey and
and Schemes
Schemesfrom
from2010
2010toto2021.
2021.
0 1 0
0
-20
Security Survey in WBANs Number of Security Schemes for WBANs

Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 9 of 37
Figure 4. WBANs Security Survey and Schemes from 2010 to 2021.
of WBANs.
Figure 5. Related Security Surveys in the Domain of WBANs.
In 2009, Saleem et al. [32] highlighted the main security requirements and Denial of
Service (DDoS) concerns in WBANs. In addition, the authors provide a broad overview
of security essentials and highlight existing WBANs threats at several layers. Finally, the
authors give a thorough assessment of existing security protocols for WBANs.
In 2011, Zhang et al. [33] attempted to investigate the probable resource-constrained
WBANs attacks and present a review of communication protocols, cryptographic algo-
rithms, and key management procedures pertinent to the security of WBANs. The authors
also examine existing solutions’ flaws and probable future research areas in WBANs secu-
rity.
In 2013, Aqeel et al. [34] attempted to offer a critical analysis of potential WBANs
authentication techniques. The IEEE 802.15.6 standard is used to guide the discussion and
reviews. In WBANs, Javadi, and Razzaque [35] examine major security and privacy issues
as well as potential threats. The authors also discuss an unsolved Quality of Service (QoS)
problem in WBANs that has the potential to cause major security difficulties. Finally, the
authors outline future directions that could be pursued.
In 2014, Saha and Anvekar [36] presented a state-of-the-art in existing WBANs security
aspects. Additionally, the authors also highlight several significant security challenges.
Pathania and Bilandi [37] give an outline of WBANs and related challenges, with a focus
on the security issue. The authors also discuss security attacks in WBANs and security
necessities in WBANs, as well as a vulnerability assessment.
In 2015, Kang and Adibi [38] investigated the security features of application and
communication protocols. The authors also discuss the architecture, vulnerabilities, and
attacks, as well as future opportunities. Mainanwal et al. [39] summarized the benefits
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 10 of 37
and drawbacks of different security and privacy solutions used in WBANs. The threats
and constraints that WBANs face is also discussed. Finally, a discussion on possible future
research directions is held. Usha and Priya [40] address various types of attacks, prevention
strategies, and simulation tools for WBANs.
In 2016, Masdari and Ahmadzadeh [41] conducted a comprehensive review and
analysis of the numerous authentication schemes offered in the literature to increase the
security of WBANs. Furthermore, the authors discuss the benefits and drawbacks of various
authentication techniques, as well as a full comparison of their features and capabilities.
Finally, the authors outline future directions that could be pursued. A broad overview of
WBANs and WSNs is presented by Naik and Samundiswary [42]. In addition, the authors
discuss WBAN security protocols, including their advantages and disadvantages.
In 2017, based on recent publications and standards, Al-Janabi et al. [43] examined
the communication architecture of WBANs, as well as the security and privacy needs,
security threats, and the major issues that these systems face. The survey also includes
information on the most up-to-date security measures and studies in WBANs. Finally,
potential topics for future research and development are investigated. A survey report by
Sawaneh et al. [44] focuses on building and implementing WBANs in healthcare systems. In
addition, the authors provide a brief overview of WBAN security and privacy requirements.
Zou et al. [45] examine the applicability of a variety of secure communication technologies
within WBANs and between external organizations and WBANs. Furthermore, their re-
search emphasizes the importance of primary security requirements for secure transmission
at both levels. Aman and Shah [46] conduct a thorough review of significant studies on
mobile, ubiquitous, and WBANs, focusing on routing and security challenges.
In 2018, Narwal and Mohapatra [47] attempted to provide a comprehensive analysis
of several authentication approaches. The authors also provide a complete analysis of
the schemes based on security attacks, security features, and a variety of other factors.
Usman et al. [48] provide a succinct overview of WBAN security. The authors suggest
a taxonomy that provides a simple manner of classifying entities involved in healthcare
systems. Security issues have been investigated at all WBANs layers. The authors have
done an excellent job of identifying outstanding topics and potential research directions.
Malik et al. [49] present a broad overview of major security requirements and potential
attacks in WBANs at various layers of the OSI model. After providing an overview
of WBANs for healthcare monitoring, the survey addresses cryptographic solutions for
addressing security and privacy issues. Kompara and Holbl [50] focus on the security
and key agreement of intra-BAN communication. It gives a thorough analysis of existing
key agreement methods and categorizes them into four groups: classic, physiological
value-based, secret key-based, and hybrid key-based schemes. In addition, each class is
described, and the security of WBANs against threats is assessed.
In 2019, Morales et al. [51] proposed several WBANs design solutions as well as a
detailed assessment of security services. Overall, the survey aims to provide a holistic
security picture of the entire WBANs system. Bharathi and Venkateswari [52] give a
general overview of WBANs, their applications, and security concerns. Based on the most
recent evaluations and publications, many security issues, and responses in WBANs are
discussed. A systematic literature evaluation on the security and privacy issues of electronic
healthcare record systems in WBANs is presented by Nidhya and Karthk [53]. WBANs
Authentication protocols have design issues, according to Joshi and Mahopatra [54]. In
addition, the authors suggest important prospects for research communities. Chaudhary
et al. [55] explore the security and privacy difficulties with WBANs, provide remedies, and
describe the type of authentication technique employed. Hussain et al. [56] provide an
overview of WBANs and their properties, as well as numerous authentication types and
schemes classification. It also compares and contrasts various authentication techniques,
highlighting their advantages, disadvantages, performance evaluation, and robustness
against various security attacks. Finally, the authors outline future directions that could
be pursued. Asam et al. [57] present a thorough assessment of the issues in WBANs from
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 11 of 37
the perspectives of communication and security. Regrettably, the authors provide only a
cursory review while ignoring major security concerns. In a WBANs study, Karchowdhury
and Sen [58] look at major security requirements and Denial of Service concerns.
In 2020, Roy et al. [59] presented a comprehensive analysis of WSNs and WBAN’s
security and privacy challenges. The authors examine the characteristics, architecture,
performance measures, and applications of both in-depth, and then conduct a comparative
analysis. Finally, researchers are offered open research challenges. Sharma and Kang [60]
examine and evaluate WBAN’s routing, security, energy, and cost-cutting problems.
In 2021, Hajar et al. [61] give a complete overview of WBANs technology with a
special focus on security and privacy concerns and countermeasures, as well as proposed
research directions and open issues. The authors, on the other hand, were only interested in
authenticating schemes. Vignesh and Sivakumar [62] cover numerous security procedures
and routing issues that WBANs face, as well as attacks that could occur through the network
and a review of some of the mechanisms that are in place to prevent them. The authors
also look into the security of various attack scenarios. Finally, the study summarizes
the primary challenges the users encounter while creating a network in WBANs, which
is a new branch of science in the face of the pandemic. A systematic literature review
of the different security approaches for WBANs is presented by Jabeen et al. [63]. The
authors identify research topics to investigate the feasibility of multiple attacks while
keeping memory restrictions in mind. To guarantee that the schemes are relevant to
the research subject, a quality assessment is undertaken. Furthermore, the schemes are
considering from 2016 to 2020 to focus on recent work. Several existing techniques are
investigated in the literature to see how the security of transmitting patients’ healthcare
data might be improved. Based on relevant qualities, data security techniques using AES,
ECC, SHA-1, and hybrid encryption are evaluated. Finally, the authors assess security in
the context of several attack scenarios. Narwal and Mahopatra [64] outline and discuss
various security and authentication schemes and solutions. Unlike earlier surveys that
have looked at security and authentication in WBANs in a piecemeal fashion to cover main
research topics, this study has taken a holistic approach to security and authentication in
WBANs. A detailed assessment of security essentials, security risks, attackers and their
attack techniques, and presently available countermeasures have been provided, as well as
a complete description of security mechanisms in WBANs. The authors also examine the
uses of WBANs, open research challenges, recommendations, and future developments.
Overall, the study delves into WBANs functionality, technology, building blocks, and a
much broader picture of WBAN’s security and authentication.
WBANs are a well-established research topic that has been around for a while. As a
result, numerous overview and survey papers have been published in the field, compiling
research on various aspects of the field. The surveys mentioned above are primarily aimed
at authentication, architecture, security, and challenges, among other things. Security
requirements, applications, signcryption schemes, the classification of existing signcryption
schemes based on the type of cryptography and algorithm, an overview of newly intro-
duced schemes, a compiled list of schemes’ security properties, and an overview of methods
for security and performance evaluations are all included in this paper’s contributions.
The fundamental purpose of this study is to create a clear and thorough classification,
analysis, and comparison of the WBAN signcryption schemes. As compared to the previ-
ously mentioned studies, this survey includes (i) an in-depth analysis of how well each
signcryption scheme fulfills the security requirements of a WBANs; (ii) detailed information
about which specific security requirements are addressed by signcryption schemes; and
(iii) an in-depth analysis of how well each signcryption scheme performs in terms of com-
putational time, communicational overheads, and security strength. Table 2 summarizes
the qualitative comparison of previous surveys with the proposed.
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 12 of 37
Table 2. Summary of the qualitative comparison of the existing surveys with the proposed survey.
Authors and Ref. No. One Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight
√ √
Saleem et al. [32] × × × × × ×
√ √
Zhang et al. [33] × × × × × ×
√ √ √
Aqeel et al. [34] × × × × ×
√ √ √ √
Javadi and Razzaque [35] × × × ×
√ √ √
Saha and Anvekar [36] × × × × ×
√ √
Pathania and Bilandi [37] × × × × × ×
√ √
Kang and Adibi [38] × × × × × ×
√ √
Mainanwal et al. [39] × × × × × ×
√ √
Usha and Priya [40] × × × × × ×
√ √ √ √
Masdari and Ahmadzadeh [41] × × × ×
√ √ √
Naik and Samundiswary [42] × × × × ×
√ √ √
Al-Janabi et al. [43] × × × × ×
√
Sawaneh et al. [44] × × × × × × ×
√ √ √ √ √
Zou et al. [45] × × ×
√ √ √
Aman and Shah [46] × × × × ×
√ √ √
Narwal and Mohapatra [47] × × × × ×
√ √ √
Usman et al. [48] × × × × ×
√ √ √
Malik et al. [49] × × × × ×
√ √ √ √ √
Kompara and Holbl [50] × × ×
√ √ √
Morales et al. [51] × × × × ×
√ √
Bharathi and Venkateswari [52] × × × × × ×
√ √ √
Nidhya and Karthk [53] × × × × ×
√ √ √ √
Joshi and Mahopatra [54]. × × × ×
√ √ √
Chaudhary et al. [55] × × × × ×
√ √ √ √ √
Hussain et al. [56] × × ×
√ √ √
Asam et al. [57] × × × × ×
√ √
Karchowdhury and Sen [58] × × × × × ×
√ √ √ √
Roy et al. [59] × × × ×
√ √
Sharma and Kang [60] × × × × × ×
√ √ √ √ √ √
Hajar et al. [61] × ×
√ √
Vignesh and Sivakumar [62] × × × × × ×
√ √ √ √ √
Jabeen et al. [63] × × ×
√ √ √ √ √ √
Narwal and Mahopatra [64] × ×
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Proposed
One: WBANs Architecture, Two: Signcryption schemes consideration, Three: Limitation and strength of WBANs
security solutions, Four: Security Requirements, Five: Performance analysis, Six: Open Research Directions and
√
future suggestion, Seven: Comparison with existing’s Surveys, Eight: WBANs applications, demonstrate a
specific area covered, × demonstrate a survey lake a specific area.
3. Taxonomy and Security Requirements

Here in this section, we will discuss the taxonomy of the signcryption schemes of
WBANs based on the type of cryptography used as well as the security requirements of
WBANs signcryption schemes.
3.1. Taxonomy
Signcryption is one of the most important aspects of security for establishing trust
between humans and medical experts. The implementation of correct signcryption schemes
ensures a WBAN’s security while also making it easier to identify non-legitimate users and
false messages. To overcome problems and provide secure communication in WBANs, many
researchers have suggested signcryption schemes. The majority of signcryption schemes
rely on various cryptographic techniques. Attribute-based signcryption [65] schemes, PKI-
based signcryption schemes, Certificateless signcryption [66] schemes, Certificate-based sign-
cryption schemes, Identity-based signcryption schemes, and Heterogeneous signcryption
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 13 of 37
schemes are the five types of schemes classified in this survey. The following methods are
linked by the fact that they all use cryptography, as seen in Figure 6. The existing schemes
have been evaluated in terms of their ability to meet security and performance require-
ments (computation time and communication overheads). The performance parameters
Sensors 2022, 22, x FOR PEER REVIEW
tabulated in Section 5.1 which were used in this survey to define the computation 14 of 39
time and
communication overheads are based on the work.
Figure 6.
Figure 6. Taxonomy of WBANs
WBANs Signcryption
SigncryptionSchemes.
Schemes.
3.2.
3.2. Security Requirements
Security Requirements
To
To maintain
maintain the security of
the security of aa patient's
patient’shealth
healthrecords
recordsatatallalltimes,
times,the the WBANs
WBANs system
system
necessitates
necessitates the implementation of certain security measures. Specific
implementation of certain security measures. Specific security measures security measures
must
must be implemented
implemented in in aasupporting
supportingWBANs WBANsarchitecture
architecturetoto ensure
ensure allall
of of these
these aspects.
aspects.
Within
Within each WBANs WBANssystem, system,the the security
security of patient
of patient information
information is veryis critical.
very critical. When
When data
data is sent,
is sent, collected,
collected, processed,
processed, and safely
and safely kept, kept,
it must it must be protected
be protected from unauthorized
from unauthorized us-
users. Figure
ers. Figure 7 depicts
7 depicts some
some ofof the
the critical
critical security
security criteria
criteria forfor WBANs.
WBANs. TheThe following
following areare
the
the primary
primary security considerationsfor
security considerations forensuring
ensuringthe thesafety
safetyofofa aWBANs
WBANs system
system and
and itsits
widespread
widespread acceptance by its users.
users.
Confidentiality,
Confidentiality, authentication,
authentication, integrity,
integrity,and
andnon-repudiation
non-repudiationare areat atleast
leastfour
four security
secu-
qualities that should
rity qualities be met
that should be by
metcommunication
by communication between the user
between the anduser the
andcontroller. Except
the controller.
for the for
Except userthe andusertheandcontroller, confidentiality
the controller, keeps
confidentiality query
keeps messages
query messages secret.
secret.Only
Onlythe
authorized
the authorized useruserhashasaccess
accessto to
thetheWBANs,
WBANs,thanksthanks to to authentication. Integrity
authentication. Integrity ensures
ensures
that
that aa user’s query message
user’s query message has hasnot notbeen
beentampered
tamperedwith withby byunauthorized
unauthorized parties.
parties. Non-
Non-
repudiation preventsthe
repudiation prevents theuser’s
user’s pastpast inquiries
inquiries from from
beingbeing denied.
denied. That is,That
theis, the WBANs
WBANs can-
cannot
not deny deny the user’s
the user’s actionaction if thehas
if the user user has
sent sent amessage
a query query message
to it. We alsoto it.hope
We that
alsothis
hope
that this communication
communication meets the meets the requirements
requirements for public verifiability
for public verifiability and ciphertext andauthentic-
ciphertext
authenticity.
ity. A third party A third
can checkparty thecan check theofauthenticity
authenticity ciphertext without of ciphertext
knowingwithout knowing
the controller’s
the controller’s
private key, which private
is knownkey, which
as public is known as public
verifiability. verifiability.
The term “ciphertext Theauthenticity”
term “ciphertextre-
fers to the ability
authenticity” of atothird
refers the party
abilitytoofcheck the party
a third correctness of ciphertext
to check the correctnesswithoutofhaving to
ciphertext
decrypt having
without it. An attacker
to decryptcannot replay
it. An existing
attacker messages
cannot replayifexisting
the sender and receiver
messages use fresh
if the sender and
nonce and
receiver usetime
freshstamp
noncetechniques
and time stamp commonly termedcommonly
techniques as an anti-replay
termedattack. Forward
as an anti-replay
secrecy Forward
attack. is a term usedsecrecy to describe
is a termthe used practice of keeping
to describe information
the practice hidden from
of keeping Even
information
if the intruder
hidden from Even has ifthe
theaccess to the
intruder hasprivate key of
the access sender’s,
to the private keyheof orthe
shesender’s,
will not be he able
or she
to obtain the encryption/decryption keys. Forward secrecy occurs when an attacker is un-
able to access the user’s encryption/decryption key.
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 14 of 37
Sensors 2022, 22, x FOR PEER REVIEWwill not

be able to obtain the encryption/decryption keys. Forward secrecy occurs
15 of 39 when an
Sensors 2022, 22, x FOR PEER REVIEW 15 of 39
attacker is unable to access the user’s encryption/decryption key.
Figure 7.7.Security
Figure SecurityRequirements
Requirementsfor WBANs.
for WBANs.
Figure 7. Security Requirements for WBANs.
4. Signcryption
SigncryptionSchemes
Schemes Suggested
Suggested for Securing
for Securing WBANs
WBANs
4. Signcryption Schemes Suggested for Securing WBANs
We
We investigated
investigatedexisting
existingWBANs
WBANs encryption
encryption strategies in terms
strategies in termsof hardness
of hardness algo-algorithm,
rithm, We investigated
security features, existing
computingWBANs
time, encryption
and strategies
security features, computing time, and communication overhead in this part.Ta-
communication in terms
overhead of
in hardness
this part. algo-
Tables 3–5
blesrithm,
summarize
security features,
3–5 summarize computing time,
the contributions,
the contributions, advantages,
and communication
advantages,andand
overhead
disadvantages
disadvantages
in this part.
ofof existing
existing sign- Ta-
signcryption
bles 3–5
cryption summarize
techniques for the contributions,
WBANs. The advantages,
following is a and that
debate disadvantages
follows a of existing
critical sign-
assess-
techniques for WBANs. The following is a debate that follows a critical assessment of
mentcryption techniques
of existing schemes.forFurthermore,
WBANs. TheFigure
following
8 showsis athe
debate that follows
hardness a critical tax-
algorithm-based assess-
existing
ment schemes.
of existing Furthermore,
schemes. Figure 8Figure
Furthermore, shows 8 the hardness
shows the algorithm-based
hardness algorithm-based taxonomy
tax- of
onomy of the WBANs signcryption schemes.
theonomy
WBANs signcryption schemes.
of the WBANs signcryption schemes.
Figure 8. Hardness Algorithm Based Taxonomy of the WBANs Signcryption Scheme.

Figure
Figure 8. HardnessAlgorithm
8. Hardness Algorithm Based
Based Taxonomy
Taxonomyofofthe WBANs
the Signcryption
WBANs Scheme.
Signcryption Scheme.
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 15 of 37
4.1. Bilinear Pairing Based WBANs Schemes

Let G1 and G2 denote a cyclic additive and cyclic multiplicative group. The prime
order q is used in all of these groups. The points P ∈ G1 computes the G1 . Consider
e : G1 ∗ G1 → G2 as a bilinear pairing that satisfies the following key features [67,68].
Table 3. Limitations of Bilinear Pairing based Signcryption Schemes presented for securing WBANs.
Authors and Ref. No. Publication Year Limitations

• Fails to address the key escrow issue
Wang and Liu [69] 2015 • High computing power consumption and increased nature of
communication bandwidth due to bilinear pairing
• Affected by a partial distribution of private keys
Li and Hong [70] 2016 • Utilize bilinear pairing for security hardness which is a computationally
intensive operation
• Affected by certificate related issues such as certificate distributions,
Mutaz et al. [71] 2018 certificate revocation, and certificate administration
• Utilize bilinear pairing for security hardness which is a computationally
intensive operation
• The scheme may experience issues with private key distribution and key
escrow due to the use of the PKG principle
Lu et al. [72] 2018 • Utilize bilinear pairing for security hardness which is a computationally
intensive operation
Li et al. [73] 2018 • Utilize bilinear pairing for security hardness which is a computationally
intensive operation
Prameela and Pon- • Affected by a partial distribution of private keys
muthuramalingam 2018 • Use bilinear pairing for security hardness which is a computationally
[74] intensive operation
Anyembe et al. [75] 2018 certificate revocation, and certificate administration
intensive operation
Iqbal et al. [76] 2019 certificate revocation, and certificate administration
intensive operation
• Affected from key escrow problem of identity-based cryptography
Hu et al. [77] 2021 certificate revocation, and certificate administration
intensive operation
4.1.1. Bilinearity
For all P, S, R ∈ G1 , e( P + S, R) = e( P, R) e(S, R) & ( P, S + R) = e( P, S) e( P, R).
Likewise, with all a, b ∈ Zq∗ , e( aP, bP) = e( P, P) ab = e( P, abP) = e( abP, P).
4.1.2. Non-Degeneracy
Given two points P, S ∈ G1 such that e( P, S) 6= 1 or e(S, R) 6= e( P, P), where 1
denotes the G2 group’s identification item
4.1.3. Computability
A robustness approach for calculating (P, S) with all P, S ∈ G1 should be available.
In 2015, using an attribute-based cryptosystem, Wang and Liu [69] proposed a ring
signcryption approach for WBANs. The computational assumptions of bilinear pairing
were responsible for the scheme’s security and efficiency. According to the authors, the
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 16 of 37
design scheme satisfies a variety of security requirements, including authenticity, confi-

dentiality, and non-repudiation, among others. However, the proposed scheme fails to
address the issue of key escrow because the hospital authority serves as a private key
generation center, generating private keys for data users and controllers. As a result, the
hospital authority can easily forge the signature using the user’s private key, rendering
the scheme ineffective. The efficiency of the scheme is also dependent on bilinear pairing,
which may be jeopardized by higher computing power consumption and the increased
nature of communication bandwidth, both of which are undesirable. The design scheme is
also vulnerable to forward secrecy, mutual authentication, anti-replay attack, and public
verifiability attacks, among others.
In the same year, Li and Hong [70], construct an access control and signcryption
approach for WBANs using a certificateless cryptosystem. The computational assumptions
of bilinear pairing were responsible for the scheme’s security and efficiency, and they were
proven to be correct. According to the authors, the design scheme satisfies a wide range of
security requirements, including authenticity, confidentiality, and non-repudiation, among
others, and is therefore widely applicable. In contrast, because the hospital authority
also serves as a private key generation center, generating private keys for data users and
controllers, the proposed scheme does not deal with the issue of key escrow. Consequently,
hospital authorities can easily forge the signature by using the user’s private key, rendering
the scheme ineffective and rendering the scheme ineffective. Furthermore, the efficiency of
the scheme is dependent on bilinear pairing, which may be jeopardized by increased com-
puting power consumption as well as the increased nature of communication bandwidth,
both of which are undesirable outcomes. In addition, the design scheme is vulnerable
to attacks such as forward secrecy, mutual authentication, anti-replay attack, and public
verifiability attack, among other types of vulnerabilities.
In 2018, Mutaz et al. [71] proposed a new IoT strategy based on heterogeneous sign-
cryption, in which the sensor devices utilize certificateless infrastructure while the server
utilizes public key infrastructure. Authentication, non-repudiation, integrity, and confi-
dentiality are among the security properties claimed by the authors, and they demonstrate
these properties using the ROM to prove the scheme’s security requirement. They also
demonstrate how this technique can be applied in WBANs. This approach, however, may
encounter difficulties with secret key distribution, certificate revocation, and administration
as a result of the use of certificateless cryptography and public key infrastructure. Bilinear
pairing is also used for security hardness, which results in increased consumption of compu-
tation resources as well as increased communicational overhead, which can be detrimental.
In addition, there is a lack of mutual authentication, public verifiability, forward secrecy,
and anti-replay attack mechanism in place.
In 2018, Lu et al. [72] suggested an attribute-based signcryption technique for a social
network-based mobile healthcare system. To protect patients’ sensitive information, the
authors use a four-party paradigm. For a range of studies, the authors claim that the
offered approach achieves the security features of traceability, privacy, unforgeability, and
accuracy. Moreover, the authors also claimed to have improved the efficiency by employing
signcryption. However, because of the private key generator principle, this scheme may
experience issues with private key distribution and key escrow. It is also open to forward
secrecy, public verifiability, non-repudiation, mutual authentication, and anti-replay attack
protection. Furthermore, bilinear pairing is used for security hardness, which can result in
higher consumption of computational resources and greater communicational bandwidth.
Li et al. [73] present a unique technique based on certificateless signcryption, which
they subsequently use to implement access control services in WBANs. Authenticity,
integrity, confidentiality, non-repudiation, and anonymity were among the security aspects
that the authors sought. The authors also compare their plan to other schemes and stats
that they produce better outcomes in terms of energy use and computing costs. However,
due to the Certificateless nature, this technique may have a partial private key distribution
difficulty, as well as higher computing power consumption and a greater bandwidth nature
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 17 of 37
due to the practice of bilinear pairing. It may also be affected as a result of a lack of public
verifiability, forward secrecy, and mutual authentications.
For the aim of access control in WBANs, Prameela and Ponmuthuramalingam [74]
suggested a better approach based on the concept of certificateless signcryption with
anonymous mutual authentication and cost-efficiency. Secure authentication is achieved
through the use of a Chaos baker map technique, which includes an XOR operation and a
one-way hash chain function. According to the findings of the solution testing, the provided
scheme beats earlier schemes in terms of, end-to-end delay, energy consumption, packet
delivery ratio, throughput, and coverage time. Due to the certificateless cryptography
notion, however, this technique may face partial private key distribution issues, as well as
snootier computational power consumption and a higher bandwidth nature due to bilinear
pairing. This technique can be harmed by a lack of forwarding secrecy, public verifiability,
and anti-replay assault.
In 2018, Anyembe et al. [75] presented a heterogeneous signcryption-based keyword
search technique for WBANs, in which the data owner employs certificateless cryptography
while the server and receiver use public key infrastructure features. The given scheme was
designed based on bilinear pairing mathematical structure. With this approach, the author
claims security services such as secrecy, unforgeability, non-repudiation, and authenticity.
Yet, due to bilinear pairing, the system may incur higher computational and communication
costs, while it may also be hampered by the necessity for a safe route for the data owner
distribution of partial keys and public key infrastructure certificate maintenance on the
receiver and server sides. In addition, lack of forward secrecy, mutual authentication, and
public verifiability can have an impact.
In 2019, Iqbal et al. [76] proposed a new BSN concept based on attribute-based cryp-
tography and blockchain. The design scheme’s security and efficiency are based on bilinear
pairing. Furthermore, the authors claim that the given scheme ensures security aspects such
as confidentiality, unforgeability, anti-replay attack, and resistance to a man-in-the-middle
attack by utilizing less energy, computational consumption, and communication overhead.
However, due to bilinear pairing, the technique may incur higher computational and
communication costs, while certificateless cryptography and public key infrastructure may
require the usage of the secure channel for the distribution of partial keys and certificate
administration, certificateless cryptography and public key infrastructure may not. Lack of
security criteria such as mutual authentication, public verifiability, and forward secrecy can
also be detrimental.
In 2021, Hu et al. [77] suggested a heterogeneous solution for WBAN that rely on
an equality test to migrate from identity-based to public key infrastructure. Before it
is uploaded to the cloud server, identifiable information is encrypted by the sensors in
the identity-based cryptography system, which is protected by the public key of the
management center in the public key infrastructure system. To make matters worse, the
proposed scheme makes use of bilinear pairing to increase security hardness, which is a
computationally intensive operation.
4.1.4. Lesson Learned, Discussion, and Open Challenges

Based on our findings from the literature stated above and (Table 3), each technique
has its own set of advantages and disadvantages, making it difficult to determine which
technique is preferable to the others. Furthermore, each of them has its own set of security
constraints based on security requirements including confidentiality, unforgeability, in-
tegrity, anonymity, non-repudiation, forward secrecy, public verifiability, and replay attack,
among others. The WBANs nodes, as obvious, are limited in terms of power efficiency,
memory, and computing and communication capabilities. Due to power consumption,
cryptographic operations necessary for computations, communication, and storage must be
severely limited. While Pairing-based techniques are considered to be costly cryptography
primitive. As a result, we believe that schemes based without pairing would be more effi-
cient in the long run. Secondly, all of the proposed techniques are based on pairing and have
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 18 of 37
been demonstrated to be secure using ROM. Besides, in terms of security requirements, the
scheme presented by Wang and Liu [69] has been subjected to forward secrecy, mutual au-
thentication, public verifiability, and anti-replay attack. The Li and Hong [70] scheme suffer
from forwarding secrecy and anti-replay attack flaws. The lack of forward secrecy, public
verifiability, anti-replay attack and mutual authentication can all impair the Mutaz et al. [71]
method. The Lu et al. [72] technique has the flaw of forwarding secrecy, non-repudiation,
and anti-replay attack. The approach by Li et al. [73] does not provide forward secrecy,
public verification, or mutual authentication. Prameela and Ponmuthuramalingam’s [74]
method has been plagued by the lack of forwarding secrecy, anti-replay attack, and public
verifiability assault. Anyembe et al. [75] describe a technique that lacks security features
such as forward secrecy and mutual authentication. The technique used in [77] lacks both
public verification and forward secrecy, which can be troublesome. Similarly, forward
secrecy, public verifiability, anti-replay attack and mutual authentication are all missing
from the Iqbal et al. [76] approach. However, proposing a novel strategy that is secure
in the standard model using pairings remains an unresolved challenge. Additionally, the
compact scheme that can achieve all the security requirements is still open.
4.2. Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) Based WBANs Schemes

This section will quickly outline the principles of ECC and the resulting computational
hardiness [78,79], which provides security and can survive a wide range of threats.
Table 4. Limitations of ECC based Signcryption Schemes presented for securing WBANs.

certificate revocation, and certificate administration
Amin et al. [80] 2014
• Use ECC with a key size of 160 bits which may incur high computing power
consumption and increase bandwidth
• Hamper by the requirement of a secure channel for distribution of partial
keys from the application provider’s and the controller’s key escrow problem
Anyembe et al. [81] 2018 • Use ECC with a key size of 160 bits which may incur high computing power
• Hamper by the requirement of a secure channel for the distribution of partial
private key
Gao et al. [82] 2019 • Use ECC with a key size of 160 bits which may incur high computing power
Table 5. Limitations of Hyperelliptic Curve based Signcryption Schemes presented for securing
WBANs.

• Fail to establish a central authority and had issues with certificate
Iqbal et al. [83] 2016 distributions, certificate revocation, and certificate administration
• Unable to provide formal proof in either ROM/Standard Model
• Necessitating certificate management in a network with a high number of
Insaf et al. [84] 2019 devices might have an impact
• Unable to provide formal proof in either ROM/Standard Model
• The authors made a false claim by claiming the security requirements of
Noor et al. [85] 2021 confidentiality, forward secrecy, anonymity, and anti-replay attack.
• Unable to provide formal proof in either ROM/Standard Model/informal
Let Fp be the finite field with prime order p. A non-singular is defined by the ECC
y2 = x3 + ax + b mod p, where 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 & a, b ∈ Fp . Consider O to be the infinite
point. With order q and generator P, all of the points form an additive group G.
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 19 of 37
4.2.1. Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)

On ECC, there are two random points P and S such that (P, S) ∈ G, where P∈G
calculates the G with a big primer order q. The ECDLP’s fundamental idea is to use
S = xP ∈ G, to calculate an integer x, where x ∈ Zq∗ is an unknown integer.
Based on symmetric cryptography incorporating Signcryption, For Body Area Net-
works, Amin et al. [80] propose a hybrid key management technique. By merging cluster
head selection and session key generation into a single logical process, the authors claim
to reduce computation time and communication overhead. According to the authors, the
design scheme can achieve secrecy, Integrity, authentication, and anti-replay attack among
other security aspects. Unfortunately, the authors utilize ECC, the approach may suffer
from higher computing power consumption and increased bandwidth. It may also be
affected by the issues with certificate renewal and revocation, as well as a lack of forward
secrecy, public verifiability, anti-replay attack and mutual authentication.
In 2018, Anyembe et al. [81] suggested a Heterogeneous signcryption-based access
control solution for WBANs, in which the controller uses the notion of certificateless
cryptography and the identity-based idea is used by the application service providers. The
cost and security hardness of the proposed scheme are determined by the mathematical
foundation of the ECC. The authors of this technology state that the given scheme is
more cost-effective, as well as provides security services such as forward secrecy, public
verifiability, anti-replay attack and mutual authentication. Nevertheless, the use of ECC
may result in higher computational and communication costs for the scheme, while the
requirement for a secure path for the application provider’s partial private key distribution
and the controller’s key escrow problem may make it difficult to complete the task in some
cases. A lack of public verifiability, forward secrecy, and mutual authentication can all have
an impact on the security of a scheme.
In 2019, using ECC for WBANs access control, Gao et al. [82] proposed a certificateless
signcryption approach. According to the author, the given scheme provides the security
services of secrecy, unforgeability, non-repudiation, and authenticity while also being cost-
effective. However, due to the use of ECC, the technique may result in higher computational
and communication costs, while the requirement for a secure route for partial private key
distribution may have an impact on the technique. A lack of forwarding secrecy, public
verifiability, and mutual authentication are all factors that may have an impact on it.

Based on our findings from the literature stated above and (Table 4), each technique
has its own set of advantages and disadvantages, making it difficult to determine which
technique is preferable to the others. We believe that schemes based on ECC would be more
efficient than bilinear pairing. Secondly, Amin et al. [80] did not present any formal proof,
while the schemes of Anyembe et al. [81] and Gao et al. [82] have been demonstrated to be
secure using the ROM. Besides, in terms of security requirements, the scheme presented
by Amin et al. [80] has been suffering from forward secrecy, public verifiability, anti-
replay attack and mutual authentication. The scheme of Anyembe et al. [81] has the
deficiencies of forwarding secrecy and anti-replay attack. The scheme of Gao et al. [82]
can be compromised against forward secrecy, public verifiability, mutual authentication
and anti-replay attack. However, proposing a novel strategy that is secure in the standard
model using ECC remains an unresolved challenge. Additionally, the compact scheme that
can achieve all the security requirements is still open.
4.3. Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptosystem (HCC) Based WBANs Schemes

HCC is a public cryptography approach that is similar to ECC in that it is an extension
of it. When compared to other encryption techniques, such as ECC, RSA, and the Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA), the HCC gives the same level of security. Due to its modest
key size, HCC is ideal for resource-constrained situations. The HCC is divided into species
of the genus: 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, with genus 2 being the most secure. The security of HCC
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 20 of 37
is influenced by the hyperelliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, which prohibits an

attacker from breaking the keys even if the P and Q are publicly known.
4.3.1. Hyperelliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (HCDLP)

For the HCDLP, the following complexity assumptions have been made.
Let Ω ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . .(y − 1)} and W = Ω·D , then finding Ω from W is called HCDLP.
In 2016, Iqbal et al. [83] constructed a new signcryption approach that satisfies the
security criteria of public verifiability while remaining cost-effective. As part of this novel
method, the authors carry out the Cluster head selection procedure. They claim that the
hyperelliptic curve, which is ideal for resource-intensive applications like WBANs. The
network model used in this paper, however, was unable to establish a central authority
and had problems with certificate renewal and revocation, among others. The authors
also fail to explain in any depth the property of public verifiability security, even though
the title of this article is largely concerned with this element. Furthermore, there is no
consideration for non-repudiation, mutual authentication, or anti-replay attacks in terms of
security service.
WBANs are being used to enable the IoT, and Ullah et al. [84] have developed a
certificate-based signcryption and energy-efficient access control approach for them. The
mathematical structure of HEC is used to determine the cost and security efficiency of the
scheme. The authors of the given technique claim that it is more cost-effective and that it
provides better security services, such as confidentiality, unforgeability, anti-replay attack,
integrity, public verifiability, and forward security, than other techniques currently available.
To put it another way, the need for certificate management across an extensive network
could affect your overall strategy. Additionally, the absence of mutual authentication and
anonymity features may have an impact.
In 2021, Noor et al. [85] presented a new framework for WBANs based on a hyperel-
liptic curve termed secure channel free certificateless signcryption technique. The authors,
on the other hand, were unable to provide any kind of formal or informal proof to support
any of the claim security requirements.

Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptosystem (HCC) is one of the most suitable for WBANs with
limited resources in terms of power efficiency, memory, and computing and communication
capabilities. Based on our findings from the literature stated above and (Table 5), each
technique has its own set of advantages and disadvantages, making it difficult to determine
which technique is preferable to the others. We believe that schemes based on HCC
would be more efficient than bilinear pairing and HCC. Secondly, Iqbal et al. [83], Insaf
et al. [84], and Noor et al. [85] did not present any formal proof. Besides, in terms of
security requirements, the scheme presented by Iqbal et al. [83] has been suffering from
non-repudiation, mutual authentication, or anti-replay attack. The scheme of Insaf et al. [84]
has the deficiencies of mutual authentication and anonymity. The scheme of Noor et al. [82]
fails to provide the security properties mentioned above. However, proposing a novel
strategy that is secure in the standard model or ROM using HCC remains an unresolved
challenge. Additionally, the compact scheme that can achieve all the security requirements
is still open.
5. Comparative Analysis
Throughout this section, we will compare all of the proposed WBANs signcryption
schemes based on their computation time, communication overhead, security hardness,
security strength, and security properties, among other factors.
5.1. Performance Evaluation Matrices

WBANs are distinguished from other networks by the significant hardware limitations
they have. WBAN processes should therefore use the least memory and processing power
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 21 of 37
possible while transferring the least amount of data possible utilizing the smallest number
of messages to reduce overall energy usage. Performance analysis is typically included
in publications since the constraints are so tight. This helps authors illustrate the success
of their strategy to tackle the challenge. Often, the costs associated with computation,
communication, and energy are separated out and included in the analysis [50].
5.1.1. Computation Time

Computation time is the most essential performance indicator. As the sensor nodes do
not have much processing capacity, and because additional computing uses up more of
the very limited energy supply, schemes must be as computationally efficient as possible.
The most frequent way for calculating computation cost is to time how long it takes for the
necessary processes to complete: [69–85]. The times are frequently compared to those of
other schemes to provide some further meaning to the observed time [65–79]. Different
approaches to analyzing the computing cost emerge when compared to other schemes.
One of the most frequent approaches is to count the number of distinct operations that
must be performed (e.g., pairing operations, exponentiation, etc.) and then compare the
results to those of other schemes [69–85].
For [69–85], we use the same performance criteria as in [86] to provide a quantitative
study of communication overhead and computing cost. Table 6 shows the values obtained
from [86], which include exponentiation, pairing operation, pairing-based scalar point
multiplication, Elliptic curve-based point multiplication, and Hyperelliptic Curve Divisor
Multiplication. According to the experimental results discussed in [86], a pairing operation
consumes 20.04 ms, an exponentiation operation takes 5.31 ms, elliptic curve scalar point
multiplication takes 2.21 ms. According to [87–90], hyperelliptic curve devisor multiplica-
tion takes half the time as compared to ECC, so it takes 1.105 ms, respectively. Thus, based
on computing time and communication overhead, we can simply choose the optimum
scheme from Tables 7–9.
Table 6. Computation Time of Costly Mathematical Operations in Milliseconds.
Descriptions Operation Time in Milliseconds

Exponentiation (E X P ) 5.31
Pairing Operation (P ) 20.04
Pairing based scalar point multiplication (BP M ) 6.38
Elliptic curve based point multiplication (SP ME C) 2.21
Hyperelliptic Curve Divisor Multiplication (HCDM) 1.105
Table 7. Cryptographic Operations Utilised in the Signcryption Phase.
Authors and Ref. No. Signcryption

Amin et al. [80] 3 SP ME C
Wang and Liu [69] 1 E X P + 1 BP M + 1 P
Li and Hong [70] 2 EX P
Jawaid et al. [83] 4 HCDM
Mutaz et al. [71] 5 BP M + 1 E X P
Lu et al. [72] 2 BP M + 11 E X P + 1 P
Li et al. [73] 4 BP M + 1 E X P
Prameela & Ponmuthuramalingam [74] 2 EX P
Omala et al. [75] 3 BP M
Omala et al. [81] 3 SP ME C
Gao et al. [82] 3 SP ME C
Ullah et al. [84] 4 HCDM
Jawaid et al. [76] 5 BP M + 1 E X P
Noor et al. [85] 4 HCDM
Hu et al. [77] 2 EX P
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 22 of 37
Table 8. Computation Time in Milliseconds (Signcryption Phase).
Authors and Ref. No. Computation Time during Signcryption Phase

Amin et al. [80] 6.63
Wang and Liu [69] 31.73
Li and Hong [70] 10.62
Jawaid et al. [83] 4.42
Mutaz et al. [71] 37.21
Lu et al. [72] 91.21
Li et al. [73] 30.83
Prameela & Ponmuthuramalingam [74] 10.62
Omala et al. [75] 19.14
Omala et al. [81] 6.63
Gao et al. [82] 6.63
Ullah et al. [84] 4.42
Noor et al. [85] 4.42
Hu et al. [77] 10.62
Table 9. Cryptographic Operations Utilised in the Un-Signcryption Phase.
Authors and Ref. No. Unsigncryption

Amin et al. [80] 2 SP ME C
Wang and Liu [69] 1 EX P + 1 P
Li and Hong [70] 1 P + 1E X P + 1BP M
Jawaid et al. [83] 3 HCDM
Mutaz et al. [71] 1 BP M + 2 P
Lu et al. [72] 6 P + 1 EX P
Li et al. [73] 2 BP M + 1 E X P + 2 P
Prameela & Ponmuthuramalingam [74] 3 EX P
Omala et al. [75] 1 BP M + 3 P
Omala et al. [81] 3 SP ME C
Gao et al. [82] 4 SP ME C
Ullah et al. [84] 4 HCDM
Jawaid et al. [76] 1 BP M + 2 P
Noor et al. [85] 3 HCDM
Hu et al. [77] 3 P + 2 EX P
Signcryption Phase
For signcryption algorithm, the scheme of Amin et al. [80] requires three SP ME C
operations, Wang and Liu [69] scheme need one BP M, one P and one E X P operation,
Li and Hong [70] two E X P , Jawaid et al. [83] require four HCDM, Mutaz et al. [71]
requires one E X P and f ive BP M, Lu et al. [72] two BP M, eleven E X P , one P opera-
tions, Li et al. [73] needs f our BP M, and one E X P operations, Prameela & Ponmuthu-
ramalingam [74] requires two E X P , Omala et al. [75] requires three BP M, Omala et al. [81]
three SP ME C , Gao et al. [82] requires three SP ME C , Ullah et al. [84] requires f our HCDM
Jawaid et al. [76] require f ive BP M, and one E X P , Noor et al. [85] requires f our HCDM
whereas the scheme of Hu et al. [77] requires two E X P operations respectively. Further-
more, Table 7 and Figure 9 illustrate a comparison of main cryptographic operations utilized
in the signcryption phase of the proposed schemes suggested for WBANs while Table 8
shows the comparison of major operations in terms of milliseconds.
Omala et al. [75] √
Omala et al. [81] √
Gao et al. [82] √
Ullah et al. [84] √
Jawaid et al. [76] √
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 23 of 37
Noor et al. [85] √
Hu et al. [77] √
Computation time during Signcryption Phase Computation time during Un-Signcryption Phase Total Time in ms
250
200
Computation Time in ms
150
100
50
Schcmes
Figure 9.
Figure 9. Computation
Computation Time
Time of
of Signcryption
Signcryption and
and Un-signcryption
Un-signcryption Phase.
Phase.
5.1.4. Communication
Un-Signcryption PhaseOverhead
Communication
For overhead
the Un-Signcryption measurement
algorithm, is critical
the scheme of Amin since
et al.it[80]
is the most energy-inten-
requires two SP ME C
sive of all operations. The amount of the sent data or the
operations, Wang and Liu [69] scheme needs one P and one E X P operations,number of messages sentLiisand
the
most typical approach of measuring the communication cost, as seen
Hong [70] require one E X P , one P , and one BP M Jawaid et al. [83] requires three HCDM, in [69–85]. The au-
thors, as
Mutaz etbefore,
al. [71] want to put
requires twotheir findings
P and one BP inMcontext
, Lu etbyal.comparing
[72] requires themonetoE other methods.
X P , and six P
In [69–85], the number of bits conveyed was compared, as indicated
operations, Li et al. [73] needs two BP M, one E X P , and two P operations, Prameela & in Table 13.
Furthermore, according
Ponmuthuramalingam to [87–90],
[74] requires bilinear
three E X P , pairing
Omala et (|G|), ECC
al. [75] (|q|), and
requires one hyperellip-
BP M and
three P operations, Omala et al. [74] f our SP ME C , Gao et al. [82] requires f our =SP
tic curve (|n|) use 1024 bits, 160 bits, and 80 bits key sizes, and message |m| 512ME bits,
C,
respectively, for communication overhead. We may conclude that the
Ullah et al. [84] requires f our HCDM Jawaid et al. [76] require one BP M, and two P , Noor HCC will be the
most
et cost-effective
al. [85] alternative
requires three HCDMinwhereasterms ofthe communication
scheme of Hu et overhead for WBANs
al. [77] requires two Ewith low
X P and
bandwidth capacity of the type described above, as shown in Table
two P operations, respectively. Furthermore, Table 9 and Figure 9 illustrate a comparison14 and Figure 10.
of main cryptographic operations utilized in the un-signcryption phase of the proposed
schemes suggested for WBANs while Table 10 shows the comparison of major operations
in terms of milliseconds.
The number of expensive operations required for the signcryption and un-signcryption
processes is used to calculate the computational time. This cost represents the amount of
computing effort required by both the sender and the recipient of the signed communication.
Multiplication and exponentiation are common examples of these operations. In terms of
hardware implementation, the number of these operations determines the computational
time [86].
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 24 of 37
Table 10. Computation Time in Milliseconds (Un-Signcryption Phase).
Authors and Ref. No. Computation Time during Un-Signcryption Phase

Amin et al. [80] 4.42
Wang and Liu [69] 25.35
Li and Hong [70] 31.73
Mutaz et al. [71] 46.46
Lu et al. [72] 125.55
Li et al. [73] 58.15
Prameela & Ponmuthuramalingam [74] 15.93
Gao et al. [82] 8.84
Ullah et al. [84] 4.42
Noor et al. [85] 3.315
Hu et al. [77] 70.74
5.1.2. Security Hardness

In this part, we analyze the security of the suggested signcryption techniques presented
for securing WBANs through quantitative analysis, including security attributes. Table 11
√
provides a security comparison of [69–85]. The represents this security attribute is
satisfied.
Table 11. Comparative Analysis of WBANs Signcryption Schemes based on Security Hardness.
Ref. No. Bilinear Pairing ECC HEC

√
Amin et al. [80]
√
Wang and Liu [69]
√
Li and Hong [70]
√
Jawaid et al. [83]
√
Mutaz et al. [71]
√
Lu et al. [72]
√
Li et al. [73]
√
Prameela & Ponmuthuramalingam [74]
√
Omala et al. [75]
√
Omala et al. [81]
√
Gao et al. [82]
√
Ullah et al. [84]
√
Jawaid et al. [76]
√
Noor et al. [85]
√
Hu et al. [77]
5.1.3. Security Strength

Security verification is very important in analyzing the security properties of crypto-
graphic schemes and can be used to prove their correctness also. It is critical to ensure that
the security necessities/requirements are satisfied. Normally, a ROM or Standard Model
√
is used to assess the security strength of signcryption techniques. The represents this
security strength is satisfied as shown in Table 12.
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 25 of 37
Table 12. Strength based Comparative Analysis of WBANs Signcryption Schemes.
Ref. No. ROM N/A

√
Amin et al. [80]
√
Wang and Liu [69]
√
Li and Hong [70]
√
Jawaid et al. [83]
√
Mutaz et al. [71]
√
Lu et al. [72]
√
Li et al. [73]
√
Prameela & Ponmuthuramalingam [74]
√
Omala et al. [75]
√
Omala et al. [81]
√
Gao et al. [82]
√
Ullah et al. [84]
√
Jawaid et al. [76]
√
Noor et al. [85]
√
Hu et al. [77]
5.1.4. Communication Overhead

Communication overhead measurement is critical since it is the most energy-intensive
of all operations. The amount of the sent data or the number of messages sent is the most
typical approach of measuring the communication cost, as seen in [69–85]. The authors,
as before, want to put their findings in context by comparing them to other methods.
In [69–85], the number of bits conveyed was compared, as indicated in Table 13.
Table 13. Communication Overhead in terms of major operations of the signcryption in presented for
WBANs.
Authors & Ref. No. Ciphertext Size

Amin et al. [80] 3| q | + | m |
Wang and Liu [69] 3| G | + | m |
Li and Hong [70] 3| G | + | m |
Jawaid et al. [83] 3| q | + | m |
Mutaz et al. [71] 2| G | + | m |
Lu et al. [72] 8| G | + | m |
Li et al. [73] 3| G | + | m |
Prameela & Ponmuthuramalingam [74] 2| G | + | m |
Omala et al. [75] 2| G | + | m |
Omala et al. [81] 3| q | + | m |
Gao et al. [82] 6| q | + | m |
Ullah et al. [84] 2| n | + | m |
Jawaid et al. [76] 2| G | + | m |
Noor et al. [85] 2| n | + | m |
Hu et al. [77] 5| G | + | m |
Furthermore, according to [87–90], bilinear pairing (|G|), ECC (|q|), and hyperelliptic
curve (|n|) use 1024 bits, 160 bits, and 80 bits key sizes, and message |m| = 512 bits,
respectively, for communication overhead. We may conclude that the HCC will be the
most cost-effective alternative in terms of communication overhead for WBANs with low
bandwidth capacity of the type described above, as shown in Table 14 and Figure 10.
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 26 of 37
Table 14. Communication Overhead of the Signcryption in Presented for WBANs.
Authors & Ref. No. Ciphertext Size

Amin et al. [80] 992
Wang and Liu [69] 3584
Li and Hong [70] 3584
Jawaid et al. [83] 752
Mutaz et al. [71] 2560
Lu et al. [72] 8704
Li et al. [73] 3584
Prameela & Ponmuthuramalingam [74] 2560
Omala et al. [75] 2560
Omala et al. [81] 992
Gao et al. [82] 1472
Ullah et al. [84] 672
Jawaid et al. [76] 2560
Sensors 2022, 22, x FOR PEER REVIEWNoor et al. [85] 672 28 of 39
Hu et al. [77] 5632
10000
8000
Communication cost in bits
6000
4000
2000
0
Schemes
Figure
Figure 10.
10. Communication
Communication Overhead
Overhead of
of all the Signcryption
all the Signcryption Schemes
Schemes Presented
Presented for
for WBANs.
WBANs.
Learnedand
5.1.5. Lessen learned andDiscussion
Discussion
The most
The most ideal
ideal method
method ofof evaluating
evaluating performance
performance is is to
to employ
employ methods
methods that that are
are not
not
reliant on
reliant on external
externalsources.
sources.The
Thelength
lengthofoftime
timerequired
required forfor
thethe process
process and
and thethe number
number of
of operations required were the two most commonly used criteria
operations required were the two most commonly used criteria for calculating computa- for calculating com-
putational
tional cost. cost. Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, neitherneither
of themof is
them is without
without flaws. flaws.
There isThere is a significant
a significant impact
impact on time measurements due to the performance of the device
on time measurements due to the performance of the device to which the method to which the method is
is ap-
applied. When comparing schemes, the number of operations
plied. When comparing schemes, the number of operations is the most advantageous is the most advantageous
choice because
choice because ititreduces
reducesthe
thereliance
relianceononother
other elements
elements of of
thethe plan.
plan. When When comparing
comparing the
the implementation of individual schemes, however, it is necessary
implementation of individual schemes, however, it is necessary to use the same algo- to use the same algo-
rithms in
rithms in all
allofofthe
theschemes
schemesunder
underconsideration.
consideration. TheThe quantity
quantity of data
of data transferred,
transferred, andand
the
the number of messages sent and received are the two metrics that
number of messages sent and received are the two metrics that are most commonly used are most commonly
used
in in communication
communication cost analysis.
cost analysis. Both ofBoththeseofindicators
these indicators are significant,
are significant, but theybutarethey
dis-
tinct from one another in their significance. A useful indicator is undoubtedly the sizethe
are distinct from one another in their significance. A useful indicator is undoubtedly of
size of the transmitted data because sending more data consumes more energy. However,
the transmitted data because sending more data consumes more energy. However, send-
sending several smaller messages is significantly more expensive than sending a single
ing several smaller messages is significantly more expensive than sending a single large
large message because they incur significantly more overhead. Therefore, it is probably
message because they incur significantly more overhead. Therefore, it is probably best to
incorporate both measures into your plan as much as you can whenever possible. Authors
rarely do this, as evidenced by the survey results.
5.2. Evaluation Based on Distance from Average Solution (EDAS)

Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 27 of 37
best to incorporate both measures into your plan as much as you can whenever possible.
Authors rarely do this, as evidenced by the survey results.
5.2. Evaluation Based on Distance from Average Solution (EDAS)

Ghorabaee et al. [91] offer the EDAS technique, which ranks given schemes based on
the average solution obtained. The average solution is derived by computing the Positive
Distance from Average and the Negative Distance from Average. It is generally agreed that
the scheme with the highest values is the highest-ranked scheme [92]. In the fuzzy-EDAS
approach, the alternatives are ranked according to the decreasing value of the defuzzified
appraisal score [93], which is obtained from the defuzzified appraisal score. Table 15 shows
the criterion that was used to rank the schemes based on their assessment score and how it
was determined. A more in-depth description of the phases involved in the fuzzy-EDAS
technique is provided in the subsequent section.
Table 15. Selected Parameters for EDAS.
Criteria Non-Beneficial Beneficial

Probability 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Computation Communication Security Security Security
Authors and Ref. No.
Time Overhead Strength Hardness Requirements
Amin et al. [80] 11.05 992 0 0.5 0
Wang and Liu [69] 57.08 3584 0 0 0.5
Li and Hong [70] 42.35 3584 0 0 0
Jawaid et al. [83] 7.735 752 0 1 0
Mutaz et al. [71] 83.67 2560 1 0 1
Lu et al. [72] 216.76 8704 1 0 1
Li et al. [73] 88.98 3584 1 0 1
Prameela & Ponmuthuramalingam [74] 26.55 2560 1 0 1
Omala et al. [75] 85.64 2560 1 0 1
Omala et al. [81] 13.26 992 1 0.5 1
Gao et al. [82] 15.47 1472 1 0.5 1
Ullah et al. [84] 8.84 672 0 1 0
Jawaid et al. [76] 83.67 2560 1 0 1
Noor et al. [85] 7.735 672 0 1 0
Hu et al. [77] 86.67 5632 1 0 1
The following section outlines the phases involved in applying fuzzy-EDAS approach
to a decision making situation.
Step-1:
Table 15 above shows the equations used to derive the weights for the prior related
schemes, which are applied to the selected matrices.
Step-2:
According to Table 16, the following Equations and Table 15 are utilized to build a
fuzzy average decision matrix with regard to all of the relevant matrices:
( φ ) = [ ϑb ] 1 × β , (1)
While
y
∑i=1 Xab
= (2)
y
Step-3:
This phase of the fuzzy-EDAS approach uses these equations to compute the matrices
for fuzzy Positive Distance from Average (PDA) and fuzzy Negative Distance from Average
(NDA), as shown in Tables 17 and 18.
P av = [(P av ) ab ] β× β (3)
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 28 of 37
If the state bth is favorable, then
max (0, ( Aveb − Xab ))

(P av ) ab = (4)
Aveb
And for less favorable, it becomes;
max (0, ( Xab − Aveb ))

(P av ) ab = (5)
Aveb
(N av ) = [(N av ) ab ] β× β (6)
Table 16. Selected Parameters Average.
Computation Communication Security Security

Authors and Ref. No. Security Strength
Time Overhead Hardness Requirements
Amin et al. [80] 11.05 992 0 0.5 0
Wang and Liu [69] 57.08 3584 0 0 0.5
Li and Hong [70] 42.35 3584 0 0 0
Jawaid et al. [83] 7.735 752 0 1 0
Mutaz et al. [71] 83.67 2560 1 0 1
Lu et al. [72] 216.76 8704 1 0 1
Li et al. [73] 88.98 3584 1 0 1
Prameela &
26.55 2560 1 0 1
Ponmuthuramalingam [74]
Omala et al. [75] 85.64 2560 1 0 1
Omala et al. [81] 13.26 992 1 0.5 1
Gao et al. [82] 15.47 1472 1 0.5 1
Ullah et al. [84] 8.84 672 0 1 0
Jawaid et al. [76] 83.67 2560 1 0 1
Noor et al. [85] 7.735 672 0 1 0
Hu et al. [77] 86.67 5632 1 0 1
Average 55.69733333 2725.333333 0.6 0.3 0.633333333
Table 17. Positive Distance from Average.

Authors and Ref. No.
Amin et al. [80] 0.801606301 0.636007828 0 0.666666667 0
Wang and Liu [69] 0 0 0 0 0
Li and Hong [70] 0.239640438 0 0 0 0
Jawaid et al. [83] 0.86112441 0.72407045 0 2.333333333 0
Mutaz et al. [71] 0 0.060665362 0.666666667 0 0.578947369
Lu et al. [72] 0 0 0.666666667 0 0.578947369
Li et al. [73] 0 0 0.666666667 0 0.578947369
Prameela &
0.523316496 0.060665362 0.666666667 0 0.578947369
Omala et al. [75] 0 0.060665362 0.666666667 0 0.578947369
Omala et al. [81] 0.761927561 0.636007828 0.666666667 0.666666667 0.578947369
Gao et al. [82] 0.722248821 0.459882583 0.666666667 0.666666667 0.578947369
Ullah et al. [84] 0.841285041 0.753424658 0 2.333333333 0
Jawaid et al. [76] 0 0.060665362 0.666666667 0 0.578947369
Noor et al. [85] 0.86112441 0.753424658 0 2.333333333 0
Hu et al. [77] 0 0 0.666666667 0 0.578947369
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 29 of 37
Table 18. Negative Distance from Average.

Authors & Ref. No.
Amin et al. [80] 0 0 1 0 1
Wang and Liu [69] 0.024824448 0.315068493 1 1 1
Li and Hong [70] 0 0.315068493 1 1 1
Jawaid et al. [83] 0 0 1 0 1
Mutaz et al. [71] 0.502226119 0 0 1 1
Lu et al. [72] 2.891748059 2.193737769 0 1 1
Li et al. [73] 0.59756282 0.315068493 0 1 1
Prameela &
0 0 0 1 1
Omala et al. [75] 0.537595855 0 0 1 1
Omala et al. [81] 0 0 0 0 1
Gao et al. [82] 0 0 0 0 1
Ullah et al. [84] 0 0 1 0 1
Jawaid et al. [76] 0.502226119 0 0 1 1
Noor et al. [85] 0 0 1 0 1
Hu et al. [77] 0.556088662 1.066536204 0 1 1
If the bth criterion is more favorable than

max (0, ( Aveb − Xab ))
(N av ) ab = (7)
Aveb
And less desirable, then the given above equations become
max (0, ( Xab − Aveb ))

(N av ) ab = (8)
Aveb
Step-4:
During this step, the fuzzy-weighted positive and negative distance matrices are
generated, as illustrated by the examples in Tables 19 and 20. This is accomplished through
the use of the equations listed below.
Table 19. Weighted Sum of PDA.

Authors & Ref. No. W P av
Amin et al. [80] 0.1603213 0.12720157 0 0.13333333 0 0.42085616
Wang and Liu [69] 0 0 0 0 0 0
Li and Hong [70] 0.0479281 0 0 0 0 0.04792809
Jawaid et al. [83] 0.1722249 0.14481409 0 0.46666667 0 0.78370564
Mutaz et al. [71] 0 0.01213307 0.133333 0 0.115789 0.26125588
Lu et al. [72] 0 0 0.133333 0 0.115789 0.24912281
Li et al. [73] 0 0 0.133333 0 0.115789 0.24912281
Prameela &
0.1046633 0.01213307 0.133333 0 0.115789 0.36591918
Omala et al. [75] 0 0.01213307 0.133333 0 0.115789 0.26125588
Omala et al. [81] 0.1523855 0.12720157 0.133333 0.13333333 0.115789 0.66204322
Gao et al. [82] 0.1444498 0.09197652 0.133333 0.13333333 0.115789 0.61888242
Ullah et al. [84] 0.168257 0.15068493 0 0.46666667 0 0.78560861
Jawaid et al. [76] 0 0.01213307 0.133333 0 0.115789 0.26125588
Noor et al. [85] 0.1722249 0.15068493 0 0.46666667 0 0.78957648
Hu et al. [77] 0 0 0.133333 0 0.115789 0.24912281
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 30 of 37
Table 20. Weighted Sum of NDA.

Authors & Ref. No. W N av
Amin et al. [80] 0 0 0.2 0 0.2 0.4
Wang and Liu [69] 0.0049649 0.0630137 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.66797859
Li and Hong [70] 0 0.0630137 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6630137
Jawaid et al. [83] 0 0 0.2 0 0.2 0.4
Mutaz et al. [71] 0.1004452 0 0 0.2 0.2 0.50044522
Lu et al. [72] 0.5783496 0.43874755 0 0.2 0.2 1.41709717
Li et al. [73] 0.1195126 0.0630137 0 0.2 0.2 0.58252626
Prameela &
0 0 0 0.2 0.2 0.4
Omala et al. [75] 0.1075192 0 0 0.2 0.2 0.50751917
Omala et al. [81] 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.2
Gao et al. [82] 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.2
Ullah et al. [84] 0 0 0.2 0 0.2 0.4
Jawaid et al. [76] 0.1004452 0 0 0.2 0.2 0.50044522
Noor et al. [85] 0 0 0.2 0 0.2 0.4
Hu et al. [77] 0.1112177 0.21330724 0 0.2 0.2 0.72452497
y
W P av = ∑ λb (PD) ab (9)
b =1
y
W N av = ∑ λb (ND) ab (10)
b =1
Step-5:
The fuzzy evaluation score for various alternatives is determined in the penultimate
step by utilizing the following equations, which are given below. Among the selected
schemes, the alternative schemes with the greatest value of the assessment score are the
best, as shown in Table 21, and they are the ones that should be pursued.
W P av
N (W P av ) = (11)
max a (W P av )
W N av (12)
N (W N av ) = 1 − max a (W N av )
1
M= N W SP D avg − N W N av (13)
2
where 0 ≤ M ≥ 1.
In this section, the methodology described above is applied to the solution of a case
study on the selection of various efficient schemes such as Amin et al. [80], Wang and
Liu [69], Li and Hong [70], Jawaid et al. [83], Mutaz et al. [71], Lu et al. [72], Li et al. [73],
Prameela & Ponmuthuramalingam [74], Omala et al. [75], Omala et al. [81], Gao et al. [82],
Ullah et al. [84], Jawaid et al. [76], Noor et al. [85] and Hu et al. [77].
All other criteria, with the exception of communication overhead and computational
cost, are unfavorable. By combining Equations (1) and (2), we were able to calculate the
objective weights for all of the decision matrices that had been collected from the three
decision-makers. Finally, aggregate weights were generated by multiplying the sum of all
objective weights for each criterion by 100. Table 15 summarizes the individual objective
weights for each condition as well as the aggregated objective weights. After that, an aver-
age decision matrix was built, the results of which are displayed in Table 16. As indicated in
Table 15, the average result was derived by applying Equations (3)–(8) to the entire number
of solutions created, which includes the average solution;s crisp value. The positive and
negative distances from the average values were calculated using Equations (9) and (10),
The fuzzy evaluation score for various alternatives is determined in the penultimate
step by utilizing the following equations, which are given below. Among the selected
schemes, the alternative schemes with the greatest value of the assessment score are the
best, as shown in Table 21, and they are the ones that should be pursued.
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 𝒲𝒫 31 of 37
𝒩(𝒲𝒫 ) = (11)
𝓂𝒶𝓍 (𝒲𝒫 )
and the results are displayed in Tables 18 and 19. Equations (11) and (12) are utilized to
𝒲𝒩 (12)
𝒩(𝒲𝒩
generate the fuzzy appraisal score ) = 1 − options based on their fuzzy assessment
for various
𝓂𝒶𝓍 (𝒲𝒩 )
scores in the penultimate stage. To finish up, Equation (12) was employed in order to rank
1 defuzzified appraisal score. Table 21 shows a visual
the alternatives in accordance with the
𝔐 = 𝒩𝒲𝒮𝒫𝒟𝒶𝓋ℊ − 𝒩𝒲𝒩 (13)
representation of all of these values.2The Noor et al. [85] scheme was found to be the most
effective
where 0 alternative
≤ 𝔐 ≥ 1. solution for a WBANs system.
Table 21. Final
Table 21. Final Ranking
Ranking based
based on
on the
the chosen
chosen Parameters.
Parameters.
Authors
Authors & & Ref. No.
Ref. No. 𝓦𝓟𝒂𝒗 W P av 𝓦𝓝𝒂𝒗 W N av 𝓝(𝓦𝓟 N 𝒂𝒗
(W ) P av ) 𝓝(𝓦𝓝 𝒂𝒗 )N av )
N (W 𝕸 Rank
Rank
Amin
Aminetet al.
al. [80]
[80] 0.420856159
0.420856159 0.4 0.40.533015065
0.533015065 0.717732835
0.717732835 0.62537395
0.62537395 66
Wang
Wang and Liu [69]
and Liu [69] 0 0.667978588
0 0.667978588 0 0 0.528628944
0.528628944 0.264314472
0.264314472 1414
Li and Hong
Li and Hong [70][70] 0.047928088
0.047928088 0.6630136990.060701007
0.663013699 0.060701007 0.532132507
0.532132507 0.296416757
0.296416757 1313
Jawaid et al. [83] 0.783705639 0.4 0.992564569 0.717732835 0.855148702 3
Mutaz et al. [71] 0.26125588 0.500445224 0.330881031 0.646851863 0.488866447 9
Lu et al. [72] 0.249122807 1.417097166 0.315514473 1.866828710 0.157757237 15
Li et al. [73] 0.249122807 0.582526263 0.315514473 0.588929908 0.452222191 11
Prameela &
0.365919179 0.4 0.463437283 0.717732835 0.590585059 7
Omala et al. [75] 0.26125588 0.507519171 0.330881031 0.641860006 0.486370518 10
Omala et al. [81] 0.662043218 0.2 0.8384789 0.858866417 0.848672659 4
Gao et al. [82] 0.618882421 0.2 0.783815675 0.858866417 0.821341046 5
Ullah et al. [84] 0.785608606 0.4 0.994974681 0.717732835 0.856353758 2
Jawaid et al. [76] 0.26125588 0.500445224 0.330881031 0.646851863 0.488866447 8
Noor et al. [85] 0.78957648 0.4 1 0.717732835 0.858866418 1
Hu et al. [77] 0.249122807 0.724524973 0.315514473 0.488725974 0.402120224 12
Lesson Learned
The EDAS technique was used to analyze the suggested WBANs domain signcryption
to discover the idlest solution among them. Signcryption and Un-Signcryption Time,
Communication Overhead, Security Hardness, Security Strength, and Security Requirement
are the performance metrics we use for this. According to the results, the solution proposed
by Noor et al. [85] outperforms the proposed methods in the area of WBANs.
The approach proposes by Noor et al. [85] outperforms the remaining WBANs domain
solutions. However, in terms of security requirements and security strength, this system
should be improved. The approach proposed by Noor et al. [85] is not supported by any
computational model, including the Standard Model/ROM. As a result, under the standard
computation paradigm, a secure HCC-based secure technique is required.
6. Conclusions, Discussion, and Future Work

Signcryption is a critical factor of secure communication; it is the first step toward
secure communication and assists networks in decreasing unwanted users and avoiding
deceptions. Until now, no survey has conducted an in-depth examination of secure sign-
cryption procedures in WBANs; the proposed study is the only one that does so, and it may
be of interest to readers and new researchers in this specialized field. In the table forms,
we have displayed useful information or features of several signcryption techniques. In
addition to the tables, we have developed numerous diagrams to show the architecture,
taxonomy, and efficiency analysis of all (to the best of our knowledge) signcryption schemes
covered in this survey, in addition to the tables. The survey starts with some basic informa-
tion about WBANs, such as architecture, applications and security requirements. These
details are crucial for new readers to gain a better understanding of WBANs architecture,
while also assisting different designers in the development of various signcryption schemes.
According to our survey, WBANs signcryption schemes are classified as Attribute-based
signcryption, Identity-based signcryption, PKI-based signcryption, Certificateless signcryp-
tion, Certificate-based signcryption, and Heterogeneous signcryption techniques. This
survey also explains all the secure signcryption schemes in WBANs, divides them into
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 32 of 37
categories depending on the hardness algorithm utilized, and describes each hardness
methodology in depth. A full explanation is drawn at the end of the section, which illus-
trates various aspects of each scheme based on the hardness algorithm, security properties,
and strength of the schemes.
Finally, the survey completes with a conclusion and future directions section, which
not only draws a few findings but also identifies several important research areas that
should be investigated shortly. As WBANs are one of the most promising developing
technologies in the field of E-health, and shortly, they will fundamentally revolutionize
people’s healthcare systems by providing a plethora of services and freeing them from the
need to attend traditional hospitals. Apart from its importance in the realm of E-health,
WBANs face numerous security risks as a result of wireless communication. Signcryption
is an increasingly essential problem about secure communication in WBANs, thus it is
critical to have safe signcryption solutions; these help the network reduce unwanted users
and protect them from illegal activities.
Notably, the solutions offered in the literature for securing the WBANs environment
are not efficient in some aspects, they fall short of meeting the necessary requirements for
security. As the solutions based on certificateless cryptography that have been adopted
for WBANs are generally hampered by the distribution of partial keys. In contrast to the
solutions based on Identity-Based Cryptography, which can be affected from key escrow
while Certificate-Based Cryptography are not suitable for large numbers of users.
WBAN solutions are frequently utilised in data-intensive applications where patients
generate large volumes of data. The data is saved on a cloud server where machine learning
tools extract, prepare, and analyse it. The algorithm takes a few days to several months to
process. Important issues to consider when using this method include security issues.
The majority of the devices that are used in the WBANs domain are limited in terms of
resources. These devices are limited in terms of computational power and storage capacity.
As obvious from our survey, the signcryption solutions that have been implemented for
WBANs are time-consuming. The solutions that are currently available were constructed
using asymmetric algorithms such as bilinear pairing and ECC. According to Hussain
et al. [94], ECC and Bilinear Pairing are unsuitable for resource-limited technologies due
to their high energy consumption. An alternative cryptographic algorithm such as the
HCC or the Chebyshev chaotic map should be implemented to achieve a better balance
between energy consumption and security strength. Ideally, the signcryption solution
should be able to provide appropriate security while consuming minimum energy on the
resource-constrained devices of WBANs.
In this survey, we discussed analysed all the existing signcryption schemes proposed
for WBANs. However, there is no signcryption method or scheme that can guarantee perfect
communication security. Designing a secure WBANs signcryption system necessitates
an appropriate mapping of signcryption methods or schemes with various signcryption
parameters. We analyzed numerous signcryption methods in this survey study, divided
them based on the security hardness algorithm utilized, and highlighted their benefits,
drawbacks, limitations, and resilience against various security threats; these may be useful
for enhancing the signcryption process in WBANs. However, additional effort is required
to design a novel signcryption scheme that meets the stringent secure communication
requirements of WBANs applications. The multi-criteria decision-making approach is used
for a comparative examination of the existing signcryption schemes. Since WBANs are still
in their infancy, they face several challenges. As a result, it is critical to implement effective
solutions to address these difficulties. Secure signcryption has recently emerged as one of
the major issues in this sector, and more effort will be necessary in the future to address this
issue. As technology improves, it is becoming more challenging to construct lightweight
secure signcryption mechanisms for devices with constrained resources.
The challenges of security for WBANs are discussed in this study. Due to the sensi-
tivity of the sensor messages being transferred to and from the human body, the WBANs
technology places a premium on security. We identify many key security requirements for
Sensors 2022, 22, 1072 33 of 37
Signcryption, which are essential for assuring security in WBANs. It is important to analyse
the strengths and weaknesses of all signcryption schemes, as well as their compliance
with security standards, attack resistance, and overall performance. To aid researchers
and developers in identifying and distinguishing essential aspects of WBAN security, the
security and efficiency of existing WBANs Signcryption methods are reviewed. For those
working on unique security solutions for WBANs, we hope that this work will serve as a
guide and a reference in the future.
Future research will need to improve existing signcryption approaches, as well as
propose a new WBANs scheme based on maintaining a trade-off between efficiency and
security. There may be a need for increased adaptability and interoperability with sensing
equipment from different vendors when developing a secure WBAN signcryption solution.
Due to intensive pairing processes, most of the authors’ use pairing-based cryptogra-
phy, which is inefficient notably in the implementation of WBANs. Hence, developing an
effective WBAN signcryption technique is a task that remains unsolved.
It is necessary to investigate the security proofs of existing solutions in order to demon-
strate the security of WBANs not only in the ROM but also in the standard computational
model. Unfortunately, none of the existing’s solutions are proven under the standard
computational model.
To improve the approach taken by Noor et al. [85], which does not involve the use of
a secure channel for the distribution of partial keys among the entities, additional work
must be done. Even though the authors did not give any formal or informal evidence. The
solution of Noor et al. [85] needs to be further polished with the assumption of HCDLP
under the standard computational model. Because of its minimal key size and compact
security, the HCDLP should be properly considered when constructing secure WBANs-
based signcryption solutions using a standard computational model.
Lightweight secured schemes that are easy to manage will be required in the future for
intelligent environments like smart homes, particularly in the field of WBANs, to manage
security and provide quick responses to users. Another requirement is to develop sign-
cryption methods that provide a better trade-off between energy consumption and security
strength, which can be accomplished by reducing the complexity of the schemes used in
the signcryption process. To sum it up, there are still many challenges to overcome on the
road to developing an unobtrusive, user-friendly, and secure WBANs system. Additionally,
there are numerous new research directions in WBANs that must be investigated as soon
as possible.
Author Contributions: All the authors contribute equally. All authors have read and agreed to the
published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This work was supported in part by the Ministry of Science and Technology in Taiwan (No.
MOST 110-2218-E-305-001-MBK and MOST 110-2410-H-324-004-MY2).
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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Sensors 2022, 22, 1072. https://doi.org/10.3390/s22031072 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/sensors

1.1. Communication Architecture of WBANs

1.1.1. Tier-1: Intra-BAN Communications

1.1.2. Tier-2: Inter-BAN Communications

1.2. WBANs Applications

1.3. Authors Motivation and Contributions

1.4. Paper Organization

Saleem et al. [32] 2009 • •Highlight

Authors and Ref. No. Publication Year Findings

Authors and Ref. No. Publication Year Findings

2. Related Security Survey Presented for WBANs

Security Survey in WBANs Number of Security Schemes for WBANs

Security Survey in WBANs Number of Security Schemes for WBANs

Figure 4. WBANs Security Survey and Schemes from 2010 to 2021.

3. Taxonomy and Security Requirements

Sensors 2022, 22, x FOR PEER REVIEWwill not

Figure 8. Hardness Algorithm Based Taxonomy of the WBANs Signcryption Scheme.

4.1. Bilinear Pairing Based WBANs Schemes

Authors and Ref. No. Publication Year Limitations

design scheme satisfies a variety of security requirements, including authenticity, confi-

4.1.4. Lesson Learned, Discussion, and Open Challenges

4.2. Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) Based WBANs Schemes

Authors and Ref. No. Publication Year Limitations

Authors and Ref. No. Publication Year Limitations

4.2.1. Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)

4.2.2. Lesson Learned, Discussion, and Open Challenges

4.3. Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptosystem (HCC) Based WBANs Schemes

is influenced by the hyperelliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, which prohibits an

4.3.1. Hyperelliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (HCDLP)

4.3.2. Lesson Learned, Discussion, and Open Challenges

5.1. Performance Evaluation Matrices

5.1.1. Computation Time

Table 6. Computation Time of Costly Mathematical Operations in Milliseconds.

Descriptions Operation Time in Milliseconds

Table 7. Cryptographic Operations Utilised in the Signcryption Phase.

Authors and Ref. No. Signcryption

Table 8. Computation Time in Milliseconds (Signcryption Phase).

Authors and Ref. No. Computation Time during Signcryption Phase

Table 9. Cryptographic Operations Utilised in the Un-Signcryption Phase.

Authors and Ref. No. Unsigncryption

Table 10. Computation Time in Milliseconds (Un-Signcryption Phase).

Authors and Ref. No. Computation Time during Un-Signcryption Phase

5.1.2. Security Hardness

Ref. No. Bilinear Pairing ECC HEC

5.1.3. Security Strength

Table 12. Strength based Comparative Analysis of WBANs Signcryption Schemes.

Ref. No. ROM N/A

5.1.4. Communication Overhead

Authors & Ref. No. Ciphertext Size

Table 14. Communication Overhead of the Signcryption in Presented for WBANs.

Authors & Ref. No. Ciphertext Size

5.2. Evaluation Based on Distance from Average Solution (EDAS)

5.2. Evaluation Based on Distance from Average Solution (EDAS)

Table 15. Selected Parameters for EDAS.

Criteria Non-Beneficial Beneficial

If the state bth is favorable, then

max (0, ( Aveb − Xab ))

And for less favorable, it becomes;