Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC - 1992

USA College of Law
Apple – 3C
25. FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON.

Case Name ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of Appeals, Branch XIV, Roxas
City and POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, SR.
Topic Torts and Damages | Vicarious Liability of Employers under Article 2180, NCC
Case No. | Date G.R. No. 75112 | August 17, 1992
Ponente GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
In the absence of evidence that the Petitioner Filamer had exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts
Doctrine
or omissions of its employees. The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and
solidary.
RELEVANT FACTS
 This case involves a reconsideration of the October 16, 1990 decision of the Supreme Court (SC) in Filamer
Christian Institute v. Court Appeals.
 The facts are as follows:
o Private Respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an eighty-two-year old retired schoolteacher, was struck
by the Pinoy jeep owned by Petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Daniel Funtecha, as
Kapunan, Sr. was walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the evening of October 20, 1977.
o As a result of the accident, Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized for a
total of twenty (20) days. At the time of the vehicular accident, only one headlight of the jeep was
functioning. Funtecha, who only had a student driver’s permit, was driving after having persuaded Allan
Masa, the authorized driver and the son of Petitioner Filamer’s President, to turn over the wheels to
him. The two fled from the scene after the incident. A tricycle driver who found Kapunan, Sr.
unconscious brought him to the hospital.
o The trial court rendered judgment finding not only Petitioner Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault, but
also Allan Masa, a non-party. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto.
o Upon a petition for review, the SC in its October 16, 1990 ruling concluded that there exists an
employer-employee relationship between Petitioner Filamer and its co-defendant Funtecha. It was ruled
that Petitioner Filamer is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter
was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable,
and that Funtecha was merely a working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, is not considered an employee of Petitioner.
o Note then when the SC rendered its decision in 1990, Kapunan, Sr. was already deceased (but not due
to the accident, of course, as that happened 13 years prior).
- Thus, the present case where the private respondents, heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., seek
reconsideration of the October 16, 1990 decision of the Court.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Funtecha is an employee of Petitioner Filamer?
(2) WON Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code is the decisive law in this case?
(3) WON Petitioner Filamer is liable for the acts of Funtecha?
RULING:
(1) Yes. Funtecha is an employee of Petitioner Filamer.
It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time Janitor and a scholar of Petitioner Filamer. He
was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2)
hours in the morning of each school day.
USA College of Law
Apple – 3C
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not,
having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately,
for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. Therefore, the Court is constrained to
conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for
which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his
janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of
liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for
the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee
driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is
determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any
act in furtherance of his master's business. (citations omitted)
(2) No. Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code is not the decisive law in this
case.
The said provision is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the
distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages
instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the
school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and
an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of
a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to
disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule
on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
(3) Yes. Petitioner Filamer is primarily and solidarily liable for the acts of Funtecha per Article 2180, NCC.
There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation arising from the
negligence or reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s)
who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over him (Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes).
Funtecha is an employee of Petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in
order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving
at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the Petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver
or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the Petitioner of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in
the supervision over him. The Petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a
good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan Masa.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any
one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the driver and
son of the Filamer president from authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the
petitioner has failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by
persons other than the driver. The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the
unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the absence of evidence that the Petitioner had exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious
liability for acts or omissions of its employees. The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and
solidary.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision dated October 16, 1990 is hereby GRANTED.
The decision of the respondent appellate court affirming the trial court decision is REINSTATED.

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USA College of Law

25. FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON.

 The facts are as follows:

(1) Yes. Funtecha is an employee of Petitioner Filamer.

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