CHAPTER 4

THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION

Requisites of a valid search warrant

The requirements are:

(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;

(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized. (UY VS. BIR, 344 SCRA 36)

Constitutional provision:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Section 2, Art. III)

Rule 126 (Search and Seizure) of the Rules of Court:

Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines. (3a)

Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence of two witnesses. — No search of a house,
room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of
his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. 

Art III Section 3 (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.

Finally, a Circular issued by the Supreme Court requires that no warrant or warrant of arrest shall be
implemented during the night, week-ends or holidays, except in exceptional cases.

Case
       UY VS. BIR, 344 SCRA 36
Facts
Illegal things can be confiscated but cannot be used as evidence against the accused.

FACTS:

Petitioners FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION are questioning the

validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises of Unifish Packing
Corporation and prayed for the return of the seized items.

Rodrigo Abos, former Operating Chief of UNIFISH, reported to the BIR that 1) UNIFISH
is selling cartons of canned sardines without issuing a receipt. This is a violation of
Sections 253 and 263 Internal Revenue Code.

How? This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated through the following scheme:

(1) Uy Chin Ho a director of UNIFISH buys in bulk from the company;

(2) Being a director, Uy Chin Ho has a lot of clout in the distribution of the canned sardines
processed by UNIFISH;

(3) Uy Chin Ho dictates the value of canned sardines that he orders and buys from UNIFISH
without any receipt of his purchases;

(4) The moment he has the quantity he wants, UNIFISH through Uy Chin Ho delivers to the
different supermarkets such as White Gold, Gaisano, etc.;

(5) Payments made by these tax evading establishments are made by checks drawn payable
to cash and delivered to Uy Chin Ho; These payments are also not receipted (sic);

(6) Uy Chin Ho will then pay UNIFISH for the quantity of sardines he had withdrawn from the
corporation;

2) Another fraudulent practice is the sale of imported oil locally to different customers. tax exemptions
are granted by the government on the condition that the oil is to be used only in the processing of
tuna for export and that it is not to be sold unprocessed as is to local customers.

3) Another fraudulent practice involves the sales of unused cans; UNIFISH also enjoys tax
exemptions in its purchases of tin cans subject to the condition that these are to be used as
containers for its processed tuna for export.

Consequently, Nestor N. LABARIA, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch

of the BIR, applied for search warrants to the RTC.

After finding probable cause, Judge Gozo-Dadole of the RTC of Cebu issued three
search warrants (Search Warrants A-1, A-2, B) which were used by the agents of the
BIR and the members of the Philippine National Police to search the premises of Unifish.

1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register Books,
Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;

2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;

 3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;

4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;

5. Sales Records, Job Order;

6. Corporate Financial Records; and

7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks

ISSUE: Was the search and seizure done to the premises of UNIFISH violative of the
constitutional right to unreasonable search and seizure?

Ruling
RULING: The Search warrant was partly invalid.

A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and
statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:

(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;

(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person;

(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and

(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized

Inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched.

(Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address as "Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City" while
Search Warrants A-2 and B states "Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City.")

The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular
description of "the place to be searched and the persons of things to be seized." The rule
is that the description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer (with the
warrant) can identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community.

In this case, even if Search Warrant A-1 did not correctly identify the city where the
premises to be searched should be, the warrant is still valid as the officers had no
problem locating UNIFISH.

Inconsistencies in the description of the persons named in the two warrants.

(Search Warrant A-1 was issued solely to Frank Uy while Search Warrant A-2 was
issued to "Frank Uy and Unifish Packing Corporation”)

The search warrant was issued not for the search of the persons occupying the premises
but for the search of the premises occupied by them. Thus, even if there are
inconsistencies in the name of the occupants, there is no violation.

Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one place.

(Search Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued for the same crime which is violation of
"SEC. 253" of the National Internal Revenue Code).

Search Warrant A-1 should be deemed superseded by Search warrant A-2. A-2 was
merely an attempt by the RTC Judge to correct the inconsistencies found in Search
Warrant A-1.  He intended to be more precise on the description of the place to be
issued as well as the name of the persons against whom the warrant is issued.

The alleged absence of probable cause.

In the determination of probable cause, examination of the witnesses under oath is

required. The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own personal
knowledge. The judge should then conduct an examination to determine the existence of
probable cause.

Nestor Labaria’s testimony is invalid because his knowledge of the alleged illegal
activities was merely supplied by Abos. Even so, Abos’s knowledge of the illegal
activities of UNIFISH was obtained during his employment there. Thus, Abos’s personal
knowledge and the inquiries made by the judge are sufficient to justify the issuance of
the search warrant.

Alleged lack of particularity in the description of the things seized.

The search warrant described the things to be seized in the following manner:

1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash

Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
 
The use of a generic term or a general description in a warrant is acceptable only when
a more specific description of the things to be seized is unavailable. Numbers 1,2,5,6
and 7 of the list above could have been more specified by the judge because ABOS
provided a photocopy of the documents that must be seized. The judge should have
made a specific description of the things to be seized based on the photocopies.

The search warrant authorizing the seizure of unregistered delivery receipt and
unregistered purchase and sales invoices, however, is valid. The serial
markings/numbers of these documents could not be specified because they are
unregistered.

Although the warrant was defective, it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Only
the invalid portions of the warrant are severable. Those things not specifically mentioned
 in the warrants that were seized must be returned.

       May an MTC Judge issue a search warrant in connection with crimes within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC? Yes.

A search warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and the resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction
over the offense committed. What controls here is that a search warrant is merely a
process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a
criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Thus, in
certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue a search
warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed, provided
that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present. (People vs. Judge
Castillo, G.R. No. 204419, November 07, 2016)

Case
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE EDMAR CASTILLO, JR. G.R. No. 204419, November 7, 2016

Facts

FACTS:

Judge Marcelo C. CABALBAG of the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan issued Search Warrant
No. 45 against the residence of Jeofrey Jil RABINO (Aparri Cagayan). PDEA and officers
of the PNP then conducted a search which yielded one sachet of shabu. RABINO was
charged for violation of Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.

The case was raffled to the RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, presided by respondent
Judge CASTILLO. A motion to Quash Search Warrant was filed by RABINO on the
ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction by the MTC court over the place to be searched.

Judge Castillo granted the motion due to lack of jurisdiction of MTC over the offense
charged (R.A. 9165 or The Dangerous Drugs Act). The MTC has exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years.
The minimum penalty of Illegal possession of Shabu is twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years, which is way beyond imprisonment of six (6) years.

ISSUE: Can a municipal trial court issue a search warrant involving an offense in which it
has no jurisdiction?

Ruling
RULING: Yes.

the application for a search warrant was filed within the same judicial region where the
crime was allegedly committed. For compelling reasons, the Municipal Trial Court of
Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue a search warrant to search and seize the
dangerous drugs stated in the application thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is
within the same judicial region. The fact that the search warrant was issued means that
the MTC judge found probable cause to grant the said application after the latter was
found by the same judge to have been filed for compelling reasons.
 Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for
search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the
judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region
where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be
made in the court where the criminal action is pending.

In this case, the application for a search warrant was filed within the same judicial region
where the crime was committed. In addition, the above-stated rule does not say that the
court issuing a search warrant must also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search
warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court and the resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the
offense committed. What controls here is that a search warrant is merely a process,
generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal
action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction.

Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue a
search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed,
provided that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present.

a motion to quash a search warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the

search warrant, such as (1) the place searched or the property seized are not those
specified or described in the search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrant.

Case
1.    PEOPLE VS. CA, 291 SCRA 400

Facts
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1998/jun1998/gr_126379_1998.html

(Note: Iba yung place na pinuntahan nila for search and seizure (Abigail Variety
Store ito naman talaga dapat) pero iba yung nakalagay sa search warrant (Apt
1207), contention ng prosecution may sketch provided prior to application nila sa
search warrant pero mali parin yung inissue ni Judge Bacalla) :)

Facts: S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before Branch 261,
RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his
possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F,
Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.

The following day a search warrant was issued against Mr. Hussain was issued
not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent (to) Abigail
Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the
seizure of their personal belongings.

three days after the warrant was served, there was no showing that lawful
occupants were made to witness the search.
 private respondents upon arraignment submitted their "Extremely Urgent Motion
(To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible, Judge
Casanova granted the motion to quash search warrant on the following grounds: 

1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1 which is adjacent to
the Abigail's Variety Store;
2) That there is no such number as "1207" found in the building as it is
correspondingly called only as "Apartment No. 1, 2, 3 and 4;"
3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigail's Variety Store;
4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from Abigail's Variety Store to
Apartment No. 1;
5) That Abigail's Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its own respective doors
used for ingress and egress.
There being no objection on the said observation of the Court, let the same be
reduced on the records.
The public prosecutor's claim — that the sketch submitted to Judge Bacalla
relative to the application for a search warrant, actually depicted the particular
place to be searched — was effectively confuted by Judge Casanova who pointed
out that said "SKETCH was not dated, not signed by the person who made it and
not even mentioned in the Search Warrant by the Honorable Judge Bacalla

Issue: whether or not a search warrant was validly issued as regards the apartment
in which private respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly,
whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically described in the
warrant.

Ruling
Ruling: The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious
typographical error" involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be
searched, but the search of a place different from that clearly and without
ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In the instant case there is no
ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising
from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between
the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done
was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the
premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been
done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different
from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched —
although not that specified in the warrant — is exactly what they had in view when
they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence.
What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the
warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in
the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the
officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units
at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or

modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence
they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is
proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to
particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to
 be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to
be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the
door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search
warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them.
The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly
be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the
discretion of the police officers conducting the search.

A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and
statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:

(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;

(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person;

(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and

(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized
Case
a. Validity of a warrantless search and seizure as a result of an informer’s tip.

PEOPLE VS. ARUTA, 288 SCRA 626

No probable cause because the NARCOM officers had no personal knowledge

Facts
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1998/apr1998/gr_120915_1998.html

Facts: In the morning of December 13, 1988, the law enforcement officers received
information from an informant named "Benjie" that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be
leaving for Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the
same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana;

(2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988, accused-appellant alighted from a
Victory Liner Bus carrying a traveling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the
law enforcement officers;

(3) The law enforcement officers approached her and introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents;

(4) When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her traveling bag, she gave the same
to him;

(5) When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves;

(6) Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.

Issue: Whether the warrantless search and seizure was valid

Ruling Ruling: The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court  and by prevailing jurisprudence;
8

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right
to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search; 9

6. Stop and Frisk;  and

10

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It
likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s),
article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by
law is in the place to be searched.

In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be present.
Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence against
the person arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of
suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.

In present case, the police officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant.
Second, Aruta's identity was priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta was not acting suspiciously and was
searched while about to cross a street.

In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of
arrest. To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag,
accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which
provides inter alia:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she

about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely
crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable
ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a
crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to
the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The
NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the
furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record,
there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was
committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could
neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any
compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless
search of accused-appellant's bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-
appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently
illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not
incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles
seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are "fruits of a
poisoned tree" and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the
Constitution.

Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest,
in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a
lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first
undertaken, and an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and
arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law

In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search and
seizure of accused-appellant's bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in "plain view"
under the second exception. The marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by the
fact that the NARCOM agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its
contents.

Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag be justified as a search of a moving
vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-appellant was
apprehended several minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was accosted in
the middle of the street and not while inside the vehicle.

In the instant case, there was no observable manifestation that could have aroused the suspicion of
the NARCOM agents as to cause them to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-
appellant was merely crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned cases,
accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOM agents when the latter identified
themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity of probable cause that would
sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was committing a crime.

The existing circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime was being committed. In short, there was
probable cause to effect a warrantless search of the building. The same could not be said in the
instant case.
 The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and
seizure would be consent given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to
amount to a waiver of her constitutional right. the act of herein accused-appellant in
handing over her bag to the NARCOM agents could not be construed as voluntary
submission or an implied acquiescence to the unreasonable search. 

Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized
to those and only those, particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers
of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made.

Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one without too
much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person intended to be
searched has been particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently
ascertained to be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. "Aling Rosa" turned out to be accused-
appellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner
bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot where Victory Liner
buses normally unload their passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to particularize
the vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them from securing a search warrant. The above
particulars would have already sufficed. In any case, this Court has held that the police should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized,  wherever and
whenever it is feasible.

Case
PEOPLE VS. MONTILLA, 284 SCRA 703

No search warrant/warrant of arrest but with consent valid.

No search warrant/warrant of arrest but with no consent invalid

Facts Ruben Montilla was apprehended near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran,
Dasmarias, Cavite by two members of the Cavite PNP Command.

         According to the two officers, Montilla was caught transporting 28 marijuana
bricks contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks had a total
weight of 28 kilos.

         The officers testified in court that they were aided by an informer who had
informed them the day before, or on June 19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a drug
courier, whom said informer could recognize, would be arriving somewhere in Barangay
Salitran, Dasmarias from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of marijuana. It was
the same informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant when the latter
alighted from a passenger jeepney on the aforestated day, hour, and place.

         Montilla was charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
 
               Contention of Montilla: the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the course
of an unlawful warrantless search and seizure. He contends that the law enforcers had
the opportunity to procure the requisite warrant.

ISSUE:
                Whether the warrantless search and seizure was valid.

Ruling HELD:
               The search and seizure operation were valid.

1) Can secure search warrant prior: Thus, (1) customs searches; 13 (2) searches of
moving vehicles,14 (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; 15 (4) consented
searches;16 (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest; 17 and (6) "stop and frisk"
measures18 have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.

In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is
controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered,
especially in rural areas.

2) On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on

appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from him, still the search on his
belongings and the consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result thereof
was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113
of the Rules of Court. Under that provision, a peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.

A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting

police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous
weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. 19 On
the other hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in
effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence with the instances of
permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a).20 These instances have been applied to
arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto. The conventional view is that
probable cause, while largely a relative term the determination of which must be
resolved according to the facts of each case, is understood as having reference to such
facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to
believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched

In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the
informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing to
him from the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the
marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and carton box which appellant was
carrying at the time. The officers thus realized that he was their man even if he was
simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects.
Accordingly, they approached appellant, introduced themselves as policemen, and
requested him to open and show them the contents of the traveling bag, which appellant
voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the
prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further search the box, they brought appellant
and his luggage to their headquarters for questioning.
        

Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point
prior to the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by
themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and
reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law.

         The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that
 appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs.
With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto,
hence his arrest and the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.

         When an individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have the same
conducted upon his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.
Montilla voluntarily opened his bag when the police officers approached him and requested him
to open his bag.
 
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search
and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent
which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision.

         Exceptions:
(1) customs searches;
 (2) searches of moving vehicles,
 (3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
 (4) consented searches; (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest; and
(6) "stop and frisk" measures.
Case PEOPLE VS. RACHO, GR No. 186529, August 3, 2010
No probable cause, no personal knowledge
Facts FACTS:
         On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular
phone with Jack Racho for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the
transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team composed of
members of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

         The agent gave the police appellant’s name, together with his physical
description. He also assured them that the appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the
following day.

         On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him
that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the
day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt.

The team members then posted themselves along the national highway in Baler,
Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler.

When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the
person he transacted with earlier.

Having alighted from the bus, the appellant stood near the highway and waited for
a tricycle that would bring him to his final destination. As the appellant was about to
board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station on
suspicion of carrying shabu.

Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from
his pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a
small sachet containing the suspected drug.
 
               Appellant Racho assails the validity of the warrantless search. He likewise
 questioned the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit
of the poisonous tree.
                 
The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he was caught in the
act of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the
apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with him a sachet of
shabu.20 Consequently, the warrantless search was considered valid as it was deemed an incident to
the lawful arrest.
 
ISSUE:
               Whether the warrantless arrest was valid.
Ruling HELD:
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip given
by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance gives
rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a
valid warrantless arrest.

The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest.

The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would
indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.

Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers.
Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense.

At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was
waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would
engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he
was committing or intending to commit a crime.

Without the confiscated shabu, appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained based on the
remaining evidence.

         The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be
carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence
obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Said
proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances

The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta In all of these cases, we refused to validate the
warrantless search precisely because there was no adequate probable cause. We required the
showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal design.
 People v. Montilla, In these cases, the Court sustained the validity of the warrantless searches
notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the
accused had committed, was actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime. But as aptly
observed by the Court, except in Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to
the rule against warrantless searches

Case
P vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646

There was personal knowledge hence there was probable cause

Facts
FACTS:
Patrolman Obita was detailed at Olongapo City. While on his way to Olongapo
from Baguio City via Victory Liner, the accused Anita Claudio, sat in front of Pat. Obita
but she placed her bag at the back of the seat of Pat. Obita. The act of the accused
putting her bag behind Pat. Obiña's seat aroused his suspicion and made him feel (sic)
nervous. With the feeling that there was something unusual, he had the urge to search
the woven plastic bag. But it was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to
go to the bag. He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of the
woven bag and smelt marijuana. 
The plastic woven bag appearing to contain camote tops on the top has a big
bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom. He could recognize the smell of marijuana
because he was assigned at that time at the ANTINARCOTICS Unit. When they reached
the Caltex Gasoline Station in Sta. rita, Obita after identifying himself as a police officer,
he searched the bag of anita because of the suspicion that she might be carrying
marijuana. They went to the Police headquarters where the bag was searched in the
presence of Investigator Cpl. Tiongco. They found a big bundle of plastic containing
marijuana weighing about 1 kl.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search, seizure and apprehension were warrantless and should be deemed
unlawful.
Ruling RULING: search and seizure was valid

The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:

.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

xxx xxx xxx

Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:

Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.— A person lawfully arrested may be

searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (12a)

Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obiña did not need a
warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search
being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful.
 Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of
policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of
proof to the contrary (People v. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason from the records
why the prosecution witnesses should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a
serious crime (See People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500).
Case P. vs. Aminnudin Y Ahni, July 6,1988 02/07/2022
No probable cause because no personal knowledge, evidence is very weak but evidence against
him
Facts FACTS: 
Aminnudin was accosted by police officers while disembarking from the M/V Wilcon in
Iloilo City. The officers inspected his bag and finding what looked like marijuana leaves took him
to their headquarters for investigation. The apprehension was due to a received tip from one of
their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was
carrying marijuana.  He was identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the
evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the
informer had pointed to him.
They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three
kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves. In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the
marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts
and two pairs of pants. . He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed.
His bag was confiscated without a search warrant.
ISSUE:
Whether Aminnudin was lawfully searched and arrested by virtue of an informer’s tip

Ruling
Defense: This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.

No, search and seizure was invalid.

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses,
it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest
and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received,
they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a
warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was
ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his
arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge)
that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

Case  PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT, 198 SCRA 401

Facts
FACTS:
         Mikael Malmstedt, Swedish, entered the Philippines as a tourist.

He went to Sagada and stayed there for two (2) days. On May 11, 1989, he took a bus
to Baguio.

On that same day, Capt. Alen Vasco of NARCOM stationed at Camp Dangwa ordered
his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain
Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region.

It is because of persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.

         At about 1:30 pm, the bus Malmstedt was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC
Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and
that they would conduct an inspection.

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on Malmstedt's waist. Suspecting
the bulge on Malmstedt's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for Malmstedt's
passport and other identification papers.

When Malmstedt failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was
that was bulging on his waist, which was a pouch bag. When Malmstedt opened the
same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed 4 suspicious-looking objects wrapped in
brown packing tape, which turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of
marijuana, when opened. Malmstedt stopped to get 2 travelling bags from the
luggage carrier, each containing a teddy bear, when he was invited outside the bus
for questioning.

It was observed that there were also bulges inside the teddy bears which did not feel
like foam stuffing. Malmstedt was then brought to the headquarters of the
NARCOM at Camp Dangwa for further investigation. At the investigation room, the
officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish.
After the laboratory examination, it was established that the objects were indeed
hashish.

         Malmstedt claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his
pouch bag and that the 2 travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely
entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. They were supposed
to ride on the same bus but because there’s no more available seats, they took the next
ride.

         The trial court found Malmstedt guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 (Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.)

ISSUE: WON the search of personal effects of  Malmstedt was illegal because it was
made without a search warrant
Ruling
RULING:

         NO, the search is not illegal. It is true that the Constitution guarantees the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a
lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following
circumstances.

         Section 5 provides that “a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

         Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime
was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the
search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions
of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
7

         Even when the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the
search was made over the personal effects of accused, there was sufficient probable
cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure
is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each
case.

Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his
possession. Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same
morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.

It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus
(where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made.
It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has
nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do
so?
 The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs
in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together
as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a   probable cause which
justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words,
the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one
of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as
the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were
prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by
the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly,
including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction
impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.

Case
b. Warrantless search on a moving vehicle based on an anonymous tip.
 P v. Cuison, 326 Phil. 345 (1996)

Facts
FACTS: In January 1992, the Reaction Group of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
gathered an information regarding the drug, activities of accused Antolin Cuizon y Ortega and his
wife, Susan Cuizon. A surveillance was conducted on them.

NBI received a report from its informant in Hong Kong that accused Cuizon, together with his
wife, was arriving NAIA carrying with him a big quantity of "shabu". 

Arriving at the NAIA, Diño positioned himself at the Arrival Area, while Yap and the other members of
the team posted themselves at the parking area of the airport. accused Cuizon and his wife, who had
just returned from Hong Kong, after passing through the Immigration and Customs Areas at the NAIA,
proceeded to the Arrival Area of the airport preparatory to their boarding a car.

While there, accused Cuizon, together with his wife, handed four (4) traveling bags to accused
Steve Pua y Clofas and accused Paul Lee y Wong, who were at the vicinity of the Arrival Area.
Accused Pua and Lee loaded the bags in a taxicab which they boarded in leaving the airport.
Accused Cuizon and his wife took another vehicle

        Diño saw the handling of bags so he radioed the other members to apprehend Pua
and Lee but the message was not received due the running short of battery power of
their radio.
         The team then proceeded to Manila Peninsula Hotel in Makati where Pua and Lee
were proceeding, according to an earlier tip. Pua and Lee allowed the NBI agents and
they saw 4 traveling bags inside the room (room 304). Upon the written permission of the
2 accused, the agents search their bags in the presence of the Chief Security Officer of
the hotel. Three (3) of the four (4) bags each yielded a plastic package containing a
considerable quantity of white crystalline substance suspected to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu".

Pua and Lee were then apprehended by Diño and his companion. Later on that day,
another laundry bag containing suspected "shabu" of more than five (5) kilos were
discovered by a roomboy in Room 304. 16 kilos of shabu

         After that, Diño and the other members of the team proceeded to the house of
accused Cuizon in Caloocan City, taking with them accused Pua and Lee and the bags
with their contents of suspected dangerous drugs. They reached the place at about 5:50
in the afternoon of the same date of February 21, 1992. Retrieved from accused Cuizon
 in his residence was another bag also containing a white crystalline substance weighing
2.695 kilos, likewise believed to be “shabu." Laboratory examination of alleged
substance proved that it was indeed shabu. The present three accused were charged in
court. Trial court found the appellants guilty of violating Section 15 of R.A. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

ISSUE: WON the the warrantless arrests and the warrantless searches conducted by the
NBI legal and constitutional
Ruling RULING: NO,

where a person is searched without a warrant, and under circumstances other than those justifying a
warrantless arrest, as discussed above, upon a mere suspicion that he has embarked on some
criminal activity, and/or for the purpose of discovering if indeed a crime has been committed by him,
then the search made of such person as well as his arrest are deemed illegal.

the law requires that the search be incident to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may
likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search
of a person and his belongings. Were a search first undertaken, then an arrest effected based on
evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary
to law.

the warrantless arrests and searches are illegal. Scrutinizing the provisions of Sec. 5 of
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on lawful arrests without warrant, par. (c) of said section
is obviously inapplicable, the appellants not being escapees from a penal institution at
the time of arrest. Par. (a) on the other hand requires that the person be arrested (i) after
he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit
an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer(s). These requirements are not
present in the case at bench, for at the time of their arrest, appellants Pua and Lee were
merely resting in their hotel room, and appellant Cuizon for his part was in bed resting
with his wife and child inside his home. No offense had just been committed, or was
actually committed or being attempted by any of the accused in the presence of the
lawmen.

         Par. (b) of the same provision is likewise inapplicable since its equally exacting
requirements have also not been met. The prosecution failed to establish that at the time
of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officers had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused-appellants had committed it.
Under the circumstances of the case, there was no sufficient probable cause for the
arresting officers to believe that the accused were then and there committing a crime.
The act per se of handing over the baggage, assuming the prosecution's version to be
true; cannot in any way be considered a criminal act.

        Cuizon could not, by the mere act of handing over four pieces of luggage to the
other two appellants, be considered to have committed the offense of "carrying and
transporting" prohibited drugs. It was not even an act performed under suspicious
circumstances as indeed, it took place in broad daylight, practically at high noon, and out
in the open, in full view of the public.

Furthermore, it can hardly be considered unusual, in an airport setting, for travellers

and/or their welcomers to be passing, handing over and delivering pieces of baggage,
especially considering the somewhat obsessive penchant of our fellow countrymen for
sending along ("pakikipadala") things and gifts through friends and relatives.
 Moreover, one cannot determine from the external appearance of the luggage that they
contained "shabu" hidden beneath some secret panel or false bottom. The only reason
why such act of parting with luggage took on the color and dimensions of a felonious
deed, at least as far as the lawmen were concerned, was the alleged tip that the NBI
agents purportedly received that morning, to the effect that appellant Cuizon would be
arriving that same day with a shipment of shabu. To quote from another decision of like
import, "(A)11 they had was hearsay information (from the telephone caller), and about a
crime that had yet to be committed."
Case
 P v. Encinada, 345 Phil 301 (1997)

Facts
Facts:

On May 21, 1992, in the City of Surigao, Philippines, Roel Encinada, have in his
possession, custody and control dried marijuana leaves weighing 800 grams, more or
less, which he transported to Surigao City from Cebu City aboard a passenger ship
M/V Sweet Pearl, well knowing that such acts are expressly prohibited by law. In gross
disregard of the prohibition of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by
Batas Pambansa Bilang 179.

At around 4 p.m. of May 20,1992, SPO4 Nicolas Bolonia was in his house when
he received a tip from an informant that Roel Encinada would be arriving in Surigao City
from Cebu City in the morning of May 21, 1992 on board the M/V Sweet Pearl bringing
with him marijuana. Bolonia was then Chief of the Vice Control Squad of the
Surigao City Police. Bolonia already knew Encinada because the latter
previously was engaged in illegal gambling known as buloy-buloy.

Iligan and other police officers deployed themselves to intercept Encinada. From
their various positions, the police officers following Encinida immediately boarded a
tricycle at Borromeo Street, still holding the plastic chairs. As the tricycle slowly
moved forward,Bolonia chased it and ordered the driver.Bolonia asked Encinada to hand
over the plastic chairs , to which the latter complied. Bolonia examined it closely and
smelled the peculiar scent of marijuana. Making a small tear in the cellophane cover,
Bolonia could see and smell what appeared to be marijuana, a prohibited drug. Encinada
was brought to the central police station.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and the evidence is sufficient to convict 
Roel Encinada.

Ruling
Bolonia explained that he could not secure a warrant because the courts in Surigao City were
already closed for the day. Thus, he and the other lawmen had no choice but to proceed the next
morning to the port area. After appellant disembarked from the ship and rode a motorela, Bolonia
stopped the motor vehicle and conducted the search. He rummaged through the two strapped plastic
baby chairs which were held by appellant and found inserted between them a package of marijuana
wrapped in a small plastic envelope.

In this case, appellant was not committing a crime in the presence of the Surigao City
policemen. Moreover, the lawmen did not have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested had committed an offense. The search cannot be said to be merely
incidental to a lawful arrest. Raw intelligence information is not a sufficient ground for a
warrantless arrest. The prosecution's evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when
the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode the  motorela. No act or fact
demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare
 circumstances.

There is simply no sufficient evidence remaining to convict him. That the search
disclosed a prohibited substance in appellants possession, and thus confirmed the police
officers initial information and suspicion, did not cure its patent illegality. An illegal
search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the
evidence yielded by the search.

Case People vs. Cogaed, 740 Phil. (2014)

Facts
Facts: 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI
Bayan) in San Gabriel,La Union, "received a text message from an unidentified civilian
informer that one Marvin Buya would be transporting marijuana" from Barangay LunOy,
San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.

PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect. member of the San
Gabriel Police set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San
Fernando City. A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived. The jeepney driver disembarked
and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying marijuana.

Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified as Victor
RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while
Dayao was holding a yellow bag.

SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. After
this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like
marijuana Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoy met gayam ti
nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag.
"SPO1 Taracatac arrested Cogaed and company and brought them to the police
station." Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their respective bags' ' inside the station.

The marijuana from Cogaed’s sack weighed 4,246.1 grams. The marijuana collected
from Dayao’s bag weighed 5,092 grams. A total of 17,429.6 grams were collected from
Cogaed’s and Dayao’s bags.

Issue: WON a warrantless search and seizure as a result of an informers tip valid?

Ruling
Ruling: The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply
with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.

"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches ) are necessary for law
68

enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of
offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens

The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer
finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe police officer.
Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior.
Hence, they should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves observe —
whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the
police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of
an illicit act.

He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboarda jeepney. There was nothing
suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of
 suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled
to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of
a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is
necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched.  Anything less
85

than this would be an infringementupon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the
probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was noteven the person
mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched
was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the
bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough
reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no
approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person
searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the
name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true
that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this
still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to
search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.

Footnote: RULES OF COURT, Rule 126, sec. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant.

Case P vs. Yanson, GR No. 238543, July 31, 2019

Facts
Facts: Six (6) kilos of dried marijuana leaves/Indian Hemp, placed inside two
(2) separate sacks, which is prohibited drugs.

Jaime Sison, Leonardo Yanson, and Rosalie Bautista were accused of

transporting along with them, in a vehicle Isuzu, colored Silver gray, with Plate No. SCC
619, six (6) kilos of dried marijuana leaves placed inside two (2) separate sacks.

The Municipal Police Station of M’lang, North Cotabato received a radio message
about a silver gray Isuzu pickup—with plate number 619 and carrying three (3) people—
that was transporting marijuana from Pikit. The Chief of Police instructed the alert team
to set up a checkpoint on the riverside police outpost along the road from Matalam to
M’lang.  The tipped vehicle reached the checkpoint and was stopped by the team of
police officers on standby. The team leader asked the driver (Sison) about inspecting the
vehicle. The driver alighted and, at an officer's prodding, opened the pickup's hood. Two
(2) sacks of marijuana were discovered beside the engine. 

The Regional Trial Court sustained the search conducted on the tipped vehicle as
a valid warrantless search because, according to it, the accused consented anyway.

Only Yanson appealed before the Court of Appeals. Yanson contended that the
two (2) sacks of marijuana supposedly seized from them are inadmissible evidence
since the police officers did not have probable cause to conduct a search on their
vehicle. He noted that the radio message supposedly received by the police officers was
 "the sole basis for their belief of the alleged transportation of marijuana."

Yanson asserted that searches at checkpoints, in the absence of probable cause,

should be limited only to a visual search. Thus, he maintained that the further instruction
for Sison to open the hood of their pickup amounted to an unreasonable intrusion and
violation of privacy. Yanson added that Sison could never have freely consented to an
extensive search.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s Joint Judgment. It ruled that there was
probable cause to conduct an extensive search since the information received by the
police officers was sufficiently accurate, given how the pickup "was spotted in the place
where it was said to be coming from and was actually loaded with marijuana.”

Issue:

Whether or not a valid search and seizure was conducted on the pickup boarded by the
accused. 

Ruling
Ruling:

No. There was no valid search and seizure conducted. The accused were
acquitted.

A search of a moving vehicle is one (1) of the few permissible exceptions where
warrantless searches can be made. 

However, for a warrantless search of a moving vehicle to be valid, probable cause

remains imperative. Law enforcers do not enjoy unbridled discretion to conduct
searches. In Caballes v. Court of Appeals: The mere mobility of these vehicles, however,
does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches
without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable
cause. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the
warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case. 

In determining the existence of probable cause, bare suspicion is never enough.

While probable cause does not demand moral certainty, or evidence sufficient to justify
conviction, it requires the existence of "a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.

In ruling that the sole reliance on tipped information, on its own, furnished by
informants cannot produce probable cause, the Court held that exclusive reliance on
information tipped by informants goes against the very nature of probable cause. A
single hint hardly amounts to "the existence of such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to
be searched." To maintain otherwise would be to sanction frivolity, opening the
floodgates to unfounded searches, seizures, and arrests that may be initiated by sly
informants.

It cannot be said that Sison, the driver, consented to the search made by the
 arresting officers. Jurisprudence has settled that "mere passive conformity or silence to
the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence, which amounts to no consent at
all."

In any case, with evidence on corpus delicti being inadmissible and placed
beyond the Regional Trial Court's contemplation, the prosecution is left with a fatal
handicap: it is insisting on the commission of the crime charged but is without evidence.  
Accused-appellant's acquittal must ensue.
Case P vs. Gardon-Mentoy, GR No. 223140, September 4, 2019
Facts
Facts: 1,400 grams of Cannavis (sic) Sativa otherwise known as "MARIJUANA",

Police officers had set up a checkpoint on the National Highway in Barangay

Malatgao, Narra, Palawan based on a tip from an unidentified informant that Rosemarie
Gardon-Mentoy would be transporting dangerous drugs on board a shuttle van.
Eventually, the authorities flagged down the approaching shuttle van matching the
description obtained from the informant and conducted a warrantless search of the
vehicle, yielding the discovery of a block-shaped bundle containing marijuana.

The informant relayed to the team that the accused will be boarding a Charing 19
shuttle van with plate number VRA 698. The police officers flagged down the van as it
approached them and declared that they were conducting a checkpoint. PO1 Rosales
asked the passengers who among them was Rose and she presented herself. SPO2
Felizarte and PO1 Rosales, however, noticed that the accused-appellant transferred a
block-shaped bundle, wrapped in yellow cellophane and brown tape, from the pink bag
to a black one. SPO2 Felizarte and PO1 Rosales suspected this bundle to contain
marijuana leaves. Rose then placed the black bag on a vacant seat beside her. SPO2
Felizarte also noticed that the accused-appellant panicked and tried to get down from the
van, but he and PO1 Rosales restrained her.

The RTC regarded the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant as validly

made upon probable cause  and concluded that the State had established the corpus
delicti of the crime by the testimonies of its witnesses. The CA rendered the assailed
decision affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant. It opined that a search could
precede an arrest if the police officers had probable cause to effect the arrest; that the
warrantless search conducted on the personal effects of the accused-appellant had been
an incident of her lawful arrest; and that the Prosecution had adequately established the
crucial links in the chain of custody. 

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid warrantless search and seizure.

Ruling
Ruling:

No. There was no valid warrantless search and seizure.

In holding that the warrantless search and seizure were without probable cause,
the Court held that a tip, in the absence of other circumstances that would confirm their
suspicion coming from the personal knowledge of the searching officers, was not yet
 actionable for purposes of conducting a search:

Without objective facts being presented here by which we can test the basis for
the officers' suspicion about the block-shaped bundle contained marijuana, we should
not give unquestioned acceptance and belief to such testimony. The mere subjective
conclusions of the officers concerning the existence of probable cause is never binding
on the court whose duty remains to "independently scrutinize the objective facts to
determine the existence of probable cause," for, indeed, "the courts have never hesitated
to overrule an officer's determination of probable cause when none exists."

But SPO2 Felizarte also claimed that it was about then when the accused-
appellant panicked and tried to get down from the van, impelling him and PO1 Rosales
to restrain her. For sure, the transfer made by the accused-appellant of the block-shaped
bundle from one bag to another should not be cited to justify the search if the search had
earlier commenced at the moment PO1 Rosales required her to produce her baggage.
Neither should the officers rely on the still-unverified tip from the unidentified informant,
without more, as basis to initiate the search of the personal effects. The officers were
themselves well aware that the tip, being actually double hearsay as to them, called for
independent verification as its substance and reliability, and removed the foundation for
them to rely on it even under the circumstances then obtaining. In short, the tip, in the
absence of other circumstances that would confirm their suspicion coming to the
knowledge of the searching or arresting officer, was not yet actionable for purposes of
effecting an arrest or conducting a search.

A lawful arrest must precede a warrantless search conducted upon the personal
effects of an individual. The process cannot be reversed. Hence, the search must rest on
probable cause existing independently of the arrest.

The arrest of the accused-appellant did not justify the search of the personal
belongings because the arrest did not precede the search. Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, clearly states that "[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant." Accordingly, there should first be a
lawful arrest before the warrantless search can be made; the process cannot be
reversed. As such, the search made against the accused-appellant would be valid only if
sufficient probable cause to support it existed independently of the arrest.

Case

Saluday vs. People, GR No. 215305, April 3, 2018, 860 SCRA 231

Facts
FACTS:
2009- Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao
of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint.   A member of the Task Force, requested all male
passengers to disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female passengers to
remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the presence and intercept the entry of
any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals.
He checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a small,
gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He asked
who the owner of the bag was and he requested that the owner was Marcelo G. Saluday
to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner obliged and the bag revealed the following
 contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber carbine bearing serial number 64702; (2) one
magazine with three live ammunitions; (3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a ten-
inch hunting knife. 
SCAA Buco then asked the petitioner to produce proof of his authority to carry
firearms and explosives. Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately arrested and
informed of his rights
The Office of the City Prosecutor for Davao City found probable cause to charge
him with illegal possession of high-powered firearms, ammunition, and explosives under
PD 1866. 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search conducted by Task Force Davao was illegal.
Ruling
RULING: In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at
a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro
Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a reduced
expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual and
minimally intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-ray and physical
inspections done at the airport and seaport terminals where passengers may further be
required to open their bags and luggage Considering the reasonableness of the bus
search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application, thereby precluding
the necessity for a warrant.
No. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it
operates against "unreasonable" searches and seizures only. Conversely, when a
search is "reasonable," Section 2, Article III of the Constitution does not apply.
The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a
person's right to privacy. Hence, only when the State intrudes into a person's expectation
of privacy, which society regards as reasonable, is the Fourth Amendment triggered.
Conversely, where a person does not have an expectation of privacy or one's
expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the alleged State intrusion is not a
"search" within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
In Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, The Court held that "simple
precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers
and inspecting their baggage, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal
detectors, before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating
the passenger's constitutional rights.”
Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private
property whose owners have every right to exclude anyone from entering. At the same
time, however, because these private premises are accessible to the public, the State,
much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those going
in. The only difference in the imposition of security measures by an owner and the State
is, the former emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article 429 of the Civil
Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of police power for the promotion of public
safety. Necessarily, a person's expectation of privacy is. diminished whenever he or she
enters private premises that are accessible to the public.

Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where
passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. 

Further, in the conduct of bus searches, the Court lays down the following
guidelines. Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to
a routine inspection akin to airport and seaport security protocol. In this regard, metal
detectors and x-ray scanning machines can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers
can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be required instead to
 open their bags and luggages for inspection, which inspection must be made in the
passenger's presence. Should the passenger object, he or she can validly be refused
entry into the terminal.

While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security
personnel of the bus owner in the following three instances. First, upon receipt of
information that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the
passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow fot an inspection of the person and
his or her effects. This is no different from an airplane that is forced to land upon receipt
of information about the contraband or illegal articles carried by a passenger on
board. Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger
can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection
by government agents or private security personnel as though the person boarded the
bus at the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is able to stop and pick
passengers along the way, making it possible for these passengers to evade the routine
search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated military or
police checkpoints where State agents can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of
the passengers andtheir bags or luggages.

In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the
bus terminal and the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following
conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search,
it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being
searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment,
humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can the search result from any discriminatory
motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In all
instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities,
children and other similar groups should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the
search, it must be contined to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized
from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that precautionary measures
were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.

The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put
at risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public
transport buses and their tenninals, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that
category.

Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers
at the terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence,
whenever compliant with these guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the
vehicle itself while in transit constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion
becomes unreasonable, thereby triggering the constitutional guarantee under Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution.

To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they

applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of
taxis, which are hired by only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no
longer be flagged down by any other person until the passengers on board alight from
the vehicle.

Case
P vs. Bagista, 288 Phil. 828 (1992)
Facts FACTS:
 On July 4, 1988, at around 8:00 o’clock in the morning, the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) Detachment Office located at the Arix Building, Bokawkan Road, Baguio
City, received information from one of its regular informants that a certain woman, 23
years of age, with naturally curly hair, and with a height of 5’2″ or 5’3″, would be
transporting marijuana from up north. Acting upon this piece of information, they
established a checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles, both private and public, coming
from the north to check if any of these vehicles were carrying marijuana leaves on board.

After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco bus with
Plate No. AVD 938 and body number 428, which came from Lepanto, Benguet . Sgts.
Parajas and Fider boarded the bus and thereupon Sgt. Parajas announced to the
passengers that they were NARCOM agents and that they were going to search their
baggage. At the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at the right
side (as one is facing the driver) of the last seat of the bus, with a travelling bag with
black and orange stripes 4 on her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag and discovered
three (3) bundles of marijuana leaves covered by assorted clothing. The bag and the
contents thereof were confiscated and the woman arrested; she was later brought to the
NARCOM office in Baguio City where she was booked and investigated.

ISSUE:

WON probable cause is present in the conduct of the warrantless search?

WON the warrantless search is valid?

Ruling HELD:

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits

of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in
plain view.

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be
searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause.

In the case at bar, the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search
all vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential
information they received from their regular informant that a woman having the same
appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north.
They likewise have probable cause to search the accused-appellant's belongings since
she fits the description given by the NARCOM informant.
 WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

Case P vs. Tangliben, 263 Phil. 106 (1990)

Facts
Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court where in Medel
Tangliben is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing him to
life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay the costs.

Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of the San Fernando Police
Station, together with Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance
mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San
Fernando, Pampanga; that the surveillance was aimed not only against persons who
may commit misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons who may be engaging
in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on information supplied by informers

On March 2, 1982, in the municipality of San Fernando, Province of Pampanga,

Philippines MEDEL TANGLIBEN, knowing fully well that Marijuana is a prohibited drug,
have in his possession, (1) bag of dried marijuana leaves with an approximate
weight of one (1) kilo and to transport (sic) the same to Olongapo City, without
authority of law to do so.

It is contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an
unlawful search without a warrant and is therefore inadmissible in evidence. One of the
exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful
arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides that a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his
arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search
was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.

Issue: WON the lower court erred in admitting as evidence the package of marijuana
allegedly seized from Medel Tangliben as it was a product of an unlawful search without
a warrant.

Ruling No, the search and seizure were valid.

One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful
arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
 Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant.

Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:

. . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense.

Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case
therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest
and is consequently valid.

In contrast, the case before us presented urgency. there was an informer who pointed to the
accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers
had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant.
P vs. Mike Maspil, Jr., 266 Phil. 815 (1990)

Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio where in
Moises Maspil is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing him to
life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay the costs.

That on or about the 1st day of November, 1986, at Sayangan, Municipality of

Atok, Province of Benguet,  Maspil, transport and carry in transit from Sinto,
Bauko, Mt. Province to Atok, Benguet One Hundred Eleven Kilos and Nine Grams
(111.9 kilos), more or less, of dried marijuana leaves. Commanding Officer, Maj.
Basilio Cablayan, had been earlier tipped off by some confidential informers that the
herein accused Maspil and Bagking would be transporting a large volume of marijuana
to Baguio City. The informers went along with the operatives to Sayangan. 

Maspil declared that on October 31, 1986, at the burned area along Lakandula
Street, Baguio City, a certain Mrs. Luisa Mendoza hired the jeep of Maspil to transport
her stock of dried fish and canned goods contained in cartons to Abatan, Buguias. They
left Baguio City at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon and arrived at Abatan at 6 pm.
After unloading their cargo, Maspil and Bagking repaired to a restaurant for their dinner
before undertaking the trip back to Baguio City. While eating, they were approached by
two persons, one of whom they would learn later on to be a certain Danny Buteng.
Buteng inquired if they were going to Baguio City and upon being given an affirmative
answer, he said that he would ride with them and that he has some cargo. Upon
reaching Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, Maspil stopped at the Marosan Restaurant where
they intended to take coffee. Their remaining passengers - Buteng and a companion -
alighted and went to the restaurant. However, a soldier waved at Maspil to drive to
where he was, which Maspil did. The soldier secured Maspil's permission to inspect their
cargo after which he grabbed Maspil on the latter's left shoulder and asked who owned
the cargo. Maspil told the soldier that the cargo belonged to their passengers who went
to the restaurant. The soldier called for his companions and they went to look for
Maspil's passengers in the restaurant. Later on, they returned and placed Maspil and
Bagking under arrest since their cargo turned out to be marijuana.

Issue: WON that the marijuana allegedly seized was a product of an unlawful search
without a warrant?

Ruling: 

The Court affirmed the appeal finding Moises Maspil is found guilty. The search
was conducted within reasonable limits. There was information that a sizable volume of
marijuana will be transported to take advantage of the All Saints Day holiday wherein
there will be a lot of people going to and from Baguio City. In fact, during the three day
(October 30, 1986 to November 1, 1986) duration of the checkpoint, there were also
other drug related arrests made aside from that of the two appellants.

But even without the Valmonte ruling, the search would still be valid. This case
involves a search incident to a lawful arrest which is one of the exceptions to the general
rule requiring a search warrant. This exception is embodied in Section 12 of Rule 126 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:

"SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant."

This case falls squarely within the exceptions. The appellants were caught in flagrante delicto since
they were transporting the prohibited drugs at the time of their arrest. (People v. Tangliben, G.R. No.
63630, April 6, 1990) A crime was actually being committed.

 Peop le vs. Quebral, 621 Phil. 226 (2009)

 This case is about the requirement of authentication of seized prohibited drugs
and the conduct of warrantless search of a suspect by the roadside based on
probable cause.

FACTS: 

The provincial prosecutor of Bulacan charged the accused Zenaida Quebral,

Eusebio Quebral, Fernando Lopez, and Michael Salvador before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan, in violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

PO3 Cecilio Galvez of the police force of Balagtas, Bulacan testified that the Chief
of the Drug Enforcement Unit called him and other police officers to a briefing regarding
a police informer's report that two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep with a
specific plate number would deliver shabu, on the following day at a Petron Gasoline
Station in Balagtas to Michael Salvador, a drug pusher in the police watch list. After a
short briefing, PO3 Galvez and six other police officers went to the North Luzon
Expressway Balagtas Exit, watching out for the owner type jeep mentioned. At around
4:00 p.m., a jeep with the reported plate number and with two men and a woman on
board, came out of the Balagtas Exit.Galvez identified the two men as accused Eusebio
Quebral, who drove the jeep, and accused-appellant Fernando Lopez and the woman as
accused-appellant Zenaida Quebral. The police trailed the jeep as it proceeded to the
town proper of Balagtas and entered a Petron gas station along the McArthur Highway.
After a few minutes, a Tamaraw FX arrived from which accused- appellant Michael
Salvador alighted.He walked towards the jeep and talked to accused Zenaida Quebral,
who then handed a white envelope to him.On seeing this, PO3 Galvez, who was
watching from about 15 meters in a tinted car, signaled his back-up team to move.The
police officers surrounded the jeep. Galvez took the envelope from Michael, and saw five
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance which he believed was shabu.

The Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office later examined and confirmed
that it was shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride. Appellants claimed that PO3
Galvez and his fellow police officers merely framed them up. 

RTC found all four accused guilty of the crime and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P5 million. While the CA was reviewing
the case on appeal, accused Eusebio Quebral died, prompting it to dismiss the case
against him. CA rendered judgment, entirely affirming the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an illegal arrest of the accused and that the police
officers' subsequent search of their persons incident to such arrest was also illegal.

RULING: 

The accused claim that since the police did not have valid grounds to arrest them,
their subsequent search of them was illegal and the evidence of the seized shabu cannot
be admitted in evidence against them. With the exclusion of the seized drugs, there
would not be proof that they were passing them.

The accused-appellants invoke the rule that a person may be arrested even
without a warrant only:

a) if he is caught in the act of committing a crime, 

b) if he has just committed a crime and the arresting officer pursued him, or

c) if he escaped from a legal confinement.

It was more of a search preceding an arrest.The police officers had information

that two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep would arrive in Balagtas and
hand over a consignment of shabu at a gas station in town to a known drug dealer
whose name was on the police watch list. When these things unfolded before their eyes
as they watched from a distance, the police came down on those persons and searched
them, resulting in the discovery and seizure of a quantity of shabu in their possession.In
such a case, the search is a valid search justifying the arrest that came after it.The
police acted on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. Since the
seized shabu resulted from a valid search, it is admissible in evidence against the
accused.

It would have been impractical for the police to apply with the appropriate
court for a search warrant since their suspicion found factual support only at the
moment accused Eusebio Quebral, Fernando Lopez, and Zenaida Quebral
rendezvoused with Michael Salvador at the Petron gas station for the hand over of the
drugs. An immediate search was warranted since they would have gone away by
the time the police could apply for a search warrant. The drugs could be easily
transported and concealed with impunity.

People vs. Tuazon, 588 Phil. 227 (2009)

FACTS: 

PO3 Glenon Bueno (PO3 Bueno) received through telephone, confidential

information that a Gemini car bearing plate number PFC 4116 would deliver an
unspecified amount of shabu in Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on said tip,
Antipolo City Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana dispatched a team of policemen to the
area to conduct a surveillance. When the team arrived in Marville Subdivision, they saw
the said Gemini car and immediately flagged it down. 

The driver of the car pulled to a stop and opened a window of said vehicle giving
the policemen the opportunity to identify themselves as members of the Antipolo City
Police Station. It was then that PO1 Manuel Padlan (PO1 Padlan) saw a gun tucked on
the appellant's waist. PO1 Padlan inquired about the gun and Tuazon allegedly replied it
did not belong to him nor could he produce any pertinent document relating to said
firearm. This prompted PO3 Bueno to order Tuazon to get down from the car. As soon
as Tuazon stepped down from the vehicle, PO3 Bueno saw five plastic sachets on the
driver’s seat, the contents of which Tuazon allegedly admitted to be shabu. Appellant
was thereafter immediately brought to the police station.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an illegal warrantless arrest by PO3 Bueno on Tuazon.

RULING: 

None. PO3 Bueno establishes beyond reasonable doubt Tuazon’s culpability.

When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such a

warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to the search that they would
find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

We hold that the police had probable cause to effect the warrantless search of the
Gemini car driven by appellant.

No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
This right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which states:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Complementing this provision is the so-called exclusionary rule embodied in Section
3(2) of the same article –

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

It is recognized, however, that these constitutional provisions against warrantless

searches and seizures admit of certain exceptions, as follows: 

(1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; 
(2) seizure of evidence in plain view; 
(3) search of a moving vehicle; 
(4) consented warrantless search; 
(5) customs search; 
(6) stop and frisk; and 
(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

In the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing, this Court elucidated on the rationale for the
exemption of searches of moving vehicles from the requirement of search warrant, thus:

[T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the
place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of
the issuing judge – a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of
smuggling affected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband
from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search
of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought."

Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to moving
vehicles does not give the police authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a
warrantless search of an automobile. To do so would render the aforementioned
constitutional stipulations inutile and expose the citizenry to indiscriminate police distrust
which could amount to outright harassment. Surely, the policy consideration behind the
exemption of search of moving vehicles does not encompass such arbitrariness on the
part of the police authorities. In recognition of the possible abuse, jurisprudence dictates
that at all times, it is required that probable cause exist in order to justify the warrantless
search of a vehicle.

Manalili vs. CA, 345 Phil. 632 (1997)

“When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen should employ
limited, flexible responses — like "stop-and-frisk" — which are graduated in relation to the
amount of information they possess, the lawmen being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate
or to treat cavalierly the citizen's constitutional rights against unreasonable arrest, search and
seizure.”

FACTS: 
At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City
conducted surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
This was done after receiving information that drug addicts were roaming around said
area. Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a Manalili, the
petitioner, in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. Manalili had reddish
eyes and was walking in a swaying manner. Manalili was trying to avoid the policemen,
but the officers were able to introduce themselves and asked him what he was holding in
his hands. Manalili resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked him if he could see what the
petitioner had in his hands. Manalili showed his wallet and allowed the officer to examine
it. Policeman Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the
wallet and its marijuana contents and Manalili to headquarters to be further investigated.

ISSUE:
Whether the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence
inadmissible as evidence.

RULING:
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be
validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is
unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
gives this guarantee:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in

evidence as a "fruit of the poisonous tree," falling under the exclusionary rule:
Sec. 3. . . .
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of . . . the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

This right, however, is not absolute. The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated
five recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1)
search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain
view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure.

In these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause. Probable
cause being at best defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s),
article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by is in the place to be searched.
Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the
general rule against a search without a warrant.
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of
an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence
illegally obtained when he failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial.

The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the trial court’s decision to convict
petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely on the strength of the
arresting officers' testimony.

P vs. Saycon, 306 Phil 359 (1994)

FACTS:
That on or about 8 July 1992, at about 6:00 in the morning, the Coastguard personnel
received information from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a suspected "shabu"
courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon was on board the MV Doña Virginia, which was
arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City. Upon receipt of the information, the
Coastguard chief officer CPO Tolin, instructed them to intercept the suspect. A combined
team of NARCOM agents and Philippine Coastguard personnel consisting of CPO Tolin,
a certain Miagme, and Senior Police Officers Ruben Laddaran and Winifredo Noble of
NARCOM posted themselves at the gate of Pier 1.

The MV Doña Virginia docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning at Pier 1 in Dumaguete
City. Alvaro Saycon alighted from the boat carrying a black bag and went through the
checkpoint manned by the Philippine Coastguard where he was identified by police
officer Winifredo Noble of NARCOM. Saycon was then invited to the Coastguard
Headquarters at the Pier area. He willingly went with them. At the headquarters, the
coastguard asked Saycon to open his bag, and the latter willingly obliged. In it were
personal belongings and a maong wallet. Inside that maong wallet, there was a Marlboro
pack containing the suspected "shabu". When police officer Winifredo Noble asked
Saycon whether the Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu" was his, Saycon
merely bowed his head. Then Saycon, his bag and the suspected "shabu" were brought
to the NARCOM office for booking. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the NARCOM
agents did not have a warrant of arrest.

ISSUE:
Whether the search of the accused’s bag, without warrant, was illegal.

RULING: 
The Court considers, therefore, that a valid warrantless search had been conducted by
the NARCOM and Coastguard Officers of the "black bag" of appellant Saycon. It follows
that the warrantless arrest of appellant Saycon which ensued forthwith, was also valid
and lawful, since the police had determined, he was in fact carrying or transporting
"shabu."
The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a
search and seizure is, however, not absolute.
Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles —automobiles, trucks,
etc. — without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant
before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to
be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each
case.

Clearly, the NARCOM Agents had to act quickly but there was not enough time to obtain
a search warrant or a warrant of arrest. It was realistically not possible for either the
NARCOM Agents or the Coastguard Officers to obtain a judicial search warrant or
warrant of arrest in the situation presented by the case at bar.

P vs. Solayao, 330 Phil. 811

FACTS:

At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of July 9, 1992, SPO3 Jose Niño, with
CAFGU went to Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran to verify reports on the
presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran.

They met the group of Nilo Solayao who were drunk. The others except Solayao
fled. SPO3 Niño told Solayao not to run away and introduced himself as "PC," after
which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found
wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally known as "latong." Thereupon,
SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the custody of the policemen
of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession
of firearms.

RTC- guilty of illegal possession of firearms.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the shotgun admitted in evidence was a product of an unlawful

warrantless search.

HELD:

No, it is not a product of an unlawful warrantless search. Hence, there was no

violation of unreasonable searches and seizures.

In the case at bar, Solayao and his companions' drunken actuations aroused
the suspicion of SPO3 Niño's group, as well as the fact that he himself was attired
in a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit and that upon espying the peace officers,
his companions fled. It should be noted that the peace officers were precisely on an
intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons were roaming around the
barangays of Caibiran. Hence, there was probable cause to conduct a search even
before an arrest could be made.

In the present case, after SPO3 Niño told accused-appellant not to run away, the
former identified himself as a government agent. The peace officers did not know that he
had committed, or was actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of firearms. 

Under the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have
procured a search warrant first.

P vs. Tampis, 455 Phil. 371 (2003)

FACTS:

PO1 Fagcayang received information from his asset that a sale of marijuana was
about to take place, he conducted a surveillance on the intended place and saw both
appellants packing the suspected marijuana leaves into a brown bag with the markings
"Tak Tak Tak Ajinomoto"; that appellants had physical possession of the subject brown
bag from the time they left the house at Sitio Bugnay, Tinglayan, Kalinga until they
boarded a Ford Fiera; that both appellants rode the Red Eagle Bus with body number
2008 bound for Baguio; that when the policemen conducted a search of the same bus at
Sabangan, they found a pregnant woman with the same brown bag located in front of
her under the driver’s seat; that upon inspection, the bag was found to contain suspected
marijuana leaves which when examined yielded positive for marijuana; that when
appellant Daisy was invited by the police, appellant Luis went with her to the municipal
hall.

Appellants contend that the warrantless arrest and search made by the police
officers was unlawful for lack of probable cause. The arrest was effected based on a
radio message that "a pregnant woman accompanied by a man" was transporting
marijuana, without any other description or identifying features of the appellants. They
further contend that the prohibited articles were the fruits of an illegal search and seizure
and are, therefore, inadmissible in evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether there was a violation of the constitutional guarantee against

unreasonable searches and seizures.

HELD:

None. Even if the message, as regards the identities of the appellants, was
merely relayed through a radio, there was a clear description of them to enable the
policemen to identify appellants. Under these circumstances, the policemen had
reasonable grounds to believe that appellants were dealing or transporting prohibited
drugs. It has been held that tipped information is sufficient to provide probable cause to
effect a warrantless search and seizure.

The warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle carrying the prohibited drugs can be
quickly moved out of the area or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

P vs. Jerry Sapla, GR No. 244045, June 16, 2020

FACTS: 
In the morning of 10 January 2014, an unnamed officer at the Regional Public
Safety Battalion (RPSB) in Tabuk, Kalinga received a text message from an informant
(concerned citizen) that an individual will be transporting marijuana from Kalinga to
Isabela. PO2 Jim Mabiasan (not the officer who received the text message) then relayed
the information to the deputy commander who coordinated with the PDEA.
About 1:00 o’clock  in the afternoon of the same day, a follow up information via text
message was received by the RPSB this time detailing the description of the drug
courier, to wit: male, wearing collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and
carrying a blue sack; he will be boarding a passenger jeepney bearing plate number
AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela.
Based on this information, a checkpoint was organized by the PNP.
At around 1:20 o’clock, the jeepney arrived. The police officers stopped the jeepney and
inside they saw the person described in the text message they received. They
approached said person and asked him if the blue sack in front of him was his. The
person answered yes. The police officers then requested the person to open the blue
sack. The person hesitated but he eventually complied. The content of the blue sack was
four bricks of marijuana. The person was later identified as Jerry Sapla.
In court, Sapla denied the allegations as he claimed that when he boarded the jeep, he
did not have any sack with him; that the blue sack was only attributed as belonging to
him by the police. Sapla was convicted by the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction and ruled that the informant’s tip was sufficient to engender probable
cause upon the minds of the police officers; that it was sufficient to conduct a warrantless
search and seizure.

ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure conducted by the police officers. 
RULING:  The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures
are:
(1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
(2) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(3) search of a moving vehicle;
(4) consented warrantless search;
(5) customs search;
(6) stop and frisk; and
(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
 
"warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in
such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is
limited to visual inspection."

On the other hand, an extensive search of a vehicle is permissible, but only when "the
officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains [an] item, article or
object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction."

It must be stressed that none of these conditions exists in the instant case.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not an informant’s tip is sufficient to engender probable cause?
HELD: No. In a long line of cases (Pp. vs Aminnudin, Pp. vs Cuizon, Pp. vs Encinada, Pp. vs
Aruta, Pp. vs Cogaed, Veridiano vs Pp., Pp. vs Comprado, Pp. vs Yanson, and Pp. vs Gardon-
Mentoy), the Supreme Court has always said that a mere informant’s tip is not sufficient to
engender probable cause. The police officer receiving the informant’s tip must rely on his
senses. The police officer must not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. The police
officer, with his/her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an
illicit act and not merely rely on the information passed on to him/her.
Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of a tip. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable
it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other
circumstance that will arouse suspicion.
The Supreme Court noted that there were two previous decisions (Pp. vs Maspil and Pp. vs
Bagista) which ruled that a confidential tip was sufficient to engender probable cause, however,
the Supreme Court in this case declared that these two cases are now being abandoned to settle
the issue once and for all.
The Supreme Court also found the text message to be double hearsay: (1) the person who
actually received the text message was not presented, and (2) the person who received the text
message merely relayed it to the officers who conducted the warrantless search and seizure
without the latter actually seeing/reading the actual text message. Further, the text message was
not preserved. It also appeared that the phone which received the text message was not a
government issued one – this belies the claim of the officers that the message was received by
their hotline.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the police officers may justify the search as a search of a moving
vehicle.
HELD: No. As a rule, searches and seizures must be done with a court issued warrant. There
are exceptions such as search of a moving vehicle where a valid warrantless search and seizure
may be affected.  But this exception comes with strict parameters which are: a) if the vehicle is
parked on public fairgrounds, the officer may only draw aside its curtain, b) the officer may only
look into the vehicle, c) the officer may only flash a light without opening the vehicle’s doors, d)
the occupants of the vehicle are not subjected to physical/body search, e) limited to visual
search, f) if done as a routine check, must be conducted in a fixed area.
This case does not fall under search of a moving vehicle because the target of the search was
not the jeepney boarded by Sapla but rather the target was the person of Sapla. Based on the
testimony of the police officers, their actual target was the person fitting the description provided
by the tip which corresponded to Sapla and not the vehicle.
ISSUE 3: Whether or not the police officers may justify the search as consented search.
HELD: No. Based on the testimony of the police officers, Sapla hesitated when he was
requested to open the blue sack. This only means that he did not give his consent and that his
compliance was vitiated by the presence of the police.
With all the foregoing, the search and seizure conducted was invalid and any evidence obtained
therefrom is inadmissible. Sapla was acquitted. The Supreme Court likewise emphasized the
need to adhere to strict standards set by the Constitution otherwise “A battle waged against
illegal drugs that tramples on the rights of the people is not a war on drugs; it is a war against the
people.”

The Bill of Rights should never be sacrificed on the altar of convenience. Otherwise, the
malevolent mantle of the rule of men dislodges the rule of law.
Eric Salibad y Mallari is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt,
and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is being lawfully held for
another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

c. General or roving warrants

A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to
the person to be arrested or the property to be seized." It is one that allows the "seizure
of one thing under a warrant describing another" and gives the officer executing the
warrant the discretion over which items to take.
Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is
issued, vulnerable to abuse. Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people
and their properties are searched only for the most compelling and lawful reasons.

1. Stonehill vs. Diokno,June 19,1967

1 search warrant =one specific offense

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1967/jun1967/gr_l-19550_1967.html 

FACTS: 
Respondents-Judges issued a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners to
search them and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to
seize and take possession of their personal property like books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). as “the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and
proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “u  sed or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense,” which is described in the applications adverted to above as
“violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
the Revised Penal Code.”
Petitioners claim that the search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not
mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents,
papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants,
to be disposed of in accordance with law — said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court
this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that,
pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using
the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases
already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing
the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding
the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers,
things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
ISSUE: Whether the documents, papers, and things seized in the residences of
petitioners may be used as evidence against the petitioners, corporation.
RULING: No, documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners are
not covered with the search warrant and are inadmissible evidence against petitioners
herein. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,
namely: 
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and 
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. 
The court were not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers
submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions
contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the
views therein expressed, should we agree thereto.

2. Bache vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823

No personal examination of judge

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1971februarydecisions.php?id=86
Facts:
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Misael Vera requested the issuance of a
search warrant against Bache& Co., for violation of Section 46(a) of the NIRC particularly
Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209. Vera authorized Rodolfo de Leon, his Revenue
Examiner, to make and file the application of the search warrant which was attached to
the letter.  
The following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the CFI of
Rizal. They brought the following:
1. Vera’s letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still
unsigned by respondent De Leon;
2. An affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent De Leon;
3. A deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio already accomplished and
signed by him but not yet subscribed.
 
Judge Ruiz instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De
Leon and Logronio. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then signed by the respondent
Judge and accordingly issued. Three days later, the agents of BIR served the warrant
and seized 6 boxes of documents.
 
Issue:
WON the search warrant was validly issued.
 
Ruling:
NO. The Court found three (3) defects in the search warrant issued.
1. First, there was no personal examination of the judge.
The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not constitute
sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner
respondent Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the
judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These were
important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-important question of whether or not
there was probable cause. This is pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution,
and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The determination of whether or not
a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of
 facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the
contrary.
 
2. Second, the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under
the Tax Code.
 
1. Violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are
interrelated. T
2. Violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source).
3. Violation of Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and
4. The fourth is the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales,
business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon).
 
Hence, it is a clear violation of Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the RRC which states:
 
“Section 4.Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines. ”
 
3. Third, the search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant
No. 2-M-70 in this manner:
 
"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars,
receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received;
certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex
and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records;
checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of
foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970."
 
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant
should particularly describe the things to be seized.
 
1. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when
the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow ; or
2. When the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the
warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or
3. When the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of
Court).
The herein search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests.
 
If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those
articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should
come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence.
 
 In this event, the description contained in the herein disputed warrant should have
mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the
receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes,
deeds of sale, messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals,
records of foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant. Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge is declared null and void.

3. Secretary of Justice vs. Marcos, 76 SCRA 301

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1977/apr1977/am_207_1977.html

2 offenses in 1 search warrant

Facts:
Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos filed an administrative complaint for
gross inefficiency against Judge Pio Marcos of the Court of First Instance of Benguet
and Baguio City, from the issuance of a search warrant past 12:00 midnight of April 4,
1971, and thereafter served and executed approximately two hours later, long before
dawn. 
The grounds alleged were that the search warrant was not limited to one offense
covering both illegal possession of firearms and violation of Central Bank rules and
regulations; that it did not particularly describe the property to be seized; that he did not
carefully examine under oath the applicant and his witnesses; that articles not mentioned
were taken; and that thereafter the return and the inventory although appearing to have
been prepared on said date were not actually submitted to respondent Judge until April
13, 1971 and the objects seized delivered only about a week later on April 19.

Issue:
Whether or not there was gross inefficiency on the part of Judge Marcos for the
search warrant he issued at past midnight.

Ruling:
1. Failure to follow the legal Procedure by the respondent Judge when he issued the
title warrant.
Judge Gatmaitan ruled that the  proceedings adopted by Judge Marcos
were not fatally wrong.It was added that there is something very probable and
thereof credible, in the testimony of this witness that time was of the extreme
essence, the urgency of the situation could no longer permit further going back to
the Office of the Clerk of Court for renewed typing of application and affidavits and
warrant, at any rate, since it was complainant Secretary of Justice himself who
presented Clerk of Court Romero, he should be bound by latter's testimony.
2. The defects manifest on the face thereof as two offenses were included and the
description of the premises to be searched and the object to be seized being too
general; the third, the absence of the probable cause; and the fourth, the article
seized having included objects not mentioned in the warrant and the delay in the
delivery thereof to respond judge.

4. Castro vs. Pabalan, April 30,l976

Fulltext: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1976/apr1976/gr_28642_1976.html

A search warrant was issued by Judge Pabalan against Maria Castro and Co Ling
without complying with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. The
search warrant failed to specify the specific offense, to examine the applicant as well as
his witnesses on the part of respondent Judge, and to describe with particularity the
place to be searched and the things to be seized, that were singled out to justify the
assertion of illegality.

Facts: 
A search warrant was issued by Judge Pabalan against Maria Castro and Co Ling
without complying with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. The
search warrant failed to specify the specific offense, to examine the applicant as well as
his witnesses on the part of respondent Judge, and to describe with particularity the
place to be searched and the things to be seized, that were singled out to justify the
assertion of illegality.

It all started when respondent Ernesto I. Lumang was informed that Maria Castro and Co
Ling, at Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union, were in possession of narcotics and other
contraband." He claimed that he had verified the report and that therefore he had
"reasons to believe that a Search Warrant should be issued to take possession" of such
narcotics and other contraband.

Rigid surveillance was conducted by Lumang and his group from PC Command of La
Union, but all they could come out with is that petitioner Co Ling is an overstaying alien
for almost ten years conducting such traffic and that after verification, he was not
registered in the Immigration Office. Then, on the very same day, a search warrant was
issued for illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband. Again, there was reference to the
possession by petitioners of such forbidden goods. As to the complete and detailed
description of the properties to be seized, the search warrant merely mentioned illegal
traffic of narcotics and contraband inside the warehouse and premises of petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant issued by the respondent Judge was tainted by
illegality because it does not comply with the constitutional requirements?

Ruling: 
The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular
description of "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." Judge  

Pabalan admitted that there was a mistake concerning the residence of petitioners,
which was set forth in the search warrant as being in Barrio Padasil when in fact it is in
Barrio Maria Cristina. He would gloss over such inaccuracy by saying that they were,
anyway, adjoining barrios. As to the premises to be searched, it may be admitted that
the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation. Nonetheless,
and again in line with Stonehill v. Diokno, the Constitution is quite explicit that there be a
particular description of the things to be seized. That requisite was not complied with in
this case. That would explain why the searching party felt it had a free hand and did take
possession of various kinds of goods, including personal effects, which the respondent
Judge himself would have them return.
What was aptly characterized as a "major objective" of this constitutional provision, the
elimination of general warrants, was thus frustrated. It need not be stressed anew that
this Court is resolutely committed to the doctrine that this constitutional provision is of a
mandatory character and therefore must be strictly complied with. 

Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the basic procedural requisite that a
search warrant "shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense." Here reference was made to "an illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband."
The latter is a generic term covering all goods exported from or imported into the country
contrary to applicable statutes. 

5. Asian Surety vs. Herrera,52 SCRA 312   -  for 2/9/2022

Fulltext: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1973/dec1973/gr_25232_1973.html

Facts: 
Respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso
Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a
search warrant in connection with a criminal case for estafa, falsification,
insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co.
Commanding to make an immediate search at any time of the premises, seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit: Fire Registers, Loss
Bordereau, Adjusters Report including subrogation receipt and proof of loss, Loss
Registers, Books of Accounts, including cash receipts and disbursements and
general ledger, check vouchers, income tax returns, and other papers connected
therewith ... for the years 1961 to 1964. 

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath NBI Agent Celso J.
Zoleta, Jr. and his witness Manuel Cuaresma that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe
that Mr. William Li Yao or his employees has/have in his/their control in premises No. 2nd Floor
Republic Supermarket Building, in Rizal Avenue district of Sta. Cruz, Manila, property (Subject of the
offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or intended to be used as the
means of committing the offense) should be seized and brought to the undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the ----- of the premises
above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Report including subrogation receipt and proof of loss,
Loss Registers, Books of Accounts, including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger,
check vouchers, income tax returns, and other papers connected therewith ... for the years 1961 to
1964 to be dealt with as the law directs.

Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft
Division of the NBI entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and
served the search warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence of
Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of directors of the insurance
firm. After the search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads of documents,
papers and receipts. Petitioner assails the validity of the search warrant, claiming that it
was issued in contravention of the explicit provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, particularly Section 3, of Art. IV of the constitution, and Sections 3, 5, 8 and 10 of
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: 
Whether the search and seizure conducted was valid?
Ruling: 
NO. The search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses
of : (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in
contravention of the explicit command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules
providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense." 
 The property to be searched and seized (Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau,
Adjusters Report, including subrogation receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers,
Books of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, etc.)
are not contraband goods, stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of one
and the same offense. What is plain and clear is the fact that the respondent Judge
made no attempt to determine whether the property he authorized to be searched and
seized pertains specifically to any one of the three classes of personal property that may
be searched and seized under a search warrant under Rule 126, Sec. 2 of the Rules. 

The respondent Judge simply authorized search and seizure under an omnibus
description of the personal properties to be seized. 

The search warrant violated the specific injunctions of Section 8 of Rule 126. the
search warrant in question left blank the "time" for making search, while actual search
was conducted in the evening of October 27, 1965, at 7:30 p.m., until the wee hours of
the morning of October 28, 1965, thus causing untold inconveniences to petitioners.
Authorities are of the view that where a search is to be made during the night time, the
authority for executing the same at that time should appear in the directive on the face of
the warrant.
6. Collector vs. Villaluz, June 18,1976
Who: Salvador Mascardo (Collector of Customs) filed a case against Cesar Makapugay
Case: violation of the National Internal Revenue Code, (b) Central Bank Circular No.
265, The Central Bank Act, and (c) Section 3601 and 3602 of Republic Act No. 1937, in
relation to Sections 2505 and 2530 (m) 1 of the same Act.
How: Cesar brought into the country FORTY (40) cartons of "untaxed blue seal" Salem
cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of Johny Walker Scotch Whiskey, also "untaxed",
without the necessary permit from the proper authorities and various Philippine
Money in the amount of Two Thousand Two Hundred Eighty (P2,280.00) Pesos cleverly hidden
in one of the pieces of baggage
Where: Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court (Onofre Villaluz)

Villaluez dismissed the case and order the customs to return the goods. Collector of
Customs refused hence, Makapugay filed a case against Mascardo.

DOCTRINE. A circuit court judge cannot order return to importer of goods seized by the
Collector of Customs even if the criminal complaint against the importer is dismissed by
said judge. Jurisdiction to replevin seized imported articles belongs exclusively to the
Bureau of Customs subject to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals.

ISSUE 

WON the items seized may be returned – NO

RATIO.

Probable Cause: SC affirms the power of the Circuit Criminal Courts to conduct preliminary
examination and investigation in all the cases falling under their jurisdiction and additionally fixes the
period for preliminary investigation.

The dismissal of a case, even with prejudice, during the stage of preliminary
investigation does not bar subsequent prosecution and conviction if the evidence
warrants the re-filing of the same becomes next to impossible.

For the enforcement of such order would virtually deprive herein petitioner
Collector of Customs of the evidence indispensable to a successful prosecution of the
case against the private respondent. Worse, the order nullified the power of seizure of
the customs official.

Respondent Judge ignored the established principle that from the moment
imported goods are actually in the possession or control of the Customs authorities,
even if no warrant of seizure had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings, the Bureau of Customs acquires
exclusive jurisdiction over such imported goods for the purpose of enforcing the Customs
laws, subject to an appeal only to the Court of Tax Appeals and to final review by the
Supreme Court.

Such exclusive jurisdiction precludes the Court of First Instance as well as the
Circuit Criminal Court from assuming cognizance of the subject matter and divests such
courts of the prerogative to replevin properties subject to seizure and forfeiture
proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code because proceedings for the
forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in
the conviction of wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty.
7. Viduya vs. Verdiago, 73 SCRA 553
Customs cannot issue search warrant but can conduct seizure
FACTS:
Prior to the issuance of a search warrant, there was a previous discovery of failure to pay the
correct amount of customs duties that led to the institution of a seizure and forfeiture.

Respondent Berdiago is the owner of a Rolls Royce car, Model 1966, which arrived in
the Port of Manila on January 8, 1968. However, the petitioner, Jose Viduya, then
Collector of Customs of Manila, obtained reliable intelligence that fraudulent documents
were used by Berdiago in securing the release of the car from the Bureau of Customs,
making it appear therein that the car was a 1961 model instead of a 1966 one, thus
enabling respondent to pay a much lower customs duty.

There was, accordingly, a formal demand for the payment of the sum to cover the
deficiency, respondent manifesting his willingness to do so but failing to live up to his
promise. As the car was kept in a dwelling house at the Yabut Compound, two officials of
the Customs Police Service as duly authorized agents of petitioner, applied to
respondent Judge for a warrant to search said dwelling house and to seize the Rolls
Royce car found therein.

Berdiago filed a motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court based on lack of
probable cause to issue the warrant. Collector Viduya opposed, alleging that Berdiago
could not rely on the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure
because it was not shown that he owned the dwelling house which was searched.
Nonetheless, Judge Andres Reyes in the challenged order quashed such search
warrant.

ISSUE:
Was said failure sufficient probable cause?

 Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in

 quashing the warrant

HELD:

Yes, search is authorized by law in case of illegal importation.

the Tariff and Customs Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203
to enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being
a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any
trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search
warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said
'dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant  issued by a judge or justice
of the peace ... .' It is our considered view,

therefore, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws.

Seizure is authorized by law in case of illegal importation, merchandise, the importation of

which is effected contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture, and that goods released contrary to
law are subject to seizure and forfeiture.

As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon payment of the duties, taxes
and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for
withdrawal shall have been granted. The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must
be in full.

The Court opined that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without
a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. There is justification then for the
insistence on the part of private respondent that probable cause be shown. So
respondent Judge found in issuing the search warrant.

Apparently, he was persuaded to quash it when he noted that the warrant for seizure
and detention came later than its issuance. In thus acting, respondent Judge apparently
overlooked that long before the search warrant was applied for, to be specific on April
15, 1968, the misdeclaration and underpayment was already noted and that thereafter
on April 24, 1968, private respondent himself agreed to make good the further amount
due but not in the sum demanded.

As the car was kept in a dwelling house, petitioner through two of his officers in the
Customs Police Service applied for and was able to obtain the search warrant. Had there
been no such move on the part of petitioner, the duties expressly enjoined on him by law
assess and collect all lawful revenues, to prevent and suppress smuggling and other
frauds and to enforce tariff and customs law would not have been performed.

While therefore, it is to be admitted that his warrant of seizure and detention came later
than the search warrant, there were indubitable facts in existence at that time to call for
its issuance. Certainly there was probable cause. There was evidently need for the
issuance of a search warrant. It ought not to have been thereafter quashed.
9. People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169 (G.R. No. L-23051)
FACTS:

Jose Ma. VELOSO, a member of the House of Representatives, was found guilty of the
crime of resistance of the agents of the authority.

VELOSO was the manager of the PARLIAMENTARY CLUB which was alleged to be a
gambling house. The police were able to secure a search warrant on the club located at
No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila. Once inside, the police apprehended fifty
persons including VELOSO whose pocket was visibly bulging. Thinking VELOSO’s
pocket contained gambling utensils, the police tried to have his pocket searched.

VELOSO refused to obey. He claimed that his name did not appear in the search
warrant. The person to whom the search warrant was directed to is “JOHN DOE” and not
Jose Ma. VELOSO. Eventually, VELOSO was laid down on the floor and long sheets of
paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.

ISSUE: Is the JOHN DOE warrant issued in this case valid?

RULING: Yes.

In general, search warrants must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. JOHN DOE warrants, as an exception, is permissible if
the name of the person to be apprehended is unknown. Even so, said warrant must
contain the best descriptio personae (description of the person) which will enable the
officer to identify the accused (without difficulty).

In this case, the search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. VELOSO as the person to be
seized. However, the search warrant did state that “John Doe has illegally in his
possession in the building occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely, in
the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain
devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law."

The contested warrant sufficiently described the place to be searched (underscored

above). Said place is under VELOSO’s control because he was the manager of the club.
Aside from being present when the police raided the club, VELOSO’s pockets were
found to contain gambling utensils. Thus, the warrant is valid because the police were
able to identify JOHN DOE quite easily.

______________________________________________________________________

Full description of how a JOHN DOE warrant can be valid:

A John Doe warrant will only be valid if the true name of the apprehended person is
unknown. In addition, the warrant must contain the best descriptio personae possible to
be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be
sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to
be served; and should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his
occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he
can be identified.

10. Lui vs. Matillano, May 27, 2004 (medyo mahaba yung case)
Right against unreasonable searches and seizures; Mission Order does not authorize an illegal
search. Waiver of the right against an unreasonable search and seizure.

In search of the allegedly missing amount of P45,000.00 owned by the employer, the residence of a
relative of the suspect was forcibly open by the authorities by kicking the kitchen door to gain
entry into the house. Thereafter, they confiscated different personal properties therein which
were allegedly part of those stolen from the employer. They were in possession of a mission order
but later on claimed that the owner of the house gave his consent to the warrantless search.

Facts: Seventeen-year-old Elenito Lariosa was employed as a laborer at the Davao

United Products Enterprise store (Davao Del Sur) with a monthly salary of ₱800.00.

The store was owned by Leong Shiu Ben and King Kiao, Adjacent to the said store was
another store owned by Kiao’s son, Eli Lui.

Lariosa was an all around employee of Ben and Kiao. Lariosa chose to live in the house
of Kiao. Lariosa fed the dogs of his employer every morning before going to work and in
the afternoon, in exchange for free meals and lodging along with his co employees
(Pagsa and Malang)

October 17, 1988, Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the day off and rested
in his aunt’s house (Paulina Matillano) where he rested until October 18,1988.

The day after (Oct. 19,1988) Kiao told him that his employment was terminated. Lariosa
did not receive his salary and decided to return to Bansalan (aunt’s place) without
retrieving his things from his employer’s house. He was able to get his backwages and
withdrew his savings. He bought a radio cassette (2,500 Php) and a pair of Rayban
glasses (900 Php).

November 5, 1988 Ben informed Lui that he had lost ₱45,000.00 in cash at the store. He
suspected that Lariosa was the culprit because the latter, as a former employee, had a
duplicate key to the side door of the United Products Enterprise Store.

November 6, 1988, Lariosa went to the house of Pagsa and Malang to retrieve his
things. The two invited Lariosa to go with them to the beach, and when Lariosa agreed,
they borrowed Lui’s Ford Fierra for their transportation. Pagsa contacted Lui and
informed the latter that Lariosa was with him.

Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to admit that he had stolen Ben’s money.
Lariosa refused to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the comfort room of the store and
pushed his face into the toilet bowl, in an attempt to force him into confessing to the
crime. Lariosa still refused to admit to anything. Lui then made a telephone call to the
Metrodiscom (PNP) based in Davao City.

Sgt. Alberto Genise of the Metrodiscom (PNP) issued a Mission Order directing Pat. Leo
Rojas "to follow up a theft case committed in Davao City. (the mauling of Lariosa
continued) a police car arrived at the store with two policemen on board. One of them
handcuffed Lariosa at gunpoint and ordered him to open the store with the use of the
keys. As Lariosa opened the lock as ordered, one of Lui’s companions took his picture.
Another picture was taken as Lariosa held the door knob to open the door.
PNP, Rojas, who was in civilian clothes, Lui, Tan and Mendoza arrived at the house of
the Spouses Matillano. With handguns drawn, they kicked the door to the kitchen and
gained entry into the house. Lui and his two companions then took two mats and two
pairs of ladies’ shoes, two pairs of pants, leather shoes, two t-shirts and two polo shirts,
old Bulova wristwatch, necklace, ring and old coins.

Lui and his companions proceeded to the Bansalan Police Station and caused an entry
in the police blotter that he had recovered the following items from the Matillano
residence -- one pair of colored blue pants valued at ₱89.00; one floor mat costing
₱290.00; a pair of black ladies’ shoes worth ₱126.00; and another pair of ladies’ shoes
worth ₱69.00.

On November 8, 1988, Lariosa executed an uncounselled confession where he stated

that he stole ₱40,000.00 from the Davao United Products, and that he used part of the
money to buy appliances, a Sony cassette tape-recorder, two pairs of ladies’ shoes, a
Seiko wristwatch, two pairs of maong pants, Rayban sunglasses and floor mats.

RTC dismissed the case, Paulina Matillano gave consent

CA reversed the decision of RTC

Issue: whether respondent Paulina Matillano consented to the petitioners’ entry into her
house, as well as to the taking of the clothes, shoes and pieces of jewelry owned by her
and her family.

Ruling: Paulina Matillano was forced to accompany Lui and his cohorts by use of guns
and threat. In this case, the petitioners failed to prove that respondent Paulina Matillano
waived her right against unreasonable search and seizure by consenting thereto, either
expressly or impliedly. Admittedly, respondent Paulina Matillano did not object to the
opening of her wooden closet and the taking of their personal properties. However, such
failure to object or resist did not amount to an implied waiver of her right against
unreasonable search and seizure. The petitioners were armed with handguns; petitioner
Lui threatened and intimidated her. 

The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried through or with judicial
warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure becomes unconstitutional within the
context of the constitutional provision because a warrantless search is in derogation of a
constitutional right. Peace officers who effect a warrantless search cannot invoke
regularity in the performance of official functions. Although petitioner Rojas did not follow
petitioner Lui and his cohorts to the second floor of the respondents’ house and himself
conduct a search therein, he allowed them to search the premises without a warrant.
The petitioners and their cohorts were not authorized to conduct a search in the house of
the respondents, much less divest the latter of their personal belongings. As a police
officer, it was petitioner Rojas’ duty to prevent the commission of crimes in his presence,
and to arrest the persons committing such crimes.

Note: ON WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There
must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right to
constitute a waiver of a constitutional right. There must be proof of the following: (a) that
the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right.The waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. 

d. Define probable cause. Who determines probable cause?

Probable Cause - for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as
such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of a warrant sufficient in
themselves to induce a reasonably discreet and cautious man to rely upon them and act
in pursuance thereof to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested and that he is probably guilty thereof, or the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place to be searched.

 Such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, will warrant a cautious man
in the belief that his actions, and the means in presenting it, are legally just and
proper.

The framers of the Constitution confined the determination of probable cause as the
basis for their issuance to Judges to better secure the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

    Two (2) kinds of probable cause:

Executive and judicial (ANTONIO LEVISTE VS. JUDGE ALAMEDA, RTC MAKATI,
G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010)

First, executive determination of probable cause is one made during

preliminary investigation.  It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor
who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to
charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus
should be held for trial.  Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to
determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.  Whether that function
has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether he has made a
correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the
trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
Second, The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the
judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused.
The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity
for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.   If the
judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.  
Paragraph (a), Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be
followed by the RTC.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION VS. FARAJALLAH, GR No. 205800, September 10,

2014;

FACTS:

         Petitioners Microsoft Corporation and Adobe Systems Incorporated were informed
that New Fields, a domestic Corporation, was unlawfully reproducing and using
unlicensed versions of their software.

         On 17 March 2010, counsel for petitioners filed a letter-complaint with the Chief of
the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group. The case was
assigned to police inspector Padilla who was trained to distinguish original from
counterfeit software.
         On 26 March 2010, Padilla, Serrano, and Moradoz went to the office of
respondents. Using a legitimate business pretext, they were able to use two computers
owned by New Fields and they found out that the software being used by New Fields is
indeed unlicensed or was illegally reproduced.

         As a result, search warrants were served on respondent New Fields on May 24,
2010. New Fields employees witnessed the search conducted by the authorities. Several
items were seized, including 17 CD installers and 83 computers containing unauthorized
copies of Microsoft and/or Adobe software.

         Upon the motion filed by New Fields, the RTC ordered quashing of both warrants
and directed all items seized from the respondents be returned.

         According to the RTC, petitioners should have identified which specific computer
had the pirated software.

         The CA sustained the quashal of the warrant because the witnesses had “no
personal knowledge of the facts upon which the issuance of warrant is justified”.
         Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
   Whether there was probable cause in the issuance of the warrant.

HELD:
   Search warrants are valid – there is probable cause.
Probable cause is a question of fact. Probable cause is dependent largely on the
opinion and findings of the judge who conducted the examination and who had the
opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses. For this reason, the findings of
the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court should overturn such findings only
upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates
of reason.
Re personal knowledge of facts: The CA sustained the quashal of the warrant
because the witnesses had no “personal knowledge of the facts upon which the
issuance of warrant is justified. However, records clearly show that Padilla and his
companions were able to personally verify the tip of their informant. Since there is
personal knowledge, there is probable cause.
         The evidence on record clearly shows that the applicant and witnesses were able
to verify the information obtained from their confidential source. The evidence likewise
shows that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. Thus, the
requirement of personal knowledge of the applicant and witnesses was clearly satisfied
in this case.

Padilla has been trained to distinguish illegally reproduced Adobe and Microsoft software.

ANTONIO LEVISTE VS. JUDGE ALAMEDA, RTC MAKATI, G.R. No. 182677, August
3, 2010
FACTS:

   Petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with homicide for the death of Rafael
De las Alas. After Leviste posted a P40,000 cash bond which the trial court approved, he
was released from detention.

The private complainants-heirs of Delas Alas filed an urgent omnibus motion for the
deferment of the proceedings and to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the
evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.
Consequently, the RTC issued an order deferring the arraignment of Leviste and
allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation.

   Meanwhile, Leviste filed an urgent ex-parte manifestation and motion before the
trial court to defer the public prosecutor’s recommendation on the proper offense, and
thereafter set a hearing for the judicial determination of probable cause. The trial court
nonetheless issued the assailed orders. Hence, this petition.

   Petitioner contends that the respondent judge should have at least allowed
petitioner’s motion for a hearing for judicial determination of probable cause because the
prosecutor’s findings are based on mere speculations and conjecture without substantial
or material new evidence during the reinvestigation.

ISSUE:
HELD:
The court denied Leviste’s motion to set a hearing for the judicial determination of
probable cause.
         To move the court to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause is a mere
superfluity, for with or without such motion, the judge is duty-bound to personally
evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor and the supporting evidence.  In fact, the
task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and
foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of
the accused.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause.  But the judge is
not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.  Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable
cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the
existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he
may disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits
of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
 
The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the accused before any warrant may be issued.
Petitioner Leviste thus cannot, as a matter of right, insist on a hearing for judicial
determination of probable cause.  Certainly, petitioner "cannot determine beforehand
how cursory or exhaustive the [judge's] examination of the records should be [since t]he
extent of the judge's examination depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the
circumstances of the case require."
BORLONGAN VS. JUDGE LIMSIACO, GR No. 143591, May 5, 2010
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS VS. HON. AGNES DEVANADERA G.R. No.
193253
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/sep2015/gr_193253_2015.html

FACTS:

Unioil-marketing distribution and sale petroleum, Oilink manufacture petroleum

BOC – conduct Audit – requested copies of some documents but Oilink cannot furnish the audit
team of the said documents.

BOC filed an administrative case against Oilink for failure to comply with the Customs admin
order and were asked to pay a fine of 2,764,859,304.80 however they failed to do so.

May 6, 2008 Unioil requested from BOC to withdraw base oils in Oilink terminal and was
granted (Terminalling Agreement between Unioil and Oilink.

May 9, 2008 Warrant of seizure and detention to seal the oil tanks and depots of Oilink Bataan.

May 12, 2008 Unioil asked Bataan to release Unioil owned products from Oilink’s storage
terminal.

             Private respondent UNIOIL Petroleum Philippines, Inc. is engaged in

marketing, distribution, and sale of petroleum, oil and other products, while its co-
respondent OILINK International, Inc. is engaged in manufacturing, importing, exporting,
buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in at wholesale and retails of petroleum, oil, gas and
of any and all refinements and byproducts thereof.  

In 2007, the Legal Service of the Bureau of Customs(BOC) rendered a Decision finding
that OILINK violated Section IV.A.2(c) and (e) of CAO 4-2004 when it refused to furnish
the Audit Team copies of the required documents, despite repeated demands. Pursuant
to the this, Commissioner Morales, in a letter directed the President of OILINK to pay the
BOC the administrative fine of P2,764,859,304.80 for violation of CAO No. 4-2004, in
relation to Section 2504 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Phil.

         Because of failure to settle its outstanding account with the BOC, a Hold Order
was issued against all shipments of OILINK. In view of the said temporary closure of
Oilink's terminal, Unioil is currently unable to fully utilize its leased tanks as well as make
use of the products contained therein. UNIOIL requested District Collector to allow it to
withdraw base oils from OILINK's temporarily closed Terminal citing the existing
Terminalling Agreement of UNIOIL with OILINK. The request was granted.

         A complaint-affidavit  was filed against UNIOIL by Atty. Balmyrson M. Valdez, a

member of the petitioner BOC's Anti-Oil Smuggling Coordinating Committee that
investigated the illegal withdrawal by UNIOIL of oil products consigned to OILINK,
accusing UNIOIL of violation of Sections 3601[18] and 3602 of the TCCP.

         Arman A. De Andres, State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ),

recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause. The
Resolution was affirmed by then Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales. Dissatisfied, the
BOC filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the public respondent, the
Acting Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera.

ISSUE:

         WON there is probable cause to indict respondents for trial for violation of
SECTION 3601 AND 3602 IN RELATION TO SECTION 2530, PARAGRAPHS (E), AND
SECTION 3604 (D), (E), (F), AND (H) OF THE TCCP

RULING:

        NO, there is no probable cause. Probable cause is such a state of facts in the mind
of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or
entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean
"actual or positive cause"; nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief.

Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act
or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial
for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.

         To find out if there is a reasonable ground to believe that acts or ommissions
complained of constitute the offenses charged, the Court must first examine whether or
not the allegations against private respondents in the BOC's complaint-affidavit
constitute the offenses of unlawful importation under Section 3601 and various
fraudulent practices against customs revenue under Section 3602 of the TCCP.

         After a careful review of records, the Court affirms the dismissal of the BOC's
complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause, but partly digresses from the reasoning of
the Acting Secretary of Justice in arriving at such conclusion. While the Acting Secretary
of Justice correctly stated that the act of fraudulent importation of articles must be first
proven in order to be charged for violation of Section 3601 of the TCCP, the Court
disagrees that proof of such importation is also required for various fraudulent practices
against customs revenue under Section 3602 thereof.

Indeed, except for complainant's sweeping allegation, no clear and convincing proof was
presented to show that the subject petroleum products (gasoil and mogas) withdrawn by
Unioil from the oil depot/terminal of Oilink were imported. For, only when the articles
are imported that the importer/consignee is required to file an import entry declaration
and pay the corresponding customs duties and taxes. The fact that complainant's record
fails to show that an import entry was filed for the subject articles does not altogether
make out a case of unlawful importation under Section 3601, or fraudulent practices
against customs revenue under Section 3602, of the TCCP, without having first
determined whether the subject articles are indeed imported. Thus, in this case,
complainant still bears the burden of proof to show that the subject petroleum products
are imported, by means of documents other than the import entry declaration, such as
but not limited to, the transport documents consisting of the inward foreign manifest,
bill of lading, commercial invoice and packing list, all indicating that the goods were
bought from a supplier/seller in a foreign country and imported or transported to the
Philippines. Instead[,] complainant merely surmised that since the subject products
were placed under warrant of seizure and detention[,] they must necessarily be
imported. Regrettably, speculation and surmises do not constitute evidence and should
not, therefore, be taken against the respondents, x x x Taken in this light, we find more
weight and credence in respondent Unioil's claim that the subject petroleum products
were not imported by them, but were locally purchased, more so since it was able to
present local sales invoices covering the same.

ROBERTS VS. CA, 254 SCRA 307

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/mar1996/gr_113930_1996.html

FACTS:

Petitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the Board of Pepsi Cola
Products Phils., Inc. were prosecuted in connection with the Pepsi “Number Fever”
promotion by handlers of the supposedly winning “349” Pepsi crowns. Of the four cases
filed against the petitioners, probable cause was found by the investigating prosecutor
only for the crime of estafa, but not for the other alleged offenses.

On 12 April 1993, the information was filed with the trial court without anything
accompanying it. A copy of the investigating prosecutor’s Joint Resolution was forwarded
to and received by the trial court only on 22 April 1993. However, no affidavits of the
witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary
investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were found in the
records of the case as of 19 May 1993.

  On 15 April 1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to the
Department of Justice seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor. They also moved for the suspension of the proceedings and the
holding in abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Meanwhile, the
public prosecutor also moved to defer the arraignment of the accused-appellants
pending the final disposition of the appeal to the Department of Justice.

  Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the respondent judge
had not the slightest basis at all for determining probable cause when he ordered the
issuance of warrants of arrest. After finding that a copy of the public prosecutor’s Joint
Resolution had in fact been forwarded to, and received by, the trial court on 22 April
1993, the CA denied petitioners’ application for writ of preliminary injunction. The CA
ruled that the Joint Resolution “was sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by
respondent Judge in convincing himself that probable cause indeed exists for the
purpose of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest” and that the “mere silence of
the records or the absence of any express declaration” in the questioned order as to the
basis of such finding does not give rise to an adverse inference, for the respondent
Judge enjoys in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official
duty. Roberts, et al. sought reconsideration, but meanwhile, the DOJ affirmed the finding
of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the
petition for mootness.
ISSUE: WON Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance
of warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation?

RULING:

         YES, Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance
of warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation.  

         In this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on 12 April 1993
with the trial court. A copy of the Joint Resolution was forwarded to, and received by, the
trial court only on 22 April 1993. And as revealed by the certification of respondent
judge’s clerk of court, no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of
the proceedings during the preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in
the course thereof were found in the records of this case as of 19 May 1993.

         Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17 May
1993 directing, among other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the
information, amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not
have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause. And
strangely enough, he made no specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the
issuance of warrants of arrest “after June 21, 1993.” It may, however, be argued that the
directive presupposes a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a
constitutional requirement for the protection of individual liberty cannot be left to
presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic.

 Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with Supreme

Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether
the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable
cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.
 There are, however, exceptions to the foregoing rule. But the Court refused to
reevaluate the evidence to determine if indeed there is probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest in this case. For the respondent judge did not, in fact,
find that probable cause exists, and if he did he did not have the basis therefor.
Moreover, the records of the preliminary investigation in this case are not with the
Court. They were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to the
DOJ in compliance with the latter's 1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993. The trial court
and the DOJ must be required to perform their duty.

SKEECHERS, USA, INC. VS. PACIFIC, GR NO. 164321, March 23, 2011

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_164321_2011.html

Fact:
Motions for Reconsideration by Skeechers (The shoe company) where they
engaged the services of a private investigation firm to check if respondents are
indeed engaged in the importation, distribution and sale of unauthorized products
bearing counterfeit or unauthorized trademarks owned by petitioner.  An
investigator went to respondents’ warehouse and saw different kinds and models
of rubber shoes including shoes bearing the “S” logo. He found that the shoes
bearing the “Strong” name with the “S” logo have the same style as the
petitioner's shoes.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)

requesting assistance in stopping the illegal importation, manufacture and sale of
counterfeit products bearing the trademarks it owns and in prosecuting the owners of the
establishments engaged therein.  NBI representatives bought 24 pairs of rubber shoes
bearing the “Strong” name and the “S” logo. They then applied for search warrants with
the court, which eventually issued the same. 

After seizure of their goods, respondents sought to quash the search warrants on
the ground  that there is no confusing similarity between the petitioner’s Skechers’
rubber shoes and respondent’s Strong rubber shoes.  The court eventually issued an
order quashing the search warrants.

Issue: WON confusing similarity between petitioner’s “Skechers” rubber shoes and its
“Strong” rubber shoes.

Ruling: 

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Skechers they could not agree with the
observation of the CA that the use of the letter "S" could hardly be considered as highly
identifiable to the products of petitioner alone.

The registered trademark owner may use its mark on the same or similar
products, in different segments of the market, and at different price levels depending on
variations of the products for specific segments of the market. The purchasing public
might be mistaken in thinking that petitioner had ventured into a lower market segment
such that it is not inconceivable for the public to think that Strong or Strong Sport Trail
might be associated or connected with petitioner’s brand, which scenario is plausible
especially since both petitioner and respondent manufacture rubber shoes.

The Court reiterated that  protection of trademarks as intellectual property is

intended not only to preserve the goodwill and reputation of the business established on
the goods bearing the mark through actual use over a period of time, but also to
safeguard the public as consumers against confusion on these goods.

Based on the foregoing, this Court is at a loss as to how the RTC and the CA, in applying the
holistic test, ruled that there was no colorable imitation, when it cannot be any more clear and
apparent to this Court that there is colorable imitation. The dissimilarities between the shoes are too
trifling and frivolous that it is indubitable that respondent’s products will cause confusion and mistake
in the eyes of the public. Respondent’s shoes may not be an exact replica of petitioner’s shoes, but
the features and overall design are so similar and alike that confusion is highly likely

MILLER VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, GR No. 165412, May 30, 2011

FACTS: 

Petition for review on certiorari.George Miller is a British national and an inmate at

the Maximum Security Compound of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) in Muntinlupa City.
Miller wrote two confidential letters addressed to then NBP Superintendent Col. Gregorio
Agalo-os. The letters contained a detailed report of the alleged irregularities and drug
trading activities of respondent Bernardino and Rodolfo Bernardo (Bernardo), both
inmates at the Medium Security Compound and ICAD Treasurer and Chairman,
respectively. Miller also recommended the transfer of Bernardino and Bernardo to the
Maximum Security Compound.

On January 6, 1999, at around 2:30 p.m., while proceeding towards the volleyball court at the
Medium Security Compound, petitioner felt a crushing blow at the back of his head. As blood oozed
from his head, petitioner ran to the Infirmary for first aid treatment.

verbal admissions made by inmates Constantino Quirante, Jr. (Quirante) and Roberto
Ceballos (Ceballos), it was found that a few days before the incident, Bernardo and Bernardino
confronted petitioner regarding the letters he wrote reporting the alleged illegal drug activities of Ace
Aprid (Aprid), Bernardo and Bernardino at ICAD. Bernardo and Bernardino were furious when
petitioner admitted having authored the letters, threatening him with the words "Mamamatay ka,"
which petitioner fully understood: he is going to die. Petitioner discovered that another inmate
(Valeroso) to whom he confided the matter, had divulged the existence of the letters to Bernardo and
Bernardino.

ISSUE: WON Secretary of Justice failed to make an independent and thorough

determination of the existence of probable cause.

 
RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Miller and said that the term "probable cause"
does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does
not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It
is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the
prosecution in support of the charge.

We need not over-emphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely
determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial.40 In a preliminary investigation, a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’
evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Certainly, it does not involve the
determination of whether or not there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to the guilt of the
person. Only prima facie evidence is required; or that which is, on its face, good and sufficient to
establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense; and
which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. Therefore, matters of evidence, such as
who are the conspirators, are more appropriately presented and heard during the trial. 41

The term "probable cause" does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does
not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough
that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely,
there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. 42

While it is this Court’s general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations,
leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable cause, courts are
nevertheless empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice when the
same was rendered without or in excess of authority. 43 Where the Secretary of Justice dismissed the
complaint against the respondent despite sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause,
such clearly constitutes grave error, thus warranting a reversal. 44 The CA thus clearly erred in
sustaining the ruling of Secretary Perez for the exclusion of respondent Bernardino from the charge of
attempted murder despite a prima facie case against him having been established by the evidence on
record.

PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO, July 10, 1994

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jul1994/gr_109633_1994.html

Facts:

RTC Cavite issued a search warrant upon application of SPO3 Raymundo

Untiveros of PNP Cavite authorizing the search and seizure of an "undetermined
quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its
paraphernalias" in the premises of Normando del Rosario’s house. A buy-bust operation
was the agreed method using a marked P100 bill. PO1 Luna with a companion
proceeded to the appellant's house to implement the search warrant which was
witnessed by del Rosario. The police found a black canister containing shabu, an
aluminum foil, a paltik .22 caliber atop the TV set, three used ammunition in a cup and
three wallets one containing the marked money, a show box of aluminum foils, napkins,
and a burner.

The seized items were photographed and turned over to NBI Forensics which
disclosed that all specimens submitted for lab analysis gave positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). Accused was later found guilty of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and Illegal Sale of Regulated Drugs.

 ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was valid.

 RULING:

No. Judgment reversed and the accused-appellant was acquitted.

Accused-appellant cannot also be convicted of illegal possession of firearms and

ammunition. The search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only the
search and seizure of ". . . the described quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalia.” Thus, the raiding party was
authorized to seize only shabu and paraphernalia for the use thereof and no other. A
search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a
finishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles
relating to a crime.

 The Constitution itself (Section 2, Article III) and the Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule
126) specifically mandate that the search warrant must particularly describe the things to
be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize the
firearm which was not mentioned, much less described with particularity, in the search
warrant. Neither may it be maintained that the gun was seized in the course of an arrest,
for as earlier observed, accused-appellant's arrest was far from regular and legal. Said
firearm, having been illegally seized, the same is not admissible in evidence (Stonehill
vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967]). The Constitution expressly ordains the exclusion in
evidence of illegally seized articles. 

DE LOS SANTOS VS. MONTESA, 247 SCRA 85

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/aug1995/am_rtj_93_983_1995.html

 FACTS:

Patrolman Reyes, Brgy Captain Panganiban and Vitug were ambushed, resulting
in the death of Reyes and Panganiban. Hipolito et al were charged with the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder.

Judge Pagarogon conducted a preliminary investigation of the witnesses and

issued an order admitting the complaint and ordering the detention of all the accused
after finding that the crimes charged have been committed and there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused are probably guilty thereof. No bail was
recommended.

Judge Pagarogon then forwarded the records of the cases to the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office of Bulacan for appropriate action. The Investigating Prosecutor,
without conducting a thorough investigation of the cases, concluded that there
was no probable cause and ordered motu proprio the release of the accused from
custody.

The widow of Patrolman Reyes petitioned the DOJ to disqualify the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office from conducting the preliminary investigation and prosecution of the
cases. The DOJ acted favorably on the petition and designated State Prosecutor
Santiago Turingan to take over and handle the cases. The State Prosecutor found
probable cause for murder and frustrated murder against all the accused and
consequently, they were formally charged. No bail was recommended and the
corresponding warrants of arrest were issued.

After examining the records of the cases as forwarded to him by the prosecution,
the trial court (JUDGE MONTESA) found the existence of probable cause but
instead of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest, for the purpose of
acquiring jurisdiction over the persons of the accused upon their apprehension or
voluntary surrender, it ex mero motu granted bail to them despite the absence of
(because it was previously withdrawn) a petition for bail and, worse, the lack of a hearing
wherein the prosecution could have been accorded the right to present evidence
showing that the evidence of guilt is strong.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Montesa is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
evident dishonesty?

RULING:  

Yes. Guilty of gross ignorance of law or incompetence and conduct prejudicial to

the best interest of the service
 The determination of probable cause in the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
mandated by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. Probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest means such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. A hearing is not necessary therefore.

In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a

warrant of arrest, the judge, following the established doctrine and procedure, shall
either (a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest, or (b) if on the face of the information he finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the prosecutor's certification and require the submission of the supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause

At this stage of a criminal proceeding, the judge is not tasked to review in detail
the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation; it is sufficient that he
personally evaluates the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution
in determining probable cause.

Once the court determines that probable cause exists for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the warrant of arrest shall forthwith be issued and it is only after the
accused is taken into the custody of the law and deprived of his liberty that, upon proper
application for bail, the court on the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution at
the hearing called for the purpose may, upon determination that such evidence is not
strong, admit the accused to bail.

The respondent judge exhibited gross incompetence. Gross ignorance of law and
incompetence are characteristics and quirks impermissible in a judge. A judge is called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules;
it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles.

8. VICENTE LIM VS. HON. FELIX

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1991februarydecisions.php?id=117

FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport
road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of
Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial
Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone
assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the
assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the
incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator filed an
amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of
the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that a
probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused..
On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4)
separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no
bail.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified
petition for change of venue w/c was authorized, from the RTC of Masbate to the RTCt of Makati
to avoid miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent
Judge Nemesio S. Felix.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and
manifestations, among others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial
records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of
Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the
existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the
existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant
shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of
such probable cause.
Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and
issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on
the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.
HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the
records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable
cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement
has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

9. Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1956marchdecisions.php?id=98

Facts: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a
complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay
from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted
the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is prima facie
evidence of robbery as charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge
Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records was “premature” because Judge
Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused. Judge Samulde sent
the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause existed,
he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested. Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case
against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground
that the fiscal had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to the performance of the act to be
required of the judge and that the latter had an imperative duty to perform it. Neverhteless, Judge
Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the accused in view
of his finding, after conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused
commited the crime charged.
HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE
THE ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR OFFICER. Under Rule 112 of
the 1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is
sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. To determine whether a WA should issue, the
investigating judge must have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his
wirtnesses by searching questions and answers; he must be satisfied that a probable cause
exists; and there must be a need to place the accused under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating
judge to issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. The fiscal
should, instead, have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for
the arrest of the accused.
10.  Quintero vs. NBI, 162 SCRA 467
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/jun1988/gr_l_35149_1988.html

[Searching parties searched different rooms simultaneously thereby resulting in no

witnesses in the other rooms when searched because the witnesses are in another room.
Clearly, the search is not valid for lack of one requisite]

FACTS:

Eduardo Quintero, delegate of the first district of Leyte to the 1971 Constitutional Convention
(Con-Con, for short) delivered a privilege speech 1 at a plenary session. In his speech, Delegate
Quintero disclosed that, on different occasions, certain persons had distributed money to some
delegates of the Con-Con, apparently in an effort to influence the delegates in the discharge of
their functions. As an offshoot of this disclosure, Delegate Quintero delivered to the Con-Con the
aggregate amount of the "payola" he himself had received, the amount of eleven thousand one
hundred fifty pesos (P11,150.00) in cash, preserved intact for delivery to the proper officials of
the Con-Con, for whatever action it may wish to take on the matter. Delegate Quintero, however,
did not reveal the names of the persons who gave him the money; and he begged at that time
not to be made to name names.

However, pressure mounted on Delegate Quintero to reveal the Identities of the people behind
the "payola" scheme. Hence, on 30 May 1972 (the day after he returned from Tacloban City,
where he had attended the funeral of his brother), Delegate Quintero released from his hospital
bed in San Juan de Dios Hospital, where he was hospitalized due to an indisposed condition, a
sworn statement addressed to the Committee on Privileges of the Con-Con, mentioning the
names of the persons who gave him the "payola."

On the basis of search warrant agents of the NBI raided Quintero's house and a criminal
complaint of direct bribery was filed against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a violation of search and seizure of the constitution.

HELD:

NO, this is because it was stated in the case at bar that the interrogations done by the NBI that
there was evident that the interrogations conducted by the respondent judge, upon the applicant
NBI agent Samuel Castro, showed that the latter knew nothing, of his own personal knowledge,
to show that Mr. Quintero had committed any offense. 

The statement of Congressman Mate, which was the sole basis for the issuance of the search
warrant, was replete (satisfied) with conclusions and inferences drawn from what he allegedly
witnessed when he visited Mr. Quintero in the hospital. It lacked the directness and definiteness
which would have been present, had the same statement dealt with facts which Congressman
Mate actually witnessed. 

Another circumstance which points to the nullity of the questioned search warrant, for having
been issued without probable cause, is the fact that the search warrant delivered to the occupant
of the searched premises, Generoso Quintero (nephew of the petitioner) was issued in
connection with the offense of "grave threats" and not "direct bribery," which was the criminal
complaint filed against Quintero with the respondent fiscal. The offense charged or labelled in the
questioned search warrant had, therefore, no relation at all to the evidence, i.e., "half a million
pesos, Philippine currency," ordered to be seized in said search warrant.

The Court finds that the questioned search warrant issued by respondent judge, is null and void,
for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.

Notes:

Article III—Bill of Rights

Section 2  The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provided:

Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice
of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.

No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

11. Soliven & Beltran vs. Makasiar, November 18, 1988 (Note that this
was widely    criticized)
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/nov1988/gr_82585_1988.html

(There is no need for the complainant and her witnesses to be personally examined by a
judge before he issues a warrant of arrest provided he has their affidavits in front of him
and upon reading it, he is convinced of the presence of probable cause)

FACTS:

Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, were charged
with libel by then President Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit
against him and the others.

Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue
by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to
be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This,
continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as
by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of
court or perjury.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the
grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible
officers as maybe authorized by law," has apparently convinced Beltran that the
Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge
issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses,
if any, to determine probable cause.

HELD:

NO, the constitutional rights of Beltran were not violated when respondent RTC judge issued
a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if
any, to determine probable cause.

The Court ruled that it was not an accurate interpretation. What the Constitution underscores
is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:

(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or

(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

It has not been shown that the respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed
procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.

The case was DISMISSED.

12. Umil vs. Ramos, et al., July 9, 1990 with the Resolution of the
Motion for Reconsideration in November, 1991
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1990/jul1990/gr_81567_1990.html (1990) 
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/oct1991/gr_81567_1991.html (1991)

 In these 8 consolidated cases, it assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by
the military on the petitioners; that a mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New
People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant.

FACTS: Military agents received confidential information that a certain man, Ronnie
Javellon, believed to be one of the 5 NPA sparrows who recently murdered 2 Capcom
mobile patrols was being treated in St. Agnes Hospital, for having gunshot wounds. Later
on, it was found out that Ronnie Javellon is a fictitious name and that his real name is
Rolando Dural (verified as one of the sparrows of the NPA). Rolando Dural was
transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons.
Meanwhile, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered
the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols. Afterwhich, the police arrested DURAL even without a
warrant of arrest.
ISSUE: 
Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any warrant of arrest for the crime of
rebellion.

RULING: YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the contemplation of
Section 5 Rule 113, Dural was committing an offense, when arrested because he was arrested
for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership
was penalized and for subversion which is a continuing offense.

There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or
authority to arrest anyone without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases expressly authorized
by law. It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must
be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion.

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested.  A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 

These requisites were complied with in the cases at bar.

Arrest  without  a  warrant  is  justified when the person arrested is caught in flagrante
delicto.—An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and(b)  of  Rule 
113  of  the  Rules  of  Court,  as  amended,  is  justified when the person arrested is caught in
flagrante delicto, viz., in the act  of  committing  an  offense;  or  when  an  offense  has  just 
been committed  and  the  person  making  the  arrest  has  personal knowledge  of  the  facts 
indicating  that  the  person  arrested  has committed it.

Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113 states:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and

 The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or
for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the
purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. 
 The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses
which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the
issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.
 The absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons
committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but
equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. 
  The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the
very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.

13. People vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1981/dec1981/gr_56443_1981.html 

FACTS: City fiscal NESTORIO M. PLACER  and an assistant fiscal ERNESTO M. BROCOY
of Butuan City, charged Rogelim Yee with serious slander by deed. It was alleged that in the
afternoon of July 14, 1980 Yee brought, attacked, assaulted and inflicted a contusion in the
left cheek of Ofelia V. Torralba, a fourth year student, in the presence of her visitors,
teachers and classmates to her great embarrassment and inconvenience. PLACER certified
that he conducted the corresponding preliminary investigation and that there was probable
cause or reasonable ground to believe that serious slander by deed was committed by Yee.
He recommended bail in the amount of P600.

Instead of issuing a warrant of arrest, JUDGE VILLANUEVA conducted an ex parte

preliminary examination by scanning the records to determine the existence of probable
cause and thereafter concluded that the offense committed was either slight slander by deed
or slight physical injuries which is a light felony for which he issued an order dismissing the
case on the ground of prescription because the information was filed sixty-four (64) days
after the offense was committed. The fiscal received a copy of the order but failed to appeal
the order of dismissal to the Supreme Court in accordance with R.A. No. 3440 in relation to
R.A. No. 3967. JUDGE VILLANUEVA denied the PLACER’S motion for reconsideration.
Long after the issuance of the order of dismissal, PLACER and BROCOY filed before the
Supreme Court the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the said order of
dismissal on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

CONTENTION OF TRIAL JUDGE VILLANUEVA: He alleged that the fiscal's preliminary

investigation under Presidential Decree No. 911 does not preclude him from exercising his
"legal duty" "to exercise his judicial power of determining before issuing the corresponding
warrant of arrest" the existence of probable cause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge can validly refuse to issue warrants of arrest if he believes
that there is no probable cause  for their issuance

RULING: 

From Atty. Gacayan’s notes:

YES, The judge may validly refuse to issue warrants of arrest if he believes that there
is no probable cause  for their issuance…despite the findings of probable cause by
the filing Prosecutor since that was for purposes of filing only. Provided that The
judge should require the fiscal to present additional evidence to show probable
cause. If the fiscal refuses to do so, then the case may be dismissed for "lack of
prosecution".

The two (2) probable causes are different from one another. What Judge Villanueva
actually did was not to verify whether the fiscal's determination of probable cause was
correct but to find out whether the criminal liability of the accused was already
extinguished, which is a different matter.

From the full text:

Judge Villanueva, before issuing the warrant of arrest, is clothed with the
 prerogative of ascertaining probable cause. That power is granted to him by
section 3, Article IV (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution which provides that "no warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce". A power
is granted to any judge authorized to conduct preliminary investigations and J
Villanueva is given that authority by section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and
by the charter of Butuan City, Republic Act No. 523.

But that power does not include the authority to dismiss outright the
information if the judge believes that there is no probable cause. The judge
should require the fiscal to present additional evidence to show probable cause. If the
fiscal refuses to do so, then the case may be dismissed for "lack of prosecution"
(Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739, 743).

The fiscal is also authorized to determine probable cause not only by the Bill of
Rights but also by the law or rule empowering him to conduct preliminary
investigations .He is a "responsible officer authorized by law" within the
meaning of section 3 of the Bill of Rights. His determination of probable cause
is a sufficient justification for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

"in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did,
or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the fiscal's
should normally prevail" (People vs. Pineda, 65 O.G. 2595, 20 SCRA 748, 756). The
settled practice is that after the fiscal has conducted a preliminary investigation and
filed an information, the Court of First Instance issues the warrant of arrest.

Generally, the Court of First Instance does not conduct any preliminary examination
to determine probable cause or to confirm the fiscal's determination for that would be
a time-wasting ritual or a duplicitous proceeding. The time-saving practice has been
for the judge (municipal, city or Court of First Instance) to rely on the preliminary
investigation conducted by the fiscal as the basis for issuing the warrant of arrest.
That practice is supported by the presumption that the fiscal performed his duties
regularly and competently (Edillon vs. Narvios, Administrative Case No. 1753, August 21,
1980, 99 SCRA 174) And that practice existed even under the old Constitution when
section 1(3) of the Bill of Rights did not contain the terms "warrant of arrest" and
"such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law". 

We hold that, as a rule, a trial judge should not hold another preliminary examination
to determine probable cause in case the fiscal has filed an information and certified
that he has conducted the requisite preliminary investigation. That certification means
that there is a prima facie case against the accused and that the issuance of a warrant
of arrest is justified.

14. Placer vs. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463 

** SAME CASE sa PEOPLE vs. Villanueva(1981) pero eto yung latter case (1983)

** Dito rin may isa pang issue tungkol sa affidavits

Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1983/dec1983/gr_l_60349_62_1983.html

FACTS:

The legal question raised in this petition is whether the certification of the investigating
fiscal in the information as to the existence of probable cause obligates respondent City
Judge to issue a warrant of arrest.

HON. JUDGE NAPOLEON D. VILLANUEVA, in his capacity as City Judge of Butuan,

issued an order for the hearing of said criminal cases for the purpose of determining the
propriety of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest after receiving information from
CITY FISCAL NESTORIO M. PLACER, the City Fiscal of Butuan City, and his assistants
that probable cause had been established, requiring the issuance of warrants of arrest.
JUDGE VILLANUEVA issued the questioned orders after the hearing, asking FISCAL
PLACER to submit to the court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documented
evidence in support of the information to help him in exercising his judicial review power
over petitioners' determinations of probable cause.

ISSUE: 
Whether the investigating fiscal's statement in the information indicating probable cause
exists obligates the respondent City Judge to issue an arrest warrant.

Whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing a warrant of
arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other
documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation.

RULING:
No. There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, But
does such certification bind the judge to come out with the warrant? We answer this
query in the negative. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it
calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate.
This is clear from the following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:

Warrant of arrest, when issued. If the judge is satisfied from the preliminary
examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense
complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.

Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information
the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification and
require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of a probable cause.

Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter
of long-standing practice had been attached to the information filed in his sala, the
respondent found the information inadequate bases for the determination of probable
cause.  For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the
required affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the
cases where he was satisfied that probable cause existed.

The obvious purpose of requiring the submission of affidavits of the complainant and of
his witnesses is to enable the court to determine whether to dismiss the case outright or
to require further proceedings.

15. Geronimo vs. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1985/may1985/gr_l60504_1985.html

These interrelated petitions arose from the controversy over the mayoralty elections in
1980, wherein the petitioner who was elected to the post of mayor of Baras, Rizal was
subsequently disqualified as a candidate for mayor by this Court's affirmance of the
Commission on Elections' decision on the ground that he was a political turncoat.

FACTS:
On January 8, 1980, private respondent Julian Pendre filed a petition with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify petitioner Meliton C. Geronimo from
running as a candidate for the mayorship of Baras, Rizal on the ground of political
turncoatism.
In the elections of January 30, 1980, Geronimo obtained a margin of 325 votes when he
garnered 2,695 votes as against his opponent Bayani Ferrera's 2,370 votes. On March
11, 1980, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9554, reinstating the proclamation made
earlier by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Baras, Rizal in favor of Geronimo as the
winning candidate for mayor but the proclamation was declared temporary subject to the
decision of this Court on the petition for certiorari filed by Geronimo.
On September 26, 1981, this Court ruled that Geronimo was disqualified to run as a
candidate for mayor for being a political turncoat. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied with finality on January 19, 1982.
On May 3, 1982, the petitioner together with some of his political followers of more than
fifty persons entered en masse the Municipal Hall of Baras, occupied its premises and
continued to do so until May 13, 1982, causing a paralyzation of official business in the
municipality. During this period, Ferrera held office in his own house. Parenthetically,
Geronimo did not enter the office of the mayor but stayed in another room in the
municipal building.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of May 14, 1982, Geronimo and his followers,
mostly women, were forcibly taken out of the municipal hall of Baras, Rizal by the military
with the use of teargas grenades. Gunshots  were also fired by the Philippine
Constabulary. Some of Geronimo's followers retaliated with empty bottles when they
heard the breaking of the glass windows of the room where Geronimo was staying. The
petitioner was seized, handcuffed, and brought to the National Penitentiary in
Muntinglupa, Rizal.
In one of the criminal complaints wherein about 75 people were charged, the warrants
of arrest were issued on the same day that the preliminary examination was
conducted. Such a hasty and manifestly haphazard manner of conducting the
preliminary examination to determine probable cause for the issuance of the warrants
of arrest and eventually for the filing of the necessary information cannot be sanctioned
by this Court. A judge must first satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before
issuing a warrant or order of arrest. The requirements are strict. (See Placer v.
Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463). The examination must be legitimate and not a feigned one
intended to justify a course of action already predetermined.
ISSUE: 
Whether the warrants of arrest issued in a hasty and manifestly haphazard manner of
conducting the preliminary examination to determine probable cause is valid.
RULING:
No, the warrants of arrest is invalid.
In the case at bar and especially considering the background circumstances which led to
the filing of charges, we find it highly improbable for the judge to be able to determine the
existence of reasonable grounds to believe that the offenses have been committed and
that each and everyone of the seventy-six (76) persons are probably guilty thereof in a
matter of a few hours and to proceed with the issuance of the warrants of arrest also on
the same day. It should be remembered and the judge should have taken into account
that all the offenses which were allegedly committed were only the product and result of
the outburst of the feelings and emotions of the people of Baras due to the highly tense
situation in the municipality, which culminated with the May 14, 1982 incident. The judge,
therefore, in conducting his preliminary investigation should have ascertained with
double care if, indeed, there was ample evidence to warrant the issuance of arrest
warrants and eventually the filing of criminal informations against such a big number of
persons, most of whom were impelled by different motivations and whose respective
participations were of varying natures and degrees.
The warrants of arrest issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Teresa, Rizal are recalled
and the matter is referred to the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal who is directed to determine
whether or not the preliminary examinations should be continued and, thereafter, to
make a ruling on the results of any examination.

16. JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR, ET AL.,

G.R.NO. 92163, June 5, 1990
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1990/jun1990/gr_92163_1990.html
FACTS: Hon. Jaime Salazar of the RTC of Quezon City issued a warrant of arrest
charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio
Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt.

In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senator Enrile was arrested.

Senator Enrile was held overnight at the NBI headquarters, without bail, none having
been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant.

The following morning, he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.

Hence, this petition for habeas corpus which was returned as this case does not fall
within the Hernandez ruling because in that case charged murders and other
common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion,
whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated
murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion.
Meanwhile, Senator Enrile and Panlilo spouses were granted liberty through cash or
surety bonds.

ISSUES: Did the Judge issue a warrant without first personally determining the probable
cause by examining under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses? 
Contention: Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest was issued barely 1 hour and 20
minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the
latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary
investigation.

RULING: No. It is sufficient that the Judge follows established procedure by personally
evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. Merely
because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period
within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or
could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the
legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
The court also addressed the issue and the continuance of Hernandez doctrine.
In the end, they still upheld the said doctrine. Hence, complexing rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion is
prohibited. Hence, the charges against the petitioners were dismissed except rebellion.
1 hour 20 minutes to issue the warrant is valid, the Judge need not read the 3000
pages of the supporting documents as long as he believes that there is probable cause
to issue a warrant. 

e. Warrantless searches and seizures--when valid or not. Is "Operation Kapkap"

valid? Warrantless search of alleged obscene magazines.

As held in PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, G.R. No. 87059, June, 1992, 210 SCRA 174,
―OPERATION KAPKAP or warrantless search without probable cause is
unconstitutional. Such search is valid only if covered by Section 5, Article 113 of
the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

Compare this case to MANALILI VS. PEOPLE, October 9, 1997. The policemen saw
several suspicious looking men at dawn who ran when they went near them. As the
policemen ran after them, an unlicensed firearm was confiscated. The search was
declared valid by the Supreme Court. Note, however, that in MALACAT VS. CA, 283
SCRA 159, the SC held that mere suspicions were not sufficient to validate warrantless
arrest.

1.    PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, G.R. No. 87059, June, 1992

Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/jun1992/gr_87059_1992.html 

FACTS: 

Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on

the strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his
warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as
evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of
the poisonous tree. The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly
received in evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest
that was doubtless lawful even if admittedly without warrant.

Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan saw two men "looking from side to
side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and
identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were
unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were
then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with
a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His
companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right
pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and Morellos were then
turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.

ISSUE: 

Whether the arrest constitutes valid warrantless arrest? 

RULING: NO

At the time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking
from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers
themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was
being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their
presence.

“OPERATION KAPKAP” or warrantless search without probable cause is

unconstitutional. Such search is valid only if covered by Section 5, Article 113 of the
Rules of Court which provides: 

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person: 

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

 (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
3. PEOPLE VS. GO, 354 SCRA 338
FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/mar2001/gr_116001_2001.html 
FACTS: 
Police civilian agent Ronnie Panuringan arrived and reported to them that he saw
accused-appellant Luisito Go, also known as "King Louie", enter the Flamingo Disco
House with 2 women. Panuringan said that he spotted a gun tucked in Go's waist.
Together, the three policemen proceeded to the Flamingo, which was located about a
hundred meters away from the outpost.
When they arrived at the Flamingo, the police officers informed the owner that they were
conducting an "Operation Bakal," whereby they search for illegally possessed firearms.
The owner allowed them in and told a waiter to accompany them. They went up to the
second floor of the disco. The waiter turned on the lights, and the police officers saw the
GO and his lady companions seated at a table. They identified themselves and asked
GO to stand up. When the latter did so, the policemen saw the gun tucked in his waist.
SPO1 Piamonte asked for the license of the gun, but GO  was unable to produce any.
On the way out of the disco, GO asked permission to bring his car, which was parked
outside. The police officers accompanied him to his car, a Honda Civic with license plate
number TCM-789. Through the windshield, SPO3 Liquido noticed a Philippine National
Police identification card hanging from the rearview mirror. He asked GO if he was a
member of the PNP, and he said no. The police officers asked accused-appellant for his
driver's license and the registration papers of the vehicle, but he was unable to produce
them. When GO opened the door, SPO3 Liquido took the ID card and found that the
same belonged to SPO4 Zenaida Bagadiong. The police officers saw pieces of glass
tooters and tin foils on the backseat and floor of the car. They asked GO why he had
these items, but he did not say anything. Instead, GO suggested that they talk the matter
over, and intimated that he had money. SPO3 Liquido replied that they should talk at the
police headquarters. GO took out an attaché case from the car and opened it. There
were two black clutch bags inside. GO opened the first bag, which contained a shiny
white substance wrapped in cellophane. The second bag contained P120,000.00 in
cash.
The police officers brought GO to the police station. When they arrived at the precinct,
they turned over the attaché case together with the two black clutch bags to the
investigator. The investigator found eight cellophane bags containing granules
suspected to be shabu in one of the clutch bags. When the attaché case was opened,
the police officers found that it also contained three glass tooters, tin foils, an improvised
burner, magazines and newspapers.
ISSUE: 
Whether the arrest constitutes valid warrantless arrest? 

RULING: YES
Where the gun tucked in a person’s waist is plainly visible to the police, no search
warrant is necessary and in the absence of any license for said firearm, he may be
arrested at once as he is in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police
officers. No warrant is necessary in such a situation, it being one of the recognized
exceptions under the Rules. As a consequence of the accused’s valid warrantless arrest
inside the nightclub, he may be lawfully searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126. 

This is a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest. In fact, the subsequent discovery in
his car (which was parked in a distant place from where the illegal possession of firearm
was committed [after he requested that he will bring his car to the Police Station after his
warrantless arrest---with a policeman escorting him]) , of a drug paraphernalia and
shabu, CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN MADE DURING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH
because of his consent, not due to search incidental to a valid arrest. As such, the
items do not fall under the exclusionary rule and the unlicensed firearms, drug
paraphernalia and the shabu, can be used as evidence against the accused. 

4. PITA VS. CA, 178 SCRA 362

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/oct1989/gr_80806_1989.html

Facts:

Petitioner Leo Pita is the publisher of ‘Pinoy Playboy’. It is one of the publications
seized and burned during the Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by Mayor Bagatsing of
Manila where magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be
obscene, pornographic and indecent were seized and confiscated and later burned the
seized materials. 

On December 7, 1983, Pita filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said defendants and
their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale
or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational
magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the
Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.

Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of obscene reading

materials but claimed that the said materials were voluntarily surrendered by the vendors
to the police authorities. In opposing Pita’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction,
the defendant pointed out that in that anti- smut campaign, the materials confiscated
belonged to the magazine stand owners and peddlers who voluntarily surrendered their
reading materials, and that the plaintiffs establishment was not raided.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search and seizure was lawful.

RULED:

No. The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which
mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a
lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing
them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.

The fact that Mayor Bagatsing’s act was sanctioned by "police power" is no
license to seize property in disregard of due process. Police power measures do not
exempt the law enforcers the right to due process of law and the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. It is basic that searches and seizures may be
done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject
to challenge.

In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP, 43 We counter-minded the orders of the Regional Trial
Court authorizing the search of the premises of We Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two
Metro Manila dailies, by reason of a defective warrant. We have greater reason here to
reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The
fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from
Burgos, a political case, because, and as we have indicated, speech is speech,
whether political or "obscene".

Warrantless Search and seizure by a private person.

1. PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA, 301 SCRA 66
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1999januarydecisions.php?id=4

FACTS:

Cecilia Mendoza was shot to death and her husband Octavio Mendoza was found
responsible for her death. Based on her testimony, Chairmaine Mendoza, the daughter,
said that her parents quarreled over the issue of Cecilia and Charmaine having left
Octavio at the party. She then heard three gunshots. Running out of her room,
Charmaine saw her mother Cecilia down on the floor of their living room, bleeding
profusely. Charmaine saw her father hiding a gun under the bed in her parents’ room.
Octavio Mendoza denied the charges against him. He also denied possession of a
revolver. 

However, when Eusebio Mendoza, father of the victim and his sons were moving
the properties inside the house, he found a mission order and a memorandum issued to
Octavio Mendoza authorizing him to carry a colt revolver. Further, Octavio Mendoza
tested positive for the presence of nitrates. 

Mendoza now contends that the documents were illegally procured in grave
violation of his constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his
right against unreasonable search and seizure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search and seizure of the documents is valid.

RULED:

Yes. The memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by the
accused-appellant's father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, a search
warrant is dispensable. The Court explained that the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from
interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.

2. SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL VS. SOLUTA, 482 SCRA 660

Facts: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/feb2006/gr_163087_2006.html

 Facts: 

Jose Marcel Panlilio, Vice President for Finance of Silahis International

Hotel, Inc. while Soluta, Santos, Bernate Vicenta and Florentino were
employees of the hotel and officers of the Glowhrain-Silahis Union Chapter,
the hotel employees’ union.
Coronel Maniego, General Manager of the Rapier Enforcement Professional
Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. (REPISA) which the hotel
contracted to provide its security force, had been receiving reports that sale
and/or use of marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution were veillance,
with the approval of Panlilio, of suspected members and officers of the
union.
In the morning of January 11, 1988, Panlilio, his personal secretary Andy
Dizon, Maniego, Bulletin reporter Nonoy Rosales, and REPISA security
guard Villanueva entered the union office located at the hotel basement,
with the permission of union officer Babay who was apprised about the
suspected illegal activities, and searched the premises in the course of
which Villanueva found a plastic bag under a table. When opened, the
plastic bag yielded dry leaves of marijuana. Panlilio thereupon ordered
Maniego to investigate and report the matter to the authorities.
On the other hand, respondents’ version:
Loida a laundry woman saw the entry of the group of Panlilo but failed to
recognized them. She immediately reported to Soluta what she witnessed
who was then trying in vain to open the door of the union office. Soluta
subsequently lodged a complaint before the Security Officer and thereafter
opened the door of the office. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed
with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Soluta and
his companions ran and called for police assistance.

The Mgt searched the union office over the objection of Babay who asked
them if they had a search warrant. After the search, a plastic bag was found
containing marijuana. As a result of the discovery of marijuana in the union
office and after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a
complaint was filed against the 13 union officers in violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.

Soluta and other union officers filed a case alleging malicious prosecution
and violation of their constitutional right against illegal search, under Article
32 of Civil Code.
Issue: 

Defense of the Accused: 

Petitioners argue that being private persons, they are not covered by the
standards set forth in Aruta case as the constitutional protection against
illegal searches and seizures is not meant to be invoked against private
individuals
They further argue that the search of the union office was reasonable under
the circumstances, given that the hotel owns the room where the union
holds office; the search was not without probable cause as it was conducted
precisely due to reports received by petitioners that the union office was
being used as a venue for illegal activities, particularly the sale and/or use of
prohibited drugs; and the search was conducted with the consent and in the
presence of union officer Babay.

The Contention of the State: INVALID

But the SC held that that the contention or petition fails, citing:
Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:

The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public
officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights
enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is why it is not even
necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with
malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the
effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of
the constitutional right of the plaintiff.

In the present case, as priorly stated, petitioners had, by their own claim,
already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities allegedly undertaken
in the union office and Maniego conducted surveillance of the union officers.
Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions
barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite
ample time for them to obtain one, and notwithstanding the objection of
Babay.

The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality, it not

falling under any of the exceptional instances when a warrantless
search is allowed by law. Petitioners’ violation of individual respondents’
constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for
the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code

3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANDRE MARTI G.R. NO. 81561,

January 18, 1991 
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1991januarydecisions.php?id=7

Facts: 
On August 14, 1987, Marti and wife Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying
with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes attended to them. Marti informed
Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II,
8052 Zurich, Switzerland"

"Anita Reyes asked Marti to examine and inspect the packages, however, refused,
assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were
gifts to his friend. In view of appellant’s representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted
on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown
corrugated box one by two feet in size ready for shipment.

"Before delivery of box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
and husband of Anita, following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for
final inspection. When he opened the box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. He
squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside.
Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the
opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers
and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter
reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the
samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper.

In the presence of the NBI agents, dried marijuana leaves were found to have been
contained inside the cellophane wrappers as contained inside the box.

The NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant’s stated address in his
passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the
latter’s Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the
Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of
the seized dried leaves.

Charged with violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Defense of the Accused: 

Contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy
of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the
same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).

Contention of the State: 

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies
as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. c

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be
first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at
the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for
only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.

VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE:

 A.  Search  incidental to a valid arrest

1.    PEOPLE VS. SPO4 SANGKI ARA, December 23, 2009

This is an appeal from the December 13, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00025B entitled People of the Philippines v. SPO3 Sangki Ara y Mirasol, Mike
Talib y Mama, Jordan Musa y Bayan, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 9 in Davao City, convicting accused-appellants of violation of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
Three Informations charged accused-appellants Sangki Ara, Mike Talib, and Jordan Musa, as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 51,471-2002 against SPO3 Sangki Ara
That on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by
law, willfully, unlawfully and consciously traded, transported and delivered 26.6563 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "shabu," which is a dangerous drug, with the aggravating
circumstance of trading, transporting and delivering said 26.6563 grams of "shabu" within 100
meters from [the] school St. Peter's College of Toril, Davao City.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Criminal Case No. 51,472-2002 against Mike Talib
That on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by
law, willfully, unlawfully and consciously had in his possession and control one (1) plastic
sachet of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "shabu," weighing 0.3559 gram, which is a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Criminal Case No. 51,473-2002 against Jordan Musa
That on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, without being authorized
by law, willfully, unlawfully and consciously had in his possession and control five (5) big
plastic sachet[s] of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "shabu" weighing 14.2936 grams,
which is a dangerous drug.
Ruling: Warrantless Arrest and Seizure Valid
In calling for their acquittal, accused-appellants decry their arrest without probable cause
and the violation of their constitutional rights. They claim that the buy-bust team had more
than a month to apply for an arrest warrant yet failed to do so.
Owing to the special circumstances surrounding the drug trade, a buy-bust operation has
long been held as a legitimate method of catching offenders. It is a form of entrapment
employed as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of commission of an
offense. We have ruled that a buy-bust operation can be carried out after a long period of
planning. The period of planning for such operation cannot be dictated to the police
authorities who are to undertake such operation. It is unavailing then to argue that the
operatives had to first secure a warrant of arrest given that the objective of the operation was
to apprehend the accused-appellants in flagrante delicto. In fact, one of the situations
covered by a lawful 
warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court is when a person has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence of a
peace officer or private person.

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

It is erroneous as well to argue that there was no probable cause to arrest accused-
appellants. Probable cause, in warrantless searches, must only be based on reasonable
ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
There is no hard and fast rule or fixed formula for determining probable cause, for its
determination varies according to the facts of each case. Probable cause was provided by
information gathered from the CI and from accused-appellants themselves when they
instructed PO1 Ayao to enter their vehicle and begin the transaction. The illegal sale of
shabu inside accused-appellants' vehicle was afterwards clearly established. Thus, as we
have previously held, the arresting officers were justified in making the arrests as accused-
appellants had just committed a crime when Ara sold shabu to PO1 Ayao. Talib and Musa
were also frisked for contraband as it may be logically inferred that they were also part of
Ara's drug activities inside the vehicle. This inference was further strengthened by Musa's
attempt to drive the vehicle away and elude arrest.

2.    PEOPLE VS. PENAFLORIDA, G.R. No. 175604, April 10, 2008

Facts: On or about the 7th day of June, 1994, in the afternoon thereat, at Barangay
Huyon-huyon, Municipality of Tigaon, Province of Camarines Sur, Salvador Peñaflorida,
with intent to sell, possess and to deliver with the use of a bicycle, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody, one
bundle estimated to be one (1) kilo more or less, of dried marijuana leaves (Indian
Hemp) without the necessary license, permit or authority to sell, administer, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug from a
competent officer as required by law.

 On 26 October 1998, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of transporting a prohibited drug, a violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659. 

Appellant admitted that he was about to convey from one place to another the package,
which contained marijuana, to a certain Jimmy Gonzales. The appellant, however,
denies any knowledge that the package in his possession contained marijuana. 

Ruling: The warrantless arrest is justified.The police was tipped off at around 1:00 p.m. that
appellant was transporting marijuana to Huyon-huyon. Certainly, they had no time to secure
an arrest warrant as appellant was already in transit and already committing a crime. The
arrest was effected after appellant was caught in flagrante delicto. He was seen riding his
bicycle and carrying with him the contraband, hence, demonstrating that a crime was then
already being committed. Under the circumstances, the police had probable cause to believe
that appellant was committing a crime.

Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, states:

SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall
act as broker in any of such transactions. x x x.

Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or convey from one place to another." In the instant
case, appellant was riding his bicycle when he was caught by the police. He admitted that he was
about to convey the package, which contained marijuana, to a certain Jimmy Gonzales.

5. Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil. 439 (G.R. No. 4680)

Contract attys fees thru contract or agreement
Cannot seize property of accused

FACTS:

Ago Chi was charged for the crime of assassination CFI Manila. Roberto Moreno was
appointed as defendant de oficio.

When he was arrested, the 700-peso he had in his possession was confiscated by the
police. The police officer deposited the money to the clerk of court.

Ago Chi was later convicted. His counsel (Moreno) prayed to the court that his services
cost 600 pesos and to order the clerk to turn over the confiscated money as his
payment.

Moreno presented the writ of execution issued by Justice Quintero and that he be paid with 550.

Moreno presented another petition praying that the court order the clerk to pay him 559.24.

Ago Chi said he was willing to pay Moreno but wished that some of the money is reserved for his
own use.

Judge lower court order the clerk to pay Moreno 50 and the balance be retained for Ago Chi

ISSUE:

(1) Was the seizure of the money valid?

(2) Should the seized money, which was found to be not connected to the offense, be
returned to the convict?

(3) Can said money be used to pay creditors?  

RULING:
(1) Yes. An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or
property found in his possession provided that the property was seized for any of the
following reasons: (1) it was used in the commission of the crime; (2) it was the fruit of
the crime; (3) it might help the prisoner in committing violence or in escaping; (4) it may
be used as evidence in the trial of the case. but there is very serious doubt whether an
officer making an arrest has the right to take from the defendant any property found
upon his person, unless for some of the reasons just mentioned.

To deprive the defendant of his money or property under other circumstances than
those mentioned above is to deprive him, perhaps, of the lawful means of defense.

(2) Yes. If the seized property was in no way connected to the commission of the crime,
the court must order the return of the property after the termination of the trial.

(3) No. Creditors or third persons such as MORENO’s counsel cannot acquire any claim
while the seized property was in the hands of the officer. To hold otherwise would lead to
unlawful and forcible searches of the person under cover of criminal process as an aid to
civil actions for the collection of debts.

To hold otherwise would lead to unlawful and forcible searches of the person under
cover of criminal process as an aid to civil actions for the collection of debts. When it is
fully shown that the property so taken was in no way connected with the crime charged,
the court should not permit any advantage to be taken of the defendant, by reason of
the fact that he had been deprived of his property by the officer and against his will.

Thus, the trial court erred when it ordered the clerk of court to deduct 50 pesos from the
confiscated money. The confiscated P700 should be returned to MORENO in full.

6. PEOPLE VS. ANG CHUN KIT, 251 SCRA 660 (G.R. No. 109232)

Immediate vicinity only

FACTS:

A buy-bust operation was formed by NARCOM operatives to arrest ANG CHUN KIT, a
Chinese national and member of a Hong Kong-based drug syndicate operating in Metro
Manila.

A Confidential Informer arranged a transaction with ANG CHUN KIT and it was agreed
that the sale of 1 kilo of shabu amounting to P400,000 will occur at seven o'clock at
the lobby of the Cardinal Santos Medical Center.

The accused and his driver arrived in a gray Toyota Corolla with Plate No. TBC-958.
After the exchange, the NARCOM operatives moved in to effect the arrest. Three more
packets of shabu placed in a Kleenex box were found in the car of the accused.

ANG CHUN KIT argued that the shabu found inside the car is inadmissible in evidence
because it was found inside the car and not in his possession. Likewise, he was outside
the car when the shabu was found.

ISSUE: Can the shabu found inside the car be used as evidence against the accused?

RULING: Yes.

The search inside the car was an incident of a lawful arrest. Remember that the accused
came with his driver who is presumed to be in conspiracy with ANG CHUN KIT. The
driver could have extended help if he had a weapon readily available in the car. The
police had to restrain him before he could do so.

“Warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a lawful arrest, may extend beyond
the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control.” ANG CHUN KIT’s lack of consent to the search in the car is
irrelevant.

7. PEOPLE VS. LUA, 256 SCRA 539 (G.R. Nos. 114224-25)

Immediate vicinity only

FACTS:

Pursuant to Oplan Saturn, which aims to address the growing problem of drugs in
Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, a buy-bust operation was formed for the entrapment of
Rolando LUA.

LUA, who was outside his house, transacted with the police poseur buyer and provided
3 small tea bags of marijuana in exchange of three P10-bills. After the exchange, the
police arrested him.

The police noticed something bulging from the waistline of LUA, so they did a body
search and found a .38 cal. Paltik with two live bullets and an empty shell in the cylinder.
When LUA was asked about the rest of the marijuana, he said that it was inside his
house. Accompanied by the police operatives, LUA went inside his house and in the
presence of his wife pointed to the police officers a soapbox containing a brick of dried
marijuana.

ISSUE: Can the marijuana found inside the house of LUA be used as evidence against
him?

RULING: No.

The arrest and the body search were lawful, but the warrantless search inside LUA’s
house is unlawful because the police had no search warrant. It does not fall under
“search made incidental to a lawful arrest” because this kind of search is limited to body
1

search and to those within the reach or control of the person being arrested or to those
2

3
which may help the arrested individual in committing violence or in escaping.

In this case, LUA was outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, the inner portion
of his house was not within his reach or control.

The buy-bust operation conducted by the police operatives is a form of entrapment allowed by law.
The arrest of the appellant was lawful having been caught in flagrante delicto. Consequently, there is
no need for a warrant for the seizure of the 3 tea bags of marijuana (5.3934 grams) the same being
the fruit of the crime. With respect to the body search made by Puno, the same was valid being
incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore, the .38 cal. paltik and the two (2) live bullets and the empty
shell found in the cylinder are admissible in evidence.

8. PEOPLE VS. Figueroa, 248 SCRA 679(G.R. No. 97143)

Warrantless search valid if in plain view

FACTS:

Captain Lodivino Rosario, the Executive Officer of the 215th PC Company, and his men
arrived at the residence of Arturo FIGUEROA at Barangay San Juan, San Francisco
Subdivision, General Trias, Cavite, to serve a warrant for his arrest for the crime of Illegal
Possession of Ammunitions.

While serving the warrant of arrest, the arresting officers noticed aluminum foil packages
scattered in the sala. Suspecting the presence of shabu, the officers requested a search
of the house to FIGUEROA and his brothers and sisters. The search yielded a .45
caliber pistol, a magazine, seven live ammunitions, and a match box containing an
aluminum foil package with "shabu." FIGUEROA denied ownership of the items.

The accused contends that the items found are inadmissible in evidence because it was
taken during a warrantless search.

ISSUE: Were the .45 caliber pistol, magazine and rounds of ammunition unlawfully
obtained?

RULING: No. The search and seizure was done on the occasion of a lawful arrest.

This kind of arrest may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the
premises or surrounding under his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence.

In this case, the accused and the officers were inside the house which is under the
control of FIGUEROA. The officers were lawfully within the area because they were
serving a search warrant. Thus, those that were in plain view of the officer can be
searched. 

NOTE: The “plain view” doctrine, which may justify a search without warrant, APPLIES
ONLY WHERE THE POLICE OFFICER IS NOT SEARCHING FOR EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE ACCUSED, BUT INADVERTENTLY(accidentally) COMES ACROSS AN
INCRIMINATING OBJECT.

Nolasco v Pano
Facts:
Mila Aguilar Roque, Cynthia Nolasco and Willie Tolentino were accused with Rebellion. On
August 6, 1984 (11:30 am) Aguilar-Roque and Nolasco were arrested at the intersection of
Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City, on the same day (12:30 pm) a search was
conducted at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City the leased residence of Aguilar-Roque.

August 6,1984 (9:00 am) Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant
from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon
City. After almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected
underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military
for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected
with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.

A search warrant was issued by Judge Ernani Cruz Pano: According to the record, Lt. Col.
Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were examined under oath by Judge Paño but
only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted. The search was made in the presence of
Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods.

August 10th, the petitioners were charged before the Quezon City Fiscal’s office for
"Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion."

August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33
(Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitioners before Branch 42 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent
Judge Antonio P. Santos

August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL, praying that
AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. Motion was denied.

Sept. 10, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying
that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles, in connection with cases
that are presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and
the court.

December 13, 1984, Judge Paño admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized
documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against respondent.

Issue: Whether the search was valid

CONTENTION ACCUSED: items seized be returned to them as the search warrant were
unlawful. DENIED by Judge Santos.
Ruling: On validity of search Warrant – not valid because it does not specify what the
subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public
contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is
absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus
giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken
also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant
and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be
seized.

On probable cause - questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's

witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The examination conducted was
general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization
will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant
may issue.

Search incidental to a valid arrest –

Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A person charged with an offense may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
the offense (Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court)

It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was
made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and
reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been
stated that, in the application of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what
constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be searched. "What must be considered
is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of
crime and the apprehension of criminals."

Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against
public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time;
that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her
dwelling did not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public
order.

Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained.

People v Belen Mariacos
Belen Mariacos on San Gabriel La Union was charged of violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act 9165 (She transported and delivered 7,030.3 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops)

October 26, 2005 San Gabriel Police Station (PO2 Pallayoc, Chief of Police and other policemen)
conducted a checkpoint near the police station at poblacion to intercept a suspected transportation
of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. (Checkpoint did not yield any
suspect or marijuana), the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay
Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation.

October 27, 2005 in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the
Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded
on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned (3) bags
and (1) blue plastic bag and a bag marked with "O.K."

PO2 Pallayoc boarded the jeepney, while vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack
with an "O.K." marking and peeked inside its contents and found bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspapers. No one knew who owns the bag.

When they reached Poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other passengers, he did
not notice who took the black backpack. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag
and three (3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2)
women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that
they were under arrest, but one of the women got away.

RTC- Belen Mariacos Guilty, CA affirmed RTC’s Decision

Issue: was the search valid?
Ruling:   the search is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was
about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable
to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time
was of the essence in this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he
only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.

***Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a
moving vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it
possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search warrant in
order to check the contents of the bags which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney.
Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no use because the motor vehicle had already left
the locality.
Espano v CA
Rodolfo Espano for violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 Dangerous Drugs
Act (he was carrying (12) plastic cellophane (bags) containing crushed flowering tops, marijuana
weighing 5.5 grams)

July 14, 1991 Pat. Romeo Pagilagan and other police officers of the Western Police Dictrict
Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug
pushing in the area. They saw Espano selling "something" to another person. After the alleged
buyer left, they approached him, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him.

The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more
marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence
where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana.

Trial Court – Guilty, CA-Guilty

Issue: whether the search was valid.

Ruling: Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides:

A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

Espano was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on
the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora
and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an
alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of
marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were
admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.

As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's residence, however, the same are
inadmissible in evidence. NOTE: (An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense. The ten cellophane bags do not fall under the exceptions)
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made
incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded
ten cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a
search warrant at the time.
People v lo ho Wing
This case involves the unlawful transport of metamphetamine, a regulated drug under Republic Act
No. 6425. One of its derivatives is metamphetamine hydrochloride, notoriously known in street
parlance as "shabu" or "poor man's cocaine."

Peter Lo, together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat  alias Antonio Lim and Reynaldo Tia, were
charged with a violation of Section 15, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RTC of Pasay
City) (56 tea bags of Meta amphetamine.

July 1987 Special Operations Group, a unit of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the
Philippine Constabulary (PC), received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group
engaged in the importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods, and gunrunning. After an
evaluation of the information thus received, a project codenamed "OPLAN SHARON 887" was
created in order to bust the suspected syndicate.

Deep penetration agents – Reynaldo Tia introduced to Lim Cheng Huat to become a male travelling
companion for his business trips abroad.

Peter Lo and Tia left for Hongkong, Tia and appellant boarded a train bound for Guangzhou. They
purchased 6 tin cans of tea. He was informed that they would carry a cardo with Chinese Drugs

Next day the two returned in Manila via China Airlines Flight. Peter Lo had with him a red travelling
bag with wheels while on board the taxi they were flagged down by the agents.

There are at least three (3) well-recognized exceptions thereto. As set forth in the case of Manipon,
Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,  these are: [1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving
3

vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view (emphasis supplied). The circumstances of the case
clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid
warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused.

We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."

In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the
authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and
transport it within the country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance
activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from this,
they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. But
such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a
search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the
warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.

B-1. Warrantless search on a moving vehicle based on an anonymous

tip

 P v. Cuison, 326 Phil. 345 (1996)

FACTS:
In January 1992, the Reaction Group of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
gathered information regarding the drug activities of accused Antolin Cuizon y Ortega
and his wife, Susan Cuizon. A surveillance was conducted on them.
         In the morning of February 21, 1992, the Reaction Group received a report from
its informant in Hong Kong that accused Cuizon, together with his wife, was arriving
on the same day at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, from the British crown colony, carrying with him a big quantity of "shabu". A team
was organized to intercept the suspects.
         At about 12:45 in the afternoon of the same date, accused Cuizon and his wife,
who had just returned from Hong Kong, after passing through the Immigration and
Customs Areas at the NAIA, proceeded to the Arrival Area of the airport preparatory to
their boarding a car. While there, accused Cuizon, together with his wife, handed four (4)
traveling bags to accused Steve Pua y Clofas and accused Paul Lee y Wong, who were
at the vicinity of the Arrival Area. Accused Pua and Lee loaded the bags in a taxicab
which they boarded in leaving the airport. Accused Cuizon and his wife took another
vehicle 
         The surveillance team did not arrest the accused while they were allegedly
handing the bag nor when they boarded a vehicle leaving the airport. Instead, the team
followed the accused to the Peninsula Hotel, where they conducted the search and
seizure and subsequently arrested them.
ISSUE:
         Whether the warrantless search and arrest are valid on the ground that the
accused have been caught in flagrante delicto.
         Whether probable cause was established based on the informer’s tip.
 
HELD:
 
1. On moving vehicles. The warrantless arrest would have been valid if it was
done in transitu. Had the agents intercepted and collared the suspects on the
way to Makati and Caloocan, or better yet, at the very moment of the hand-over,
then there would not have been any question at all as to the legality of their arrest
and search, as they would presumably have been caught red-handed with the
evidence, and consequently for that reason and by the very nature and manner of
commission of the offense charged, there would have been no doubt also as to
the existence of conspiracy among the appellants to transport the drugs.
 
2. On anonymous tip. The court finds it extremely difficult to subscribe to the trial
court's finding as to the existence and sufficiency of probable cause in this case,
one major component of which would have been the alleged information or "tip"
purportedly received by the agents as to the expected arrival of the spouses
Cuizon that fateful day with a large cache of "shabu".
 
The question that defies resolution in our minds is why, if indeed the
information or "tip" was genuine and from a highly reliable source as claimed by
the government agents, did they not act on it? Throw in the alleged month-long
surveillance supposedly conducted by some of the NBI people on the Cuizon
couple, and the mystery only deepens.
Even with the so-called tip and the results of surveillance, the government
officers were still seemingly hesitant, reluctant, uncertain, or perhaps afraid, to
arrest and search the accused appellants, so much so that the NBI agents who
went after Pua and Lee at the Peninsula Hotel, instead of outrightly cuffing and
searching them, as they were supposed to, opted instead to play it safe and
meekly beseeched the two to sign a written consent for the agents to search their
personal effects! Indeed, this is one for the books.
 If this is how confident the agents were about their "hot tips", reliable
informers and undercover surveillance, then we cannot be blamed for failing to
appreciate the existence/sufficiency of probable cause to justify a warrantless
arrest and search in this case. There is a whole lot more that can be said on this
score, but we shall leave it at that for now. We shall now dispose of the appeals of
the accused-appellants individually.

In relation to previous discussions, arresting officers should have personal

knowledge that a crime has been committed, is being committed, or is about to be
committed. Tips from informers are not reliable as emphasized by Atty. Gacayan, citing
the case of People vs Sapla.

 P v. Encimada, 345 Phil 301 (1997)

FACTS:
         At around 4 p.m. of May 20, 1992, SPO4 Nicolas Bolonia was in his house when
he received a tip from an informant that Roel Encinada would be arriving in Surigao City
from Cebu City in the morning of May 21, 1992 on board the M/V Sweet Pearl bringing
with him "marijuana".
         After receiving the tip, Bolonia notified the members of his team — SPO3 Marcial
Tiro, SPO3 Glen Abot and SPO3 Charlito Duero — as well as his colleague SPO4
Cipriano Iligan, Jr., the chief of the Intelligence and Investigation Division, of the
information he received. Because the information came late, there was no more time to
secure a search warrant
         In the early morning of May 21, 1992, Bolonia, Iligan and other police officers
deployed themselves in different strategic points at the city wharf to intercept Encinada.
At about 8:15 a.m. of the same day, the M/V Sweet Pearl finally docked. The police
officers saw Encinada walk briskly down the gangplank, carrying two small colored
plastic baby chairs in his hand
         Bolonia apprehended Borromeo as he was about to board a tricycle.
         Bolonia noticed that there were two small chairs, one green and the other blue,
stacked together and tied with a piece of string. Between the stack of chairs, there was a
bulky package. Bolonia examined it closely and smelled the peculiar scent of marijuana.
Making a small tear in the cellophane cover, Bolonia could see and smell the what
appeared to be "marijuana," a prohibited drug
         Encinada was brought to the central police station. Bolonia, in the presence of
one Nonoy Lerio who is a member of the local media and a friend of Encinada, opened
the package. It was discovered that indeed, the contents consisted of dried leaves
known as marijuana.
 
ISSUE:
HELD:
         Encinada is acquitted on constitutional ground. Warrantless search and
seizure is illegal.
         Warrantless search on moving vehicles are valid for the reason that a crime is
being committed, and the police officers have no time to secure a warrant. In this case,
there was sufficient time to secure a warrant because the M/V Sweet Pearl was not
expected to dock until 7:00 am of the next day.
         In this case, appellant was not committing a crime in the presence of the Surigao
City policemen. Moreover, the lawmen did not have personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested had committed an offense. The search cannot
be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Raw intelligence information is not a
sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest. Bolonia's testimony shows that the search
preceded the arrest
         Contrary to the trial court's ruling, People vs. Tangliben is factually inapplicable to
the case at bar. The prosecution's evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when
the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact
demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare
circumstances.
         Even if the information was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May 20, 1992
at his house, there was sufficient time to secure a warrant of arrest, as the M/V Sweet
Pearl was not expected to dock until 7.00 a.m. the following day.

P vs. Cogaed, 740 Phil. (2014)

Facts:

The Police Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) received a text message from an
‘unidentified civilian informer’ that one Marvin Buya (aka Marvin Bugat) would be
transporting marijuana from Barangay Lun- Oy to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La
Union.

The police organized checkpoints in order to intercept the suspect. At one of the
checkpoints, a passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived. The jeepney driver
disembarked and signaled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who
were carrying marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers— Victor
Cogaed who was carrying a blue bag and a sack, and Santiago Dayao who was holding a
yellow bag.

When asked about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and Dayao claimed that they did
not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomate named
Marvin. Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like
marijuana. Cogaed then muttered, “nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoy met gayam ti
nagyanna,” which translates to “Marvin is a fool, this is what is contained in the bag.”
SPO1 Taracatac arrested Cogaed and Dayao and brought them to the police station.

Cogaed and Dayao were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The case
was dismissed against Dayao because he was only 14 years old at that time and was
exempt from criminal liability under RA 9344.

The trial court found Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that Cogaed at that time was
not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that he was about
to do so or that had just done so. However, notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest,
Cogaed waived his right to object to such irregularity when he did not protest when
SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his bag. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Hence, this appeal was filed. The main issue is whether there was a valid search and
seizure of marijuana as against the appellant Cogaed.

Held: Acquitted.

Reasonable search

As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of
this provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that
can only be determined by a judge. The existence of probable cause must be established
by the judge after asking searching questions and answers. Probable cause at this stage
can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames
the searches done by the law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the
place and the things to be searched.

Invalid “stop and frisk” search in Cogaed’s case

The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it did not
comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution. Cogaed
was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was
nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a
bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the
jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was
“suspicious.”

The jeepney driver had to point to Cogaed. He would not have been identified by the
police officers otherwise. It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead
to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the
suspicion initiated by another person.

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no
approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person
searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the
name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true
that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this
still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to
search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.

The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v. Aruta where there were no
suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta’s arrest and the subsequent search and
seizure. It was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her.. The
evidence obtained was not admissible because of the illegal search. Consequently, Aruta
was acquitted.

Not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest

None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be
admissible. The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None
of the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present
when the arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed,
was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. There were no overt acts within
plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs
at that time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not
have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.

P vs. Yanson, GR No. 238543, July 31, 2019

Facts:

An Information was filed against Sison, Yanson, and Bautista before the Regional Trial
Court, of Kabacan, Cotabato City, charging them with violation of Section 4 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 or the illegal possession of dangerous drugs particularly
the possession of six (6) kilos of marijuana leaves.

According to the prosecution, the Municipal Police Station of M'lang, North Cotabato
received a radio message about a silver gray Isuzu pickup—with plate number 619 and
carrying three (3) people—that was transporting marijuana from Pikit. The Chief of
Police instructed the alert team to set up a checkpoint on the riverside police outpost
along the road from Matalam to M'lang.

At around 9:30 a.m., the tipped vehicle reached the checkpoint and was stopped by the
team of police officers on standby. The team leader asked the driver about inspecting
the vehicle. The driver alighted and, at an officer's prodding, opened the pickup's hood.
Two (2) sacks of marijuana were discovered beside the engine.

The vehicle, its driver, and its passengers were brought to the local police station. The
Chief of Police kept the seized sacks.

The driver and the two (2) passengers were later identified as Sison, Bautista, and
Yanson, respectively.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Yanson, Sison, and Bautista of the crime charged.

Only Yanson appealed before the Court of Appeals.

Yanson contended that the two (2) sacks of marijuana supposedly seized from him,
Bautista, and Sison are inadmissible evidence since the police officers did not have
probable cause to conduct a search on their vehicle. He noted that the radio message
supposedly received by the police officers was "[t]he sole basis for their belief of the
alleged transportation of marijuana."

The Office of the Solicitor General countered that probable cause was properly
established since there was verified information that the pickup was being used to
transport illegal drugs. It maintained that an extensive search in checkpoints is allowed
if the officers conducting the search have probable cause to believe, prior to the search,
that either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find evidence pertaining
to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

The main issue to be resolved is whether or not a valid search and seizure was
conducted on the pickup boarded by accused-appellant and his co-accused, Jaime Sison
and Rosalie Bautista.

Held: Accused are acquitted.

Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution:

 

SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
 to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)

Solitary tip does not constitute probable cause

Exclusive reliance on information tipped by informants goes against the very nature of
probable cause. A single hint hardly amounts to "the existence of such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place to be searched." To maintain otherwise would be to sanction
frivolity, opening the floodgates to unfounded searches, seizures, and arrests that may
be initiated by sly informants.
The police officers here proceeded to effect a search, seizure, and arrest on the basis of
a solitary tip: the radio message that a certain pickup carrying three (3) people was
transporting marijuana from Pikit. When the accused's vehicle (ostensibly matching this
description) reached the checkpoint, the arresting officers went ahead to initiate a
search asking the driver about inspecting the vehicle. Only upon this insistence did the
driver alight. It was also only upon a police officer's further prodding did he open the
hood.
The records do not show, whether on the basis of indubitably established facts or the
prosecution's mere allegations, that the three (3) people on board the pickup were
acting suspiciously, or that there were other odd circumstances that could have
prompted the police officers to conduct an extensive search. Evidently, the police
officers relied solely on the radio message they received when they proceeded to inspect
the vehicle.
Mere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is not consent
It cannot be said that Sison, the driver, consented to the search made by the arresting
officers. Jurisprudence has settled that mere passive conformity or silence to the
warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence, which amounts to no consent at all.
The validity of a supposedly consented warrantless search is contingent on the totality of
the attendant circumstances.This may entail an inquiry into the environment in which
the consent was ostensibly given, such as the presence of coercive police procedures.
Illegal searches and seizures result in the inadmissibility in evidence of whatever items
were seized
Relevant Constitutional provision: Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution:

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

This exclusionary rule is a protection against erring officers who deliberately or

negligently disregard the proper procedure in effecting searches, and would so recklessly
trample on one's right to privacy. By negating the admissibility in evidence of items
seized in illegal searches and seizures, the Constitution declines to validate the law
enforcers' illicit conduct. Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an
unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
The arresting officers' search and subsequent seizure are invalid. As such, the two (2)
sacks of marijuana supposedly being transported in the pickup cannot be admitted in
evidence.
Even assuming that they were admissible, there remains no proof, whether direct or
circumstantial, that the accused actually knew that there were drugs under the hood of
their vehicle. Ultimately, their actual authorship of or conscious engagement in the
illegal activity of transporting dangerous drugs could not be ascertained.
No corpus delicti, no crime
In drugs cases where the allegedly confiscated drug is excluded from admissible
evidence—as when it was acquired through an invalid warrantless search—the
prosecution is left without proof of corpus delicti. Any discussion on whether a crime has
been committed becomes an exercise in futility. Acquittal is then inexorable.

Saluday vs. People, GR No. 215305, April 3, 2018, 860 SCRA 231

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/apr2018/gr_215305_2018.html

FACTS:

Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the
Philippine Army at a checkpoint.  SCAA Junbert M. Buco, a member of the Task Force,
requested all male passengers to disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female
passengers to remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the presence and
intercept the entry of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious
individuals.

He checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a small,
gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He asked
who the owner of the bag was and he requested the owner, who was Marcelo G.
Saluday, to board the bus. When asked about the content of the bag, Saluday said that it
was just a cellphone but SCAA Buco noticed it was heavy so he requested Saluday to
open the bag. Petitioner obliged and the bag revealed the following contents: 

(1) an improvised .30 caliber carbine bearing serial number 64702; 

(2) one magazine with three live ammunitions; 

(3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and 

(4) a ten-inch hunting knife. 

SCAA Buco then asked the petitioner to produce proof of his authority to carry
firearms and explosives. Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately arrested and
informed of his rights

The Office of the City Prosecutor for Davao City found probable cause to charge
him with illegal possession of high-powered firearms, ammunition, and explosives under
PD 1866. 

On cross-examination, SCAA Buco further elaborated on the search conducted

that the check point, which was conducted along llang Road,Davao City, was by virtue of
a memorandum. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search conducted by Task Force Davao was illegal.

RULING:

No, the search is not illegal. The bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao
at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it

operates against "unreasonable" searches and seizures only. Conversely, when a
search is "reasonable," Section 2, Article III of the Constitution does not apply.

The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a

person's right to privacy. Hence, only when the State intrudes into a person's expectation
of privacy, which society regards as reasonable, is the Fourth Amendment triggered.
Conversely, where a person does not have an expectation of privacy or one's
expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the alleged State intrusion is not a
"search" within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.

In Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, The Court held that "simple
precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers
and inspecting their baggage, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal
detectors, before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating
the passenger's constitutional rights.”

Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private
property whose owners have every right to exclude anyone from entering. At the same
time, however, because these private premises are accessible to the public, the State,
much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those going
in. The only difference in the imposition of security measures by an owner and the State
is, the former emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article 429 of the Civil
Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of police power for the promotion of public
safety. Necessarily, a person's expectation of privacy is. diminished whenever he or she
enters private premises that are accessible to the public. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro
Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a reduced
expectation of privacy. 

Furthermore, in the conduct of bus searches, the Court Jays down the following
guidelines. Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to
a routine inspection akin to airport and seaport security protocol. Metal detectors and x-
ray scanning machines can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be
frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be required instead to open their
bags and luggages for inspection, which inspection must be made in the passenger's
presence. Should the passenger object, he or she can validly be refused entry into the
terminal.

While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security
personnel of the bus owner in the following 3 instances:First, upon receipt of information
that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is
aboard can be stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the person and his or her
effects. Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger
can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection
by government agents or private security personnel as though the person boarded the
bus at the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is able to stop and pick
passengers along the way, making it possible for these passengers to evade the routine
search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated military or
police checkpoints where State agents can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of
the passengers and their bags or luggages.

In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at
the bus terminal and the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following
conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the
search, it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or
persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public
embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can the search result from any
discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives.
In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities,
children and other similar groups should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the
search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized
from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that precautionary measures
were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.

The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may
be put at risk. However, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars and to
moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis.

P vs. Bagista, 288 Phil. 828 (1992)

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1992septemberdecisions.php?id=642

FACTS:

On July 4, 1988, at around 8:00 o’clock in the morning, the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) Detachment Office located at the Arix Building, Bokawkan Road, Baguio
City, received information from one of its regular informants that a certain woman, 23
years of age, with naturally curly hair, and with a height of 5’2″ or 5’3″, would be
transporting marijuana from up north. Acting upon this piece of information, they
established a checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles, both private and public, coming
from the north to check if any of these vehicles were carrying marijuana leaves on board.

After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco bus with
Plate No. AVD 938 and body number 428, which came from Lepanto, Benguet. Sgts.
Parajas and Fider boarded the bus and thereupon Sgt. Parajas announced to the
passengers that they were NARCOM agents and that they were going to search their
baggage. At the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at the right
side (as one is facing the driver) of the last seat of the bus, with a travelling bag with
black and orange stripes 4 on her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag and discovered
three (3) bundles of marijuana leaves covered by assorted clothing. The bag and the
contents thereof were confiscated and the woman arrested; she was later brought to the
NARCOM office in Baguio City where she was booked and investigated.

ISSUE: WON the warrantless search is valid?

HELD: YES, the warrantless search is VALID.

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits

of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle,  and the seizure of evidence in
plain view. This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause.
 In the case at bar, the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search
all vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential
information they received from their regular informant that a woman having the same
appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north.
They likewise have probable cause to search the accused-appellant's belongings since
she fits the description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there is a valid
warrantless search by the Narcom agents, any evidence obtained during the course of
said search is admissible against the accused.

P vs. Tangliben, 263 Phil. 106 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1990/apr1990/gr_l_63630_1990.html

Facts:

In the late evening of March 2, 1982, Pat. Quevedo and Punzalan of the San
Fernando Police Station, together w/ Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan, were
conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound located at
Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga. The surveillance was aimed not only
against persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons
who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on informations supplied
by informers. It was around 9:30 in the evening that said Patrolmen noticed a person,
Medel Tangliben, caring a traveling bag who was acting suspiciously and they
confronted him. He was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red
traveling bag but the person refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen
identified themselves. They found inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a
plastic wrapper and weighing one (1) kilo, more or less. He was asked why he was at the
said place explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver the
marijuana leaves. The accused was taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando,
Pampanga, for further investigation.

The RTC found Tangliben guilty of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. (Section 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs)

Issue: WON the lower court erred in admitting as evidence the package of marijuana
allegedly seized from Medel Tangliben as it was a product of an unlawful search without
a warrant.

Ruling: The warrantless search is VALID.

One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search
incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:

Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides that a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of
his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search
was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.

Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic
notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as
carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to
act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. We cannot therefore
apply the ruling in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require search warrants during on-
the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng
collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely
difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated.

However the SC does not agree with this trial court's finding that the accused has
the intent to transport the marijuana leaves considering the quantity of the marijuana
leaves (1 kilo but later found out to be only 600 grams) found in the possession of the
accused and the place he was arrested which is at San Fernando, Pampanga, a place
where the accused is not residing. What was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt
is not his intent to transport the marijuana leaves but his actual posession. The offense
committed by the appellant is possession of marijuana under Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended).

 P vs. Quebral, 621 Phil. 226 (2009)

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2009novemberdecisions.php?id=1299 

 This case is about the requirement of authentication of seized prohibited drugs

and the conduct of warrantless search of a suspect by the roadside based on
probable cause.

FACTS: 

The provincial prosecutor of Bulacan charged the accused Zenaida Quebral,

Eusebio Quebral, Fernando Lopez, and Michael Salvador before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan, in violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

PO3 Cecilio Galvez of the police force of Balagtas, Bulacan testified that the Chief
of the Drug Enforcement Unit called him and other police officers to a briefing regarding
a police informer's report that two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep with a
specific plate number would deliver shabu, on the following day at a Petron Gasoline
Station in Balagtas to Michael Salvador, a drug pusher in the police watch list. After a
short briefing, PO3 Galvez and six other police officers went to the North Luzon
Expressway Balagtas Exit, watching out for the owner type jeep mentioned. At around
4:00 p.m., a jeep with the reported plate number and with two men and a woman on
board, came out of the Balagtas Exit.Galvez identified the two men as accused Eusebio
Quebral, who drove the jeep, and accused-appellant Fernando Lopez and the woman as
accused-appellant Zenaida Quebral. The police trailed the jeep as it proceeded to the
town proper of Balagtas and entered a Petron gas station along the McArthur Highway.
After a few minutes, a Tamaraw FX arrived from which accused- appellant Michael
Salvador alighted.He walked towards the jeep and talked to accused Zenaida Quebral,
who then handed a white envelope to him.On seeing this, PO3 Galvez, who was
watching from about 15 meters in a tinted car, signaled his back-up team to move.The
police officers surrounded the jeep. Galvez took the envelope from Michael, and saw five
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance which he believed was shabu.

The Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office later examined and confirmed
that it was shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride. Appellants claimed that PO3
Galvez and his fellow police officers merely framed them up. 

RTC found all four accused guilty of the crime and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P5 million. While the CA was reviewing
the case on appeal, accused Eusebio Quebral died, prompting it to dismiss the case
against him. CA rendered judgment, entirely affirming the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an illegal arrest of the accused and that the police
officers' subsequent search of their persons incident to such arrest was also illegal.

RULING: 

The accused claim that since the police did not have valid grounds to arrest them,
their subsequent search of them was illegal and the evidence of the seized shabu cannot
be admitted in evidence against them. With the exclusion of the seized drugs, there
would not be proof that they were passing them.

The accused-appellants invoke the rule that a person may be arrested even
without a warrant only:

a) if he is caught in the act of committing a crime, 

b) if he has just committed a crime and the arresting officer pursued him, or

c) if he escaped from a legal confinement.

It was more of a search preceding an arrest.The police officers had information

that two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep would arrive in Balagtas and
hand over a consignment of shabu at a gas station in town to a known drug dealer
whose name was on the police watch list. When these things unfolded before their eyes
as they watched from a distance, the police came down on those persons and searched
them, resulting in the discovery and seizure of a quantity of shabu in their possession.In
such a case, the search is a valid search justifying the arrest that came after it.The
police acted on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. Since the
seized shabu resulted from a valid search, it is admissible in evidence against the
accused.

It would have been impractical for the police to apply with the appropriate
court for a search warrant since their suspicion found factual support only at the
moment accused Eusebio Quebral, Fernando Lopez, and Zenaida Quebral
rendezvoused with Michael Salvador at the Petron gas station for the hand over of the
drugs. An immediate search was warranted since they would have gone away by
the time the police could apply for a search warrant. The drugs could be easily
transported and concealed with impunity.

 P vs. Tuazon, 588 Phil. 227 (2009)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/sep2007/gr_175783_2007.html 

FACTS: 

PO3 Glenon Bueno (PO3 Bueno) received through telephone, confidential

information that a Gemini car bearing plate number PFC 4116 would deliver an
unspecified amount of shabu in Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on said tip,
Antipolo City Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana dispatched a team of policemen to the
area to conduct a surveillance. When the team arrived in Marville Subdivision, they saw
the said Gemini car and immediately flagged it down. 

The driver of the car pulled to a stop and opened a window of said vehicle giving
the policemen the opportunity to identify themselves as members of the Antipolo City
Police Station. It was then that PO1 Manuel Padlan (PO1 Padlan) saw a gun tucked on
the appellant's waist. PO1 Padlan inquired about the gun and Tuazon allegedly replied it
did not belong to him nor could he produce any pertinent document relating to said
firearm. This prompted PO3 Bueno to order Tuazon to get down from the car. As soon
as Tuazon stepped down from the vehicle, PO3 Bueno saw five plastic sachets on the
driver’s seat, the contents of which Tuazon allegedly admitted to be shabu. Appellant
was thereafter immediately brought to the police station.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an illegal warrantless arrest by PO3 Bueno on Tuazon.

RULING: 

None. PO3 Bueno establishes beyond reasonable doubt Tuazon’s culpability.

When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such a

warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to the search that they would
find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

We hold that the police had probable cause to effect the warrantless search of the
Gemini car driven by appellant.

No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
This right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which states:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
 effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

Complementing this provision is the so-called exclusionary rule embodied in Section

3(2) of the same article –

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

It is recognized, however, that these constitutional provisions against warrantless

searches and seizures admit of certain exceptions, as follows: 

(1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; 
(2) seizure of evidence in plain view; 
(3) search of a moving vehicle; 
(4) consented warrantless search; 
(5) customs search; 
(6) stop and frisk; and 
(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

In the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing, this Court elucidated on the rationale for the
exemption of searches of moving vehicles from the requirement of search warrant, thus:

[T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the
place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of
the issuing judge – a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of
smuggling affected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband
from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search
of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought."

Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to moving
vehicles does not give the police authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a
warrantless search of an automobile. To do so would render the aforementioned
constitutional stipulations inutile and expose the citizenry to indiscriminate police distrust
which could amount to outright harassment. Surely, the policy consideration behind the
exemption of search of moving vehicles does not encompass such arbitrariness on the
part of the police authorities. In recognition of the possible abuse, jurisprudence dictates
that at all times, it is required that probable cause exist in order to justify the warrantless
search of a vehicle.

Manalili vs CA G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/oct1997/gr_113447_1997.html
Facts: 
 A review on certiorari. This is criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen
should employ limited, flexible responses — like "stop-and-frisk" — which are
graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess, the lawmen
being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the
citizen's constitutional rights against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure.

At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City
conducted surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
This was done after receiving information that drug addicts were roaming around said
area. Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon Manalili, in front of the
cemetery who appeared high on drugs. Manalili had reddish eyes and was walking in a
swaying manner. Manalili was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to
introduce themselves and asked him what he was holding in his hands. Manalili resisted.
Policeman Espiritu asked him if he could see what the petitioner had in his hands.
Manalili showed his wallet and allowed the officer to examine it. Policeman Espiritu found
suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana
contents and Manalili to headquarters to be further investigated.

Manalili protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession,
contending that they were products of an illegal search that he was aboard a tricycle at
A. Mabini street near the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his boarding house.
Three policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and
his lone passenger were under the influence of marijuana. The policemen brought the
accused and the tricycle driver inside the Ford Fiera which the policemen were riding in.

Issue:  Whether or not the warrantless search on a moving vehicle based on

an anonymous tip is  valid? 

Ruling:
Yes, the0 warrantless search is valid. The stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as
another exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant.
In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence
illegally obtained when he failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial.

Article III Sec. 3 (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of  this the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.This right, however, is not
absolute.The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions
to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1) search incidental to a lawful
arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search,
and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and
seizure

The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the assailed Decision and Resolution of
the respondent court.

People vs Sayco  G.R. No. 110995 September 5, 1994

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/sep1994/gr_110995_1994.html
Facts: 
That on July 8 1992, at about 6:00 in the morning, the Coastguard personnel
received information from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a suspected
"shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon was on board the MV Doña
Virginia from Manila to Dumaguete City. Alvaro Saycon alighted (he got off)
from the boat carrying a black bag and went through the checkpoint manned by
the Philippine Coastguard where he was identified by police officer Winifredo
NARCOM. Saycon was then invited to the Coastguard Headquarters at the
Pier area. He willingly went with them. At the headquarters, the coastguard
asked Saycon to open his bag, and the latter willingly obliged. In it were
personal belongings and a maong wallet. Inside that maong wallet, there was a
Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu". Then Saycon, his bag and
the suspected "shabu" were brought to the NARCOM office for booking. When
Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the NARCOM agents did not have a warrant of
arrest.
After the arrest of Saycon, the suspected drug material taken from him was
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Cebu City for chemical examination.
The PNP's Forensic Analyst declared in court that she had conducted an
examination of the specimens were positive to be shabu.Saycon denied
ownership of the "shabu" taken from his black bag. 

Issues: Whether or not the warrantless search on a moving vehicle based on

an anonymous tip is  valid?

Ruling: Yes valid warrantless search

The Court considers, therefore, that a valid warrantless search had been
conducted by the NARCOM and Coastguard Officers of the "black bag" of
Saycon that morning of 8 July 1992 at the checkpoint nearby the docking place
of the MV Doña Virginia. 

The Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial
warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where 
(1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana
(People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 [1988]);

(2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National

Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable
volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search
was conducted (People v. Maspil, 188 SCRA 751 [1990]);

(3) Narcom agents were informed or "tipped off" by an undercover "deep

penetration" agent that prohibited drugs would be brought into the country on a
particular airline flight on a given date (People v. Lo Ho Wing, supra);
 
(4) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when
the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of as
conspicuous bulge in this waistline, he failed to present his passport and other
identification papers when requested to do so (People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA
401 [1991]); and 

(5) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having
the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting
marijuana (People v. Bagista, supra.).

People vs Solayao G.R. No. 119220 September 20, 1996

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/sep1996/gr_119220_1996.html
Facts:
Nilo Solayao was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. That on 9:00 o'clock in the evening of July 9, 1992, with CAFGU
members Teofilo. and Cecilio, went to Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran,
Biliran. To conduct an intelligence patrol as required of them by their
intelligence officer to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming
around the barangay.

ThePolice officer became suspicious when they observed that the latter were
drunk and that Nilo Solayao was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.
Nilo Solayao  and companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled.  
Police Officer Niño told Nilo Solayao not to run away and introduced himself as
"PC," after which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was
carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally
know as "latong." When he asked Nilo Solayao who issued him a license to
carry said firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any
intelligence group, Nilo Solayao answered that he had no permission to
possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm and turned
him over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran who subsequently
investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm.

Issues:
Whether or not the  trial court erred in addmitting that the homemade firearm
as evidence nor violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Ruling:
Nilo Solayao is acquitted.  There was no error on the part of the trial court
when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence nor violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The SC ruled that the search and seizure conducted in this case be likened to
the Posadas case where the suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be
likened to a "stop and frisk" situation. There was a probable cause to conduct a
search even before an arrest could be made.As with Posadas, the case at bar
constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be effected without
first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" Nilo
Solayao when his companions fled upon seeing the government agents. Under
the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a
search warrant first.

However, the prosecution failed to produce evidence that the Nilo Solayao
has no license to carry the firearm by merely relying on the lone witness’
(SPO3 Nio) testimony that Nilo Solayao admitted to them during the time he
was apprehended that he has no license to carry such weapon.
The prosecution should have presented a certification from the Firearms and
Explosives Unit of the Philippine National Police that accused-appellant was
not a licensee of a firearm of any kind or caliber would have sufficed for the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the
crime of illegal possession of firearm.

 P vs. Tampis, 455 Phil. 371 (2003)

https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2003/jul2003/148725.php

FACTS:

PO1 Fidel Fagcayang of the Intelligence Task Force, Mountain Province Police, received
a report from an asset that marijuana was about to be sold at Sitio Bugnay, Tinglayan,
Kalinga. PO1 Fagcayang saw the two appellants (Luis and Daisy Tampis) and an old
woman packing suspected marijuana leaves into a brown bag with the markings Tak Tak
Tak Ajinomoto inscribed on its side. The appellants boarded a Ford Fiera bound for
Bontoc. He informed his superior PO1 Awichen that a pregnant woman and a thin man
were transporting marijuana leaves from Bontoc.
PO1 Awichen organized a team to check on the buses leaving Bontoc. They spotted a
pregnant woman and her companion on board a Red Eagle Bus. While PO1 Fagcayang
reported the events to PO1 Awichen, the bus departed. He immediately radioed the
Sabangan Police Station to monitor the Red Eagle Bus with body number 2008.
The Investigation Section of Sabangan Police Station received the radio message. The
policemen flagged down the bus and informed the driver and the conductor that certain
passengers were allegedly carrying marijuana. They searched the bus and found a
brown bag marked with Tak Tak Tak Ajinomoto under the seat on the left-hand side of
the driver, right in front of appellant Daisy Tapis. They asked the passengers who owned
the bag and, when nobody answered, they opened it and found seven bricks of
suspected marijuana leaves packed with masking tape and assorted clothing. They
seized the said articles and invited appellants to the municipal hall for questioning.
Moments later, members of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) arrived and took
custody of appellants and the confiscated articles.
Appellants contend that the warrantless arrest and search made by the police officers
was unlawful for lack of probable cause. The arrest was effected based on a radio
message that "a pregnant woman accompanied by a man" was transporting marijuana,
without any other description or identifying features of the appellants. They further
contend that the prohibited articles were the fruits of an illegal search and seizure and
are, therefore, inadmissible in evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure.

RULING:

Yes.

The information given to the policemen at the Sabangan Police Station, who eventually
apprehended the appellants, provided them sufficient ground to believe that a crime has
been committed or is being committed and justified the arrest of the appellants without a
warrant. To reiterate, PO1 Fagcayang alighted at Tocucan and called the policemen
stationed at the Provincial Headquarters to inform them that a pregnant woman with a
brown bag and a thin man were transporting suspected marijuana leaves from Bontoc. In
response, PO1 Awichen organized a team to check on the buses leaving Bontoc. One of
them spotted a pregnant woman on board the Red Eagle Bus with body number 2008,
which, however, left before further inspection and/or apprehension could be made.
Immediately thereafter, the policemen requested the Sabangan Police Station to monitor
the bus which carried appellants. Even if the message, as regards the identities of the
appellants, was merely relayed through a radio, there was a clear description of them to
enable the policemen to identify appellants. Under these circumstances, the policemen
had reasonable grounds to believe that appellants were dealing or transporting
prohibited drugs. It has been held that tipped information is sufficient to provide probable
cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.

 P vs. Jerry Sapla, GR No. 244045, June 16, 2020

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2020junedecisions.php?id=287
FACTS:
In the morning of 10 January 2014, an unnamed officer at the Regional Public Safety
Battalion (RPSB) in Tabuk, Kalinga received a text message from an informant
(concerned citizen) that an individual will be transporting marijuana from Kalinga to
Isabela. PO2 Jim Mabiasan (not the officer who received the text message) then relayed
the information to the deputy commander who coordinated with the PDEA.
About 1:00 o’clock  in the afternoon of the same day, a follow up information via text
message was received by the RPSB this time detailing the description of the drug
courier, to wit: male, wearing collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and
carrying a blue sack; he will be boarding a passenger jeepney bearing plate number
AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela.
Based on this information, a checkpoint was organized by the PNP.
At around 1:20 o’clock, the jeepney arrived. The police officers stopped the jeepney and
inside they saw the person described in the text message they received. They
approached said person and asked him if the blue sack in front of him was his. The
person answered yes. The police officers then requested the person to open the blue
sack. The person hesitated but he eventually complied. The content of the blue sack was
four bricks of marijuana. The person was later identified as Jerry Sapla.
In court, Sapla denied the allegations as he claimed that when he boarded the jeep, he
did not have any sack with him; that the blue sack was only attributed as belonging to
him by the police. Sapla was convicted by the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction and ruled that the informant’s tip was sufficient to engender probable
cause upon the minds of the police officers; that it was sufficient to conduct a warrantless
search and seizure.
ISSUE: Whether or not an informant’s tip is sufficient to engender probable cause?
HELD: No. In a long line of cases (Pp. vs Aminnudin, Pp. vs Cuizon, Pp. vs Encinada,
Pp. vs Aruta, Pp. vs Cogaed, Veridiano vs Pp., Pp. vs Comprado, Pp. vs Yanson, and
Pp. vs Gardon-Mentoy), the Supreme Court has always said that a mere informant’s tip
is not sufficient to engender probable cause. The police officer receiving the informant’s
tip must rely on his senses. The police officer must not adopt the suspicion initiated by
another person. The police officer, with his/her personal knowledge, must observe the
facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act and not merely rely on the information
passed on to him/her.
Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of a tip. A tip is still hearsay no matter how
reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any
other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.
The Supreme Court noted that there were two previous decisions (Pp. vs Maspil and Pp.
vs Bagista) which ruled that a confidential tip was sufficient to engender probable cause,
however, the Supreme Court in this case declared that these two cases are now being
abandoned to settle the issue once and for all.

The Supreme Court also found the text message to be double hearsay: (1) the person
who actually received the text message was not presented, and (2) the person who
received the text message merely relayed it to the officers who conducted the
warrantless search and seizure without the latter actually seeing/reading the actual text
message. Further, the text message was not preserved. It also appeared that the phone
which received the text message was not a government issued one – this belies the
claim of the officers that the message was received by their hotline.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not the police officers may justify the search as a search of a
moving vehicle.

HELD: No. As a rule, searches and seizures must be done with a court issued warrant.
There are exceptions such as search of a moving vehicle where a valid warrantless
search and seizure may be effected.  But this exception comes with strict parameters
which are: a) if the vehicle is parked on public fair grounds, the officer may only draw
aside its curtain, b) the officer may only look into the vehicle, c) the officer may only flash
a light without opening the vehicle’s doors, d) the occupants of the vehicle are not
subjected to physical/body search, e) limited to visual search, f) if done as a routine
check, must be conducted in a fixed area.

This case does not fall under search of a moving vehicle because the target of the
search was not the jeepney boarded by Sapla but rather the target was the person of
Sapla. Based on the testimony of the police officers, their actual target was the person
fitting the description provided by the tip which corresponded to Sapla and not the
vehicle.

ISSUE 3: Whether or not the police officers may justify the search as consented search.

HELD: No. Based on the testimony of the police officers, Sapla hesitated when he was
requested to open the blue sack. This only means that he did not give his consent and
that his compliance was vitiated by the presence of the police.

With all the foregoing, the search and seizure conducted was invalid and any evidence
obtained therefrom is inadmissible. Sapla was acquitted. The Supreme Court likewise
emphasized the need to adhere to strict standards set by the Constitution otherwise “A
battle waged against illegal drugs that tramples on the rights of the people is not a war
on drugs; it is a war against the people.”

C.  Seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties/taxes 

 1. Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1968/feb1968/gr_l-27360_1968.html

FACTS:

Martin Alagao, the head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department,
acting upon a reliable information regarding a certain shipment of personal effects,
allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the
customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks.

Accordingly, he conducted surveillance at gate no. 1 of the customs zone upon orders of
the Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of
Customs. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4,
1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted
them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila.

The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were
seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed
ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of
Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in
the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.

However, Remedios Mago filed with the CIF petition "for mandamus with restraining
order or preliminary injunction claiming that she was the owner of the goods seized and
hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa.

Particularly, she contended that

o   she purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga;

o   she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said
place to her residence at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila;

o   the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without search
warrant issued by a competent court;

o   Manila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios
Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein be not examined;

o    then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to

examine goods because the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of
the Commissioner of Customs;

o   the goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were
not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because
Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge that they
were imported illegally.

Respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the petitioners
from opening the nine bales in question, and at the same time set the hearing of the
petition for preliminary injunction on November 16, 1966
However, when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had
already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of
officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of
herein respondent Remedios Mago

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Customs bureau has the jurisdiction to seize the goods and institute
forfeiture proceedings against them

RULING:

Yes. The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others,

(1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues,
fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws;

(2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and

(3) to enforce tariff and customs laws.  The goods in question were imported from
Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal
Entry".  As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only
upon the payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to
be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted.  
The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full.

Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of
the customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same,
nevertheless, when said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4,
1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting under directions and orders of
their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the Commissioner of
Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods.
Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs
the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other
charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according
to law. The goods in question, therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of
the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case
No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966. The
Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said
goods even if the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the purposes of the
seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.

It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction
over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the
moment the goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure
or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with
seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually
seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of
Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the
tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the
Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the
Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12,
1967. And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said
warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case.

The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in
question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need
of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows
that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order
of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.

2. Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16

https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1974/mar1974/gr_l_23996_1974.php

FACTS:

Private respondent Ricardo Santos bought from Donald James Hatch, a tax-exempt
person, a Mercury Automobile Model 1957. Being originally owned by a tax-exempt
person, the said car was properly brought to the country without payment of its customs
duties and tax. This being the case and where the car was subsequently transferred to
Santos, a nontax-exempt person, the latter paid the customs duties and taxes. Later
however herein petitioner Pedro Pacis found out that the amount paid for customs duties
and taxes for the car was insufficient and as a result he instituted seizure proceedings
and issued the necessary warrant of seizure and detention. The car was then seized and
was under detention in the General Affairs Compound.

On August 26, 1964, Santos requested the return of the car 

his contention being that the issuance of the warrant was not authorized, such warrant
being issued not by a judge and therefore is in violation of the then Article III, Section 1,
par. 3 of the 1935 Constitution against unreasonable search and seizures. Also since the
warrant was issued by Pacis in his capacity as Collector of Customs and not by a judge,
Santos contended that he (Pacis) could also be criminally liable under Article 241 of
RPC. In his reply on August 31, 1964, Pedro Pacis denied the request for release
without prior payment of the outstanding custom duties and tax of the automobile and
contended that he had the authority under the law to issue the warrant.

Santos then instituted the criminal action against pacis for violation of Article 241 of PRC,
this was pursued by Public respondent Manila Assistant City Fiscal Manuel R Pamaran.
Pacis then instituted prohibition proceeding in the Supreme Court to perpetually retrain
the litigation of the case, hence this case.

Issue: 

WON there was unreasonable seizure of the automobile of private respondent due to
unauthorized issuance of a seizure and detention warrant by  petitioner.
Held:

No, the issuance of the seizure and detention warrant was proper and so the actual
seizure of the automobile is warranted. The law being that authority to issue warrant was
extended to officers authorized by law and such power is no longer solely confined to a
judge, petitioner can validly issue such warrant. The only question that will remain is
whether the said officer, the petitioner in this case, was able to comply with the requisites
in order to validly issue said warrant. The requisite only being that “one’s possessions be
subject to seizure”. Since it was established that the proper custom duty and taxes was
not yet paid (fully paid), the subject, the automobile, became a proper subject for
seizure. The issuance of the warrant and the actual seizure was therefore proper.

Article III, Section 1, par. 3 of the 1935

(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

3. HIZON VS. CA, 265 SCRA 517

September 1992, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan received reports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal waters of the city. In response to
these reports, the city mayor organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to assist the police in the detection
and apprehension of violators of the laws on fishing.

Task Force Bantay Dagat reported to the PNP Maritime Command that a boat and several small
crafts were fishing by "muro ami" within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa. 

found several men fishing in motorized sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B Robinson
within the seven-kilometer shoreline of the city. They boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected the
boat with the acquiescence of the boat captain, Silverio Gargar.

In the course of their inspection, the police saw two foreigners in the captain's deck. SP03 Enriquez
examined their passports and found them to be mere photocopies. The police also discovered a large
aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish weighing approximately one ton at the bottom of the
boat.   They checked the license of the boat and its fishermen and found them to be in order. 
2

Fish caught were positive of Sodium Cyanide (a violent poison)

PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City filed the complaint at bar against the owner and
operator of the F/B Robinson, the First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by herein
petitioner Richard Hizon, the boat captain, Silverio Gargar, the boat engineer, Ernesto Andaya, two
other crew members, the two Hongkong nationals and 28 fishermen of the said boat.

Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws
have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted
on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured. Yielding to this reality,
judicial authorities have not required a search warrant of vessels and aircrafts before their search and
seizure can be constitutionally effected.

The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery
laws. These vessels are normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them to elude arresting
ships of the Philippine Navy, the Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our fishery
laws. 22

We thus hold as valid the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of having
engaged in illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence seized in the course of the search were
properly admitted by the trial court.

4. PEOPLE VS. QUE, 265 SCRA 721

 March 8, 1994 SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging,
received an information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally
cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. 

Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within
the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City.

March 8, 1994 at 1:00 am the police while on patrol saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number PAD-
548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.

SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When interviewed,
accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut
slabs.

SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the cargo's supporting documents, specifically: (1)
certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from
the DENR, and (5) certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs.
Accused-appellant failed to present any of these documents . All he could show was a
certification   from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez
7

Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate
transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.

they counted two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3
board feet (8.79 cubic meters) and total assessed value of P93,232.50. 

Wilson Que was charged with violation of Section 68 PD 705

RTC-Guilty,

Issue: was the search valid?

Ruling: Yes, With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground
that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

 the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search appellant's truck. A member of the
Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable information that a ten-wheeler truck
bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two
weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General Segundo
Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the
Marcos Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there were
sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked for the lumber's
supporting documents, accused-appellant could not present any. The foregoing circumstances are
sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which justified the extensive search of appellant's
truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were
thus properly admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of accused-appellant.

D.  Seizure of evidence in plain view 

1. PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ, 341 SCRA 25

Inadvertently
G.R. No. 129296               September 25, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ

Facts:
On September 25, 1996, at Sitio Bulan, Barangay Sawmill, Municipality of
Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines,Valdez, who was caught
in flagrante delicto,planted, seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as
Indian Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos.

SPO3 Tipay testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he
received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana
plantation, allegedly owned by Valdez.The prohibited plants were allegedly
planted close to Valdez's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of
Police of Villaverde, then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify
the report. The team was  given specific instructions to "uproot said marijuana
plants and arrest the cultivator of same."

As its sole witness, the defense presented Valdez. He testified that at around
10:00 o'clock A.M., September 25, 1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in
Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know.
He was asked to go with the latter to "see something." This unknown person
then brought appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were found,
approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut.Five armed policemen were
present and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then
asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied
any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit
ownership of the plants. Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted
owning the marijuana.

Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless  search under the "plain view" doctrine is
valid? 
Or  ito?
Whether or not plain view is  justified by mere seizure of evidence
without further search?

Ruling: Valdez was acquitted

The Supreme Court ruled that the "plain view" doctrine cannot be made to
apply. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis
plants was not inadvertent (unintentional). We also note the testimony of SPO2
Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area"
before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants
were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum,
the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and
hand." 

The Supreme Court said that ``plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the
following elements must be present:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to
be where they are; and

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

2. ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. y CERBO vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
Facts:  Police operatives including PDEA conducted a surveillance of drug
trafficking in Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City. The informant of
the police directed them to the residence of a certain "ABE" PO3 Antonio then
positioned himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the members
of the group deployed themselves nearby. Through a small opening in the
curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of
1 1/2 meters, he saw "Abe" arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets
which he believed to be containing shabu. At the same instance they arrested
the petitioner. However, the version of the petitioner is that, together with her
father and sister while watching television the police operatives barrage
themselves into their house and that the shabu was later planted to the
petitioner while traveling to the police station.

The trial court rendered the decision finding the petitioner guilty of Violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. The CA subsequently affirmed the trial
court's decision.

Issue: Whether or not peeping through a curtain-covered window is within the

meaning of "plain view doctrine" for a warrantless seizure to be lawful.

Ruling:
Miclats appeal was denied. The Supreme Court ruled there is no compelling
reason to reverse the findings of fact of the trial court. It is clear, therefore, that
an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight . Since
Miclats arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before
effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of
a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in
plain view of the arresting officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure
were admissible in evidence to prove petitioner’s guilt of the offense charged.

It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-
sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily
surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police officer. The seizure
made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not
only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the "plain
view" doctrine.

3.People vs Elenita Fajardo  G.R. No. 190889              

January 10, 201

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/jan2011/gr_190889_2011.html
Facts:
On August, 2002, in the morning, in Barangay Andagao, Municipality of Kalibo,
Aklan.  Elinita Fajardo have in their possession,two (2) receivers of caliber .45
pistol, two (2) pieces short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35)
pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live
caliber .45 ammunition, which items were confiscated and during a search
conducted by members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operation
Group,by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 issued by OIC Executive
Judge Dean Telan of the Regional Trial Court of Aklan.

Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside petitioner’s residence

were declared inadmissible in evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by
the policemen outside the house of petitioner before the warrant was served
were admitted as evidence, pursuant to the plain view doctrine.

Elinita Fajardo insists on an acquittal and avers that the discovery of the two
(2) receivers does not come within the purview of the plain view doctrine. 

Issue: Whether or not  the seizure of the two receivers of the .45 caliber pistol
outside petitioner’s house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.

Ruling: 

The Supreme Court ruled that the seizure of the two receivers of the .45 caliber
pistol outside petitioner’s house falls within the purview of the plain view
doctrine.Thus, Elina Fajardo is acquitted.

The plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has
a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the
law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must
lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object
must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery is inadvertent.

4. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/aug1992/gr_93516_1992.html 

Plainview, inadvertently saw the item

ACCUSED: 

BASILIO DAMASO @ Bernardo/BERNIE MENDOZA @ KA DADO

 Damaso/Mendoza was charged with illegal possession of firearms.

 The police saw the M14 Rifle on top of a table inside the rented apartment
of the accused AFTER THE OWNER OF SAID APARTMENT OPENED IT
WITH HER OWN KEY. Seizure of the gun cannot be justified under the
“plain view” doctrine because they were looking for evidence at that time
and something was done before they saw it. It was not inadvertently or
unintentionally found.

FACTS: 

Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected with the 152nd
PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify
the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani,
Dagupan City (June 18, 1988). In said place, the group captured Gregorio
Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When
interrogated, the persons arrested revealed the underground safehouse at Gracia
Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commander
of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found
subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items. 

After the raid, the group went to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under
surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina
Aritumba (earlier arrested). They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of
Rosemarie Aritumba who stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza (other
names: Basilio Damaso/ Ka DADO - appellant). 

She led the group to the house rented by Mendoza. When they reached the
house, the group found that it had already been vacated by the occupants. Since
Morados was hesitant to give the new address of Damaso/Mendoza, the group
looked for the Barangay Captain and requested him to direct them to the new
house rented by Mendoza. They again required Morados to go with them. When
they reached the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her
that they already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At first, she
denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the group to go inside the
house. Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw
radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a computer
machine. They also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco
(namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Maries Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and
Luzviminda Morados). The group requested the persons in the house to allow
them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw
books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions,
Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro an(d)
Laguna and other items. They confiscated the articles and brought them to their
headquarters for final inventory. They brought the persons found in the house to
the headquarters for investigation who revealed that Damaso/Mendoza was the
lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated. 

ISSUE: Whether the evidence is admissible?

RULING: NO. The evidence is inadmissible.

Damaso was ACQUITTED. The case against him still will not prosper, the
reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements
of a valid search and seizure proceedings.The right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is enshrined in the Constitution (Article III, Section 2). The
purpose of the law is to prevent violations of private security in person and
property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home by officers of the law
acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such
usurpations when attempted (see Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646). However,
such a right is not absolute. There are instances when a warrantless search and
seizure becomes valid, namely: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a
moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (Manipon, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, L-58889, July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 267, 276). None of these
exceptions is present in this case.

The Court said that the evident purpose of this requirement is to leave the officers
of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end
that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and abuses may not
be committed. It is also aimed at preventing violations of security of persons
and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, and giving
remedy against such usurpation when attempted.

 If an act is performed (like opening the door, opening a cabinet)

before being able to see the items be it illegal it does not fall under
the “plain view” doctrine

5. PEOPLE VS. VELOSO, 252 SCRA 135

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1925/oct1925/gr_l-23051_1925.html 

FACTS:

Jose Ma.Veloso, a congressman and the manager of the Parliamentary Club

alleged to be a gambling house, was found guilty of the crime of resistance of the
agents of authority. The police had reliable information that the club was nothing
more than a gambling house. Because of this, Detective Geronimo applied for
and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño to search the building located
at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila. 

Once inside the   Parliamentary   Club,   nearly   50   persons   were   captured 

by   the police. One   of them was  the  defendant  Veloso. Veloso  asked 
Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant (JOHN
DOE). Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and
not John Doe,   and   that  the   police  had   no   right  to  search   the   house.  
Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's
pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required
Veloso to show him the evidence of the game but the latter insisted in his refusal
to submit to the search. Left with no choice, VELOSO was laid down on the floor
and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were
taken from his pockets.

In the record of the application for search warrant, it was found that since the
applicant did not know the person/s occupying the  premises  to be  searched,  
only John  Doe  was  written  in  the  issued search warrant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?

RULING: 

YES. The police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which
are difficult enough to perform under the best of conditions, by superficial
adherence to technicality or far fetched judicial interference. The police officers
were accordingly authorized to break down the door and enter the premises of the
building occupied by the so-called Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then
had the right to arrest the persons presumably engaged in a prohibited game, and
to confiscate the evidence of the commission of the crime. It has been held that
an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or
property found upon his person, which was used in the commission of the crime
or was the fruit of the crime, or which may furnish the person arrested with the
means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence
on the trial of the cause, but not otherwise. (Moreno vs. Ago Chi [1909], 12 Phil.,
439.)

6. PEOPLE VS. LESANGIN, 252 SCRA 213

hindi ko mahanap yung LESANGIN kaya nagbase ako sa 252 SCRA 213 pero
PEOPLE vs. LEANGSIRI yung case 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/jan1996/gr_112659_1996.html 

FACTS: 

Accused Leangsiri (Thai) was arrested at his arrival in NAIA. He was in the act of
bringing into the country 8,225.31 grams of heroin hidden under the false
bottom of a black suitcase. He informed the authorities that he was to deliver the
contraband to (3) people at the Las Palmas Hotel in Manila.  The team and
agents of the Bureau of Customs proceeded to the Las Palmas Hotel, where they
allowed Leangsiri to check into Room 504 with the confiscated black suitcase
containing the heroin.

Amidu, Omogbolahan and Bhola, arrived at the hotel. They knocked on the door
of Room 504. Leangsiri stood up from the bed in which he sat, opened the door,
and let the three appellants in.  Leangsiri opened the suitcase and displayed its
contents to his visitors. Appellants briefly examined the black suitcase and two (2)
transparent plastic bags which contained the heroin. After the examination,
Leangsiri closed the suitcase and handed it over to appellants. Appellants started
to leave the hotel room with the contraband when Gapiangao and Balneg barged
out of the washroom, identified themselves as NARCOM agents, and made the
arrest.

Accompanied by the hotel's owner and security officer, Samala (one of NARCOM
agents) searched appellant Amidu's room. Tucked within the pages of her
telephone and address book was a piece of paper with the name "SUCHINDA
LEANGSIRI'' written on it.  The paper and Amidu's other possessions were
confiscated. 

The trial court finds the herein appellants guilty of the crime charged.

ISSUE: 

Whether the articles sought in the other room and hotel, outside the direct
premises of the arrest, are admissible as evidence?

RULING: 

NO. Those articles are inadmissible as evidence as it was obtained not in

planview nor within the direct premises of the arrest. The plain view
doctrine applies to OBJECTS OF THE PLAIN VIEW OF AN OFFICER WHO
HAS THE RIGHT TO BE IN THE POSITION TO HAVE THAT VIEW ARE
SUBJECT TO SEIZURE AND MAYBE PRESENTED AS EVIDENCE. Thus,
what can be admitted are evidence seized within the direct premise where
the accused has an immediate control which should only be Rm. 509.

The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled
searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory
search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view"
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not, searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. . . . Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the
following limitations on the application of the doctrine.

What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in
the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification - whether it be a warrant for
another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a
search directed against the accused - and permits the warrantless
 seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is
legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not
be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges.

In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las
Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper bearing Leangsiri's name was obtained
through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the same hotel, and found
tucked within the pages of appellant Amidu's telephone and address
book. Clearly, the warrantless search is illegal and the piece of paper
bearing Leangsiri's name cannot be admitted as evidence against
appellants. The inadmissibility of this evidence will not, however,
exculpate appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy the prosecution's
case against appellants. The remaining evidence still established their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

E. When there is waiver of right or there is consent;

1. Lopez vs. Commissioner, 65 SCRA 336

Consent cannot be given by any person aside from the accused.

*Short case*
FACTS:
When a team of agents stormed their leased hotel room and took documents and
papers, petitioner Tomas Velasco was not there. A lady who looked to be the petitioner's
wife but turned out to be a manicurist let them into the room.

On the question of the search of the hotel room, the petition alleged that at about 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon of September 19, 1966, when the vessel was searched, a
combined team of Constabulary and Regional Anti-Smuggling Center operatives headed
by NBI agent Earl Reynolds raided the hotel room then being rented by petitioner Tomas
Velasco without any search warrant and in the absence at the time of such petitioner
Tomas Velasco or the presence of any other person, except one Teofila Ibañez, a mere
manicurist of Davao City by occupation and "forcibly opened luggages and boxes from
which only several documents and papers were found, then seized, confiscated and took
away the same."

ISSUE:
Whether Velasco's booked hotel room was subjected to a warrantless search and
seizure even if the consent was given by the manicurist in said room.

RULING:
YES. Where, at the time the government agents entered and searched the hotel room
then being rented by petitioner Tomas Velasco, a woman who appeared to be
petitioner's wife was inside the room and, upon being informed of the purpose of the
search, invited the officers to enter and search the room and even voluntarily gave the
officers the documents and items requested. Even if the said woman, who could aptly be
described as the wrong person, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, the officers of the
 law could not be condemned if they acted on the appearances since Teofila Ibañez was
not the petitioner's wife, but a mere manicurist by trade.

Their effort appurtenant thereto is doomed to failure. If such indeed were the case, then
it is much more easily understandable why that person, Teofila Ibañez, who could be
aptly described as the wrong person at the wrong place and at the wrong time, would
have signified her consent readily and immediately. Under the circumstances, that was
the most prudent course of action. It would save her and even petitioner Velasco himself
from any gossip or innuendo. Nor could the officers of the law be blamed if they would
act on the appearances. There was a person inside who from all indications was ready
to accede to their request. Even common courtesy alone would have precluded them
from inquiring too closely as to why she was there. Under all the circumstances,
therefore, it can readily be concluded that there was consent sufficient in law to dispense
with the need for a search warrant.

2. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 457

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/aug1992/gr_93516_1992.html

FACTS:
On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected
with the 152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent
to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani,
Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina
Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons
apprehended revealed that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia Village
in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commander of Urdaneta,
the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village.

They found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other
items (pp. 4, 6-7, tsn, October 23, 1989).

After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance
the rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they
earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba.
She stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza, herein appellant. She guided the
group to the house rented by appellant. When they reached the house, the group found
that it had already been vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give
the new address of Bernie Mendoza, the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the
place and requested him to point out the new house rented by appellant. The group
again required Morados to go with them. When they reached the house, the group saw
Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already knew that she was a member of
the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested
the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the
Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a
computer machine. They also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco
(namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Maries Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and
Luzviminda Morados). The group requested the persons in the house to allow them to
look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for
subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial
beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro an(d) Laguna and other items. They
confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters for final inventory. They
likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation.
Said persons revealed that appellant was the lessee of the house and owned the items
confiscated therefrom.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a search on a house without the owner’s presence is valid.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS EVIDENCE THE FIREARMS

DOCUMENTS AND ITEMS LISTED IN EXHIBIT E AFTER THEY WERE DECLARED
INADMISSIBLE WITH FINALITY BY ANOTHER BRANCH OF THE SAME COURT AND THE
SAID EVIDENCE ARE THE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
RULING:
NO. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal
one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is
expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.

Decision appealed from is REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED.

Person involve should be the one to give consent

Not plain view doctrine, the gun should be found inadvertently

3. P. vs. Ruben Burgos, September 14,1986

Continuing crime NPA, can be arrested anytime,

Facts:
Ruben Burgos was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of
subversion.

Cesar Masamlok surrendered to the authorities at Digos Davao Del Sur stating that he was forcibly
recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm
against his life, if he refused. He was also asked to contribute one (1) chopa of rice and one peso
(P1.00) per month, as his contribution to the NPA.

upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-INP units, composed of fifteen (15) members, was
dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to arrest accused Ruben Burgos.

He was found plowing his filed and was asked about his firearm. Burgos denied possession of the
firearm but his wife pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground. 

The police verified the place and recovered a firearm, Caliber .38 revolver and then after subversive
documents which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of cogon at a distance of three (3) meters apart
from his house.
likewise recovered documents consisting of notebook colored maroon with spiral bound, a pamphlet
consisting of eight (8) leaves, including the front and back covers entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan ng
Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo, Leninismo Kaisipang Mao Zedong,
and another pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa sa Habagatang Mindanao, March and April 1981
issue, consisting of ten (10) pages.

Burgos admitted that the gun was issued by Nestor Jimenez, otherwise known as a certain Alias
Pedipol, allegedly team leader of the sparrow unit of New People's Army, responsible in the
liquidation of target personalities, opposed to NPA Ideological movement, an example was the killing
of the late Mayor Llanos and Barangay Captain of Tienda Aplaya Digos, Davao del Sur.

Ruben Burgos was represented by Atty. Anyog to assist accused in the subscription of his extra-
judicial statement. Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession from English to
Visayan language, resulting to the deletion of question No. 19 of the document, by an inserted
certification of Atty. Anyog and signature of accused, indicating his having understood, the allegations
of his extra-judicial statement.

With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the presence of Atty. Anyog and Fiscal
Lovitos, without the presence of military authorities, who escorted the accused, but were sent outside
the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for the accused. 

Issue: Whether there is consent?

Ruling:

Search Warrant – No personal knowledge. police authorities did not have any warrant of arrest or
search warrant with them. There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge
was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by
Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.

At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in
fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.

On consent - Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by
the accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must
appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right. The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not
amount to a permission to make a search therein.

it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his
arrest. So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership of the gun and pointed to the location
of the subversive documents after questioning, the admissions were obtained in violation of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the Bill of Rights winch
provides:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under

investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and
to counsel, and to be informed of such right.. . .

Burgos was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the
custodial interrogation. The lower court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty.
Anyog, to help the accused when he subscribed under oath to his statement at the Fiscal's Office
was too late. It could have no palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the
time of the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statement was being taken.
 3. VEROY VS. LAYAGUE, 210 SCRA 97

There was consent but it should be specific not general.

SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and MA. LUISA VEROY were charged with illegal possession of
firearms, owned and formerly resided at No. 13 Isidro St., Skyline Village. Catalunan Grande, Davao
City. 

Leopoldo Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System
he and his family transferred to 130 K-8th St., East Kamias, Quezon City, where they are presently
residing.

The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to two (2) houseboys, Jimmy Favia and
Eric Burgos and would occasionally send money for their wages through Edna Soguilon. The Veroys
had the keys for their house except 1 key for the kitchen in case of emergency.

Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP, acting upon a directive issued by
Metrodiscom Commander Col. Franco Calida, raided the house of herein petitioners in Davao
City on information that the said residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers.

They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the
owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant.

Petitioner Ma. Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero to
ask permission to search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being used as a hideout and
recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to
Davao City to witness the search but relented if the search would not be conducted in the
presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP, Davao City and a long time
family friend of the Veroys. The authority given by Ma. Luisa Veroy was relayed by Capt.
Obrero to Major Macasaet who answered that Ma. Luisa Veroy has called him twice by
telephone on the matter and that the permission was given on the condition that the search be
conducted in his presence.

Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet conducted the search pursuant to the authority granted by
petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy. The caretakers facilitated their entry into the yard, and using the key
entrusted to Edna Soguilon, they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen. However, a locksmith
by the name of George Badiang had to be employed to open the padlock of the door leading to
the children's room.

Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and conducted the search. Capt.
Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing seven (7) live bullets in a black
clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer. Three (3) half-full jute sacks containing printed
materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the children's room. 

a big travelling bag containing assorted polo shirts, men's brief, two (2) pieces polo barong and short
sleeve striped gray polo. sweat shirt, two (2) pairs men's socks, a towel made in U.S.A., one blanket,
a small black bag, Gandhi brand, containing a book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the
Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and
religious pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom.

Issue: was the consent valid?

Ruling: No - Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma.
Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their residence, it was merely for the purpose of
ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not
include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The items
taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights As
such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them.

The reason for searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a
hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the
compound, he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners
were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did
not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the
same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to
ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police
officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not.

4. PEOPLE VS. BAULA, 344 SCRA 663

Presumption of innocence, police made a mistake resulting in

inadmissibility of the evidence.

Facts: Jupiter Caburao, followed his mother, Patrocinia Caburao, who went to settle her due
obligations at a store, by Brigida Tumamang.

Jupiter noticed a commotion near the creek and saw Crisanto Baula and Danilo Dacucos in the act of
hacking a person who was lying on the ground, while Robert Baula and Ruben Baula stood as
lookouts. 

Jupiter saw that it was his mother but did not reveal it to his relatives or the police.

An investigation was conducted, the policemen went to the house of the accused, they asked Ruben
Baula and Crisanto Baula for the clothing they wore on the night of the murder. Ruben Baula
gave his bloodstained pair of short pants, and Crisanto Baula turned over his bloodstained
polo shirt. The policemen next went to the hut of Danilo Dacucos. Inside the hut, the group
found hanging on the wall a bloodstained bolo. The blood found on the shorts, shirts and bolo
matched the blood type of the deceased.

Issue: was the consent valid?

Ruling: No. Accused-appellants were not being arrested at the time that the subject articles were
allegedly taken from them but were just being questioned by the police officers conducting the
investigation about the death of Patrocinia Caburao. The investigating officers had no personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed the crime. Being in no position to effect
a warrantless arrest, the police officers were thus likewise barred from effecting a warrantless search
and seizure.

The Court finds it less than credible the stance of the prosecution that the polo shirt and short
pants have been voluntarily given. An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure
cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. This 34 

presumption, by itself, cannot prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an

individual, and zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods
that the Constitution itself abhors.

F. STOP & FRISK

1. SUSAN ESQUILLO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 182010, August 25, 2010

Susan Esquillo was charged with violation of RA 9165 (the comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002) 0.1224 gram of shabu

On the basis of an informant’s tip, police officers were sent to Bayanihan St, Malibay Pasay City to
conduct surveillance on the activities of an alleged notorious snatcher operating in the area known
only as "Ryan."

As the police officers alighted from the vehicle, he glanced at the direction of Susan and she was
seen placing inside a yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing white substance. 

While PO1 Cruz was not sure what the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious when Susan
started acting strangely as he began to approach her. He then introduced himself as a police officer
to petitioner and inquired about the plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case. Instead
of replying, however, petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely restrained by
PO1 Cruzin who then requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the cigarette case.

Issue: was the stop and frisk valid?

Ruling: the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers constituted a valid "stop-
and-frisk" operation.

That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid search warrant is
settled. The same, however, admits of exceptions, viz:

(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels and aircraft for
violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of
automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;"
(7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and
(8) "stop and frisk" operations.

What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual
suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a "stop-and-frisk"
practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

The operation by the police officers was in compliance with the standards on how "stop-and-
frisk" operation should be carried out. The police officer should properly introduce himself and
make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious
conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The
apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s
experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has
weapons (or contraband) concealed about him.

3. PEOPLE VS. POSADAS, 188 SCRA  288

A person who is innocent will not run away

Facts: members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the
Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While
they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges, they spotted Romeo Posadas carrying
a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.

They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith &
Wesson revolver, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade,
and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun.

Issue: was the stop & frisk valid?

Ruling: Yes, it was valid. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing
something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the
same.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner
only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to
be useless, futile and much too late.

The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation
whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the
status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information.

3. MANALILI VS. PEOPLE, October 9, 1997

Facts: Policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were
conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan
City Cemetery. The surveillance was being made because of information that
drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.

Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle.
They then chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on
drugs who was identified as Alain Manalili. The male person was observed to have
reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to
avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police
officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands.
The male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could
see what said male person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed
Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it.
He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its
marijuana contents

Issue: was the stop and frisk valid?

Ruling: the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. 

In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of
effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in
appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. 

In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their
surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the
Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout of
drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who
were "high." The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to
investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found
marijuana in petitioner’s possession

In the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, 18 a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular
designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him,
and pat him for weapon(s): jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably
to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection
of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and
any weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from
whom they were taken.

5. MALACAT VS. CA, 283 SCRA 159

See something in someone that can convince you, mere

suspicion is not enough
Four police officers were conducting a patrol in Quiapo (6:30PM)  due to bomb threats that
been occurring in the area for the last seven days. They found two groups of Muslim-looking
men standing on opposite sides of the Quezon Boulevard corner who were acting
suspiciously and their eyes were moving very fast. After thirty minutes of observing the two
groups, they decided to approach one of the groups. Upon seeing the policemen, the groups
fled in all directions. Fortunately, one of the men later identified as Malacat, was
apprehended. Without a warrant, the police officer searched him and found a grenade
tucked inside his front waist line. Malacat was arrested and charged with illegal possession
of explosives. 

the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid -A genuine reason must exist not a mere suspicion

There could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search
in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Rodolfo Yu, the arresting officer, or
an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been
committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Since the arrest of petitioner
is invalid, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful
arrest.

There was also no justifiable reason to apply the “stop-and-frisk” rule. While probable cause
is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a
hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him.

First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group which
attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police
report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.

Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited
even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" — an observation which leaves
us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30
p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and
were not creating any commotion or trouble

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a
deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered"
"inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and
petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have
been visible to Yu. 

G. Warrantless search in checkpoints

RICARDO VALMONTE VS. GEN RENATO DE VILLA,              GR No. 83988, September 29, 1989. 

Bodily search is not allowed.

Private parties are excluded

Facts:
On January 20 1987, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) was activated to conduct security operations for the purpose of
establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty, the NCRDC
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

However, residents of Valenzuela are worried about  the installation of the

checkpoints for being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering
that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.
Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone through these
checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a
court order or search warrant.
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a
blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order
in violation of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
WON the installation of checkpoints violates the Constitutional right of the
residents against unreasonable search and seizure and thus shall be dismantled or
banned.
RULED:
No. Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by
the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the
checkpoints as per se illegal. 
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped
and searched without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without
stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against
unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether
there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all
searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is
to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela may be considered as
a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take
judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency
movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military
men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and
the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions —
which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the
men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse.
But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizens, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community.
The Court dismissed the petition for prohibition seeking the declaration of the
checkpoints as unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning.

(Read also the RESOLUTION  ON  THE MOTION  FOR RECONSIDERATION dated
JUNE 15, 1990, 185 SCRA 665)

Facts: In the Court’s decision dated 29 September 1989, petitioners’ petition for
prohibition seeking the declaration of the checkpoints as unconstitutional and
their dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed. Petitioners have filed the instant
motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said decision. Before submission
of the incident for resolution, the Solicitor General, for the respondents, filed his
comment, to which petitioners filed a reply. The checkpoints are nonetheless attacked by
the movants as a warrantless search and seizure and, therefore, violative of the
Constitution.
Issue: 
Whether installment and operation of checkpoints is unconstitutional and
constitutes warrantless search.

Held: 
No, it is the basic right of the State to defend itself from its enemies and,
while in power, to pursue its program of government intended for public welfare;
and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has the equal right, under
its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving
them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected. it the basic right to
defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of government
intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has
the equal right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for
best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected.
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the
potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways
are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second, checkpoint operations both
appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. 
The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible
evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and
believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by
officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the
most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such
officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on
motorists as a class, and since field officers may stop only those cars passing the
checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there
was in the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of
discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop
judicial review
H. Warrantless search involving “hot logs”
MUSTANG LUMBER VS. CA, 257 SCRA 430
FACTS:
The Chief of the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR
organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at a
lumberyard which is, according to on an information, a huge stockpile of narra
flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of Mustang Lumber in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard a
truck loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. The
driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, so the team
seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at
Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises
because of the refusal of the owner.

ISSUE:
  WON the seizure of the truck and its cargo without warrant was unlawful.
RULED:
No. The warrantless search and seizure of the truck, which was moving out
from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes
of lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did
not offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be supported
by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions
where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving
vehicle. As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and
shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled that the said seizure was a
continuation of that made the previous day and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the
search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not
even question. And, although the search warrant did not specifically mention almaciga,
 supa, and lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is settled that the
executing officer is not required to ignore contrabands observed during the conduct of
the search.
The seizure of such a truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested
upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D.
No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the
FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search
could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant.
EDDIE GUAZON, ET AL. VS. MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, ET AL., GR NO. 80508, January 30, 1990

Facts: 
NPA were alleged to be in manila hence, the saturation drives
Military power during abnormal times only, if there are abuses you can file a case.

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and
police officers represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal Target
Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila.

The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bonafide residents of
Metro Manila and taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities. They maintain
that they have a common or general interest in the preservation of the rule of law,
protection of their human rights and the reign of peace and order in their
communities. They claim to represent "the citizens of Metro Manila who have
similar interests and are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before this Court."

According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" are in
critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the
subversives are hiding. The arrests range from seven (7) persons during the July 20
saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one thousand five hundred (1,500) allegedly
apprehended on November 3 during the drive at Lower Maricaban, Pasay City. The
petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights
abuses. 

"1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or early
morning hours, police and military units without any search warrant or warrant of
arrest cordon an area of more than one residence and sometimes whole
barangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila. Most of them are in civilian
clothes and without nameplates or identification cards.

"2. These raiders rudely rouse residents form their sleep by banging on the walls
and windows of their homes, shouting, kicking their doors open (destroying some
in the process), and then ordering the residents within to come out of their
respective residences.

"3. The residents at the point of high-powered guns are herded like cows, the men
are ordered to strip down to their briefs and examined for tattoo marks and other
imagined marks.

"4. While the examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted by the
raiders, some of the members of the raiding team force their way into each and
every house within the cordoned off area and then proceed to conduct search of
 the said houses without civilian witnesses from the neighborhood.

"5. In many instances, many residents have complained that the raiders ransack
their homes, tossing about the residents’ belongings without total regard for their
value. In several instances, walls are destroyed, ceilings are damaged in the
raiders’ illegal effort to ‘fish’ for incriminating evidence.

"6. Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with increasing
frequency that their money and valuables have disappeared after the said
operations.

"7. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and unwelcome
intrusions are arrested on the spot and hauled off to waiting vehicles that take
them to detention centers where they are any warrants of arrest duly issued by a
judge, nor under the conditions that will authorize warrantless arrest. Some
hooded men are used to fingerpoint suspected subversives.

"8. In some instances, arrested persons are released after the expiration of the
period wherein they can be legally detained without any charge at all. In other
instances, some arrested persons are released without charge after a few days of
arbitrary detention.

"9. The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point them at the
residents during these illegal operations.

"10. Many have also reported incidents of ‘on-the-spot beatings’, maulings and
maltreatment.

"11. Those who are detained for further ‘verification’ by the raiders are subjected
to mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical information."

Issue: whether the saturation drive is legal

Defense of the Accused: 

Respondents stress two points in their Comment which was also adopted as their
Memorandum after the petition was given due course. First, the respondents have legal
authority to conduct saturation drives. And second, they allege that the accusations of
the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human rights are total lies. Insofar as the
legal basis for saturation drives is concerned, the respondents cite Article VII, Section 17
of the Constitution which provides:
"The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed

"The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

they were intelligently and carefully planned months ahead of the actual operation. They
were executed in coordination with barangay officials who pleaded with their
constituents to submit themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification.
Local and foreign correspondents, who had joined these operations, witnessed and
recorded the events that transpired relative thereto.
 Ruling: NO

Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved,

it is the duty of the court to stop the transgression and state where even the awesome
power of the state may not encroach upon the rights of the individual.

It is the duty of the court to take remedial action even in cases where the petitioners do
not complain that they were victims of the police actions, where no names of any of the
thousands of alleged victims are given, and where the prayer is a general one to stop all
police "saturation drives," as long as the Court is convinced that the event actually
happened.

The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. We
cannot imagine police actions of the magnitude described in the petitions and admitted
by the respondents, being undertaken without some undisciplined soldiers and
policemen committing certain abuses. However, the remedy is not to stop all police
actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong in police
making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or
violent demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A show of force is
sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated. A
blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to
one on one confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests against
specific individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police
decide to sit down in their offices because all concerted drives where a show of force is
present are totally prohibited.c

If our policy makers sustain the contention of the military and the police that occasional
saturation drives are essential to maintain the stability of government and to insure
peace and order, clear policy guidelines on the behavior of soldiers and policemen must
not only be evolved, they should also be enforced.  

Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sarmiento

The question, then, is purely one of law: Are the saturation drives in question lawful and legitimate? It
is also a question that is nothing novel: No, because the arrests were not accompanied by a
judicial warrant. Therefore, the fact that they had been carefully planned, executed in
coordination with Tondo’s barangay officials, and undertaken with due courtesy and
politeness (which I doubt), will not validate them. The lack of a warrant makes them, per se,
illegal. I find allusions to the last aborted coup d’etat inapt. In that case, our men in uniform had all
the right to act amidst crimes being committed in flagrante. The instant case is quite different.
There are no offenses being committed, but rather, police officers fishing for evidence of
offenses that may have been committed. As I said, in that event, a court warrant is
indispensable.

As a general rule, a peace officer can not act unless he is possessed of the proper arrest
or search warrant. The exception is when a criminal offense is unfolding before him, in
which case, action is justified and necessary. The majority would have the exception to
be simply, the general rule.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and
RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA UMIL and NICANOR DURAL, FELICITAS SESE VS. FIDEL RAMOS, ET AL.
and companion cases, G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990

Facts: 
This is a case that involves eight (8) petitions for habeas corpus filed before the Court,
which have been consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the various respondents to produce the
bodies of the persons and to explain why they should not be set at liberty without further
delay.

The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made
without warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the
information filed against them are null and void.

Defense of the Accused:

In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested
and are detained by virtue of valid information filed in court against them.

The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective
pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor
arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances
attending these cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus.

Ruling: 

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos).

The claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without
basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the
nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses,
aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees were well within the
bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is
more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and
the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial
warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt
acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by
the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence
against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is
of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of
invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these
contingencies continues cannot be less justified.

In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo
Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified. When apprehended at the house of Renato
Constantino in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted
that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and other
members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a member of the
National United Front Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of
subversive documents found in the house of her sister in Caloocan City. She was also in
possession of ammunition and a fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or
authority to possess.

In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and
Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both are admittedly
members of the standing committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the house
of Renato Constatino, they had a bag containing subversive materials, and both carried
firearms and ammunition for which they had no license to possess or carry.

In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is
justified under the Rules, since she had with her unlicensed ammunition when she was
arrested. Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her arrest without a
warrant is justified.

In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the petitioner
Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article
142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, is similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of the
Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association
of drivers and operators of public service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their
mutual aid and protection. Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the
petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid information filed with the competent court, he
may not be released on habeas corpus. He may, however be released upon posting bail
as recommended. However, we find the amount of the recommended bail (P60,000.00)
excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00 only
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit in the
submission of Narciso Nazareno that he was illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained.

If the judge finds that there's probable cause, must he issue a warrant of arrest  as a matter of
course?

SAmulde vs. Salvani, September 26, 1988 (No because a warrant is issued in
order to have jurisdiction of the court over the person of an accused and to assure
the court of his presence whenever his case is called in court. As such, if the court
believes that the presence of the accused could be had even without a warrant of
arrest, then he may not issue said warrant. Note: This case involves a minor
offense)
GOZO VS. TAC-AN, 300 SCRA 265. If the offense committed is a serious one
like that obtaining in this case for murder, the Judge must issue a warrant of arrest
after determining the existence of probable cause

1. Samulde vs. Salvani, September 26,  1988

(Not necessarily if it involves a minor offense provided he is sure that the accused will
 
appear in court whenever his case is scheduled for trial)

Read information to find probable cause to continue a case, judge to ask for additional
evidence, dismissed

Can cite in contempt

Can forfeit the bond in did not appear

Bond-will appear

FACTS 

Municipal Judge Gelacio Samulde of Patnoñgon, Antique, conducted a preliminary investigation of

Pelayo Arangale upon a complaint for robbery by Maria Magbanua alleging that Arangale harvested
palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale's land.

After making a preliminary investigation based on the affidavits of the complainant and
her witnesses and counter-affidavits of the respondent and his witnesses, as provided in
Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Judge Samulde
transmitted the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Ramon Salvani with his
finding that "there is robbery as charge in the complaint.

The fiscal returned the records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of
the records to his office was "premature" because Judge Samulde failed to include the
warrant of arrest against the accused as provided in Section 5, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure.

 Judge Samulde sent back the records to Fiscal Salvani. He pointed out that under
Section 6, Rule 112, he may issue a warrant of arrest if he is satisfied "that a probable
cause exists AND that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, " implying thereby that, although he
found that a probable cause existed, he did not believe that Arangale should be
immediately placed under custody so as not to frustrate the ends of justice. Hence, he
refused to issue a warrant of arrest. 

Provincial fiscal Salvani anchored his action for mandamus against Judge Samulde on
Section 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Canal Procedure which provides that upon the
termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating judge should transmit to the
provincial fiscal (instead of the clerk of Court of the CFI as provided in the 1940 and
1964 Rules of Court) the warrant of arrest and other records of the preliminary
investigation. From that fiscal Salvani deduced that the investigating judge must issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused upon the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation. 

ISSUE:
 Whether it is mandatory for the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused in
view of his finding, after conducting a preliminary investigation, that there exists prima
facie evidence that the accused committed the crime.
HELD: 
 NO.  To determine whether a warrant of arrest should issue against the accused, the
 investigating judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses "in writing and
under oath ... in the form of searching questions and answers." When he is "satisfied that
a probable cause exists, and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice," he may issue the warrant
as provided in Section 6, par. b, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

SEC. 6  When a warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Court..... (b)
By the Municipal Trial Court. -If the municipal trial judge conducting the
preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath
of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice,
he shall issue a warrant of arrest. 

As correctly argued by the petitioner Judge Samulde, three (3) conditions must concur
for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The investigating judge must:  

(a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses
by searching questions and answers;
 (b) be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and  
(c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice.

It is an entirely new rule, and it is plain to see that it is not obligatory, but merely discretionary,
upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, even after having
personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers, for the determination of whether a probable cause exists and whether it is necessary to
arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or
discretion.

In this particular case, since the robbery charge was the offshoot of a boundary dispute between two
property owners, the investigating judge did not believe there was any danger of the accused
absconding before the filing of the information against him by the fiscal, hence, he found no need to
place him under immediate custody.

 The provision of Section 5, Rule 112 simply means that the warrant of arrest, if one was
issued, shall be transmitted to the fiscal with the records of the preliminary investigation.
If the investigating judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion, decides not to issue a
warrant of arrest, then none need be transmitted to the fiscal, and he may not be
compelled by mandamus to issue it. 

The fiscal's speedy and adequate remedy, if he believes that the accused should be
immediately placed under custody so as not to frustrate the ends of justice, is not to file a
mandamus action (which may take two years or more to finally resolve, as happened in
this case), but as sensibly indicated by the petitioner, to immediately file the information
so that the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused

2. GOZO VS. TAC-AN, 300 SCRA 265

(Yes, he must because the case is for Murder and as such, the accused must be in jail for a
non-bailable offense
FACTS: 
On the night of February 9, 1995, the officials, teachers, and students of the Concepcion
Aguila Memorial College in San Jose, Batangas organized a school party.

While the party was going on, the principal, Felizardo Aguila, was informed that several
drunk men were trying to force their way through the main gate.

One of the men seemed armed with a handgun. After calling the police, Aguila went to
the main gate, where he asked the men what their business was.

At this point, members of the Philippine National Police of San Jose, Batangas arrived.
Blanco and Atienza arrived at the school. They were shortly joined by Pedro Castillo,
Sulit, and Ildefonso Castillo.

They demanded from the man armed with the handgun, who later turned out to be the
victim Gilbert Dyogi, that he surrenders his gun and go with them to the station. Gilbert
Dyogi gave the handgun to the respondents, who then asked to see his license. He
produced a sheet of paper from his wallet which he handed to them. After allowing them
to inspect the weapon and the alleged license, Gilbert Dyogi asked the private
respondents to give them back to him. However, respondent Blanco, who had the
handgun, refused to do so.

What exactly followed is unclear. Before long the two were grappling for possession of
the gun. Apparently, Blanco pulled out his sidearm and fired at Gilbert Dyogi twice.

In connection with the fatal incident, Gerald Varez, Investigator in the Office of the
Ombudsman for the Military, charged Blanco, Pedro Castillo, Sulit, Atienza, and
Ildefonso Castillo with murder in an information filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas City.

The accused filed a motion to hold issuance of warrant and prayed that the court should
determine whether there was probable cause.

Edna Dyogi opposed the motion.

Judge PeternoTac-an of the RTC of Batangas found probable cause to hold Blanco for
homicide only and the other were discharged due to lack of evidence,

Edna Dyogi filed for reconsideration arguing that the crime was murder. Again, Judge Tac-an
included Castillo in the information as an accomplice.

Edna Dyogi filed for another motion contending that the power to determine the nature of the
offense to be charged was vested in the Provincial Prosecutor and not in the Regional Trial
Court but was denied Hence, the petition of certiorari

Ruling: RTC judges are not authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.

Rule 112, §1 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary investigation as "an inquiry or proceeding for
the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial."

Thus, as provided in Rule 112, §2(d), other officers may be authorized by law to conduct
preliminary investigations. Indeed, under R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman
Act of 1989, investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman may conduct preliminary
investigations of cases involving public officers. 

It is evident that in this case, respondent judge conducted an inquiry, not only for the purpose of
determining whether there was probable cause to order the arrest of private respondents Blanco,
Pedro Castillo, Sulit, Atienza, and Ildefonso Castillo, but for the purpose of determining whether there
was sufficient evidence to prosecute them as well. Indeed, in his questioned orders, respondent
judge did not only determine the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest,
but also what the charge should be and who should be charged. In so doing, respondent judge
exceeded his authority.

To justify his orders, respondent judge invokes Art. III, §2 of the 1997 Constitution, which provides
that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized." However, this provision applies to the issuance of arrest and search warrants,
which should be distinguished from a preliminary investigation. As already stated, the determination
of probable cause for the issuance of such orders is vested in the courts, but the conduct of
preliminary investigations is entrusted to the executive branch, with the exception of inferior court
judges.

The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's
job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary
examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.

Lack of probable cause is not one of the grounds for a motion to quash under Rule 117, §3 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. A motion to quash should be based on a defect in the
information which is evident on its face. 
Place to be searched indicated in the warrant is different what the police had in mind when
applied for a warrant:
1. PEOPLE VS. CA, 291 SCRA 400 (G.R. No. 126379 June 26, 1998)

FACTS:

S/Insp PNP James BRILLANTES applied for a search warrant against Mr. Azfar
HUSSAIN, who allegedly possessed firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety
Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan.

 Judge Marciano BACALLA issued a search warrant, but it was not served by the
police officers at Abigail Variety Store. The police officers served the search
warrant at Apt. No. 1 which is adjacent to Abigail Variety Store. Four Pakistani
nationals were arrested. Their belongings, cash and guns were seized. Some of
the guns confiscated were not described in the search warrant.

The motion to quash search warrant, applied by the arrested individuals, was
granted because the place searched is different from the place mentioned in the
search warrant. In addition, it was established that:
1) the residence of the Pakistani nationals is at Apartment No. 1 which is adjacent
to the Abigail's Variety Store;
2)  there is no such number as "1207" found in the building as it is correspondingly
 called only as "Apartment No. 1, 2, 3 and 4;"

3) Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigail's Variety Store;

4) there are no connecting doors that can pass from Abigail's Variety Store to
Apartment No. 1;
5) Abigail's Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its own respective doors used
for ingress and egress.

ISSUE: Can police officers carry out a search on a place that was different from
the one indicated on the search warrant just because that place was the one in
their mind when they applied for a search warrant?

RULING: No.

The only place that may be legitimately searched is the one described in the
search warrant. What the police officers did was they substituted the place that
the Judge had written down in the warrant to the premises that they had in their
mind. This should not have been done.

It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that
stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched — although not
that specified in the warrant — is exactly what they had in view when they applied
for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material
in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not
what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they
submitted to the court issuing the warrant.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or

modified by the officers’ own personal knowledge of the premises. The
particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be
done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the
discretion of the police officers conducting the search. 

Thus, as there was a violation of the constitutional requirement that a search

warrant particularly describes the place to be searched, the evidence obtained in
such search shall be inadmissible in any proceeding. Even if there is a finding of
probable cause for the search warrant, the search and seizure is still invalid. 

Searching questions
DR. NEMESIO PRUDENTE VS. THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE
ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC 33, Manila & People of the Philippines,
GR No. 82870, December 14, 1989 (En Banc)
(When the applicant testifies that his knowledge that the petitioner has guns and explosives in
his office came from a very reliable informant, there is no probable cause since he has no
personal knowledge of said fact.)

FACTS:
Police Major Alladin DIMAGMALIW filed an application for a search warrant
against Dr. Nemesio PRUDENTE for illegally possessing firearms. The RTC of
Manila Branch 33, presided over by Judge DAYRIT received the application.

P/Major DIMAGMALIW alleged that he has been informed that Nemesio

PRUDENTE possesses illegal firearms and explosives at the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines and that he has verified the report and found it to
be a fact. P/Major DIMAGMALIW’s sole witness, Police Lieutenant Florenio
ANGELES, declared in his affidavit or deposition that as a result of their
continuous surveillance for several days, they gathered information from
verified sources that the holders of the said firearms and explosives were not
licensed to possess them.

Judge DAYRIT, after examining under oath P/Major DIMAGMALIW and P/Lt.
ANGELES, found probable cause against DR. PRUDENTE.

He then issued a Search Warrant which is to be executed within the premises of

Polytechnic University of the Philippines, more particularly (a) offices of the
Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at
the ground floor; (b) office of the President, Dr. PRUDENTE at PUP, Second
Floor and other rooms on the second floor.

As a result of the search, three hand grenades were found inside the washroom
of Dr. PRUDENTE’s office.

DR. PRUDENTE claimed that the search warrant is invalid because the applicant
(P/Major DIMAGMALIW) and the witness (P/Lt. ANGELES) did not have personal
knowledge of the facts which were the basis for the issuance of the search
warrant. In addition, DR. PRUDENTE claimed that the examination done by
Judge DAYRIT was not in the form of searching questions.

ISSUE: Is the search warrant valid?

RULING: No.

The applicant and the witness did not have personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances which became the basis for issuing the contested search warrant.
They acquired said knowledge only through information from other sources or
persons. In other words, their knowledge was merely hearsay. In addition, Judge
DAYRIT did not examine P/Lt. ANGELES "in the form of searching questions and
answers." On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a
simple "yes" or "no" answer. Asking leading questions in an application for search
warrant, and conducting examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the
requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.
Sufficiency test (as to personal knowledge):

The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a

search warrant is whether it has been drawn in a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
applicant for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported
by a person whom one considers to be reliable. 

xxx

The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the applicant or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.  

Tested by the above standard, P/Lt. ANGELES, could not be held liable for
perjury for the allegations he stated in his affidavit because he did not have
personal knowledge of the facts. He said that they "gathered information from
verified sources."

The allegations of P/Major DIMAGMALIW are also not valid because there is
nothing in the records to show how and when he verified the information he
previously received. What’s worse, even if it was stated that Judge DAYRIT
examined P/Major DIMAGMALIW under oath, there are no records to show that
any searching questions and answers were asked to the applicant in order to
verify his allegations.

Searching Questions (as to examination by the judge):

The examination against P/Lt. ANGELES was too brief and short (5 questions
were shown in the case). Further, the questions asked were not searching
questions but rather, leading questions needing a “yes” or “no” answer. They are
not sufficient to establish probable cause.

HUBERT WEBB VS. DE LEON, 247 SCRA 650 (G.R. No. 121234)
This case refers to the infamous Vizconde massacre. The Supreme Court affirmed the validity of
the arrest of all of the accused in this 1995 case. However, in 2010, the Supreme Court
acquitted the accused of all charges because the testimony of eyewitness, Jessica Alfaro, was
false. 

FACTS:

NBI filed with DOJ a letter-complaint charging Hubert WEBB, Michael

GATCHALIAN, Antonio J. LEJANO and six (6) other persons, with the crime of
Rape with Homicide (Vizconde Massacre).

The DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors to conduct a preliminary investigation of

those charged with the rape and killing on June 30, 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde;
her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their
home in BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila.

NBI presented, among others, the sworn statement of the principal witness Maria
Jessica M. ALFARO who allegedly saw the commission of the crime.

The DOJ Panel then issued a 26-page Resolution finding probable cause to hold
the accused for trial and recommending that an Information for rape with homicide
be filed against them.

The case was raffled to the court of Judge ESCANO, but he voluntarily inhibited
himself because he was employed with the NBI before he became a judge.

Judge Raul de Leon, the pairing judge of Judge ESCANO, issued a warrant of
arrest against the accused. Due to Judge ESCANO’s inhibition, the case was re-
raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita TOLENTINO who issued new
warrants of arrest.

The accused claimed that the judges should have conducted a personal
examination of the witnesses before issuing a warrant of arrest against them.
They also highlighted that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was made in a
matter of a few hours after receipt of the 26-page Resolution of the DOJ Panel.

ISSUE:

(1) Is the judge required, before issuing a warrant of arrest, to personally examine
the complainant and his witnesses in order to determine probable cause?

(2) Does the fact that the judges, who issued the warrants of arrest, only took a
few hours to review the 26-page DOJ Panel resolution mean that they invalidly
issued a warrant of arrest?

RULING:

(1) Is the judge required, before issuing a warrant of arrest, to personally examine
the complainant and his witnesses in order to determine probable cause?

No. What the Constitution requires is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In
satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses.

The judge just needs to (1) personally evaluate the report and the documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.

(2) Does the fact that the judges, who issued the warrants of arrest, only took a
few hours to review the 26-page DOJ Panel resolution mean that they invalidly
issued a warrant of arrest?

No. The fact that it took the judges a few hours to review and affirm the probable
cause determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no personal
evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case.

Before issuing a warrant of arrest, judges merely determine personally the

probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not
conduct a de novo (new) hearing to determine the existence of probable cause.
They can just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding
a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. Also, the
sufficiency of the review process cannot be measured by merely counting minutes
and hours.

Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 (G.R. No. L-45358)

FACTS:

Chief Mariano G. ALMEDA of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board applied
for a search warrant with the CFI of Tayabas presided by Judge Eduardo
Gutierrez DAVID.

Chief ALMEDA stated in his affidavit that according to reliable information,

Narciso ALVAREZ is keeping in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books,
documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with
his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of
the law.

In his oath at the end of the affidavit, Chief ALMEDA stated that his answers to
the questions of Judge DAVID were correct to the best of his knowledge and
belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of
the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person.

Judge DAVID then issued a search warrant to be executed in the house of

ALVAREZ. Several agents of the Anti-Usury Board executed the search warrant
at seven o'clock on the night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took possession of
books, documents and other papers.

ALVAREZ claimed that the search warrant was illegal because Chief ALMEDA
had no personal knowledge of the facts which served as the basis for the
issuance of the search warrant. In addition, his affidavit was not supported by
other affidavits.

ISSUE:

(1) Was probable cause sufficiently established before the issuance of the
warrant?

(2) Is it required that the affidavit of the applicant be supported by other affidavits
(of witnesses)?

RULING:

(1) Was probable cause sufficiently established before the issuance of the
warrant?

No. The affidavit of ALMEDA was based on an information he secured from a

person whom he considered reliable. Thus, he did not have personal knowledge
of the facts. As a matter of fact, he swore an oath regarding the correctness of the
information he received from the reliable person and not regarding information he
personally acquired.

A search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the

applicants and the witnesses he may produce. This oath must refer to the truth of
the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant or his witnesses, because
the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause.

Thus, the search warrant is illegal because the warrant was based solely upon the
affidavit of ALMEDA who had no personal knowledge of the facts of probable
cause.

(2) Is it required that the affidavit of the applicant be supported by other affidavits
(of witnesses)?

No. If the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may
dispense with the affidavits of other witnesses. The purpose of requiring the
presentation of depositions/affidavits is nothing more than to satisfy the
committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause.

In this case, the affidavit of the applicant was insufficient because his knowledge
of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay. It is then the duty of the judge to
require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the
existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. 

REMEMBER: When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains

sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge
is satisfied that there exists probable cause. However, when the applicant's
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses
having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary.

Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 687

Illegal items, Forfeited in favor of the government

Judge Romulo Gonzales issued a search warrant against Josefino Roan. His
house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant
was discovered.

However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt
Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now
the bases of the charge against the petitioner.

During the "examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce" the complainant himself was not subjected to an
interrogation.

Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:

The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed

his application for a search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared
before me in the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada
and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to me their
respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police
investigator assigned to the PC-INP command at Camp Col. Maximo
Abad. As the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, I
proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to
ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same.
Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same before me. 10

By his own account, all he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of
his affidavit only "to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the
same," and only because "the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to."
The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the
affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any
case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the
contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant's deposition in writing
and attach them to the record, together with the affidavit presented to him.

The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant
Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search
warrant on the basis of the information provided by the aforenamed witnesses
whose depositions as aforementioned had already been taken by the
undersigned."

Issue: was the search warrant valid?

Ruling: No – Like Alvarez v CFI, In other words, the applicant was asking for
the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of of mere hearsay and not of
information personally known to him (Quillosa), as required by settled
jurisprudence."

The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a

prosecution for perjury in case the applicant's declarations are found to be
false. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of
the warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by
their own personal information, to establish the apphcant's claims. 

It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not

merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be
established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of
the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of
the application.

A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus
Tohilida, who both claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were
in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except
that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the
respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by Tohilida that
they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the
opposition candidate in the forthcoming election (a "Lecarista") did not excite
the respondent judge's own suspicions. This should have put him on guard as
to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible
misrepresentations from them.

The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses' statement

that they saw eight men deliver arms to the petitioner in his house on May 2,
1984.  This was supposedly done overtly, and Tohilida said he saw everything
through an open window of the house while he was near the gate.  He could
even positively say that six of the weapons were.45 caliber pistols and two
were.38 caliber revolvers. 

One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how
the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he
was from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or a second floor, or
why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done
openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were
against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were
injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declarations of the witnesses were readily
accepted and the search warrant sought was issued forthwith.

Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388

Must be attached to show that there is compliance

Facts: Soriano Mata is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306 "AN ACT
GRANTING THE PHILIPPINE JAI-ALAI AND AMUSEMENT CORPORATION A FRANCHISE
TO OPERATE, CONSTRUCT AND MAINTAIN A FRONTON FOR BASQUE PELOTA AND
SIMILAR GAMES OF SKILL IN THE GREATER MANILA AREA".

The information against herein petitioner alleged that he offered, took and
arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao
tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement
Corporation or from the government authorities concerned Hence, Judge
Josephine Bayona issued a search warrant against Mata and the searching
officers found the following: stock of "masiao" tickets; "masiao" issue tickets; bet
money; control pad or "masiao" numbers; stamping pad with rubber stamp
marked Ormoc City Jai-Alai.

During the hearing of the case, the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected
to the issuance of the warrant are missing from the records of the case to which the
judge responded “it is with the court”.

Mata filed for motion to quash under Sec 4 of Rule 126 “the judge must, before, issuing
the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the
record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him”

Judge Bayona dismissed the petition stating that the court has made a thorough
investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T.
Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that
in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents
relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal
case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents
are to be attached to the records. 

Issue: Whether the search warrant was valid

HELD:

NO. The search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge
may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction,
Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant
personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition
to any affidavits presented to him.

Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal
requisites. Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the
requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. In the case at bar, the
search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with
essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to record,
rendering the search warrant invalid.

While the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized cannot be ordered. In
Castro v. Pabalan (70 SCRA 478), it was held that the illegality of the search warrant
does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.

Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541

Must be specific not general

Regional Trial Court judge Esteban Lising of Quezon City, upon application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin
Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service, issued Search Warrant No. Q-
00002 authorizing the search and seizure of certain documents:

1. Printed copies of Philippine Times;

2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times;

3. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;

4. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners;

5. Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines,

video machines and tapes

which have been used and are being used as instrument and means of committing the crime of
inciting to sedition by Rommel Corro-a publisher and editor of the Philippine Times

Issue: Whether the search warrant was valid?

Ruling: No- Search warrant was general. Thus, an application for search warrant must state with
particularly the alleged subversive materials published or intended to be published by the publisher
and editor of the Philippine Times, Rommel Corro.

The affidavit of Col. Castillo states that in several issues of the Philippine Times:

... we found that the said publication in fact foments distrust and hatred against the
government of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities, defined and
penalized by Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1835; (p. 22, Rollo)

and, the affidavit of Lt. Ignacio reads, among others—

... the said periodical published by Rommel Corro, contains articles tending to incite
distrust and hatred for the Government of the Philippines or any of its duly constituted
authorities. (p. 23, Rollo)

The above statements are mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. They cannot serve as basis for the issuance of search warrant, absent of the existence of
probable cause. In fact, as a consequence of the search warrant issued, the items confiscated from
the premises of the office of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Bldg., T.M.
Kalaw, Ermita, Manila were the following:
 1. One bundle of assorted negative;

2. One bundle of assorted lay out;

3. Three folders of assorted articles/writings used by Philippine Times news and other
paraphernalias;

4. Four tape — alleged speech of Mayor Climaco, two alleged speeches of Aquino
and a speech of one various artist;

5. One bundle Dummies;

6. Ten bundles of assorted copies of Philippine Times issued on different dates (Nos.
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15):

7. One Typewriter Remington Brand Long Carriage with No. J-2479373;

8. OneTypewriterAdler-short with No. 9003011;

9. Three (3) bundles of Philippine Times latest issue for Baguio City

In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed seizure of printed copies
of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies,
subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and
tape recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable
records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search
warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally
objectionable.

5. Nolasco vs Pano, 147 SCRA 509

Leading questions, questions pertaining to identity, and lack of particularization in the
examination of witnesses
FACTS:
         Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), Aguilar-
Roque was one of the accused of Rebellion.

On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG,
applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street,
Quezon City, determined to be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost
a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground
house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for
being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly
connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.
           
         At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, Aguilar-Roque and Nolasco were arrested by a
Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall
Street, Quezon City. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously
been issued against Nolasco.
 
It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was
submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge Paño.

According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus,
were examined under oath by Judge Paño but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has
been submitted to us. The latter deposed that to his personal knowledge, there were
kept in the premises to be searched records, documents and other papers of the
CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front, including support money from foreign and
local sources intended to be used for rebellion.

The petitioners assert that probable cause has not been established for lack of
searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness.
Questions:

Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant filed by Lt. Col.
Virgilio Saldajeno and the Court would like to know if you affirm the truth of your
answer in this deposition?
(The deposition instead)—
A Yes, sir,
 
Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?
A Almost a month, sir.
Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?
A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.
Q So, you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the application for search
warrant?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque?
A Because of our day and night surveillance, Your Honor, there were so many
suspicious persons with documents.
Q What kind of documents do you refer to?
A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New People's
Army.
Q What else?
A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National Democratic Front,
Organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines ...
Q And may include what else?
A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these
groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions,
manuals not otherwise available to the public and support money from foreign and
local sources.

 
ISSUE:
         Whether the examination questions of the judge are sufficient to establish
probable cause.
HELD:
         The search warrant is null and void.
The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the
applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause.
The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant
comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon
them and act in pursuant thereof. 
  Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to Identity.
The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions.
The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be seized,
which is Identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of
particularity.
The examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the
deposition of said witness.
Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause upon which a warrant may issue.

Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800

FACTS:

Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon
City] issued 2 search warrants in the premises of The "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum”
newspapers in Quezon City, its office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the
said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written
literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-
editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were searched and seized.

         Petitioners contended:

-   That the supporting affidavits and documents lacked specification and are
mere generalization
-   that respondent judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by Section 4,
Rule 126 of the ROC.
-   That the search warrants were used to search two distinct places: No. 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City.
-   That properties not belonging to Jose Burgos were seized
-   That real properties were seized
ISSUE:
Whether there was probable cause in the issuance of the search warrants.
HELD:
         Search warrants are null and void.
         The SC upheld the contention that the search warrants lack particularity regarding
the subversive materials.

in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating
with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice. 

Col. Abadilla’s broad statement that petitioner "is in possession or has in his
control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended ..." is not sufficient.
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce;  the Constitution requires no less than
 personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the
issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
         Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration
constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. 
 
Regarding the other contentions of the petitioners stated above:
1. Re failure of the judge examine under oath or affirmation the applicants –
rendered moot and academic.
2. Re search warrants were used to search two distinct places - The defect pointed
out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied
for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct
premises. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was
applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. Obviously
this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued the warrant.
3. Re seizure of properties not belonging to the accused – the rule on search
warrants does not require that the properties seized belong to the accused.
Ownership is of no consequence and it is sufficient that the person against whom
the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property.

7. Aberca vs. Ver, April 15,1988

Suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus does not validate illegal search and illegal detention.

FACTS:
         Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct
pre-emptive strikes against Communist- Terrorist underground houses. TFM raided
several houses, employing in most cases defectively judicial search warrants, arrested
people without warrant of arrest, denied visitation rights, and interrogated them with the
use of threats and tortures.

During these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of
purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper
warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied
visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to
silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures
and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or
confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional
rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said
plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

         Petitioners sought damages by virtue of Article 32 of the Civil Code.

         Respondents contend that the petitioners’ cause of action is barred by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (protects against unlawful and
indefinite imprisonment)
           
ISSUE:
         Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus validates
illegal arrest or detention.
HELD:
         Suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not validate illegal searches,
arrests, or detention.
We find merit in petitioners’ contention that the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners’ right and cause of action for damages
for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The
suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through
the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners’ right of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and
causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents’ confiscation of their
private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their
right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and
other cruel and inhuman treatment.
 
It cannot be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be
held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions
those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.
 
Effect posting bail or entering a plea or failing to file a motion to quash,  if the arrest was          illegal

STEPHEN SY VS. PEOPLE, GR No. 182178,  August 15, 2011

STEPHEN SY WAS CHARGED WITH VIOLATION OF SEC 11 OF RA

9165. UPON HIS ARRAIGNMENT, HE PLEADED NOT GUILTY. HE
WAS FOUND GUILTY BY THE RTC AND IT WAS AFFIRMED BY
THE CA. UPON APPEAL TO THE SC, STEPHEN RAISED THE
ISSUE ON HIS ILLEGAL ARREST.
PO3 Faelogo, a member of the PNP and assigned as Intelligence Operative of the Dumaguete City
Police Station testified that while on duty he received a telephone call from a concerned citizen that
an illegal drug trade was going on at Zone 3, Barangay Looc, Dumaguete City. 

They responded and saw Stephen Sy examining a transparent plastic sachet containing shabu
powder by flicking the same (0.02 gram of shabu).

Stephen Sy tried to escape but was subdued and was handcuffed.

Issue: illegal arrest

Ruling: It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of
his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this
ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the
court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

In the case at bar, petitioner never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment.
Moreover, he actively participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Thus, he is deemed to have
waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even
negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.

THE SUPREME COURT STATED THAT an accused is estopped from

assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to
move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground
before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived.
Petitioner never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Moreover, he actively participated in the proceedings
before the RTC. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived
defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court trying his case.  

PEOPLE VS. GALVEZ, 355 SCRA 246

MANUEL GALVEZ WAS CHARGED WITH THE MURDER (non

bailable offense) FOR KILLING ROMEN CASTRO.
UPON ARRAIGNMENT, THE ACCUSED PLEADED NOT GUILTY,
BUT WAS FOUND OUT BY THE TRIAL COURT, GUILTY. THE
RULING OF THE RTC, WAS AFFIRMED BY THE CA.
UPON APPEAL TO THE SC, THE ACCUSED RAISED THE ISSUE
ON THE LEGALITY OF HIS ARREST.
Danilo Julia, Loreto Palad, and Alvin Adolfo were at a local fair inside the DM Compound
in Heroes del 98, Caloocan City. Danilo Julia was playing bingo, while Loreto Palad,
Alvin Adolfo, and the victim Romen Castro4 were playing a game where they would throw
25 centavo coins in one of the stalls. 

After a while, five men arrived, including Manuel Galvez. Two of the men approached
Romen Castro, while the other two men served as lookouts. Manuel Galvez then went
up directly to Romen Castro and stabbed him at the back with a knife causing his death.

there was no warrant of arrest at the time Galvez was taken into custody by Saligumba.
Gamboa also testified that there had been efforts to arrest the other suspects who were
still at large.

Ruling: Accused-appellant's arrest was illegal. Arturo Saligumba admitted that he

arrested Galvez on the basis solely of what Reynaldo Castro had told him and not
because he saw accused-appellant commit the crime charged against him. 21 Indeed, the
prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of arrest issued against accused-
appellant when the latter was taken into custody. Considering that accused-appellant
was not committing a crime at the time he was arrested nor did the arresting officer have
any personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant committed a crime,
his arrest without a warrant cannot be justified.

By entering a plea of not guilty and participating actively in the trial, however, accused-
appellant Galvez waived his right to raise the issue of the illegality of his arrest. It is now
settled that objection to a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which a court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea ,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived.  The fact that the arrest was illegal does not
render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the
guilty when all the facts point to the culpability of the accused.

THE RULING OF SC FOUND THAT THE ARREST OF GALVEZ IS DEEMED ILLEGAL.

HOWEVER, By entering a plea of not guilty and participating actively in the
trial, however, accused-appellant Galvez waived his right to raise the issue of
the illegality of his arrest. It is now settled that objection to a warrant of
arrest or the procedure by which a court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the
objection is deemed waived.23 The fact that the arrest was illegal does not
render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to
convict the guilty when all the facts point to the culpability of the accused. 
Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA 377

Faustina Callanta was charged with two counts of grave oral

defamation. her motion to quash complaints were denied by judge
Felipe Villanueva of Dagupan City. She questions the validity of the
issuance of the warrants on the ground that it should have been the
city fiscal who should have conducted the preliminary examination.
However, it was shown that after such issuance of the warrants of arrest with the bail fixed in
the amount of P600.00, petitioner posted such required bail bonds, thus obtaining her provisional
liberty.

The petitioner questions the validity of her arrest 

Ruling: SC RULED THAT With the express admission by petitioner
that she had posted the required bail to obtain her provisional liberty, it
becomes futile to assail the validity of the issuance of the warrants of
arrest. Posting of a bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity
attending the arrest of a person, stop him from discussing the validity
of his arrest. where petitioner has filed an application for bail and
waived the preliminary investigation proper, 'he waived his objection to
whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination conducted prior
to the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

PEOPLE VS. NAZARENO, 260 SCRA 256

Facts :
Narciso Nazareno and Ramil Regala guilty of murder for the killing of Romulo
"Molet" Bunye II in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on December 14, 1988 and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 
On December 14, 1988, between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 am Romulo Bunye II took a
tricycle (referred to in the record as "stainless" body made of stainless steel), which was
driven by Fernando Hernandez. Unknown to Bunye was that two men were waiting
outside his house and that the two hailed another tricycle in order to follow him.Then a
man approached Bunye and shot him also in the head. 
After 14 days on December 28, 1988, Ramil Regala, Narciso Nazareno, Orlando
Hular and Manuel Laureaga were arrested. Regala and Nazareno were put in a police
line-up. They were identified and pointed to as the assailants by the tricycle drivers
Hernandez and de Limos. Hernandez and de Limos executed additional sworn
affidavits.Narciso Nazareno also claimed to have been tortured to admit to the crime but
refused to sign any written statement
The trial court ruled the confessions of Regala and Hular to be inadmissible while the
Court of Appeals ruled that
Issue: 
WON the claim of the accused on arrest without warrant were illegal?
Ruling:  
Yes legal arrest.
The Supreme Court court ruled that Narciso Nazareno and Regala claim that their
arrests without warrant were illegal and justify the nullification of the proceedings of the
trial court. The contention is untenable.

The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Narciso Nazareno was upheld by this

Court in 1990 in a petition for habeas corpus. It appears that, on January 9, 1989,
Nazareno filed a motion for bail. As the trial court denied his motion, a petition for
habeas corpus was filed on his behalf with this Court. It was alleged that Nazareno's
arrest was illegal because it was made without warrant fourteen days after the killing of
Romulo Bunye II. This Court dismissed the petition in its decision of July 9, 1990. He
filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court also denied on the ground that the
warrantless arrest was in accordance with Rule 113, §5(b) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The question which Nazareno raises has thus been settled long ago
in a final decision of this Court.
 Furthermore, Nazareno and Regala waived objections based on the alleged
irregularity of their arrest, considering that they pleaded not guilty to the charges against
them and participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must be deemed cured when
they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Consequently, if
objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not a
sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment rendered after a trial, free
from error. The technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings void and
deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to the
culpability of the accused.

Note: This case is from RTC to SC it did not undergo CA under Rule 65 unless and only
if, it meets Rule 65.

FILOTEO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 263 SCRA 222

Facts: 
The petition for certiorari assail the decision of the Sandiganbayan finding Jose
Filoteo, guilty as co-principal in violation of Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law
of 1974. Jose Filoteo was armed with guns, stopped a Postal Delivery Truck and carried
away the contents of the truck in the total amount of more or less P253,728. 29. They
were then arrested and brought before the courts, where they pleaded not guilty. The
Sandiganbayn’s decision convicted Jose Filoteo and the motion for consideration was
not granted.
Jose Filoteo questions the manner of his arrest, stating that the arresting officers
"invited" him without a warrant of arrest and brought him to Camp Crame where he was
allegedly subjected to torture almost a month after the commission of the crime. 
Petitioner's claim is belatedly made. He should have questioned the validity of his arrest
before he entered his plea in the trial court. 
Issue: Whether or not the arrest was legal?
Ruling: 
Not an illegal arrest 

The Supreme Court ruled that it is much too late for Jose Filoteo to raise the
question of his arrest without a warrant. When Jose Filoteo was arrested and a case
was filed against him, he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, participated in the trial
and presented his evidence. Jose Filoteo is thus estopped from questioning the legality
of his arrest. It is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or
procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused
must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. 

Jose Filoteo  did not move for the quashal of the information before the trial court
on this ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured
when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a
plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an
accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after trial free from error.
 The only move petitioner made in regard to his arrest was to file a complaint for
"grave coercion, grave threat & maltreatment" which was docketed as I.S. No. 82-12684
before the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City. The complaint was an offshoot of his alleged
maltreatment in the hands of the SOG upon his arrest. However, as stated above, he
did not lift a finger to revive it upon its 

PEOPLE VS. LAPURA, 255 SCRA 85

Facts:
February 19, 1988, in the City of Manila, Philippines,Dionisio Lapura shot
Petronilo Lim several times with a .45 caliber pistol hitting him on left anterior
lumbar and left thigh, which caused his death.
Appellant contends that People vs. Opida,  where the Court exonerated the
appellant for nonobservance of certain of his constitutional rights as an accused,
should also be applied in acquiring him. He alleges that —

Like accused-appellants Olpida (sic) and Marcelo in that case, the constitutional
rights of herein appellant have been grossly violated. From the very time that he
was arrested without warrant on February 25, 1988 and detained at WPD station,
Tondo, Manila in connection with the murder of Petronilo Lim, five days after its
perpetration on the flimsy ground that his face resembles that of man drawn in a
cartograph prepared by the police, perhaps based on the descriptions of people
who may have witnessed the crime, to the filing of the fatally flawed information
on March 2, 1988 or 7 days after his unlawful arrest, he was deprived of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure, of his right against
arbitrary or unlawful arrest, of his right to remain silent and to counsel and to be
informed of said rights, of his right to a preliminary investigation in a crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and finally of his right to have a valid
information against him filed within the period allowed by law implied in Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code the provisions of which he had never waived.

Issue: WON the arrest of  Dionisio Lapura is illega?

Ruling: Not an illegal

We agree with the Solicitor General that Opida is predicated on two vital
premises; viz: (a) the trial judge's palpable partiality, as well as the irregular
manner in which he conducted his interrogation of the accused and their witness,
and (b) the admission of an extrajudicial confession despite strong evidence of
manhandling by the police. These circumstances do not obtain in this case.
During trial, while the judge did propound questions to the witnesses, they clearly
appear, however, to be in the main clarificatory and certainly not adversarial in
character. Relative to his alleged warrantless arrest, he has waived, by filing a
petition for bell, any irregularity attendant thereto.Indeed, by his application for bail
and by entering a plea of not guilty and then submitting to the proceedings below,
appellant must be deemed to have foregone his right to preliminary
investigation and to question any irregularity that might have attended such
investigation
Palon vs. NAPOLCOM, May 28, 1989
Search warrant for “pirated video tapes”
. Century Fox vs. CA, 164 SCRA 655
Facts:
Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation through counsel sought the NBI assistance in the
conduct of searches and seizures in connection with the latter's anti-film piracy campaign. The
letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in
the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form which constitute
a flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree on the
Protection of Intellectual Property). 

NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and
subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by
the private respondents. The applications were consolidated and heard by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati.

The lower court issued the desired search warrants. The search warrants described the articles
sought to be seized as follows: “Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head
cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines used or intended to be used in the
unlawful reproduction, sale, rental/lease distribution of the above-mentioned video tapes which
she is keeping and concealing in the premises above-described." Armed with the search
warrants, the NBI accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized
the items described therein. An inventory of the items seized was made and left with the private
respondents.  

Acting on a motion to lift search warrants and release seized properties filed by the private
respondents, the lower court issued an order lifting the three (3) search warrants issued earlier
against the private respondents by the court.  NBI are hereby ordered to be returned to their
owners through their lawyer. The petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner in CA was
dismissed.
Issue:
1.    Whether or not the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier upon the
application of the NBI on the basis of the complaint filed by the petitioner.
2.    Whether or not the search warrant issued were in nature of general warrant.
Ruling:
1. YES. In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants
against the private respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for the issuance
of the said search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its
witnesses that infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed.
The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of
probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. 

As found out by the court, the NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal
knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony which was the alleged commission of the
offense by the private respondents.

Only the petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of
the search warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by
the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner.
However, the lower court did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that
the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the
application.

All these factors were taken into consideration by the lower court when it lifted the three
questioned search warrants. There is no truth, therefore, to the petitioner's allegation that the
lower court based its January 2, 1986, order only "on the fact that the original or master copies
of the copyrighted films were not presented during the application for search warrants , thus
leading it to conclude that it had been "misled by the applicant and his witnesses."

The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in
their possession the pirated films.
The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of
application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not
determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search
warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were
necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.

The proliferation of pirated tapes of films not only deprives the government of much-needed
revenues but is also an indication of the widespread breakdown of national order and discipline.
Courts should not impose any unnecessary roadblocks in the way of the anti-film piracy
campaign. However, the campaign cannot ignore or violate constitutional safeguards. To say
that the problem of pirated films can be solved only by the use of unconstitutional shortcuts is
to denigrate the long history and experience behind the searches and seizures clause of the Bill
of Rights.
 
2. Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants.
Television sets, video cassette recorders, re-winders and tape cleaners are articles which can be
found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out betamax
tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are generally connected with, or related to a
legitimate business not necessarily involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of
copyright laws. Hence, including these articles without specification and/or particularity that
they were really instruments in violating an Anti-Piracy law makes The search warrant too
general which could result in the confiscation of all items found in any video store. In fact, this
actually happened in the instant case.

2. COLUMBIA PICTURES VS. CA, 261 SCRA 144

Facts: 
Complainants lodged a formal complaint with the NBI for violation of PD No. 49 and sought its
assistance in their anti-film piracy drive. Agents of the NBI and private researchers made discreet
surveillance on various video establishments in Metro Manila including Sunshine. NBI Senior
Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a search warrant with the court a quo against Sunshine seeking
the seizure, among others, of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films all of which were
enumerated in a list attached to the application, and, television sets, video cassettes and/or
laser disc recordings equipment and other machines and paraphernalia used or intended to be
used in the unlawful exhibition, showing, reproduction, sale, lease or disposition of videograms
tapes in the premises above described. 
The search warrant was served. The NBI Agents found and seized various video tapes of duly
copyrighted motion pictures/films owned or exclusively distributed by private complainants, and
machines, equipment, television sets, paraphernalia, materials, accessories all of which were
included in the receipt for properties accomplished by the raiding team. 
A “Return of Search Warrant” was filed with the Court. A”Motion To Lift the Order of Search
Warrant” was filed but was later denied for lack of merit. A Motion for reconsideration of the
Order of denial was filed. Petitioners appealed to the CA but it was dismissed as well as the
Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the 20th Century Fox ruling may be applied retroactively in this case.
Ruling:
No. The 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the
quashal of Search Warrant.
In 1986, obviously the 1988 case of 20th Century Fox was not yet promulgated. The lower court
could not possibly have expected more evidence from the Video Regulatory Board and Columbia
Pictures in their application for a search warrant other than what the law and jurisprudence,
then existing and judicially accepted, required with respect to the finding of probable cause.
The Supreme Court also revisited and clarified the ruling in the 20th Century Fox Case. It is
evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do, that in
copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of the copyright films is always
necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. It is
true that such master tapes are object evidence, with the merit that in this class of evidence the
ascertainment of the controverted fact is made through demonstration involving the direct use
of the senses of the presiding magistrate. Such auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out
the use of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of
evidence tending to prove the factum probandum, especially where the production in court of
object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to is
evidentiary value.
In fine, the supposed pronouncement in said case regarding the necessity for the presentation of
the master tapes of the copy-righted films for the validity of search warrants should at most be
understood to merely serve as a guidepost in determining the existence of probable cause in
copy-right infringement cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master
tape and the pirated copies. An objective and careful reading of the decision in said case could
lead to no other conclusion than that said directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and
inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases.
In the case at bar, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, who filed the application for search warrant
with the lower court following a formal complaint lodged by petitioners, judging from his
affidavit and his deposition, did testify on matters within his personal knowledge based on said
complaint of petitioners as well as his own investigation and surveillance of the private
respondents’ video rental shop. Likewise, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, in his capacity as attorney-in-
fact, stated in his affidavit and further expounded in his deposition that he personally knew of
the fact that private respondents had never been authorized by his clients to reproduce, lease
and possess for the purpose of selling any of the copyrighted films.
The assailed judgment and resolution of the CA are reversed.