RULE 58 (Preliminary Injunction)

SPOUSES PRUDENTE D. SOLLER VS. SINGSON

FACTS:

Before this Court is an appeal by certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Resolution2 dated July 10, 2014 and Resolution3 dated November 18, 2014
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

In their Complaint, petitioners averred that they are the owners of parcels of land located
near the Strong Republic Nautical Highway at Poblacion, Bansud, Oriental Mindoro.4

As a result, however, of the commencement of the elevation project between kilometer

90 and 92 of the national highway near the Bansud River Bridge by King's Builder and
Development Corporation, their safety was placed in imminent danger.5

Further bolstering their claim, petitioners alleged that the respondents initiated the
elevation of the national highway to around one meter, thereby blocking and retaining
floodwaters naturally coming from the nearby Bansud River and farm lands from the
direction of the mountains of Conrazon; and submerging houses and lands on the left
side of the road including their properties.6

Aside from safety issues, petitioners maintained that the elevation of the highway
impaired their use and enjoyment of their houses and properties as pedestrians and
vehicles alike will have to negotiate a steep climb and descent in going to and from their
properties.7

Instead of filing their Answer, Secretary Rogelio Singson and Engr. Magtanggol Roldan
filed a Motion to Dismiss8 alleging that the issuance of injunctive writs is prohibited by
Presidential Decree No. 18189; and that the doctrine of State's immunity from suit applies
in this case.

In a Resolution10 dated July 10, 2014, the RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss, finding
that it has no jurisdiction over the case as stated in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8975,11 thus:

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants
Secretary Rogelio Singson, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and
District Engineer Magtanggol Roldan, DPWH Oriental Mindoro is GRANTED and the
above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED as a consequence thereof.

SO ORDERED.12

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution13 dated
November 18, 2014.
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the matter before this Court.

In its Comment,14 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) essentially avers that the
petition must be dismissed outright as it raises factual issues; and that the dismissal of
the case was proper as petitioners prayed for the issuance of a TRO in its complaint.

Petitioners, in their Reply,15 insist that their petition involves a pure question of law as
the issue raised therein delves into the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case.

ISSUE:

Ultimately, petitioners insist on the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter.

RULING:

Preliminarily, a motion to dismiss which has been granted on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter operates as a dismissal without prejudice.16
Relevantly, such order is not subject to an appeal under Section 1 of Rule 4117 of the
Rules of Court. Under the same provision, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.18

In this case, not only did petitioners avail of the wrong remedy by filing an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45, but they likewise violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in
assailing the twin Resolutions of the RTC, directly before us.19

Nevertheless, in a plethora of cases, the Court relaxed the application of procedural rules.
The Court has noted that a strict application of the rules should not amount to straight-
jacketing the administration of justice and that the principles of justice and equity must
not be sacrificed for a stem application of the rules of procedure.20 Thus, when the strict
and rigid application of procedural rules would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, they must always be eschewed.21

In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the Court finds it proper to resolve the case on the
merits.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 8975 expressly vests jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court to issue
any TRO, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the
government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or
private acting under the government's direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel specified
acts. To be specific:

Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary

Mandatory Injunctions. - No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the
government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or
private acting under the government direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following
acts:

(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of
any national government project;

(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under

Section 2 hereof;

(c) Commencement prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such

contract or project;

(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and

(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such
contract/project.

xxxx

In the case of Philco Aero, Inc. v. Secretary Tugade,22 this Court recognized the remedy
of resorting directly before this Court in cases covered under R.A. No. 8975. Section 3 of
R.A. No. 8975 was explicit in excluding other courts in the issuance of injunctive writs.
However, in the case of Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Uy,23 this Court
clarified that the prohibition applies only to TRO and preliminary injunction, viz.:

A perusal of these aforequoted provisions readily reveals that all courts, except this Court,
are proscribed from issuing TROs and writs of preliminary injunction against the
implementation or execution of specified government projects. Thus, the ambit of the
prohibition covers only temporary or preliminary restraining orders or writs but NOT
decisions on the merits granting permanent injunctions. Considering that these laws
trench on judicial power, they should be strictly construed. Therefore, while courts below
this Court are prohibited by these laws from issuing temporary or preliminary restraining
orders pending the adjudication of the case, said statutes however do not explicitly
proscribe the issuance of a permanent injunction granted by a court of law arising from
an adjudication of a case on the merits. (Emphasis supplied)

As conferred by Section 1924 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the RTC has jurisdiction over
all civil cases in which the subject matter under litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. One of which, as established by jurisprudence, is a complaint for injunction.25

It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought.26

In this case, the allegations and the reliefs prayed for in the complaint reveal that
petitioner, as landowners of the surrounding estate of the highway elevation project,
sought to enjoin such construction; or if completed, to restore the affected portion thereof,
to their original state. Clearly, the principal action is one for injunction, which is within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.

“To emphasize, the principal action for injunction is distinct from the provisional
or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part
or an incident of an independent action or proceeding.27 Contrary to the OSG's
stance, herein complaint is one for injunction with a prayer for issuance of a TRO
and/or preliminary injunction. In determining the jurisdiction of the RTC, what is
controlling is the principal action, and not the ancilliary remedy which is merely an
incident thereto.”

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated July 10,
2014 and November 18, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental
Mindoro, Branch 41 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 41 for further proceedings
with deliberate dispatch.

EMPIRE INSURANCE, INC., VS. ATTY. MARCIANO S. BACALLA, JR.

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
which assails the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA),

The Facts

This case is an offshoot of the liquidation proceedings of the Tibayan Group,

involving the recovery of 650,225 Prudential Bank common shares allegedly acquired in
fraud of the Tibayan Group’s investor-creditors, 230,225 shares of which formed part of
the assets of TMG Holdings and 420,000 shares formed part of the assets of Cielo Azul
Holdings Corporation. Both entities were allegedly dummy corporations used by the
Tibayan Group to dispose of assets in fraud of creditors by using illegally transferred
assets to buy and sell shares of stock, some of which were acquired by petitioner Empire
Insurance, Inc. (EII), Virginia Belinda S. Ocampo, Jose Augusto G. Santos, and Katrina
G. Santos. RTC of Las Pinas City, Branch 253 granted petition for involuntary dissolution.
Hence, Receiver Atty. Marciano S. Bacalla, Jr. is ordered to immediately effect the
liquidation process.

Bacalla, in his capacity as the court-appointed receiver of the Tibayan Group,

filed a “Very Urgent” application for injunctive relief before the trial court, seeking to enjoin
the holders of the Prudential Bank shares from selling or otherwise disposing the same
to other parties. The trial court, in its Resolution dated September 15, 2005, granted the
application and further authorized Bacalla to prosecute an action to recover the shares.
In their answer, defendants countered that the filing fees were deficient because
the correct basis of computation should have been the market value of the shares, which
was alleged to be at Php 400.00 to 700.00, thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1.
The CA committed an error of law in upholding the trial court's issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction, despite the bacalla group's failure to pay the correct filing
fees; and
2.
The CA committed an error of law in refusing to recognize that the empire group
was denied due process of law when the injunction was issued.

RULING:

The settled rule is that a case is deemed filed only upon the payment of the filing
fee. The court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon full payment of such
prescribed filing fee. The computation of the correct amount of filing fees to be paid rests
upon a determination of the nature of the action. Thus, in a money claim or a claim
involving property, the filing fee is computed in relation to the value of the money or
property claimed. while in an action incapable of pecuniary estimation, the Rules
prescribe a determinate amount as filing fees.

If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered

capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the
amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of the principal relief sought like in
suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific
performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment
or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.

The Court holds that the action filed by the Bacalla group in the case at bar is incapable
of pecuniary estimation. The action has for its primary objective the nullification of the
transactions which brought the shares in dispute outside the control of the debtor, i.e.,
Tibayan Group, and perforce to preserve them for inclusion in the assets to be liquidated.
Furthermore, the Bacalla group does not assert direct, personal claims over the shares.
Bacalla claims the shares only in his capacity as receiver of the Tibayan Group, while
Abacan, et al. and FITI claim the shares only for purposes of having them included in the
asset pool of the Tibayan Group, out of which their respective claims are to be paid. These
circumstances distinguish the case at bar from those obtaining in National Steel
Corporation v. CA, where the Court upheld the computation of filing fees on the basis of
the market value of the shares in dispute, because the plaintiff therein lodged a direct and
personal claim over the shares. The Court, therefore, held that the primary objective of
the claim in that case was for recovery of property, hence, filing fees must be computed
on the basis of the value of the shares as alleged by the claimant. Considering that the
Bacalla group paid almost Php 1,100,000.00 in filing fees, they have more than complied
with the requirements of the Rules of Court.

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the valid grant of preliminary
injunctive relief: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act
sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[29] Elucidating on these
requirements, the Court has held that the evidence required to justify the issuance of the
writ need noli be conclusive or complete; and only a sampling of evidence intended merely
to give the court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction is required. There
must be proof of an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in the complaint.[30]
Ultimately, the grant of preliminary injunctive relief rests upon the sufficiency, of the
allegations made in support thereof.[31]

The Court has studied the record assiduously and is satisfied that the allegations and
evidence set forth by the Bacalla group constitute sufficient bases for the grant of
preliminary injunctive relief.

Anent the first requisite, there has been prima facie showing of the existence of a right in
esse in favor of the Bacalla group. As found by the CA, their right to the shares in dispute
is based on the final and executory decision of the trial court in the dissolution proceedings
against Tibayan Group. The findings of the SEC which led to the issuance of the Cease-
and-Desist Order against the Tibayan Group, and the PSE memorandum only serve as
further proof of the existence of this clear and unmistakable right, by illustrating the flow
of the assets from the Tibayan Group to the dummy corporations to the defendants. The
entitlement of the Bacalla Group to the shares in dispute is clearly established by the
decision in the dissolution case and the resolution of the trial court authorizing Bacalla to
sue for their recovery and inclusion in the asset pool of the Tibayan Group.

Anent the second and third requisites, given that shares of stock are a readily tradable
commodity, the Court concurs with the CA that the right of the Bacalla group to the return
of the shares to the Tibayan Group's asset pool will be greatly prejudiced if the continued
disposition thereof is not enjoined. The Court quotes with approval the findings of the
appellate court:
Private respondents (the Bacalla group) truly have a clear and present right to be
protected insofar as the subject shares are concerned. To allow their further disposition
would result in the continued dissipation and dispersal of the original assets of the
[Tibayan Group]. It would be harder for private respondents to trace and pool them back
together again. They would suffer serious damage for the assets sought to be protected
may forever get lost if they continue to change hands. By then, any judgment in the case
would become ineffectual.[32]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
September 30, 2010 and the Resolution dated January 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 95754 are hereby AFFIRMED.

PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE v. MAXIMO M. DE LEON

Facts:

This case arose from the Equipment Lease Agreement executed on January 25,
1995 by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming and
Management Corporation. The Equipment Lease Agreement provided that the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office, as lessee, will lease the lottery equipment and accessories
of the Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation, as lessor, for the operation of its
on-line lottery in Luzon. The term of the Equipment Lease Agreement was eight (8) years
or until 2003

On November 14, 1997, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine
Gaming and Management Corporation amended the Equipment Lease Agreement "to
reduce the original number of required terminals from 2,000 to 1,250 terminals."[11]
Several cases were filed in court causing the 8-year term of the Equipment Lease
Agreement to commence in 1999. With the 4-year delay, the Equipment Lease
Agreement would end in 2007.[12]On December 29, 2004, the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation executed
another lease agreement, amending the Equipment Lease Agreement.[13] One of the
provisions in the Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement[14] was on the extension
of the lease duration to another eight (8) years or until 2015

In 2011, the Equipment Lease Agreement was investigated by the Philippine Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee.[17] The investigation was conducted due to an alleged "lapse in
financial judgment"[18] when the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office rented lottery
machines for US$148,000,000.00, instead of purchasing them for US$25,000,000.00.[19]
After investigation, the Philippine Senate Blue Ribbon Committee recommended that the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office proceed with the renegotiation of the rental fee "to
ensure that the basis for the fees is commensurate to the cost of the subject of the lease
and that the amount thereof is not unduly burdensome to the public."[20] The Philippine
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee also recommended that the renegotiations should be
pursued not only with the Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation but also with
the Pacific Online Systems Corporation (Pacific Online), the on-line lottery operator for
Visayas and Mindanao.[

Pursuant to the Philippine Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's recommendation, the

Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office sought the renegotiation of the lease rental rate
with the Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation, and Pacific Online. Pacific
Online conceded for the reduction of the lease rental to 7.85% of the gross lotto sales.
Since the Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation declined to reduce the rental
rate of 10% of the gross lotto sales, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office allowed
Pacific Online to provide lottery equipment for the on-line lottery operations in
Luzon.[22]On June 8, 2012, while the Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement was
still in effect, the Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation filed a Petition for
Indirect Contempt with Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. The case was docketed as SCA Case 12-
530

The Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation argued that the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office "violated a Court order confirming its exclusiv[e] right

On the other hand, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and its Board and Officials
filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Ad Cautelam[25] on June 26, 2012 and a
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss on July 9, 2012.[26] They contended that the Regional
Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the case and that the Philippine Gaming and
Management Corporation "has no exclusive right as the sole supplier of on-line lottery
equipment to [the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office] in Luzon territory."

On July 12, 2012, then Acting Presiding Judge Rommel Baybay (Judge Baybay) issued
a Resolution[28] granting the Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation's
application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction

On January 18, 2013, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and its Board and
Officials filed a Petition for Certiorari[36] against Judge Baybay before the Court of
Appeals... n March 1, 2016, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[55] granting the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and its Board and Officials' Manifestation with
Motion to Dismiss and directed the Division Clerk of Court to issue an Entry of
Judgment.[56

Issues:

Whether or not respondent Presiding Judge Maximo M. De Leon committed grave

abuse of discretion when he granted respondent Philippine Gaming and Management
Corporation's application for injunctive relief.

Ruling:

The petition has merit.

Respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation insists that its right
based on the Interim Settlement will be violated if petitioner continues with the bidding of
the Nationwide On-line Lottery System. However, a scrutiny of the records shows
otherwise.To recapitulate, the original contract between petitioner and respondent
Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation is the Equipment Lease Agreement with
a term of eight (8) years-from 1995 to 2003:3. TERM
On November 14, 1997, the Equipment Lease Agreement was amended to extend the
term until 2007:

On December 29, 2004, the Equipment Lease Agreement was further amended. The
parties executed the Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement, which extended the
term of the lease to another eight (8) years-from August 23, 2007 to August 22, 2015:

It was during the effectivity of the Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement that
petitioner "allowed (Pacific Online] to supply a number of lottery equipment for its Luzon
operation

On December 11, 2013, while the Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement was still
in effect, petitioner and respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation
entered into an Interim Settlement and agreed to bring the exclusivity issue before an
arbitral tribunal. Thus, on March 12, 2014, respondent Philippine Gaming and
Management Corporation initiated the arbitration before the International Chamber of
Commerce.[116]While the arbitration case was pending, petitioner and respondent
Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation executed a Supplemental and Status
Quo Agreement, extending the term of the Equipment Lease Agreement to another three
(3) years "to ensure unhampered lotto operation.

Since the extended Equipment Lease Agreement between petitioner and respondent
Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation was about to expire in August 2018,
petitioner started preparing for the bidding of the Nationwide On-line Lottery System,
which would have a term of five (5) years-from August 2018 to August 2023. Claiming
that it is "the exclusive supplier/lessor of lottery equipment for Luzon,"[119] respondent
Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation applied for a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction on July 11, 2017. It sought to enjoin petitioner
from further proceeding with the bidding process.

From the brief outline of the aforestated facts, it is evident that respondent Philippine
Gaming and Management Corporation's basis for its Writ of Preliminary Injunction
application is its purported exclusive rights for the period beyond what was agreed
upon in the extended Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement. To emphasize,
respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation's exclusive rights, if any,
extend only until August 21, 2018. After the expiration of the Supplemental and Status
Quo Agreement, it can no longer claim any alleged right to exclusively provide on-line
lottery equipment in Luzon

This Court finds that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation's application for
injunctive relief.

The issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is governed by Rule 58, Section 3 of the
1997
Respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation's claim of exclusive rights,
as stated in the Interim Settlement and which was brought to arbitration, pertained to its
rights under the Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement, which will expire on
August 21, 2018. It failed to provide proof that the Amendments to Equipment Lease
Agreement was extended beyond August 21, 2018. It cannot claim that it has alleged
exclusive rights to be protected and that it will suffer irreparable injury if petitioner
continued with the Nationwide On-line Lottery System bidding process. This is
precisely because the bidding was for the next supplier of the Nationwide On-line
Lottery System for a period of five (5) years after August 21, 2018 or commencing
on August 22, 2018.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED

Principles:

Absent the showing of an existing right to be protected, a party's application for an

injunctive relief must necessarily be denied.

From the brief outline of the aforestated facts, it is evident that respondent Philippine
Gaming and Management Corporation's basis for its Writ of Preliminary Injunction
application is its purported exclusive rights for the period beyond what was agreed upon
in the extended Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement. To emphasize,
respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation's exclusive rights, if any,
extend only until August 21, 2018. After the expiration of the Supplemental and Status
Quo Agreement, it can no longer claim any alleged right to exclusively provide on-line
lottery equipment in Luzon.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final

judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. As an ancillary or
preventive remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may therefore be resorted to by
a party to protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the
pendency of the principal action.

In Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) v. City Advertising Ventures

Corporation,[123] this Court held that "[f]or a writ of preliminary injunction to be
issued, the applicant must show, by prima facie evidence, an existing right before
trial, a material and substantial invasion of this right, and that a writ of preliminary
injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable injury.
 BICOL MEDICAL CENTER v. NOE B. BOTOR, GR No. 214073, 2017-10-04

Facts:

Sometime in 1982, the Camarines Sur Provincial Government donated about five
(5) hectares of land to the Ministry of Health, now the Department of Health,[8] as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13693.[9] The Training and Teaching
Hospital and Road Lot No. 3 were included in this donation.[1

The Training and Teaching Hospital became the Bicol Medical Center (BMC) in 1995.[

BMC constructed a steel gate along J. Miranda Avenue to control the flow of vehicle and
pedestrian traffic entering the hospital premises.

(Dr. Nerva), BMC Chief I, issued Hospital Memorandum No. 0310,[13] which ordered the
rerouting of traffic inside the BMC Compound.

This rerouting scheme closed the steel gate for vehicles and pedestrians along J. Miranda
Avenue, relocating it from the eastern side of the hospital to the western side

Atty. Noe Botor (Atty. Botor) wrote to Naga City Mayor John Bongat (Mayor Bongat),
asking for the reopening or dismantling of the gate for being a public nuisance.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Naga City passed a resolution authorizing Mayor

Bongat to dismantle the gate.[18] However, instead of dismantling it, Mayor Bongat filed
a Verified Petition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against BMC.

Atty. Botor, Celjun F. Yap, Ismael A. Albao, Augusto S. Quilon, Edgar F. Esplana II, and
Josefina F. Esplana (Intervenors) were allowed to intervene and submit their complaint-
in-intervention.

the Regional Trial Court denied Naga City's application for injunctive relief, ruling that
Naga City failed to prove a clear and unmistakable right to the writ prayed for.[

Only the Intervenors filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

the Court of Appeals granted the petition and emphasized that only a prima facie showing
of an applicant's right to the writ is required in an application for writ of injunctive relief.

the Court of Appeals[30] denied the motions for reconsideration filed by BMC and the
Department of Health. However, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the injunction was
not directed against the construction of the Cancer Center Building but against the
relocation of the service road and gate closure.

petitioners BMC and the Department of Health filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari...
petitioners applied for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
to prevent the reopening of the gate since doing so would affect the construction of the
Cancer Center Building.

The first Resolution[45] granted petitioners' motion for extension to file their petition. The
second Resolution[46] issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation
of the Court of Appeals... which directed the Regional Trial Court to issue a writ of
mandatory preliminary injunction on the closure of Road Lot No. 3.

Issues:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in directing the Regional Trial Court to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction on the closure of Road Lot No. 3.

Ruling:

A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary and interlocutory order issued

as a result of an impartial determination of the context of both parties. It entails a
procedure for the judge to assess whether the reliefs prayed for by the complainant will
be rendered moot simply as a result of the parties' having to go through the full
requirements of a case being fully heard on its merits. Although a trial court judge is
given a latitude of discretion, he or she cannot grant a writ of injunction if there is
no clear legal right materially and substantially breached from a prima facie
evaluation of the evidence of the complainant. Even if this is present, the trial court
must satisfy itself that the injury to be suffered is irreparable.

Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the instances when a writ of preliminary
injunction may be issued:... when it is established: (a) That the applicant is entitled to
the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b) That the
commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) That a
party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the
rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Jurisprudence has likewise established that the following requisites must be proven first
before a writ of preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, may be issued:

The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in
esse; (2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) There is an
urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) No
other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of
irreparable injury.
In satisfying these requisites, the applicant for the writ need not substantiate his or her
claim with complete and conclusive evidence since only prima facie evidence[64] or a
sampling is required "to give the court an idea of the justification for the preliminary
injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits."

To prove its clear legal right over the remedy being sought, Naga City presented before
the trial court the 1970s Revised Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and its
Identification Map which both identified Road Lot No. 3 as being in the name of the
Province of Camarines Sur.[70] Witnesses' testimonies were also presented to
corroborate Naga City's claims of the public nature of Road Lot No. 3.

Respondents claimed that as members of the general public, they had every right to use
Road Lot No. 3, a public road.[72] On the other hand, BMC presented TCT No. 13693,[73]
which covered a total land area of 53,890m2 within Barrio Concepcion, Naga City with
the Ministry of Health, now Department of Health, as the registered owner. It is not
disputed that Road Lot No. 3 is part of the property covered by TCT No. 13693.

A careful reading of the records convinces this Court that respondents failed to establish
prima facie proof of their clear legal right to utilize Road Lot No, 3. Whatever right they
sought to establish by proving the public nature of Road Lot No. 3 was rebutted by the
Department of Health's certificate of title and the City Engineer's categorical statement
that "the road from Panganiban Drive up to the entrance and exit gate of [BMC] was not
included in the list'' of city roads under Naga City's control.[

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals erred in limiting prima facie evidence merely to
the evidence presented by Naga City and respondents and in disregarding altogether
petitioners' evidence,[80] which had the effect of squarely rebutting Naga City and
respondents' assertions. The Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the nature of the
ancillary remedy of a writ of preliminary injunction as against the ex parte nature of a
temporary restraining order.

Writs of preliminary injunction are granted only upon prior notice to the party sought to be
enjoined and upon their due hearing. Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court

Rule 58 requires "a full and comprehensive hearing for the determination of the propriety
of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,"[82] giving the applicant an opportunity
to prove that great or irreparable injury will result if no writ is issued and allowing the
opposing party to comment on the application

By focusing solely on Naga City and respondents' evidence to determine if there was
prima facie evidence to issue the writ of preliminary injunction while the case was being
heard in the lower court, the Court of Appeals misappreciated the nature of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
To reiterate, a preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy issued after due hearing where
both parties are given the opportunity to present their respective evidence. Thus, both
their evidence should be considered.

Respondents were unable to present prima facie evidence of their clear and unmistakable
right to use Road Lot No. 3.

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS v. CITY ADVERTISING VENTURES

CORPORATION

Facts:

On October 6, 2006, the Department of Public Works and Highways announced

that they would start dismantling billboards.[28] During its operations, it was able to
remove 250 of City Advertising Ventures Corporation's lamppost banners and frames, 12
pedestrian overpass banners, 17 pedestrian overpass frames, and 36 halogen
lamps.[29]City Advertising Ventures Corporation then filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City its Complaint for "Violation of [Administrative Order No.] 160, Tort, [and]
Injunction with Prayer for [Temporary Restraining Order], Preliminary Injunction, and
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction"[30] dated October 18, 2006.Asserting that
Administrative Order No. 160 pertained specifically to "billboards" (i.e., "large panel[s] that
carr[y] outdoor advertising") and not to small advertising fixtures such as its signages and
banners, City Advertising Ventures Corporation claimed that the Department of Public
Works and Highways exceeded its authority when it dismantled its banners and other
fixtures.[31] It also claimed that the Department of Public Works and Highways "seriously
impeded the pursuit of [its] legitimate business and ... unlawfully deprived [it] of property,
income and income opportunities ... without due process of law,"[32] violated Articles
19,[33] 20,[34] 21[35] and 32(2), (6), and (8)[36] of the Civil Code, and impaired
contractual obligations.[37]

When petitioners sought relief from the Court of Appeals, what they sought to
remedy was the Regional Trial Court's issuance of its November 21, 2006 and April 11,
2007 Orders. These were interlocutory orders pertaining to a temporary relief extended
to respondent, that is, a writ of preliminary injunction. These orders were not judgments
that completely disposed of Civil Case No. 06-899. They were not the Regional Trial
Court's final ruling on Civil Case No. 06-899. By the time petitioners sought redress from
the Court of Appeals (and even at the time of the filing of their appeal before this Court),
the Regional Trial Court had not yet even ruled on the merits of Civil Case No. 06-899.

The question before the Court of Appeals was, therefore, limited to the matter of whether
the Regional Trial Court's issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. On appeal from the original action brought before the Court of
Appeals, it is this same, singular issue that confronts us.

Issues:
Regional Trial Court denied the Omnibus Motion.

Ruling:

When petitioners sought relief from the Court of Appeals, what they sought to
remedy was the Regional Trial Court's issuance of its November 21, 2006 and April 11,
2007 Orders. These were interlocutory orders pertaining to a temporary relief extended
to respondent, that is, a writ of preliminary injunction. These orders were not judgments
that completely disposed of Civil Case No. 06-899. They were not the Regional Trial
Court's final ruling on Civil Case No. 06-899. By the time petitioners sought redress from
the Court of Appeals (and even at the time of the filing of their appeal before this Court),
the Regional Trial Court had not yet even ruled on the merits of Civil Case No. 06-899.

Principles:

Petitioners prevented and threatened to prevent respondent from engaging in its cardinal
business activity. Their admitted actions and apparent inactions show that the well-
defined due process mechanisms outlined by Administrative Order No. 160 and 160-A
were not followed. Confronted with acts seemingly tantamount to deprivation of property
without due process of law, the Regional Trial Court acted well within its competence
when it required petitioners to temporarily desist, pending a more complete and
circumspect estimation of the parties' rights. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The
assailed December 3, 2007 and May 14, 2008 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 101420 are AFFIRMED without prejudice to the ultimate disposition of Civil
Case No. 06-899.The temporary restraining order dated July 7, 2010 is LIFTED.

RULE 59 (Receivership)

PILAR M. NORMANDY v. CALIXTO DUQUE

Facts:

On September 6, 1960, appellant was appointed receiver of the WARVETS by the

lower court in Civil Case No. 34998[1] "generally to do and perform such acts respecting
the pro-perty, assets and... transactions" of the organization "as the court may authorize".
Upon filing a bond in the sum of fifty thousand (P50, 000.00) pesos, he entered upon the
dis-charge of his functions.

During his term, appellant went to Japan by authority of the lower court's order
dated October 12, 1960 for the purpose of checking on the reported undervaluation of
goods shipped to the WARVETS and of preparing the shipment of the goods which had
not yet been... committed. For expenses in-curred by him during this trip, which amounted
to P9, 431.48, he was ordered reimbursed by the lower court on June 5, 1963.
Except for this reimbursed amount, appellant received no other fee or compensation from
the WARVETS. In fact, for a continuous period of three (3) years, he performed his duties
as receiver without receiving any compensation as... such. Hence, on October 9, 1963,
he filed a motion in the lower court to fix not only his compensation but also that of his co-
receiver, Macario Ofilada.[... appellant filed another motion, on May 28, 1964, re-signing
from his post as receiver and praying that the low-er court accept it and at the same time
fix the amount of his fees and compensation as... receiver.

On June 5, 1964, appellant was discharged as receiver and his compensation was fixed
at P10,000.00.

Subsequently, one Atty. Anacleto Magno, on his own behalf, presented before the
lower court a motion dated August 18, 1964, for the payment of attorney's fees to him in
the amount of P10, 000.00 for his alleged services as legal counsel for the appellant when
he was... still a receiver. Appellant, himself, filed another motion for the payment and
cancellation of his receiver's bond and for the reimbursement to him of the sum of P2,
030.00 which he paid out of his personal funds as premium for said bond from September
9, 1960... to September 9, 1964. On September 24, 1964, the lower court disposed of
both motions in one order by allowing compensation to Atty. Magno in the reduced
amount of P1, 000.00 and granting re-imbursement to appellant in the whole sum prayed
for by... him as premium on his bond.

Barely two months after the issuance of the last-mentioned order, or on November 18,
1964, appellant filed another motion for reimbursement, this time for the amount he
allegedly paid as compensation of a clerk whom he em-ployed when he was still a
receiver for the period

Septem-ber 9, 1960 to May 28, 1964, inclusive, at the rate of P120.00 a month, or the
total sum of P5, 236.00. Appellant alleged that in view of the voluminous paper and legal
work which he had to attend to as receiver, it was neces-sary for him to... engage the
service of a typist-stenogra-pher, one Melchor C. Ordoño, who doubled as messenger,
filing clerk, utility clerk and records clerk.

Issues:

The lower court committed an error in holding that he is not entitled to

reimbursement of the salaries paid by him to his clerk as receiver of the WARVETS

Ruling:

It is true that in the case at bar, the motion in question of the receiver was not
opposed by any of the parties. It is to be observed, however, that the records show that
the court a quo had previously allowed or ap-proved reimbursements to... the receiver of
expenditures made by him in connection with the performance of his duties, more
particularly, for a trip made to Japan and for the fees of a lawyer who had allegedly
assisted him, notwith-standing, he is a lawyer himself. Besides, the court... a quo fixed
the total compensation to the appellant receiver at P10, 000.00 for his services as such
and said amount, from all appearances, is agreeable to everyone, including appel-lant.

The receivership court's reasons for withholding approval of the reimbursement in

question are precisely because "whatever amount he (the receiver) now seeks in addition
thereto (P10, 000) would be improper. Moreover, he is now estopped from claiming...
any further amount as compensation for alleged clerical services employed by-him as
such receiver without prior approval or authority of this Court." We find these reasons to
be cogent enough in the premises, specially because appellant's alleged employment of
a clerk was made... without prior leave of court. In these circumstances, it cannot be said
that the court a quo abused its discretion, much less gravely.

Principles:

A receiver is a representative of the court appointed for the purpose of preserving

and conserving the property in litigation and prevent its possible destruction or dissipation,
if it were left, in the possession of any of the parties. The... receiver is not the
representative of any of the parties but of all of them to the end that their in-terests may
be equally protected with the least possible inconvenience and expense. It is inherent in
the office of a receiver not only that... he should act at all times with the diligence and
prudence of a good father of a family but should also not incur any obligation or
expenditure without leave of the court and it is the responsibility of the court to supervise
the receiver and see to it that he... ad-heres to the above standard of his trust and limits
the expenses of the receivership to the minimum. For these rea-sons, it is generally the
receivership court that is in a better position to determine whether a particular
expendi-ture is reasonable and... justified or not and its ruling thereon may not be
disturbed by this Court.

RULE 60 (Replevin)

ENRIQUEZ V. MERCANTILE INSURANCE

FACTS:

Petitioner Enriquez filed a replevin case against Asuten for the recovery of the
Toyota Hi-Ace van valued at P300,000.00.[49] She applied for a bond in the amount of
P600,000.00 with respondent in Asuten's favor. The Regional Trial Court approved the
bond and ordered the sheriff to recover the van from Asuten and to deliver it to petitioner.
While the van was in petitioner's custody, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the case
without prejudice for failure to prosecute. Thus, it ordered the sheriff to restore the van to
Asuten. When petitioner failed to produce the van, the Regional Trial Court directed
respondent to pay Asuten the amount of the bond.

There was no trial on the merits. The Regional Trial Court's dismissal for failure to
prosecute was a dismissal without prejudice to re-filing. In this particular instance, any
writ of seizure, being merely ancillary to the main action, becomes functus oficio. The
parties returned to the status quo as if no case for replevin had been filed. Thus, upon
the dismissal of the case, it was imperative for petitioner to return the van to Asuten.

ISSUE:

Petitioner Enriquez argues that she should not have been made liable for the bond
despite her failure to return the van, considering that it was effective only until February
24, 2004, and that she did not renew or post another bond.

HELD:

De Guia v. Alto Surety & Insurance, Co. requires that any application on the bond
be made after hearing but before the entry of judgment. Otherwise, the surety can no
longer be made liable under the bond.

For this reason, a surety bond remains effective until the action or proceeding is finally
decided, resolved, or terminated. This condition is deemed incorporated in the contract
between the applicant and the surety, regardless of whether they failed to expressly state
it, as provided under the Guidelines on Corporate Surety Bonds.

This is a rare instance where the writ of seizure is dissolved due to the dismissal without
prejudice, but the bond stands because the case has yet to be finally terminated by the
Regional Trial Court.

The peculiar circumstances in this case arose when petitioner failed to return the van to
Asuten, despite the dismissal of her action. This is an instance not covered by the Rules
of Court or jurisprudence. In its discretion, the Regional Trial Court proceeded to rule on
the forfeiture of the bond. As a result, respondent paid Asuten twice the value of the van
withheld by petitioner. Respondent, thus, seeks to recover this amount from petitioner,
despite the van only being worth half the amount of the bond.

Of all the provisional remedies provided in the Rules of Court, only Rule 60,
Section 2 requires that the amount of the bond be double the value of the property.
The other provisional remedies provide that the amount be fixed by court or be
merely equal to the value of the property.

However, there is a rationale to the requirement that the bond for a writ of seizure
in a replevin be double the value of the property. The bond functions not only to
indemnify the defendant in case the property is lost, but also to answer for any
damages that may be awarded by the court if the judgment is rendered in
defendant's favor.

Any application of the bond in a replevin case, therefore, is premised on the

judgment rendered in favor of the defendant. Thus, the Rules of Court imply that there
must be a prior judgment on the merits before there can be any application on the bond.
Forfeiture of the replevin bond, therefore, requires first, a judgment on the merits
in the defendant's favor, and second, an application by the defendant for damages.
Neither circumstance appears in this case. When petitioner failed to produce the van,
equity demanded that Asuten be awarded only an amount equal to the value of the van.
The Regional Trial Court would have erred in ordering the forfeiture of the entire bond in
Asuten's favor, considering that there was no trial on the merits or an application by
Asuten for damages. This judgment could have been reversed had petitioner appealed
the Regional Trial Court's May 24, 2004 Order in Civil Case No. 10846. Unfortunately,
she did not. Respondent was, thus, constrained to follow the Regional Trial Court's
directive to pay Asuten the full amount of the bond.

BA Finance Corporation v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Roberto M. Reyes

FACTS:

Spouses Manahan executed a promissory note binding themselves to pay

Carmasters, Inc., P83,080.00 in 36 monthly installments. To secure payment, the
Manahan spouses executed a deed of chattel mortgage over a motor vehicle, a Ford
Cortina. Carmasters later assigned the promissory note and the chattel mortgage to
petitioner BA Finance Corporation with the conformity of the Manahans. When the latter
failed to pay the installments, petitioner sent demand letters. The demands not having
been heeded, petitioner filed a complaint for replevin with damages against the spouses,
as well as against a John Doe, praying for the recovery of the vehicle with an alternative
prayer for the payment of a sum of money should the vehicle not be returned. The lower
court issued a writ of replevin.

The service of summons upon the spouses Manahan was caused to be served by
petitioner. The original of the summons had the name and the signature of private
respondent Roberto M. Reyes indicating that he received a copy of the summons and the
complaint. Petitioner, through its Legal Assistant, issued a certification to the effect that it
had received from Orson R. Santiago, the deputy sheriff of the RTC the Ford Cortina
seized from private respondent Roberto M. Reyes, the John Doe referred to in the
complaint, in Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Consequently, the lower court came out with an order
of seizure.

A few months later, the court issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute
and further ordering the plaintiff to return the property seized with all its accessories to
defendant John Doe in the person of Roberto M. Reyes.

The order was recalled, but summons still could not be served on the Manahans. So, the
trial court dismissed the case and ordered that the vehicle be returned to Reyes. The CA
affirmed.

On appeal, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not a mortgagee can maintain an action for replevin against any
possessor of the object of a chattel mortgage even if the latter were not a party to the
mortgage.

RULING:

No. Replevin is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional relief. It

may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels
being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional remedy that
would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and hold it
pendente lite. The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines
nothing more than the right of possession. The person in possession of the property
sought to be replevied is ordinarily the proper and only necessary party defendant, and
the plaintiff is not required to so join as defendants other persons claiming a right on the
property but not in possession thereof. The Rules of Court allows an application for the
immediate possession of the property but the plaintiff must show that he has a good legal
basis, i.e., a clear title thereto, for seeking such interim possession.

Where the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the specific property is so conceded
or evident, the action need only be maintained against him who so possesses the
property. The court, in an earlier case held that persons having a special right of property
in the goods the recovery of which is sought, such as a chattel mortgagee, may maintain
an action for replevin therefor. Where the mortgage authorizes the mortgagee to take
possession of the property on default, he may maintain an action to recover possession
of the mortgaged chattels from the mortgagor or from any person in whose hands he may
find them.

A chattel mortgagee, unlike a pledgee, need not be in, nor entitled to, the
possession of the property unless and until the mortgagor defaults and the mortgagee
thereupon seeks to foreclose thereon. Since the mortgagee’s right of possession is
conditioned upon the actual fact of default which itself may be controverted, the inclusion
of other parties, like the debtor or the mortgagor himself, may be required in order to allow
a full and conclusive determination of the case. When the mortgagee seeks a replevin in
order to effect the eventual foreclosure of the mortgage, it is not only the existence of, but
also the mortgagor’s default on, the chattel mortgage that, among other things, can
properly uphold the right to replevy the property. The burden to establish a valid
justification for that action lies with the plaintiff. An adverse possessor, who is not the
mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of his possession, let alone be bound by the
terms of the chattel mortgage contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up
an action for replevin.