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    The Buncefield Expolsion & Fire - Dr. David Painter

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    orlcosta
    The document summarizes a report on the Buncefield fuel depot explosion in the UK in 2005. It describes the incident, including the overfilling of a tank, formation of a vapor cloud, explosion and massive fire. It discusses the causes such as poor safety management and lack of adequate protections. It outlines the response, including an industry-regulator group that developed new safety standards covering topics like overfill prevention, tank integrity, emergency response and safety culture. The standards were aimed at preventing future incidents by better understanding vapor formation risks and applying layers of protection.

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    The Buncefield Expolsion & Fire - Dr. David Painter

    Uploaded by

    orlcosta
    94 views32 pages
    The document summarizes a report on the Buncefield fuel depot explosion in the UK in 2005. It describes the incident, including the overfilling of a tank, formation of a vapor cloud, explosion and massive fire. It discusses the causes such as poor safety management and lack of adequate protections. It outlines the response, including an industry-regulator group that developed new safety standards covering topics like overfill prevention, tank integrity, emergency response and safety culture. The standards were aimed at preventing future incidents by better understanding vapor formation risks and applying layers of protection.

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    The Buncefield Expolsion & Fire_Dr. David Painter

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    The document summarizes a report on the Buncefield fuel depot explosion in the UK in 2005. It describes the incident, including the overfilling of a tank, formation of a vapor cloud, explosion and massive fire. It discusses the causes such as poor safety management and lack of adequate protections. It outlines the response, including an industry-regulator group that developed new safety standards covering topics like overfill prevention, tank integrity, emergency response and safety culture. The standards were aimed at preventing future incidents by better understanding vapor formation risks and applying layers of protection.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    94 views32 pages

    The Buncefield Expolsion & Fire - Dr. David Painter

    Uploaded by

    orlcosta
    The document summarizes a report on the Buncefield fuel depot explosion in the UK in 2005. It describes the incident, including the overfilling of a tank, formation of a vapor cloud, explosion and massive fire. It discusses the causes such as poor safety management and lack of adequate protections. It outlines the response, including an industry-regulator group that developed new safety standards covering topics like overfill prevention, tank integrity, emergency response and safety culture. The standards were aimed at preventing future incidents by better understanding vapor formation risks and applying layers of protection.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    of 32

    Health

    Healthand
    andSafety
    Safety
    Executive
    Executive

    The Buncefield incident-


    experiences and lessons
    learned
    David Painter
    Principal Specialist Inspector
    UK Health and Safety Executive
    Buncefield 11 December 2005
    - the fuel depot before the incident
    Buncefield 11 December 2005
    - the release event
    Health
    Healthand
    andSafety
    Safety
    Executive
    Executive

    Deflector plate

    Liquid flow from Wind girder

    the tank top

    Impact zone
    Liquid cascade - water
    Liquid cascade - hexane
    Buncefield 11 December 2005
    - the extent of the vapour cloud

    Forensic examination of the evidence


    from:
    • Burn damage
    • Damaged objects (particularly cars)
    • Off-site CCTV records
    Allowed a good estimate of the cloud size
    which extended between 150 and 200
    metres from the side of the overfilled tank
    Health
    Healthand
    andSafety
    Safety
    Executive
    Executive

    Extent of
    vapour
    cloud
    Buncefield 11 December 2005
    - the explosion
    There were over forty injuries –
    fortunately no fatalities
    The explosion caused massive damage
    on and off site (around £1 billion)
    Extensive building damage and business
    disruption
    M1 motorway closed, nearby homes
    evacuated
    Reduced fuel supply to London airports
    Buncefield 11 December 2005
    - building damage
    Buncefield 11 December 2005
    - property damage
    Buncefield 11 December 2005
    - the fire

    The explosion caused a fire that engulfed


    at least 20 storage tanks
    This burned for five days consuming
    thousands of tonnes of fuel
    Required a massive fire fighting response
    Resulted in pollution of the local aquifer
    by firewater and foam
    Buncefield 11 December 2005
    - the fire 09:00
    Buncefield 11 December 2005
    - the fire fighting response
    Buncefield 11 December 2005
    - after the fire
    Buncefield 11 December 2005
    - immediate causes of the event

    Loss of control of tank filling process


    Failure of level measurement and
    independent high level trip
    Leading to loss of primary containment
    During the fire, failure of secondary &
    tertiary containment
    Buncefield 11 December 2005
    - underlying causes
    Poor management of key risk activity –
    tank filling (human factors)
    Poor design & maintenance of overfill
    protection equipment
    Inadequate change management
    Poor design of bunds to deal with
    prolonged fire event
    Lack of adequate tertiary containment
    Overall poor process safety management
    Buncefield – The response

    In general the risks from tank storage


    operations were not well understood:
    • the very efficient vapour formation in the
    event of an overfill of gasoline
    • the severity of an explosion of a large
    shallow vapour cloud
    As a result tank storage operations had
    not received the attention they should
    have done
    Buncefield – Joint response

    Industry and regulators worked together


    to define good practice covering
    • fuel transfer operations
    • tank overfill protection
    • staff competence & staffing levels
    • emergency preparedness
    • secondary & tertiary containment
    Process Safety Leadership Group

    Final report published 2009


    “Safety and environmental standards for
    fuel storage sites”
    this covered 6 main themes plus
    emergency planning:
    Part 1: Systematic assessment of
    safety integrity levels

    • Overfill protection systems for storage


    tanks
    • BS EN 61511 – agreed standard
    • Application of layers of protection
    analysis (LOPA) to the overflow of
    atmospheric tanks (appendix 2)
    Part 2: Protecting against loss of
    primary containment using high
    integrity systems

    • Management of instrumented systems


    • Preventative maintenance
    • Automatic overfill protection for gasoline
    tanks – (appendix 4)
    • Defining tank capacity – (appendix 3)
    Part 3: Engineering against escalation
    of loss of primary containment

    • Siting of emergency response facilities –


    (appendix 6)
    • New tanks to BS EN 14015 or API 650
    – Single bottom design
    • Tank integrity management – EEMUA 159 / API
    653
    • Competence – inspectors to EEMUA 159 level 1
    or API 653
    Emergency arrangements

    Appendix 6
    • Routemap to emergency planning guidance
    • Template for completion of COMAH on-site
    plan
    • Assessment of vulnerable emergency
    response equipment & resources
    • COMAH off-site plan exercising/auditing
    record
    • Communicating with the public
    • (Note: COMAH = Control of Major Accident Hazards
    Regulations 1999)
    Part 4:Engineering against loss of
    secondary and tertiary containment

    • COMAH Competent Authority Containment


    Policy
    • Bund lining
    • Pipe penetrations & expansion joints
    • Bund capacity & strength
    • Firewater management
    • Tertiary containment
    Part 5 & 6: Operating with high
    reliability organisations – culture &
    leadership

    Appendix 5
    • Leadership & safety culture
    • Process safety management
    • Hazard identification & layers of protection
    • Roles responsibilities & competence
    • Staffing, shift work & working conditions –
    shift handover
    • Organisational, plant & process change
    • Principles for safe fuel transfer
    Buncefield response – Key points

    This way of working requires certain commitments:


    • Responsibility for controlling risk remains with
    site operators
    • The regulators must allow sufficient time for
    improvements to be made
    • Industry Trade Associations must be able to
    commit on behalf of member companies
    • Must be clear on what each new standard
    means in practice
    • Engagement and commitment is essential
    Buncefield – land use planning

    • Following public consultation HSE revised


    its approach to providing land use
    planning advice for new fuel sites and
    developments near to existing sites
    • This included an accident scenario to take
    account of the potential for a large vapour
    cloud explosion
    • Research continues in this area
    Buncefield – research

    Vapour cloud formation & prevention


    Explosion mechanism
    Event frequency
    A reminder – Buncefield was not
    unique
    Puerto Rico 2009 Jaipur 2009

    Venezuela 2012
    Buncefield – references

    Buncefield Investigation reports (MIIB)


    http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/index.htm

    Buncefield: why did it happen


    http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/buncefield-report.pdf

    PSLG final report


    http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/fuel-storage-sites.pdf

    Vapour cloud formation & FABIG TN12


    http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr908.pdf
    http://www.fabig.com/video-publications/TechnicalGuidance

    Explosion mechanism
    http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrhtm/rr718.htm
    Acknowledgements

    With grateful thanks to HSE for


    permission to share this presentation with
    you
    Also to colleagues in HSE, HSL and from
    industry for all of their hard work and
    dedication in helping to understand this
    incident and to learn and apply the
    lessons

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