Philosophy of Mind

Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the ontology and nature of the mind
and its relationship with the body. The mind–body problem is a paradigmatic issue in philosophy
of mind, although a number of other issues are addressed, such as the hard problem of
consciousness and the nature of particular mental states.[1][2][3] Aspects of the mind that are
studied include mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness and its
neural correlates, the ontology of the mind, the nature of cognition and of thought, and the
relationship of the mind to the body.
A phrenological mapping of the brain – phrenology was among the first attempts to correlate mental functions with
specific parts of the brain although it is now widely discredited.
Dualism and monism are the two central schools of thought on the mind–body problem,
although nuanced views have arisen that do not fit one or the other category neatly.
Dualism finds its entry into Western philosophy thanks to René Descartes in the 17th
century.[4] Substance dualists like Descartes argue that the mind is an independently existing
substance, whereas property dualists maintain that the mind is a group of independent
properties that emerge from and cannot be reduced to the brain, but that it is not a distinct
substance.[5]
Monism is the position that mind and body are ontologically indiscernible entities, not
dependent substances. This view was first advocated in Western philosophy by Parmenides in
the 5th century BCE and was later espoused by the 17th-century rationalist Baruch Spinoza.[6]
Physicalists argue that only entities postulated by physical theory exist, and that mental
processes will eventually be explained in terms of these entities as physical theory continues
to evolve. Physicalists maintain various positions on the prospects of reducing mental
properties to physical properties (many of whom adopt compatible forms of property
dualism),[7][8][9][10][11][12] and the ontological status of such mental properties remains
unclear.[11][13][14] Idealists maintain that the mind is all that exists and that the external world is
either mental itself, or an illusion created by the mind. Neutral monists such as Ernst Mach
and William James argue that events in the world can be thought of as either mental
(psychological) or physical depending on the network of relationships into which they enter,
and dual-aspect monists such as Spinoza adhere to the position that there is some other,
neutral substance, and that both matter and mind are properties of this unknown substance.
The most common monisms in the 20th and 21st centuries have all been variations of
physicalism; these positions include behaviorism, the type identity theory, anomalous monism
and functionalism.[15]
Most modern philosophers of mind adopt either a reductive physicalist or non-reductive

physicalist position, maintaining in their different ways that the mind is not something separate
from the body.[15] These approaches have been particularly influential in the sciences, especially
in the fields of sociobiology, computer science (specifically, artificial intelligence), evolutionary
psychology and the various neurosciences.[16][17][18][19] Reductive physicalists assert that all
mental states and properties will eventually be explained by scientific accounts of physiological
processes and states.[20][21][22] Non-reductive physicalists argue that although the mind is not a
separate substance, mental properties supervene on physical properties, or that the predicates
and vocabulary used in mental descriptions and explanations are indispensable, and cannot be
reduced to the language and lower-level explanations of physical science.[23][24] Continued
neuroscientific progress has helped to clarify some of these issues; however, they are far from
being resolved. Modern philosophers of mind continue to ask how the subjective qualities and
the intentionality of mental states and properties can be explained in naturalistic terms.[25][26]
However, a number of issues have been recognized with non-reductive physicalism. First, it is
irreconcilable with self-identity over time. Secondly, intentional states of consciousness do not
make sense on non-reductive physicalism. Thirdly, free will is impossible to reconcile with either
reductive or non-reductive physicalism. Fourthly, it fails to properly explain the phenomenon of
mental causation.[27]
Mind–body problem
Philosophy of perception
Philosophy of mind and science
Philosophy of mind in the continental tradition
Topics related to philosophy of mind
See also
References
Further reading
External links

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Most modern philosophers of mind adopt either a reductive physicalist or non-reductive

Philosophy of mind and science

Philosophy of mind in the continental tradition

Topics related to philosophy of mind

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