Joint Publication 3-03

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Joint Interdiction

9 September 2016
 PREFACE
1. Scope

This publication provides doctrine to plan, execute, and assess joint interdiction
operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the
Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides considerations for
military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational
forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the
exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders
(JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military
guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders.
It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing
the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to
ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders
of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate
components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances
dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the
contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance.
Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military
command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United
States (US). For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should
evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where
applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

KEVIN D. SCOTT
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Force Development

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Preface

Intentionally Blank

ii JP 3-03
 SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-03
DATED 14 OCTOBER 2011

 Incorporates the concept of full-spectrum superiority and provides additional

discussion of maritime domain awareness into the elements of effective
interdiction.

 Updates discussion on employment of mines and cluster munitions to include the

effect of changes in international law and conventions on both US and partner
nations.

 Updates discussion of United States Coast Guard conduct of interdiction in

support of law enforcement operations.

 Clarifies the role of Special Operations Forces for both conduct and support of
interdiction operations.

 Expands and updates sections on both electronic warfare and cyberspace

operations as complements to interdiction operations.

 Updates and reorganizes the discussion of the theater air-ground system and the
Service organizations which support interdiction operations.

 Clarifies aspects of command relationships that apply to interdiction operations.

 Adds discussion of the types of air interdiction mission types found on air tasking
orders.

 Clarifies the role of fire support coordination measures for the conduct of
interdiction operations.

 Simplifies the discussion of assessment as it pertains to interdiction operations.

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Summary of Changes

Intentionally Blank

iv JP 3-03
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii

CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTALS

 Introduction................................................................................................................ I-1
 Interdiction in Joint Operations ................................................................................. I-1
 Purpose of Interdiction Operations ............................................................................ I-2
 Interdiction Objectives Considerations...................................................................... I-4
 Elements of Effective Interdiction ............................................................................. I-9

CHAPTER II
JOINT CAPABILITIES

 Interdiction-Capable Forces......................................................................................II-1
 Complementary Operations ......................................................................................II-9

CHAPTER III
COMMAND AND CONTROL

 Command and Control of Joint Interdiction Operations ........................................ III-1

 Command Relationships ......................................................................................... III-6

CHAPTER IV
PLANNING

 Overview................................................................................................................. IV-1
 Integrating Interdiction and Maneuver ................................................................... IV-2
 Planning Joint Interdiction ...................................................................................... IV-4
 Targeting ................................................................................................................. IV-7
 Intelligence ............................................................................................................. IV-9
 Interdiction Planning Considerations ................................................................... IV-10
 Preparation ............................................................................................................ IV-14

CHAPTER V
INTERDICTION EXECUTION

 Operational Area Geometry and Coordination ......................................................... V-1

 Fire Support Coordination Measures ........................................................................ V-4
 Assessments .............................................................................................................. V-7

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Table of Contents

APPENDIX

A References ................................................................................................. A-1

B Administrative Instructions ........................................................................B-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-4

FIGURE

I-1 Elements of Effective Interdiction Operations ............................................ I-9

II-1 Interdiction-Capable Forces .......................................................................II-1
III-1 Key Air Force and Army Components of the Theater Air
Control System: Army Air-Ground System ............................................ III-4
IV-1 Joint Interdiction Plan .............................................................................. IV-7
V-1 Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas .................................. V-2
V-2 Linear Versus Nonlinear Operations (Depicted as a Corps
Area of Operations) ................................................................................... V-3
V-3 Notional Joint Operations Area with Designated Land and/or
Maritime Area of Operations .................................................................... V-5

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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Provides the Fundamentals of Interdiction in Joint Operations

• Covers Joint Capabilities for Conducting Interdiction

• Describes Command and Control of Joint Interdiction

• Discusses Joint Interdiction Planning

• Explains Joint Interdiction Execution

Fundamentals

Interdiction Interdiction is an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or

destroy the enemy’s military surface capability
before it can be used effectively against friendly
forces or to achieve enemy objectives. In support
of law enforcement, interdiction includes activities
conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, intercept,
board, detain, or destroy, under lawful authority,
vessels, vehicles, aircraft, people, cargo, and
money.

Purpose of Interdiction The purpose of interdiction operations is to prevent

Operations adversaries from employing surface-based
weaponry and reinforcing units at a time and place
The desired effects for of their choosing. Interdiction can divert enemy
interdiction operations are forces or assets from areas where there are critical
described using standard terms operational requirements for them. Actions
such as divert, disrupt, delay, or supporting disruption will interrupt or impede the
destroy. enemy or enemy capabilities or systems, upsetting
the flow of information, operational tempo,
effective interaction, or cohesion of the enemy
force or those systems. Actions can delay the time
of arrival of enemy forces or capabilities or alter
the ability of the enemy or adversary to project
forces or capabilities. Actions supporting
destruction will damage the structure, function, or
condition of a targeted system so that it can neither
perform as intended, nor be restored to a usable
condition, rendering it ineffective or useless.

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Executive Summary

Interdiction Objectives Joint force commanders (JFCs) vary the emphasis

Considerations upon interdiction operations and surface
maneuvers, depending on the strategic and
When developing interdiction operational situation confronting them. During
objectives, consider the major operations and campaigns, the effects of
relationship between targets and interdiction are typically more influential when
what second or third order directed against an enemy’s ability to command,
effects may be created, paying mass, maneuver, supply, and reinforce available
particular attention to potential conventional combat forces. Interdiction is more
unintended or undesired effects. difficult against an enemy that employs a covert
force structure, a simple logistic net, and
unconventional tactics.

Elements of Effective Effective interdiction operations share a number of

Interdiction common elements that lead to the attainment of
interdiction objectives. The element of effective
interdiction are full-spectrum superiority;
synchronization with maneuver; sustained and
concentrated pressure; accurate, reliable, and
timely intelligence; and effective resource
planning, positioning, and allocation.

Joint Capabilities

Interdiction-Capable Forces Interdiction operations can be conducted by all

components of the joint force, employing both lethal
During interdiction operations, and nonlethal means. Air forces employ such
components may support or be weapons as projectiles, missiles, unguided
supported by another component munitions, precision-guided munitions, land and/or
commander to achieve sea mines, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and
theater/operational area-wide sensors from airborne platforms in the air
interdiction objectives, or they interdiction (AI) role. Maritime forces employ a
may conduct interdiction network of integrated and redundant sensors, and
operations as part of their command, control, communications, computers,
component mission. intelligence, and EW systems, as well as, missiles,
torpedoes, fixed-wing, tiltrotor, rotary-wing aircraft,
unmanned aircraft, mines, naval fires, expeditionary
forces, and boarding parties to support naval, air,
and ground forces. Land forces employ such assets
as attack helicopters, missiles, artillery, and forces
capable of conducting conventional airborne, air
assault, and amphibious operations to accomplish
interdiction.

Complementary Operations Joint interdiction operations are most effective

when fully integrated into the concept of

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 Executive Summary

operations (CONOPS) of the joint force. In

addition to counterair and maneuver, other
operations notable for their specialized roles which
can complement joint interdiction operations,
include strategic attack operations; intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; space operations;
EW; cyberspace operations; information
operations; air refueling; and strike coordination
and reconnaissance.

Command and Control

Command and Control (C2) of Joint interdiction operations require an integrated,
Joint Interdiction Operations flexible, and responsive command and control (C2)
structure to process interdiction requirements and
dependable, interoperable, and secure
communications architecture to exercise control.
The JFC exercises C2 through functional or
Service component commanders. Each component
may perform interdiction as part of their internal
mission, employing their organic C2 assets in
accordance with their particular tactics, techniques,
and procedures.

Service C2 Systems The theater air control system (TACS) is the Air
Force component commander’s mechanism for
controlling air component assets. It consists of
airborne and ground elements to conduct tailored
C2 of air component operations, including AI. The
Army air-ground system is an inherent part of the
Army mission command system (arrangement of
facilities, networks, information, personnel, and
processes) that connects to the TACS and
supporting joint air components of the theater air-
ground system (TAGS). The Navy tactical air
control system is the principal air control system
afloat. The Marine Air Command and Control
System consists of various air C2 agencies
designed to provide the Marine air-ground task
force aviation combat element commander with the
ability to monitor, supervise, and influence the
application of Marine and supporting air assets.

Theater Air-Ground System The TAGS combines each Service’s C2 and

airspace management system into a unified
framework allowing each to contribute in a unified
effort supporting the JFC. The JFC directs the

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Executive Summary

TAGS architecture for a particular operational

area. Each component’s air-ground system is
designed to facilitate C2 of that component’s
operations and interface with the TAGS.

Command Relationships To ensure unity of command and effort of

interdiction operations throughout a theater/joint
The capabilities of forces used operations area (JOA), the JFC normally delegates
for joint interdiction, as well as the planning and execution of theater/JOA-wide AI
the magnitude of their potential operations to the component commander with the
contribution, must be considered preponderance of AI assets with theater/JOA-wide
while planning and conducting range and the ability to control them. The joint
the joint interdiction effort. The force air component commander (JFACC) is
joint force commander normally the supported commander for the JFC’s
structures the joint force to overall AI effort, while land and maritime
ensure that diverse component component commanders are supported
capabilities, operations, and commanders for interdiction in their areas of
forces complement each other to operations (AOs). There may be situations in
achieve the desired results which designation of a JFACC is not required
effectively and efficiently. when a conflict or situation is of limited duration,
scope, or complexity. The JFC may approve the
formation of a joint fires element within the
operations directorate of a joint staff. Component
commanders develop interdiction priorities to
enhance mission accomplishment. Within their
designated AOs, land and maritime component
commanders integrate and synchronize joint
maneuver and fires functions and interdiction
missions. To facilitate this integration and
synchronization within their AOs, such
commanders have the authority to designate target
priority, effects, and timing of fires.

Planning

Joint Force Objectives Joint interdiction typically focuses on

operational-level objectives as delineated in the
JFC’s operation or campaign plans. It must also
support strategic-level objectives by working in
concert with other efforts to neutralize or destroy
the enemy’s centers of gravity or other key target
systems.

Integrating Interdiction and Interdiction and maneuver are complementary

Maneuver operations that should normally be integrated to
create dilemmas for the enemy. Joint interdiction

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 Executive Summary

can isolate enemy forces, control the movement of

enemy forces into or out of a land or maritime AO,
and set conditions for maneuver forces.

Planning Joint Interdiction The JFC establishes broad planning objectives and
guidance for interdiction of enemy forces as an
integral part of a joint campaign or major
operation. Commanders should consider how
planned operations can complement joint
interdiction objectives and vice versa.
Components may conduct interdiction operations
as part of their specific mission in addition to, or in
lieu of, supporting the theater/JOA-wide
interdiction effort. Detailed planning facilitates a
coherent interdiction effort involving diverse
forces using different employment procedures and
reduces the potential for friendly fire incidents.
Certain time-sensitive targets—highly lucrative,
fleeting targets designated by the JFC as high
priority—and other targets of opportunity may
preclude the use of normal coordination
procedures. The JFC establishes C2 architecture
and procedures to coordinate dynamic targeting
events across the joint force.

Targeting During target development, the targeting process

must relate specific targets to objectives, desired
effects, and accompanying actions. The goal of
targeting in interdiction is to select and prioritize a
series of targets and/or target systems that when
engaged, support the achievement of the JFC’s
operational/strategic objectives.

Intelligence Priority intelligence requirements are developed to

support interdiction operations. To that end, joint
interdiction targets must be identified and then
prioritized to facilitate collection management and
mission accomplishment.

Interdiction Planning The nature of the mission or a target set may

Considerations determine its suitability for interdiction and what
forces and weapon systems should be employed.
Mobile or easily concealed targets may require an
approach different from that employed in attacking
fixed emplacements.

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Executive Summary

Preparation JFCs should ensure that the correct mix of

interdiction assets will be in place. Forces should
be positioned within operational reach of enemy
decisive points to support the JFC’s CONOPS and
exploit unforeseen opportunities.

Interdiction Execution

Operational Area Geometry and Joint interdiction may be conducted in conjunction

Coordination with friendly forces operating in an AO. In order
to integrate joint fires and avoid friendly fire, fire
support coordination measures (FSCMs) must be
established. When air operations are involved,
airspace coordinating measures will normally be
used along with FSCMs.

Fire Support Coordination FSCMs are necessary to facilitate the rapid

Measures (FSCMs) engagement of targets and simultaneously provide
safeguards for friendly forces. Permissive FSCMs
Within their areas of operations, facilitate attacks and include coordinated fire lines,
land and naval force free fire areas, fire support coordination lines
commanders employ permissive (FSCLs), and kill boxes. Restrictive measures
and restrictive FSCMs. safeguard friendly forces and include no-fire areas,
restrictive fire areas, restrictive fire lines, and
airspace coordination areas. Interdiction of targets
short of the FSCL is controlled by the appropriate
land or amphibious force commander. Joint
interdiction forces attacking targets beyond the
FSCL must inform all affected commanders in
sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid
friendly casualties. Special operations forces
operations beyond the FSCL and outside the land
force AO are particularly at risk and require
detailed coordination to ensure proper restrictive
FSCMs are in place to protect friendly personnel.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides doctrine to plan, execute,

and assess joint interdiction operations.

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 CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTALS

“An army can be defeated by one of two main alternative means—not

necessarily mutually exclusive: we can strike at the enemy’s troops
themselves, either by killing them or preventing them from being in the right
place at the right time; or we can ruin their fighting efficiency by depriving them
of their supplies of food and war material of all kinds on which they depend for
existence as a fighting force.”

Wing Commander J. C. Slessor

Air Power and Armies, 1936

1. Introduction

This publication provides a basis to plan, execute, and assess interdiction operations.
Interdiction is an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military
surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces or to
achieve enemy objectives. In support of law enforcement, interdiction includes
activities conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy,
under lawful authority, vessels, vehicles, aircraft, people, cargo, and money.
Interdiction is conducted on enemy surface targets (e.g., enemy command and control
[C2], intelligence, fires, reinforcing units, lines of communications [LOCs], logistics, and
other operational- and tactical-level enemy surface capabilities). These operations may
be used to shape the operational environment or to directly support ongoing military
operations by isolating the enemy from materiel, leadership, money, or moral support.
Interdiction missions are conducted at such distance from friendly surface forces that
detailed integration of each mission with the fire and maneuver of those forces is not
required. Interdiction operations may support theater or operational area-wide
priorities or component operations. Due to the nature of modern conflict that involves
nation states, non-state actors, and other threats to the US, interdiction operations can
span from US shores, across the open seas, and into theaters or operational areas. These
operations may complement, support, or be supported by maneuver operations. When
directed, other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies may support
joint interdiction operations or conduct their own interdiction activities. Interdiction-
capable forces are discussed in Chapter II, “Joint Capabilities.” Joint force commanders
(JFCs) may employ interdiction operations as a principal means to achieve intended
objectives. Military interdiction operations can also support other USG efforts and law
enforcement activities overseas, as well as in the US as part of homeland security.

2. Interdiction in Joint Operations

JFCs integrate and synchronize operations and employ military forces and
capabilities, as well as nonmilitary resources, resulting in greater combat power and
operational effectiveness. Further, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to mass
forces in the shortest time possible, and with minimal casualties, to achieve military

I-1
Chapter I

objectives. JFCs also gain decisive advantage over the enemy through asymmetrical
actions conducted to preserve freedom of action for future operations.

a. Asymmetrical operations are particularly effective when applied against enemy

forces not postured for immediate tactical battle, but instead operating in more vulnerable
aspects—operational deployment and/or movement, extended logistic activity (including
rest and refitting), or mobilization and training (including industrial production). Thus,
JFCs should aggressively seek opportunities to apply asymmetrical force against an
enemy in as vulnerable an aspect as possible—air attacks against enemy ground
formations in convoy (e.g., the air and special operations forces’ [SOFs’] interdiction
operations against German attempts to reinforce its forces in Normandy); naval air
attacks against troop transports (e.g., US air attacks against Japanese surface
reinforcement of Guadalcanal); and land operations against enemy naval, air, or missile
bases (e.g., The Anaconda Plan—the Union blockade of the Confederate States during
the Civil War—was a strategic interdiction operation designed to support ground combat
operations by disrupting and denying trade in material goods thus impacting both the
ability for the Confederacy to supply its army and generate revenue to fund the war.)

b. Interdiction can create opportunities for commanders to exploit and should be

integrated with other operations of the joint force. It can significantly affect the course of
a campaign or major operation. However, the use of interdiction must be tailored to the
situation and should be closely integrated in the JFC’s overall plan. Interdiction against
an enemy with a rigid, top-down C2 structure differs from the rapid, agile interdiction
required against a decentralized, networked terrorist organization or insurgency.
Interdiction can be particularly effective when the enemy must rapidly move major forces
and their sustaining supplies.

3. Purpose of Interdiction Operations

The purpose of interdiction operations is to prevent adversaries from employing

surface-based weaponry and reinforcing units at a time and place of their choosing. The
desired effects for interdiction operations are described using standard terms such as
divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy. Actions associated with one desired effect may also
support the others. For example, delay can result from disrupting, diverting, or
destroying enemy capabilities.

a. Divert. Interdiction can divert enemy forces or assets from areas where there are
critical operational requirements for them. Its purpose is to consume resources or
capabilities critical to enemy operations in a way that is advantageous to friendly
operations. It may divert enemy ground forces to a location more favorable to the JFC or
divert enemy naval, engineering, and personnel resources to the tasks of repairing and
recovering damaged equipment, facilities, and LOCs. It can draw the attention of enemy
forces away from critical friendly operations. These diversions prevent enemy forces and
their support resources from being employed for their intended purpose. Diversions can
also cause more circuitous routing along LOCs, resulting in delays for the enemy.
Diversion may be effective in the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
material.

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 Fundamentals

b. Disrupt. Actions supporting disruption will interrupt or impede the enemy or

enemy capabilities or systems, upsetting the flow of information, operational tempo,
effective interaction, or cohesion of the enemy force or those systems. Interdiction can
disrupt the enemy’s C2 systems, intelligence collection capabilities, transportation
systems, supply lines, industrial base, and psychological will. Interdiction thus disrupts
the movement and routing of the enemy’s information, materiel, and forces. Disruption
can result from degradation or destruction of these enemy capabilities. Disruption of
enemy surface forces can be accomplished in a number of ways. A key task during
interdiction planning is analyzing the enemy for critical vulnerabilities that, if attacked,
will have a disruptive effect across significant portions of the enemy force.

(1) The enemy’s combat operations may be disrupted with attacks on its C2
nodes or key commercial infrastructure components, such as electrical power and
transportation, which support and sustain enemy operations. Such attacks may force the
enemy to use less capable, less secure backup communications systems that can be more
easily exploited by friendly forces. Regimes that possess a rigid, top-down C2 structure
can be particularly vulnerable to interdiction.

(2) Interdiction can disrupt by attacking enemy LOCs, forcing the enemy to use
less capable transportation modes to communicate and sustain its forces. These
disruptive effects can severely affect the tempo of enemy operations and ultimately force
the enemy to culminate earlier than anticipated.

(3) Interdiction attacks can also produce a psychological impact which could
significantly reduce enemy capabilities and morale. Uncertainty as to whether or not
forces, materiel, or supplies will arrive can directly affect enemy commanders, their
staffs, and forces.

(4) Disruption can also be achieved through nonlethal means in support of

counterterrorism, countering WMD, law enforcement, or national and/or international
sanction activities. The purpose of these nonlethal actions is to impede unlawful
activities or activities that pose a threat, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to
personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. In modern complex
operations, the adversary is often neither easily recognized nor a uniformed, armed
combatant. In such an environment, activities such as boarding, diverting, and seizing, if
feasible, are frequently more appropriate than lethal attacks.

c. Delay. Actions can delay the time of arrival of enemy forces or capabilities or
alter the ability of the enemy or adversary to project forces or capabilities.

(1) When interdiction delays the enemy, friendly forces gain time. What JFCs
do to improve their situation in the time gained is critical to any assessment of
interdiction’s contribution. However, an interdiction plan that focuses on delay and is
effectively executed does not guarantee a major impact on operations. For delay to have
a major impact, either the enemy must face urgent movement requirements or the delay
must enhance the effectiveness of planned friendly operations.

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Chapter I

(2) It is advantageous for friendly forces to pressure their adversaries to attempt

time-urgent movement. Ideally, if the joint force maintains the initiative, the opponent is
forced to make unplanned, time-urgent movements at times and places that maximize
their vulnerability to interdiction.

(3) The purpose of interdiction may be to lengthen the time during which
enemy land or naval forces are at risk of attack. When vehicles mass behind a damaged
route segment, or ships are trapped in a harbor because of mines, a more concentrated set
of targets and a longer period of exposure results. If there are follow-on strikes, this
makes the enemy easier to destroy or render ineffective.

d. Destroy. Actions supporting destruction will damage the structure, function, or

condition of a targeted system so that it can neither perform as intended, nor be restored
to a usable condition, rendering it ineffective or useless. The destruction of enemy
forces, cargoes, support elements, and resources is the most direct form of interdiction.
This level of interdiction may not always require follow-up missions or a sustained
operation or campaign. Destroying transportation systems is usually not an end in itself,
but contributes to the delay, diversion, and disruption of enemy forces and materiel. It
may cause the enemy to mass air defense assets, which may be useful elsewhere, around
critical transportation nodes. It may force the enemy to use alternate, less efficient routes
or disperse critical assets. The enemy may have to divert engineering resources from
other tasks to prepare alternate routes in anticipation of possible attacks. This may be
true even when transportation systems remain largely undamaged. It may also produce
unintended or undesirable effects. However, destruction may also inhibit friendly
freedom of action. Additionally, collateral damage and other unintended effects may
influence the commander’s decision to employ destructive fires in urban areas. For
example, destruction of key enemy transportation infrastructure in and around land and
naval areas of operations (AOs) could hinder subsequent friendly surface movement.
Appropriate coordination of interdiction helps to preserve friendly freedom of action.
Knowledge of the enemy helps the JFC to anticipate the reactions and consequences of a
destruction-oriented interdiction upon all stakeholders—enemies, populace, friends,
allies, and sympathizers.

4. Interdiction Objectives Considerations

a. The effectiveness of interdiction is dependent on a number of factors to include:

the distance between interdiction operations and the location of intended effect; the
means and rate of movement (ships, trains, aircraft, trucks); the physical target (forces,
cargo/passengers, supplies, fuel, munitions, infrastructure); the level of enemy activity;
enemy tactics; and the resilience, adaptability, persistence, and resourcefulness of the
enemy or its targeted force or system. Interdiction may be planned to create advantages
at any level, from tactical to strategic, with corresponding effects on the enemy and the
speed with which interdiction affects frontline enemy forces. Interdiction deep in the
enemy’s rear area can have broad operational effects. However, deep interdiction may
have a delayed effect on land and maritime operations. Interdiction closer to land and
maritime forces may be of more immediate operational and tactical concern to maneuver
forces. Thus, JFCs vary the emphasis upon interdiction operations and surface

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 Fundamentals

maneuvers, depending on the strategic and operational situation confronting them.

During major operations and campaigns, the effects of interdiction are typically more
influential when directed against an enemy’s ability to command, mass, maneuver,
supply, and reinforce available conventional combat forces. Interdiction is more difficult
against an enemy that employs a covert force structure, a simple logistic net, and
unconventional tactics. However, with timely, accurate intelligence, and persistent
operations, interdiction can disrupt supply operations, destroy weapons caches, and deny
sanctuary. The following are considerations for interdiction objectives: attrition of
enemy capabilities, constriction of enemy logistic systems, disruption of enemy C2
systems, forcing urgent movement upon the enemy, channeling enemy movements,
denying enemy threat potential, interdicting insurgency operations, and aiding in the
enforcement of sanctions. When developing interdiction objectives, consider the
relationship between targets and what second- or third-order effects may be created,
paying particular attention to potential unintended or undesired effects.

b. Attrition of Enemy Capabilities. Attriting inbound enemy forces and materiel

may isolate forces directly engaged with US forces allowing the joint force to generate a
greater material, informational, or psychological advantage. In some cases,
circumstances such as enemy deployment or limiting rules of engagement (ROE) may
make fielded forces a more viable target than supporting infrastructure. Resources,
terrain, weather, and enemy actions are just a few variables to consider when developing
interdiction targets.

(1) Depending on the situation, destroying individual enemy targets may not be
the most efficient approach in terms of munitions, time, and forces available. Although
the destruction of individual enemy forces has an immediate impact on enemy combat
power, it usually requires more interdiction capabilities due to the larger number of
individual targets—especially if they are dispersed, concealed, or fortified.

(2) Terrain and weather affect the ability to attrit enemy forces. Attacking an
enemy in open terrain in good weather significantly differs from striking an enemy in
rough wooded terrain under a layer of foul weather. As an example, during Operation
DESERT STORM, Iraqi reinforcing combat units or logistic trains moving across open
desert terrain were more vulnerable to interdiction by coalition airpower than dispersed
Serbian forces that benefited from trees, valleys, and poor weather conditions during
Operation ALLIED FORCE.

(3) Enemy characteristics influence the adopted concept of operations

(CONOPS). The enemy’s operational vulnerability and ability to replace losses—or
adapt operations to mitigate them—must be weighed against the expected results of
targeting supporting infrastructure. The enemy’s movement also influences the ability to
destroy fielded forces. Friendly maneuver can force an enemy to react and become
predictable, making interdiction both viable and more effective.

c. Constricting the Enemy Logistic System. Combat creates demands on fielded

forces and speeds consumption of vital war materiel. This in turn increases the
effectiveness of interdiction operations by straining the support systems and reducing

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stockpiles. For surface combat to take place, Service members, and their weapons,
ammunition, food, and communications equipment, must get to the battle. When the
enemy consumes large quantities of supplies because of heavy combat or extensive
movement, interdiction operations have an accelerated impact for two reasons. First,
when opponents are under heavy pressure, they may be forced to use up stockpiles
reserved for ongoing or future operations. Second, high consumption drives an enemy to
use more direct routes, making it more vulnerable to interdiction attacks. The nature of
ground combat also determines which supporting elements are most critical at any given
time. Historically, an enemy army fighting under static conditions is more affected by
the destruction of munitions, while a highly mobile enemy is more disrupted by the loss
of fuel and transportation.

(1) The less surplus capacity the enemy’s logistic systems have, the less they
can compensate for damage. For any type of interdiction in a combat or noncombat
environment, degrading the mobility of the enemy’s distribution system hinders its ability
to redistribute assets to effectively counter friendly operations. When attacking the
enemy’s logistic systems, it is normally prudent to concentrate efforts on a small number
of limiting factors, such as concentrations of supplies; petroleum, oils, and lubricants;
storage and resupply systems; or soft vehicles. When a critical vulnerability is
identified within the enemy’s logistic systems, it is usually beneficial to employ
parallel attacks against that vulnerability.

(2) The enemy’s transportation system should also be broken down into critical
requirements and critical vulnerabilities when analyzing for weaknesses to attack. Most
transportation systems consist of the actual link for travel (roads, rail, etc.), vehicles used
to transport troops or supplies along the link, energy required for those vehicles to
operate (typically petroleum or electricity), C2 to run the transportation system, and
repair facilities to keep the system operating. The loading and unloading nodes in the
transportation system may prove especially lucrative for attack, as large concentrations of
enemy forces or supplies are often found there. Examples include rail yards, harbors, and
airfields. If forces or supplies are critically needed at the front, the enemy may not have
the luxury of dispersing them during loading or unloading, which increases their
vulnerability to interdiction. In many cases, the enemy will use the same transportation
system for both forces and supplies. Under such circumstances, destroying or degrading
the enemy’s LOCs will affect both mobility and resupply capability. When analyzing an
enemy transportation network for importance to its overall strategy, all possible uses for
such a system must be considered. The analysis of the enemy’s transportation network
should include its surplus capacity and reconstitution capability.

d. Disrupting Enemy C2 Systems. The enemy’s combat operations may be

disrupted with strategic or interdiction attacks on its C2 nodes; the level of C2 disruption
must be commensurate with overall objectives. Attacks on the C2 structure may seek to
isolate enemy combat forces from higher headquarters or to force the enemy to use less
capable and secure backup communications systems that can be more easily exploited.
When the enemy employs a rigid, top-down C2 doctrine, it can be particularly vulnerable
to the disruptive effects of C2 interdiction. This is especially true when the enemy has
not had a long preparation period to exercise its plan or when the conflict has moved

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beyond the initial stages. Conversely, an enemy that practices a high degree of C2
autonomy will likely be less affected by attacks on its C2 network. In some
circumstances, complete destruction of the enemy C2 architecture could be
counterproductive. For example, a plan requiring an enemy reaction to a friendly
maneuver could fail if the enemy commander can neither receive reports of the maneuver
nor transmit the order to react to it. The capability to affect the enemy through non-lethal
electronic warfare (EW), cyberspace operations (CO), or other information-related
capabilities (IRCs) should also be considered, as this approach may lead to better overall
results, while freeing up conventional interdiction assets to prosecute alternate objectives.
CO and information operations (IO) can also be used along with lethal interdiction to
have greater effectiveness.

e. Forcing Urgent Movement upon the Enemy. The enemy may execute time-
urgent movement for several reasons: an attempt to achieve surprise, the need to attack
before reinforcements or supplies arrive, the requirement for rapid reinforcement of
threatened defensive positions, the attempt to exploit offensive operations, or when
driven to urgent movement by interdiction. Rapid movement of enemy forces and
supplies often makes them more vulnerable to interdiction. They generally become more
concentrated while traversing more exposed and predictable avenues, occasionally
foregoing some of the more time-consuming camouflage, concealment, and deception
techniques. However, movements are normally limited in duration due to a desire to
limit exposure. For friendly forces to capitalize on such opportunities, the JFC must deny
the enemy mobility when it needs it most. Close coordination is required among all
forces to take full advantage of the situation. Additionally, commanders require access to
information systems able to process real-time and near real-time intelligence in order to
exploit the capabilities of interdiction and the opportunities these operations create.
Friendly forces must take full advantage of all reconnaissance and surveillance assets to
detect when these movements occur.

f. Channeling Enemy Movements. Interdiction can be used to channel the

enemy’s movements. The lack of transportation routes and man-made and natural
obstacles makes interdiction efforts more effective. The fewer routes available to handle
enemy supplies and reinforcements, the greater the loss or delay caused by severing those
routes. Attacks on enemy lateral LOCs can channel movement, impair reinforcement,
reduce operational cohesion, and create conditions for defeating the enemy in detail.
Minefields may be employed to channel enemy maritime and ground movements,
although the decision to use mines must be balanced against any potential that friendly
forces or civilians may need to move through the targeted area. Geography may also
restrict or channel surface movement, creating chokepoints and concentrated targets.
Geography influences the rate of enemy movement, the size of the force to be moved,
where it can move, and the means required to move the force.

A detailed discussion of the integration of barriers, obstacles, and mines is included in

Joint Publication (JP) 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations.

g. Denying Enemy Threat Potential. The presence or threat of effective

interdiction operations can result in deterring a potential enemy’s actions. Fear of

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interdiction can result in a less than optimum use of resources by the enemy. For
example, an enemy that has faced or witnessed air interdiction (AI) may be reluctant to
move reserve troops to the front lines where they are critically needed. The threat of
interdiction operations is also a strong deterrent to the movement and proliferation of
WMD. WMD interdiction encompasses operations directed toward weaponized
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear devices/warheads and delivery vehicles;
dual-use items required to produce devices/warheads, their precursors, or related items;
related technology; financial and transportation intermediaries, which facilitate trade in
WMD; and individuals associated with all of the above.

See JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, for more information on WMD
interdiction operations.

h. Interdicting Insurgency Operations. Interdiction operations can be particularly

valuable in irregular warfare and when conducting counterinsurgency. Guerrilla fighters
do not often have large stockpiles of weapons, munitions, money, and other supplies
close to their operating areas since they historically blend into, or come from, the
population. Thus, they rely on regular supply routes to keep the insurgency supplied and
funded. This opens up interdiction targets for the JFC. Of greater challenge in irregular
warfare, however, is the fact that supply routes are much harder to interdict since they
will often overlap with legitimate civilian routes, and insurgent supplies may be hidden in
or be identical to legitimate civilian supplies moving through the operational area.
Incorrectly destroying food stocks or civilian supplies may create animosity amongst the
population and increase insurgent sympathy or support. Interdiction, when coordinated
with combat operations against guerrillas, may deny or disrupt withdrawal routes for the
enemy forces fleeing direct engagement with US forces. In these cases, significant
coordination must be made between interdiction forces and forces in direct contact with
insurgents to prevent friendly fire and maintain constant pressure and pursuit.
Additionally, successful insurgencies often benefit from a sanctuary where forces can
recruit, rest, refit, and avoid attrition from counterinsurgency forces. Thus, interdiction in
irregular warfare that denies or disrupts access to sanctuary will be of enormous value to
the overall counterinsurgency effort.

i. Enforcement of Sanctions. Sanction enforcement operations employ coercive

measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items or information
into or out of a nation or specified area. Maritime interception operations (MIO) are a
form of interdiction used for sanction enforcement that are military or legal in nature, and
serve diplomatic/political and military purposes. The diplomatic/political objective is to
compel a country or group to conform to the objectives of the initiating body, while the
military objective focuses on establishing a barrier that is selective, allowing only
authorized goods or persons to enter or exit. Depending on the geography, sanction
enforcement normally involves some combination of air and surface forces. MIO can be
used across the range of military operations. It can be used to enforce sanctions or
national policies imposed unilaterally, multinationally, or as directed by an international
organization (e.g., the United Nations Security Council) or other regional authority. MIO
may include the following:

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 Fundamentals

(1) Sending armed boarding parties to visit merchant ships bound to, through,
or out of a defined regional area.

(2) Examining boarded ships’ crewmembers’ papers, documentation, and cargo.

(3) Searching for evidence of contraband, to include WMD or material required

in the production of WMD.

(4) Diverting vessels failing to comply with the guidelines set forth by the
sanctioning body or nation.

(5) Seizing suspect vessels and their cargo that refuse to divert.

(6) Destroying vessels and cargo, if necessary.

For more information, refer to Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP)
3-07.11M/Coast Guard Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (CGTTP) 3-93.3/Marine
Corps Interim Publication (MCIP) 3-33.04, Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure Operations.

5. Elements of Effective Interdiction

Effective interdiction operations share a number of common elements that lead to the
attainment of interdiction objectives. The mix of elements in each operation depends on
such variables as the nature of the conflict, geographic location, weather, and enemy
characteristics. Elements normally required to successfully prosecute interdiction
operations are shown in Figure I-1 and are discussed below.

a. Full-Spectrum Superiority. The cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land,

maritime, and space domains and information environment (which includes cyberspace)
permits the conduct of joint operations without effective opposition or prohibitive
interference.

Elements of Effective Interdiction Operations

 Full-Spectrum Superiority

 Synchronization with Maneuver

 Sustained and Concentrated Pressure

 Accurate, Reliable, and Timely Intelligence

 Effective Resource Planning, Positioning, and Allocation

Figure I-1. Elements of Effective Interdiction Operations

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Chapter I

b. Synchronization with Maneuver. The synchronization of interdiction

operations and maneuver can lead to more effective operations. Planning and conducting
interdiction and maneuver operations within a coherent framework creates a synergistic
effect. The benefits of integrating these operations are discussed in more detail in
Chapter IV, “Planning.”

c. Sustained and Concentrated Pressure. Successful interdiction operations have

highlighted the importance of sustained, concentrated efforts. Since interdiction is often
directed against replaceable systems or assets (vehicles, weapons, aircraft, ships,
illegal/dangerous cargoes, persons, or communications equipment) and reparable systems
(engineering features, such as bridges and rail lines), sustained, concentrated pressure,
sufficient to impede efforts to replace or repair affected assets, is required. This applies
particularly to operations of long duration, because time allows the enemy to restore
losses. Eventually, resourceful enemies can circumvent even the most enduring effects of
interdiction. Success or failure often comes down to the balance between the enemy’s
ability to mitigate interdiction effects versus friendly ability to sustain interdiction
actions. Effective employment of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
assets provides critical information to the JFC on the results of interdiction and on the
enemy’s ability to reconstitute.

d. Accurate, Reliable, and Timely Intelligence. Information about the enemy’s

plan of operations, LOCs, tactical dispositions, and capabilities can help determine the
enemy’s probable course(s) of action (COA[s]), identify contraband shipments (as related
to WMD) or interrelated target systems, and allow the commander to anticipate enemy
actions or counteractions and respond accordingly. A prerequisite for planning joint
interdiction operations is an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the
enemy and how they are most likely to operate. Accurate, reliable, and timely
intelligence allows commanders to develop achievable objectives, select appropriate
targets, apply the appropriate weapon and delivery systems, and keep abreast of the
enemy’s response, as applicable.

(1) Intelligence assessments can provide interdiction operations with crucial

input on target development by assessing enemy characteristics. Intelligence analysts
also support interdiction planners with environmental assessments. Conversely,
interdiction may enhance intelligence collection efforts if, for example, the destruction of
primary communications nets causes the enemy to use systems which are more
vulnerable to exploitation.

(2) Accurate, reliable, and timely intelligence is extremely important to

maritime domain awareness (MDA). The National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan
for the National Strategy for Maritime Security (December 2013) defines MDA as “the
effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could
impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the US.” Obtaining and
maintaining accurate MDA is a key enabler of an active and layered maritime defense in
depth, and it facilitates more expeditious and precise actions by the joint force maritime
component commander (JFMCC), if established, and subordinate commanders. Some
degree of MDA is also required to effectively operate as a component of the joint force.

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 Fundamentals

Achieving awareness of the maritime domain is challenging due to the vastness of the
oceans and seas, the large volume of maritime commerce, sensor limitations, the great
length of shorelines, and size of port areas, which provide both concealment and
numerous access points to the land. MDA requires integrating all-source intelligence,
law enforcement information, open-source data, and information from public and private
sectors, both nationally and internationally. By networking maritime regions and
resources into a common global maritime picture, useful data can be presented in a form
that supports a wide range of planning, decision, execution, and assessment requirements
to include those supporting interdiction operations. Given the nature of these operations,
it is important that information be shared within the interagency and international
communities to the maximum extent possible.

e. Effective Resource Planning, Positioning, and Allocation. Ensuring the

appropriate resources (units, munitions, vessels, etc.) are allocated and positioned to
conduct effective interdiction operations requires detailed planning. Interdiction
objectives will affect the movement and positioning of appropriate interdiction platforms
and weapons. Proper weapon planning and employment are important factors for
effective combat interdiction operations. Matching the correct weapon (system) to the
target minimizes the time and resources required to achieve the objective. Mismatching
available munitions or assets with targets and/or target systems can greatly increase the
time and resources required to achieve the objectives of the interdiction operation and
unduly risks valuable personnel and weapon systems through additional strikes against
the same undamaged/undestroyed target. Munitions and fuse settings should be tailored
to the desired effect—target and/or target systems destruction, neutralization, or
suppression. Although precision-guided munitions (PGMs) have become a primary
weapon of choice, planners should realize that general purpose and cluster munitions
may, consistent with application of ROE and the law of war, create better effects in some
situations. Planners should also consider the possibility of adverse weapons effects
against friendly forces, such as the employment of time-delayed munitions against an
enemy near advancing friendly forces. Additionally, planners should consider adverse
effects of enemy munitions or weapons material collocated at a target site. Some WMD
targets may have restrictions due to the danger of releasing hazards. PGMs are uniquely
valuable in attacking hardened point targets or for minimizing collateral damage. These
highly accurate munitions provide rapid strike capability with maximum flexibility, while
standoff precision weapons allow joint interdiction forces to remain outside the most
heavily defended areas with the same accuracies. Precision attack of key infrastructure,
transportation, and C2 targets may cripple an enemy force’s ability to maneuver.

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 CHAPTER II
JOINT CAPABILITIES

1. Interdiction-Capable Forces

Interdiction operations can be conducted by all components of the joint force,

employing both lethal and nonlethal means. During interdiction operations, components
may support or be supported by another component commander to achieve
theater/operational area-wide interdiction objectives, or they may conduct interdiction
operations as part of their component mission. Broad lethal and nonlethal interdiction
capabilities of the components and other USG departments and agencies are listed in
Figure II-1.

a. Air forces employ such weapons as projectiles, missiles, unguided munitions,

PGMs, land and/or sea mines, EW systems, and sensors from airborne platforms in the
AI role.

(1) AI is an air operation conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the

enemy’s military surface capabilities before it can be brought to bear effectively against
friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve enemy objectives. AI is conducted at such
distances from friendly forces that detailed integration of each AI mission with the fire

Interdiction-Capable Forces
 Air forces employ such weapons as projectiles, missiles, unguided
munitions, precision munitions, land and/or sea mines, electronic warfare
systems, and sensors from airborne platforms.
 Maritime forces employ assets such as surface combatants, aircraft
carriers, amphibious warfare ships, aircraft, helicopters, submarines,
landing forces, and special operations forces, and weapons such as
missiles, munitions, torpedoes, and mines, capable of conducting a variety
of air, land, and sea operations.
 Land forces employ such assets as attack helicopters, missiles, artillery,
and those forces capable of conducting conventional airborne, air assault,
and amphibious operations.
 Special operations forces may support conventional interdiction operations
by providing terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions, or may act
independently when the use of conventional forces is inappropriate or
infeasible.
 Other United States Government departments and agencies work with
military forces in a whole-of-government approach to interdiction
capabilities and forces. Military elements work with our interagency
partners (Department of the Treasury, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
etc.) to interdict threat finance and foreign fighter streams.
 Cyberspace forces can employ offensive cyberspace operations
capabilities to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy capabilities in
support of interdiction operations.

Figure II-1. Interdiction-Capable Forces

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Chapter II

and movement of friendly forces is not normally required. Some characteristics or

considerations of AI follow.

(a) AI can be executed as a supported mission or it can provide support to

land and maritime commanders. AI contributes by disrupting the enemy’s ability to
command, mass, maneuver, withdraw, supply, and reinforce available combat power, and
by weakening the enemy physically and psychologically.

(b) AI can contribute to or achieve JFC objectives independent of surface

forces. AI operations outside surface AO and conducted against enemy forces, LOCs, C2
systems, and other enemy resources can significantly alter the course of an operation.

(c) AI creates opportunities for friendly commanders to exploit. AI may

support a surface scheme of maneuver within a surface commander’s AO. AI can create
effects that facilitate and support the land and maritime component’s ability to execute
JFC specified tasks and missions.

(d) AI is inherently less complicated to execute than close air support

(CAS) because it does not require detailed integration with the fire and movement of
friendly forces. Detailed integration requires extensive communications, comprehensive
deconfliction procedures, and meticulous planning. Therefore, if the enemy surface force
presents a lucrative target, AI conducted before friendly land forces make contact can
significantly degrade the enemy’s fighting ability and reduce the number of CAS sorties
required. The CAS/AI relationship has a parallel within the maritime domain. Like
CAS, maritime air support (MAS) refers to air action against hostile surface targets—at
sea—that requires detailed integration with the fire and movement of maritime forces. AI
of maritime targets differs from MAS in that detailed tactical integration with naval
surface forces is not required.

(2) Each Service’s air forces’ flexibility, range, speed, lethality, precision, and
ability to mass at a desired time and place contribute significantly to the overall joint
interdiction effort. Air forces offer the versatility and capability to deliver combat power
against the enemy when and where needed to attain objectives. The ability of aircraft to
employ PGMs offers a distinct advantage over other weapon systems in many cases.
PGMs can correct for ballistics, release, and targeting errors in flight. Explosive loads
can also be more accurately tailored for the target, since planners can assume most bombs
will strike in the manner and place expected. Unless using time-delayed munitions,
manned and unmanned aircraft (UA) can offer the advantage of conducting phase I battle
damage assessment (BDA). Also, stealth capabilities and air-launched conventional
standoff weaponry reduce the risk of detection and loss of aircraft and aircrews while
increasing the probability of successful attacks.

(3) Technological advancements have given the joint force UA armed with
PGMs. UA may provide the benefit of lower cost, lower radar and visual signatures, and
extended loiter times compared with most manned aircraft and provide the JFC another
interdiction option. UA can be employed over suspected or known enemy strongholds to
locate and engage targets of opportunity for longer periods of time. Armed UA have

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 Joint Capabilities

been used extensively in this capacity during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)
and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).

(4) Employment of cluster munitions allows joint forces to channel the enemy
into kill zones or deny access to an area. Sea mines can also be delivered by aircraft,
deterring enemy ships from entering an area of the sea or sinking them. Often, mines are
more effective for interdiction than bombs, because delayed effects munitions continue to
be effective after the delivery aircraft have left the area. Enemy uncertainty regarding the
presence of these munitions can result in excessive delays, diversion of resources into
time-consuming countermeasures, and reduced enemy morale. However, the use of
cluster/mine munitions may also present several disadvantages to the joint force to
include: collateral damage, danger to civilians, post-conflict cleanup cost, adverse
coalition public relations, international legal implications, and denial of friendly access to
the targeted area. Programmable self-destruct munitions may mitigate some of these
disadvantages. Lastly, the use of mines and cluster munitions is governed by rigorous
safeguards to ensure compliance with international law and the national security needs of
the US. US policy in this area is under constant review and modification. Employment
must only be executed in accordance with the ROE approved for the operation.
Additionally, the use of cluster/mine munitions may be problematic in an environment
where multinational members have ratified international conventions against these
munitions.

For more information on mine warfare, see JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine
Warfare for Joint Operations.

b. Maritime forces employ a network of integrated and redundant sensors, and

command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and EW systems, as
well as, missiles, torpedoes, fixed-wing, tiltrotor, rotary-wing aircraft, UA, mines,
naval fires, expeditionary forces, and boarding parties to support naval, air, and
ground forces. Ships performing surface warfare and submarines performing
antisubmarine warfare are examples of interdiction actions to establish and maintain sea
control. Expeditionary forces can conduct operational maneuver from the sea to extend
control to the edge of the operational area and disrupt and destroy enemy forces and
facilities. Interdiction in a maritime operational area can isolate an enemy from outside
support, halt undesired activity, and enforce legal sanctions. It can also enhance free use
of the sea LOCs for such friendly operations as deployment of forces and can provide
security for other naval operations. Interdiction in the maritime operational area can be
significantly different from operations in other operational areas due to the complexity of
international law of the sea. Especially when conducting homeland security (e.g., United
States Coast Guard [USCG] under Title 14, United States Code [USC]), or homeland
defense interdiction operations, maritime forces may be tasked to intercept, interdict,
disable, stop, and board vessels prior to use of lethal means of interdiction.

(1) Interdiction can deny the enemy free movement into or within an objective
area prior to an amphibious assault by landing force elements. Naval fires may also be
used for interdiction along littoral LOCs.

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Chapter II

(2) Interdiction on waterways can disrupt enemy infiltration, movement, and

resupply along and across major waterways in an operational area. Mines have a wide
application to interdiction operations in both the littoral regions and the open ocean.
They are effective in harbors, coastal regions, and strategic chokepoints of the ocean.
Harbors can be vital to maintaining both a viable economy and an effective maritime
force. A lack of adequate ports to resupply naval vessels may reduce the effectiveness of
enemy forces. Ports may also be essential in sustaining a military campaign. Disrupting
the flow of ships in and out of a port—or shutting it off altogether—can be an effective
way to cripple an enemy.

(3) The general purpose of MIO is to interdict goods or persons prohibited by a

lawful sanction. However, not every individual MIO action or boarding results in
interdiction, because the vast majority of vessels boarded in these operations are free of
prohibited goods or persons. While a primary mechanism for initiation of MIO has been
United Nations Security Council resolutions, other rationales exist for MIO, including:

(a) Consensual boarding (permission granted by the ship’s captain);

(b) A flag state authorized boarding;

(c) An interception as a condition of port entry;

(d) The belligerent right of visit and search;

(e) An interception made in accordance with Article 110 of the United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), based upon reasonable grounds
for suspecting that the intercepted ship is engaged in piracy, engaged in the slave trade,
engaged in unauthorized broadcasting (but only if the flag state of the warship has
jurisdiction under Article 109 of UNCLOS), without nationality, or is the same
nationality as the warship (though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag); or

(f) An interception made pursuant to the right of self-defense.

(4) Visit, board, search, and seizure agreements—such as bilateral ship

boarding agreements negotiated between nations that have endorsed the Proliferation
Security Initiative Statement of Interdiction Principles—can assist in the timely
interdiction of vessels. The tactics, techniques, and procedures for the conduct of MIO
are provided in NTTP 3-07.11M/CGTTP 3-93.3/MCIP 3-33.04, Visit, Board, Search, and
Seizure Operations, which describes detailed visit, board, search, and seizure operations.

(5) Expanded maritime interception operations (EMIO) are authorized by the

President and directed by the Secretary of Defense to deter, degrade, and/or disrupt or
gather raw intelligence to potentially prevent attacks against the US and its allies. EMIO
involves interception of vessels identified to be transporting targeted personnel or
materiel that pose an imminent threat to the US and its allies. EMIO may be
implemented without sanctions and may involve multinational forces or other USG
departments and agencies. The legal rationales required to permit boarding include those
listed in subparagraph 1.b.(3).

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 Joint Capabilities

(6) Law enforcement operations (LEO) are a form of interdiction operations for
which the Department of Defense (DOD) plays a critical role. The basis and mission of
LEO, however, is different from MIO. Title 14, USC, Section 2, requires the USCG, as
the primary, maritime federal law enforcement agency (LEA), to enforce or assist in the
enforcement of all applicable federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the US and to engage in maritime air surveillance or
interdiction to enforce or assist in the enforcement of violations of the laws of the US.
USCG vessels routinely conduct LEO independent of naval operations. However, United
States Navy (USN) vessels may embark USCG boarding teams, typically in the form of
law enforcement detachments (LEDETs), in order to conduct LEO for boardings. USN
ships carrying USCG boarding teams or LEDETs support federal law enforcement
efforts, but USN and other DOD personnel are limited by law, policy, and regulation in
the role they can play in law enforcement activities, such as boarding, arrest, or seizure.
Counterdrug and alien migrant interdiction operations are examples of LEO. As the lead
US federal agency for detection and monitoring the illegal aerial and maritime transit of
drugs into the US, DOD plays a critical role in supporting US and partner nation law
enforcement interdiction efforts by sharing relevant information on targets of interest.
Subject to restrictions, Title 10, USC, Sections 372-374, permits DOD to provide
personnel, equipment, facilities, maintenance, training, and advice to US LEAs. DOD
also has capability, when authorized, to train partner nation security forces in MIO.

For more information refer to NTTP 3-10.1, Coastal Riverine Force Operations.

(7) Subject to authorities, SOF are well-suited to provide support to law

enforcement interdiction operations and to build the capacity of partner nation security
forces to conduct interdiction operations.

(8) Riverine operations facilitate interdiction in coastal and inland waterways.

In areas with limited land transportation, but numerous waterways, rivers provide natural
transportation routes and are logical population centers. In some developing countries,
inland waterways are major arteries for economic circulation, and military operations
may be needed to keep waterways open to maintain the local economy. Water routes are
strategically and tactically important to an insurgent or enemy force, particularly in
situations where an external aggressor supports and directs insurgency. Such a situation
may require interdiction and control of waterways.

(a) A thorough understanding of the riverine environment is needed to plan

and conduct riverine operations. In a riverine area, watercraft are the principal means of
transport. In such areas, indigenous personnel often settle along the waterways because
they are the only usable means of travel between villages. Civilian traffic and settlements
conceal the enemy’s movements, mining, and ambush operations. Control of waterways
is necessary in riverine areas.

(b) Riverine operations are joint operations undertaken primarily by ground

and naval forces. Participating forces must coordinate and integrate efforts to achieve a
common objective. Interdiction may be an objective of riverine operations, while other
objectives may be to seize key terrain, strike, raid, or facilitate freedom of navigation.

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Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available/time available are the
basis for the task organization. Considering the total forces available, riverine operations
require a balance between types of forces. A special consideration in task organization
for riverine operations is the amount of troop lift and fire support available from the air,
maritime, or land components. The major factors determining maritime support
requirements are:

1. The extent to which navigable waters permit moving naval support

to, within, and around the operational area.

2. The size of ground forces needed in the objective area, the

availability of other means of transportation, and the desirability of using other means to
deliver them.

3. The command relationship between the maritime commander and

ground force commander.

4. The maritime force commander having responsibility for moving

subordinate joint force ships and watercraft between riverine bases and support facilities
outside the riverine area. The land force commander in the riverine area is responsible
for the security of ships within the area.

c. Land forces employ such assets as attack helicopters, missiles, artillery, and
forces capable of conducting conventional airborne, air assault, and amphibious
operations to accomplish interdiction. The interdiction goals of operational-level
commanders are to isolate the AO by interdicting enemy military potential before its
effective use against friendly forces. Direct or indirect fires may be used by land forces
to achieve interdiction goals.

(1) Attack helicopters provide a commander with an effective and versatile means
of interdicting enemy forces. They may use them for rapid reaction operations and where
terrain restricts or prohibits ground force occupation or engagement of the enemy’s forces.
Attack helicopters are capable of employing precision-guided weapons and providing
terminal guidance for other interdiction forces. They are capable of operating during the
day or night and in adverse weather conditions.

(2) Field artillery contributes to land operations by massing fires in space and
time on single or multiple targets with precision, near-precision, and area fire capabilities.
Field artillery can rapidly shift fires throughout the AO in support of the scheme of
maneuver and to counter unforeseen enemy reaction to create the maneuver commander’s
desired effects. Artillery assets are very effective for interdicting high-value, well-
defended targets, day or night, in all weather conditions. Artillery can create obstacles to
enemy maneuver and cover the friendly force’s advance with obscuring smoke and
disruptive/destructive fires. Artillery can suppress enemy defensive systems to facilitate
ground and air operations and can be used to promote deception, keep the enemy off
balance, interdict enemy counterattack routes, and test its responses. Appropriate

II-6 JP 3-03
 Joint Capabilities

artillery target areas include mobility corridors which form chokepoints on the enemy
supply route and areas through which hostile weapon systems and equipment must pass.

(3) Current technology for missile system warhead guidance allows missiles to
target mobile armor formations and small point targets such as buildings or other non-
hardened targets. They can conduct short-notice strikes without airborne aircraft support
against targets in heavily defended areas where the probability of the loss of manned
aircraft is too high. Missile systems are usually employed against soft, stationary targets.
These targets include unhardened surface-to-surface missile sites, emplaced artillery
batteries, air defense sites, logistic sites, and C2 facilities. The Army Tactical Missile
System (ATACMS), guided multiple launch rocket system, and 155-millimeter
projectiles provide the joint force with interdiction capabilities, which can complement
and enhance the theater/operational area-wide interdiction effort.

(4) Airborne and air assault forces provide the joint force with an interdiction
capability, using forcible entry operations in the form of raids to seize key terrain or
chokepoints to achieve interdiction objectives. During Operation DESERT STORM,
elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps, in the largest air assault in military history,
penetrated 260 kilometers into Iraqi territory to the Euphrates River. The purpose of this
operation was to cut the Iraqi LOCs along Highway 8 to Baghdad, effectively isolating
Iraqi forces in the Kuwait theater of operations.

d. SOF can conduct interdiction operations in their own right with specialized
capabilities. However, their greatest contribution to joint interdiction operations may be
in their use as a force enabler and multiplier. SOF complement and support conventional
interdiction operations by providing raw intelligence, target cueing, guidance for PGMs,
and post attack assessment. Additionally, SOF can conduct and support joint interdiction
operations with a range of special operations core activities when the use of conventional
forces is inappropriate or infeasible. SOF may conduct coastal or riverine interdiction
operations using a variety of specialized ships and craft. In a linear operational
environment, SOF may be inserted in the enemy’s rear operational area for their
disruptive effect or to engage key transitory targets. Such direct action operations
typically involve an attack on critical targets such as LOCs. SOF may employ organic
weapon systems such as fixed- or rotary-winged gunships. Additionally, SOF may enlist
the support of local friendly forces who may interdict from within the enemy’s
infrastructure in areas presumed to be safe from attack. SOF may also degrade or
obstruct the warmaking capability of a country by damaging, destroying, or diverting war
materiel, facilities, utilities, and resources. This sabotage may be the most effective or
only means of attacking specific targets that lie beyond the capabilities of conventional
weapon systems.

(1) The use of SOF in terminal guidance operations (TGO) can significantly
enhance interdiction. TGO are actions that provide additional information regarding a
specific target location to approaching aircraft and/or weapons by electronic, mechanical,
voice, or visual communications. This combination of SOF TGO and joint interdiction
aircraft was used extensively during OEF.

II-7
Chapter II

(2) SOF special reconnaissance (SR) missions are another means of supporting
interdiction operations. SR is reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a
special operation in hostile, denied, or within diplomatically or politically sensitive
environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance,
employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. These actions
provide an additive capability for commanders and supplement other conventional
reconnaissance and surveillance actions. Even with today’s sophisticated long-range
sensors and overhead platforms, some information can be obtained only by visual
observation or other collection methods in the target area. SOF’s highly developed
capabilities of gaining access to denied and hostile areas, worldwide communications,
and specialized aircraft and sensors enable SR against targets inaccessible to other forces
or assets. SR is further divided into two mission subsets:

(a) Target Acquisition (TA). TA includes all activities to acquire and

collect information in support of planning for, or interdiction of, a specific target. These
actions can be in support of a follow on SOF mission or in support of other strike assets.

1. Reconnaissance. These are operations with the primary purpose of

locating targets of opportunity (e.g., enemy materiel, personnel, and facilities in assigned
general areas or along assigned ground communication routes) and LOCs.
Reconnaissance is not conducted for the purpose of attacking specific identified targets.

2. Target and Threat Assessment. These are operations conducted to

detect, identify, locate, and assess a target to determine the most effective employment of
weapons. This type of operation might include the assessment of the potential effects (to
include collateral damage) of a strike or an attack on a chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, or toxic industrial material site.

(b) Specific Data Collection. Specific data collection consists of all

activities to collect data for purposes other than targeting.

1. Environmental Reconnaissance. These are operations conducted

to collect and report critical hydrographic, geological, and meteorological information.

2. Post-Strike Reconnaissance. SOF can gather a variety of post-

interdiction information, including impact on population behavior and detailed BDA on
target structures.

e. Multi-Service Capabilities. Some capabilities or weapons used for interdiction

operations cross Service boundaries. Cruise missiles are one such weapon which can be
launched from aircraft, ships, and submarines. Cruise missiles, such as the joint air-to-
surface standoff missile or Tomahawk land-attack missile, can be effective interdiction
assets and provide a potent employment option to the joint force. Several variants
provide single warhead unitary blasts or a hardened target penetration warhead. Low
risk, accuracy, and range make missiles most viable in the planning of interdiction
contingency operations against stationary targets. Cruise missiles are capable of
conducting short-notice strikes launched from aircraft operating outside the range of

II-8 JP 3-03
 Joint Capabilities

enemy threats. They are ideal for use against targets in heavily defended areas where the
probability of the loss of manned aircraft is too high. Cruise missiles are also capable of
neutralizing enemy air defenses to facilitate a much larger attack by land- and sea-based
airpower.

f. Interagency Partners. Often, DOD will either support or be supported by

interagency partners. Supporting combatant commands or government agencies can
provide capabilities in support of interdiction. When these capabilities are synchronized
with intelligence collection and IO, they play a key role in the interdiction of WMD and
other forms of interdiction. USG departments such as the Department of State,
Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of the
Treasury bring significant resources to the table in the effort for interdiction. The JFC
should coordinate through the combatant commander to access these resources.

See JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation, for further information.

2. Complementary Operations

Joint interdiction operations are most effective when fully integrated into the
CONOPS of the joint force. In addition to counterair and maneuver, other operations
notable for their specialized roles, which can complement joint interdiction operations,
include the following:

a. Strategic Attack Operations. A strategic attack is a JFC-directed offensive

action against a target—whether military, political, economic, or other—that is
specifically selected to achieve national or military strategic objectives. These attacks
seek to weaken the enemy’s ability or will to engage in conflict or continue an action and
as such, could be part of a campaign, major operation, or conducted independently as
directed by the President. Additionally, these attacks may achieve strategic objectives
without necessarily having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition. Suitable
targets may include, but are not limited to, enemy strategic centers of gravity (COGs).
Strategic attack and interdiction operations complement one another. As an example,
strategic attack may focus on halting production and storage of critical war materiel,
while interdiction concentrates on cutting off the flow of this materiel. Strategic attack
and interdiction operations also create a synergistic effect with simultaneous attacks
against the enemy in depth, which places maximum stress on the enemy, allowing them
no respite.

b. ISR is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of
sensors; assets; and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support
of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations
function, and it comprises a joint mission to produce relevant information from all
sources in a comprehensive, responsive, timely manner, so that military decision makers
may gain and maintain an information advantage over an enemy.

c. Space Operations. Space systems support joint interdiction target analysts,

planners, and combat forces by providing capabilities for C2; sea, land, air, and space

II-9
Chapter II

surveillance; intelligence collection; tactical warning and combat assessment; navigation;

geospatial information and services; and environmental monitoring. Space control
operations balance the protection of US space capabilities with the denial of those of the
adversary and must be integrated into joint interdiction plans and operations as
appropriate. Planning must account for critical vulnerabilities with respect to space-
based systems. Joint force reliance on these systems makes them a lucrative target for an
enemy with the means to attack them. Also, many space-based systems, such as Global
Positioning System signals, are susceptible to EW techniques and environmental
interference, and these factors must be taken into account during the planning process.

JP 3-14, Space Operations, provides further amplification on the role of space forces in
joint operations.

d. EW. EW capabilities produce effects throughout the electromagnetic spectrum

(EMS) in support of joint interdiction operations. Commanders conduct EW (i.e.,
electronic attack [EA], electronic protection [EP], and electronic warfare support [ES]) to
retain freedom of maneuver in the EMS, accomplish the JFC’s objectives, deny freedom
of action to adversaries, and enable other operational activities. EA assets perform vital
screening functions and can degrade, disrupt, or deceive an adversary’s positioning,
navigation, and timing (PNT); datalinks; communications; and radars. EP measures
provide protection and ensure effective friendly use of the EMS, to include
communications and weapons datalinks. ES synchronizes and integrates the planning
and operational use of sensors, assets, and processes within a specific operational
environment to reduce uncertainties concerning the adversary, environment, time, and
terrain. ES efforts dynamically map the electromagnetic operational environment
(EMOE) for targeting and threat avoidance planning. ES can also provide geolocation of
transmissions that interfere with effective and timely PNT signal reception and provide
combat assessment feedback during and after strike activities by monitoring changes in
the EMOE.

e. CO. Many aspects of joint operations rely in part on cyberspace; CO can

complement and enable other forms of interdiction. Automated information systems
support most forms of interdiction planning and execution, from situational awareness
sensors and displays to embedded computers in navigation and weapon systems.
Security of these cyberspace elements is crucial to their effective use and the outcome of
related interdiction missions. Cybersecurity actions, including properly trained users and
keeping software and hardware correctly configured, protect mission-critical systems
from internal and external cyberspace threats, and increase the effectiveness of
interdiction missions throughout the operational environment.

JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, provides further amplification on the role of cyberspace

forces in joint operations.

f. IO. IO is the integrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs in

concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision
making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. IO
complements interdiction through a variety of means and can be used to accomplish

II-10 JP 3-03
 Joint Capabilities

interdiction objectives, ideally achieving the goals before friendly forces engage the
enemy. Use of IRCs to affect adversary C2 and intelligence functions may lead to
confusion, uncertainty, or lack of confidence in available information and leadership
decisions, and may contribute directly to collapse of enemy capability and will. The
synergistic effects of military information support operations (MISO) conducted in
parallel with interdiction operations can affect the enemy’s capabilities and will to fight
simultaneously. The psychological shock of massed joint interdiction with IO can be
overwhelming to the enemy’s fielded forces, especially when those forces have already
been strained by land or maritime combat. The nonlethal nature of many IRCs allows
their use prior to and after hostilities, extending contact across time, thereby giving the
friendly force greater opportunity to influence events and outcomes favorably.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.01, Joint Information
Operations Proponent, and JP 3-13, Information Operations, discuss the role of IO in
joint operations.

g. Air refueling provides the JFC the ability to maneuver and mass interdiction
forces, using surprise and economy of force, at a time and location where the enemy is
least prepared, to deter, dissuade, or destroy. Station times will be increased for airborne,
on-call AI missions, providing decreased response times. While technically a support
asset, air refueling has become such an integrated part of AI operations that it would be
difficult to imagine operating without the enhanced capabilities it provides. For example,
enemy antiship defenses may force an aircraft carrier to stand off from the target area,
requiring refueling support to get carrier aviation to the fight. When air superiority is in
dispute and enemy aircraft and missiles threaten air bases close to the fight, air refueling
may be the only way to get interdiction missions to the target area.

h. Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR). SCAR is a mission flown

for the purpose of detecting targets and coordinating or performing attack or
reconnaissance on those targets. SCAR missions are flown in a specific geographic area
and are an element of the C2 interface to coordinate multiple flights, detect and attack
targets, neutralize enemy air defenses, and provide BDA. The area may be defined by a
box or grid where potential targets are known or suspected to exist, or where mobile
enemy surface units have relocated because of surface fighting. Typical SCAR tasks
include cycling multiple attacking flights through the target area and providing
prioritized targeting guidance and enemy air defense updates to maximize the effect
of each sortie. Maritime SCAR is conducted as specified by the surface warfare
commander (SUWC). Detailed SCAR procedures are outlined in Army Techniques
Publication (ATP) 3-60.2/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-23C/NTTP 3-
03.4/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.72, Multi-Service
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance.

II-11
Chapter II

Intentionally Blank

II-12 JP 3-03
 CHAPTER III
COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Command and Control of Joint Interdiction Operations

At the highest level, the JFC is responsible for the execution of theater strategy and
operations. The joint operations center is the focal point for integrating joint operations
at the macro level, to include interdiction. Interdiction of enemy forces and infrastructure
is an integral part of a joint campaign or major operation. Joint interdiction operations
require an integrated, flexible, and responsive C2 structure to process interdiction
requirements and dependable, interoperable, and secure communications
architecture to exercise control. The JFC exercises C2 through functional or Service
component commanders. Each component may perform interdiction as part of their
internal mission, employing their organic C2 assets in accordance with their particular
tactics, techniques, and procedures.

a. The JFC normally delegates the planning and execution of theater/joint

operations area (JOA)-wide AI operations, outside of component-assigned AOs, to
the joint force air component commander (JFACC), if established. The JFACC
directs, coordinates, and deconflicts joint AI operations from an operations center which
is normally designated a joint air operations center (JAOC). The JAOC is structured to
operate as a fully integrated facility and relies on expertise from other component liaisons
to coordinate requests or requirements and maintain an up-to-date status of the other
component operations and interdiction target nominations. The JFACC staff will
normally task and allocate most joint AI operations using host-component, organic C2
architecture. Reliable, secure communications are required to exchange information
among all participants. In joint operations, components provide and operate the C2
systems, which have similar functions at each level of command. The JFACC tasks joint
AI assets made available for theater/JOA-wide tasking through the JAOC and appropriate
Service component C2 systems to ensure the proper integration of interdiction with the
surface scheme of maneuver. With proper coordination, other components may provide
the JFACC supporting capabilities, like long range artillery, that contribute to joint AI
objectives.

b. Theater Air Control System (TACS). The TACS is the Air Force component
commander’s mechanism for controlling air component assets. It consists of airborne
and ground elements to conduct tailored C2 of air component operations, including AI.
The structure of the TACS should reflect sensor coverage, component liaison elements,
and the communications systems required to provide adequate support. As an organic
Air Force system, the TACS remains under operational control (OPCON) of the
commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR). The air operations center (AOC) is the
senior C2 element of the TACS and includes personnel and equipment of necessary
disciplines to ensure the effective planning and conduct of component air operations.
The AOC is designed to expand, via augmentation, to form the JAOC when the
COMAFFOR is designated by the JFC as the JFACC.

III-1
Chapter III

(1) Exchange of liaisons between Service and functional components is critical

to ensure coordination between the US Air Force’s TACS and the Army air-ground
system (AAGS). To facilitate this coordination, the US Air Force habitually aligns air
support operations groups (ASOGs) at each Army corps and the air support operations
squadron (ASOS) at each Army division. The wartime functions performed by the
ASOG and ASOS are unique to each; the ASOG’s functionality is focused at the
operational level, while the ASOS’s functionality is focused at the tactical level.

(2) Joint Air Component Coordination Element (JACCE). The Army corps
ASOG is organized, trained, and equipped to serve the wartime function of the JACCE.
The COMAFFOR or JFACC may establish one or more JACCEs with other functional
component commanders’ headquarters (joint force land component commander [JFLCC],
joint force special operations component commander [JFSOCC], JFMCC, etc.) or joint
task force headquarters to better integrate joint air operations plans with the host
headquarters operation plans. When established, the JACCE is a component-level liaison
that serves as the direct representative of the JFACC. The JACCE does not perform any
C2 functions, and the JACCE director does not have command authority over any air
forces.

(3) Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) and Tactical Air Control Party
(TACP). The division ASOS is organized, trained, and equipped to serve the wartime
functions of ASOC and TACP. The ASOC is subordinate to the JAOC and resides at the
Army’s senior tactical echelon, normally collocated with the division fires cell and
airspace element. While the JAOC provides control of theater-wide air power, the ASOC
provides primary control of joint air power operations in support of the Army. The
interdiction coordinator, within the ASOC, is responsible for oversight of all AI that takes
place within division assigned airspace. Integration then continues down through the Air
Force component liaisons aligned with land combat forces. TACPs normally provide
support from the Army’s senior tactical echelon down to battalion levels to advise ground
commanders on the capabilities and limitations of joint air support operations, assist the
staff in joint air support planning, and conduct terminal control of CAS. When
integrated, the TACS and AAGS are collectively known as the TACS-AAGS (see Figure
III-1 and ATP 3-52.2/MCRP 3-25F/NTTP 3-56.2/AFTTP 3-2.17, Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System).

c. AAGS. The AAGS is an inherent part of the Army mission command system
(arrangement of facilities, networks, information, personnel, and processes) that connects
to the TACS and supporting joint air components of the theater air-ground system
(TAGS). AAGS is the Army’s control system to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate
joint air operations with the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver and fires. The
AAGS provides the framework to initiate and process air support requests, collection
requirements, airspace integration, Army indirect fires, joint fires, air and missile defense,
and exchange of liaisons. The AAGS and Air Force TACS are designed to work together
to enhance joint air-ground integration for their respective components. Habitual
relationships and frequent training events between the Army and Air Force improve the
conduct of critical joint air-ground functions and assist in creating synergistic effects for
interdiction operations.

III-2 JP 3-03
 Command and Control

(1) As previously mentioned, the exchange of liaisons between Service and

functional components is critical to coordination between the TACS and the AAGS. To
facilitate this coordination, the Army habitually aligns the battlefield coordination
detachment (BCD) with AOCs.

(2) The BCD is an Army coordination detachment that enables selected

operational functions as the senior liaison between the Army forces commander and the
air component commander. The BCD interfaces with the appropriate divisions within the
AOC to ensure the Army commander’s needs are represented to the air component
commander. Key tasks include exchanging current intelligence and operational data
(priorities, friendly order of battle, scheme of maneuver), support requirements (ISR,
joint fires, space support, suppression of enemy air defense, EW), coordinating Army
forces requirements for airspace coordinating measures (ACMs), fire support
coordination measures (FSCMs), and theater airlift. The critical role of the BCD is to
ensure the exchange of information and to advocate for the Army commander as the
liaison element between Service components. For additional information regarding the
BCD, see ATP 3-09.13, The Battlefield Coordination Detachment.

(3) Ground Liaison Detachments (GLDs). The GLDs are supervised by the
BCD. GLDs serve as the primary coordinating element between the supporting Air Force
unit and supported ground forces. GLDs support wing operations and provide continuous
ground liaison coverage. A GLD normally consists of a combat arms officer and a
combat arms noncommissioned officer. A GLD’s primary role is to provide liaison
between the ground units requesting air support and the Air Force fighter wings, bomber
wings, airlift wings, and composite wings providing CAS, AI, airlift, and airdrops. For
additional information regarding GLDs, see ATP 3-09.13, The Battlefield Coordination
Detachment.

(4) Joint Air-Ground Integration Center (JAGIC). The JAGIC is a method

to effectively organize personnel and equipment to build personal relationships and
teamwork between Soldiers and Airmen. This is facilitated through the physical
integration of selected division current operations staff members with Air Force ASOS’s
TACP and ASOC personnel. The JAGIC evolved from a concept to enhance joint
collaborative efforts to integrate joint air-ground assets. Located in the Army division
current operations integration cell, the JAGIC provides commanders a technique to
coordinate, integrate, and control operations in division-assigned airspace. The JAGIC
co-locates decision-making authorities from the land and air component to support the
supported maneuver commander’s objectives and intent. The JAGIC facilitates effective
mission execution while reducing the level of risk. The JAGIC is designed to fully
support and enable division-level current operations through the rapid execution and
clearance of fires and airspace. It is a modular and scalable center designed to integrate
and synchronize fires and airspace control in the division AO in accordance with
guidance received from the division commander and the JFACC and airspace control
authority. For additional information regarding JAGIC, see ATP 3-91.1/AFTTP 3-2.86,
The Joint Air Ground Integration Center.

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Chapter III

Key Air Force and Army Components of the Theater

Air Control System: Army Air-Ground System

FAC(A) JSTARS AWACS CRC JFC

Air
Component
Land
AOC Component/
JTF/Corps

BCD ASOG*
II X XX

Battalion Brigade Division

ADAM/ Airspace GLD

TACP BAE Element
WOC
TACP ASOS* (WG, GP, SQN)

Joint Air Request Net

TACS-AAGS Connectivity

*Exact make up and capabilities of the ASOG/ASOS tailored to match the mission assigned to the corps/division.
The ASOC is normally collocated with the senior Army tactical echelon.

NOTE:
Coordination is effected between all organizations for effective/efficient operations.

Legend
AAGS Army air-ground system GP group
ADAM air defense airspace management JFC joint force commander
AOC air operations center JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
ASOC air support operations center JTF joint task force
ASOG air support operations group SQN squadron
ASOS air support operations squadron TACP tactical air control party
AWACS airborne warning and control system TACS theater air control system
BAE brigade aviation element WG wing
BCD battlefield coordination detachment WOC wing operations center
CRC control and reporting center
FAC(A) forward air controller (airborne)
GLD ground liaison detachment command and control

Figure III-1. Key Air Force and Army Components of the Theater Air Control System: Army
Air-Ground System

III-4 JP 3-03
 Command and Control

d. The Navy tactical air control system (NTACS) is the principal air control
system afloat. The senior USN air control agency is the Navy tactical air control center
(Navy TACC) and the subordinate airborne element is the E-2 Hawkeye aircraft. The
Navy TACC plans the conduct of naval air operations, as well as coordinates operations
that affect airspace. The Navy TACC is the primary air control agency within the
AO from which all air operations supporting the amphibious task force are
controlled.

e. Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS). The MACCS consists
of various air C2 agencies designed to provide the Marine air-ground task force aviation
combat element commander with the ability to monitor, supervise, and influence the
application of Marine and supporting air assets. Marine aviation’s philosophy is one of
centralized control and decentralized execution. The Marine force’s focal point for
tasking and exercising OPCON over Marine Corps air forces is the tactical air command
center, which performs similar duties for organic Marine aviation that the JAOC
performs for joint air component operations. The direct air support center (DASC) is
roughly equivalent to the Air Force’s ASOC.

f. Special Operations Air-Ground System (SOAGS). Theater special operations

are normally under the control of the JFSOCC. If designated by the JFSOCC, control of
SOF airpower is normally exercised by a joint special operations air component
commander (JSOACC). If a JSOACC has not been designated, then SOF airpower is
controlled by its Service component within the joint force special operations command.
The JFSOCC provides a special operations liaison element (SOLE) to the JFACC to
coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations air, surface, and subsurface
operations with conventional air operations. The SOLE can provide timely operational
environment awareness which can enhance interdiction operations.

g. TAGS. The TAGS combines each Service’s C2 and airspace management

system into a unified framework allowing each to contribute in a unified effort supporting
the JFC. Combining the TACS, AAGS, NTACS, MACCS, and SOAGS creates the
TAGS. The JFC directs the TAGS architecture for a particular operational area. Each
component’s air-ground system is designed to facilitate C2 of that component’s
operations and interface with the TAGS. The roles, responsibilities, and authorities of
each TAGS element should be clearly spelled out in theater-wide documents such as the
area air defense plan and airspace control plan.

For more information on TAGS, see ATP-52.2 (Field Manual [FM] 3-52.2)/MCRP 3-
25F/NTTP 3-56.2/AFTTP 3-2.17, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
the Theater Air-Ground System.

h. USN and USCG forces may have specific targets for interdiction or they may
operate in patrol areas. The distances involved and the ambiguity of possible threats at
sea require operational flexibility. C2 may be through a task force, other military chain
of command, or in some instances of maritime operational threat response (MOTR) plan
execution, directly through national level authorities. Both the USN and USCG may
respond under Title 10, USC, authority. However, unless the situation involves a major

III-5
Chapter III

and immediate threat requiring emergency USN response as the only/most capable
available force, USCG will respond if mission requirements dictate, under Title 14, USC,
law enforcement authority.

For more information on MOTR, see JP 3-27, Homeland Defense.

i. Within the maritime operational area, authority for control of AI of maritime

target assets is derived from the JFMCC as the supported commander. The JFACC may
allocate sorties, via the air tasking order (ATO), to provide reconnaissance and
surveillance—often referred to as surface surveillance coordination—and AI in the
maritime AO. These sorties play a critical role in targeting and establishing/maintaining
a common operational picture. In most cases, the sea combat commander or the SUWC
will be authorized to designate surface contacts for strike during AI of maritime target
execution.

2. Command Relationships

JFCs typically conduct joint interdiction operations through component commanders.

All elements of the joint force can be called upon to perform interdiction operations. For
example, SOF may conduct limited interdiction operations deep in enemy territory, and
land or maritime force commanders may employ interdiction assets within their AOs.
Planning and coordinating interdiction operations occurs at many levels of command
within a joint force. The flexibility and capability of interdiction-capable assets allow
them to be employed in a multitude of situations. Subordinate commanders possess
organic assets which can contribute to interdiction operations. These assets may also be
employed in support of the JFC’s operation or campaign objectives, or to support other
components of the joint force, which benefits the joint force as a whole. Normally, air
assets tasked in support of the theater/JOA-wide interdiction effort are also heavily tasked
to conduct or support other joint operations, such as CAS, counterair, strategic attack, IO,
and maritime support.

a. Unity of Effort in Joint Interdiction Operations. The capabilities of forces

used for joint interdiction, as well as the magnitude of their potential contribution, must
be considered while planning and conducting the joint interdiction effort. The JFC
structures the joint force to ensure that diverse component capabilities, operations, and
forces complement each other to achieve the desired results effectively and efficiently.
To ensure unity of command and effort of interdiction operations throughout a
theater/JOA, the JFC normally delegates the planning and execution of
theater/JOA-wide AI operations to the component commander with the
preponderance of AI assets with theater/JOA-wide range and the ability to control
them. The JFACC is normally the supported commander for the JFC’s overall AI
effort, while land and maritime component commanders are supported
commanders for interdiction in their AOs.

b. The JFC establishes JFACC authority and command relationships. JFACC

authorities and command relationships typically include exercising OPCON over
assigned forces. The JFACC will normally exercise tactical control (TACON) over

III-6 JP 3-03
 Command and Control

forces made available for tasking. Service component commanders will normally retain
OPCON over their assigned and attached Service forces. However, the JFC may decide
that direct support is a more appropriate command authority for certain capabilities
and/or forces.

c. JFC Staff Option. There may be situations in which designation of a JFACC is

not required when a conflict or situation is of limited duration, scope, or complexity. The
JFC may approve the formation of a joint fires element (JFE) within the operations
directorate of a joint staff (J-3). The JFE is an optional staff element composed of
representatives from the J-3, the components, and other elements of the JFC’s staff, to
include the intelligence directorate of a joint staff targeting staff, and others as required.
The JFE is an integrating staff element that synchronizes and coordinates fires planning
and coordination, to include interdiction, on behalf of the JFC.

Refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, for a detailed
discussion of command relationships involving joint air operations. For more
information on command relationships and authorities, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed
Forces of the United States.

For more information on the JFE, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

d. The JFMCC is the supported commander within the maritime AO designated by

the JFC. Within the designated AO, the JFMCC has the authority to designate target
priority, effects, and timing of fires in order to integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires,
and interdiction. In coordination with the JFMCC, other commanders designated by the
JFC to execute theater- or JOA-wide functions have the latitude to plan and execute these
JFC-prioritized operations within the maritime AO. Commanders executing such a
mission must coordinate the operation to avoid adverse effects and friendly fire incidents.
If those operations would have adverse impact within the maritime AO, the commander
assigned to execute the JOA-wide functions shall readjust the plan, resolve the issue with
the JFMCC, or consult with the JFC for resolution.

Refer to JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations, for a detailed
discussion of command relationships involving joint maritime operations.

e. The JFLCC is the supported commander within the land AO designated by the
JFC. Within the designated AO, the JFLCC has the authority to designate target priority,
effects, and timing of fires in order to integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and
interdiction. In coordination with the JFLCC, commanders designated by the JFC to
execute theater- and/or JOA-wide functions have the latitude to plan and execute these
JFC prioritized operations within the land AO. Any commander executing such a
mission within a land AO must coordinate the operation to avoid adverse effects and
friendly fire. If those operations would have adverse impacts within the land AO, the
commander assigned to execute the JOA-wide functions must readjust the plan, resolve
the issue with the JFLCC, or consult with the JFC for resolution.

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Chapter III

Refer to JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, for a detailed
discussion of command relationships involving joint land operations.

f. Although a part of DHS, USCG is a military Service and a branch of the Armed
Forces of the United States (Title 14, USC, Section 1 and Title 10, USC, Section 101).
The USCG is, at all times, an “armed force” under Title 14, USC. The USCG does not
require Title 10, USC, authority to participate in the national defense of the US. Upon
declaration of war, or when directed by the President, the USCG transfers to the
Department of the Navy (Title 14, USC, Section 3). Even after transfer, the USCG
retains full Title 14, USC, authorities. Absent such declaration or direction, the Service
operates under the auspices of DHS and closely cooperates with the USN regarding
maritime security issues (Title 14, USC, Section 145) and assists DOD in the
performance of any activity for which the USCG is especially qualified.

g. Component commanders develop interdiction priorities to enhance mission

accomplishment. Within their designated AOs, land and maritime component
commanders integrate and synchronize joint maneuver and fires functions and
interdiction missions. To facilitate this integration and synchronization within their AOs,
such commanders have the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing of
fires. When employing interdiction operations within their AOs, commanders attempt to
strike targets with organic assets first when practical and feasible. Coordination with the
JFACC in these instances may be necessary to prevent redundant targeting and joint
interdiction mission disruption. Targets that the land or maritime force commander is
unable to strike, due to lack of organic assets or for which joint force assets are best
suited, are nominated to the joint targeting process for interdiction operations as
individual targets, categories of targets, or in terms of desired effects. Once validated, the
targets may be prosecuted by another component commander or another component
commander’s assets may be made available for tasking to the air, land, or maritime force
commander. However, forwarding desired effects rather than strict target nominations
gives those responsible for conducting joint interdiction maximum flexibility to exploit
their capabilities.

(1) The supported commander should clearly articulate the concept of

maneuver operations to commanders who apply joint interdiction forces within the
commander’s designated AO. In particular, supported commanders should provide
supporting commanders as much latitude as possible in planning and executing their
operations. When coordinating maneuver operations, supported commanders should
clearly state how they envision interdiction supporting their maneuver operations; what
they want to accomplish with interdiction; as well as those actions they want to avoid,
such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions in a
specific area.

(2) Supported commanders decide which targets will be nominated for

interdiction operations during the decision-making and deliberate targeting processes.
For example, the JFLCC could send a target nomination consisting of the target
description (enemy tank brigade), desired effects (attrite by 20 percent in one ATO
period), approximate timing (ATOs “x, y, and z”), and rationale (to reduce the brigade to

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 Command and Control

less than 50-percent combat effectiveness over a three-day period) to the JFACC via the
BCD. The supporting JFACC can then determine how best to support the JFLCC—
without knowing in advance the exact location or timing of the mobile targets. Joint
intelligence preparation of the operational environment can help identify appropriate
target areas with named areas of interest and target areas of interest to allow the JFLCC
to provide the JFACC with predicted mobile target locations to facilitate interdiction
operations against the enemy tank brigade. By judiciously employing FSCMs,
specifically kill boxes, the JFLCC can facilitate the joint interdiction effort within the
JFLCC’s AO.

(3) It is important to note that joint interdiction can be conducted inside an

AO in direct response to JFC tasking and may not be in support of the AO
commander. The JFC may, for example, have designated certain high-payoff targets
that are located inside a subordinate commander’s AO. Any commander executing such
a mission within a land or maritime AO must coordinate the operation to avoid adverse
effects and/or friendly fire incidents. If those operations would have an adverse impact
within a land or maritime AO, the commander assigned to execute the mission must
readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the land or maritime component commander, or
consult with the JFC for resolution.

Refer to ATP 3-91.1/AFTTP 3-2.86, The Joint Air Ground Integration Center, for a
detailed discussion of command relationships and coordination measures for AI
conducted within the land component area of operations.

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Intentionally Blank

III-10 JP 3-03
 CHAPTER IV
PLANNING

“A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week.”

General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947

1. Overview

The JFC directs the actions of assigned and attached forces to achieve objectives
through an integrated joint campaign and major operations. The manner in which the
JFC plans, organizes, and directs forces affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint
interdiction operations. Unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution
are key to success in joint and interagency interdiction operations.

a. Joint Force Objectives. JFCs employ forces to accomplish their missions; the
principal challenge is to combine force capabilities and operations to create effects that
support achievement of those missions. The planning, coordination, and integration of
joint interdiction with other operations, such as maneuver, can yield unique advantages.
This integration of effort begins with the JFC’s theater-/JOA-level objectives, guidance,
and intent. Likewise, the JFC’s theater/JOA campaign or operation plan facilitates such
integration and helps to ensure that interdiction operations are part of a larger plan aimed
at achieving the JFC’s objectives. Centralized planning and decentralized execution of
joint interdiction operations ensure coherence and aid in the effective use of force;
enhance the exploitation of tactical events; avoid fragmented, duplicated, and conflicting
efforts; and accommodate the Service and functional components’ different employment
concepts and procedures.

b. Joint interdiction typically focuses on operational-level objectives as delineated in

the JFC’s operation or campaign plans. It must also support strategic-level objectives by
working in concert with other efforts to neutralize or destroy the enemy’s COGs or other
key target systems. Additionally, joint interdiction complements maneuver force
operations. Successful joint interdiction requires close integration with other operations,
available resources, and anticipated effects. Strategic- and operational-level objectives
are best described in terms of desired outcomes rather than specific targets.

c. Simultaneity in planning refers to the simultaneous application of military and

nonmilitary power against the enemy’s critical capabilities/requirements and COGs.
Simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an enemy’s collapse by
placing more demands on enemy forces and functions than can be handled. To the
degree possible within the constraints of the principles of economy of force and mass,
joint force operations should be conducted across the full breadth and depth of the
operational area, creating competing and simultaneous demands on enemy commanders
and resources. Just as with simultaneity, the concept of depth seeks to overwhelm the
enemy throughout the operational area, creating competing and simultaneous demands on
enemy commanders and resources and contributing to the enemy’s speedy defeat.
Interdiction is one manner in which JFCs add depth to operations at the operational level.

IV-1
Chapter IV

This also forms the foundation of deep operations theory. The intent of deep operations
is to bring force to bear on the opponent’s structure at tactical and operational depths in a
near simultaneous manner. The goal is to compel the enemy to comply with our will by
diminishing its freedom to act and to resist our intentions through a continual erosion of
its own capabilities and will. Operational reach enables early detection and identification
of threats and increases the opportunity for interdiction.

GULF WAR COALITION INTERDICTION

Coalition air interdiction operations placed Iraqi forces on the horns of

a dilemma: if they remained in position, they would be struck either
from the air or by the advancing Coalition ground forces; if they tried
to move, they made themselves extremely vulnerable to patrolling
Coalition aircraft, including attack helicopters.

SOURCE: Department of Defense Final Report to Congress

on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992

d. Geographic distance (that is, “close” versus “deep”) should not constitute the
primary distinction between different forms of interdiction. The concept of depth applies
to time as well as space. Operations extended in depth, time, and space shape future
conditions and can disrupt an opponent’s decision cycle. Although it has usually been
the case that interdiction closer to enemy forces was designed to affect the battle over a
shorter term than actions deeper in the enemy’s territory, the most important aspect in
planning interdiction operations is the effect desired, which may be measured in time.
The commander’s intent, prioritized objectives, approved mission statement, and
targeting guidance directly impact targeting decisions.

e. Immediacy of Interdiction Operations. The relative immediacy of the impact

of interdiction may depend on several factors: the distance between interdiction
operations and the location of intended effect, the means and rate of enemy movement
(ships, trains, aircraft, trucks, tanks, or foot), the type of interdiction targets (forces,
supplies, fuel, munition, or infrastructure), the level of enemy activity, and the strength
and resilience of the attacked force or system. The JFC should not apply strict
geographic boundaries to interdiction, but should plan for its theater-/JOA-wide
application.

2. Integrating Interdiction and Maneuver

a. Interdiction and maneuver operations are potent entities in their own right. Both
interdiction and maneuver operations include the movement of forces and weapon
systems, and delivery of fires (lethal and nonlethal) which create effects to support
objectives at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Maneuver and interdiction could
be conducted relatively independent of each other in certain circumstances. However,
integrating interdiction and maneuver, as well as their joint fires, enhances the
ability for each to more fully contribute to a successful outcome of a campaign or
major operation.

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 Planning

b. Interdiction and maneuver are complementary operations that should

normally be integrated to create dilemmas for the enemy. Synchronizing AI with a
ground movement toward the enemy flank forces the enemy into the dilemma of either
absorbing a potentially deadly flanking ground attack or repositioning and exposing
themselves to a much more effective air attack. Accordingly, integrating interdiction and
maneuver provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force.
Interdiction and maneuver should not be considered as separate operations against
a common enemy, but rather as complementary operations designed to achieve the
JFC’s objectives.

(1) Maneuver can play a major role in enabling conditions for effective
employment of interdiction. Maneuver can place sustained pressure on the enemy,
forcing the enemy to increase consumption of logistics, increase resupply rates, and
thereby increase the frequency of exposure to interdiction. As a result, interdiction may
destroy enemy forces and assets at a faster rate than they can be repaired, replaced, or
resupplied. Actual or threatened maneuver can force an enemy to respond by attempting
rapid repositioning or resupply. Close coordination among the components will help
ensure that conditions occur in which the enemy force is made most vulnerable to
interdiction.

(2) Joint interdiction can also facilitate maneuver operations. It may, but is
not required to, occur at the same place and time as the maneuver to be effective. Joint
interdiction can control the time of engagement to that point most advantageous to
friendly forces. Joint interdiction can be a major contributor and enabler for land and
naval force operations. Interdiction can give land or maritime forces the time and
protection they need to maneuver. The psychological effects of interdiction efforts can
greatly reduce the will of enemy forces to continue, especially when faced with the
prospect of having to defend against subsequent maneuver operations. In a forced entry
scenario, joint interdiction may support land and amphibious maneuver operations by
denying the enemy supply or resupply of equipment and forces to the objective area. It
may also interfere with their means of C2 or provide a diversionary screen. Joint
interdiction can isolate enemy forces, control the movement of enemy forces into or out
of a land or maritime AO, and set conditions for maneuver forces. When joint
interdiction is conducted in support of land or maritime forces, it should be properly
integrated with the scheme of maneuver of the supported force. Within the AO, the
supported land or maritime commander is responsible for the integration of maneuver,
fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders designate the
target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs.

c. The JFC ultimately approves the integration of joint interdiction operations

with the execution of other joint force operations. JFACC-controlled interdiction
operations conducted over maritime and littoral areas may require close coordination
between the JFACC and the JFMCC. Additionally, in the case of AI operations short of
the fire support coordination line (FSCL), all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack
operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander.
Coordination between the JFACC and the JFLCC, as well as coordination between
aircrews and friendly land forces, is required through the appropriate air C2 agencies.

IV-3
Chapter IV

3. Planning Joint Interdiction

a. The JFC establishes broad planning objectives and guidance for interdiction of
enemy forces as an integral part of a joint campaign or major operation. Subordinate
commanders recommend to the JFC how to use their combat power more effectively to
this end. With this advice, the JFC sets interdiction priorities, provides targeting
guidance, and makes apportionment decisions. The JFC should clearly designate where
the weight of the joint interdiction should be applied. Weight of effort may be expressed
in terms of percentage of total available resources, by assigning priorities for resources
used with respect to other aspects of the theater/JOA campaign or operation, or as
otherwise determined by the JFC. This is a particularly important consideration for
commanders who must determine the correct number and types of forces and weapon
systems within their AO, including the effects of joint interdiction. Likewise, effective
interdiction planners must have a thorough understanding of the JFC’s CONOPS. Once
the JFC establishes campaign or major operation objectives, component commanders
develop operation plans that accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) the
theater-/JOA-wide strategic and operational objectives. Commanders should consider
how planned operations can complement joint interdiction objectives and vice versa.
These operations may include such actions as military deception operations, withdrawals,
lateral repositioning, and flanking movements that are likely to cause the enemy to
maneuver forces which may make them more vulnerable to interdiction.

b. Component Organic Interdiction Operations. Components may conduct

interdiction operations as part of their specific mission in addition to, or in lieu of,
supporting the theater-/JOA-wide interdiction effort. For example, maritime forces
charged with seizing and securing a lodgment along a coast may include the interdiction
of opposing land and maritime forces as part of the overall amphibious operation. Within
an assigned AO, a ground commander can interdict enemy forces to enhance the
effectiveness of the friendly scheme of maneuver with the use of organic assets such as
ATACMS, organic fixed-wing, tiltrotor, rotary-wing aircraft, and artillery. In such
situations as these, C2 for the operation is normally conducted according to the
component’s procedures.

c. JFACC. The JFACC, after coordination with other components commanders’

requirements for air component support, recommends the theater-/JOA-wide air
apportionment recommendation to the JFC. The JFC provides target priorities and air
apportionment guidance to the JFACC and other component commanders. The JFACC,
using priorities established in the JFC’s air apportionment decision, then plans and
executes the overall air component effort, using air assets assigned or made
available. This air component effort includes not only AI, but also other component
capabilities provided in support of AI objectives.

(1) Theater/JOA AI capabilities and forces made available for tasking are
determined by the JFC, in consultation with component commanders. They are based on
JFC-assigned objectives and the CONOPS. Following the JFC’s air apportionment
decision, the JFACC allocates and tasks the capabilities/forces made available. The
JFACC’s AI employment guidance, based on the JFC’s air apportionment decision,

IV-4 JP 3-03
 Planning

is used by the JAOC for input into the ATO. Scheduled AI missions may be
dynamically re-tasked if requisites such as aircrew qualifications, weapons load, and
weapons fusing are compatible. The following are AI missions found in the ATO:

(a) AI. AI is a scheduled mission to strike targets in response to JFC or

component-target nominations. AI missions are normally tasked to plan and prosecute
targets through deliberate targeting and tasked on the ATO. AI missions may be
redirected during execution to prosecute higher priority targets of opportunity through
dynamic targeting.

(b) Ground alert AI is an on-call air mission placed on ground alert to

provide responsive AI throughout the theater in response to emerging targets.

(c) Airborne alert AI is an on-call air mission that pursues planned on-call
or may be directed during execution to pursue unplanned or unanticipated targets of
opportunity in designated areas versus planned (scheduled or on-call) targets tasked on an
ATO. Airborne alert AI is often referred to in the Marine Corps as armed
reconnaissance. The Marine Corps abbreviation for armed reconnaissance is “AR;”
however, because “AR” is “air refueling” in the ATO, the Marine Corps term is not used
in ATOs. Some theater concepts of employment define on-call missions to provide
responsive strike capability to specific targets sets, often targets with mobile
characteristics that are validated and approved on the joint integrated prioritized target
list. For example, airborne alert AI may be tasked to target long-range missile systems
that threaten accomplishment of friendly force objectives.

(d) SCAR. Once aircrew are tasked with SCAR by the ATO or a C2
agency, no further authorization is required unless otherwise restricted/amended by the
supported commander or ROE. For additional information regarding SCAR, see ATP 3-
60.2/MCRP 3-23C/NTTP 3-03.4.3/AFTTP 3-2.72, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance.

Note: The United States Marine Corps and USN consider armed reconnaissance as one of
three types (AI, armed reconnaissance, and SCAR) of deep air support. The United States
Air Force equivalent to armed reconnaissance is airborne alert AI.

Note: The air apportionment process and the joint air tasking cycle are discussed further in
JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations.

(2) The JFC is the only individual who has the authority to change the priorities
established in the air apportionment decision. However, the JFACC may retarget, cancel,
or change allocated AI target assignments to adapt to a changing situation, consistent
with the JFC’s intent. The JFACC coordinates changes with affected commanders
whenever possible to minimize impact on other joint force operations. The JFC may give
the JFACC the authority to redirect joint air operations, but the JFC or affected
component commander approves all requests for redirection of direct support air
assets. Affected component commanders are notified by the JFACC upon redirection of
joint sorties previously allocated in the joint ATO for support of component operations.

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Chapter IV

d. Component commanders, as supported commanders within their AOs, are

responsible for integrating and synchronizing maneuver, fires, and interdiction
within their AOs. Accordingly, land and maritime commanders designate the target
priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs. They may
designate priority of attacks to focus allocated interdiction assets on the targets or target
systems essential to achieving the land or maritime force commanders maneuver
objectives. The supported commander specifies desired effects to defeat threats to the
maneuver force, to position the enemy for defeat by maneuver forces, and to avoid
friendly fire or hindrance to friendly maneuver. Timing of operations is synchronized to
mass effects at the desired place and time to achieve the objective. Synchronization
requires explicit coordination and unity of effort among the units and components in any
operation. Failure to properly coordinate attack of targets within AOs may result in a
duplication of effort or increase the risk of friendly fire. Maneuver force commanders are
assisted in this integration by such elements as the Army’s BCD and Marine liaison
officer and naval and amphibious liaison element at the JAOC, JACCE, TACPs, and air
liaison officers who provide advice to the maneuver force commander and staff on the
capabilities, limitations, and employment of air assets, to include interdiction.

e. Detailed planning facilitates a coherent interdiction effort involving diverse forces

using different employment procedures and reduces the potential for friendly fire
incidents. Interdiction coordination procedures must not inhibit timely application of
fires in the conduct of other operations. Commanders should consider component
capabilities for speed, range, maneuver, weapon system characteristics, ability to operate
in a potentially contaminated area, IO, intelligence gathering, and ability to receive and
distribute information available from space-based assets. Commanders at all levels must
ensure interdiction operations are integrated with other ongoing operations. At the joint
force level, the joint operations center integrates interdiction into joint operations.
Normally, subordinate commanders establish planning cycles for operations based on
JFC guidance. This practice permits the coordination of applicable operations, including
interdiction, between component commanders early enough and in sufficient detail to
allow integration of those operations.

f. Certain time-sensitive targets (TSTs)—highly lucrative, fleeting targets designated

by the JFC as high priority—and other targets of opportunity may preclude the use of
normal coordination procedures. The JFC establishes C2 architecture and procedures to
coordinate dynamic targeting events across the joint force. In such cases, dynamic
targeting procedures, appropriate coordination measures, prior coordination, on-scene
commander, decentralized execution authorities, and ROE should enable rapid attack of
targets. TSTs and other targets of opportunity should be coordinated between affected
component commanders prior to attack. When mission objectives, desired effects, and
general deconfliction and time sequencing have been jointly planned and integrated at the
JAOC for AI operations, details such as attack tactics and individual mission
deconfliction can be worked out by those responsible for execution. To ensure a coherent
and coordinated effort, a plan for conducting joint interdiction should address two
principal areas: a general CONOPS and a description of the planning and coordination
cycle required for the phasing of joint interdiction (see Figure IV-1).

IV-6 JP 3-03
 Planning

Joint Interdiction Plan

The concept of operations should include:

 Identification of objectives and resource requirements necessary to

sustain activities
 An orderly schedule of anticipated decisions needed to shape and
direct the conduct of joint interdiction
 Phases for related joint interdiction operations
 Arrangements for orchestrating the operations of air, land, maritime,
and special operations forces to ensure an integrated effort
 Scheme of support operations needed to assist and protect forces
engaged in joint interdiction operations
 Provisions for feedback or analysis concerning the effectiveness of joint
interdiction operations

The planning and coordination cycle should:

 Emphasize simplicity
 Emphasize mission-type orders when appropriate
 Ensure availability of appropriate forces and capabilities for employment
 Ensure that component efforts support and reinforce each other to
minimize duplication and conflicting actions
 Arrange tasking and coordination of support operations to assist and
protect forces engaged in joint interdiction
 Preclude adverse effects on other friendly forces and operations
 Ensure the continuance of effective operations during periods of
degraded communications
 Provide flexibility to adapt to changing conditions and priorities

Figure IV-1. Joint Interdiction Plan

4. Targeting

The JFC is responsible for all aspects of planning and targeting, from establishing
objectives, coordination, and deconfliction between component commanders to
assessment of operations. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets
and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational
requirements and capabilities. Targeting proceeds from the definition of the problem to
an assessment of the results achieved by the executed COAs. During target development,
the targeting process must relate specific targets to objectives, desired effects, and
accompanying actions. Interdiction should focus on those systems that will result in the
greatest payoff and achieve the objectives. The targeting process is complicated by the
requirement to deconflict duplicative efforts, to prevent friendly fire, to ensure
compliance with the law of war, to perform collateral damage estimation, and to
synchronize and integrate the interdiction of those targets with other activities of the joint
force. Joint planners, targeteers, and weaponeers should consider CO and capabilities
which may be useful in environments where lethal or other options are unavailable or of
limited utility.

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Chapter IV

a. The goal of targeting in interdiction is to select and prioritize a series of targets

and/or target systems that when engaged, support the achievement of the JFC’s
operational/strategic objectives. A highly effective means to facilitate this process is the
joint targeting coordination board (JTCB). The JTCB is a group formed by the JFC to
accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to
coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and
refining the joint integrated prioritized target list. The board is normally comprised of
representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required, component
subordinate units.

Additional details on the JTCB and targeting doctrine can be found in JP 3-30,
Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

b. Joint interdiction assets are limited resources. Nominated targets will usually
outnumber available assets. A component commander’s number one priority may not
match JFC’s priorities. Interdiction operations within AOs occur simultaneously with
joint interdiction operations that have a theater-/JOA-wide range. Coordination,
communication, and feedback between components regarding targeting decisions are
essential and enhance trust between supported, supporting, and subordinate commanders
and forces. Under most circumstances, the ATO achieves the desired coordination for
planned AI missions.

c. Interdiction missions are categorized by their targeting method—dynamic or

deliberate. Dynamic targeting is normally employed during current operations planning
because of the nature and time-frame associated with current operations (usually the
current 24-hour period). On-call missions engage targets of opportunity (targets
identified too late or not selected for action in time to be included in deliberate targeting),
that require time-sensitive or immediate attention by employing dynamic targeting.
However, the same quick-response nature of dynamic interdiction that allows it to take
advantage of fleeting opportunities can also have a negative impact on individual mission
success through threat exposure, incorrect fusing, improper weapon/target matching, and
reduced situational awareness. Dynamic targeting should be used in those cases when the
need for a short reaction time outweighs the reduced effectiveness that may result when
compared to those interdiction missions planned during deliberate targeting. Scheduled
interdiction missions involve the use of deliberate targeting which supports the joint
force’s future plans effort, normally 24-to-72 hours prior to mission execution.
Deliberate targeting allows joint interdiction forces more time to study target imagery and
to align attack axes to optimize weapons effects. Detailed study can reduce threat
exposure and allow mission planners to optimize the weapon’s fusing for maximum
effect. Deliberate interdiction allows better packaging of interdiction and support assets
when required. Moreover, gain/loss considerations should be weighed. Commanders
should ensure the benefits of redirecting interdiction assets away from a planned target to
a target of opportunity outweigh the costs by pondering several variables. What is the
operational impact of delaying or not striking a planned target with a scheduled mission?
What are the overall targeting priorities and objectives? Does the payoff of interdicting a
target of opportunity pass the gain/loss considerations? Is the higher risk of redirecting or
retargeting scheduled assets from planned targets that have performed tactical mission

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 Planning

planning, rehearsals, and configured for a specific mission worth pursuing an unplanned
or unanticipated target that is normally a fleeting window of opportunity?

Additional information on dynamic targeting can be found in the ATP 3-60.1/MCRP 3-

16D/NTTP 3-60.1/AFTTP 3-2.3, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Dynamic Targeting.

d. Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS):

(1) JADOCS is a software application and collaborative tool used for dynamic
targeting and facilitates the integration of joint/multinational fires. Digital integration of
US and multinational fires systems enables timely execution of TSTs, component-critical
targets, high-payoff targets, and high-value targets.

(2) The joint management function provides the ability to change and display
operational maneuver graphics, ACMs on the airspace control order, air tracks on the
ATO loaded on the air defense system integrator, and FSCMs while conducting joint fire
support.

(3) The AI planning and execution function provides more effective

employment of AI assets through timely and improved information flow for the
identification, assignment, and nomination of AI targets.

For more information on JADOCS, see JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support; AFTTP 3-3 AOC,
Operational Employment-Air and Space Operations Center; and ATP 3.60.1/MCRP 3-
16D/NTTP 3-60.1/AFTTP 3-2.3, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Dynamic Targeting.

5. Intelligence

a. Commanders require intelligence systems that facilitate exploitation, sharing, and

appropriate dissemination of real-time and near real-time intelligence. Intelligence
collection assets provide this intelligence for interdiction planning. Planners must ensure
that intelligence collection is focused in the most critical areas to enable interdiction
operations. Intelligence analysts must collaborate to create well-analyzed, useful, and
timely products that support effective interdiction planning and targeting operations
against planned and fleeting target sets.

b. Priority intelligence requirements are developed to support interdiction

operations. To that end, joint interdiction targets must be identified and then prioritized
to facilitate collection management and mission accomplishment.

Collection management relationships are discussed further in JP 2-01, Joint and National
Intelligence Support to Military Operations. Joint intelligence preparation of the
operational environment is discussed in JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Operational Environment.

IV-9
Chapter IV

6. Interdiction Planning Considerations

The nature of the mission or a target set may determine its suitability for interdiction
and what forces and weapon systems should be employed. For example, a pipeline in the
jungle might best be attacked by SOF elements whereas clandestine river transportation
of weapons or illegal cargo may best be interdicted by coastal riverine forces. The fewer
the routes and depots in an enemy transportation system, and the more the enemy
depends on that system, the more that system may be vulnerable to interdiction.
Conversely, an enemy who possesses a varied, dispersed transportation system is usually
much less affected by LOC interdiction. Mobile or easily concealed targets may require
an approach different from that employed in attacking fixed emplacements.

a. Target area environmental considerations include restrictive terrain, time of

day, adverse weather, sea state, and seasonal and temperature effects. These
conditions may camouflage or conceal targets, reduce visibility, and degrade weapon
systems and force capabilities. Terrain features may affect acquisition of the target,
requiring specialized weapons and attack tactics. For example, heavily forested
emplacements or staging areas may be more suited to SOF direct action missions than
laser-guided weapons.

(1) Adverse environmental conditions, to include humidity and temperature

effects, solar activity, lunar illumination, and passive defense measures, such as smoke,
may conceal targets, reduce visibility, and degrade weapon systems and overall
interdiction capabilities. The rate and extent of enemy maneuver may also be influenced
by the physical environment. These, in turn, can provide greater interdiction
opportunities. For example, when enemy maneuver on land or sea is restricted to a few
major routes by transient or seasonal weather or oceanographic conditions, it can result in
the concentration of forces. Accurate environmental information facilitates the joint
force’s ability to maximize the performance of its personnel and systems, such as
forecasting the electro-optical environment (thermal crossover periods and other TA data)
for employing advanced weapon systems. This information increases the probability of
successful interdiction and enables friendly forces to exploit the environmental
limitations of enemy forces and systems.

For more information on weather support, see JP 3-59, Meteorological and

Oceanographic Operations.

(2) Technology has enhanced detection and identification of obscured targets.

For example, night vision devices and electronic sensors can greatly reduce the
concealment previously provided by limited visibility. More importantly, assets
equipped with advanced sensors, such as Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) and UA systems, can direct interdiction assets onto immediate, high-value
TSTs which might otherwise be undetectable. However, the enemy’s capability to deny
this technology is constantly evolving. Camouflage, concealment, and deception have
the capability to affect a multitude of sensors and can severely limit the TA process.

IV-10 JP 3-03
 Planning

(3) Target defenses may distract aircrew or degrade aircraft systems, reducing
the effectiveness of AI. Detection assets, such as JSTARS and UA or the use of all-
source intelligence, may enhance TA. However, enemy air defenses may not allow
interdiction aircrew adequate time or avenues to acquire their target due to high speeds,
low or high altitudes, or restricted ingress routing necessary to minimize the risk of
engagement. Effective force packaging can reduce the impact of enemy air defenses and
achieve local air superiority.

b. Interdiction operations in urban areas can be problematic and require

special considerations during planning. To begin with, collateral damage in cities or
towns that have not been evacuated will represent a great risk that must be considered
and minimized. One real, alleged, or staged collateral damage or friendly fire incidents
can have strategic impact, affecting world opinion, ROE, and host-nation restrictions on
operations. Planners should integrate public affairs, CO, MISO, and other IRCs into
interdiction operations from strategy development through mission execution and follow
on operations. Next, planners need to account for weather effects caused by the urban
environment. Factors include increased pollution and aerosols affecting target detection,
warmer temperatures affecting infrared signatures, and variable wind speeds affected by
building layout. Finally, urban operations, by their very nature, involve significant law of
war considerations. In particular, commanders must determine the military necessity of
an operation, the proportionality of the damage that will be caused, and whether the
potential harm to civilians outweighs the importance of the operation. Interdiction forces
must give extra attention to the axis of attack and target designation; the problem may be
similar to attacking enemy forces in steep mountainous terrain. Larger urban areas with
more vertically developed buildings add increased target elevation issues to the targeting
problem, and the combination of tall buildings and narrow streets can cause an “urban
canyon” effect leading to masking issues for line-of-sight munitions and targeting
sensors. Munitions effects will vary greatly depending on whether the enemy can be
attacked in the open versus inside buildings, requiring both patience and flexibility for
mission success. Planners and operators should take great care in choosing the correct
delivery method, munition, and fusing option when employing fires in an urban
environment.

For additional information on urban operations, see JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations.
For additional information on joint collateral damage procedures, see CJCSI 3160.01,
No-Strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology. For additional
information on collateral damage risk to civilians, civilian structures, and properties
associated with CAS, see JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support.

c. While there are many similarities between air operations over land and sea,
important differences exist.

(1) Maritime ROE include customary international law that impact ROE (e.g.,
territorial waters versus high seas).

(2) Maritime Airspace Control. Nearly every combatant has a powerful radar
sensor/weapons system. As a result, maritime airspace control tends to be more positive

IV-11
Chapter IV

vice procedural. This emphasis on positive control involves more controlling agencies
within a maritime operational area.

d. Limitations. Joint forces operate in accordance with applicable ROE, conduct

warfare consistent with international laws recognized by the US, and operate within
restraints and constraints specified by their commanders. Military objectives are justified
by political, military, and legal necessity, and achieved through appropriate and
disciplined use of forces. ROE/rules for the use of force are applied by JFCs as a
primary means to ensure that operations adhere to the law of war and US law.
Many factors influence ROE, including national and international law, national command
policy, mission, operational environment, and commander’s intent. ROE always
recognize the inherent right of self-defense. Properly developed ROE must be clear,
tailored to the situation, reviewed for legal sufficiency, and included in training.
ROE typically will vary from operation to operation and may change during an operation.
DOD forces operating under USCG TACON per Memorandum of Agreement Between
the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security for Department of
Defense Support to the United States Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Security
operate in accordance with Coast Guard Use of Force Policy. The JFC may prohibit or
restrict joint force attacks on specific targets or objects, without specific approval based
on diplomatic/political considerations, military risk, the law of war, and ROE. Targeting
restrictions fall into two general categories. Items on the no-strike list are those
designated by the appropriate authority upon which attacks are prohibited. Restricted
targets are legitimate targets that have specific restrictions imposed to avoid interfering
with military operations, and any actions that exceed those restrictions are prohibited
until coordinated and approved by the establishing headquarters. Targets may have
certain restriction caveats associated with them that should be clearly documented in the
restricted target list (for example, do not strike during daytime, strike only with a certain
weapon, etc.). Some require special precautions (e.g., chemical, biological, or nuclear
facilities; proximity to no-strike facilities). Many traditional interdiction targets, such as
bridges, power generation systems, dams, and other infrastructure, may be placed on the
restricted list to avoid indiscriminate effects on the civilian population and a lengthy
rebuilding process when major combat operations (MCOs) are complete. In addition,
structures such as bridges may be vital for use by tactical forces during MCOs and
attacking them in this case is counterproductive.

For additional information, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

e. JFCs should consider the potential requirements for interagency coordination as a

part of their activities. Early inclusion of interagency considerations in assessments,
estimates, and plans for military operations, will facilitate civil-military integration
of effort, focus the appropriate military participation, and assist the military effort
to obtain the best available support from other interagency participants. At the
same time, DOD must be prepared to support other federal, state, and local agencies
as appropriate. There is no activity conducted by a JFC that is totally a military
operation, including major combat against a near peer competitor, WMD interdiction in
international waters, or enforcing sanctions. Interagency participants, from the
Department of State to the DHS, have interest in and requirements to participate in

IV-12 JP 3-03
 Planning

planning military interdiction operations. For example, MIO actions against a vessel with
suspected WMD cargo en route to a US port could easily involve USN (DOD), USCG
(DHS), Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, US
Special Operations Command, defense intelligence entities, and Department of Justice
activity. Two tools that JFCs and their staffs can use to facilitate interagency
coordination are: annex V (Interagency Coordination) to operation plans designed to
enhance interagency planning and coordination with partner agencies in carrying out
assigned missions, and the joint interagency coordination group.

For more information on interagency activities, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational

Cooperation.

f. Today’s security environment is extremely fluid, with continually changing

coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new (both national and transnational) threats
constantly appearing and disappearing. Joint forces should be prepared for operations
with forces from other nations within the framework of an alliance or coalition.
When conducting interdiction, JFC and staff must consider the inherent complexity of
coordinating with multinational partners.

(1) Participation in multinational operations may be complicated by varying

national obligations derived from international agreements (i.e., other members in a
coalition may not be signatories to treaties that bind the US or they may be bound by
treaties to which the US is not a party). Differing capabilities of allies and coalition
partners complicate the integration of multinational partners and the coordination
and synchronization of their activities during multinational operations.

(2) Alliances typically have compatible C2 structures and weapon systems but
many multinational partners will not. This can have a detrimental effect on multinational
operations, to include interdiction. As we increasingly rely on information technology
to plan and conduct operations, we must take into account the capabilities of our
multinational partners and the possible limiting effects of their C2 structure.

(3) Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural

identity—the result of language, values, religion, and economic and social outlooks.
Language differences often present the most immediate challenge. Information lost
during translation can be substantial, and miscommunication or misunderstanding
can have disastrous effects.

(4) An ability to share valuable information helps build trust and

confidence, and is beneficial to effective integration of the complex interactions
required to succeed in any operations against an enemy. It is incumbent on the JFC
to develop processes and procedures that facilitate the sharing of information. In
addition the JFC should consider establishing a civil-military operations center to ensure
maximum unity of effort and ease coordination for development of processes and
procedures.

IV-13
Chapter IV

7. Preparation

a. Positioning of Interdiction Forces. Interdiction forces must be positioned in a

manner that will allow attack on enemy vulnerabilities. During the earliest stage of
planning, JFCs should ensure that the correct mix of interdiction assets will be in place.
Forces should be positioned within operational reach of enemy decisive points to
support the JFC’s CONOPS and exploit unforeseen opportunities. Commanders
must remain flexible and use every available option to ensure success. For example, a
host nation might deny basing and overflight rights to joint aircraft. To circumvent this
obstacle, air refueling might be required to support interdiction aircraft, unrestricted
multinational interdiction aircraft might be utilized, or maritime or land forces may need
to maneuver to a position where organic weapons are in range of interdiction targets.

b. Operations Rehearsal. Preparing for interdiction operations includes

organizing and, where possible, training forces to conduct operations throughout the
JOA. When it is not possible to train forces in the theater of employment, as with US-
based forces with multiple taskings, maximum use should be made of regularly scheduled
and ad hoc exercise opportunities. Realistic joint training during peacetime will
dramatically increase the lethality of the joint force. Staffs should be identified and
trained for planning and controlling joint operations. JFCs and the composition of their
staffs should reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure that those
responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of their capabilities
and limitations. The training focus for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives
should be the combatant commander’s joint mission essential task list.

IV-14 JP 3-03
 CHAPTER V
INTERDICTION EXECUTION

1. Operational Area Geometry and Coordination

a. JFCs may employ various control and coordination measures to facilitate

effective joint operations. These measures may include establishing boundaries,
objectives, coordinating altitudes to deconflict air operations, air defense areas,
amphibious objective areas, and submarine operating areas. Boundaries require special
emphasis because of their implications on the integration of interdiction and maneuver.
Boundaries define areas in order to facilitate integration and deconfliction of
operations. In land and maritime operations, a boundary is a line that defines areas
between adjacent units or formations. A boundary may be designated for maritime
operations adjacent to the area of land conflict to enhance coordination and execution of
maritime operations. Integration of efforts and synchronization of activities within the
land or maritime operational boundaries is particularly important.

(1) The JFC may use lateral, rear, and forward boundaries to define AOs for
land and maritime forces. These are sized, shaped, and positioned to enable land or
maritime forces to accomplish their mission while protecting forces. Theater air sorties
are not constrained by land boundaries, per se. However, since the airspace above
surface areas is used by all components of the joint force, JFCs promulgate airspace
control measures to deconflict the necessary multiple uses required.

For more information on ACMs, see JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.

(2) Boundaries are based on the JFC’s CONOPS and the land or naval force
commander’s requirement for depth to maneuver rapidly and to fight at extended ranges.

b. Operational Environment Geometry. Joint interdiction may be conducted in

conjunction with friendly forces operating in an AO. In order to integrate joint fires
and avoid friendly fire, FSCMs must be established. When air operations are involved,
ACMs will normally be used along with FSCMs. Before discussing coordination
measures, a brief background on operational environment geometry will provide a better
understanding for the types of FSCMs required in interdiction operations.

(1) Operational areas may be contiguous or noncontiguous (see Figure V-I).

When they are contiguous, a boundary separates them. When operational areas are
noncontiguous, they do not share a boundary; the CONOPS links the elements of the
force. A noncontiguous operational area is normally characterized by a 360-degree
boundary. The higher headquarters is responsible for the area between noncontiguous
operational areas.

For additional information on contiguous and noncontiguous operations, see JP 3-0,

Joint Operations.

V-1
Chapter V

Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas

JSOA

MARFOR
AO
ARFOR ARFOR MARFOR
AO AO AO

JSA
JSA

Contiguous Noncontiguous
Adjacent, subordinate commands Subordinate commands operational
operational areas share boundaries. In areas that do not share boundaries. The
this case, the higher headquarters has higher headquarters retains
assigned all of its operational area to responsibility for the unassigned portion
subordinate commands. of its operational area to subordinate
commands.

Legend
AO area of operations JSOA joint special operations area
ARFOR Army forces MARFOR Marine Corps forces
JSA joint security area

Figure V-1. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas

(2) Operations may be linear or nonlinear in nature (see Figure V-2). In

linear operations, commanders direct and sustain combat power toward enemy forces
in concert with adjacent units. Linear perspective refers primarily to the conduct of
operations along lines of operations with the forward line of own troops (FLOT)
identified. In linear operations, emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of the
land force in relation to other friendly forces. This positioning usually results in
contiguous operations where surface forces share boundaries. Linear operations are
normally conducted against a deeply arrayed, echeloned enemy force or when the
threat to LOCs requires control of the terrain around those LOCs. In these
circumstances, linear operations allow commanders to concentrate and integrate
combat power more easily. World War I, World War II, and the Korean War offer

V-2 JP 3-03
 Interdiction Execution

multiple examples of linear operations, while more recent examples include maneuver
during Operation DESERT STORM and the drive to Baghdad during OIF.

Linear Versus Nonlinear Operations

(Depicted as a Corps Area of Operations)

Noncontiguous Areas
Contiguous Areas of Operation
of Operation

Linear Operations Linear Operations

XXX

XX XX
XX

REAR
FLOT FLOT AREA

FEBA FEBA
XX

REAR
XXX
XXX

AREA

XXX

Nonlinear Operations Nonlinear Operations

XXX XXX

XX
XX

XX

XXX XXX

Legend
FEBA forward edge of the battle area FLOT forward line of own troops

Figure V-2. Linear Versus Nonlinear Operations (Depicted as a Corps Area of Operations)

V-3
Chapter V

(3) In nonlinear operations, forces orient on objectives without geographic

reference to adjacent forces. Nonlinear operations are usually characterized by
noncontiguous operations. Nonlinear operations emphasize simultaneous operations
along multiple lines of operation from selected bases. Nonlinear operations place a
premium on intelligence, mobility, and sustainment. OEF is an excellent example of
nonlinear operations. Joint forces orient more on their assigned objectives (for example,
destroying an enemy force or seizing and controlling critical terrain or population
centers) and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly forces.

For additional information on nonlinear operations, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

2. Fire Support Coordination Measures

a. A notional JFLCC or JFMCC AO is depicted in Figure V-3. It is important to

note that interdiction is taking place both inside and outside the AO, as well as, long and
short of the FSCL. There are three important constructs to understand when discussing
coordinating measures (FLOT, FSCL, and kill boxes).

(1) The forward boundary (FB) defines a component’s outer AO and is the
farthest limit of an organization’s responsibility. The organization is responsible for deep
operations to that limit. Within the JOA, the next higher headquarters is responsible for
coordinating deep operations beyond the FB. In offensive operations, the FB may move
from phase line to phase line, depending on the AO situation.

(2) The FLOT is a line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly
forces during linear operations at a specific time. The FLOT normally includes the
forward location of covering and screening forces. The zone between the FLOT and the
FSCL is typically the area over which friendly ground forces intend to maneuver in the
near future and is also the area where joint AI operations are normally executed through
the ASOC/DASC.

b. FSCM. Within their AOs, land and naval force commanders employ permissive
and restrictive FSCMs. FSCMs are necessary to facilitate the rapid engagement of
targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Permissive
FSCMs facilitate attacks and include coordinated fire lines, free fire areas, FSCLs,
and kill boxes. Restrictive measures safeguard friendly forces and include no-fire
areas, restrictive fire areas, restrictive fire lines, and airspace coordination areas.

(1) The FSCL is a significant consideration during interdiction operations.

When appropriate, a FSCL will be established and adjusted by appropriate land or
amphibious force commanders within their assigned boundaries in consultation with
superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. The FSCL facilitates the
expeditious attack of surface targets beyond the coordinating measure and applies to
all fires of air-, land-, and sea-based weapon systems using any type of ammunition
against surface targets. The FSCL is a permissive FSCM, the permissive area being
beyond the coordination measure. The air component, while recognizing this aspect
of the FSCL, also views the FSCL as a restrictive FSCM when regarding the area

V-4 JP 3-03
 Interdiction Execution

short of the coordination measure. The JFLCC and JFMCC cannot employ fires long
of the FSCL without coordination with affected commanders, and the JFACC cannot
employ fires short of the FSCL without coordination with the JFLCC or JFMCC. The
FSCL does not divide an AO by defining a boundary between close and deep
operations or a zone for CAS.

(2) The FSCL is primarily used to establish C2 procedures for planning and
execution purposes—it does not define mission types. Interdiction can occur both short
of and beyond the FSCL. Attacks on surface targets short of the FSCL during the

Notional Joint Operations Area with Designated Land and/or

Maritime Area of Operations

Forward
Boundary

Joint
Interdiction

FSCL

CAS Targets

FLOT

Legend
CAS close air support troops in contact
FLOT forward line of own troops
FSCL fire support coordination line designated land and/or maritime areas of operations

joint operations area

Figure V-3. Notional Joint Operations Area with Designated Land and/or Maritime
Area of Operations

V-5
Chapter V

conduct of joint interdiction operations must be controlled by, and/or coordinated with, the
appropriate land or amphibious force commander. While conducting AI short of the FSCL,
mission updates through a TACS or amphibious TACS agency can help ensure that those
targets are still valid, eliminate redundant targeting, and reduce the potential for friendly fire
incidents. An example of this type of coordinating agency is an ASOC/JAGIC, DASC, or
Navy TACC.

(a) Interdiction of targets short of the FSCL is controlled by the appropriate

land or amphibious force commander. Coordination is normally conducted through such
agencies as the Army fires cell and fire support coordination center. This coordination is
facilitated by C2 platforms or centers such as JSTARS, BCD, ASOC/JAGIC, DASC, Navy
TACC, or SOLE.

(b) Joint interdiction forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL must inform all
affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid friendly
casualties.

(c) SOF operations beyond the FSCL and outside the land force AO are
particularly at risk and require detailed coordination to ensure proper restrictive FSCMs are
in place to protect friendly personnel. Coordination of engagements beyond the FSCL is
especially critical to commanders of air, land, multinational, and SOF units operating beyond
the FSCL. Such coordination is also important when engaging forces are employing wide-
area munitions or those with delayed effects. Finally, this coordination assists in avoiding
conflicting or redundant engagement operations.

(d) The decision on where to place (or even to use) a FSCL requires careful
consideration. Placement of the FSCL should strike a balance so as not to unduly inhibit
operating tempo while maximizing the effectiveness of organic and joint force interdiction
assets. The optimum placement of the FSCL varies with specific AO circumstances, but
considerations include the ground force positions and anticipated scheme of maneuver
during the effective time period of the FSCL and their indirect fire support systems’
range limits where typically the preponderance of lethal effects on the AO shifts from
the ground component to the air component. In this way, the FSCL placement maximizes
the overall effectiveness of the joint force, and each component will suffer only a small
reduction in efficiency. The proper location for the FSCL may also shift from one phase of
the combat operation (or campaign) to the next, depending on the scale and scope of each
component’s contribution during that phase.

See JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, for further discussion of the FSCL.

c. Kill Boxes

(1) Purpose. A kill box is a three-dimensional FSCM with an associated ACM

used to facilitate the integration of fires. A kill box is a measure, not a mission. Kill boxes
are established to support AI efforts as part of the JFC’s joint targeting process. Kill boxes
allow lethal attack against surface targets without further coordination with the establishing
commander and without the requirement for terminal attack control. When used to integrate

V-6 JP 3-03
 Interdiction Execution

air-to-surface and subsurface/surface-to-surface indirect fires, the kill box will have
appropriate restrictions. These restrictions provide a three-dimensional block of airspace in
which participating aircraft are deconflicted from friendly surface fires. The restrictive
measures also prevent non-participating aircraft and maneuver forces from entering the kill
box. The goal is to reduce the coordination required to fulfill support requirements with
maximum flexibility (permissive attributes), while preventing friendly fire incidents
(restrictive attributes). Fires executed in a kill box must comply with ROE and law of war
targeting constraints; designation of a kill box is not authorization to fire indiscriminately into
the area.

(2) Establishment. A kill box is established and adjusted by supported component

commanders in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected
commanders, and is an extension of an existing support relationship established by the JFC.
Requirements for kill boxes and other control measures are determined using normal
component targeting and planning processes and are established and approved by
commanders or their designated staff. Information about the type, effective time, duration,
and other attributes will be published and disseminated using existing voice and digital C2
systems. Component commanders, acting on JFC authority, establish and adjust kill boxes
within their AO in consultation with higher, subordinate, supporting, and affected
commanders. Requirements for kill boxes and other control measures are determined using
normal component targeting and planning processes.

See JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, and ATP 3-09.34 [FM 3-09.34]/MCRP 3-25H/NTTP 3-
09.2.1/AFTTP 3-2.59, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box
Employment, for further information.

3. Assessments

a. Assessment is used to measure progress of the joint force toward mission

accomplishment. Commanders continuously assess the operational environment and the
progress of operations, and compare them to their initial vision and intent. Commanders
adjust operations based on their assessment to ensure objectives are achieved and the desired
end state is attained.

b. At the tactical level, combat assessment is composed of three related elements: BDA,
munitions effectiveness assessment, and future targeting or reattack recommendations.
Combat assessment typically focuses on task accomplishment and target engagement. Joint
interdiction operations should include both pre-engagement and post-engagement target
reconnaissance efforts in order to facilitate combat assessment. When combat assessment is
linked to current and reliable intelligence, the JFC can accurately assess what was
accomplished, the overall effect on the enemy and whether or not the enemy has
accomplished system reconstitution or an effective workaround solution. Information gained
from combat assessment provides input for follow-on interdiction efforts.

For more information on assessment, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and JP 3-60, Joint
Targeting. Each publication describes the assessment process in detail and includes an
appendix on the subject.

V-7
Chapter V

Intentionally Blank

V-8 JP 3-03
 APPENDIX A
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-03 is based upon the following primary references.

1. General Publications

a. National Security Presidential Directive-17/Homeland Security Presidential

Directive-4, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

b. Presidential Policy Directive-18, Maritime Security Policy.

c. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the

Department of Homeland Security for Department of Defense Support to the United
States Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Security.

2. Department of Defense Publications

a. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 1400.31, DOD Civilian Work Force

Contingency and Emergency Planning and Execution.

b. DODD 3000.03E, DOD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and
NLW Policy.

c. DODD 3600.01, Information Operations (IO).

d. DODD 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major

Components.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCSI 3160.01, No Strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology.

b. CJCSI 3210.01, Joint Information Operations Proponent.

c. CJCSI 3520.02B, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Activity Program.

d. CJCSI 5120.02D, Joint Doctrine Development System.

e. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

f. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

g. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

h. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

i. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

A-1
Appendix A

j. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

k. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

l. JP 3-05, Special Operations.

m. JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations.

n. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

o. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

p. JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

q. JP 3-13, Information Operations.

r. JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.

s. JP 3-14, Space Operations.

t. JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations.

u. JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations.

v. JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations.

w. JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

x. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.

y. JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations.

z. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

aa. JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

bb. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

cc. JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

dd. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

4. Service Publications

a. ATP 3-52.2 (FM 3-52.2)/MCRP 3-25F/NTTP 3-56.2/AFTTP 3-2.17, Multi-

Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System.

b. ATP 3-60.1/MCRP 3-16D/NTTP 3-60.1/AFTTP 3-2.3, Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Dynamic Targeting.

A-2 JP 3-03
 References

c. ATP 3-60.2/MCRP 3-23C/NTTP 3-03.4/AFTTP 3-2.72, Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance.

d. ATP 3-91.1/AFTTP 3-2.86, The Joint Air Ground Integration Center.

e. MCRP 3-25J/NTTP 3-20.8/AFTTP 3-2.74, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures for Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare.

f. NTTP 3-07.11M/CGTTP 3-93.3/MCIP 3-33.04, Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure

Operations.

A-3
Appendix A

Intentionally Blank

A-4 JP 3-03
 APPENDIX B
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:
Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine
Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments
should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and
appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Air Force. The Joint Staff doctrine
sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction, 14 October 2011.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine (DD JED), Attn: Joint
Doctrine Division, 7000 Joint Staff (J-7), Washington, DC, 20318-7000 or email:
js.pentagon.j7.list.dd-je-d-jdd-all@mail.mil.

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint

Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View
Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697, and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint
Force Development, J-7/JED.

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change
source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and
other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source
documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint
force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and
policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of
record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing,
collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the
development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine

B-1
Appendix B

through the joint doctrine development process by providing lessons and lessons learned
derived from operations, events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into
joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP.
Lessons and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs
throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found
at https://www.jllis.mil or http://www.jllis.smil.mil.

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must
be IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program:
Overview, Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3,
DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are
available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (NIPRNET) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp
(SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and
Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-
Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community

member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs.
This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can
be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat
support agencies.

B-2 JP 3-03
 GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAGS Army air-ground system

ACM airspace coordinating measure
AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AI air interdiction
AO area of operations
AOC air operations center
ASOC air support operations center
ASOG air support operations group
ASOS air support operations squadron
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System
ATO air tasking order
ATP Army techniques publication

BCD battlefield coordination detachment (Army)

BDA battle damage assessment

C2 command and control

CAS close air support
CGTTP Coast Guard tactics, techniques, and procedures
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CO cyberspace operations
COA course of action
COG center of gravity
COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces
CONOPS concept of operations

DASC direct air support center

DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive

EA electronic attack
EMIO expanded maritime interception operations
EMOE electromagnetic operational environment
EMS electromagnetic spectrum
EP electronic protection
ES electronic warfare support
EW electronic warfare

FB forward boundary
FLOT forward line of own troops
FM field manual (Army)
FSCL fire support coordination line

GL-1
Glossary

FSCM fire support coordination measure

GLD ground liaison detachment

IO information operations
IRC information-related capability
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

JACCE joint air component coordination element
JADOCS Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System
JAGIC joint air-ground integration center
JAOC joint air operations center
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander
JFE joint fires element
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JFMCC joint force maritime component commander
JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander
JOA joint operations area
JP joint publication
JSOACC joint special operations air component commander
JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JTCB joint targeting coordination board

LEA law enforcement agency

LEDET law enforcement detachment (USCG)
LEO law enforcement operations
LOC line of communications

MACCS Marine air command and control system

MAS maritime air support
MCIP Marine Corps interim publication
MCO major combat operation
MCRP Marine Corps reference publication
MDA maritime domain awareness
MIO maritime interception operations
MISO military information support operations
MOTR maritime operational threat response

Navy TACC Navy tactical air control center

NTACS Navy tactical air control system
NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
OPCON operational control

GL-2 JP 3-03
 Glossary

PGM precision-guided munition

PNT positioning, navigation, and timing

ROE rules of engagement

SCAR strike coordination and reconnaissance

SOAGS special operations air-ground system
SOF special operations forces
SOLE special operations liaison element
SR special reconnaissance
SUWC surface warfare commander

TA target acquisition
TACON tactical control
TACP tactical air control party
TACS theater air control system
TAGS theater air-ground system
TGO terminal guidance operations
TST time-sensitive target

UA unmanned aircraft
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
USC United States Code
USCG United States Coast Guard
USG United States Government
USN United States Navy

WMD weapons of mass destruction

GL-3
 PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

air interdiction. Air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s
military surface capabilities before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly
forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives that are conducted at such distances from
friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement
of friendly forces is not required. Also called AI. (Approved for incorporation into JP
1-02.)

axis of advance. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

battlefield coordination detachment. An Army liaison located in the air operations center
that provides selected operational functions between the Army forces and the air
component commander. Also called BCD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-03)

diversion. 1. The act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the
principal operation; an attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention. 2. A change made in
a prescribed route for operational or tactical reasons that does not constitute a change of
destination. 3. A rerouting of cargo or passengers to a new transshipment point or
destination or on a different mode of transportation prior to arrival at ultimate
destination. 4. In naval mine warfare, a route or channel bypassing a dangerous area by
connecting one channel to another or it may branch from a channel and rejoin it on the
other side of the danger. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-03)

forward line of own troops. A line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly
forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. Also called FLOT. (JP 1-
02. SOURCE: JP 3-03)

interdiction. 1. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military surface
capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to achieve enemy
objectives. 2. In support of law enforcement, activities conducted to divert, disrupt,
delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy, under lawful authority, vessels, vehicles,
aircraft, people, cargo, and money. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

maritime interception operations. Efforts to monitor, query, and board merchant vessels
in international waters to enforce sanctions against other nations such as those in
support of United Nations Security Council Resolutions and/or prevent the transport of
restricted goods. Also called MIO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-03)

precision-guided munition. A guided weapon intended to destroy a point target and

minimize collateral damage. Also called PGM, smart weapon, smart munition.
(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-03)

strike coordination and reconnaissance. A mission flown for the purpose of detecting
targets and coordinating or performing attack or reconnaissance on those targets. Also
called SCAR. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-03)

GL-4 JP 3-03
 Glossary

terminal guidance. 1. The guidance applied to a guided missile between midcourse

guidance and arrival in the vicinity of the target. 2. Electronic, mechanical, visual, or
other assistance given an aircraft pilot to facilitate arrival at, operation within or over,
landing upon, or departure from an air landing or airdrop facility. (JP 1-02. SOURCE:
JP 3-03)

use of force policy. Policy guidance issued by the Commandant, United States Coast
Guard, on the use of force and weapons. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

GL-5
Glossary

Intentionally Blank

GL-6 JP 3-03
 JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1

JOINT
DOCTRINE

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

COMMUNICATIONS
PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS PLANS SYSTEM

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-03 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:

STEP #4 - Maintenance STEP #1 - Initiation

 JP published and continuously  Joint doctrine development
assessed by users community (JDDC) submission to fill
 Formal assessment begins extant operational void
24-27 months following  Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-
publication end analysis
 Revision begins 3.5 years  Joint Doctrine Planning Conference
after publication validation
 Each JP revision is completed  Program directive (PD) development
no later than 5 years after and staffing/joint working group
signature  PD includes scope, references,
outline, milestones, and draft
authorship
 JS J-7 approves and releases PD to
lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant
Maintenance command, JS directorate)

Initiation
ENHANCED
JOINT
WARFIGHTING
CAPABILITY

Approval Development

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

 JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7  LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first
 JS J-7 prepares publication for signature draft (FD)
 JSDS prepares JS staffing package
 PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
 FD comment matrix adjudication
 JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for
signature  JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to
JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
 Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment
matrix
 FC joint working group