Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science

Volume 33 Number 1 Article 14

1965

On Political Obligation and Civil Disobedience

Mulford Q. Sibley
University of Minnesota

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Sibley, M. Q. (1965). On Political Obligation and Civil Disobedience. Journal of the Minnesota Academy of
Science, Vol. 33 No.1, 67-72.
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 On Political Obligation and Civil Disobedience
MULFORD Q. SIBLEY'
University of Minnesota

ABSTRACT-The problems of political obligation and civil disobedience have recently been re-
emphasized in the civil rights struggle, in student demonstrations of various kinds, and in direct
act ion connected with the peace movement. At the same time, men like the late President Ken-
nedy have seemed to say that deliberate disobedience of law could never be countenanced.
In the light of controversies such as these, the present paper explores the disquietude about
'l egitimacy of political rule in the Western political tradition; restates and evaluates several of the
views that seek to give an account of political obligation; and formulates a possible way of view-
ing obligation and the conditions under which civil disobedience might be both a right and a
duty. No historical political system, the paper argues, has ever been completely legitimate, so
that under certain circumstances the possibility, right, and obligation of civil disobedience must
be understood to be open.

The United States, during the past five years, has given adapt these statements to the uncertainties of others and
birth lo new versions of very old issues in dramatizing to the language of our own day. Secondly, we remind
such central questions as the bases of political obligation ourselves of the various doctrines that, in light of the
and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of civil disobedience. · disquietude, have been advanced to provide a basis for
In Birmingham, while in prison, Martin Luther King political obligation. Noting the merits and weaknesses
wrote his Letter from Birmingham Jail in which he re- of each, it is argued that no one of them furni shes an
stated the justification for deliberate disobedience of law; adequate foundation for political obligation. Thirdly ,
and in Berkeley, California, a similar problem was posed building upon the fact of uneasiness and such insights
during the autumn of 1964 by leaders of the greatest as are provided by the several accounts of obligation,
student revolt of the present generation. At the same the attempt is made to restate a basis for obligation and
time , public officials seek to restate the duty to obey law, to develop criteria for judging when civil disobedience
apparently without qualification. Thus, the late President is legitimate.
Kennedy, in 1962. maintained that Americans were not
free to choose the laws they should obey (N.Y. Times, The Disquietude About Legitimacy
1962: 22); and Senator Goldwater, in the campaign of The anxiety concerning legitimacy may be illustrated
1964, denounced those who, in his judgment, were con- if we recall the dilemmas confronted by St. Augustine,
doning both direct action in general and civil disobedi- the fifth-century Church Father, who sought to evaluate
ence in particular (N .Y. Times, 1964:12) . Recent ar- all political systems in terms of their justice . On the one
ticles, moreover, have given a certain popularity to the hand, he conceived of a city of God , whose members
issue (Bedau , I 961; Cohen, 1964; Frankel, 1964); and are destined for salvation, who are pure in heart, and
dry questions that a few years ago seemed to be appro- who are members of the heavenly city. On the other side
priate only for desiccated professors of political philoso- are those condemned to spiritual death, who have turned
phy have suddenly taken on new life. away from God, and whose destiny is presumably hell.
There is, of course, a long tradition that may cast The cities or states of human history stand between the
considerable light on the current discussion of political city of God and the city of the damned, since any given
obligation and civil disobedience. This paper proposes to historical society will be composed of both tI1e saved and
re-examine certain aspects of that tradition , to relate the condemned. Out of this commingling of heavenly and
th em to the contemporary debate, and to vindicate both nonheavenly citizens arises political authority to provide
the right and the obligation of civil disobedience. a kind of uneasy peace pending the coming of the end
Three points are developed. First, the long-standing of history, the elate of which no man knows and which
disquietude about the cl aims of the State to our obedi- may be imminent or remote in time.
ence is examined . We seek to illustrate this by reference What puzzles Augustine - and presumably all those
lo certain classical statements of St. Augustine, and to exercised about the issue of political obligation - is
' Formerly on the faculty of the University of IlliDois ; visiting whether any distinction can be made between and among
professor, Political Science, Stanford University, 1957-1958: visit- the types of political authority he has known or about
professor, Government. Cornell University, 1962-63. Contributor which he has read. Are all of equal value and equally en-
of articles to such professional .i ournals as the American Polirical titled to obedience? Or are some legitimate and others
Science Review , Journal of Polirics, American Quarrerly . and
Hasrings Law Journal. Most recent hook-length publication is illegitimate? If so, how do we distinguish between the
The Quiet Batlle: Writings in rhe Theory and Prauice of Non- legitimate and the illegitimate? In Augustine's thinking,
Vio/enr Resistance (Doubleday Anchor, 1963), which he edited political authority did not exist in Eden but is the result
and panly wrote.
Currently, Professor of Political Science, University of l'vlinne- of the necessity for coercion that accompanies the Fall
sota, where he teaches courses and seminars in Political Theory. of Man . Can distinctions be made between and among

Joumal of, Volume Thirty-three , No . I, 1965 67

historical soc1et1es, so that one feels a greater sense of of statecraft, on the other. Rousseau appeared to think:
obligation to some than to others - always keeping in that most historic political authority has been - at least
mind that all grow out of wickedness? in considerable measure - simply a disguise for illegiti-
Augustine tried out two alternative answers (Bk. II, mate ends. As for the Marxist tradition, it is Augustin-
Ch . 21; Bk. IV., Ch. 4 ; Bk . XIX, Ch. 21, 23, and 24) . ian in its despair about any possibility of congruence be-
His first point of departure was Cicero's statement that tween "justice" and historic states, but hopeful in its
a people is a multitude of men associated together by a belief that the historic process itself will provide a ··solu-
common acknowledgment of right and a community of tion" by wiping out all class-biased (and therefore un-
interests. Augustine interpreted "right" to mean "true just) organizations. thus opening the way for a true mo-
justice. " And true justice includes not only giving to rality .
each man his due and to society what belongs to it, but Obviously, the disquietude expressed by many think-
also genuine worship of the one true God. Taking these ers has a foundation in our actual experience. Govern-
requirements together, he concluded that there had been ments that exist presumably to promote peace actually
in reality no just society in history. Yet without justice, encourage war on a large scale ( Cook, J 962). Rulers
he asked, what is any kingdom but a great robbery? R e- established to help guarantee freedom tend to destroy it.
m ow Justitia quid regna nisi magna /atrocinia? From this Governing classes placed in control of the state machin-
point of view, no historic political society has satisfied the ery by an originally democratic process become oli-
Augustinian criterion of legitimacy and, inferentially, our garchies and thus restrict or destroy the process.
obligation to all such societies reaches the vanishing Under circumstances of this kind, can one wonder at
point. Augustine's despair or be surprised by his tendency to
But he tended to withdraw in horror from what seems state, in effect, that any kind of order must be obeyed,
to be the logic of his position and he asked whether there since it is at least an order? Can we escape his seeming
may not be a more reasonable or, perhaps, usable defini- conclusion that in effect all political societies are, relative
tion of a people. He found the clue to his second con- to true justice, at about the same level, and that 1t 1s
ception in the fact that while all historic political soci- hopeless to differentiate between and among them with
eties have been little better than "robberies," it is equally any certainty?
true that even robber bands have at least one of the char-
acteristics of Cicero's popu/us: They are associations of Legitimacy and Obligation
men united by the objects of their love and with rules for Despite this ubiquitous disquietude about the possibil-
the distribution of spoils. Although they may not be just ity of distinguishing political societies from one another.
in terms of their ends, they do and must provide a cer- the tradition of political philosophy has obviously made
tain ordering - if only to carry out robbery efficiently some attempt to do so.
and to distribute the spoils according to regular rules -
and order is valuable regardless of its goals. At le ast, it The Naturalist View
is better than disorder. Or, as a modern scholar has put Perhaps the most persistent effort to construct a theory
it, there is "law" even among the "outlaws." ( Merriam , of political obligation has been that of what we might call
1934: Ch. Ill). Every robber band, Augustine suggested , the naturalists. Although there arc many rather diverse
is a little kingdom and , contrariwise, every kingdom is views included under this designation, they have in com-
an enlarged robber band. Both provide a measure of or- mon the notion that man 's true ends can be rationally
der and, perhaps, this is about all we can expect in this determined, can be separated from false ends , and can
world of fallen men. The implication of this view would furnish a foundation for natural law whose precepts will
seem to be that every well established power structure, provide grounds for distinguishing between legitimate and
since it at least establishes order, has a certain claim on illegitimate rule. By this account, man is a polit1cal ani-
our obedience . By contrast with his true justice test of mal whose ends are naturally fulfilled only within a po-
legitimacy, Augustine's second-level definition would litical society. That system of rule is binding, then. which
seem to open the way to a well nigh unqualified notion conforms in its main outlines to the precepts of Nature
of obligation. And, indeed, he seemed to suggest pre- conceived as a rationally discovered system of ends or
cisely this: The only ground for disobedience is presum- goals. Beginning with such presumably self-evident prop-
ably a specific Scriptural command ( Deane, 1963: 147, ositions as that we should seek the good and avoid the
89, 90). evil, the naturalists then ask what the good for man may
Nor is St. Augustine the only great thinker to give evi- be held to be. Their answer turns on an examination of
dence of a profound uncertainty over the degree of legiti- his natural needs, whether biological, social, or spiritual.
macy present in political societies. Although St. Thomas From these needs they deduce such principles as that
Aquinas seemed to think that even relatively bad gov- order is essential; that government is necessary for order;
ernments may be implicitly seeking good ends, he ap- that legitimate government is that that enhances achieve-
peared to imply the very mixed character of all political ment of goals natural to man and discourages ends that
rule and he envisioned occasions on which men may are unnatural. The individual's obligation to obey posi-
have to consider disobedience. Luther was bothered by tive law turns on the degree to which it expresses natural
the contrast between the maxims of the Sermon on the law, or at least does not contradict it.
Mount, on the one hand. and the apparent imperatives One difficulty with natural law conceptions in differ-
68 The Minnesota Academy of Science
entiating between legitimate and illegitmate systems of pain, said the nineteenth-century utilitarians, and assum-
rule is that the distinction between natural and unnatural ing that pleasure is equivalent to "good" and pain to
ends is not easy to determine. What is natural tends to be "evil," then I am obliged to obey, since it is to my inter-
a function of the culture, and objective standards, where est to do so. The great merit of a utilitarian view is that
they may be held to exist, are ambiguous at best. ls the it attempts to make less vague such often rationalizing
government of the United States legitimate, for example? formulae as "vital interests" and "general welfare." On
The present Constitution was adopted by procedures that the other hand, it is obvious that even a utilitarian
violated the law of the land at the time. Is not the ad- scheme must begin with propositions not derived from
monition to act according to positive law a principle of utility; and since "obligation" tends to be identified with
natural law? Why, under natural law principles, am I "interest," the problem of obligation, as Carritt has
obliged to obey the Constitution? Some naturalists might pointed out (Carritt, 1935), is really evaded or ignored.
say that because it has existed for a long time and has
been generally obeyed, "prescription" makes the govern- Organicism
ment established under it legitimate, hence obligatory. Organicist positions have something in common with
But does this imply that anything old - e .g., the institu- naturalist statements but need not put their viewpoint in
tion of war - carries with it the odor of moral sanctity terms of a natural law. ln the tradition stemming from
simply because of that fact? This is simply one example Rousseau and Hegel, and embracing, to some extent,
of the many questions on which naturalist views seem to such thinkers as Green, the general will of the moral
cast a light that is uncertain at best. community binds me because it is the true or real will
of myself. Thus I am obliged to obey because I have a
Contract moral duty to transcend the limitations of my "empirical"
According to another pos1t1on, contract provides the self and to release the "true self" that is struggling to be
!basis for obligation. Although many versions of the con- born-a self, purged of egoism, that understands that only
tract theory have existed - among them those of Hobbes, obedience to the general will can make for moral prog-
Locke. Rousseau, for example - they have in common the ress. My empirical self, which operates in terms of self-
notion that each of us has made an agreement with his interest, can be transcended only by being constantly re-
fellows to obey a government - either under certain spe- minded through law of the unselfish being that is con-
cified conditions and limitations ( as with Locke) or with- stantly at war with it. Out of this conflict arises the dis-
out qualification. tinction between mere "interest" and "obligation." The
The objections to contract theories are numerous. former means unlimited freedom to express my present
When did members of the present generation contract self, the latter the freedom to do what I ought in terms
with one another to obey the rules of a document drawn of my rational self.
up in l 787? When did the British agree to obey the gov- There are many difficulties with the organicist posi-
ernment of William the Conqueror - that "bastard" lead- tion; among them is the problem of discovering the iden-
ing an .. mmed banditti," as Tom Paine used to call him - tity of the true self. This problem is similar to the ques-
after 1066? Even if we maintain that a given generation tion confronted by the naturalist when he attempts to
agrees to submit itself to political rule, why is this alleged find out the meaning of right reason or the ends of Na-
contract binding on future generations who have made no ture. Does the law of every historical state, for example
such specific agreement? Nor does the doctrine of an im- - no matter what its contents may be - automatically
plicit consent stated by such thinkers as Socrates ( in Pla- identify my true self? The historical state notoriously re-
to's Criro) and Locke meet the issue, for by the time I flects compromise and clashing economic interests. In
have reached the age of discretion, I have been so condi- what sense, then, can it be said to speak for my true or
tioned bv the culture and language of a nation that my moral self?
decision to remain in that nation is hardly a free one.
Evaluation of Views
Yet another important question is whether we should
regard the keeping of promises - a central value impera- The upshot of all this is that all traditional accounts
tive under contract theories - as the supreme value. To of the basis of political obligation are inadequate in one
be sure, the principle that promises should be fulfilled is or more respects. At the same time, if we do not push
an important one, but it would seem doubtful that it them too far, each of them gives us an insight into the
ought to take precedence over all other considerations in complexity of treating obligation, and each, moreover,
making up one's mind about what is right at a given points up one aspect of the problem. Naturalist views
moment: and if one accept this notion, promises should surely reflect an important desideratum for any doctrine
be only one factor in making a decision on what is right. of legitimacy- a nonarbitrary, nonconventional set of
standards by which we can judge political authority. Con-
My promise can never be interpreted as one committing
tract positions dramatize the notion that authority to be
me t-0 obey under all circumstances and regardless of my
binding must repose on consent as well as embody the
sense of right at a particular time.
morally defensible statements stressed by the natural-
Utility ist. Utilitarian views warn us against taking refuge in
Some have asserted that obligation might be based on such unsatisfactory and vague expressions as "national
utility. If the government promotes more pleasure than interest" or "national honor." Finally, organicist ideas
Journal of, Volume Thirty-three, No. I, 1965 69
rightly stress the social and political dimensions of what Under conditions of this kind. in other words. author-
we call "personality" and, therefore, the unreality of ity would, so to speak, be fully authoritative and would
completely discrete "individuals." carry its own "power." Vera jus1i1ia-true justice-would
An adequate theory of obligation will have to take ac- obtain.
count of both the strengths and the weaknesses embodied If, now, one were to imagine an ideal type illegitimate
in the several traditional views. system of political relations, one need only spell out the
reverse of the picture of legitimacy. The coordinating
Disquietude, Obligation and Civil Disobedience
machinery of society woul'd manipulate men for its own
Having now suggested the anxiety about political so- ends in such a way that they would not even be aware of
ciety and having summarized important attempts to pro- their own exploitation. If perchance they resisted, force
vide an adequate foundation for political obligation, I without stint would be applied, sometimes without even
turn, in this last section, to (a) a restatement of the is- the pretense of using forms of law. Law and principles
sue of political obligation that will take account of both of morality would be determined completely by the rul-
Augustine's dilemma and the weaknesses and strengths ing classes, any distinction between right and might be-
in the several analyses of obligation, and ( b) a justifi- ing eliminated. Threats of various kinds would keep the
cation. under certain circumscribed conditions, of civil population cowed and submissive. Law would be im-
disobedience. posed with no explanation of the reasons supporting it.
Restatement of the Issue Armies would, of course, play an important role, one
A theory of obligation requires, first, a delineation of road to political power being success in military intimi-
what a fully legitimate authority would be; second, a dation. Spontaneity would be discouraged in every way,
similar sketch of an ideal-type illegitimate ruler; and even in the realms of sport and recreation.
third, judgment of all historical authorities by standards This dichotomization between legitimate and illegiti-
arising out of our standards of legitimacy and illegiti- mate is obviously based on a particular view of what the
macy. Our obligation is greatest to those alleged authori- conception of humanity implies by way of social order-
ties that endeavor by their actions to approximate legiti- ing, and in this respect the notion of legitimacy is di-
macy, and least to those that appear to forget the criteria rectly connected with those perspectives that earlier were
of moral licitness. termed naturalist-in the sense that legitimacy implies a
From the viewpoint of this paper-and of an important situation in which man's true nature has been fulfilJed.
t~a_dition in Western political thought-a completely le- But there are also elements of the contractual, insofar as
g1t1mate authority is one that exists in a society that has consent becomes a fully developed and genuine ingredi-
reconciled our consciousness of individuality with our ent in political relations. Utilitarian ideas are relevant,
feeling of belonging to others. In such a society-envi- too, at least to the degree that authority would necessar-
sioned in greater or lesser degree by such thinkers as St. ily have to appeal to judgments about consequences and
Thomas Aquinas, Rousseau, Marx, Engels, and Lenin- would have to define objectives in concrete terms. Fi-
each person would be free and spontaneous and yet nally, organicist conceptions are mirrored in the over-
wourd be associated with his fellows for collective en- coming of the alienation of men from their fellov.s .
deavors. The order demanded when men mingle with Just as Augustine's first definition of a commonwealth
one another would not find itself in tension with person- emphasized the fact that no historical society is fully le-
aJities that have ends beyond the social order. gitimate, so does my formulation maintain the highly
In a perfectly legitimate society, it would seem, the mixed and morally ambiguous character of all past and
coordinating machinery of the society, so necessary present regimes. Every political system is partly robbery
when men become specialized in their tasks, would pri- and piracy and yet it is also, in terms of Augustine's
marily administer " things," as the Marxist communist second definition, some kind of order that ,ve deem val-
version would have it. Direct coercion of men, and par- uable . At best, any given historical scheme can be justi-
ticularly the utilization of physical force, would vanish. fied only relatively and our obligation is only a r-:lative
Law would become, in Emerson's pregnant words, a or conditional one.
mere ''memorandum"; and once individual personalities What criteria can we discover for distinguishing be-
read the words of the memorandum, they would see im- tween relatively legitimate and relatively illegitimate re-
mediately the legitimacy of its prescriptions. Law ··mak- gimes?
ing" itself would be the end result of a consensus-oath- We might see an answer , first , in terms of the proced-
. b
enng process, with formal voting reduced to the vanish- ures whereby decisions are reached and, second. in rela-
ing point. The pull of special economic interests would tion to the substance of the decisions themselve~ .
have been abolished through common ownership and With respect to procedures, any claimed authority that
administration of resources, and distribution in accord- closes avenues to the enhancement of its legitimacy
ance with need (a need that each self-disciplined individ- would seem to be attacking the principle of authority at
ual would determine). Taxation as we know it today its roots. Thus any quasi-authority that cuts oft criti-
would have vanished, since collective necessities would cisms, reduces freedom of expression, or deliberately
be supplied from the total product before individual dis- withholds information is undermining the basic founda-
tribution could take place. Armies would, of course, be tions in that it is denying the means for nonviolent
no more. Complete freedom of expression would obtain. change in the direction of greater legitimacy. Other pro-
70 The Minnesota Academy of Science
cedural values are scarcely less important, and for the any doubt, it would seem , should be given to the existing
same reason: among these are reasonably nonarbitrary law or decree. This is because we can share with Augus-
procedures in criminal and civil courts and the absence tine the view that the value of order - any kind of order,
of too wide a discretion in the sphere allocated to the ex- or, in other terms, any system of mutual expectations-is
ecutive . In general, any serious denial of the rule of law so great that unless the system can be shown to be grave-
subjects a regime to the charge of too great a degree of ly deficient in its moral underpinnings, it must be as-
illegitimacv. sumed to have a certain claim, however bastardized .
fr the f~amework allows change and progress in the Norms of Procedure and Substance Violated. In de-
direction of full authority, then the substance of many ciding whether the presumption of obligation to obey is
decisions can be tolerated, if not fully approved, on to be overthrown, reference should be made to the no-
grounds either that they are ethically neutral or that, tion of legitimacy suggested earlier, both in its ideal-typi-
given the actual conditions obtaining, they may be rela- cal form and in its adaptation to the exigencies and rela-
tively justified. Thus, under conditions of perfect legiti- tivities of the historical situation . First of all, one should
macy, physical coercion would disappear. Within the rel- give primary weight to procedures and to the notion of
ativities of history, however, some coercion under certain rank ordering of values in the procedural framework. A
specific circumstances might be regarded as supportable. system of rule that disregards the basic norms of even
But some decisions would seem to be ruled out in a relative authority is contradicting its implicit purpose,
virtuallv absolute sense. Thus the deliberate and pre- which is, let us repeat, a more solidly based authority
meditated taking of life under the guise of "authority" from the moral point of view. Similarly, to the extent
would appear to be beyond the pale. This prohibition of that the basic substance of decisions contradicts the ends
deliberate killing might be said to derive from the notion for which quasi-authorities are established, to that de-
that a central function of authority is to enhance life and gree does claimed authority cease to be morally obliga-
not to destroy it. In particular circumstances, to be sure, tory, even in a relative sense.
we might well be uncertain as to what constitutes delib- Thus when alleged authority silences a man through
erate and premeditated taking of life as against acci- intimidation, takes a life in war, kills a person under the
dental or unintended killing; but surely capital punish- guise of punishment, or deprives human beings of liveli-
ment and war would be ruled out, at a minimum. hoods through an inadequate property system, it thereby
Then. too, a high substantative priority would be a undermines its own authority and correspondingly weak-
property system that assures a livelihood for all, even ens its claims on my obedience. After a certain point has
though distribution of economic power might be far from been reached, if I do obey it will he because of sheer ex-
the norms of pure legitimacy. The property question as- pediency and not by virtue of a sense of obligation.
sumes high-order priority because of its close relation to It was considerations of this kind that led Martin Lu-
the objective of enhancing life. ther King, in 1963, to violate court orders forbidding him
The~e. then, are among the most significant of the to protest segregation (King, 1963: 7); that impelled
procedural and substantive values, the denial of which students at the University of California to occupy build-
by the quasi-authorities of history would seem to reduce ings in violation of law; and that often send the conscien-
political obligation to the vanishing point and open the tious objector to jail for refusing to register under the
way for morally legitimate civil disobedience. Having conscription law.
sketched out ideal-type legitimacy and illegitimacy and
Overt, Not Covert Disobedience . It is precisely be-
their adaptation to the relativities of history, the princi-
ples under which civil disobedience may be justified can cause the civilly disobedient take seriously their political
obligation that they feel impelled to violate the law de-
now be spelled out.
liberatefy and overtly. They make public announcement
Justification of Civil Disobedience of it, accept responsibility, and stand ready to suffer the
Those who would support civil disobedience, we sug- consequences in terms of a penalty. They disobey be-
gest, must act with a sense of responsibility, give the cause they value law and deem the rule they are violat-
benefit of the doubt to the Jaw, be fairly certain that basic ing to be either no law ( the natural law view) or bad
norms of procedure and substance have been violated, law ( the positivist position). Although they recognize
disobey overtly rather than covertly, act nonviolently , that no alleged law can be fuUy authoritative in the
and recognize that the individual himself, rather than a mixed world characteristic of history, they insist that it
group, has the right and obligation to decide when civil must meet certain minimum requirements lest it destroy
disobedience is required. its very raison d'etre. They thus vindicate the principle
Responsibility. By responsibility is meant that the pur- of law in the very act of violating a particular command.
pose and possible consequences of the proposed civil Non-Violence. The disobedience must not only be
disobedience must be carefully weighed before the deci- overt but also nonviolent. One cannot consistently pro-
sion is made. Thus mere impulse must be ruled out as test against the undermining of authority by the histori-
incompatible with rational human action. cal state and, at the same time, utilize violence in the
Benefit of the Doubt. Fully admitting that any given process. For violence runs counter to the idea of moral
legal and political system is a mixture of the aspiration authority, it denigrates human personality, and, in effect,
for legitimacy and an attack on legitimacy, the benefit of it subverts the foundations of the order to which I am
Journal of, Volume Thirty-three, No . 1, 1965 71
appealing as a civilly disobedient person. Thus violent disobey law without thought and without cnt1c1sm. An
revolution tends to be self defeating, destroying the historical order reposing on conscience may have ele-
foundations of moral order while it claims to be seeking ments of durability; but one bottomed on unreflective
a more nearly legitimate authority. When violence is obedience and impulsive disobedience can be swept away
used to secure revolutionary change, it is as illegitimate by whim and happenstance. Possible civil disobedience
and therefore as unauthoritative as the violence of a war is the price we pay for an order resting, in part at least,
waged by the quasi-authorities of history. on awareness that an historical regimes are in some
Decision by the Individual. In deciding whether to be degree illegitimate and may have to be resisted. But
disobedient, the individual in the end must be guided by this price is far less than the moral and social charge
his own conscience. assessed when we assume that all alleged law must be
Some thinkers, to be sure, are dissatisfied with conclu- automatically obeyed; for automatic obedience implies
sions of this kind, protesting that the individual cannot automatons in the guise of men-a denial of the aspira-
and must not determine when he should and should not tion for autonomy and moral authority, which is the
obey. Typical of these critics is Dr. Will Herberg, who most distinctive quality of humanity.
wrote: In our day particularly, with its arge-scale manipula-
tion of human beings, the civilly disobedient may not
Every man has his conscience; and if the individ- only vindicate their own personal integrity but also ren-
ual conscience is absolutized ( that is, divinized), der a genuine social service. They vividly remind us that
and made the final judge of laws to be obeyed or
disobeyed, nothing but anarchy and the dissolution all power tends to corrupt ; that shock techniques are
of the very fabric of government would result (Na- needed to recall so-called democracies to their own prin-
tional Review, 1964, p. 580). ciples; that elites often become both stupid and immoral;
and, to recur to St. Augustine, that only a relatively thin
In response to such objections, we might well remind line may separate the ruler claiming political authority
ourselves that "conscience" originally meant "joint from the pirate chief.
knowledge" and that in considerable measure it still has
this connotation. One's conscience about a particular References
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72 The Minnesota Academy o_i Science