Ac 20 02
Ac 20 02
Ac 20 02
of
[SUAS Make/Model]
for
[Project/Program Title]
[Preparer]
[Reviewer]
Approved: Date:
[TAA or DTA]
CONTENTS:
Introduction
Section 1: Program Information
Section 2: Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Information
Section 3: Causes of Loss of Control
Section 4: Common Safeguards
Section 5: Vehicle Safety History and Reliability
Section 6: Risk Assessment
INTRODUCTION:
An airworthiness assessment was conducted on the [insert system name] and the results are
captured in this report.
This report is focused on hazards that may result in the following consequences:
• Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) crashes which may result in death or injury, or damage to
property.
• Mid-air collision between UAV and other aircraft causing death or injury, or damage.
1. PROGRAM INFORMATION
1.1. Program/Project Name:
1.2. Program/Project POC: Name, Office, Phone (DSN or commercial), email
1.3. Program Objective:
1.4. Previous AW Approval(s):
1.5. Operating Environment:
___Flight Test
___Operational
___Other
1.6. Operator:
___USAF
___Contractor
___Both
1.7. Airspace:
___DoD Test or Training Range
___Other DoD Controlled Airspace
___FAA COA
___Other Airspace: ______________________
1.8. References used in this document:
1.8.1. [list as applicable]
2. UAS INFORMATION
2.1. General Description
2.1.1. Model/Nomenclature:
2.1.2. Manufacturer:
2.1.3. Air Vehicle Type:
___Fixed Wing
___Rotary Wing
___Multi-rotor
___Other: ______________________
4. COMMON SAFEGUARDS
This section describes the capabilities inherent to this system and mitigation procedures.
4.1. Degraded modes of flight. What failures or conditions will cause the flight to be
aborted (i.e., precautionary return to base)?
4.2. Return Home Modes. Describe the Return Home Mode and what triggers it. Does
Return Home Mode work without GPS?
4.3. Containment and Geofence. Does the system have "Geofence" capability? If so,
describe. Describe UAS containment procedures and methods of containment in
requested area in the event of a "fly-away"
4.4. Flight Termination System. Is a FTS installed? Describe the FTS. Can FTS be self-
activated, if so, what causes self-activation of the flight termination system? Electrical
power loss? Loss of flight critical function? Loss of FTS signal? What are the criteria
for activation of the FTS or flight termination maneuver? Does FTS activate if battery
backup fails (i.e., fails “safe”)? Does FTS operate on an independent battery circuit?
4.5. Fail Safe Mode. Is there a “fail safe” mode? What conditions cause it to activate?
What happens when it is activated (engine shut off, flight controls to “turn” or
“tumble”)? Is there a specified time delay between what triggers fail safe mode and
actions taken to cause the vehicle to stop flying?
4.6. In Flight Restarts. Can the system be restarted in flight? What conditions would lead to
a restart? How long does it take to return to full capability? Does it return in the same
state or revert to a set of defaults? Can the air vehicle maintain flight during the
restart?
4.7. Collision Avoidance. How is the risk of mid-air collision with manned aircraft
mitigated? How does the UAS Operator “see and avoid” other aircraft that may be
nearby (radar, transponder, visual)?
4.8. Parachute. Does the UAS have a parachute recovery system? How is it activated? At
what altitude will the chute deploy and what is the impact and drift rate? Is there a
minimum deployment altitude? Are there altitude, airspeed, or attitude limits on
deploying the parachute?
4.9. Other. Include any other safeguards not addressed above.
Severity
Descript ion Category Mishap Result Criteria
C04Ad rest.II in one or more oi the fd lowl'lg: death, permanent total disabiity, irre-versible
Catast rophi c 1 sigiificant enVl"Onmental impact. or monetary loss equal to or exceeding S 10M.
C04Ad rest.II in one or more oi the fd lowl'lg: injury or occupational illness resutting in one or
Marginal 3 more Sost wOlk dav(s). reversible moderate environmentll impact, or monetary bss eaual to or
exceedi,g $ 100K but less than SIM.
C04Ad rest.II in one or more oi the fd lOWl'lg: injury or occupational illness not resultng in a lost
Negligib l e
• wOlk day. minimal env.-Onmental inpact. or monetary loss less than $ I 00K.
Probable B WI occur several ti'nes in the life of an item. Will occur frequently.
Occas iona.l C Likely to occur sometime in the life oi an item. Will occur several times.
If historical mishap data is available and risks are aggregated at the system level, use the
equation below to determine the Aggregate Probability of Mishap. The Quantitative
Probability Level is determined by finding the range associated with the Aggregate
Probability of Mishap per flight hour (FH) or Sortie / 10 in AWB-150, Table 2: Quantitative
Probability Level Thresholds. (The division by 10 is appropriate to transform the
Quantitative Probability Level Thresholds table from dealing with individual hazard types to
handling the aggregate risk to the system.)
The Risk Assessment Matrix in Table 6.3 is used to determine appropriate risk acceptance
authorities (RAAs) based on residual risk levels. The residual risk from each hazard is used
to set the overall risk level to be accepted for the intended usage of the system. The overall
risk level will be no lower than the highest residual risk level from any of the hazards. The
requiring activity determines the appropriate RAAs in accordance with DoD and AF policy.
Table 6.4 –Example Risk Summary
Hazard Residual Risk
GENERAL
Lithium Battery Fire/Explosion 3-E, MED
Unsuccessful Launch 3-E, MED
Unsuccessful Recovery 4-E, LOW
LOSS OF CONTROL
Loss of Command Link 4-D, LOW
Loss of Vehicle Position Information 4-D, LOW
Loss of Flight Reference Data 4-E, LOW
Control surface failure 3-E, MED
Loss of Propulsion 4-D, LOW
Loss of Aircraft Power 4-E, LOW
Loss of Ground Station Eliminated
SAFEGUARD FAILURES
Airspace violation 4-E, LOW
Mid-air Collision 4-E, LOW
MISHAP HISTORY 3-C. MED
Table 6.5 – Example Risk Assessment
RESIDUAL
HAZARD CAUSE EFFECT INITIAL RISK MITIGATION
RISK
GENERAL
Damage; inappropriate storage or Loss of A/C Pre-flight procedure checks battery health; Mx
Lithium Battery
charging of batteries 3-C manual describes proper storage and charging 3-E
Fire/Explosion procedures
Propulsion failure during launch Loss of lift and impact Pre-flight procedure checks engine functionality;
Unsuccessful Launch with ground 3-D displays provide health and status, vertical speed 3-E
indicator
Net capture failure Impact with ground at Displays provide landing point deviations, vertical
Unsuccessful Recovery high speed 4-D speed indicator; ground observers provide cross 4-E
check
LOSS OF CONTROL
Complete failure of primary and A/C executes Lost Lost Comms plan returns A/C home along pre-
Loss of Command Link secondary radios or tracking Comms flight plan 4-C programmed route. Flight Termination conditions 4-D
antenna are set during pre-flight.
Lost/degraded GPS A/C reverts to Displays provide health and status; Emergency
Loss of Vehicle Position
Information magnetometer, gyros 4-C procedures reduce probability of loss of A/C. 4-D
and IMU; returns home
Improper pitot-static assembly Uncontrolled loss of Warnings/Caution in Mech Ops Manual and
Loss of Flight Reference Data aircraft 3-C positive Pre-flight checks reduce risk of in-flight 4-E
failure.
Stuck controller Uncontrolled loss of Positive Pre-flight checks reduce risk of in-flight
Control surface failure aircraft 3-C failure. 3-E
Mechanical failure Controlled loss of Displays provide health and status; Emergency
Loss of Propulsion aircraft-Loss of altitude 4-C procedures sufficiently reduce probability of loss of 4-D
A/C..
Mechanical failure Uncontrolled loss of Emergency procedures sufficiently reduce
aircraft probability of loss of A/C including VTOL
Loss of Alternator or PMU 4-D landing.45-60 min backup battery for control 4-E
surfaces
Electrical failure Loss of UAV C2 Handoff to backup control station on separate
Loss of Ground Station 3-D electrical circuit Eliminated
SAFEGUARD FAILURES
Autopilot failure results in fly- Fuel exhaustion and Autopilot mfr has mature SW development process
Airspace violation away belly landing 4-D (10+ yrs) incorporating bug fixes from operational 4-E
events
Loss of situational awareness Loss of A/C Operations under FAA COA w/ airspace de-
Mid-air Collision and/or anti-collision lights 4-C confliction, use of observers 4-E
MISHAP
MISHAP HISTORY FLIGHT HOURS MISHAPS MISHAP RATE REPLACEMENT VEHICLE COST
RISK
Make/Model 20,000 10 5.5E-04 $500k 3-C