British Politics

https://doi.org/10.1057/s41293-020-00134-8

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Political alienation and referendums: how political

alienation was related to support for Brexit

Stuart Fox1

© The Author(s) 2020

Abstract
A common interpretation of the UK’s Brexit vote is that it was an expression of anti-
establishment sentiment, outrage and dismay from a politically alienated majority.
This line of thinking suggests Brexit, like the electoral appeal of Donald Trump and
parties such as the Five Star Movement, is but the latest manifestation of a growing
disconnect between Western citizens and their democratic institutions. The direct
role of political alienation in building support for such anti-establishment causes
has, however, barely been examined. This study addresses this gap and uses previous
literature on political alienation to build a model to test the claim that Brexit was (at
least in part) driven by political alienation in UK citizens. The analyses show that
while political alienation did have a substantial effect in making some citizens more
likely to support Brexit—specifically those who lacked trust in the integrity of the
political elite and felt that the political system was unresponsive—its impact overall
was limited. Moreover, claims that Brexit was driven by political alienation under-
state how alienated from politics most people who were opposed to it also feel.

Keywords  Brexit · British politics · Political alienation · Euroscepticism

Introduction

A common interpretation of the UK’s ‘Brexit vote’ is that of an alienated major-

ity of voters, left behind by economic development and let down by out of touch
politicians, venting their frustration by rejecting the preference of the political
and economic elite. The efforts of the Leave campaigns during the referendum
to link support for Brexit with a rejection of the political establishment and their
management of issues such as the economy, healthcare and immigration were
clear (Shipman 2016, 2017). The efforts of the Remain campaign to link opposi-
tion to Brexit with the protection of the status quo were equally clear. Since the

* Stuart Fox
Stuart.fox@brunel.ac.uk
1
Department of Social and Political Sciences, Brunel University, Kingston Lane, London, UK

Vol.:(0123456789)
 S. Fox

referendum, journalists have frequently emphasised the link between support for
Brexit and anger at the perceived failings of the political and economic system
(Freedland 2017; Harris 2016; Shipman 2016, 2017), and both the Labour and
Conservative Party campaigns during the 2017 general election reflected their
belief that Brexit was “an anti-establishment vote” (Shipman 2017, p. 261). Aca-
demics have similarly suggested that political discontent and alienation was cor-
related with support for Brexit and opposition to some of the more visible conse-
quences of European Union (EU) membership, such as mass migration (Vines and
Marsh 2017; Ford and Goodwin 2014; Goodwin and Heath 2016; Watson 2017;
Clarke et al. 2017; Curtice 2017; Marsh 2018). Some also suggest that Brexit is
the UK’s manifestation of rising levels of political discontent and anti-establish-
ment sentiment apparent in numerous Western democracies, comparable with the
election of Donald Trump in the United States, and support for parties such as
Italy’s Five Star Movement, Jobbik in Hungary or Alternative for Germany (Ford
and Goodwin 2014; Geddes 2014; Vines and Marsh 2017; Marsh 2018).
While there have been numerous insightful assessments of the referendum in
both the media and academia that highlight the importance of discontent with
the political elite (Clarke et  al. 2017; Goodwin and Heath 2016; Jackson et  al.
2016; Curtice 2017; Shipman 2016; Freedland 2017), the effect of characteristics
associated with ‘political alienation’ in the academic literature on the concept has
not been directly examined. Rather, there is an assumption that support for Brexit
was driven at least in part by political alienation, resulting from voters’ percep-
tions or circumstances such as economic deprivation or feeling that there are too
many immigrants in their neighbourhood. In other words, alienation is implied as
the causal link that bridges certain voter perceptions or circumstances with their
support for Brexit.
This is problematic for several reasons. First, alienation does not necessarily have
to be positively associated with support for Brexit. While someone who is aggres-
sively opposed to mass immigration from the EU, for example, may have felt alien-
ated from the political system that allowed it, they need not necessarily feel that
way—they may simply be dissatisfied with government policy. Second, the assump-
tion implies that those who voted ‘remain’ in the referendum were less alienated
than Brexit supporters, which could be unsustainable in light of the numerous stud-
ies that have examined political alienation, political discontent or anti-politics in the
UK and shown that it is more widespread than the 52% who voted ‘leave’ in 2016
(Whiteley 2012; Stoker 2006; Fox 2015; Hay 2007; Jennings et al. 2016). Third, not
only is a potential contribution to explanations for Brexit overlooked, but an oppor-
tunity to learn more about political alienation is missed as well. There is a healthy
literature on the theory, measurement, causes and consequences of political aliena-
tion, and the concept has been used to examine a range of political concerns, such as
support for populist or non-mainstream political candidates, the development of atti-
tudes towards democracy in children and low youth turnout (Southwell 2003, 2012;
Southwell and Everest 1998; Kabashima et  al. 2000; Fox 2015; Gniewosz et  al.
2009; Dermody et al. 2010; Dahl et al. 2017). Examining how alienation was related
to vote choice in the UK’s referendum presents an opportunity to learn more about a
concept of increasing relevance to contemporary political and social research.
Political alienation and referendums: how political alienation…

This study addresses these gaps in the literature and examines the effect of politi-
cal alienation on the likelihood of British citizens supporting Brexit. It develops a
model of political alienation rooted in previous research that is based around voters’
political trust and efficacy. The effect of these traits on support for Brexit is mod-
elled while controlling for other characteristics associated with participation in the
referendum and Euroscepticism. The analyses show, first, that concern regarding the
extent of political alienation and anti-political sentiment in the UK may be justified,
with a clear majority of British voters feeling that the political elite cannot be trusted
and that the political system is unresponsive, and a substantial minority finding the
political process too complex to effectively engage with. Second, while the people
most likely to hold such views are also those most likely to have voted for Brexit
(i.e. older, white males with low education, limited economic resources and who are
sceptical about immigration), the association between such attitudes and support for
Brexit was relatively weak. Only voters who felt that the political elite could not be
trusted and that the political system and elite were unresponsive were significantly
more likely to support Brexit; there was no appreciable difference between the vote
choices of those who exhibited other forms of alienation and those who were not
alienated at all.
This article begins by defining political alienation and outlining the theory and
approach to operationalising it developed in previous research. It then outlines the
model used in this analysis and the hypotheses to be tested, before presenting the
results. The conclusion summarises the findings and considers the implications both
for the future study of political alienation and for understandings of why the UK
voted to leave the EU in 2016.

Defining and measuring political alienation

The concept of alienation was first popularised in the fields of political economy
and sociology in the nineteenth century. Its hey-day in political science came in the
1960s and 1970s when it was used to explain various activities amongst US citizens
in opposition to government policy that indicated far more than simple disagree-
ment or dissatisfaction, such as voluntary renunciation of citizenship (Ranade and
Norris 1984; Keniston 1965). This literature defined political alienation in terms of
a lasting form of estrangement from some aspect of one’s political system, com-
munity or environment (Citrin et al. 1975; Finifter 1970; Seeman 1959; Cutler and
Bengston 1974). Political alienation does not refer to a short-term expression of dis-
satisfaction; rather, it is a long-term orientation towards the political system that is
perceived as something alien to the individual, which is heavily influenced by that
individual’s political socialisation (Citrin et  al. 1975; Dermody et  al. 2010). This
means that key socialising agents and experiences during adolescence are vital to
determining one’s alienation from the political system, such as the attitudes of one’s
parents, key early experiences of the political process, or exposure to institutions or
communities that can encourage alienation (such as the press that has been shown
to promote low trust and cynicism in the political process) (de Vreese 2005; Cap-
pella and Jamieson 1997; Gniewosz et al. 2009). As individuals age, the values and
 S. Fox

dispositions developed during adolescence are reinforced and become habitual;

barring a dramatic event that ‘over-rides’ these habits, alienation (or a lack of it)
becomes a relatively stable and lasting component of one’s political characteristics,
meaning that changes in political alienation are very rare (Van der Eijk and Franklin
2009; Fox 2015).
Political alienation is expressed attitudinally, not through behaviour, although
the attitudes do necessarily affect behaviour (Citrin et al. 1975; Olsen 1969). This
means that acts such as refusing to vote, rioting, or voting for Brexit are not indi-
cators of political alienation in themselves, but rather are caused by the attitudes
that reflect alienation. The utility of the concept is that it provides the causal link
between an individual’s negative perceptions of the political system and their subse-
quent behaviour (Citrin et al. 1975; Cutler and Bengston 1974). Those behavioural
consequences of alienation can be highly varied, but in essence take one of two
forms: “[w]hen an individual is faced with an external situation that is perceived
as undesirable, [s]/he is presented with two options: (1) take remedial action, or;
(2) exit the scene” (Southwell and Everest 1998, p. 43; Hirschman 1970). Taking
remedial action could involve activities intended to change or remove the object of
the political system that makes the individual feel estranged, such as voting for radi-
cal anti-establishment candidates or rioting (Hooghe et al. 2011; Templeton 1966).
‘Exiting the scene’ essentially means disengaging from the political process alto-
gether, or at least refusing to participate in ‘formalised’ activities (such as voting)
(Southwell and Everest 1998).
Previous literature has identified three attitudinal ‘domains’ or ‘dimensions’ of
alienation, each of which constitutes a means by which it can be expressed and all
of which were linked with behavioural consequences in the form of remedial action
or withdrawal. The first is ‘political powerlessness’ (Finifter 1970; Aberbach 1969;
Nachimas 1974), which refers to the individual’s perception that the political pro-
cess or elite is unresponsive to their influence, essentially mirroring the concept
of external political efficacy (Citrin et al. 1975). This is usually associated with an
individual’s withdrawal from political activity (Fox 2015). The second is ‘politi-
cal normlessness’ (Finifter 1970; Schwartz 1973), which refers to the individual’s
belief that the norms governing just and fair political interaction are not adhered
to. It refers to the trust that a citizen has in the integrity of the political elite or pro-
cess and in the fairness of the operation of the political system. This can be associ-
ated with withdrawal from politics, but also with the desire to take remedial action
(Southwell and Everest 1998; Southwell 2012). Finally, ‘political meaninglessness’
refers to citizens’ lack of faith in their own knowledge and understanding of politics,
which results in them feeling unable to identify any order or meaning in the political
process, and so undermining their confidence in their capacity to effectively engage
with it (Nachimas 1974; Denters and Geurts 1993). It mirrors the concept of internal
political efficacy. This alienation is likely to result in the individual’s withdrawal
from the political process altogether (Fox 2015).
It is in these dimensions that the distinction between political alienation and
related concepts such as political discontent or anti-politics becomes apparent (Jen-
nings et  al. 2016; Stoker 2006; Hay 2007; Vines and Marsh 2017). While a wide
array of negative perceptions of the political system is associated with ‘anti-politics’
Political alienation and referendums: how political alienation…

or political discontent, they are usually focused on voters’ assessments of their

politicians. Jennings et al. (2016), for example, outline five dimensions of political
discontent, focussed on citizens beliefs about politicians’ lack of technical skill to
deliver desirable outcomes; lack of courage to pursue radical objectives; focus on
short-term victories and ‘the median voter’ or on ‘big business’ and opinion form-
ers; and weakness in the face of globalisation and ‘big money’. While these could
clearly inform an individual’s political trust or efficacy, they do not cover ways in
which respondents’ could be alienated from other elements of the political system
besides the political elite, such as the electoral system, the party system or even the
idea of a democratic society. Jennings et al.’s (2016) dimensions also do not account
for how citizens can be politically alienated by their own lack of confidence in their
understanding of it—a trait that could have nothing to do with the performance of
politicians. While there is clear overlap between political discontent, anti-politics
and political alienation, therefore, and it is likely that there are causal relationships
between them, there are also differences in the traits they refer to and the object to
which expressions of discontent/alienation can be directed.

Research Design

This research was conducted using a nationally representative sample of British

adults (Northern Ireland was excluded), surveyed online by YouGov in June 2017
and commissioned by the Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research, Data
and Methods (WISERD). Respondents were asked just before the 2017 general elec-
tion about a variety of attitudes relating to the political system. The YouGov panel
also included data on how those respondents voted in the EU Referendum in 2016,
collected either immediately after the referendum or as soon as possible after it. This
study uses expressions of political attitude indicative of political alienation in June
2017, therefore, to predict vote choice in the 2016 referendum. This, clearly, falls
some way short of the ideal standard for testing causal hypotheses in social research.
It is considered an acceptable limitation for the objective of this study—to assess the
claim that support for Brexit was (at least in part) driven by political alienation—for
several reasons. First, the inherent stability of traits indicative of political aliena-
tion—political trust, internal efficacy and external efficacy—means that people who
were (for example) alienated by their lack of trust in politicians in 2016 were highly
unlikely to have substantially changed their opinions over the following year. Even
an event as dramatic as the referendum would not be expected to affect such atti-
tudes, although the wider impact of Brexit on British politics over the following
years may well have done so and is a further avenue of research discussed below. In
other words, respondents who felt politically un/alienated in 2017 were highly likely
to feel that way in 2016 before voting in the referendum. While clearly problematic,
therefore, this survey data can give a glimpse into how alienation may have contrib-
uted to the UK’s Brexit vote. Second, there is no other survey capable of sustain-
ing this study; while surveys such as the British Election Study or United Kingdom
Household Panel Study include some indicators of political alienation alongside
EU Referendum vote choice, they do not include indicators of all three dimensions.
 S. Fox

Reliance on them would preclude not only a complete assessment of how alienation
affected support for Brexit, therefore, but also the potential to examine how different
dimensions of alienation may have interacted. Despite the drawbacks, therefore, this
survey still provides the best way of examining how political alienation contributed
to Brexit.
A combination of descriptive statistics and regression analyses were used to
examine the relationship between alienation and vote choice in the referendum.
Three dependent variables were used: voting ‘leave’, voting ‘remain’ or not voting
at all. Political alienation was measured by three survey items corresponding to the
three dimensions of external efficacy (powerlessness), political trust (normlessness)
and internal efficacy (meaninglessness). External political efficacy was measured
through respondents’ agreement (measured on a five-point Likert scale) that ‘politi-
cians don’t care what people like me think’. Political trust was measured through
agreement that ‘politicians in Westminster cannot be trusted to put the interests of
the country ahead of the interests of their party’, while internal political efficacy was
measured through responses to the view that ‘politics and government can seem so
complicated, I find it hard to understand what’s going on’. The number of respond-
ents who ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’, ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed’ for
each measure was very small and so the variables were collapsed into dichotomous
indicators separating respondents who could be described as politically alienated to
some extent (i.e. agreed that politicians did not care what they thought, that politi-
cians could not be trusted, or that politics and government was too complicated)
from those who were not.1 A single independent variable was then created that
grouped respondents based on their expression of political alienation, to account for
the fact that people can be alienated by more than one dimension at a time. The
variable distinguished between those who felt no alienation at all (i.e. did not agree
with any of the statements), who were alienated in terms of all three dimensions (i.e.
agreed with all three), who were alienated only in terms of external efficacy, politi-
cal trust or internal efficacy, and every combination of the three, producing an eight
category measure.
The political alienation literature suggests that a lack of political trust should be
associated with ‘taking remedial action’, i.e. being more likely to vote for Brexit
and against the political establishment. While there is little research into how inter-
actions between different forms of alienation might affect political behaviour, it
is possible that someone with low trust in politics could feel even more strongly
about the need to take remedial action if they also felt that the political system was
unresponsive and felt that the political process was too difficult to understand. Con-
versely, those respondents who did not feel alienated from politics at all should have
been the staunchest opponents of Brexit, as they held the political elite and system
in high regard and would be the most likely to want to retain the status quo. The first
hypotheses will test this expectation:

1
  Just one in ten respondents disagreed, for example, that politicians could not be trusted, and 16% disa-
greed that politicians did not care what they thought.
Political alienation and referendums: how political alienation…

H1  Respondents who felt alienated in terms of all three dimensions of alienation
were the most likely to support Brexit.

H2  Respondents who did not feel alienated in terms of any dimension were the least
likely to support Brexit.

There should also be variations between manifestations of alienation. The asso-

ciation of normlessness with ‘remedial action’ should mean that those whose aliena-
tion was at least in part driven by their lack of trust in politicians should have been
more supportive of Brexit than those who had more trust:

H3  Respondents who felt alienated by their lack of trust in politicians were more
likely to support Brexit than those with higher trust, or who were alienated only by
their lack of external or internal efficacy.

Conversely, the fact that powerlessness and meaninglessness tend to be associ-

ated with ‘exiting the scene’ and essentially withdrawing from politics suggests that
these forms of alienation should be associated with a lower chance of voting in the
referendum at all:

H4  Respondents who felt alienated by their low external political efficacy should be
less likely to vote in the referendum than those with high external efficacy.

H5  Respondents who felt alienated by their low internal political efficacy should be
less likely to vote in the referendum than those with high internal efficacy.

The hypotheses were tested using descriptive statistics and logistic regres-
sion analyses, which allowed for the inclusion of control variables indicating
other traits associated with participation in the referendum and support for Brexit/
Euroscepticism:

– Education as a proxy for political sophistication, given that higher levels of each
are associated with less Euroscepticism (Gabel 1998).
– Age, marital status, education status and retirement status, to account for the
relationship between the life cycle and Euroscepticism (Fox and Pearce 2018;
Down and Wilson 2013, 2017).
– National identity, as those who hold to exclusive national identities are more
likely both to oppose the impact of EU membership on the sovereignty of the
national government and the impact of immigration on the cultural and ethnic
homogeneity of that nation (McLaren 2002; Haesly 2001).
– Occupational social grade, household tenure, work type, employment status and
whether the respondents lived in an urban, semi-urban or rural area, to account
for the relationship between economic deprivation and/or a lack of economic
resources and hostility to EU membership/support for Brexit (Clarke et al. 2017;
Ford and Goodwin 2014; Watson 2017; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Gabel 1998).
 S. Fox

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
External Poli
cal Internal External External Poli
cal All Not
efficacy trust only efficacy efficacy + efficacy + trust + dimensions alienated
only only poli
cal internal internal of
trust efficacy efficacy aliena
on

Fig. 1  Political alienation in Britain (%). Source YouGov (weighted data); n = 5095

– Attachment to domestic political institutions (such as political parties) associated

with differing levels of Euroscepticism, political ideology and assessments of
the performance of the incumbent government (Nelsen and Guth 2017; Fox and
Pearce 2018; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Franklin et al. 1995).
– A dummy variable indicating whether respondents had no interest at all in poli-
tics, to account for the positive relationship between political engagement and
support for EU membership, and the importance of being politically engaged to
the possibility of being politically alienated (Citrin et al. 1975).
– Finally, controls for the demographic traits of gender and ethnicity were also
included.2

Results

The survey showed that most British citizens could be described as politically alien-
ated in some way. Clear majorities felt that the political system/elite is unresponsive
(60%) and that politicians cannot be trusted (66%), and a substantial minority (42%)
felt that politics is too complex. Figure  1 shows the proportion of respondents in
each category of alienation and demonstrates that while there is no particular form

2
  While measures of political ideology were available in the survey, there were no direct measures of
respondents’ assessments of the performance of the national government or their loyalty to domestic
political parties. This effect was captured, therefore, through measures of respondents’ political ideology
and newspaper readership (assuming that those who were left-wing and/or read The Guardian, for exam-
ple, were more likely to be opposed to the incumbent Conservative government and to feel that it was
doing a poor job of running the country than respondents who were right-wing and/or read The Daily
Mail).
Political alienation and referendums: how political alienation…

that dominates, most respondents were estranged either by their lack of political
trust and their lack of faith in the responsiveness of the political system, or by both
of these and their lack of confidence in their understanding of that system.
Consistent with previous research, political alienation tends to be concentrated
amongst those from poorer socio-economic backgrounds (Finifter 1970; Citrin et al.
1975; Southwell 2012). Almost one in five respondents with degrees or post-grad-
uate qualifications, for example, did not feel alienated from politics, compared with
13% of those with no qualifications; conversely, 30% of those with no qualification
felt alienated in terms of all three dimensions, compared with 16% of graduates.
Similarly, 18% in social grades A and B did not feel alienated at all, and another
18% felt alienated in terms of all three dimensions—the equivalent figures for those
in grades D and E are 13% and 29%. That said, respondents from more advantaged
backgrounds were more likely to be alienated by their lack of trust in politicians
alone: 16% of graduates and 17% of those in social grades A and B, for example,
were alienated only by their lack of trust in politicians, compared with 8% of those
with no qualifications or in grades D and E, respectively. This does not indicate a
greater propensity to distrust politicians amongst these respondents, rather than
the lower likelihood of them lacking internal or external political efficacy. In other
words, political normlessness is more widespread and reaches across socio-eco-
nomic boundaries more extensively than powerlessness or meaninglessness.
There were few substantial differences in terms of gender or ethnicity, with
around 15% of men and women not feeling alienated at all. This is actually against
the expectations of previous literature, with numerous studies identifying women as
more likely to be alienated by low internal efficacy than men, and Guerrina et  al.
(2018) arguing that prior to the 2016 referendum women stood out for being less
confident in their understanding of it. While there was some evidence of this, the
differences were very small, with 8% of women alienated by lack of internal efficacy
alone, and another 8% by lack of internal and external efficacy, compared with 5%
and 4% of men, respectively. The only exception is with regard to political trust,
where men were more likely to be alienated than women: 13% of men were alien-
ated in terms of normlessness only and 31% in terms of normlessness and power-
lessness, compared with 9% and 21% of women, respectively.
Ethnicity had virtually no effect, with the small exception of non-white respond-
ents being less likely to be alienated by powerlessness and normlessness (18%)
than white respondents (26%). Age, however, had a more substantial impact. A
common claim in studies of youth political participation is that young people are
less likely to vote because they feel alienated from mainstream politics (Henn et al.
2005; Henn and Foard 2012; Marsh et al. 2007; Sloam 2014). While the differences
are small, and most young people do not hold the British political system in high
regard, younger respondents are less likely to feel alienated than their elders: 51% of
18–24-year-olds agree that politicians do not care what they think, compared with
an average of 61% of older age groups, while 62% of under-25s do not trust politi-
cians, compared with 67%. The only area where young people stand out for being
slightly more alienated is their lack of confidence in their own political understand-
ing, with 45% of under-25s finding politics too complex to understand, compared
with 42% of their elders.
 S. Fox

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
ss

ss

ss

rm

ns

d
ea

ea

te
ne

ne

ne

sio
No

na
M

M
ss

ss

ss

en

lie
+

+
le

le

le

im
er

er

rm
er

rm

ng

ta
w

ld
w
w

ni

No
No
No

Po

Po
Po

ea

Al
M

Fig. 2  Alienation and participation in EU referendum (%). Source YouGov (weighted data); n = 5095

Figure 2 shows how alienation was related to participation and vote choice in the
EU referendum. Consistent with H1 (which expected those alienated in terms of all
three dimensions to be the strongest supporters of Brexit), those alienated by low
internal and external efficacy and trust were the most likely to vote for Brexit, with
48% voting ‘leave’ and only 34% voting ‘remain’. That said, respondents alienated
only in terms of low external efficacy and trust were equally likely to support Brexit,
though slightly more (38%) voted for ‘remain’, suggesting that a lack of internal effi-
cacy was less important than a lack of trust and external efficacy in shaping support
for Brexit.
H2 theorised that those who did not feel alienated at all would be the least likely
to vote for Brexit, but this is not supported. Figure 2 shows that such respondents
voted ‘leave’ in greater numbers (42%) than those alienated by only a lack of politi-
cal trust (32%) or low trust and internal efficacy (31%). The fact that those alienated
by low trust or low trust and efficacy were the least likely to support Brexit also
challenges H3 (which stated that low trust would lead to greater support for Brexit
than having higher trust, or being alienated only by low efficacy): not only were
those with low trust the least likely to support Brexit, they were the most likely to
oppose it by supporting ‘remain’: 55% of those alienated by low trust alone voted
‘remain’, along with 49% of those alienated by low trust and internal efficacy. The
only instance in which political normlessness was associated with high support for
Brexit was when it was combined with a low feeling of external political efficacy.
Finally, H4 (stating that low external efficacy should be associated with a lower
likelihood of voting at all) is also challenged, while H5 (stating that those with low
internal efficacy should be less likely to vote) is supported: while the majority of
respondents reported voting in the referendum, non-participation was concentrated
amongst those with low internal efficacy, with 16% of those alienated by their lack
of confidence in their understanding of politics not voting, as did 18% of those
Political alienation and referendums: how political alienation…

alienated by low internal and external efficacy.3 Amongst those alienated by a lack
of external efficacy alone, only 6% chose not to vote, along with 9% of those alien-
ated by low external efficacy and low trust.
Table  1 presents the results of regression analyses in which the relationship
between alienation and support for Brexit was examined while controlling for other
traits associated with participation in the referendum, while Table 2 shows the same
information with non-voting as the dependent variable. The first model in each table
included control variables only; the second included measures of political alienation
only; and the final model included all variables. Table 1 shows that the control vari-
ables had the anticipated effects on support for Brexit. Older, white people with no
university education and working in manual or skilled manual occupations were the
most likely to vote to leave the EU. Those who identified themselves as ideologically
right-wing, who read newspapers sympathetic to the right-wing Conservative party
and critical of the EU, or who strongly identified with an ‘English’ (or ‘Welsh’) and
not ‘British’ national identity, were also particularly pro-Brexit.
The alienation model confirms that some forms of alienation had a significant
and substantial effect on vote choice in the referendum, although not always in the
anticipated direction. The most likely to support Brexit were those alienated by low
external efficacy and trust or all three dimensions of alienation, both of whom were
around 6% more likely to vote ‘leave’ than those with no alienation (the reference
category). The least likely to vote ‘leave’ were those alienated only by political trust
or by trust and internal efficacy, who were each around 10% less likely to support
Brexit than those with no alienation. There was no notable impact from being alien-
ated by a lack of external or internal efficacy only, nor of the two combined.
Accounting for the control variables had substantial impacts on some of these
effects. There was no significant impact on the effects of low external or internal effi-
cacy, or the two combined, nor the effect of being alienated by low external efficacy,
internal efficacy and trust. This confirms the rejection of H1—that those alienated
in terms of all three dimensions would be the most likely to support Brexit—and
H2—that those with no alienation would be least likely to support it. The greatest
impact from accounting for the control variables is on the effect of political trust.
With controls, being alienated by low political trust, or low trust plus internal effi-
cacy, no longer had a significant effect on support for Brexit. The effect of being
alienated by low trust and external efficacy becomes stronger (and remains statisti-
cally significant), however, after accounting for the controls. The typical respondent
alienated in this way had a 47% probability of supporting Brexit, 11% greater than
those who were not alienated at all. There was no single dimension of alienation
that made people more likely to support Brexit, therefore, but those who felt that
the norms of the political system were not being respected and that it (or the politi-
cal elite) was unresponsive to their influence were more likely to vote to leave the

3
  87% of respondents reported voting in the referendum. While the referendum turnout—at 72.2%—was
high and above the average for general elections in the UK since the 1990s, this survey clearly over-
estimates turnout. This is typical of surveys of electoral behaviour, however, in which respondents are
frequently shown to exaggerate their electoral participation (Van der Eijk and Franklin 2009).
 S. Fox

Table 1  Regression analysis results, support for brexit

Control Alienation Full
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er

(Not alienated at all)

Alienated on all three dimensions 0.25a 0.11 0.23 0.13
External efficacy only − 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.20
Political trust only − 0.42c 0.12 − 0.10 0.14
Internal efficacy only 0.06 0.15 0.07 0.18
External efficacy + political trust 0.26a 0.10 0.45c 0.12
External efficacy + internal efficacy − 0.04 0.17 − 0.04 0.20
Political trust + internal efficacy − 0.46b 0.17 − 0.21 0.19
c
Age 0.03 0.00 0.02c 0.00
Gender (female) − 0.11 0.09 − 0.08 0.09
Ethnicity (White British)
Other white background − 1.42c 0.32 − 1.47c 0.32
b
Non-white background − 0.61 0.20 − 0.58b 0.20
No interest in politics − 0.56b 0.22 − 0.54a 0.22
Education (no qual/no post-compulsory)
A-level/Scottish higher − 0.07 0.12 − 0.08 0.12
Nursing/teaching/HE diploma − 0.17 0.16 − 0.19 0.16
Other technical/professional/higher 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.13
Degree/higher degree − 0.29a 0.12 − 0.31a 0.12
Region and national identity (England and
British only/more British)
England and British and English equally − 0.18 0.10 − 0.18 0.10
England and English only/more English 0.58c 0.11 0.56c 0.11
England and none − 0.17 0.22 − 0.15 0.22
Wales and British only/more British − 0.16 0.27 − 0.15 0.26
Wales and British and Welsh equally − 0.25 0.36 − 0.27 0.39
Wales and Welsh only/more Welsh 0.25 0.31 0.18 0.32
Wales and none − 1.18 0.86 − 1.25 0.83
Scotland and British only/more British − 0.23 0.28 − 0.22 0.29
Scotland and British and Scottish equally − 0.67b 0.24 − 0.67b 0.23
Scotland and Scottish only/more Scottish − 0.44a 0.20 − 0.45a 0.20
Scotland and none − 0.79 0.46 − 0.76 0.46
Tenure: rented/not owned 0.00 0.10 − 0.03 0.10
Social grade (AB)
C1 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.11
C2 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.13
DE 0.26a 0.13 0.24 0.13
Work type (professional/higher technical)
Manager/senior admin/intermediate − 0.01 0.14 − 0.03 0.14
Clerical/junior management 0.32a 0.14 0.32a 0.14
Sales/services 0.40a 0.19 0.39a 0.19
Political alienation and referendums: how political alienation…

Table 1  (continued)
Control Alienation Full
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er

Foreman/supervisor 0.81b 0.31 0.85b 0.31

a
Skilled manual 0.50 0.20 0.45a 0.20
Semi/Un-skilled manual 0.38a 0.18 0.37a 0.18
Other 0.34a 0.17 0.33 0.17
Never worked 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.30
Employment status (working full-time)
Working part-time 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.12
Not in/looking for work 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.15
Unemployed − 0.24 0.23 − 0.25 0.23
Other − 0.01 0.25 − 0.02 0.25
Urban/rural (urban)
Town/fringe 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.12
Rural 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12
Ideology (centre)
Very left-wing − 1.05c 0.28 − 1.06c 0.28
c
Fairly left-wing − 1.02 0.15 − 1.00c 0.16
Slightly left-wing − 0.45c 0.14 − 0.47c 0.14
Slightly right-wing 0.36b 0.13 0.40b 0.13
Fairly right-wing 0.86c 0.16 0.89c 0.16
Very right-wing 1.21c 0.35 1.19c 0.35
Don’t know − 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.11
Newspaper readership (none)
Daily Express/Mail 0.68c 0.12 0.69c 0.11
Daily Mirror/Record 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.21
The Sun 0.30 0.16 0.30 0.16
Daily Telegraph 0.06 0.24 0.13 0.24
The Guardian/Independent − 0.90c 0.15 − 0.88c 0.15
b
Financial Times/The Times − 0.45 0.17 − 0.42a 0.17
Other 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.15
Other local newspaper − 0.15 0.18 − 0.15 0.18
Constant − 1.52c 0.28 − 0.34c 0.08 − 1.64c 0.30
Obs 5091 5095 5091
Pseudo r2 0.207 0.012 0.212
BIC 6051 6948 6080

Source: YouGov, logistic regression analysis with robust standard errors

a
 Coefficient statistically significant at 95% confidence level
b
 At 99%
c
 At 99.9%. Life cycle effects not reported because of space limitations but available on request
 S. Fox

Table 2  Regression analysis results, non-voting in referendum

Control Alienation Full
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er

(Not alienated at all)

Alienated on all three dimensions 0.34a 0.17 0.01 0.19
External efficacy only − 0.18 0.32 − 0.38 0.35
Political trust only − 0.20 0.23 − 0.09 0.24
Internal efficacy only 0.58a 0.22 0.48 0.25
External efficacy + political trust − 0.02 0.18 0.09 0.19
External efficacy + internal efficacy 0.70b 0.24 0.14 0.27
Political trust + internal efficacy 0.46 0.26 0.45 0.27
Age − 0.03c 0.01 − 0.03c 0.01
Gender (female) 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.13
Ethnicity (White British)
Other white background 2.24c 0.27 2.29c 0.27
b
Non-white background 0.59 0.20 0.62b 0.20
No interest in politics 0.96c 0.22 0.95c 0.23
Education (no qual/no post-compulsory)
A-Level/Scottish higher − 0.11 0.17 − 0.10 0.17
Nursing/teaching/HE diploma − 0.18 0.24 − 0.17 0.24
Other technical/professional/higher − 0.29 0.24 − 0.28 0.24
Degree/higher degree − 0.60b 0.19 − 0.58b 0.19
Region and national identity (England and
British only/more British)
England and British and English equally 0.06 0.15 0.04 0.15
England and English only/more English 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.17
England and none 0.39 0.22 0.36 0.23
Wales and British only/more British 0.28 0.45 0.30 0.45
Wales and British and Welsh equally 0.90 0.59 0.92 0.59
Wales and Welsh only/more Welsh − 0.60 0.70 − 0.56 0.69
Wales and none 0.44 0.65 0.34 0.64
Scotland and British only/more British 0.21 0.48 0.21 0.49
Scotland and British and Scottish equally 0.16 0.39 0.20 0.39
Scotland and Scottish only/more Scottish 0.34 0.27 0.35 0.27
Scotland and none 0.28 0.54 0.25 0.56
Tenure: rented/not owned 0.61c 0.15 0.63c 0.15
Social Grade (AB)
C1 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.16
C2 0.38 0.20 0.36 0.20
DE 0.26 0.19 0.26 0.19
Work type (professional/higher technical)
Manager/senior admin/intermediate − 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.24
Clerical/junior management − 0.19 0.20 − 0.19 0.20
Sales/services 0.02 0.26 − 0.01 0.26
Political alienation and referendums: how political alienation…

Table 2  (continued)
Control Alienation Full
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er

Foreman/supervisor 0.17 0.54 0.19 0.54

Skilled manual − 0.07 0.33 − 0.02 0.33
Semi/un-skilled manual 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.25
Other − 0.22 0.27 − 0.22 0.27
Never worked 0.05 0.31 − 0.04 0.31
Employment status (working full-time)
Working part-time 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.17
Not in/looking for work 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.21
Unemployed 0.39 0.27 0.42 0.27
Other 0.20 0.34 0.26 0.33
Urban/rural (urban)
Town/fringe − 0.12 0.22 − 0.15 0.22
Rural − 0.11 0.20 − 0.12 0.20
Ideology (centre)
Very left-wing − 0.59 0.35 − 0.57 0.35
Fairly left-wing − 0.33 0.22 − 0.34 0.22
Slightly left-wing − 0.35 0.23 − 0.36 0.23
Slightly right-wing − 0.43 0.23 − 0.43 0.23
Fairly right-wing − 0.39 0.26 − 0.40 0.26
Very right-wing − 0.41 0.53 − 0.43 0.53
Don’t know 0.52b 0.17 0.49b 0.17
Newspaper readership (none)
Daily Express/Mail − 0.15 0.19 − 0.16 0.18
Daily Mirror/Record − 0.24 0.35 − 0.24 0.33
The Sun 0.08 0.21 0.10 0.21
Daily Telegraph − 0.82 0.50 − 0.85 0.49
The Guardian/Independent − 0.33 0.19 − 0.32 0.19
Financial Times/The Times − 0.01 0.25 0.03 0.25
Other − 0.48 0.27 − 0.48 0.27
Other local newspaper − 0.06 0.28 − 0.05 0.29
Constant − 1.32b 0.44 − 1.91c 0.14 − 1.44b 0.46
Obs 5088 5095 5088
Pseudo r2 0.217 0.025 0.221
BIC 3997 4399 4048

Source: YouGov, logistic regression analysis with robust standard errors

a
 Coefficient statistically significant at 95% confidence level
b
 At 99%
c
 At 99.9%. Life cycle effects not reported because of space limitations but available on request
 S. Fox

EU. Roughly one in four British adults, therefore, were more likely to vote ‘leave’ in
2016 because of their alienation from the political system. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the pseudo r-squared and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) statistics
show that political alienation offers little to our overall explanation for Brexit. The
alienation-only model had a pseudo r-squared of 0.01, compared with 0.21 for the
control model.
Table  2 presents the analyses relating to non-participation, allowing a test of
whether political alienation made certain respondents less likely to vote at all. The
control variables once again had the anticipated effects, showing that the least likely
to vote were younger respondents, from non-white backgrounds, with no university
education and who did not own their homes. The alienation model confirmed that
there was no significant effect from a lack of external efficacy on the likelihood of
non-voting (once again going against the expectations of H4), nor was there a sig-
nificant effect from political trust. A lack of internal efficacy was the most likely to
result in non-participation (consistent with H5), particularly if it was coupled with a
lack of external efficacy as well: those alienated by their lack of confidence in their
understanding of politics were typically 8% less likely to vote than those with no
alienation, while those also alienated by their lack of external efficacy were 10%
less likely to vote. Those alienated on all three dimensions were also significantly
less likely to vote, by around 4%. That said, all the alienation coefficients became
non-significant once the control variables were included in the model. While this
may reflect low statistical power (as most of the sample reported voting in the refer-
endum), it suggests that while political alienation affected vote choice in 2016, it did
not significantly affect the decision to vote at all.

Conclusion

The notion that political alienation contributed to the UK’s Brexit vote in 2016 is
commonplace in popular discourse regarding the referendum and events to which it
is compared, such as the election of President Trump. This study has provided the
first direct test of the relationship between political alienation and support for Brexit.
The results are, perhaps, somewhat surprising: while most British citizens can be
described as alienated from politics in some way, the influence of this on their deci-
sions in the referendum was limited. The differences in support for ‘remain’ or
‘leave’ between those of differing levels of alienation (or none) were mostly small,
and feeling alienated from politics was by no means limited to those who were
opposed to or in favour of Brexit. There is also no evidence that political aliena-
tion depressed turnout in the referendum. This is not to say, however, that political
alienation had no effect at all: roughly one in four British adults are alienated from
politics by their view that the norms of democratic behaviour and discourse are not
respected by the political elite or system, and that the political process is unrespon-
sive to citizens’ influence. These individuals were significantly more likely to vote
for Brexit than the wider electorate, although the magnitude of this effect is con-
siderably weaker than those characteristics more frequently associated with Brexit
in academic research, such as education or national identity (Curtice 2017; Clarke
Political alienation and referendums: how political alienation…

et al. 2017). The common description of Brexit as an expression of political aliena-

tion and anti-establishment sentiment, therefore, while not entirely misplaced does
not do justice to the key reasons most British citizens had for voting to leave the EU,
nor indeed to the high levels of alienation exhibited by those who voted to remain
in the EU either. While not challenging the many studies associating economic
deprivation, concerns about UK sovereignty, distinct political values and hostility
to immigration with support for Brexit, this study suggest that the link frequently
drawn between these traits and a feeling of alienation from the political system that
compelled them to vote to leave the EU is—in many cases—questionable.
These findings also have important implications for the future study of political
alienation. Most of the hypotheses developed in this research—based on the findings
of previous literature—were not supported by the analyses. It is unclear why most
expressions of political alienation did not have the anticipated effect. One explana-
tion is that the specific context of the referendum and the issue of Brexit, which
divided British society almost in two along lines reflecting age, education, region,
national identity and political ideology, meant that the effect of alienation was not
similar to that identified in previous research studying other political contexts (such
as elections). Another possibility is that, despite their anti-establishment rhetoric, the
‘Leave’ campaigns were very often led by ‘establishment’ figures, including sitting
government ministers, long-serving backbench Members of Parliament and wealthy
individuals or politicians such as Nigel Farage. Perhaps the ‘Leave’ campaigns were
not particularly successful in winning the support of the politically alienated major-
ity because they were perceived as being a part of the political system many citizens
felt alienated from. Either way, further research into how political alienation affects
behaviour in contexts beyond national elections or high-profile protests would reveal
more about the consequences of what appears to be a more important and widely
held trait by democratic citizens. In addition, while this study employed a model
of political alienation developed and employed extensively in other literature, it is
unique for categorising respondents depending on simultaneous expressions of two
or more dimensions of that alienation. Indeed, this captured the only way in which
political alienation was significantly related to support for Brexit. There is a need
for further research to explore how different dimensions of political alienation may
interact and affect political behaviour, to provide a more thorough understanding of
the consequences of alienation.
Finally, the limitations of this research highlight valuable avenues for future
research. Data limitations meant that this research had to rely on single indicators
of political trust and efficacy. While valid operationalisations of the dimensions of
political alienation, there are other ways that alienation could be theoretically mani-
fested, such as through lacking trust in elements of the political system besides the
elite, or lacking a sense of identification with the British democratic system or the
notion of British democracy itself. A wider array of operationalisations of alienation
may have shed more light on how alienation affected behaviour during the referen-
dum. Furthermore, as was noted above, while it is unlikely that the result of the 2016
referendum affected the political alienation of British citizens, the events it precipi-
tated in British politics may well have done so. The dominance of Brexit in Parlia-
ment and public debate; the polarisation of voters into ‘remain’ and ‘leave’ groups
 S. Fox

that have become sources of political identification and terms of abuse; the dramatic
shifts in party support following the 2017 general election and the emergence of the
Brexit Party; and most recently the election of Boris Johnson as the new Prime Min-
ister and his decision to prorogue Parliament, prompting protests across the UK—
collectively, this tumultuous period could have affected British citizens’ alienation
from their democratic system. Similarly, the process of Brexit started by the 2016
referendum may itself have gradually affected citizens’ alienation from the politi-
cal system that delivers that process despite their opposition (Brandle et al. 2018),
particularly with both major parties committing to leave the EU and disagreeing
only over the terms of that departure. Future research should examine the impact
of Brexit on political alienation with panel data that could go beyond the timeframe
and limitations of this study and would learn a great deal about not only the impact
of Brexit on public opinion but the nature of political alienation itself.
Finally, it was discussed above how political alienation was related to and distinct
from concepts such as anti-politics and political discontent. There is undoubtedly
more that could be learned about public opinion, political engagement and those
concepts themselves with a more detailed analysis of how they are similar and dif-
ferent in terms of their causes, impact on political behaviour and potential to affect
each other. Such a study could then explore how the many different traits associated
with these concepts could have interacted to produce the referendum result, or been
affected by it. The result would be a much more detailed understanding of the nature
of alienation/discontent in the UK, and how political events may affect it, which
would itself be a precursor to identifying measures that could reverse it and re-con-
nect British citizens with their democracy.

Acknowledgements  This article is based on research supported by the Wales Institute of Social & Eco-
nomic Research, Data & Methods (WISERD), and was funded by the Economic and Social Research
Council (ESRC), Grant Number: ES/L009099/1. WISERD is a collaborative venture between the Univer-
sities of Aberystwyth, Bangor, Cardiff, South Wales and Swansea.

Open Access  This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creat​iveco​mmons​.org/licen​
ses/by/4.0/.

References
Aberbach, Joel D. 1969. Alienation and Political Behaviour. The American Political Science Review 63
(1): 86–99.
Brandle, V.K., C. Galpin, and H.J. Trenz. 2018. Marching for Europe? Enacting European Citizenship as
Justice During Brexit. Citizenship Studies 22 (8): 810–828.
Cappella, J.N., and K.H. Jamieson. 1997. Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Political alienation and referendums: how political alienation…

Citrin, Jack, J. Herbert McClosky, Merrill Shanks, and Paul J. Sniderman. 1975. Personal and Political
Source of Political Alienation. British Journal of Political Science 5 (1): 1–31.
Clarke, Harold D., Matthew Goodwin, and Paul Whitesley. 2017. Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the
European Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Curtice, John. 2017. Why Leave Won the UK’s EU Referendum. Journal of Common Market Studies 55
(S1): 19–37.
Cutler, Neal E., and Vern L. Bengston. 1974. Age and Political Alienation: Maturation, Generation and
Period Effects. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 415: 160–175.
Dahl, Viktor, Erik Amna, Shakuntala Banaji, Monique Landberg, Jan Serek, and Norberto Ribeiro. 2017.
Apathy or Alienation? Political Passivity Among Youths Across Eight European Union Countries.
European Journal of Developmental Psychology 15 (3): 284–301.
De Vreese, C.H. 2005. The Spiral of Cynicism Reconsidered. European Journal of Communication 20
(3): 281–301.
Denters, Bas, and Peter Geurts. 1993. Aspects of Political Alienation: An Exploration of their Differential
Origins and Effects. Acta Politica 4: 445–469.
Dermody, Janine, Stuart Hanmer-Lloyd, and Richard Scullion. 2010. Young People and Voting Behav-
iour: Alienated Youth and (or) an Interested and Critical Citizenry. European Journal of Marketing
44 (3/4): 421–435.
Down, Iain, and Carole J. Wilson. 2013. A Rising Generation of Europeans? Life-Cycle and Cohort
Effects on Support for ‘Europe’. European Journal of Political Research 52: 431–456.
Down, Iain, and Carole J. Wilson. 2017. A Rising Generation of Europeans? Revisited. European Jour-
nal of Political Research 56 (1): 199–214.
Finifter, Ada W. 1970. Dimensions of Political Alienation. The American Political Science Review 64 (2):
389–410.
Ford, Rob, and Matthew Goodwin. 2014. Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right
in Britain. Abingdon: Routledge.
Fox, Stuart. 2015. Apathy, Alienation and Young People: The Political Engagement of British Millenni-
als, Ph.D. Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham.
Fox, Stuart, and Sioned Pearce. 2018. The Generational Decay of Euroscepticism in the UK and the EU
Referendum. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 28 (1): 19–37.
Franklin, Mark, Cees Van der Eijk, and Michael Marsh. 1995. Referendum Outcomes and Trust in Gov-
ernment: Public Support for Europe in the Wake of Maastricht. Western European Politics 18:
101–107.
Freedland, Johnathan. 2017. We’ll Never Stop Brexit or Trump Until We Address the Anger Fuelling
Both. The Guardian. https​://www.thegu​ardia​n.com/globa​l/comme​ntisf​ree/2017/nov/10/never​-stop-
brexi​t-trump​-addre​ss-anger​-impea​chmen​t-secon​d-refer​endum​. Accessed 10 Jan 2018.
Gabel, Matthew. 1998. Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories. The
Journal of Politics 60 (2): 333–354.
Geddes, Andrew. 2014. The EU, UKIP and the Politics of Immigration in Britain. The Political Quarterly
85 (3): 289–295.
Gniewosz, Burkhard, Peter Noack, and Monika Buhl. 2009. Political Alienation in Adolescence: Associa-
tions with Parental Role Models, Parenting Styles, and Classroom Climate. International Journal of
Behavioural Development 33 (4): 337–346.
Goodwin, Matthew, and Oliver Heath. 2016. The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An
Aggregate-Level Analysis of the Result. The Political Quarterly 87 (3): 323–332.
Guerrina, Roberta, Theofanis Exadaktylos, Simona Guerra. 2018. Gender, Ownership and Engagement
During the European Union Referendum: Gendered Frames and the Reproduction of Binaries.
European Journal of Politics and Gender 1 (3): 387–404.
Haesly, Richard. 2001. Eurosceptics, Europhiles and Instrumental Europeans: European Attachment in
Scotland and Wales. European Union Politics 2 (1): 81–102.
Harris, John. 2016. If You’ve got Money, You Vote in … If You Haven’t got Money, You Vote Out. The
Guardian. https​://www.thegu​ardia​n.com/polit​ics/comme​ntisf​ree/2016/jun/24/divid​ed-brita​in-brexi​
t-money​-class​-inequ​ality​-westm​inste​r. Accessed 10 Jan 2018.
Hay, C. 2007. Why We Hate Politics. London: Polity Press.
Henn, Matt, and Nick Foard. 2012. Young People, Political Participation and Trust in Britain. Parliamen-
tary Affairs 65 (1): 47–64.
Henn, Matt, M. Weinstein, and S. Forrest. 2005. Uninterested Youth? Young People’s Attitudes towards
Party Politics in Britain. Political Studies 53 (3): 556–578.
 S. Fox

Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations, and
States. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2005. Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on Euro-
pean Integration. European Union Politics 6 (4): 419–443.
Hooghe, Marc, Sofie Marien, and Teun Pauwels. 2011. Where Do Distrusting Voters Turn if There is No
Viable Exit or Voice Option? The Impact of Political Trust on Electoral Behaviour in the Belgian
Regional Elections of June 2009. Government and Opposition 46 (2): 245–273.
Jackson, D., E. Thorsen, and D. Wring. 2016. EU Referendum Analysis 2016: Media, Voters and the
Campaign. Bournemouth: Bournemouth University.
Jennings, W., G. Stoker, and J. Twyman. 2016. The Dimensions and Impact of Political Discontent in
Britain. Parliamentary Affairs 69 (4): 876–900.
Kabashima, Ikuo, Jonathan Marshall, Takayoshi Uekami, and Dae-Song Hyun. 2000. Casual Cynics or
Disillusioned Democrats? Political Alienation in Japan. Political Psychology 21 (4): 779–804.
Keniston, Kenneth. 1965. The Uncommitted. New York: Wiley.
Marsh, David. 2018. Brexit and the Politics of Truth. British Politics. https​://doi.org/10.1057/s4129​
3-018-0076-x.
Marsh, David, Therese O’Toole, and Su Jones. 2007. Young People and Politics in the UK: Apathy or
Alienation?. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
McLaren, Lauren M. 2002. Public Support for the European Union: Cost-Benefit Analysis or Perceived
Cultural Threat? The Journal of Politics 64 (2): 551–566.
Nachimas, David. 1974. Modes and Types of Political Alienation. The British Journal of Sociology 25
(4): 478–493.
Nelsen, Brent F., and James Guth. 2017. European Union or Kingdom of the Antichrist? Protestant Apoc-
alyptic Narratives and European Unity. National Identities 19 (22): 251–267.
Olsen, Marvin E. 1969. Two Categories of Political Alienation. Social Forces 47 (3): 288–299.
Ranade, Wendy, and Pippa Norris. 1984. Democratic Consensus and the Young: A Cross National Com-
parison of Britain and America. Journal of Adolescence 7 (1): 45–57.
Schwartz, D.C. [1973] 2009. Political Alienation and Political Behaviour. London: Aldine Transaction.
Seeman, Melvin. 1959. On the Meaning of Alienation. American Sociological Review 24: 783–791.
Shipman, Tim. 2016. All Our War: The Full Story of How Brexit Sank Britain’s Political Class. London:
William Collins.
Shipman, Tim. 2017. Fall Out: A Year of Political Mayhem. London: William Collins.
Sloam, James. 2014. New Voice, Less Equal: The Civic and Political Engagement of Young People in the
United States and Europe. Comparative Political Studies 47 (5): 663–688.
Southwell, Priscilla L. 2003. The Politics of Alienation: Nonvoting and Support for Third-Party Candi-
dates Among 18–30 Year Olds. The Social Science Journal 40 (1): 99–107.
Southwell, Priscilla L. 2012. Political Alienation: Behavioural Implications of Efficacy and Trust in the
2008 US Presidential Election. Review of European Studies 4 (2): 71–77.
Southwell, Priscilla L., and Marcy J. Everest. 1998. The Electoral Consequences of Alienation: Nonvot-
ing and Protest Voting in the 1992 Presidential Race. The Social Science Journal 35 (1): 43–51.
Stoker, Gerry. 2006. Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Templeton, Frederic. 1966. Alienation and Political Participation: Some Research Findings. Political
Opinion Quarterly 30 (2): 249–261.
Van der Eijk, Cees, and Mark N. Franklin. 2009. Elections and Voters. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Vines, Emma, and David Marsh. 2017. Anti-politics: beyond supply-side versus demand-side explana-
tions. British Politics. https​://doi.org/10.1057/s4129​3-017-0053-9.
Watson, Matthew. 2017. Brexit, the Left Behind and the Let Down: The Political Abstraction of
‘The Economy’ in the UK’s EU Referendum. British Politics. https​://doi.org/10.1057/s4129​
3-017-0062-8.
Whiteley, Paul. 2012. Political Participation in Britain: The Decline and Revival of Civic Culture. Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Publisher’s Note  Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
maps and institutional affiliations.